



PE3 Support For Policy Change

Technical Report

Support for policy change

Technical report
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

International Climate Finance (ICF) is a United Kingdom (UK) government commitment to support developing countries to respond to the challenges and opportunities of climate change.¹ It is part of the concerted global action to limit and manage the impact of climate change and in particular, ensure that the global temperature rise will stay well below 2°C. It contributes to progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and delivers against all four aims of the UK aid strategy, namely:

1. Strengthening global peace, security and governance.
2. Strengthening resilience and response to crises.
3. Promoting global prosperity.
4. Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world's most vulnerable.

The UK is firmly committed, alongside other developed countries, to contribute to the mobilisation of US\$100 billion of public and private climate finance a year by 2020 and ICF is a core component of the UK's contribution to this shared goal. Managed jointly by the Department for International Development (DFID), the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department for Environment, Food Rural Affairs (Defra), ICF is committed to investing at least £5.8 billion (2016–2021) in over 50 developing countries, working through diverse channels from private equity funds to small non-governmental organisation (NGO) grants.

ICF aims to:

- Change facts on the ground, delivering results that demonstrate that low-carbon, climate-resilient development is feasible and desirable.
- Improve the international climate architecture and finance system to increase the scale, efficiency and value for money of climate spend.
- Test out new approaches to delivering climate finance that have the potential to achieve bigger and better results in the future.

Climate change mitigation/adaptation will take time to achieve; intermediate goals for ICF include:

- The public setting of high ambitions, e.g. in the form of nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
- Making markets and supply chains work in favour of climate protection rather than against it.
- Improving compliance with existing laws and regulations designed to protect the climate.
- Changing the policies and practices of banks and other funders to ensure investment decisions take climate impacts into account and preferably avoid adverse impacts altogether.
- Making 'better' policy, in other words, policy that:
 - Tackles the problem it is supposed to tackle.
 - Avoids perverse effects.
 - Is feasible and affordable to implement, including to enforce.
 - Stands the test of time.
- Making policy more rapidly to reduce the impact of ongoing climate threats such as deforestation.

One of the ways in which these objectives will be achieved is to support the design and implementation of policies of global bodies, and national and sub-national governments.

¹ HMG (June 2018). [International Climate Finance: Overview](#).

1.2 Purpose

This evaluation sets out how, in what respects and in what circumstances supporting policy change has and has not been effective. The critical success factors driving successful support for policy change have also been identified.

The purpose of the evaluation is to enable the UK government and other donors and development partners to learn about the effectiveness of supporting policy change to achieve the UK's international objectives on climate change and thus drive wider transformational change. The intended audience is Her Majesty's Government (HMG) officials.

Specific applications for the results include:

1. To provide input into future spending reviews.
2. To inform the implementation of the Africa Strategy by the Africa Regional Department (ARD).
3. To feed into programme planning and priority setting for future ICF activity generally, and also specifically in ICF's portfolios including forests, renewable energy and low-carbon development.
4. To inform BEIS's new Technical Assistance programme.
5. To inform country offices in the case study countries (Colombia, Indonesia and Uganda).

In addition, audiences external to the commissioning departments may also benefit including international partners, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), other government departments such as HM Treasury, implementation partners and consultants, recipients of ICF funding, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international development bodies more generally.

1.3 Recipient

The evaluation was commissioned by the UK government's ICF Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) team. This team is the immediate recipient of the evaluation and will coordinate its dissemination and use within HMG and externally. A dissemination and utilisation plan has been prepared by the team. This has identified the intended users of the evaluation and how they will engage with the evaluation and its findings.

1.4 Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions were set out in the terms of reference and then refined following discussions with the Evaluation Steering Group (ESG).

How, in what respects, and in what circumstances has the ICF supported change in global, national and sub-national policies relating to climate change?

1. What approaches have been used by ICF programmes to support change in global, national and sub-national policies? What were the intended outcomes? In what circumstances have these been successful or unsuccessful, in what respects and why (or is it too soon to tell)? Have there been unintended outcomes?
2. How and in what circumstances does ICF's work to support policy change at each of the global, national and sub-national levels support or obstruct its work at the other levels?
3. How, in what respects, and in what circumstances is ICF's support for policy change contributing to transformational change?
4. What other factors support changes in policies relating to climate change, how and in what circumstances do these factors support or obstruct ICF support for policy change?
5. What are the objectives of programmes within the ICF portfolio with regard to supporting policy change?
6. Are there examples of policy change supported by ICF resulting in adaption and/or mitigation impacts?
7. What can be learned, by whom to improve the effectiveness of ICF's support on global, national and sub-national policies?
8. How does ICF evaluate support for policy change and monitor the progress of ICF's objectives to support policy change, and how can this be done better?

1.5 Evolution of theory

Our theories of change developed in response to the evidence we gathered over the course of the evaluation. The significant changes are set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Summary of significant changes made to theories of change over the course of the evaluation

Initial theory	Changes made following phase 1	Changes made following case studies
Supporting policy change approach typology	Change: A series of changes to restructure the typology and sub-divide some of the larger categories.	Change: Complete rethinking of the approach. The final conceptualisation is set out in section 3.6.
	Rationale: To better reflected the evidence of how ICF works.	Rationale: Technical assistance was not a helpful category because it covered too many different types of activity. Convening and persuasion were also not helpfully separated.
Raising national ambition	Change: Theory has been integrated into theory 1b – national and sub-national support for policy change.	N/A
	Rationale: No evidence to support distinct mechanisms operating for raising national ambition compared with any other policy outcome.	N/A

National and sub-national support for policy change	Change: None	Change: The major aspects of the theory have been retained and slightly restructured. The important contexts have been reworked a little, but it remains largely intact.
	Rationale: No significant changes required	Rationale: Evidence from the case studies
Supporting policy change in multilateral funds	Change: Separated from supporting policy change in MDBs	Change: Recombined funds and MDBs
	Rationale: Evidence indicated that the way support for policy change works is quite different due to the frameworks associated with the funds creating channels within which support can flow.	Rationale: There was enough commonality between them to warrant a combined theory. The revised theory drew on the case studies.
Supporting policy change in MDBs	Change: Separated from supporting policy change in multilateral funds	Change: Recombined funds and MDBs
	Rationale: Evidence indicated that the way support for policy change works is quite different due to the frameworks associated with the funds creating channels within which support can flow.	Rationale: There was enough commonality between them to warrant a combined theory. The revised theory drew on the case studies.
Influencing other donors	Change: Reworked as a result of the interviews with other donors	Change: Reworked again to focus on the main ways in which supporting policy change happens in practice
	Rationale: The original conception of how supporting policy change worked did not reflect reality.	Rationale: The interviews with other donors from phase 1 were supplemented with the interviews for the CIFs and World Bank case studies.
Interaction between levels of support for policy change	Change: Converted from a table into a CMO, despite not having much more information on which to base this.	Change: Reworked based on the evidence from the case studies – this resulted in some significant reconceptualisation compared with the earlier phases which were based on very limited evidence.
	Rationale: CMOs were required for testing.	
Transformational change	Change: Converted from generalised thinking into a CMO, despite not having much more information on which to base this.	Rationale: Entirely rethought based on the role of supporting policy change in transformational change, and recently published work for the CIFs.
	Rationale: CMOs were required for testing.	Rationale: The case study research gave us a more robust basis on which to theorise, and the work for the CIF provided a conceptual framework.

1.6 Limitations

Table 2 sets out the limitations and risks of this evaluation, alongside our comments, explanations and the mitigation strategies we adopted.

Table 2: Limitations and risks with comments and mitigation strategies

Limitation/risk	Mitigation strategy	Comment
Positivity bias: There is a tendency for people to share success stories only, particularly if they have received funding.	Outcomes selected for study included examples of failure. Topic guide was designed in a way to elicit failures as well as success. Interviews were held with different people on the same topic.	Some respondents proved to be very willing to talk about what did not go well in addition to successes.
Sampling bias: We deliberately selected programmes where support for policy change had occurred, where there had been outcomes, whether positive or negative, where we were likely to find evidence (i.e. the intervention had occurred long enough ago for an effect to be seen, but not so long ago that we were unlikely to find evidence), and where there was some kind of HMG in-country presence. This may have resulted in certain types of support for policy change being under-represented or not represented at all.	We aimed to include a range of country at different levels of development and in different policy areas, but those countries were aligned with ICF objectives and did not include any that were opposed to climate change actions.	This bias remains present in the evaluation, and should be taken into account when interpreting and acting on the results.
Timing/age of programme: Some programmes had produced only interim outcomes from the support for policy change and it was too soon to tell whether these would lead on to actual changes in policy.	Focus on outcomes in selecting case studies ensured plenty of final outcomes were included. Interim outcomes were also of interest.	Support for policy change can take time to be reflected in policy therefore we have identified and reported on interim outcomes that seem likely to result in policy change. Although we didn't collect specific evidence on this, we were able to trace outcomes back through a number of previous steps of support so it is clear that interim outcomes can go on to contribute to policy change
Response rate: Although the response rate to our request for interviews was good, there were some key informants who we did not interview.	Implementation of a specific process for chasing response, involving emails, phone calls and also support policy change through third parties. Interviewing other people in similar positions.	There remains a risk that an important perspective has been omitted. In particular, there was one priority Colombian official and one priority Indonesian official we were unable to interview.
Direct causality: Officials find it difficult to draw conclusions about the extent to which the activities of ICF in supporting policy change played a role separate to other influences.	Interviews were designed to explore this carefully. Process-tracing analysis used to indicate the level of support for the contribution made by ICF support for policy change.	We were also alert to other support for policy change such as changes in government or the role of other donors.
Extrapolation: It is not appropriate to extrapolate to other countries, policy areas, funds or MDBs on the basis of the case study evidence collected.	N/A	The evidence was obtained from a purposive sample of programmes and is not representative of all ICF programmes.
Absence of monitoring data: Because supporting policy change was typically only part of the programme's objectives, and because it is hard to measure, there was no monitoring data available.	We relied on the information we could obtain, which is necessarily incomplete.	The evaluation does not claim to present a complete record, but to use the available evidence to develop an understanding of how, for whom and why support for policy change is successful.

<p>Non-response bias: Those who agree to be interviewed may be more interested in the subject, or may have a particular interest in ICF funding.</p>	<p>Implementation of a specific process for chasing response, involving emails, phone calls and also influence through third parties.</p> <p>Interviewing other people in similar positions</p>	<p>The response rate is sufficiently high to provide confidence that a full range of views and experiences have been obtained.</p>
<p>Additionality: We do not know if other donors would have contributed to programmes if ICF had not stepped forward, so we cannot be sure that the support for policy change was additional.</p>	<p>Explicitly seek evidence about the ICF support for policy change.</p>	<p>Although we have sought evidence where we could find it about the ICF activities to support policy change, we cannot be confident that the policy outcome would not have been achieved without ICF funding.</p>
<p>Availability of evidence: Despite asking, there was limited documentary evidence to support claims, which limited the opportunity for triangulation of evidence sources.</p>	<p>Identify likely evidence and ensure we ask for it.</p> <p>Follow up on requests for additional documentary evidence.</p>	<p>This has limited the strength of the evidence somewhat.</p> <p>In some cases, information was not available because it had not been retained or could not be located. For example, in Uganda we suspected that a document existed that tracked changes to a national policy on which DFID had been consulted. However, the person who would have created this document had moved on and as we were not certain it had ever existed, we could not reasonably press the busy current incumbent of the role any further.</p> <p>In other cases, information was confidential; in Colombia, some documents relating to policy that was under development could not be reviewed.</p> <p>In other cases, documents were in native languages which made use more difficult; this applied in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Loss of granularity: A small number of respondents declined to have the interview recorded. Notes were taken instead but this has limited the granularity and use of quotations in some parts of the case studies.</p> <p>A few interviews in Indonesia were conducted using an interpreter. This has limited the granularity available.</p>	<p>Interviews were recorded wherever possible. A notetaker was used once it became apparent that we would not be able to follow this strategy in Uganda.</p> <p>We used a bilingual interviewer in Colombia based on experience in Indonesia.</p>	<p>This has limited our ability to use quotations from these interviewees within the report.</p>
<p>Realist approach: Provide depth of understanding of how interventions work in a certain place at a certain time, with generalisation through middle-range theories. Cannot be certain about causality.</p>	<p>Using realist analysis and process tracing in combination.</p>	<p>These explanations may be useful for decision makers and programme managers in other circumstances, but the basis for portability needs to be understood and limitations made clear in the dissemination of findings.</p>
<p>Process tracing approach: Enables an assessment of the strength of evidence for causality, which is not the purpose of realist evaluation. But cannot explain why effects are seen.</p>	<p>Using realist analysis and process tracing in combination.</p>	<p>We set out robust criteria for the certainty associated with causal inferences in advance and have been clear about this in the report, using the wording agreed for different strengths of process tracing evidence (strong/some/weak) and the conclusions we have drawn from them (convincing / plausible/tentative).</p>

1.7 This report

This Technical Report is an adjunct to PE3 Support for policy change: Final Report (the 'Main Report'). It contains additional evidence and details that are expected to be of interest to a specialist evaluation audience. It is accompanied by appendices which contain detailed tables of data, background information and copies of the research tools used for the evaluation. We refer to these as 'the Appendices'.

To avoid including unnecessary detail, the report refers to PE3 Policy influencing: Inception Report where much of the background to the work has already been set out. We refer to this report as 'the Inception Report'.

1.8 Terminology

This evaluation was originally described as investigating how ICF had influenced policy change in global, national and sub-national governments. It was subsequently decided that the use of the term influence was inappropriate and did not correctly describe how ICF worked with partner governments and consequently the terminology was changed to investigating how ICF had supported policy change.

There are some parts of this report (particularly diagrams, quotations and research tools) and the Appendices where the original terminology is still in place and should be read as synonymous with supporting policy change.

2 Method


2.1 Evaluation methodology

The evaluation used realist methods supplemented by process tracing as set out in the Compass Evaluation Quality Framework (EQF), which is published separately. This section summarises the essential aspects of realist evaluation; more detail is available in the Inception Report and the EQF.

2.1.1 Realist evaluation

Realist evaluation is a theory-based approach and the evaluation questions have been investigated by developing and refining theories. These question theories are expressed as a set of Context, Mechanism, Outcome (CMO) configurations. Theory building and testing is an iterative process that aims to result in a theory that is a satisfactory explanation of the evidence. This process is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Theory refinement approach



Realist evaluation provides understanding in the form of ‘middle-range theories.’ These are sufficiently detailed and specific to provide a rich understanding but also sufficiently general to provide actionable learning. The process of theory building moves between rich, detailed evidence from specific cases and middle-range theories until there is a reasonable level of satisfaction that the theories present a good explanation of all the evidence. Realist evaluation establishes how and in what circumstances ICF programmes were supporting policy change, elaborating on mechanisms and contexts and providing insight into how support is successful.

Realist evaluation demonstrates causality by identifying and verifying the causal mechanisms that generate outcomes (intended and unintended) and establishing the contexts in which those mechanisms trigger. The reasoning and response construction of the programme mechanism enables investigation of the role of actor decision making in determining the outcomes of a policy, initiative or intervention. The particular strengths of realist evaluation are that:

- Causal theories are developed and tested at a middle level of abstraction and can then be applied across different programmes and contexts. This strong external validity will enable lessons from the evaluation to be applied across the ICF and more widely.
- The contexts that make a difference to whether/which outcomes are generated are identified, which also supports portability and the application of lessons from the evaluation.
- The approach delivers a deep and rich understanding of how context and mechanism combine to cause different outcomes in different circumstances.

Several theories of change were developed during the inception stage which hypothesised a number of CMO configurations. The research tested these theories and gathered evidence to inform their refinement. The refined theories reflect all the relevant evidence and we have not found any evidence that contradicts them. The existence of contradictory evidence would require further revision of the theories. The revised theories presented in this report were found to be valid in the specific contexts explored within the case studies, which were purposively selected; while it is intended that the learning from this evaluation would be valuable for other contexts, care should be taken not to assume generalisability of the findings.

2.1.2 Process tracing

Although realist evaluation has many strengths, the methodology does not provide formal tools and methods for evidencing the relationships between causes and outcomes, so process tracing has been used to supplement the approach. The particular strength of process tracing is that it provides a formal assessment of whether the intervention has contributed to outcomes in individual cases. It does so by tracking ‘traces’ of evidence that should be available if hypothesised causal processes have in fact operated and applying a series of evidence tests. More information about processing tracing is available in section 7.4 of the Inception Report and in the EQF.

2.2 Evaluation design

At the outset of the evaluation, it was agreed with HMG that a case study design would yield the most insightful evidence, especially as we wanted to investigate support for policy change at the ICF portfolio level and the interactions between different types and levels of support for policy change. It was agreed that this would be achieved through case studies at global, national and sub-national levels, and that a purposive approach to sampling would be used, based on where we would be most likely to find evidence of policy change supported by ICF.

At the global level, we agreed that we would aim for one multilateral fund case study and one MDB case study. At a national/sub-national level, we agreed that the cases would be countries and that we would seek cases that could evidence sub-national as well as national support for policy change, aiming for three or four country case studies.

2.3 Selecting programmes

The starting point in selecting case studies was to review ICF programmes; this was done as part of an initial sift of programmes during the first phase of the evaluation. Although the evaluation was not limited to support for policy change through programmes, discussions with the ESG suggested this would play a significant role and that a number of programmes had objectives to support policy change (see section 3 below for more detail about the objectives to support policy change of ICF programmes). A purposive approach was taken to sampling so we could include programmes within the case studies that were thought to have supported policy changes and where there was a chance of finding evidence. The detail is set out in section 6.2 of the Inception Report and summarised here.

The first stage of the work involved focussing on programmes likely to be supporting policy change. ICF uses three key performance indicators (KPIs) that relate to supporting policy change – KPIs 13, 14 and 15 – so we selected all 112 programmes that reported against them. An additional five programmes were included that, although not reporting against any of the three ICF KPIs, were recommended for inclusions based on advice from the ESG.

From the 117 candidate programmes, a smaller sample was generated based on the following criteria:

- Had explicit aims to support change in global, national and/or sub-national policies.
- Targeted low-carbon development (LCD) and/or forestry sectors.
- Had emerging evidence of the results of supporting policy change, including successful and unsuccessful activities.
- Were relatively mature, having been operating since 2016 or earlier, and so likely to have useful insights to offer the evaluation.

The selection process involved a ‘light touch’ review of the core documentation (i.e. the business case, logframe, and latest annual review/project completion review), a discussion with the ESG and an assessment the relevance of each programme to the case study topics. On the basis of this review 27 programmes went forward to phase 1 of the research as described by Table 3 below.

Table 3: Sample analysis by relevance to theory of change (N= national, SN = sub-national)

Programme/Fund	DFID or BEIS ²	Donors	Theory of Change				
			Raising national ambition	Supporting change in national/ sub-national gov policy	Supporting policy change in MDBs and funds	Influencing other donors	Interactions between the levels
Forest Governance, Markets and Climate	DFID	UK, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden		N			
Tanzania Climate Change Institutional Strengthening Programme	DFID	UK only		N SN			
Results Based Financing for Low-Carbon Energy Access	DFID	UK only		N			
Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces	DFID	Not known – supplemented an additional project		N SN			
Promoting Low-Carbon Development with Returnable Capital in Indonesia	DFID	UK, France		N			
Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus (StARCK+)	DFID	UK only		N SN			
Forestry, Land-use and Governance in Indonesia	DFID	UK only		N			
International CCS Capacity Building	BEIS	UK, Norway, Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute		N			
Low-Carbon Agriculture in Colombia	BEIS	UK only		N SN			
REDD Early Movers (REM)	BEIS	Germany, Norway, UK (GNU partnership)		N			
International 2050 Pathways Partnership	BEIS	UK only		N			
Improving Governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia	DFID	UK only		N SN			
International Forestry Knowledge (KnowFor)	DFID	Each partner has its own donors		N			
East Africa Geothermal Energy (EA-Geo)	DFID	Germany, UK, EU. The EAGER element was 100% UK funded		N			
Climate Proofing Growth and Development in South Asia	DFID	UK only		N SN			
Low-Carbon GET FiT/On and Off-Grid Small Scale Renewable Energy in Uganda	BEIS/ DFID	Norway, Germany, UK, EU		N			
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	DFID	Australia, Denmark, Indonesia, Korea, Norway, Qatar, UAE, UK		N			
Forests Carbon Partnership Facility - Carbon Fund (FCPF-C)	BEIS	EU, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, UK, United States plus private sector donors		N SN			
NAMA Facility	BEIS	Germany, Denmark, UK, EU		N			

² Defra did not fund any of the programmes selected for inclusion within PE3.

BioCarbon Fund	BEIS	Germany, Norway, UK, United States		N SN			
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience	BEIS	Multilateral		N			
Africa Clean Energy programme	DFID	UK only		N			
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	BEIS	Multilateral					
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): FIP	BEIS	Multilateral		N			
Investment in Forests and Sustainable Land Use Programme (IFSLU)	DFID	UK, Norway, Netherlands		N			
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): CTF	BEIS	Multilateral		N			
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): SREP	BEIS	Multilateral		N			

2.4 Document review

Having decided which programmes were included in the sample, a document review was carried out. As a minimum we reviewed the business case, logframe and latest annual reviews, supplemented by relevant research or analysis conducted by the programme, evaluations, websites and other documentation identified during the document review or interviews. This review fed into the development of topic guides for the interviews with HMG officials (below) and was used as background in the preparation of the case studies. Information from HMG documents was not regarded as ‘evidence’ although information from independent evaluations, where available, was considered to be evidence and used appropriately in assessing impact and causality.

The research team was alert to the risk of bias arising in three areas:

1. Availability bias: This is a key determinant of the conclusions that can be drawn; where evidence was sought but not found, there may be consequences for the strength of any emerging theory. The main area where we had hoped to find documentary evidence - but were largely unable to do so - was the tracking of signatures of technical assistance through the policy process, for example, the same wording used in policy documents as in advice to the national government.

2. Publication bias: Linked to the above, some information is more likely to have been published than other information. Where we were aware of documentation, we worked with the ESG to try to obtain unpublished evidence from within the ICF, and followed up with interviewees to obtain unpublished documents, such as notes of meetings and comments on draft documents. Nevertheless, there were unpublished documents that we requested but which were not provided, and there would have been documents that we were not aware of so did not request.

3. Selection bias: Contributors are likely to have particular views or interests which could affect the independence of their contributions and might lead to them only signposting us to evidence that supports their view. This was addressed through ensuring we consulted with a wide range of stakeholders and supplemented consultation with the use of internet research. Please note that the reliability and rigour of all evidence collected through internet searches was assessed.

The evaluation team followed the approach to extracting data from documents set out in the EQF.

At the end of the document review, a Programme Investigation Strategy (PIS) was drawn up for each programme. The PIS summarised our understanding of the programme, set out what we wanted to investigate and the theories we wished to test during interviews. An example of a completed PIS is included in Appendix 3.

2.5 Interviews with HMG officials

To understand more about the programmes, interviews were carried out with the DFID or BEIS official that knew the most about the programme. A template topic guide was produced for interviewing the HMG official with most knowledge of the programme. For each programme, the PIS was used to create a bespoke topic guide. An example of a topic guide is included in Appendix 7.

HMG identified the relevant government official and approached them for their consent to be interviewed. Once consent was received, we followed up to make an appointment and conduct the interview. Interviews were recorded (no one refused consent for this) and transcribed using automatic software.

For some programmes, no appropriate person could be identified, and not all of the identified contacts could be interviewed in the timeframe; we interviewed someone representing 17 of the 27 programmes (24 if the CIFs are combined).

The interviews were useful where the official had been involved with the programme for some time but not a good use of time where the official had had limited exposure to the programme. This was because we were asking for a depth of insight that the interviewee did not have. Nevertheless, the interviews were useful for signposting to other potential interviewees.

Due to a lack of availability earlier in the programme, several HMG officials were interviewed in the second phase of primary research rather than the first phase, adding a further three programmes to the coverage, making a total of 20 of the 24 programmes.

2.6 Interviews with other donors

In discussion with the ESG, we shortlisted nine donors to interview and approaches were made to all. A total of 10 telephone interviews were completed with individuals from four donor countries.

The interviews were exploratory in nature and provided useful insight on the way ICF seeks to support policy change in the context of the multilateral funds and, to a more limited extent, how this is done outside the framework provided by the multilateral funds, including through the Germany-Norway-UK (GNU) collaboration on deforestation climate finance.

2.7 Case studies

Having carried out a review of the programme documents, interviewed HMG officials and other donors, the next stage was to define the case studies. The country case studies and the multilateral fund case study were designed to gather evidence of support for policy change; the World Bank case study was exploratory in nature with interviews designed to glean theory rather than test it.

The ‘case’ is the specific policy change, set within the context of the country or fund. This means that although there are five case studies, many more than five cases of supporting policy change have been investigated. This is explained further below.

2.7.1 Selecting the countries

The next stage was to identify which countries were most likely to yield evidence. A process was agreed with the ESG based on the likelihood of yielding interesting evidence, and this led to four countries being selected – Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal and Uganda – to cover two high-level policy areas of forestry and land use, and low-carbon development.

Colombia was selected as a case study of forestry and land-use policy in a middle-income country. It had seven potentially relevant ICF-funded programmes, other donors had mentioned it as an example of successful collaborative working, and HMG officials were particularly interested in it. It was a clear frontrunner throughout the selection process.

Indonesia was selected as a case study of forestry and land-use policy in a middle-income country. It had 11 potentially relevant ICF-funded programmes and had come up in a number of discussions with HMG officials. The embassy in Jakarta was also very willing to assist, which we felt would make the case study research more productive. It was a clear frontrunner throughout the selection process.

Nepal was selected as a case study of low-carbon development policy in a low-income country. It had six potentially relevant ICF-funded programmes. Ultimately, this case study was dropped to enable more resources to be put into Indonesia and the World Bank case study. Nepal was dropped rather than any of the others because we struggled to get engagement from the DFID country office and BEIS had no relevant programmes in-country.

Uganda was selected a case study of low-carbon development in a low-income country. It had eight potentially relevant ICF-funded programmes.

Table 4: Programmes by case study country and by policy area

Policy area	Programme/Fund	Middle income		Low income	
		Colombia	Indonesia	Nepal	Uganda
Forestry	Forest Governance, Markets and Climate				
	Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces				
	Forestry, Land Use and Governance in Indonesia				
	REDD Early Movers (REM)				
	International Forestry Knowledge (KnowFor)				
	Forests Carbon Partnership Facility - Carbon Fund (FCPF-C)				
	Investment in Forests and Sustainable Land Use Programme (IFSLU)				
Low-carbon development	Results Based Finance for Low-Carbon Energy Access				
	Promoting Low-Carbon Development with Returnable Capital in Indonesia				
	International CCS Capacity Building				
	East Africa Geothermal Energy (EA-Geo)				
	Low Carbon GET FIT/On and Off-Grid Small Scale Renewable Energy in Uganda				
	Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)				
	NAMA Facility				
	Africa Clean Energy programme				
	Climate Proofing Growth and Development in South East Asia				
	Climate Investment Fund (CIF): CTF				
	Climate Investment Fund (CIF): SREP				
Both forestry and low-carbon development	Low-Carbon Agriculture in Colombia				
	International 2050 Pathways Partnership				
	Improving Governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia				
	BioCarbon Fund				
	Green Climate Fund				
	Climate Investment Fund (CIF): FIP				

Once the countries had been selected, a summary of the political and economic situation in each was produced, with reference to the specific policies to be investigated. These are included in Appendices 12 to 14.

2.7.2 Deciding the focus of the case studies

Having decided which case studies to pursue, we then determined which policy outcomes to investigate in depth – these are the ‘cases’ investigated, set within the broader context of the country or Fund. A case study plan was produced for each. This set out the theories to be tested, the specific policy outcomes to be investigated and the types of evidence to be sought.

2.7.2.1 Colombia

At the stage when we decided the focus of the case studies, ICF programmes in Colombia were thought to have supported:

1. National ambition to reduce deforestation
2. National policies through an integrated strategy to combat deforestation
3. A national forest inventory
4. A forest-monitoring system
5. Local policies in three provinces

Following discussions with the British embassy in Bogota and implementing partners, we decided to focus on 12 outcomes which appeared to have benefited from ICF involvement:

1. The National Development Plan (NDP) commitment to silvopastoral targets
2. The Payment for Environmental Services (PES) policy document and law
3. The NDP including a new chapter on sustainable plan for the Orinoquia region
4. The NDP including a new chapter on sustainable plan for the Amazonia region
5. The development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on the biodynamic model
6. The policy on sustainable cattle ranching
7. The increased engagement of the Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability
8. The use of the 2050 Calculator in policy making
9. Payments from reducing emissions (REM) payment by results supporting policy change
10. The signing of the zero deforestation agreements
11. The development of a policy on deforestation (referred to from here onwards as ‘the CONPES document’)³
12. The NDP commitment to have 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) from forest products

The relevant ICF programmes operating in Colombia are:

- REDD Early Movers (REM)
- Amazon Vision (Vision Amazonia in Spanish) funded by the REM programme above
- Low-Carbon Agriculture in Colombia (SPS Colombia) – known in Colombia as Ganadería Colombiana Sostenible
- International 2050 Pathways Partnership – including 2050 Calculator
- BioCarbon Fund
- Green Climate Fund (GCF)

³ The policy document is referred to as ‘CONPES’ as shorthand. CONPES stands for ‘Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social’ – the National Council for Economic and Social Policy – which is the highest authority in national planning and advises the government in all aspects of economic development. The high-level documents which the Council produces are known as CONPES documents.

2.7.2.2 Indonesia

When we reviewed the programme documents, ICF programmes claimed to have supported change in 22 different policies in Indonesia. Following discussions with implementing partners, we decided to investigate a group of interventions that supported change in forestry and land-use policy. This approach also provided an opportunity to explore the actions of multiple programmes operating at local, national and global levels in supporting policy change. Interventions included:

- Working with civil society organisation (CSO) groups to monitor compliance, ensure better law enforcement and hold government officials to account on commitments to improving land governance.
- Generating evidence – including commissioning research and running demonstration projects – that could be used by government officials to support the design and implementation of policy and persuade others of the benefits of action.
- Providing expert technical assistance to government officials to design and draft regulation.
- Bringing different stakeholders together at national/provincial workshops to build a shared understanding of how they needed to work together to achieve policy change.
- Paying for secretariat support to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

In addition, ICF provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Planning which was thought to have supported the National Medium-term Development Plan 2020–2024. This presented an opportunity to investigate strategic support through a relatively small intervention.

This meant that in Indonesia two policy areas were investigated: forestry and land use, and low-carbon development.

2.7.2.3 Uganda

At the time of deciding the focus of the case study, ICF was thought to have supported change in renewable energy policy in Uganda through the GET FiT programme and also through the East Africa Geothermal Technical Assistance Facility (EAGER) component of East Africa Geothermal. Initially we proposed to focus on GET FiT alone, but in the development of the case study plan we broadened out to also cover geothermal energy policy. GET FiT Uganda was funded by the GNU partnership which we thought might also enable us to investigate aspects of the other donors' theory.

Following discussions with implementing consultants, we decided to focus on three outcomes which appeared to have benefited from ICF involvement:

1. Creation of a new regulatory framework for renewable energy development, including standardised Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) including a deemed energy clause (GET FiT).
2. The enforcement of environmental and social protection laws relating to the construction of power plants (GET FiT).
3. The production of a draft geothermal policy and legislation (EAGER).

2.7.2.4 CIFs

As a result of the review of the programme documents and discussions with HMG officials, we focussed on two successful outcomes and one unsuccessful attempt at supporting policy change:

1. The non-initiation in 2019 of the CIFs sunset clause.
2. The Evaluation and Learning (E&L) Initiative sponsored by the UK, in particular the adoption of the concept of transformational change, the monitoring framework associated with it and the use of findings in the design of Future of the CIFs proposal.
3. The proposal for the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) 2.0.

2.7.2.5 World Bank

The purpose of the World Bank case study was to construct more complete and evidence-based theories about the ways in which HMG seeks to support policy change in the MDBs. Research in the first phase of the evaluation suggested that support for policy change might involve:

- Building coalitions of support.
- Direct lobbying, including making use of the GNU partnership to add weight to the lobbying voice.
- At official level, being helpful and available to provide technical input and support to World Bank officials.
- Spreading new ways of thinking and doing things.
- Convincing influencers and those who hold a formal mandate through the governance system.
- Providing climate finance.

We also made sure to include consideration of the ways in which ICF ‘convinces the influencers’, in other words, those within HMG that hold the power and have the position to exert support for policy change.

2.7.2.6 Summary

Table 5: Focus of the case studies

Case study and Theories to be tested	Outcomes to be studied	Programme(s)
Colombia	NDP commitment to Silvopastoral systems	SPS Colombia
1a National and sub-national support for policy change	Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Policy Document and Law	SPS Colombia
1d Other donors	NDP including a new chapter on sustainable plan for the Orinoquia region	BioCarbon Fund
2 Interactions between different levels of supporting policy change (global/national/local)	NDP including a new chapter on sustainable plan for the Amazonia region	Amazon Vision
4 Transformational change	Development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on the biodynamic model	SPS Colombia
	Development of a policy on sustainable cattle ranching	SPS Colombia
	Increased engagement of the Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability	SPS Colombia, Amazon Vision, BioCarbon Fund, MoU and JDI
	Use of the 2050 calculator in policy making	2050 Calculator
	Payments from REM payment by results-supporting policy change	REM
	Signing of the zero deforestation agreements	JDI
	Development of a CONPES document on deforestation	Amazon Vision
	NDP commitment to have 1% GDP from forest products	N/A
Indonesia	Tighter regulation of mining permits	SETAPAK
1a National and sub-national support for policy change	Strengthening of the legal timber verification system	FGMC
	Effective implementation of social forestry initiative	SETAPAK
1d Influencing other donors	New Ecological Fiscal Transfer established in North Kalimantan and Papua	SETAPAK
2 Interactions between global/national/sub-national support for policy change	Inclusion of Low-Carbon Development Initiative in RPJMN 2020-24	LCDI
4 Transformational change		
Uganda	Creation of a new regulatory framework for renewable energy development, including standardised PPAs	GET FiT
1a National and sub-national support for policy change	Enforcement of environmental and social standards in construction of power plants	GET FiT
1d Influencing other donors	Iterations developed of draft geothermal policy and legislation	EAGER
4 Transformational change		
CIFs	Non-initiation in 2019 of the CIFs sunset clause	N/A
1b Supporting policy change in Multilateral Funds	The embedding of the E&L Initiative into CIF and MDB operations	N/A
	The failure of the proposal for CTF 2.0	N/A

2.8 Data collection – primary research phase 2

The core of the data collection approach involved carrying out interviews with people in a position to provide testimony, supplemented by documentary evidence.

2.8.1 Identifying interviewees

Interviewees were identified during the preparation of the case study plans, based on discussions with HMG officials and documentary review. Where we did not know the name of a desired interviewee, we often knew the organisation and/or job role, and could seek an individual as part of the interviewing process. Snowballing was commonplace (and encouraged) as interviewees suggested people who may be able to elaborate further on topics being discussed.

2.8.1.1 Implementing partners

We interviewed 33 implementing partners and/or consultants. These interviews were useful to confirm the key policy-relevant outcomes, the type of support for policy change that took place, to develop specific questions to ask those at the receiving end of support for policy change, and to identify useful interviewees.

2.8.1.2 HMG officials

We interviewed 15 HMG government officials, including those in-country for the country case studies. These interviews were additional to those carried out in the first phase of the evaluation. They were useful for confirming our understanding of what the programmes involved in terms of supporting policy change, what the interviewees thought had been achieved, and for ‘sense-checking’ our plans for further interviewing.

2.8.1.3 Financial partners/donors

We interviewed nine financial partners or donors. These interviews were useful to understand how ICF’s activities in supporting policy change are understood by others, and they were particularly useful for formulating alternative explanations of support for policy change.

2.8.1.4 Country or fund officials

We interviewed 44 officials from national government, local government, government agencies and, for the CIFs, fund management. These interviews were useful for gathering evidence of supporting policy change and for testing our theories about how support for policy change worked.

2.8.1.5 CSOs and others involved in the policy process

We interviewed six CSOs and others involved in delivering policy on the ground. This was particularly the case in Indonesia where civil society groups are an important way of ensuring policy enforcement. These interviews were useful for understanding the way in which ICF’s involvement had led to support for policy change.

2.8.1.6 Others

We interviewed four other informants who we felt were useful for getting an independent perspective on ICF’s role in supporting policy change.

2.8.2 Interview approach

Most of the interviews for the country case studies were completed face-to-face, with a small number carried out by telephone. In Indonesia, we made use of an interpreter for some interviews. In Colombia, we used a bilingual interviewer who also translated Spanish interviews into English.

The CIFs and World Bank case studies were largely carried out by telephone. Telephone interviewing was also used for sub-national support for policy change in Colombia as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised against travel to the two regions we had identified as potentially useful.

Interviews followed realist methods in which elements of the theory were explicitly tested with respondents.⁴ To ensure the responses are not biased and reflect respondents' experience and opinions, we:

- Asked open questions, exploring what has happened, why and in what circumstances.
- Tested multiple theories with the respondent – giving them alternatives to choose between and opportunities to refine elements of theory.
- Asked for evidence about the theories with which they agree and ask if there were times when it didn't work like that, what happened and why.

The interview was presented to the respondent as a collaborative effort to try and develop understanding rather than the interviewer having a settled view of theories for which they are seeking endorsement.

Tailored interview topic guides were prepared for each interviewee in order to direct the discussion to the areas of the theory that they were able to discuss.

Subject to the respondent's permission, interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. In Uganda, most government officials declined to be recorded so notes were taken instead. This was also the case for a handful of interviews in Indonesia. This did lead to some loss of granularity in the data although as much word-for-word content as possible was noted down.

Example interview guides are included in Appendices 4 to 8.

2.8.3 Interviews achieved in the case study phase

The total achieved sample size for the case studies is shown below.

Table 6: Interviews completed as part of the case studies for different respondent types

Type of respondent	Interviews completed
HMG officials	15
Implementing partners and consultants	33
Government/Fund/MDB officials	44
Other donors/financial partners	9
CSOs and other stakeholders	6
Others	4
All	111

⁴ Manzano, A. (2016) The Craft of Interviewing in Realist Evaluation, Evaluation, 22 (3), pp. 342-360.
Available at: <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/94454/3/RealistInterview-Reviewed.9thOct.pdf>

Table 7: Total number of interviews completed by case study

Case Study	Interviews completed
CIFs	18
Colombia	27
Indonesia	34
Uganda	27
World Bank	5
Total interviews	111

2.8.4 Interview follow-up

Very often follow-up was required with interviewees to obtain documentary evidence that had been discussed during the interview. This was almost always forthcoming, although in some cases took some time and chasing.

2.9 Lessons from the case study primary research

We were pleased that most respondents, and respondents of all types, were generally willing to speak openly. We had very few refusals – one donor refused due to time constraints and four individuals whom we thought would have important evidence could not be interviewed due to non-response.

Making contact with and recruiting respondents took time and persistence, but this lesson had been learnt from PE2 and, where possible, we allowed extra time for this task. This was not possible for Indonesia due to the short timeframe between receiving approval from HMG for the case study and arriving in-country.

Using interpreters was not very successful in realist interviewing because they summarised interviewees' responses, which may have lost important nuances and the granularity of descriptions. We learnt this lesson in Indonesia and used a bilingual interviewer in Colombia. We then used the interviewer to translate the interviews, which ensured the detail and nuances were preserved.

We underestimated the effect that the 2019 Madrid Cop25 would have on the availability of interviewees for the CIFs and World Bank cases studies, which resulted in fieldwork running later than planned.

2.10 Analysis and synthesis

The analysis and synthesis of evidence followed the approach set out in the Compass Quality Framework and the RAMESES quality standards.⁵

All evidence (documents, interview transcripts, emails) was imported into analysis software (MaxQDA) and coded according to:

- The theory it was relevant to.
- Whether it was evidence for a context, mechanism or outcome.
- Where it was evidence for a mechanism, which specific mechanism(s).

Using the software, we were then able to align evidence against the hypothesised CMOs and refine theories by addressing the following questions:

- To which element(s) of the theory is the evidence relevant?
- Does the evidence support, refute or refine those elements of the theory?
- What particular refinements does the evidence require (e.g. new contexts requiring new CMOs)?
- To what extent is there evidence to support the refinements?
- Where are the gaps in evidence, and what do those gaps mean for synthesis?
- Does the evidence raise any new questions or prompt any ideas?
- To what extent and for which results is it possible to draw general conclusions from the evidence?

A sample page from MaxQDA is given at Appendix 11.1.

2.11 Process tracing

Process tracing as a technique has been described in section 7.4 of the Inception Report, therefore it is not repeated here. In summary, the analysis involved categorising evidence into four types according to its value in confirming or eliminating our theories. These types are identified in the evidence tables as follows:

- ‘Hoop’ – necessary but not sufficient for the hypothesis to be true; if a hoop test is failed, it can eliminate a theory.
- ‘Straw in the wind’ – these provide weak evidence for the truth of a hypothesis (e.g. that a mechanism caused an outcome). They are neither necessary nor sufficient, but they increase the plausibility of the hypothesis. Multiple straws in the wind increase confidence that a theory is correct.
- ‘Smoking gun’ – sufficient but not necessary for a hypothesis to be true, a smoking gun provides strong support for a hypothesis.
- Double decisive (DD) tests – both necessary and sufficient, they strongly support a hypothesis and can eliminate a counterfactual hypothesis.

We were particularly interested in:

- Evidence that provides a ‘signature’ relating to ICF programmes; for example, use of new knowledge created by ICF technical assistance implementing partners cited as rationale for a new law. There could be documentary evidence; statements made in interviews would also count (although see section 2.12 below on strength of different types of evidence).
- Triangulating evidence from different independent sources.
- Triangulating different types of evidence: e.g. interview, documentary and published evidence.
- Evidence from independent credible sources: e.g. other donors or academics reporting ICF support for policy change.

In order to perform the tests using the evidence gathered, the theory of change was tailored for each of the case studies. This was a more specific version of the theories of change and set out the circumstances in which that programme was thought to have supported policy change. Alternative hypotheses were also considered i.e. what other factors might have led to the observed policy change.

Tests were based on evidence about the approach to support policy change and the supporting policy-change effect. These are known as causal process observations (CPOs)⁵ and each CPO was assessed for whether the evidence would be likely to be seen if the theory was true or if the theory was false.

⁵ Wong et al (2013) Realist synthesis, Rameses training materials.

The process-tracing analysis explored other factors that would need to be in play for policy change to occur: for example, a non-hostile political environment and a bureaucratic means of achieving the change. Other factors may also drive change such as a requirement to meet international obligations or a desire to improve standing on the world stage.

The strength of evidence for the case supporting the theory under examination was assessed as follows:

- Strong support – smoking gun (or DD) tests passed and no hoop tests (nor DDs) failed.
- Some support – multiple straw in the wind tests passed and no hoop tests (nor DDs) failed; also, no smoking guns nor DDs passed.
- Mixed – mixture of smoking gun or DD tests passed but some hoop tests (or DDs) failed – this required the CMO to be revised.
- Failed – some hoop (or DD) tests failed, no DD or smoking gun tests passed – this required the theory to be rejected and the CMO abandoned or significantly revised.

It is important to note that due to the theory-refining process that went on throughout data collection, ‘failed’ and ‘mixed’ tests were less likely to be found in the final stage of process tracing. All evidence presented in this report fits in the ‘some’ and ‘strong’ categories for this reason.

⁶ ‘Causal process observation’ refers to information about both context and mechanisms, defined as “[...] an insight or piece of data that provides information about the context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference. It does not necessarily do so as part of a larger, systematized array of observations [...]” (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, ‘A Sea Change in Political Methodology’ in *Introduction to Rethinking Social Inquiry*, 2 edn., Henry E. Brady and David Collier, ed. Rowman and Littlefield (2010), pp. 184–185).

2.12 Credibility and strength of evidence

The evidence used to support, refine and refute theories and for the process-tracing tests was assessed for credibility against four tests – Chronology, Authority, Signature and Triangulation.

Table 8: Examples of evidence credibility tests

Type of test		Example that would be Strong → Failed			
Chronology		The intervention happened prior to the outcome (e.g. technical assistance was provided over a three-month period and six months after it had concluded the law was changed).			The intervention happened after the outcome (e.g. the law changed and technical assistance was provided one month afterwards).
Authority	Documentary	Documentary evidence from official published or peer reviewed sources	Documentary evidence from official but unpublished or unreviewed sources	Documentary evidence from unofficial unreviewed sources	Documentary evidence from unknown or anonymous sources
	Interview	Interview evidence from officials who were present and involved at the time, who have no vested interests in portraying things in any particular way, and where the events occurred recently (e.g. within two years).	Interview evidence from officials who were present and involved at the time, who have no reason to fabricate, but the events occurred some time ago so recall error might be a factor.	Interview evidence from unofficial sources or from someone who has a point of principle to make or something to gain.	Interview evidence based on hearsay or speculation rather than observation
Signature	Documentary	Official document of the time uses wording that was supplied by ICF and could only have come from ICF.	Official document from the time uses language that strongly suggests it was supplied by ICF, but it is not completely identical.	Official document from the time uses language that tends to suggest it was supplied by ICF, but significant elements are not identical.	
	Interview	Interview evidence from a government official who was present at the time, and speaks authoritatively, in detail and gives specific very examples.	Interview evidence from a government official who was present at the time but is more hesitant when speaking about the events and can only provide generalised examples.	Interview evidence from someone who was not present at the time but who had heard it from colleagues and can't give any specific examples at all.	
Triangulation		Where convergent evidence drawing on different data types has been obtained from all appropriate evidence sources.	Where evidence converges but data from some groups/sources is missing or all groups/sources are represented but some divergence in the evidence is observed.	Where evidence is missing from a large number of groups/sources or missing from particularly important ones and/or there is wide divergence in the evidence.	Where there is data from only one evidence source. ⁷

The strength of the evidence has been allocated to one of three categories – convincing, plausible or tentative, as set out in Table 9 below.

⁷ While data from one source is, by definition, unacceptable under a triangulation test, that does not mean it has no value. In an example where there is no other evidence on a theory, it may provide weak evidence that still has value in the evaluation.

Table 9: Strength of evidence

Category	Description	Example
Convincing	<p>The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition AND where the proposition has been tested with different methods including specific and appropriate tests of causality such as process tracing or quantitative methods AND the proposition is consistent with formal theory.</p> <p>A finding is deemed convincing when evidence to support it meets all of the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Found in five or more cases of supporting policy change. • For each case of support for policy change, found in more than one interview with credible witnesses, or in a combination of credible documents and interviews. • At least one case of strong support is found in process tracing. 	<p>The ICF increases capability of government officials by transferring knowledge:</p> <p>CMO for the supporting change in national and sub-national policy theory is convincing because evidence to support it has been found in 40 interviews from seven ICF programmes, with government officials, implementing partners and civil society organisations, and process tracing revealed strong support in four cases.</p>
Plausible	<p>The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition.</p> <p>A finding is deemed plausible when evidence to support it meets one or more of the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Found in five or more cases of supporting policy change. • For each case of support for policy change, found in more than one interview with credible witnesses, or in a combination of credible documents and interviews. • At least one case of strong support is found in process tracing. 	<p>The ICF promises support in return for policy change: CMO for the supporting change in national and sub-national policy theory is plausible because process tracing revealed strong support in one case and some support in three cases, but it was only found in four ICF programmes.</p>
Tentative	<p>The proposition is supported by evidence from a smaller number of sources, has only been tested in some contexts or where there is some evidence that undermines the proposition.</p> <p>A finding is deemed tentative when evidence to support it meets all of the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Found, but in less than five ICF programmes. • For each case of support for policy change, found in only one interview or document. • No cases of strong support are found in process tracing. 	<p>The CMOs created from the interviews with other donors is tentative because no formal evidence testing was carried out on it and it relates in the main to one or two programmes (CIFs or GCF).</p>

2.13 Changes since the Inception Report

In the Inception Report, we said we would carry out four country case studies and one global case study which combined the CIFs and the World Bank. In discussion and agreement with the ESG, a decision was made to reduce the number of country case studies to three, and allocate the saved resource to carrying out a small-scale, exploratory study of supporting policy change in the World Bank as well as an evidence-gathering case study of the CIFs, and to allocate additional resources to the Indonesian case study to enable a low-carbon development outcome to be investigated as well as the forestry and land-use outcomes already identified. Case study plans were developed and signed off by HMG on this basis.

Changes to the scope and focus of the case study plans were made once we had discussed them with implementation partners, implementation consultants and HMG officials in-country:

- In Colombia, the focal outcomes were tweaked and refocussed to align with in-country realities following initial interviews. Investigation of the GCF was de-prioritised due to the multinational nature of the fund and irrelevance of the Colombia project compared with other ICF programmes.
- In Indonesia, we additionally investigated the formulation of a new Ecological Fiscal Transfer (EFT) policy as ICF felt it had had significantly supported policy change; we spoke to a number of interviewees by phone rather than in person due to forest fires restricting travel.
- In Uganda, we rethought the outcomes to be investigated and also decided not to include district renewable energy planning because there was no evidence of ICF supporting policy change.
- For the CIFs, we rescoped one of the outcomes to be more reflective of reality and as the outcomes were at a cross-fund level, we broadened the study out from just the CTF.
- For the World Bank study, new policy outcomes were identified and explored in greater detail than those identified as part of the case study plan due to the specific knowledge of the respondents we interviewed.

3 ICF's objectives to support policy change

3.1 Introduction

ICF's intentions in supporting policy change are different for national/sub-national governments and for multilateral funds.

For national and sub-national governments, ownership of national priorities is a principle of development aid⁸ and an approach actively pursued by ICF. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that ICF will, from time to time, wish to support change in these priorities, and in particular support governments in the effective design and implementation of their policy priorities. This is particularly relevant to achieving transformational change, where embedding actions in policy contribute to sustainability.⁹ Support for policy change may be done through programmes or through diplomatic channels linked to HMG presence in-country.

For the multilateral funds, ICF's decision to contribute will entitle the UK to a role in governance which will enable support for change in fund policies, for example funding criteria and rules on M&E. ICF's decision to support a fund may be based on ability to influence flows of international climate finance as well as support for the particular objectives of that fund.

3.2 Key definitions

By policy we mean the position an organisation takes towards a topic relevant to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation, whether that organisation is governmental, private or part of civil society. This will normally be formalised (e.g. written down) and made public in some way. In Table 1 of the Inception Report (p. 16), we set out what policy would look like for different policy actors.

Policy design – is the first stage of policy development. It includes thinking about how to achieve policy goals and then formalising decisions in writing. It can take a range of forms including business case development, cost-benefit analysis of policy options, narrative statements of positions and drafting text of laws and regulations.

Policy implementation – is the stage of the policy process where a broad statement of intent is operationalised through policy instruments. It can include rolling out the law, setting up the institutions that will make the policy happen in reality, creating market measures, or creating templates for legal documents.

By policy enforcement – we mean the activities that take place after a regulatory policy has been rolled out, to ensure that is abided by. It can include surveillance, inspection, reporting, giving out warnings or prosecuting offenders.

⁸ OECD (2005) Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

⁹ For example, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact notes, "[t]o achieve its goal of transformational impact, the ICF needs to influence the policies and investment priorities of its priority countries. It is, therefore, working to support national climate policy and target setting." ICF in its indicator definition publication for KPI15 states that "[t]he ICF will have greater impact if it can be 'transformational' by, for example, encouraging others to replicate activities, and facilitating institutional and policy change."

Policy change – comes in a number of guises. Some of the apparently small changes in emphasis may be just as important in facilitating change on the ground as the major changes.

- At design stage, it can include the adoption of an entirely new policy, a change in direction of an existing policy, or subtle changes in emphasis.
- At implementation stage, it can include the creation of a new institution to oversee roll-out, the creation or amendment of regulatory documents, or the setting-up of new market mechanisms.
- At enforcement stage, it can include establishment of new methods of surveillance, new reporting mechanisms or new fine structures.

By supporting policy change we mean the activities carried out either by ICF staff or with the support of ICF resources that are intended to change the design, implementation or enforcement of policy.

3.3 How ICF supports national and sub-national policy change

In our initial sift of programmes we identified 22 programmes that had objectives to support policy change and addressed the policy areas we wished to target in the evaluation. They are shown in Table 10 below along with a precis of the objectives for supporting policy change as set out in the Business Case (see Appendix 1 ‘List of the documents reviewed’).

The types of support for policy change intended by the programmes fall into three categories according to our classification:

1. Working with partners to strengthen aspects of the policy design and implementation process, including enforcement and dialogue.
2. Supporting partners to incorporate climate into strategy, policy and development plans.
3. Demonstrating effectiveness of approaches and supporting partners to embed them into policy.

Table 10: The objectives to support policy change of the short-listed programmes (excluding multilateral funds)

Type	Programme	Dates	Type of support for policy change intended from business case/annual reviews
Working with partners to strengthen aspects of the policy design and implementation process, including enforcement and dialogue	Forest Governance, Markets and Climate	2011-21	Strengthening regulation and enforcement in producer countries
	Improving Forestry, Land-Use and Governance in Indonesia (SETAPAK)	2015-20	Improved planning and licensing processes
	REDD Early Movers (REM) – including Amazon Vision	2016-	Improving policy coordination and strengthening the capacity of environmental authorities
	Forests Carbon Partnership Facility - Carbon Fund (FCPF-C)	2012-	Improving forest governance and implementing clear land tenure to attract private sector investment
	Investment in Forests and Sustainable Land-Use Programme (IFSLU)	2014-22	Strengthening governments' capacity to tackle deforestation
	Promoting Low-Carbon Development with Returnable Capital in Indonesia	2013-15	Informing policy dialogue and supporting the policy reform process
	International 2050 Pathways Partnership (programme name on DevTracker)	2012-14	Initiating a dialogue and empowering politicians to take action on climate change
	Climate Proofing Growth and Development in South Asia	2012-19	Transforming the way in which policy is planned and delivered by building knowledge and capacity of political leaders and governments
	Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	2014-20	Sharing programme knowledge and evidence with policy makers to increase their capacity to implement policies and programmes
	BioCarbon Fund	2013-	Supporting policy reform to create an enabling environment for sustainable land use
	International CCS Capacity Building	2012-23	Supporting the establishment of policy frameworks and incentive structures
	Improving Governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia	2012-15	Improving national and local policies and increasing transparency, participation and accountability in policy implementation
	International Forestry Knowledge (KnowFor)	2012-17	Improving the design and implementation of national policies
	East Africa Geothermal Energy (EA-Geo) – incorporating EAGER	2014-19	Enabling policy improvements to allow geothermal power development
	NAMA Facility	2012-15	Creating enabling environments and supporting national governments to develop policies which shift them onto a low-carbon development trajectory
	Africa Clean Energy programme	2016-21	Supporting governments to put appropriate policies and regulations in place

Supporting partners to Incorporate climate into strategy, policy & development plans	Tanzania Climate Change Institutional Strengthening Programme	2011-16	Mainstreaming environment and climate change adaptation in the implementation of national policies and development plans
	Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus (StARCK+)	2013-18	Mainstreaming climate change into the next national medium-term plan
Demonstrating effectiveness of approaches and supporting partners to embed them into policy	Results Based Financing for Low-Carbon Energy Access	2012-19	Integration of the financing model into international policy and financing structures
	Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua provinces	2012-15	Integration of land-mapping approach into national policy, the land-use planning process and international negotiations
	Low-Carbon Agriculture in Colombia (SPS Colombia)	2012-15	Informing policy and legal support mechanisms
	Low-Carbon GET FiT /On and Off-Grid Small Scale Renewable Energy in Uganda	2013-24	Demonstrating that the right regulatory regime will help attract investment

3.4 Objectives to support policy change in multilateral funds

The UK's objectives in relation to the large multilateral funds (CIFs and GCF) are to ensure that they act as strong vehicles for achieving ICF aims. The business case for continuing to support the CIFs places values on the UK's significant ability to drive discussions through its involvement as a Trust Fund Committee member, its role in the CIFs formal governance sessions (including as co-chair), and through written decision making. For GCF, the ambition is to ensure the fund is successfully operationalised thereby securing the progress made during the design phase. It is also about enabling the UK to continue to support policy change within the fund to effectively fulfil its internationally envisaged role as the main multilateral climate finance fund. Ability to support policy change and drive discussions was felt to be exerted by virtue of its membership of the GCF Board and through the relationships the UK has with other board members and the Secretariat.

3.5 Objectives to support policy change outside programmes and funds

Country offices have their own priorities covering all aspects of policy and development, including supporting climate change policy at national and sub-national government levels. The High Commission in Uganda employs a Climate Change and Natural Resources Adviser and hosts an FCO Regional Climate Coordinator, the British embassy in Colombia has a team dedicated to climate change, and there is a UK Climate Change Unit in Indonesia. These teams have their own national programmes which may include coordinating relevant programmes and advocating in favour of the UK's climate priorities.

¹⁰ DFID/BEIS CIF documentation available at <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-13-ICF-0004-CIF/documents>

¹¹ DFID/BEIS (2015) [Green Climate Fund: Long-Term Support to Multilateral Climate Funds](#)

3.6 Approaches to support policy change

To achieve its objectives, ICF has a range of approaches for supporting policy change at its disposal, some of which are more appropriate to certain contexts than others. Throughout the evaluation, our thinking about the range of approaches has evolved.

Supporting policy change by definition rules out many of the traditional tools of government influence which are based on hierarchy (telling) and coercion (imperatives). The approach that comes closest to an authority-based tool is contingent finance, whereby the recipient must comply with the terms of the finance; however, as the recipient is not obliged to take the finance, this is better characterised as a market-based tool relying on the principle of exchange (I will give you ‘x’ if you do ‘y’). The majority of approaches are based on persuasion and rely on convincing others, through appeals to reason, values, or reciprocity of favour, that change is in their best interest.

Our final typology of approaches for supporting policy change is based on the evidence collected during the case studies, in which we identified nine successful approaches to support policy change, which we have grouped into four broad categories:

1. Creating and corraling evidence to convince people to change policy (‘evidence’).
2. Creating and exploiting opportunities to convince people to change (‘convening’) – this includes high-level diplomacy as well as official level meetings.
3. Empowering others to advocate or deliver policy change through capacity building (‘empowering’) – this includes government officials and CSOs.
4. Promising and providing resources to deliver policy change (‘supporting’) – this includes finance and technical advice and assistance.

4 In what circumstances, to what extent, for whom and how has ICF supported change in national and sub-national policy?

4.1 Outcomes

4.1.1 Successful attempts to support change in national and sub-national policy

The three country case studies investigated 17 cases where ICF programmes were thought to have contributed to policy change.

4.1.2 Attempts to support change in national and sub-national policy which have not yet been successful but where there are positive interim outcomes

The three country case studies identified six examples where ICF programmes were thought to have contributed to positive interim outcomes.

Table 11 below shows the identified policy outcomes by programme and country, and the level of support from the evidence that ICF supported the change in policy. These are explored in detail in the relevant country case studies.

Table 12 below shows the identified interim outcomes by programme and country, and the level of support from the evidence that ICF support for policy change contributed to the interim outcome. These are explored in detail in the relevant country case studies.

Table 11: Policy outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were thought to have supported policy change

Policy outcome	Country	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	ICF supporting policy change objective from Business Case (see Table 10)	Level of policy change support (strategic, tactical, financing implementation)	Policy conditions supported by the outcome (motivation, evidence, capacity, systems)	Types of approach supporting policy change deployed	Evidence that ICF supported outcome (from process tracing)
1. National Development Plan makes commitment to new silvopastoral targets.	Colombia	SPS Colombia	●		Informing policy and legal support mechanisms	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems (farming)	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b) Empowering (3a) Support (4a)	Strong
2. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) policy document and law	Colombia	SPS Colombia	●		Informing policy and legal support mechanisms	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems (farming)	Evidence (1a)	Some
3. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Orinoquia region.	Colombia	Biocarbon Fund	●		Supporting policy reform to create an enabling environment for sustainable land use	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems	Empowering (3a) Support (4a)	Strong
4. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Amazonia region.	Colombia	Amazon Vision	●		Improving policy coordination and strengthening the capacity of environmental authorities	Strategic Tactical	Motivation	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d) Empowering (3a)	Some
5. Stronger enforcement of the timber legality assurance system	Indonesia	FGMC	●		Strengthening regulation and enforcement in producer countries	Tactical Financing implementation	Capacity Systems	Convening (2b, 2c) Empowering (3b) Support (4b)	Some
6. Unlocking of the Reforestation Fund for social forestry	Indonesia	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●		Improved planning and licensing processes	Tactical	Evidence	Evidence (1a) Convening (2b) Empowering (3b)	Strong
7. New regulation requiring that all social forestry applications are verified within 22 days.	Indonesia	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●		Improved planning and licensing processes	Tactical Financing implementation	Capacity Systems	Empowering (3a) Support (4b)	Some
8. Tighter regulations to ensure that mining companies comply with licensing requirements.	Indonesia	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●		Improved planning and licensing processes	Tactical	Motivation Evidence Capacity	Evidence (1a) Convening (2d) Empowering (3a, 3b)	Some

Table 11: Policy outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were thought to have supported policy change

Policy outcome	Country	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	ICF supporting policy change objective from Business Case (see Table 10)	Level of policy change support (strategic, tactical, financing implementation)	Policy conditions supported by the outcome (motivation, evidence, capacity, systems)	Types of approach supporting policy change deployed	Evidence that ICF supported outcome (from process tracing)
9. Implementation of ecological fiscal transfer mechanism in two provinces (North Kalimantan and Papua)	Indonesia	SETAPAK (FLAG)		●	Improved planning and licensing processes	Tactical	Evidence Capacity	Evidence (1a) Convening (2b, 2d) Empowering (3a)	Strong
10. Incorporation of a deemed energy clause into the Ugandan standard Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)	Uganda	GET FIT	●		Demonstrating that the right regulatory regime will help attract investment	Tactical Financing implementation	Capacity Systems	Evidence (1a) Convening (2b) Support (4b)	Strong
11. Improved regulation of environmental and social standards during renewable energy project development	Uganda	GET FIT	●		Demonstrating that the right regulatory regime will help attract investment	Tactical Financing implementation	Capacity Systems	Support (4b)	Some

Table 12: Interim outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were thought to have supported policy change

Policy outcome	Country	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	ICF supporting policy change objective from Business Case (see Table 10)	Level of policy change support (strategic, tactical, financing implementation)	Policy conditions supported by the outcome (motivation, evidence, capacity, systems)	Types of approach supporting policy change deployed	Evidence that ICF supported outcome (from process tracing)
1. Development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on ITPS (biodynamic model) that incentivises sustainable farming.	Colombia	SPS Colombia	●		Informing policy and legal support mechanisms	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems (farming)	Evidence (1a) Convening (2b) Empowering (3a)	Some
	Colombia	Amazon Vision	●		Improving policy coordination and strengthening the capacity of environmental authorities	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems (farming)	Evidence (1a) Convening (2b, 2c, 2d) Empowering (3a)	
2. Upcoming policy on sustainable cattle ranching	Colombia	SPS Colombia	●		Informing policy and legal support mechanisms	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Systems (farming)	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b) Empowering (3a)	Some
3. Increased engagement of the Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability	Colombia	SPS Colombia	●		Informing policy and legal support mechanisms	Strategic	Motivation Capacity	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b)	Strong
	Colombia	Amazon Vision	●		Improving policy coordination and strengthening the capacity of environmental authorities	Strategic	Motivation Capacity	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b)	
	Colombia	BioCarbon Fund	●		Supporting policy reform to create an enabling environment for sustainable land use	Strategic	Motivation Capacity	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b)	
4. Ministry of Finance has given a public statement committing to developing a national mechanism that enables national to provincial fiscal transfers to reward strong environmental performance.	Indonesia	FLAG	●		Improved planning and licensing processes	Tactical	Motivation Evidence	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2b) Support (4a)	Strong

Table 12: Interim outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were thought to have supported policy change

Policy outcome	Country	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	ICF supporting policy change objective from Business Case (see Table 10)	Level of policy change support (strategic, tactical, financing implementation)	Policy conditions supported by the outcome (motivation, evidence, capacity, systems)	Types of approach supporting policy change deployed	Evidence that ICF supported outcome (from process tracing)
5. The National Strategic Development Plan (2020–24) now contains a chapter on climate change and disaster resilience for the first time. The Plan also includes a macro indicator on emissions reductions.	Indonesia	LCDI	●		Informing policy dialogue and supporting the policy reform process	Strategic Tactical	Motivation Evidence	Evidence (1a) Convening (2a, 2c) Empowering (3a)	Some
6. Uganda's draft geothermal policy is complete, and it is now working its way through parliament.	Uganda	EAGER	●		Enabling policy improvements to allow geothermal power development	Tactical Financing implementation	Evidence Capacity	Evidence (1a) Support (4b)	Some

4.1.3 Where attempts to support change in national and sub-national policy did not result in the desired effect

ICF provided technical support to the Indonesian Ministry of Planning's Low-Carbon Development Initiative (LCDI) which identified policies that could maintain economic growth whilst also achieving significant reductions in carbon emissions, setting out a number of different scenarios – Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario, moderate (29% reduction by 2030), high (41% by 2030 with international support) and plus (net zero by 2050). ICF helped to develop a number of climate change indicators which were adopted into Indonesia's National Strategic Plan 2020–24. In early 2020 the government of Indonesia adopted the moderate scenario. This is the same as Indonesia's current NDC commitment and was the least ambitious scenario that could have been adopted. The evidence provided by ICF technical support was used by the Ministry of Planning, but they failed to get the cross-government buy-in that was required to opt for a more ambitious target, due to a lack of political will.

In Colombia, the 2050 calculator was found to not have been used by government officials to set NDC commitments. This was due to the timing of the programme which came after the NDC formulation had been done. There was some weak evidence that the 2050 Calculator may have been used at a regional level.


The REM payment-by-results incentive in Colombia was also seen to have taken longer than expected to work because the standards were perceived to be too high in the context of the rise in deforestation after the 2016 peace process.

5 Theory of change – supporting national and sub-national policy change

5.1 Overall CMO

The diagram below shows how support for policy change works.


Figure 2: How support for policy change works



5.2 Strategic, tactical and financing CMOs

The diagram below shows how strategic, tactical and financial approaches to policy change work.


Figure 3: how strategic, tactical and financial approaches to policy change work



5.3 The different elements of policy change

The diagram below shows how the different elements of policy change work; these are expanded upon in the tables that follow.

Figure 4: the different elements of policy change



Overall contexts (national and sub-national support for policy change):

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
There is an opportunity for action because there is a favourable policy environment		
Convincing	8 ICF programmes 41 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 with implementing partners • 4 with CSOs • 22 with government officials • 1 with another donor Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 4 cases • Some support in 7 cases 	<p>“The current president has a huge interest in both the international agenda and the productive systems with the role of environmental issues. And that is when a positive pressure is created to move things in this direction, both international and national pressure because also we, the citizens, are demanding changes worldwide – we are generating the pressure as well.”</p> <p>“The momentum is there with the Paris Agreement. Climate change is there, SDGs and everything is there. The necessary information is already out there to inform the decision making in country. Indonesia is a signatory of the Paris Agreement and we do have a law that ratified the adoption of it.”</p> <p>“The Ugandan government initiated the programme. Therefore, it had strong political support right from the top. That was one of the key factors that caused it to do well. And Uganda is one of a handful of countries in Africa that has a fully liberalised electricity market.”</p> <p>There were no examples of support resulting in policy change where there was not political will in place.</p>
 Policymakers take ownership and ICF support is not prescriptive		
Convincing	6 ICF programmes 28 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 with implementing partners • 3 with CSOs • 13 with government officials • 1 with others Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 6 cases • Some support in 1 case 	<p>“I prefer to work directly hand-in-hand with the UK. Because for example [other donors], they have other priorities.”</p> <p>“One thing about working with the UK is that they never impose on us, they work with us, together, it is teamwork. They never come and say this is my money, you have to do this, no. The UK is different. We always have a bilateral very fluid dialogue.”</p> <p>“There are many supporters from [other countries and MDBs], but sometimes they have their own priorities [...]; usually their projects have their own vision and priorities and then they negotiate it with us [...]. With [the UK] we discussed what is really important for Indonesia.”</p> <p>“A success factor is that the government kind of owns the [ICF programme] and the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Agriculture feel like [the programme] is their own.”</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF creates and corrals evidence to convince people to change policy

Context: Key decision makers are not convinced to make policy change because they do not see the benefits of taking action, or key decision makers are open to change but do not have the evidence they need to mobilise action.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** ICF funds various types of technical assistance, including demonstration projects and technical input to policy development, using trusted experts to generate independent evidence that shows the benefits of taking action and/or that policy will work in practise.
- **Reasoning:** Policymakers are convinced that policy change is the right thing to do and opposition is diffused because key stakeholders can see that there are key benefits to acting and that policy change will work in practise

Outcome: Policymakers have the evidence to act

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Convincing	<p>6 ICF programmes</p> <p>17 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 with implementing partners • 7 with government officials • 1 with a CSO • 1 with other <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 2 cases • Some support in 4 cases 	<p>“The sustainable options are way, way more expensive than the business-as-usual. But [ICF programme] really showed that it's better. And that's really unique in Colombia. Like we don't have those type of experiences where it's cheaper, honestly, to do something sustainably [...]. I think hearing the farmers out of their own mouth saying this is amazing. I love it. And having the government saying the same. It's very unique. Usually, you have a lot of clashes between them.”</p> <p>“It was not that difficult to sell the case because they proved that more sustainable activities are more profitable and sustainable. It wasn't the case that one day the ambassadors/presidents woke up and decided to value the forests – it's all about the business case.”</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF creates opportunities for persuasion at high-level diplomatic meetings		
<p>Context: ICF has a sufficient level of influence within HMG to feed into high-level meetings between UK and recipient country, and the UK's view holds weight for diplomatic reasons.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: ICF uses diplomatic channels to persuade senior government politicians to express support for action to address climate change. • Reasoning: Government officials are motivated to develop and implement policy because they understand it is a political priority. <p>Outcome: Policymakers are motivated to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Tentative	<p>3 ICF programmes</p> <p>7 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 with implementing partners • 4 with government officials • 1 with another donor <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>"We visited the UK with a very high-level agenda. Probably the most important one was the time that the President visited the Queen, and on that occasion, we used the interest that we had on these issues [...]. And we also used the opportunity to move the agenda forward and also ask for help on the areas that we needed help. We used opportunities to make public commitments but subject to the support of the UK to make it possible. But we both used those opportunities to offer our help and also our commitment, and we recognise our commitment".</p> <p>"If you think about it, climate change was not a top priority for [partner government]. When there are these programmes, there is a higher commitment at national level. There are sessions where ministers and vice-ministers are learning about these projects. There are meetings with the UK embassy and German embassy. There was a lot of interaction with the ambassadors of UK, Germany and Norway around the Climate Fund. The meetings to sign the contracts with the ministers' involvement give these topics a higher visibility within the ministry. This leads to a higher level of commitment, maybe not the level of commitment that I would like, but at least some."</p> <p>The UK helped to arrange a meeting between the DFID Minister and the Indonesian Minister for Planning in London. The Indonesian minister then used that publicity and UK endorsement as leverage over his colleagues to push the LCDI agenda within the Ministry of Planning.</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF convenes disparate interests to build shared understanding and common goals		
<p>Context: Policy change and/or implementation is dependent on cooperation between stakeholders who are not aligned with one another and ICF is viewed as a credible and neutral party.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: ICF convenes stakeholders together, creating a neutral space to exchange views and establish the different roles, responsibilities and ways of working that are required to make the proposed policy change work. • Reasoning: Stakeholders build a shared understanding of the benefits of working together to address climate change which increases their capacity to deliver policy change. <p>Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Convincing	<p>6 ICF programmes</p> <p>21 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 with implementing partners • 9 with government officials • 2 with CSOs • 2 with other donors <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 5 cases 	<p>“Actually, there's a new vision in social forestry, where to accelerate and to strengthen the social forestry, it has to be enforced by collaboration between the sectors and ministries. The ministry has to collaborate and coordinate, and also between different levels of governments, the central government to provincial, to regency and so on. And to make this happen, we need [ICF implementing partners and CSOs] to facilitate this kind of collaboration and communication. Because if we only rely on the government, there will be bureaucracy. So, we hope that by collaborating with [ICF implementing partners and CSOs], this will make the collaborations between sectors and levels of government to be easier, more communicative.”</p> <p>“The more meetings that we attended, we got a better understanding, better perceptions.”</p> <p>“There is a big difference. It could be thought that it doesn't matter [who convenes], anybody could have done it, and in fact many embassies do it. However, the UK has a clear focus in at least three areas. The UK embassy says, we know about climate finance, forest protection and forest control with Norway. They are the experts in those areas and that generates trust. So, when the UK convenes a meeting, it is not like ‘another crazy project’, it is from someone that has been working with us over the years constantly and they have credibility.”</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF co-locates expertise to expedite decisions and maintain momentum

Context: Government officials require technical assistance which is dependent on informal interaction and communication between expert consultants and government officials, but external constraints (e.g. not being in the same location) inhibits that close working.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** ICF sets up an office/workspace within government department so that implementing partners can have informal two-way communication with their counterparts with their officials in government.
- **Reasoning:** Policymakers get timely, practical guidance which builds their understanding, allowing them to make faster, more effective decisions.

Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>3 ICF programmes</p> <p>9 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 with implementing partners • 2 with government officials • 1 with other donors <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>“You really want to know which part of your back needs be scratched. That is something that can only be observed if you are there and part of the system and activities there.”</p> <p>“I think it's really useful being based here [...] it means that people can just pop over, and we can just walk over to their offices. And it makes things a lot more fluid and easier to do informal things, just because we're here. I think that's actually proven to be really important. If we were outside of it, it wouldn't be the same.”</p> <p>“If you've got people on-hand to answer questions as and when they arise, that's a very efficient use of everybody's time and time means funding - money - so, I think it is an effective and efficient way of going about it.”</p>

Being associated with successful ICF programmes creates 'reflected glory' which opens doors

Context: ICF programmes are perceived to have high standards with access to resources and influence.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** ICF provides technical assistance and resources to government officials as part of a programme to provide support to policy change.
- **Reasoning:** Officials perceived by other stakeholders as having access to resources and influence, so they are willing to involve those officials in policy development because they are seen as having the capacity to deliver.

Outcome: Policymakers are motivated to act.

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Tentative	<p>3 ICF programmes</p> <p>6 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 with implementing partners • 3 with government officials • 1 with a CSO <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>“It is a very powerful program. So, I think [the President] got into that. And since he saw results in a very difficult time, he's facing now, he's like this is good. This is good press. We need this now.”</p> <p>“It's all about reputation and differentiation. Behaviour only changes when the markets ask for it.”</p> <p>“And the governor was very happy about that because it was the first in Indonesia.”</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF increase capability of government officials by transferring knowledge

Context: Government officials know what they want to achieve, but progress is stalled because they do not know how to achieve it, or they lack some relevant technical information for policy design or implementation, or they are not sure whether their ideas would work.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** ICF provides technical assistance which generates the necessary data, information, knowledge, and/or tools required to move forward.
- **Reasoning:** Government officials have increased capability to deliver policy change because they have a better understanding of how to design and implement a particular policy.

Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Convincing	7 ICF programmes 40 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 with implementing partners • 19 with government officials • 4 with CSOs • 1 with other Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 4 cases • Some support in 8 cases 	<p>"It gives us more confidence to do something about the idea, because, at the beginning, we had the initiative, but we were confused about how to follow it up. And yes, [ICF implementing partner] provided us with technical assistance on how to establish the regulation and we felt more confident."</p> <p>"I tell my colleagues - the things I learned in my five years under [ICF programme], I would need about 20 years if I was to go to school. [...] I consider myself privileged to have been in the right place at the right time."</p> <p>"[ICF programme] has already given us an idea of how to do cattle ranching sustainably. It gave us the path to work to and the design of the cattle ranching policy. It's not ready yet, but we are working very closely on it now with [implementing partner] and [government ministry]. It is helping policy development by telling us how to do it in a better way".</p>

Building the capacity of civil society enables it to contribute to policy development

Context: CSOs are committed to advocating for climate change but lack funds, skills and/or the coordination to do so.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** ICF provides training/funding/coordination for CSOs to enable them to provide information, scrutinise government performance and provide recommendations.
- **Reasoning:** Policymakers have a better understanding of community needs, resulting in more effective policymaking.

Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	2 ICF programmes 23 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 with implementing partners • 13 with government officials • 6 with CSOs Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>"We think that [ICF-supported national CSO] as an organisation was an essential part of our policy making and implementing because they have been monitoring the use of the Reforestation Fund in the field, in the local governments. They monitor the [provinces], and they give us input from this monitoring and evaluation process – they give us reports and papers."</p> <p>"It's very important to have pressure from outside to keep that pressure on the government. And also, if the President thinks there is pressure, if there are interventions, then the President from this office thinks the people still want it, and so [the pressure] makes it continue and pushes for improvements."</p> <p>"So, we also expect the CSOs to be more critical against us, so we can improve ourselves to be more cautious in issuing recommendations."</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF works with well-connected CSOs to provide new channels to influence stakeholders		
<p>Context: CSOs are well-connected with senior government officials at a national and sub-national level.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: CSOs provide channels for evidence and/or advocacy that are not available to ICF directly. • Reasoning: ICF can influence stakeholders that would otherwise be inaccessible. <p>Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>2 ICF programmes</p> <p>13 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 with implementing partners • 5 with government officials • 3 with CSOs <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 1 case 	<p>“The story is the governor, before he became the governor, is my friend. That's why it is easier in [province] to advocate to the local government. We can create the programme in [province] related to the mining, forestry and environment and generate some local regulations. The government style is a top down process. If you know the top leader, you can organize, if you don't know then it is difficult to advocate.”</p> <p>“Actually, I've been working with [senior government official] for some time, so the relationship was built before [this programme]. There are many partners working but he asked us to draft [key document], I think it means something. It means we are trusted because it is really sensitive.”</p>

ICF promises support in return for policy change		
<p>Context: Senior government officials want to act but lack the resources to do so.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: ICF promises support (financial and/or programmatic) to help deliver/implement policy change. • Reasoning: Government officials have increased motivation to implement change because they have the confidence that they can deliver stakeholder benefits. <p>Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>4 ICF programmes</p> <p>8 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 with implementing partners • 5 with government officials • 1 with another donor <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 3 cases 	<p>“Having this letter/mandate, the possibility of support from those countries, clearly, for those of us that have been trying to push this agenda, then we suddenly have a higher weight because we have those international partners. Then we (the technicians/those pushing this agenda in Colombia) have this, we a higher weight at higher levels, there is an increase in the visibility of the problem. In addition to this, we have been good at capitalising on this by positioning ourselves on the international agenda on environmental issues.”</p> <p>“[When the President's office] heard that we had the JDI, that we had [money] in the bank [...] they were shocked. And one [official] said ‘no I'm sorry, now this is being taken on by us, tomorrow we are going to have all of the ministries in here’ – and they did.”</p> <p>In Indonesia, ICF offered technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance to develop a national indicator for EFT if they chose to implement the policy, as well as support to expand the roll-out of provincial EFT across Indonesia.</p>

Specific CMOs (support for national and sub-national policy change):

ICF provides financial support to ensure policy delivery		
<p>Context: Partner governments are motivated and have plans for policy change but lack the financial and/or human resources to implement them.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: ICF pays for activities that are required to deliver policy change. • Reasoning: Government officials have increased capacity to deliver policy change because they have the resources they need to make sure it happens. <p>Outcome: Policymakers have the capacity to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>2 ICF programmes</p> <p>11 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 with implementing partners • 6 with government officials • 1 with another donor • 1 with other <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 4 cases 	<p>In one ICF programme in Indonesia, the senior government officials knew what they wanted to do, how they wanted to do it and the expert consultant(s) they wanted to tender for the work. ICF simply paid for the consultant(s) that were chosen.</p> <p>“We have our strategic plan. And let's say this area of priority will be funded by us and there is a gap with this area, if you would like to fill this in, please come in.”</p> <p>In Uganda, one consultant after another has been used by the Geothermal Resources Department (GRD) to deliver its policy development programme. Following the EAGER programme, the GRD applied to the UN CTCN to continue the work that EAGER had progressed.</p>

6 Case Study: Supporting change in Indonesia's national and provincial forestry and land-use policy and low-carbon development policy

6.1 Policy context

In 2015 Indonesia was the world's fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Its NDC includes an emissions reduction target of 29% below BAU by 2030, plus a conditional target of up to 41% reductions with international support. Indonesia's National Energy Policy also has a target to have renewable energy as 23% of the total energy supply by 2025. As a G20 member country, Indonesia is highly visible and is receiving increasing international scrutiny with regard to its environmental targets.

Climate change policy is influenced by several ministries, including Finance, Planning, Environment and Forestry, Energy and Mineral Resources. Ministries have a poor track record of working together and sharing information. Coordinating ministries have been established to address this problem, but progress is slow.

The economic and political decentralisation of Indonesia has shifted power to provincial governments. As a result, legislation introduced by the national government must be translated into provincial regulation before it can be implemented on the ground. However, the lack of coordination between national and sub-national government officials makes the implementation of policy difficult.

At a national level, policymakers in central government are reliant on information, evidence and cooperation from other ministries with different aims and objectives, as well as sub-national governments in the provinces.

The lack of resource at a provincial level in terms of expertise and financial support has been a significant barrier to the speed and effectiveness of policy implementation and enforcement once policy has been introduced.

Indonesia has a history of corruption, particularly in the extractive industries. Following the move to regional autonomy, district governments were given the power to issue permits and there was a sharp rise in the number of licenses granted and poor governance. However, the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) is a strong voice within government and is taking steps to improve the operation of those industries.

In the post-Suharto era under the President Joko Widodo administration, there has been a significant effort to become more open and transparent, with a strong role for civil society to inform policy and to hold the government to account.

6.2 UK strategy and interventions

All UK development cooperation is channelled through the UK Climate Change Unit (UKCCU) housed in the embassy in Jakarta. As Indonesia is a fellow G20 country, a partnership approach is key and support is positioned as two countries working together on a global issue with a particular focus on forestry, land use, governance and low-carbon development. The government of Indonesia has its own existing focus areas, targets and presidential mandates with regard to climate change. The UKCCU describes its approach as "strategically opportunistic", designed to support the implementation of existing policies and the delivery of new policies that align with UK priorities.

¹² This information came from the document review for the PIS and interviews with senior responsible officers and ICF programme teams in Indonesia.

By providing robust evidence on how existing policy is working in practice, the UK aims to improve the understanding of government officials of what needs to be done and how to do it, giving them the information required to make the case for change. The UK does that in two main ways – by commissioning research and analysis by expert consultants to give decision makers increased knowledge of benefits that can be realised, and by supporting CSOs to gather evidence from the field to help bridge the information gaps between siloed ministries and levels of government.

Through its programming, the UK has built a coalition of CSOs at a national and sub-national level to create an understanding of the collective resources available and how best to approach the government in a coordinated way. The UK provides training and resourcing for CSOs to gather evidence from the field on how policy is working, increasing their capacity and skills to act as watchdogs, and to lobby and support policymakers with recommendations for how policy can be improved.

Where government officials are committed to policy change but lack the resources or knowledge to act on that commitment, the UK provides expert technical assistance through its implementing partners who have specific environmental and/or legal expertise to increase the capacity of government to create new policy, including the design and drafting of new regulation. Where government officials know what needs to be done, how they want to do it, and, in many cases, the consultant they want to do the work – then the UK simply pays for the expertise that is required, rather than choosing the experts or deciding what should be done. In this way, the UK helps Indonesia do the things it wants to do in the way it wants to do them.

The UK also acts as a convenor to bring together decision makers from different ministries, levels of government, private sector stakeholders and civil society with the aim of building understanding of respective priorities and agreeing a way forward in certain policy areas. In some cases, the UK does this itself and, in some cases, it supports well-connected CSOs to do this.

6.3 Policy outcome 1: tighter regulation of mining permits

As a result of decentralisation and regional autonomy in the early 2000s, the power to issue mining concessions was granted to district governments. This led to a rapid increase in the number of licenses being granted. Many district governments did not have the capacity or capability to conduct thorough due diligence during the application process and, as a result, almost 60% of the mining licenses had issues such as overlapping with other permits.

In 2011, KPK started a new initiative to save Indonesia's natural resources and tackle corruption and non-compliance in the extractive industries. They created a new programme of activity requiring that all licenses needed to meet 'clean and clear' guidelines. A 'clean and clear' license is one that is not overlapping with others, is legally obtained and is compliant with regulations around tax and post-mining land reclamation.

The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has now issued tighter regulations to ensure that mining companies comply with the licensing requirements around post-mining land reclamation and the payment of taxes. They have also brought in a new centralised, integrated system that holds data about all of licenses that are operational in Indonesia – this information is public and published on the ministry's website. Enforcement has also improved with a large number of permits being revoked for non-compliance.

At a sub-national level, several provinces have also issued new governor regulations designed to tighten regulation around post-mining land reclamation.

6.3.1 ICF's approach and impact on policy change

The ICF SETAPAK (Improving Forestry, Land-Use and Governance in Indonesia)) programme has been supporting KPK, ESDM and sub-national governments to review licenses, monitor compliance and tighten regulation around mining permits. The SETAPAK programme has been able to successfully support change in policy as it has aligned itself with the existing priorities of the government in tackling corruption within the natural resources sector.

A new regulation requiring that all permit documentation must be transferred from the district to the provincial level provided a clear opportunity for the review of all mining permits that had been granted in the licensing boom of the 2000s. SETAPAK was able to use this momentum, hosting industry events to advocate for the reformation of the industry and empowering internal champions within the ministry by publicly rewarding their commitment to improved governance.

SETAPAK funds a number of national and sub-national CSOs to gather evidence from the field and bridge the information gap between the provinces and the central government in Jakarta about how the mining licensing system is working in practice; for example, the amount of unpaid non-tax revenue by mining companies and which permits are overlapping with each other. This information is often obtained by submitting freedom of information requests to provincial government. By building a network of CSOs who were already working with local government officials at a sub-national level, ICF was able to leverage existing relationships and partner with organisations that were already known and trusted by the officials concerned.

This evidence was then presented to the ministry by the national CSOs in the form of policy briefs with recommendations for how to improve the system, providing senior government officials with an increased understanding of what needed to be done and giving them the confidence to introduce tighter regulation that addressed the issues. For example, CSO data about the amount of unpaid non-tax revenue was used to help diffuse opposition to reform by highlighting that tighter regulation (and the revoking of permits) would not lead to a loss in income revenue.

ICF implementing partners and supported CSOs attend regular focus group discussions with the ministry and these are used by the government officials as consultation sessions. By consulting the CSOs who are embedded at a sub-national level and working closely with local government officials to monitor compliance, government officials can be more confident that the new regulations will be fit for purpose and address the key issues in the provinces. Whilst the government drafted the new policy themselves, they have added in several new articles as a result of consultation with CSOs.

“They also propose things to make the policy better. They supply us with the input, very critical sometimes, good critiques and we accept that, and we use that when we review or revise the policy. Their inputs become one of the considerations.”

In North Kalimantan, ICF was able to leverage informal networks by engaging a CSO who had personal links to the governor and was a trusted partner. ICF funded the CSO – who had specific legal and environmental expertise – and they signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department for Energy and Mineral Resources to review all of the mining concessions in the province. The local government had the political will to implement the policy and introduce stricter controls but lacked the skills, knowledge and experience. The CSO supplied recommendations on which permits should be revoked based on the ‘clean and clear’ guidance and also drafted a new governor regulation relating to the management of mining licenses, advocating for the inclusion of several new articles relating to the openness of information, data systems, the reclamation of post-mining land and grievance mechanisms.

“With the expert advice and experience of [the CSO], the department is really helped because we have limited resources [...]; with the additional resource we can accelerate through the whole process and [the CSO] gave us more energy.”

This way of working – with CSOs supporting local government officials who lack environmental and legal knowledge with regard to the ‘clean and clear’ guidance and the revocation of non-compliant permits – has been replicated in numerous provinces as part of the SETAPAK programme. ICF has also provided advocacy training for CSOs on how to develop more effective policy briefs to lobby the government at a sub-national level to bring in tighter checks and regulations, as well as funding support to cover operational costs.

6.3.2 Other contributing factors

ESDM is seeking to modernise the mining licensing system in line with international standards. The ministry has been looking at how other high coal producing countries – such as Canada and Australia – have used technology to improve mining governance. This has also given them a better understanding of how tighter regulation and digitisation can be replicated in Indonesia.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis showed that there is strong support for the alternative hypothesis that the ‘clean and clear’ initiative would have taken place in the absence of the UK’s intervention because it was championed by KPK. However, there is some support for the claim that the UK influenced the successful implementation of the initiative by facilitating knowledge transfer and advocacy by CSOs.

6.4 Policy outcome 2: strengthening of the legal timber verification system

The Forest Governance, Markets and Climate (FGMC) programme has been supporting the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) since 2010 to develop and strengthen Indonesia’s sustainable timber verification system (SVLK) as a condition of the Indonesia-EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA), ensuring that all timber exports to the EU are legal and sustainable.

The SVLK is now fully operational, with a formal established role for CSOs who monitor and verify the actions of the private sector. The timber sector has been transformed – in 2005, more than 80% of exports were illegal and now all exports are independently verified as meeting all ESG and legal standards.¹³

6.4.1 ICF’s approach and impact on policy change

The political will to involve civil society in the process was already in place as part of a wider national initiative to increase transparency and openness in the post-Suharto era, which was a key context for the adoption of the multi-stakeholder approach supported by FGMC. However, the KLHK lacked the capacity and capability to manage all aspects of implementing the new SVLK framework, and the UK was seen as a partner who could deliver and support the existing aims and objectives of the ministry.

¹³ DFID (2017) Annual Review: Forest Governance Markets and Climate (FGMC).

Based in Jakarta, one of the main issues facing the ministry was their lack of knowledge of how the SVLK system was working in the field – which regulations were working, and which needed to be adapted – and their capacity to enforce the regulation in the provinces. To overcome this, and generate the evidence required for government officials to feel confident enough to commit resources to changing the system, ICF engaged with existing CSOs to provide training and increase their capacity and capability to monitor and verify timber companies operating in the heavily forested provinces. ICF provides financial support for these CSOs to continue operating as watchdogs, and they were formally recognised as part of the SVLK. These organisations regularly feed back to the ministry on how the system is working in practice and make recommendations on how it can be improved.

“The [CSOs] have been really involved in this whole process, from defining legality in the first place. And then a continuous process of strengthening the regulations, so the [CSOs] do an investigation: they point out the crimes or the problems, and they also actually make longer-term recommendations for which regulations need to be strengthened and how to do that.”

Although evidence from CSOs alone was not enough to affect policy change, it was a catalyst for government officials to commission further work to strengthen the system. When the ministry needs external consultants to work on aspects of the SVLK, ICF pays for the consultants to provide additional expert capacity.

Within government, the SVLK system requires different departments to work together when responding to cases of illegality. However, these departments have different roles and responsibilities and their mandates do not always align – for example, law enforcement and timber administration have differing views on how cases should be handled. As external parties, ICF’s implementing partners have engaged bilaterally with these different departments and, because they are seen as honest brokers, key government stakeholders were willing to start engaging in a convening process to agree a way forward.

The location of the Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme phase 4 (MFP4) office within the KLHK building itself has helped to facilitate a close working relationship between ICF and government officials. With both parties available for informal discussions and quick responses when urgent matters need to be escalated, decisions relating to SVLK can be made more effectively as a result of improved communication channels.

“This close relationship is needed for most of us actually [...]. If there is something important, we just can talk. We just come and pop in and talk. If we need something, let's say the ministry need to have something urgent, and we have the knowledge and people are close to this office it's much easier.”

The ongoing strengthening and improvement of the SVLK is dependent on input from the wide range of stakeholders who play different roles within the system, including the private sector (logging companies, timber manufacturers, exporters), CSOs and national and sub-national government officials from across the country. The KLHK lacked the human and financial resource to bring these stakeholders together. ICF funds and manages secretariat support for the ministry (including the Joint Implementation Committee of the VPA), managing logistics and coordinating meetings attended by stakeholders from across Indonesia. This practical support to the convening process is important, ensuring that there are regular and consistent opportunities for stakeholders to be consulted, building a shared understanding of how the SVLK is working and agreeing a way forward, giving the government confidence that the system will be a success.

6.4.2 Other contributing factors

FGMC is one of numerous programmes and donor-supported initiatives working with the Indonesian government to improve legality and sustainability in the natural resources sector. With growing international pressure and rejection of non-sustainable timber exports, the government already had a strong existing incentive to strengthen the SVLK in line with international standards to secure future trade.

The way the VPA is designed also gives the EU a strong say over any changes made to how the SVLK is implemented and the formal role of civil society. The EU can apply significant pressure on the government to comply with its commitments. For example, when the Minister of Coordinating Economic Affairs made a statement to say that they were considering changing the system so that the verification process did not apply to exports not going to the EU, or to furniture companies, many CSOs were concerned that supply chain control would be fundamentally compromised. The European Commission then wrote a letter to the minister asking for further clarification, making it clear that the consequences of implementing that measure would mean that the VPA would be broken and Indonesia would lose access to the European timber market.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates strong support for the alternative hypothesis that the transformation of the timber sector was predominantly due to the VPA and the need for Indonesia to adapt or lose their ability to trade. However, there is some support for the claim that ICF's implementing partners engaged bilaterally and formed close working relationships with government officials which provided practical support for the policy change

6.5 Policy outcome 3: Effective implementation of social forestry initiative

The SETAPAK programme has been supporting the KLHK to deliver on the presidential mandate to allocate 12.7m hectares to social forestry in the 2016–2020 Strategic National Plan.

SETAPAK advocated the use of the Reforestation Fund to increase the financial support available for social forestry and it has now been included as one of the activities that the fund can be used for. The government also introduced a new regulation requiring all social forestry permit proposals to have a technical assessment and be verified within 22 days. These two regulation changes, along with the increased capacity of junior government officials, has resulted in the acceleration and more effective implementation of social forestry across Indonesia.

6.5.1 ICF's approach and impact on policy change

In a similar way to how the SETAPAK programme supported the ESDM to review mining permits and deliver tighter regulation, a SETAPAK-funded national CSO working on public finance management reform coordinated the gathering of evidence relating to the problems faced by sub-national government officials regarding the underspend of the Reforestation Fund that had been transferred to local government accounts. These funds were locked to forest rehabilitation and could not be used for social forestry despite the underspend and lack of budget allocation for social forestry.

The opportunity to advocate for policy change arose as the government was already under pressure to release funds for local governments to act due to forest fires. Social forestry was then included as part of the wider change process. By presenting this evidence at focus group discussions with the DG Fiscal Balance, CSOs were able to provide information that was lacking at a national level, and government officials were given the confidence to make changes to the use of the fund.

“We think that [ICF-supported national CSO] as an organisation was an essential part of our policy making and implementing because they have been monitoring the use of the reforestation fund in the field, in the local governments. They monitor the [provinces], and they give us input from this monitoring and evaluation process – they give us reports and papers.”

“The input given by [ICF-supported national CSO] was a general idea that was already in our minds but because of their input, we felt assured about the regulation because we had a third-party perspective, so we felt that it was a good regulation.”

With multiple national CSOs with different priorities, expertise and networks, there was a need for a coordinated strategy. ICF was able to convene these CSOs and build a coalition, creating a shared understanding of the collective resources and how best to approach the government. This joined-up approach was key to the success of the interaction between the government and civil society.

Local government officials had previously raised the issue with national government, including the Ministry of Finance, without success. This was due to the fact that the Reforestation Fund underspend needed to be resolved by three different line ministries with poor coordination between them. Operating outside of the government structure, an ICF-supported national CSO was able to act as a go-between, bringing the different ministries together to build a shared understanding of what needed to be done and how to do it.

“The first one is to develop the common understanding about the problem. And then the second to develop commitment, how to solve the problem and who does what. And then the CSO coalition acts as an oversight to ensure that the commitment is implemented by each of the line ministries.”

Once the Reforestation Fund was unlocked, ICF provided training for sub-national CSOs on budget advocacy and how the fund could be used to support the communities they are working with to accelerate social forestry. This enabled them to lobby local government officials to access the funds. CSOs also provided technical assistance to junior government officials who lacked experience with regard to social forestry, forming part of local task forces and helping them process permits more effectively.

ICF also provided technical assistance to the KLHK. ICF’s implementing partner provides forestry experts to form part of the ‘fly in team’, who go out to the provinces to verify permit applications and ensure that they are processed within the fixed 22-day timeframe. By helping to accelerate the implementation of social forestry, ICF aligned itself with a strong government mandate with a lot of momentum behind it. ICF was able to help plug the gaps and support the government with key resource and expert capacity to help with implementation.

6.5.2 Other contributing factors

The presidential commitment to social forestry has given the government a strong mandate to deliver, including regulation that required the setting-up of regional task forces to accelerate the number of permits being issued. The task forces enable stakeholders to build a collective understanding of issues relating to implementation and work collaboratively to come up with solutions, holding each other to account.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis found strong support for the claim that evidence collected by ICF-funded CSOs along with the coordinated strategy of ICF was key to the release of the Reforestation Fund at both national and sub-national levels.

6.6 Policy outcome 4: new Ecological Fiscal Transfer (EFT) policy developed

The EFT policy is a fiscal transfer from a higher level of government (national, provincial, district) to lower-level government in each jurisdiction (provincial, district, village) based on their performance with regard to protecting the environment.

There are two types of EFT: TAPE (provincial to district) and TAKE (district to village). These have been successfully adopted in North Kalimantan and Papua respectively, with 12 other sub-national governments committing to adopting EFT in their jurisdictions. The development and implementation of TANE (national to provincial) has been given official backing by the Ministry of Finance and the KLHK.

6.6.1 ICF's approach and impact on policy change

EFT is an innovative concept designed in collaboration between the Centre for Climate Change Financing within the Indonesian Fiscal Policy Agency and UKCCU and its implementing partners. There had already been close cooperation between the Agency and UKCCU in 2014 to produce a document used to evaluate how green budgets are to inform future planning. EFT aimed to shift the paradigm to move from conventional regional transfer to a greener, performance-based transfer, using it as one of the tools to help meet Indonesia's environmental commitments. The government is under political pressure to meet its NDC targets and national targets, and the DG Fiscal Balance was already going through a process of reforming the regional fiscal transfer process, providing a timely opportunity to advocate a new fiscal mechanism that would contribute to the achievement of Indonesia's green milestones.

The adoption of EFT was dependent on the Ministry of Finance committing to the concept and passing new regulation, but both the Fiscal Policy Agency and UKCCU were struggling to get traction at the ministry due to a lack of understanding of the idea and evidence that it would work. UKCCU and the agency decided to pilot EFT at a sub-national level, generating evidence that they could then take back and present to the ministry. ICF worked with trusted CSOs to leverage existing relationships with local governments in heavily forested provinces (North Kalimantan and Papua) who were already committed to conservation, but lacked a mechanism to incentivise and reward good performance, providing technical assistance and expert capacity to design and implement new EFT regulation.

In Indonesia, all national policy needs to be translated into local regulation for implementation, so having a working system put in place at a provincial and district level provided those advocating for EFT inside and outside government with a strong lobbying position to engage with the Ministry of Finance. The fact that EFT could work within the existing system, without the need for a complete systems overhaul, was felt to be an important factor in the ministry giving its backing to the idea.

“EFT operates at the provincial level, giving incentive to the district and also municipal, without any fiscal pressure to the existing budget. This just changes the allocation, the way of allocation [...] we just change the mechanism.”

The Fiscal Policy Agency used the evidence generated by the pilots to lobby internally with the ministry, presenting a set of recommendations for how EFT could be incorporated into the process of reforming regional transfer already being undertaken by the DG Fiscal Balance. The UKCCU and its implementing partners used the same evidence to lobby externally, convening a national event to present EFT, inviting senior government officials from the Ministry of Finance, KLHK and the Ministry of Planning, as well as sub-national government officials from all over Indonesia. This was followed up by two regional workshops in the provinces to discuss how TAKE/TAPE could be replicated in new provinces. ICF was able to present a clear replicable model and the offer of support from implementing partners to implement EFT in new provinces.

As a G20 partner, the UK was able to use formal high-level meetings with the ministry to not only advocate EFT, but also to offer programmatic support to implement it at a national level.

“So, you can imagine if the UK discusses with the Minister, and they just discuss the initial idea without any evidence then this is just an academic discussion [...] without any evidence. I think it's a different feeling if the UK comes to the Minister and says okay, so we've already implemented a very progressive issue and we already have the evidence from the local government, we have several champions and we can now support you to showcase all of the champions [...]. I think it's a very different angle with a different output.”

For EFT to work at a national level, there needs to be strong collaboration between ministries across government. ICF has delivered a multi-stakeholder workshop attended by different departments within the Ministry of Finance and the KLHK to discuss ideas around how to construct the TANE indicators, building a shared understanding of what the national EFT policy indicators could be. This process is ongoing.

6.6.2 Other contributing factors

The Climate Change Centre within the Fiscal Policy Agency has a strong reputation for green innovation within the Ministry of Finance, and is able to work internally, leveraging informal networks, to persuade the DG Fiscal Balance that EFT is a viable tool to help them meet their own environmental commitments.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates strong support that this intervention provided those advocating for the wider adoption of EFT with the evidence required to persuade national policymakers that EFT should be adopted at a national level. This has yet to result in national policy, although the national government has verbally agreed to its extension.

6.7 Outcome 5: mainstreaming low-carbon development into national planning

The Low-Carbon Development Initiative (LCDI) has been supporting the Ministry of Planning to incorporate environmental indicators into the development of Indonesia's National Strategic Plan 2020–24. LCDI produced a number of scenarios based on different levels of carbon emission reduction – BAU, moderate (29% reduction by 2030), high (41% reduction by 2030 with international support) and plus (net zero by 2050).

The moderate scenario has now been adopted into the National Strategic Plan as government policy, in line with Indonesia's existing NDC commitments. This was the least ambitious scenario that could have been adopted as a target.

6.7.1 ICF's approach and impact on policy change

At a strategic meeting between UKCCU and the Vice-Minister of Planning in 2017, the Stern Review on the economics of climate change was discussed. Senior government ministers within the ministry, including the minister, already had a strong willingness to include environmental sustainability in future development planning and decided to work collaboratively with the UK to develop their own review on the economics of climate change for Indonesia. Due to the timing of the discussions, with the upcoming National Strategic Plan 2020–2024 being developed, the ministry decided that instead of simply commissioning a review, there was an opportunity to work with the UK to mainstream Indonesia's commitment to addressing climate change into the planning process.

As a result, the UK established the LCDI for Indonesia, funded by DFID and comprising a consortium of partners.¹⁴ LCDI provided expert technical assistance to create a dynamic systems model that includes over 1000 climate change indicators, delivering the four different scenarios and providing robust evidence that Indonesia can significantly reduce carbon emissions whilst still keeping the economic growth that is required. This evidence was used by the Ministry of Planning in negotiations with other key ministries within government in the decision-making process. An expert from the World Resources Institute Indonesia was seconded into the ministry as part of the internal LCDI team for three days a week, providing direct support to the minister and his deputies.

UKCCU also provided diplomatic support, helping to coordinate a high-profile meeting between the Indonesian Minister for Planning and the DFID Secretary of State on a UK visit in 2019. LCDI was discussed and the secretary of state gave public backing to the approach, positioning LCDI as an innovative initiative between two G20 partners. This UK seal of approval was used by the Minister for Planning to enhance the reputation of LCDI and justify his position that there did not need to be a trade-off between economic growth and environmental sustainability – the minister published a press release on the Ministry of Planning's website and used the meeting as leverage over colleagues within the ministry who were sceptical of the LCDI approach.

¹⁴ UK Climate Change Unit, New Climate Economy, WRI Indonesia, Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Indonesia Institute of Deliverology (IDeA), Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) with support from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

In early 2020 the government issued its five-year National Strategic Development Plan, adopting the moderate scenario in line with Indonesia's existing NDC commitments. The LCDI intervention failed to increase the ambition of the Indonesian government with regard to emissions reductions. The adoption of more ambitious targets was highly dependent on support from a number of different ministries, and the ability of those ministries to deliver the implementation of new policy. During cross-government negotiations, some ministries felt that the raising the ambition would be unrealistic as the structures were not yet in place to meet higher targets. For example, for Indonesia to achieve a higher level of emissions reductions, the renewable energy contribution to the energy mix (currently at 7%) needs to be significantly increased, but the Ministry of Energy felt that the renewables industry was not yet ready to support that shift. LCDI has now been extended to May 2021 to help put in place structures at a provincial level with a view to increase the capacity of government to achieve higher emission reduction targets in the future.

Although LCDI failed to achieve the adoption of the 'high' or 'plus' scenarios, ICF representatives felt that the inclusion in the National Strategic Development Plan of a new chapter on climate change and disaster resilience was a significant achievement, demonstrating the willingness of the Indonesian government to mainstream climate considerations into planning. This was reinforced by the inclusion of a macro indicator on emissions reductions for the first time, holding the government to account on its NDC commitment – whereas before the indicators had been focussed on inflation, GDP and population numbers.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates some support for the claim that evidence from the dynamic systems model - which was created by technical assistance supported by DFID - enabled policy advocates to make the case to for a more ambitious policy; however, they were not successful in obtaining support from others.

6.8 Unintended consequences

The ICF interventions that channel support through the CSO approach are dependent on existing informal networks and relationships that the CSOs have with local government officials. The sustainability of policy change and implementation can then be put at risk with personnel changes in key positions and much of the good work can be undone. We found evidence of this happening in one province in Indonesia. In one province, a CSO had a strong relationship with the governor and had an agreement in place to review all of the mining permits in the region. When the governor changed, the CSO identified several cases where tighter licensing requirements were not being implemented but the new governor was less receptive.

"In [province] we had a good relationship with the previous governor, but it is difficult with the new governor, he is not good for civil society and NGOs."

We also found evidence where a well-connected CSO changed their strategy and stopped working with ICF as a result of the amount of resource required to meet reporting demands. This had the unintended consequence of the ICF programme losing access to the local knowledge and networks available to that particular CSO.

6.9 Conclusion

ICF has been able to successfully support policy change in Indonesia by taking an opportunistic approach to supporting policy change. As the government in Indonesia has a strong sense of what it wants to do, with its own existing focus areas, targets and presidential mandates, ICF support has mainly been focussed on helping Indonesia deliver on its existing ambition. A key context for all interventions was the informal network and way of working in Indonesia, where those inside and outside government leverage existing relationships and contacts to push certain agendas. By choosing to work through trusted, well-connected individuals/partners, ICF was able to tap into this resource and reach the people it needed to reach more effectively.

We found evidence that ICF did this by supporting the Indonesian government in the following ways:

- **Holding government officials to account** – by providing training and resources to CSOs, ICF supported them to provide key information from the field on how policy is working in practise, whether it was being successfully enforced, and recommendations for how it could be improved. Working with CSOs was particularly successful at a sub-national level because the CSOs had existing relationships – and informal networks – which they could leverage within local government to advocate for policy change. The involvement of civil society had a positive impact as government officials did not want to be publicly held accountable for a failure to take action which would damage their reputation.
- **Acting as a convenor** – where successful policy implementation was dependent on collaboration and coordination between ministries, but they were not aligned, then ICF was able to leverage existing bilateral relationships with those stakeholders (often through informal networks), bring those key line ministries together to build a shared understanding of the benefits of working together. ICF-led convening increased the capacity of those stakeholders by opening up communication channels between them and improving their knowledge of how they needed to work together to implement policy change.
- **Increasing capability of government officials** – where a policy initiative had been put in place at a national level but was not being implemented at a sub-national level because of a lack of capacity of local government officials, ICF was able to assist with delivery by providing technical expertise to local government officials to help conduct permit reviews and draft new regulation. This provided local government officials with the know-how and capability required to implement the national policy.
- **Financing policy implementation** – paying for technical assistance. This approach worked because the government knew what it wanted to do, how it wanted to do it and – in some cases – the consultants/experts it wanted to bring in to deliver the work. This also aligned with UK priorities. By providing additional financial resource, ICF helped the Indonesian government achieve what it wanted to achieve in terms of strengthening the SVLK system to meet the requirements of the VPA and maintain access to the EU market.
- **Colocation** – The colocation of ICF programme offices within government offices was particularly effective in this context, enabling informal, constant communication between ICF and the KLHK without the need for formal meetings. This increased the capacity of government officials to be able to solve problems as and when they occurred, making quicker and more effective decisions because they had a direct line of communication to expert advice.
- **Generating evidence** – where government officials were pushing internally for a policy change and needed to persuade others, ICF helped to equip those advocates with evidence that gave them the confidence to make a convincing case for change. It did this by running pilots in provinces to provide robust evidence that demonstrated the effectiveness of a new policy, and also by commissioning research and analysis by expert consultants to show the benefits of action. This independent evidence from trusted experts helped to diffuse opposition to policy change by demonstrating that change was possible and desirable.

Although UK support has resulted in Indonesia having the resources to deliver policy change more effectively and sooner than it would have otherwise done, ICF has been unable to persuade Indonesia to increase its ambition with regard to climate change. Where ICF attempted more strategic support for policy change - as in the case of LCDI - the approach was ultimately unsuccessful. The high-level persuasion and the evidence that was generated in support of the initiative was not sufficient to overcome the lack of political will across government (outside of the Ministry of Planning) for increased ambition, as a result of the appropriate structures not being in place to support action. Whereas the VPA gave the EU significant leverage to persuade Indonesia to deliver a new policy framework for sustainable timber - and ensures compliance by providing conditional market access for exports - the UK has no such leverage. This appears to have limited the scope of ICF's support for policy change to those opportunities where it can plug in to support Indonesia's existing aims and objectives.

7 Case Study: Supporting change in Colombia's national and regional forestry and land-use policy

7.1 Context to policy making in Colombia

Deforestation in Colombia has been monitored by Colombian Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies Institute (IDEAM) since 2012. It recorded a peak of 219,973 hectares lost in 2017.¹⁵

Faced with this rise in deforestation, the government of Colombia has a sophisticated and evolving policy framework in place to ensure it achieves forestry and land use targets seeking to reduce degradation of the Colombian landscape.

Since 2011 there has been increasing demand from civil society for Colombia to face the facts of climate change and to act with clear environmental responsibility. This has been matched with genuine political will and ambition from the government. Colombia's NDC committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% with respect to the projected BAU scenario by 2030. With international support it could be increased to 30%.

The peace agreement between President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group signed in 2016 led to a surge of deforestation as territories which had been occupied by FARC were left vulnerable to land grabs and widespread deforestation. This highlighted the lack of land registry policies and appropriate prosecution processes in Colombia. Flooding also raised awareness of climate change. As a result, deforestation came to the attention of many who had previously not engaged with it, including other ministries.

The peace process had consumed all government energy and the signing of the peace agreement also gave political space and resources to focus on other things.

The presidential election in 2018 represented a change from a political narrative focussing on peace, to one focussing on sustainability. Climate change policy in Colombia has historically been the domain of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS) and didn't involve other ministries or high-level politicians. In the past, the five regions of Colombia framed their climate policy within the guidelines set by national policy, and regional plans didn't make it into national policy. There is now significant interest from the president and the creation of the National Council to Fight Deforestation has been important in bringing ministries together.

¹⁵ See report Resultados Monitoreo de la Deforestación 2018. Available at:

http://www.ideam.gov.co/documents/24277/91213793/Actualizacion_cifras2018FINALDEFORESTACION.pdf/80b719d7-1bf6-4858-8fd3-b5ce192a2fdc

7.2 The UK's approach

The UK is perceived by government stakeholders to be a key partner that specialises in climate finance, forest protection and management, and one which works in collaboration with Colombia rather than imposing its own agenda. It is widely agreed that this collaborative approach to programme design and policy formation is highly valued, and that co-creating interventions in this way creates a sense of ownership among relevant government officials which makes policy development more likely as a result.

The UK's approach to supporting change in climate change policy in Colombia is formalised and strategic.

The key instruments are:

1. Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI) between the governments of Colombia, Norway, Germany and the UK on the cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) and on promoting sustainable development in Colombia.
2. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the governments of Colombia and the UK.

These two agreements (both explained in more detail below) reflect the collaborative way of working of the UK in Colombia, either through working as part of a donor group (as with the JDI) or through direct bilateral agreements (as with the MoU).

The UK has recently restructured its staffing at the British embassy in Bogotá, and there is now a dedicated and well-regarded climate change team of Colombian, technically-strong individuals. The team is well respected, and their experience in Colombian politics and climate change provides strong links to ministries and supports the efforts of the UK. Several government officials commented that the fact that there is a dedicated team at the embassy has been very beneficial in helping them understand the UK's priorities and aligning positions with Colombia's priorities.

The degree of involvement of the British ambassador is important in securing high-level engagement, for example when the ambassador's presence at meetings obliges relevant ministers and presidential advisors to also attend.

7.2.1 Joint Declaration of Intent

The governments of Germany, Norway and the UK are working together in a joint partnership commonly referred to as the GNU partnership. At Paris in 2015, the three countries jointly launched a GNU initiative pledging US\$5 billion for REDD+ and forest and climate protection activities between 2015 and 2020.

The Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI) is an agreement between the Colombian government and the GNU member governments through which the partners agree on the way forward in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) and promoting sustainable development in Colombia. Signing the declaration primarily commits the Colombian government to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through pursuing a number of related national targets, which are split between two 'modalities'. Modality 1 covers policy design and implementation milestones while modality 2 covers national emissions reductions. For Germany, Norway and the UK signing the declaration is a commitment to support the Colombian government with financial and technical assistance. Contributions from the three donor country governments are made through different interventions; the British funding is primarily through REM, BioCarbon Fund and Partnerships for Forests.

The first JDI was signed at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris; in 2019 the partners signed a new agreement, renewing the JDI until 2025. The development of the JDI has been a collaborative process. The first JDI was managed exclusively by MADS whereas the new JDI was negotiated by the President's office. An interviewee said:

"I think it's a very strategic platform. And I would say right now with their renewal of the Joint Declaration, it's giving us a visibility that we've never seen before in Colombia because it's allowing us to just go straight to the President's office and talk about issues that we've never thought we will be able to get this much attention. So, it's been really, really useful."

It took longer than expected to release money from modality 2 because deforestation reductions did not go below the designated historical baseline. This was caused by the increase in deforestation caused by the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC. Some believe the targets were initially too difficult to meet and the resulting lack of pay-out weakened payment-by-results as a diplomatic/persuasive tactic. However, targets have since been re-adjusted in the 2019 JDI and payment-by-results has served to raise ambition. This is discussed further in section 7.6.2 below.

President Duque was motivated by the promise of funding to get involved in negotiating the JDI. Following this, the President's office convened a meeting with the ministries. The impact of the potential funding from the JDI should be seen alongside the genuine political will in Colombia to reduce deforestation.

Regular meetings between the embassy climate change technical team and government officials has maintained focus and raised awareness.

7.2.2 Memorandum of Understanding

In June 2019, the governments of Colombia and the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) setting out a partnership for sustainable growth between the FCO and the BEIS of the UK, and the MADS and the National Planning Department (DNP) of Colombia. The MoU commits both the UK and Colombia to working more closely to promote low-carbon investments and improve resilience against climate change.

Aside from its content, the existence of, and political buy-in for, such a bilateral agreement appears to have given increased credibility to the relevant government bodies (i.e. MADS) and facilitated discussions on environmental policy to take place in Colombia. An example of this provided by one stakeholder is how President Duque's support for the partnership and attendance at the MoU signing boosted the visibility of MADS, UK cooperation and the sustainable growth partnership.

"The picture is literally our Minister of Environment and Duque overseeing the event. That has given us so much leverage and so much power to convene because we have now this umbrella of co-operation."

This 'power to convene' is agreed by others to be very important for policy work in Colombia. One government official from MADS told of how it was previously difficult for them to secure a meeting with other institutions or ministries but since having a direct partnership with the UK in place, they have had more success.

"It was a huge help the fact that the UK government was involved. The fact that we [name of ministry] had the partnership gave us the position to talk with the other ministers or the institutions, sometimes before it was very difficult [...]. Because sometimes when they received an invitation from me, they say 'I am busy, sorry.' But when they see UK government they say, 'okay, okay, it's important'."

Joint ownership was found to be important in the relationship, and the UK was said to work in collaboration. This approach was seen by one government official as a key reason why they currently work so closely with the UK as one of their main partners.

“One thing about working with the UK is that they never impose on us, they work with us, together, it is teamwork.”

It should be noted that it is too soon to see the effect of the second JDI or the MoU on policy as both were only signed in 2019. However, there is strong interest to make sure concrete actions were taking place quickly to prevent this MoU from being ‘just a paper’, and there has already been some work under the MoU to provide training to implement a new land registry policy.

7.3 Outcome 1: Sustainable cattle ranching

7.3.1 What ICF did

The ICF-funded silvopastoral systems (SPS) Colombia programme (known in Colombia as Ganadería Colombiana Sostenible) sought to promote low-carbon agricultural practices and protect forests through the conversion of 35,500 hectares of land to silvopastoral systems between 2012 and 2020. These land-use systems are increasingly recognised as solutions for reducing the impact of the cattle ranching sector on greenhouse gas emissions by converting grazing land into a more diverse environment by planting trees, shrubs and crops in pastures (rather than grazing cows in open fields), simultaneously restoring degraded land, reducing deforestation and increasing the productivity of cattle farmers.

The programme built on a history of advocating for silvopastoral systems in Colombia. Between 2008 and 2015, the World Bank implemented the GEF-funded Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Sustainable Cattle Ranching.¹⁶ ICF's SPS programme is an expansion of this project, introducing a payment for ecosystem services scheme and expanding the project into two areas identified as 'deforestation hotspots' with the aim of demonstrating that silvopastoral systems can reduce deforestation. Both projects worked with FEDEGAN, the national Cattle Ranching Association, enabling them to build a strong knowledge base on the approach and become a lobbying force for it with government.

“And BEIS tripled the amount of investment and gave this project really, really a lot of traction to be able to do things in the field. So basically, it started to create a lot of awareness of the different ways that you could do livestock sustainably. Nobody used to talk about that in Colombia. So, now you can see that everyone talks about SPS.”

7.3.2 Commitments to silvopastoral systems in National Development Plan (NDP)

Although silvopastoral systems are mentioned in the previous NDP (2014–2018), these aims reflect a significant shift in the government's prioritisation of such systems.

Alongside the NDP commitments, President Duque's public announcements to convert land to silvopastoral systems as a way forward have been an important signal. For example, Duque spoke of plans to convert 100,000 hectares to silvopastoral systems during his address to the Climate Change Summit of the last UN General Assembly in September 2019.¹⁷

¹⁶ Global Environment Facility. Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Sustainable Cattle Ranching. Available at <https://www.thegef.org/project/mainstreaming-biodiversity-sustainable-cattle-ranching>

¹⁷ 'Presidente Duque destacó en la ONU la agenda del Gobierno para desarrollar una ganadería sostenible', CONtexto Ganadero, 24 September 2019. Available at <https://www.contextoganadero.com/politica/presidente-duque-destaco-en-la-onu-la-agenda-del-gobierno-para-desarrollar-una-ganaderia>

“The fact that the government at the very, very high level is he's talking about these is the direct influence of the project. And I think those kinds of things are very valuable because these are now in their agenda at a very high level in the policy chain.”

7.3.2.1 ICF's impact on policy change

Building on the original GEF-funded project, ICF's SPS programme provided high-quality evidence of how conversion to SPS can work in more regions and with more farmer types. This helped to validate existing policy assumptions and provide further proof-of-concept for SPS as a mechanism for sustainable land conversion and reducing deforestation. The scale-up also provided evidence on how much it costs to implement such projects in different geographical areas. This information enabled the DNP to set evidence-informed regional targets in the NDP.

“And without [the evidence from SPS] obviously, we would have never been able to suggest including anything like this in the plan.”

The 2019 JDI includes a commitment that “by 2022, an additional 147,000 hectares will be under sustainable cattle ranching systems with zero deforestation”. This commitment reflects and reinforces the targets set in the NDP.

The SPS programme demonstrated the popularity of the approach and provide evidence for its economic benefits.

“Behaviour only changes when the markets ask for it. It was not that difficult to sell the case because they proved that more sustainable activities are more profitable and sustainable. It wasn't the case that one day the ambassadors/presidents woke up and decided to value the forests – it's all about the business case.”

This information also informed the president, who was presented with the economic track record of silvopastoral systems.

“When discussing the formulation of the objective to transform 100,000 hectares into silvopastoral systems, the first question from the Presidency was 'how much will it cost?'. With the information from the project we can plan according to the different options [...]. And we can provide a breakdown of cost for all of the above”.

The embassy reported that the president was interested in sustainable cattle ranching and was now seeing how they can create a policy framework based on its evidence.

“And recently I had a call from the deputy minister of environment saying that she had a meeting with Duque and they told him about the SPS programme. And he became obsessed like he's now like 'SPS. SPS. Cattle ranching, sustainable cattle ranching'. So now they're seeking to us and seeing how they can now create a new policy and regulatory framework for SPS, based on our programme.”

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates strong support that timely and opportunistic ICF-funded activities enabled the silvopastoral systems approach to gather traction and led to the inclusion of a target for silvopastoral systems in the NDP and the commitment from the president

7.3.3 Payment for Environmental Services (PES) policy document and law

In 2017, a national PES law (Law No. 870, 2017) and a national PES policy document were issued. The latter, entitled 'Policy Guidelines and National Programme of Payment for Environmental Services for the Construction of Peace', outlines the roles of national and regional governments in PES implementation. The policy document claims that:

“It is important for the country to implement PES schemes because they stimulate the conservation, preservation and restoration of ecosystems and promote sustainable, productive development with agroforestry systems, silvopastoral systems and good agricultural practices.”¹⁸

7.3.3.1 ICF's impact on policy change

The DNP and MADS requested input from the SPS project team around their experiences implementing SPS when writing the policy. The implementing partner also took part and shared lessons learned from the project and explained not only the success of the payments, but how to execute them effectively. This process enabled sustainable livestock and SPS to be highlighted in the policy document as a viable policy option for compensating for environmental protection.

“Sustainable livestock and silvopastoral systems are included now as a compensation policy because of the project and the whole work that was done by the alliance to really influence and, you know, show the opportunities that silvopastoral systems could represent.”

Colombia and the GNU partner countries committed to issuing the national decree, policy and (proposal of a) law on PES in the 2015 JDI. These commitments were met in 2017. There are two commitments relating to payment for environmental services in the revised 2019 JDI:

- By 2022, include 195,000 additional hectares under PES and conservation incentives schemes in areas of high deforestation, including lands located in collective territories of ethnic groups.
- By 2022, a proposal for PES and other conservation incentives, aimed at indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities will be developed with the communities and will be in its implementation phase.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates some support for the claim that the technical knowledge created in the SPS project contributed to the development of PES policy documentation.

¹⁸ CONPES document on PES. Available at <https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/3886.pdf>

7.4 Outcome 2: Deforestation policy and long-term deforestation strategy

7.4.1 What ICF did

The Amazon Vision (or Vision Amazonia in Spanish) programme was developed by the government of Colombia with support from the governments of Germany, Norway and the UK (the GNU partnership). The overall aim of the programme is help Colombia achieve zero deforestation by 2020.

The programme's interventions are split into five pillars: 1) forest governance; 2) sectorial sustainable development; 3) agro-environmental development; 4) environmental governance with indigenous people; and 5) enabling conditions. ICF's contribution to Amazon Vision is channelled through the REDD Early Movers (REM) programme, which provides conditional payments for results in reducing emissions and deforestation. Information from the Amazon Vision project is shared with IDEAM.

The ICF-co-funded BioCarbon Fund – Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (ISFL) is implementing a Colombia Orinoquía Sustainable Integrated Landscape Programme. Targeting the Orinoquía region, the programme focusses on “promoting a conducive business environment for sustainable agriculture practices and production systems by strengthening institutional capacities -at the national, regional and local levels - to plan, implement and monitor integrated landscape management”.¹⁹

The Amazon Vision project was co-designed with MADS, therefore, government ownership of the programme was strong. Amazon Vision had their office in MADS and this co-location helped the programme to be seen as a government programme, giving it more capacity to support policy change.

“[...] they can influence more easily and be completely aligned with the policy changes that the government wants to, because other programmes they work on are not embedded but work separately from the government. A success factor is that the government kind of owns the Vision Amazonia programme and the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Agriculture feel like Vision Amazonia is their own and it's as if it were their own needs.”

The Amazon Vision project helped convene meetings with different departments and institutions which helped to devise strategy on working together to combat deforestation. An interviewee emphasised the importance of Amazon vision in convening IDEAM, the SINCHI institute, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and the financing institution FINAGRO.

“That wouldn't have happened if there wasn't Vision Amazonia I think. Not at the same scale because they'd been working there for 20 years, but they never had a strategy vision of working together and how this programme likes following up what's happening and how to deliver results.”

¹⁹ BioCarbon Fund. Colombia Orinoquia Sustainable Integrated Landscape Program. Available at <https://www.biocarbonfund-isfl.org/colombia-program>

7.4.2 Policy outcomes

The sections below describe the policy changes in Colombia that have been supported by ICF.

7.4.3 The NDP's regional pact for Orinoquía

The current NDP (2018–2022) contains a chapter dedicated to the Llanos-Orinoquía region, framed as a 'regional pact'. This pact outlines three objectives for the region, one of which centres around boosting the productivity and sustainability of agricultural supply chains and another on the management of ecological systems, including controlling deforestation and ecosystem degradation.

7.4.3.1 ICF's impact on policy change

Though the BioCarbon Fund had not yet started implementation at the time of the NDP's writing, its preparatory activities included years of research on the local area to identify suitable means of promoting sustainable growth there. The knowledge generated from these activities were instrumental in the inclusion and formulation of the NDP's regional pact for Orinoquía.

“And this is where the BioCarbon Fund came in, to help think about projects that can stop the extension of the agricultural border towards the south by developing productive systems that made the most of the resources available [...]. The programme is what helped us join all these points and decide what to do.”

Strength of evidence

Process-tracing analysis indicates strong support for the claim that the evidence created in the preparatory years of the BioCarbon Fund influenced the Llanos-Orinoquía region chapter in the NDP.

7.4.4 The NDP's regional pact for Amazonia

The current NDP also contains a regional pact for the Amazonia region, sub-titled 'Sustainable Development for a Living Amazon'. This pact prioritises ecosystem conservation efforts, rural transport and services, and sustainable productive models for agriculture and biocommerce.

The REM-funded Amazon Vision project provided a robust evidence base, contributing information to IDEAM to inform the chapter of the NDP on the Amazonia Region.

7.4.4.1 ICF's impact on policy change

The NDP's focus was on moving from an extractive model to a sustainable one and used the territorial and land-use model for the Amazon region (MOTRA). This model was created as part of the Amazon Vision project, through a series of meetings with the national planning departments in each region. A series of regional policies were developed and compiled in the MOTRA. Information from the Amazon Vision project has been shared with IDEAM, providing information and therefore strengthening software that already exists. Amazon Vision has strengthened the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system which now produces monthly early warning reports which were previously produced much less frequently. This is allowing for more focussed and relevant policy and enforcement work.

“Without this [MRV] system, we would not know what to do and where.”

Strength of evidence

Process-tracing analysis indicates some support for the claim that the Amazon Vision project contributed to the Amazonia Region chapter in the NDP by creating the MOTRA and strengthening the information presented through IDEAM, which is then used in policy creation and enforcement.

7.5 Interim outcomes

7.5.1 Upcoming policy to deliver commitments to sustainable cattle ranching

At the time of data collection, there is a draft national policy on sustainable cattle ranching which should be considered an interim outcome as it has not yet become law.

7.5.1.1 ICF's impact on policy change

ICF contributed to the creation of an evidence base around SPS which fed into the drafting process for the sustainable cattle ranching policy.

“There's been a lot of lessons learned from that programme and the implementation of that project that have built many of the criteria and policy aspects that are now part of the sustainable livestock policy.”

It is clear that the fact that the SPS Colombia implementing partner – FEDEGAN – is an active participant in the livestock sector beyond the project, and not simply an NGO; it had great impact on the translation of project learning into this policy outcome. As a research article on the livestock sector points out,²⁰ SPS “underscores the importance of having personnel who know the cattle business, but who also know how to manage pastures and silvopastoral systems and can provide a comprehensive approach for the farm”. The president of FEDEGAN was mentioned by an interviewee as a driving force, actively looking for resources. FEDEGAN has been engaged by the Ministry of Agriculture to contribute to the policy drafting process, which has enabled policy making to be done 'better', as an interviewee confirms:

“[SPS Colombia] has already given us an idea of how to do cattle ranching sustainably. It gave us the path to work and the design of the cattle ranching policy. It's not ready yet, but we are working very closely on it now with FEDEGAN and MADR. It is one way it is helping policy development by telling us how to do it in a better way.”

SPS Colombia supported the new policy through the provision of technical evidence to the national Sustainable Livestock Roundtable. The roundtable was initially established by the Ministry of Agriculture and brings together relevant stakeholders including public institutions, NGOs, international bodies, research centres, supply companies, trade unions and producer associations. The roundtable is the primary source of input for the sustainable cattle ranching policy and multiple interviewees mentioned that discussions at the roundtable often centred around learning coming from the experience of the SPS programme.

“Part of the resources that the UK gave to the country went in the silvopastoral programmes, especially the one related to the World Bank. So, in that sense, they generate the technical basis for the discussions that the Sustainable Cattle Ranching Roundtable is having to provide inputs for the policy of cattle ranching.”

²⁰ Tapasco, J., LeCoq, J.F., Ruden, A., Rivas, J.B., and Ortiz, J. (2019). The Livestock Sector in Colombia: Toward a Program to Facilitate Large-Scale Adoption of Mitigation and Adaptation Practices. Available at <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2019.00061/full#h3>

The SPS Colombia programme also boosted interest and engagement in the roundtable through funding five regional workshops in 2016 and through scaling up the project to include more farmers. This led to the creation of regional-level roundtables which enabled more farmers and other stakeholders to contribute to the policy. According to one interviewee:

“The project helped us create this committee and convene the ministry of the environment, agriculture, DNP, Banks and finance sectors [...]. The project helped because it forced us to work together. [...]. And as a result of the project, making us work together every day, we say OK, we need a high-level coordination meeting for the SPS project. So, we created the national cattle ranching roundtable.”

The UK brought the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR) into the project. They were initially interested in the funding from international cooperation, but more and more they started to see sustainability and the environment as part of their remit.

The additional funding ICF provided to the original GEF-funded project not only allowed project scale-up but also created space for more collaborative inter-ministerial work, providing “greater flexibility in terms of time to strengthen the interdepartmental work” (government official). This flexibility created opportunities for convening stakeholders (as seen in the above quote), and also allowed inputs from the SPS programme to feed into the design of Amazon Vision programme.

7.5.1.2 Alternative explanations

The sustainable cattle livestock sector is large in Colombia and involves many actors. ICF is only linked to the SPS programme, and there are other activities promoting sustainable agriculture. One interviewee felt that the policy would have been developed regardless of the SPS programme.

“But quite frankly, there are many reasons why that politics can happen, not because of the sustainable cattle ranching programme you get. I mean, there is, I think, some input and value from the experience gained from that process, but it's not because of that programme that the policy is now being developed.”

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates some support for the claim that the SPS programme provided the technical evidence and boosted the roundtables which in turn influenced policy; however, it is yet to be seen whether this will become law.

7.5.2 Increased engagement of Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability

The MADR is more involved in environment and sustainability issues than previously. MADR was historically focussed on improving agricultural activity, whereas now it has been mandated to include a focus on sustainability in the agriculture agenda. It is in the context of this agreement that MADR was allocated to lead the BioCarbon Fund's Colombia programme, the first time this ministry has taken on such a project.

MADR and MADS previously had very little coordination or joint activities. They now work together on the BioCarbon Fund programme.

7.5.2.1 ICF's impact on interim outcome

The MoU sets out specific activities for which there is close collaboration and coordination on the environment. The process of establishing the MoU helped to reinforce inter-ministerial learning which had been encouraged by ICF-funded projects such as SPS and the BioCarbon Fund.

“There are sessions where ministers and vice-ministers are learning about these projects. There are meetings with the UK embassy and German embassy. There was a lot of interaction with the ambassadors of UK, Germany and Norway around the Climate Fund. The meetings to sign the contracts with the ministers’ involvement give these topics a higher visibility within the ministry. This leads to a higher level of commitment, maybe not the level of commitment that I would like, but at least some.”

Although strengthened by the process of agreeing the terms of the MoU, it was work on the SPS project which first brought the ministries together (see outcome 7.3.4 above). MADR and MADS were then brought together again by the UK to work together on the BioCarbon Fund. An interviewee credits the UK with making the environment a concern of MADR, claiming that:

“Initially, the Ministry of Agriculture didn't see environmental issues as something they should worry about. But the pressure from the UK has made it possible.”

The Biocarbon Fund has since increased ministry coordination.

“Biocarbon provided more visibility and probably a great motivation for the two ministries to come closer and closer.”

MADS was a small ministry with limited resources, and the financial incentives of leading an environmental project were sufficient to get MADR interested. There was a need for inter-ministerial work and the Biocarbon Fund made a significant contribution.

“[The Fund] has contributed significantly to improving coordination, improving coordination between these two ministries.”

“In the case of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, thanks to the interaction or the intervention of the UK between both ministries we started to have a joint agenda.”

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicated strong support for the claim that UK involvement helped to increase the engagement of the MADR in sustainability.

7.5.3 Development of a green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on the biodynamic model

An innovative new financing model for SPS has been designed through the ICF-funded Amazon Vision programme.²¹ The Instrument for Sustainable Productive Transformation (ITPS in Spanish) is an agro-environmental financing incentive designed by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), FINAGRO and the Earth Innovation Institute with technical input from the SPS Colombia programme. It is currently being piloted in Caquetá and Guaviare departments of Colombia, both located in the Amazon biome area. There is potential for this model to be embedded into the national regulatory framework as part of the approach to incentivising sustainable development.

“And if it is successful, we think it could be adopted by government as one of the credit lines for the systems to finance the cattle ranching sector.”

This model is an example of multiple ICF programmes and ICF-funded entities working together towards the same goal. SPS and the Amazon Vision programme created the model and a part ICF-funded entity, GGGI, was also involved in its creation.

“So, the important thing is not to have completely independent projects, but projects that use their synergies. And this is where things like the partnership really help us, because then people like me, non-technical, can point out when one project needs to ‘speak with’ another project, like SPS, Vision Amazonia and the Coffee project [...]. So, this is the challenge, ensuring that each project is not its own independent wheel, but that everything works together.”

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing evidence indicated some support for the claim that the biodynamic model influenced the development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks. There is no evidence that this has influenced national policy yet.

7.6 Where the outcome of ICF’s support for policy change is less clear

7.6.1 2050 Calculator

It was hypothesised following initial document review that the 2050 Calculator programme had been supporting change in national policy making, particularly around setting NDC commitments. During fieldwork, this was found not to be the case. The reason for this appears to have been timing, with the NDC team instead using information collated by the University of Los Andes in NDC formulation (work on which began in 2013).

The 2050 Calculator does appear to have been used post-NDC setting at a regional level, particularly in the education sector and in creating regional climate plans for example. However, the interviewees were not adequately involved at this level to provide much further detail. There does appear to be appetite for its use in the future, but for now its effects on policy are inconclusive.

“Now we want to use it again for the 2050 strategy. This is a long-term strategy that we committed to present by next year under the umbrella of Paris Accord. There it would be helpful also as a communication tool and also for the regional work. But this is looking at the future, not what we have done to date. We realize it is a tool we have not used so much.”

²¹ The Amazon Vision (or Vision Amazonia in Spanish) programme was developed by the government of Colombia with support from the governments of Germany, Norway and the UK (the GNU partnership).

7.6.2 REM payment by results

The payment-by-results mechanism initially did not work as intended due to external contexts such as the rise of deforestation in the wake of the 2016 peace agreements. Payments were at first much lower than anticipated; however, it still had some effect on raising ambition and awareness.

“Payment by results have advantages and disadvantages. It is also worth remembering that it is a very different scenario in the post-conflict. In that sense, it is normal, it is totally normal and it was expected, that once the peace agreement was signed deforestation would go up. And that is in fact what happened. But there are now new actors in the areas putting pressure on deforestation. And in this sense, payment by results could be a problem for the continuation of the project, because this was not foreseen in the projects. The problem of land grabbing for example, was not expected. Before this phenomenon was quite small, but now there are big land grabbing actors. We also think that drug trafficking is involved, and that makes things even harder because what both actors want is big extensions of land. In this context, the payment by results, with these new actors [...].”

Another interviewee said that this meant that payment by results was becoming more of a ‘tease’ than a leverage:

“Government realizes that it's so impossible to meet the standards of payment for results that now it's been a bit counterproductive”.

However, the prospect of support from this mechanism was said by multiple interviewees to have increased ambition. One interviewee reported his payments weren’t affected too adversely by the changing contexts.

“It worked for a bit, and very kindly they paid me, a little bit. But then the post-conflict situation, and even with that I managed to reduce a little bit, and they paid me some more [...].”

This led to suppositions from different interviewees that without payment by results, results may have been worse.

“But I'm certain that without Vision Amazonia the situation in the Amazonia would be much worse than today. I'm convinced of that because at least the level of awareness of the people that we have today is much higher than what it was. You know, in that time. Oh, also higher level of awareness in the organisations. The problem is that it is very difficult to quantify what would have happened.”

“I would say, still having the results based has influenced policy somehow, because if we didn't have it, the government would not feel the pressure to be pushed to increase ambition.”

7.6.3 Zero deforestation agreements

In 2017, the government of Colombia formally aligned with the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA 2020), a global partnership (supported by ICF) that brings together governments, private sector, and CSOs together to remove deforestation from the supply chains of palm oil, soy, beef, and paper and pulp. To fulfil its objectives as an alliance partner, the government has been working on setting up zero deforestation agreements with supply chain stakeholders in these industries and, at the time of data collection, had successfully co-signed four agreements related to beef, dairy, palm oil and cocoa supply chains.

7.6.3.1 ICF's impact on policy change

The 2015 JDI includes as a purpose of the partnership, to “promote zero deforestation in key commodity supply chains”, formalising the commitment of the GNU partnership and encouraging action.

ICF supports both the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 and Amazon Vision, which work toward the same objectives in Colombia. Another ICF-funded entity, GGGI is also involved in working towards these objectives. Amazon Vision has supported involvement of the private sector which in turn has aided this process, although the evidence linking the outcome to ICF is inconclusive. It is included here as it presents the complex overlap between programmes and activities supporting policy change in Colombia.

7.6.4 CONPES document on deforestation

The CONPES document on deforestation is in progress and information from the Amazon Vision programme may be contributing to its formation.²² However, the evidence was inconclusive.

7.6.5 Commitment to have 1% of GDP from forest products in the NDP

In interviews, we explored the connection between the increase in GDP from 0.6% to 1% from forest products, but the evidence was inconclusive.

7.7 Conclusions

ICF has been able to successfully support policy change in Colombia by taking an opportunistic and pragmatic approach to supporting policy change. There was existing political will to include low-carbon climate-resilient approaches in policy and strengthen the green constitution. ICF helped build on this, rather than bringing new ideas.

The collaborative approach by the UK was successful because ministries were willing and able to take ownership of policy outcomes. The UK worked in partnership with the Colombian government (who already had the political will to make these changes) rather than imposing an agenda. Trust between the countries enabled this approach to be successful.

Political ambition and commitment were reinforced by the JDI and MoU because they provided the prospect of funding, and boosted reputations. This was in the context of a political focus on sustainability and good evidence for effective actions that could be taken. Within that context the JDI and MoU acted as a concerted effort.

²² A CONPES document is created by the National Planning Department (DNP) and becomes a policy which defines cross-sector responsibility.

Joined up programming and the JDI and MoU brought ministries together because they were placed in structures where they had to work together to get the benefits, and they saw the political, social and economic payback. Again, this was in the context of good evidence and funding to support activities.

Presidential buy-in was key to supporting policy change in Colombia and was gained for SPS when evidence from the project was presented. The financial incentives were sufficient to gain the attention of the president, and he became genuinely interested and excited about SPS. Presidential buy-in was also seen in other instances, such as the Colombian president's presence at the signing of the MoU. This high-level attention and support then filtered down into policy making in Colombia, and this top-down approach was ultimately successful.

We found evidence that ICF also supported policy change by supporting the Colombian government in the following ways:

- **Generating evidence** – Evidence generation from ICF-funded projects like SPS, Amazon Vision and the BioCarbon Fund has been critical in enabling evidence-informed policy making to take place. This evidence reassured policy and decision makers that it is the right thing to do, and allowed them to set more realistic targets on deforestation and land conversion. This meant that better policy could be developed based on the information, that the new targets set are both ambitious and realistic, that monitoring of progress is possible and that policy enforcement is timelier.

It is also crucial that this evidence related to existing priority areas and built on and contributed to existing pilots and processes. In the case of SPS, the evidence built on the GEF funded pilot, proving that sustainable agriculture was both economically and environmentally viable. Amazon Vision provided evidence which demonstrated how to both plan and enforce measures, using the robust evidence base generated by IDEAM during the project.

By working with well-established and well-connected partners such as FEDEGAN, ICF was able to gather credible evidence as it could engage stakeholders, and ensure evidence reached the right people through the well-connected partners.

- **Convening** – ICF projects supported policy making by bringing ministries and organisations together. There was a proactive approach in engaging the ministries. Convening the right people at high level made policy development more likely because decision makers were made aware of the issue and provided with evidence. It both ensured that the right resources and skills were available and that the right ministries were taking responsibility for policy development and implementation.

Convening high-level meetings to formalise agreements led to opportunities to increase ambition and announce new commitments. The increased visibility brought by the UK was key.

- **Colocation** – The colocation of the Amazon Vision project within MADS enabled the flow of information between the two. It was particularly helpful in giving the Colombian government a sense of ownership over the project.
- **Boosting credibility of climate change champions** – The fact that MADS was working with the UK made it more credible to others within government as they thought that if the UK is working with them, they must know what they are doing.

8 Case Study: Supporting change in Uganda's national renewable energy policy

8.1 Policy making and implementation in Uganda

Uganda is a relatively stable presidential republic. Uganda's policy-making and law-making system is much like the UK's with ministries headed by a cabinet member, and a professional²³ civil service that carries out policy development, implementation and review.

The Ministry for Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) is responsible for energy policy; geothermal energy policy is led by the Geothermal Resources Department, based in Entebbe, while energy policy as a whole is led by the Electricity Department, based in Kampala.²⁴ Delivery of policy is largely vested in the Electricity Regulation Authority (ERA) and the Rural Electrification Authority (REA).

Regulation of the liberalised electricity market in Uganda is the responsibility of ERA, which is a statutory body under the Electricity Act 1999. ERA issues electricity generation, transmission, distribution, sale and import licences, sets licence conditions and ensures compliance with those conditions. ERA is also responsible for the tariff structure, including the renewable energy feed in tariff (ReFIT).²⁵

Prior to 2011, Uganda had experienced high levels of economic and population growth,^{26,27} particularly in urban areas.²⁸ Access to electricity was essential to support this growth so the 2002 Energy Policy focussed on sustainably meeting the population's energy needs, for the purposes of social and economic development.^{29,30}

By the middle of the 2000s, electricity supply was still failing to meet demand.³¹ The two aging hydroelectric plants on which Uganda relied were experiencing low flows due to prolonged drought, and there were frequent brownouts, evening load-shedding³² and rationing of supply.³³ Two diesel-powered plants were commissioned as an expensive stop-gap solution.³⁴

In 2007 the Renewable Energy Policy was adopted.³⁵ This encouraged the private sector to get involved in diversifying energy sources away from hydroelectric and increasing the use of modern renewable energy technologies. The target was to increase renewable energy from 4% of total supply to 61% by 2017.

²³ Interview with an HMG official.

²⁴ Geothermal energy uses the heat trapped beneath the earth's surface to generate electricity.

²⁵ ERA [Policies](#) – for more information see [Guidelines and Standards](#).

²⁶ World Bank (2019) [The World Bank in Uganda](#): Overview, accessed 3/1/20.

²⁷ Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2018) [Population Projections 2018](#), accessed 3/1/20.

²⁸ World Bank (2019) [The World Bank in Uganda](#): Overview, accessed 3/1/20.

²⁹ The Republic of Uganda (2002) [The Energy Policy for Uganda](#) – available by clicking 'Energy Policy 2002' on arrival at the linked page.

³⁰ Even now, the country has low levels of access to electricity, with just 26.7% of the total population having grid access in 2016, falling to just 18% in rural areas ([Sustainable Energy for All Africa Hub Uganda](#)). Uganda currently has one of the lowest per capita electricity consumptions in the world at 215 kWh per capita per year compared with a sub-Saharan Africa average of 552 kWh per capita and a World average of 2,975 kWh per capita (Energypedia [Uganda Energy Situation](#)).

³¹ Only 1% of the rural population and 32% of the capital city residents had access to power and system losses were significant at 41.5% - See Gore, C. (2008) 'Electricity and privatisation in Uganda: The origins of the crisis and problems with the response' in *Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the Power Grid*, Chapter: 14, Publisher: Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council; London: Earthscan, Editors: David McDonald, pp.359-399.

³² Load-shedding is where power supply is temporarily stopped to prevent excessive demand on generation facilities.

³³ See, for example, BBC (2007) 'Controversial dam divides Ugandans'.

³⁴ The Republic of Uganda (2007) [The Renewable Energy Policy for Uganda](#) – available by clicking 'Renewable Energy Policy, 2007 (REP)' on arrival at the linked page.

³⁵ Ibid.

A developer had to obtain a licence to develop and run a power plant. In order to obtain the licence, they had to first obtain a permit to carry out feasibility studies to enable the licence application to be prepared.³⁶ In order to supply electricity to the grid, the developer had to negotiate a PPA from the sole off-taker, UECTL. In total, up to 14 different permits, licences or approvals may have been needed, through a process that was “complex, long, costly and with very high requirements for small scale RE projects.”^{37, 38} Although on the face of it Uganda was an attractive proposition for independent power producers (IPPs) with an interest in renewable energy, the transaction costs were deterring outside investors, and five years after the renewable energy policy was launched, no developers had come in.³⁹

8.2 UK strategy and interventions

According to DFID Uganda, “Uganda’s influence and relative stability in the region makes it a priority country for UK objectives”.⁴⁰ Although climate and energy issues are not explicitly mentioned in DFID’s Ugandan objectives,⁴¹ access to electricity is relevant to two agendas – supporting economic growth and ameliorating the refugee situation.⁴²

ICF’s activities in Uganda are operationalised through DFID, through centrally-managed as well as locally-led programmes. The UK’s support for change in renewable energy policy in Uganda has been through two programmes:

- UK ICF has been the largest single funder of the GET FiT programme (see box), but programme design and development was led by the German state-owned development bank KfW, ERA and Multiconsult with approval of key decisions by the steering group, on which DFID had a seat.
- £6 million of ICF funding allocated to a geothermal technical assistance facility which was intended to improve the strategy, policy and regulatory conditions for geothermal energy across the five countries targeted by the East Africa Geothermal Programme (EAGER), including Uganda.

International donors are also active in the Ugandan energy policy arena. Germany is particularly well connected; KfW is involved in many renewable energy initiatives and the German Development Agency (GIZ) has an office within MEMD. There was an active Development Partners Group which has an Environment and Climate Change sub-group. Norway is also an active funder, as is the EU through its Africa Infrastructure Investment Fund and the UN through its Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).⁴⁵ Iceland, New Zealand and the United States (US) have all been active in the space of geothermal policy.⁴⁶

³⁶ ERA [Licensing Procedure](#).

³⁷ CREEC (2014), Study on Challenges for Private Sector Led Investment in Small-Scale Renewable Energy Projects in Uganda (unpublished). See p.42.

³⁸ Many interviewees mentioned this, including a developer and a government official.

³⁹ Interview with an implementation consultant.

⁴⁰ DFID Uganda. Overview available at <https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/dfid-uganda>.

⁴¹ DFID Uganda profile document (2018) available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723334/DFID-Uganda-Profile-July-2018.pdf

⁴² Uganda is the world’s third largest refugee hosting nation, according to the DFID Uganda profile document.

⁴³ DFID East Africa Geothermal Business Case.

⁴⁴ This is recognised in the 2019 Draft Renewable Energy Policy which states that “[d]evelopment partners play an important role in assisting the government through technical support and guidance, programmes and projects, as well as funding and budgetary support to develop, implement, monitor, supervise and evaluate the policy implementation.” (p.55).

⁴⁵ The Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN) is the operational arm of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UN Environment) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

⁴⁶ See Appendix D in Castalia (2016) *First Performance Review and Baseline Report for GET FiT Uganda*. Although a foreword to this report warns the reader that the report did not meet the required quality standards, the appendix is a useful summary.

Regular meetings are held between donors and the Ugandan government. The UK attends these meetings, and this provides an opportunity to coordinate donor activities and also to discuss priorities. As Uganda already has ambitious policy objectives, and the UK and Uganda are reasonably well aligned on energy policy, ICF works to give the UK's view about specific policy proposals, to build institutional capacity to deliver on commitments, and tactically address barriers to success as they arise. High-level support does occur when needed,⁴⁷ but typically ICF's support for policy change has been deployed at MEMD commissioner (head of department) level and below, focussing on specialist and technical officials within the ministry, Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd (UETCL), ERA and REA, and delivered mainly through the technical assistance component of funded programmes (according to a UK government official).

8.2.1 GET FiT Uganda

The GET FiT concept was developed in 2010 by Deutsche Bank following a request from the UN for new ideas to promote renewable energy investments in developing regions.⁴⁸ Partners quickly showed interest particularly the government of Uganda, the UK, Germany, the EU, Norway and the World Bank.

The objective of GET FiT was to combat climate change and increase access to clean energy by supporting investment in capital intensive renewable energy sources in emerging and developing countries. The donors came on board in 2013 and it was formally launched in May of that year.

GET FiT Uganda was a programme of initiatives aimed at encouraging IPPs to invest in small to medium scale renewable energy generation. It included several components – a top-up tariff to make investment more attractive; standardisation and agreement of legal documents to make the process quicker and simpler for both developer and regulator; the development of tools to help the regulator make better decisions; and capacity building to strengthen the regulator, ERA, to make regulation more effective.⁴⁹

The UK's role in GET FiT was two-fold. Firstly, ICF contributed significant funding to the programme; in March 2013 the UK officially granted funds through an initial disbursement of £6 million⁵⁰ which ultimately rose to more than £50 million⁵¹ as the programme progressed. Secondly, the UK as a donor had one vote on the steering committee. This operated by consensus and was responsible, amongst other things, for signing off terms of reference for implementation and evaluation consultants, and approving the annual report.⁵²

By 2018, 17 plants had been approved, of which 10 are operational⁵³ – seven hydropower, two solar and one bagasse⁵⁴ plant.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ For example, the UK wrote to the Government of Uganda in support of Germany.

⁴⁸ GET FiT Uganda Partners – Deutsche Bank **A Foreword from the Concept Developers**. One interviewee suggested that the idea originally came from ERA; we have found no evidence to support this claim. The most plausible explanation is that the concept was co-created by KfW (Jan Martin Witte), Deutsche Bank (Sylvia Kreibiehl) and ERA (Benon Mutambi).

⁴⁹ A good summary is provided in Rieger, S. (2015) **GET FiT Uganda**.

⁵⁰ DFID (2013) Contract between the Secretary of State for International Development and KfW regarding support to the GET FiT East Africa Programme – Uganda Roll-Out Phase 1.

⁵¹ DFID granted £27.5 million and BEIS £25.8 million.

⁵² GET FiT (2013) Uganda Annual Report. Available at [Uganda 2013 Annual Report Appendix 1: GET FiT Uganda Operational Guide-Lines / Governance Structure \(As Of March 2013\)](#).

⁵³ Interviewees have informed us that operational plants now number 14, but the annual report for 2019 is not yet available.

⁵⁴ Bagasse is a dry pulpy residue left over from milling sugar cane.

⁵⁵ GET FiT Uganda (2019) **Annual Report 2018**.

8.3 Outcome 1: Supporting change in key regulatory documents in electricity generation

To build and operate a power station in Uganda, a set of legal agreements, permits and licences are required. The GET FiT programme supported changes to two of these documents:

1. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which sets the terms upon which electricity will be purchased by the off-taker. This was revised in early 2014⁵⁶ to allocate to the government of Uganda the ‘power evacuation risk’, the risk that power may be prevented from leaving the plant, and therefore no payments received, due to a lack transmission lines to the nearest sub-station.
2. The Implementation Agreement is the contract with the government of Uganda which among other things sets out the responsibilities of each of the parties. The Implementation Agreement was revised to specify that the government of Uganda would be responsible for building transmission lines for GET FiT developments.

These two changes along with the reduced time taken to negotiate, meant that the documents were ‘bankable’, i.e. they could be used to support borrowing. Along with an attractive basic and top-up tariff, plus other guarantees, this meant that developers were attracted into Uganda. This ultimately resulted in the mobilisation of private finance for 17 new renewable energy power plants within a matter of years. The PPA and Implementation Agreement have since been used as templates for similar documents in other countries.

8.3.1 What did ICF do and what difference did it make?

ICF was the main donor to GET FiT Uganda (see box in section 8.2.1) and, through its role on the steering committee, supported changes in the terms of reference for implementation partners. GET FiT funded Trinity International LLP to work with ERA, UETCL and the government of Uganda to devise a standard PPA and Implementation Agreement.⁵⁷ In practice this consisted of:

1. Running a series of training workshops with ERA staff aimed at getting them up to speed with the way developers and investors view the electricity market, so they would be able to contribute effectively.
2. Accepting or rejecting suggested amendments from a consultation exercise which attracted hundreds of replies.
3. Revising the documents, clause by clause, including negotiating with ERA, UETCL, MEMD and the Attorney General’s Office a few contentious clauses which related to electricity evacuation (deemed energy), dispute resolution, price adjustment and some technical issues (according to a government official).
4. Producing a final set of documents and agreeing them with MEMD, ERA, UETCL, and the Ugandan office of the Attorney General.

The workshops and consultation overcame the government of Uganda’s strongly held position of not accepting the power evacuation risk by improving officials’ understanding of the way investment decisions in the power market were made. The revisions to the documents ensured that they would be bankable and support investment by developers.

⁵⁶ GET FiT Uganda (2014) *Year in Review 2013* – Approval of Standardised Implementation Agreement and PPA.

⁵⁷ Trinity International LLP (2016) *GET FiT to power Africa – a Ugandan case study*.

Knowledge transfer was successful because ERA and UETCL staff were educated, professional and committed to self-development. An interviewee commented:

“[...] people really like being there and they feel impassioned by what they're doing, want to get more information, and so with ERA basically a lot of the technical assistance will include capacity building partly because people know that they'll be able to absorb it.”

Another interviewee commented:

“[...] they've got some really, really good people in ERA [...]. And in UETCL - they are really good people. And that probably sets them apart from some of the other countries.”

The interviewee felt that the time spent on training secured buy-in for the change and convinced officials that it would be necessary for the government of Uganda to take on the evacuation risk because, rather than just come in and start editing documents; the lawyers took the time to get everyone up to speed. As an interviewee put it:

“The GET FiT approach is to start with days and days and days of workshops, basically. And I would only say that the more the better. There's a huge information download [...]. Our job was to transfer knowledge and, yeah, and to bring our clients along. It wasn't sort of a top-down - here's the documents, sign or not sign on the bottom line. We very much had to convince our clients as to why. And how do you convince the minds, well you have to explain it to them.”

The change in policy regarding evacuation risk was made possible because ERA was institutionally committed to external technical support and continuous improvement. The organisation was keen to learn; one of the success factors critical to delivering its 10 year Strategic Plan was identified as the “continuous capacity building of ERA staff in order to cope with emerging industry trends” (p.36) and this was supported by specific budget allocation.⁵⁸ As an interviewee put it:

“ERA have [...] had a very aggressive learning strategy. I mean, they send staff to various courses around the world.[...] It's not only about, you know, travelling to Norway or South Africa or UK or whatever, it's really about learning and really about becoming better.[...] There's a culture at ERA for continuously learning and improving and a very high level of professionalism that I haven't seen in any other East African institution.”

As a result of training provided by GET FiT consultants, ERA's understanding of project risks “improved immensely”. For the first time, there was appreciation of the need for government to take on the power evacuation risk in order to make the projects bankable.

The steering group for GET FiT included all the main players and made decisions by consensus which ensured support for policy change from the government of Uganda at each stage. The steering group included ERA, UECTL, MEMD and the donors. The UK was represented by DFID. Attendance was at CEO level and sometimes even the Minister for Energy would attend. The MFPED also had a role, and by getting “all actors around one table to agree” it averted the fate of other similar projects which had got tied up in red tape. An interviewee commented: “it is unusual for things to run this smoothly and well.”

⁵⁸ Additional budget was provided for staff training in the 2014/15-2023/24 **Strategic Plan**, which states, “[d]uring this period, staff training will be given special attention in order to enhance technical and professional capacity. An increment of 7% per year has been provided on training expenditure.” (p.32). This is in comparison to 10% over a 10 year period for other expenditure.

Smooth running was assisted by both ERA and UETCL being regarded as well-run organisations that inspired “trust and confidence”. An interviewee commented that the choice of ERA to front GET FiT was a very good one, going on to say that ERA was already proactive, transparent and open, even before the programme started. This confidence that the steering group had in the delivery organisations, and the mutual trust and respect amongst participants, contributed to the ability of the steering group to make good and timely decisions.

Decisions were made by consensus which was felt by participants to have been an important factor in all parties agreeing to the inclusion of the deemed energy clause in the PPA.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicates strong support for the claim that technical assistance from GET FiT made a significant contribution to the revision of the PPA and the Implementation Agreement. ICF supported this change by providing funding to GET FiT. However, it seems likely that if ICF had not provided funding this activity would have been supported by another donor.

8.4 Outcome 2: Improved regulation of environmental and social standards during development

8.4.1 Background

Uganda has standards for environmental and social aspects of infrastructure development. However, prior to GET FiT, the regulatory agencies in Uganda, particularly the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) and ERA, had limited expertise and resources to inspect and enforce them.⁵⁹ In order to receive the GET FiT benefits, developers had to comply with IFC Environmental and Social Performance Standards,⁶⁰ and the programme provided resources and training to enforce compliance.

Following GET FiT, developers and their consultants have improved expertise and capacity to meet environmental and social standards; regulators have improved expertise and capacity to enforce compliance.

8.4.2 What did ICF do and what difference did it make?

GET FiT funded Multiconsult and KfW engineers to enforce the required standards while building capacity in ERA through mentoring their staff who accompanied the consultants on inspection and enforcement visits during groundwork and construction phases, and learned by watching and asking questions.

Inspections were more thorough as ERA officials learned what they should be looking for in these new types of energy technology, and regulatory requirements were more stringently enforced.

“The high E&S standards and procedures set under GET FiT Programme have [...] strengthened the integration and monitoring of E&S aspects into the ERA licensing regime.[...] All future power project appraisals, licensing and monitoring conducted by ERA shall greatly benefit from application of the E&S GET FiT Programme experiences.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Kityo, P. (2018) Environmental and Social Safeguards in Hydropower in Uganda: Experiences in Implementing International Standards in Hydropower Projects (unpublished).

⁶⁰ IFC Performance Standards.

⁶¹ Kityo, P. (2018) Environmental and Social Safeguards in Hydropower in Uganda: Experiences in Implementing International Standards in Hydropower Projects (unpublished).

Technical assistance increased regulators' understanding of engineering, environmental and social aspects of developing renewable energy plant and helped them to understand how to enforce standards appropriately. One interviewee commented:

"Developers would get shocked that I asked some serious questions. They'd think I was a civil engineer – which I am not."

ERA staff and the Multiconsult Secretariat worked closely together to decide on the focus of the activities and how they should be delivered, which ensured it was relevant and that ERA took ownership. As an interviewee put it:

"Technical assistance from GETFiT I think was a continuous process because we worked together with the team at the secretariat - Multiconsult team, the KfW team. We were involved in all the processes."

And although the knowledge transfer was one way, the focus of activities was decided jointly; one interviewee described it as having "concurrence on issues that we needed to deal with".

An interviewee commented:

"ERA really has been in the driver's seat when it comes to what kind of technical assistance has been conducted under the program, and they've been very much taken ownership to that themselves."

The technical assistance gave ERA staff practical experience of enforcing standards which built their understanding of what they should be looking for and their confidence to require it. An interviewee described the approach as "informal ... it's been more kind of been about the day to day interaction between Multiconsult and ERA" going on to say:

"I'm a very big fan of this more informal type of knowledge transfer. [...] This long-term interaction where you really get a chance to spend a lot of time together, establish personal relationships, and really exchange knowledge through actually working together on specific projects. [...] I think that informal way of doing capacity building, this informal relationship that has grown over all these years now between Multiconsult experts and ERA experts has been extremely valuable to the key area staff that are responsible and will be responsible going forward to follow up on the both technical, but perhaps even more importantly environmental and social compliance [...]."

During activities themselves ERA staff worked closely with the consultants, with one interviewee commenting:

"We would leave here, plan our outings, discuss, reflect, take decisions and communicate."

This approach seems to have been instrumental in transferring knowledge. One interviewee commented:

"I tell my colleagues - the things I learned in my five years under GET FiT, I would need about 20 years if I was to go to school. [...] I consider myself privileged to have been in the right place at the right time."

The operating standards of developers also changed meaning that less regulatory intervention was required. An interviewee commented on the level of compliance with contractual E&S requirements prior to any regulatory intervention by inspectors, saying that:

“There is a high level of compliance that is observed with projects implemented with support of the GET FiT compared to projects that are outside that programme.”

However, this was only tangentially related to the capacity building and was more the result of the “barrage of overseers” that came with the GET FiT programme (interview with ERA official) meaning there was no opportunity to sit back and not implement the standards. The same interviewee commented:

“GET FiT stuck to its guns and implemented exactly what they said. And these developers had to comply. I'm using the word comply, meaning that they had to take it or leave it.”

ERA officials reported that the knowledge obtained from the technical assistance has been institutionalised within the organisation and is now part of its induction process.

One unintended consequence of the capacity building programme has been to bolster the employability of individuals who received the technical assistance, with the effect that some left ERA to pursue careers elsewhere. The impact of this was mitigated by ERA which has institutionalised the learning obtained from the technical assistance.

8.4.3 Other contributing factors

The threats of tariff removal, the intense scrutiny of GET FiT inspectors deployed for assurance purposes, and the upskilling of the contractor base also contributed to improved regulatory compliance. However, as ERA staff are already conducting independent inspections and applying the knowledge they have gained, it seems likely that the improved compliance will continue following the completion of GET FiT.

Strength of evidence

Process-tracing analysis indicated strong support for the claim that the technical assistance which GET FiT provided used a mentoring approach and this helped build capacity. ICF supported this change by providing funding to GET FiT. However, there is strong support for the claim that the ERA was a strong regulator, and some support for the alternative explanation that the threat of tariff removal caused regulatory compliance.

8.5 Outcome 3: Support for policy change on geothermal energy

8.5.1 Background

Uganda had ambitious targets for geothermal energy exploitation. Vision 2040 (2007) set an annual target of 1500 MW, and it was also expected to make a significant contribution to the 2030 target for renewable generation of 3200 MW. However, despite considerable donor involvement, by 2015 there had been limited progress;⁶² no deep well drilling had been undertaken, there was no adopted policy and no legislation⁶³ and, although three concessions had been awarded, there was no sign of any development taking place.

In 2015–16, experts working for the United Nations Climate Technology Centre and Network (UN CTCN) recognised that Ugandan geothermal resources were cooler than others in the region meaning that a more complex power plant would be needed to convert the steam to electricity. On one hand, this reduced the attractiveness of investment because there are more upfront costs. On the other hand, it makes direct use applications more attractive.

8.5.2 What did ICF do and what difference did it make?

EAGER helped the GRD further the understanding of Uganda's geothermal resource. The Adam Smith Institute (ASI) engaged the experts that had worked for CTCN to train GRD staff on geophysical, geological and geochemical surveying of systems like this, and how to interpret the data obtained, and built an evidence base on the nature of the fault system to form the basis of policy development and implementation.

In parallel, EAGER helped the GRD finalise the draft geothermal policy for Uganda. GRD had been working on a policy with UN CTCN, and a draft had been produced. The EAGER technical assistance consultant commented twice on the draft, the first time in the form of a recommendations report and the second time in the form of tracked changes on the draft policy itself as well as a formal recommendations report. An interviewee commented that “[y]es, [the technical assistance consultant] really gave us very good suggestions.”

GRD has taken ownership of the work needed to progress the geothermal policy; an interviewee commented:

“[...] at the very last conference we went to, [the Assistant Commissioner] gave a presentation on how they were going to explore another site which we hadn't even been to. And it was very clear that they learned the lessons of how to do it, and their planning for that was actually spot on. So, they had learned the concept of an exploration strategy for this type of resource and how you might use it.”

Geothermal policy is now rooted in a much-improved understanding of the nature of the geothermal resource and suitable applications for exploiting it.⁶⁴

⁶² Economic Consultants Associated Ltd (2012) *East Africa Geothermal Energy: Review of Donor Initiatives and Current Regulatory Framework*, (p.3).

⁶³ Ibid. (p.7).

⁶⁴ For example, in 2018 the GRD sent a request for technical assistance to the UN CTCN for help in assessing the direct use applications of its resource, and in autumn 2019 UNCTCN issued a call for technical assistance on direct use in the six East African countries with low to medium enthalpy (total heat content) systems.

EAGER came into conflict with another donor on the subject. As one interviewee put it:

“[The technical assistance consultant] was trying to inject some realism into some of the countries' views on what the geothermal resource was, which was, I think, a bit at odds with the Africa Union's view that we should be kind of concentrating on the large megawatt scale electricity generation [...]. The lead of the Administrative Unit didn't like it because they thought that EAGER was saying that a lot of the programs which had been approved with grant contracts with GRMF [Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility] weren't going to actually be successful in the future, which I think actually is true because we still have no successful drilling programmes through GRMF [...].”

The president was also reluctant to accept that what he had been told by international developers about the potential for electricity production from his country's geothermal resources may not materialise. The technical assistance helped officials to address these challenges because it had brought in globally recognised experts. One interviewee commented:

“[...] so many of the consultants and experts actually don't understand the fault-controlled [geothermal systems]. People like [NAME] and [NAME] who we got in, are THE world experts on it. They are some way ahead of the pack.”

The UK's approach was to bring in the most appropriate expert regardless of nationality. This was felt to be an advantage as some other donors would restrict themselves to experts from their own country.

“The success of EAGER is the fact that they were able to put together a team of experts from different countries. Other funders, sometimes, like if it was UK it would only be like they bring experts from the UK, and sometimes maybe they are not so good experts in that area. So, this one, yes, someone from UK, fine, so [NAME], he is good on policy, he comes, another one from the US, the only one who understands the fluid system, he comes. Someone from Iceland on direct use, he comes.”

The technical assistance was designed to ensure that the GRD took ownership over the work programme. The style was very much asking the GRD officials what they wanted, and ‘working with’ rather than “telling them what to do, which can sound like we all know best”. This had the effect of building a relationship based on trust and mutual respect.

The use of an in-country interlocuter helped provide understanding of the country context to the team of foreign technical assistance consultants. As one interviewee put it:

“[...] having [NAME] as this interlocuter in country just helping bridge the culture gap and, as it were, the on-the-ground circumstance; it does really matter and I think a lot of programmes can learn from that.”

Close working led to an effective transfer of knowledge and know-how between technical assistance consultant and GRD officials. The approach was built on mutual trust and respect rather than taking a “lecturer approach” and the contact was so regular that it was like the consultants were seconded in. An interviewee commented:

“The fact that consultants took time to stay with you and transfer skills was good. [...] It is rare to get the type of training where you have the opportunity to sense check your interpretation of data with others through group discussions and peer review.”

Spending just enough time in-country ensured that the GRD benefited from the expertise but kept moving things forward themselves; if too much time was spent, the officials started to rely on the presence of the technical assistance consultants. An interviewee commented:

“We specifically set out by agreement [...] to say, ‘Right. We’re not going to be here all the time here. We are going to set you up and move things on, and then we’ll come back for the next stage. And if you could do stuff in the meantime, that’s great.’ So, they would actually have to do things while we weren’t there [...].”

The fact that the government of Uganda was committed at senior and departmental levels to taking geothermal forward helped drive progress. The commitment is shown in the policy statements on renewable energy, and also in the creation of the GRD in 2013.⁶⁵ One of the interviewees commented: “in Uganda, you know, momentum was really there.”

At departmental level, the fact the GRD officials were not only receptive to the technical assistance, but keen to join in visits, to move policy on and commit time learning meant that officials really took on the opportunities provided by the technical assistance. This was helped by the fact GRD had qualified and professional staff; as one interviewee put it: “EAGER did not find that we are totally clueless, like sheep.” Another interviewee explained:

“I give great credit to them [...]. From being very uncertain at the beginning – and you weren’t quite sure whether anything would ever happen – to every time we were there, they were ready for us. What needed to be done in the meantime had been done, they had pulled together a whole army of people to do the policy work [...].”

There is now a final version of the national geothermal policy which is making its way through the Ugandan parliamentary process, with the expectation of a new Act coming into force in the next few years. The policy has significantly more emphasis on support for direct use as an option. In the current version,⁶⁶ direct use is portrayed as an important application for geothermal energy, almost on a par with electricity production. The case for direct use is made with reference to the greater levels of employment potential it offers compared with electricity generation.

If DFID had not funded EAGER, it is very likely that the Ugandan government would have found funding from another donor. There have been a series of funders for geothermal related work and that continues post-EAGER.

Strength of evidence

Process-tracing analysis indicates some support for the claim that the approach that EAGER took to give technical assistance resulted in increased capacity, and workshops with government officials led to changes in geothermal policy documents. However, it seems likely that if ICF had not provided funding, the Ugandan government would have gained support from another donor.

⁶⁵ New Vision (2014) [Uganda to set up geothermal energy entity](#).

⁶⁶ The September 2019 version provided to the project by GRD, file dated 3 September 2019.

8.6 Conclusions

ICF's support for change in Uganda's renewable energy policy between 2011 and the present day focussed on building the capacity of government officials to design, implement and enforce policy. For example:

- GET FiT improved officials understanding of what drives financial decisions which motivated them to change policy on the allocation of risk and return in a way that mobilised private finance.
- GET FiT gave officials hands-on experience of conducting inspections to enforce environmental and social standards; this built their skills and confidence and is expected to lead to an improvement in standards in future.
- EAGER provided evidence about the geothermal resources available to Uganda, which enabled policy to be designed to exploit those resources more effectively.

Capacity building was supported by the provision of expertise to implement the policy decisions: for example, drafting of the PPA and Implementation Agreement for renewable energy and the drafting of revisions to the geothermal policy. The use of world class experts gave policymakers confidence that the advice was correct and impartial.

The collaborative approach to the technical assistance ensured it was designed to meet the needs of policymakers. Aspects of the way it was delivered supported knowledge transfer by deliberately fostering close relationships, using a mentoring training style, ensuring enough contact with external experts and working with well-connected local experts.

The environment within which technical assistance was delivered contributed to the role it had over policy.

- Uganda was already motivated to expand renewable energy, so a technocratic approach was all that was needed; there was no political-level support for change required.
- The institutional structure around renewable energy was supportive; the electricity market was liberalised, there was a strong independent regulator, and ministries and departments were given freedom, within reason, to drive agendas forward.
- MEMD, ERA and UETCL had highly professional and well-educated staff who were committed to high standards and eager to learn.
- ERA, in particular, had a learning and development culture and placed importance on staff developing the skills required to regulate in a modern world.

Although an approach targeted towards supporting technical aspects of renewable energy policy change worked well in Uganda for the most part, where scientific evidence conflicted with strongly held political beliefs this 'bottom-up' approach was not successful. Although the president appears to have remained supportive of exploiting geothermal energy, the policy has had to be carefully worded to ensure it is widely acceptable.

9 In what circumstances, to what extent, and for whom has ICF supported change in global institutions' policy?

9.1 Outcomes

9.1.1 Successful attempts to support change in global institutions' policy

The CIFs and World Bank case studies identified five cases where UK support was thought to have contributed to policy change.

Table 13 below shows the identified policy outcomes, and the level of support from the evidence that ICF supported the change in policy. These are explored in detail in the relevant country case studies.

Due to the nature of the World Bank case study which was designed to understand the ways in which UK seeks to support policy change in the MDBs, policy outcomes related to the World Bank have not been fully tested and process tracing has not been used.

Table 13: Policy outcomes in global institutions

Policy Outcome	MDB/Fund	UK intervention	Evidence that ICF supported policy change (from process tracing)
Agreement to defer a decision about implementing the sunset clause of the Clean Technology Fund (CTF).	CIFs	Building coalitions of support and providing evidence (through E&L) that supports continuation of the CTF.	Strong
Core funding of the second phase of the E&L initiative.	CIFs	Funding and championing a demonstration E&L pilot and using the evidence to persuade stakeholders that it should be continued.	Some
International Development Association (IDA) commitment to include a biodiversity indicator, agreeing to roll out a minimum of 10 pilots to work with the poorest countries to protect their biodiversity.	World Bank	Using financial and diplomatic leverage around time of IDA replenishment to build coalitions of support.	n/a
World Bank issue document entitled: Strategic Use of Climate Finance to Maximize Climate Action: A Guiding Framework.	World Bank	Technical input and sharing of evidence with World Bank teams.	n/a
Creation of the Coalition of Ministers for Climate Action and the adoption of the six Helsinki principles.	World Bank	Using diplomatic leverage to persuade other donors to join.	n/a

9.1.2 Attempts to support change in global policy which have not yet been successful but where there are positive interim outcomes

We found evidence that the transformational change framework developed by the E&L initiative has now both been incorporated into other CIF programmes and also mainstreamed into other areas by MDBs, such as GCF.

UK representatives believe that ICF's support – using financial leverage to build coalitions of support with other donors during the International Development Association (IDA) 19 replenishment negotiations – had contributed to the increased ambition of the World Bank with regard to the percentage of IDA lending that would have climate co-benefits (rising from 28 to 30%) and supporting at least 15 IDA countries (up from 10) to systematically update their climate related action plans.


9.1.3 Where attempts to support change in global policy did not result in the desired effect

ICF attempted to use its influence to advocate for the implementation of CTF 2.0 and persuade other donors to back the initiative, providing technical expertise to help design how the new fund would operate. However, this was unsuccessful as they were unable to overcome the political opposition of other donors who believed that new investment would be better channelled through the GCF.

9.2 Theory of Change – support for policy change in global institutions

This section presents the high-level theory in tabular and diagrammatic form. It then describes the evidence for that theory along with an assessment of the strength of that evidence. The diagram below shows how support for policy change in global institutions works.


Figure 4: Overall CMO



9.3 The different elements of policy change

The diagram below shows how the different elements of policy change work; these are expanded upon in the tables that follow.

Figure 5: how the different elements of policy change work



Overall contexts (supported change in global policy):

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
	There is no strong political opposition to policy change	
Plausible	13 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 with MDB/funds • 3 with other donors • 5 with UK representatives Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>"If there's no support politically for a continuation, then even if you have like a very good argument, you cannot win."</p> <p>"It's a very difficult moment because the UK is one shareholder and there is a very, very strong coalition of the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, who are very pro coal, who are very anti the Paris Agreement. And so, it's quite hard to influence the [MDB] management to do things."</p> <p>"I mean the timing was just incredibly unfortunate in relation to the US election, then the change of U.S. administration who weren't up for supporting this and the Japanese had some reservations. Which has meant that we haven't been able to do it."</p>
	UK is seen has having expertise in policy area	
Plausible	9 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 with MDB/funds • 2 with other donors • 8 with UK representatives • 1 with recipient country Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 2 cases • Some support in 0 case 	<p>"I think the UK government, from both sides BEIS and DFID, they have in a way, a very unique expertise because they have been very active in many different settings in climate finance space."</p> <p>"We also have a history of being very principled and very consistent in our approach. Very evidence-based, whereas I think others can seem more biased and more partisan in how they support projects and how they influence the Bank. So, I think we're very well respected and because we have very knowledgeable directors from a development ministry and a treasury ministry."</p>

Financial leverage when MDBs/funds are fundraising

Context: MDB/fund is fundraising.

Mechanism:

- **Resource:** UK offers substantial funding and articulates how it wants to see the money used.
- **Reasoning:** Other stakeholders support the UK's position because they want to maximise funding for the MDB/fund.

Outcome: MDB/fund stakeholders are motivated to act.

Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Tentative	7 interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 with MDB/funds • 1 with other donors • 5 with UK representatives Process-tracing evidence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 1 case 	<p>"The UK is usually well prepared; they have a clear position and a clear direction. So, it's easy to follow what they want and also easy for other countries to decide, 'that sounds good, I will support that'."</p> <p>"I mean, there's a certain amount of weight that comes with the money that goes in. But if I look across the board, you know, the US has got a lot of money in, but they don't have the same clout that the UK does. Similarly, the Dutch don't have a lot of money in, but their representative is very active and is very well respected. So, I think I think it has less to do with the amount of money and more to do with the quality of the representatives."</p>

Specific CMOs (supporting change in global policy):

UK shows commitment as largest donor		
<p>Context: UK is a large donor to a fund.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: UK sets out what it wants to see from the fund with regard to climate change policy and engages with other donors to get their backing. • Reasoning: Smaller donors who are not committed to a particular position will support the UK's preferred approach because they respect the UK's commitment. <p>Outcome: MDB/fund stakeholders are motivated to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>18 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 with MDB/funds • 3 with other donors • 6 with UK representatives • 1 with recipient country <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 1 case 	<p>"I don't necessarily see the other contributors, you know, in a position of 'let's keep the UK happy'. I don't think that that's really what's playing out. What's playing out is that they are the top contributor. Clearly, you know, they are very invested in this mechanism, they know it very well and they are deeply engaged. And so, they have done their due diligence thoroughly. And so, let's listen to what they have to say."</p> <p>"In the case of the UK, let's say, because they're a large shareholder in the fund it kind of gives the others confidence that the UK is more exposed than they may be. And if the UK have expressed the view in a certain way, that then gives them the confidence to do that because given the larger exposure, the UK has a [potential] bigger loss than they may have."</p> <p>"I think there's also an important role of being the largest donor, you know, and that's the sort of unwritten rule that, you know, actually people do respect the fact that [you] have been a, you know, a consistent and large scale supporter of the CIF. So, there's a certain amount of you know, respect, for that."</p>

Coalitions of support		
<p>Context: UK builds coalitions of support with donors and recipient countries.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: Coalition of stakeholders builds confidence of less committed stakeholders at MDB/fund to move in a certain direction. • Reasoning: Less committed stakeholders at MDB/fund feel more confident to make policy change because key stakeholders are backing it. <p>Outcome: MDB/fund stakeholders are motivated to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Tentative	<p>6 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 with MDB/funds • 1 with other donors • 3 with UK representatives <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 1 case 	<p>So, if it had just been, you know, donor countries shouting out about why this is important, it wouldn't have had the same effect. But it was that people who represented Brazil, who represented Burkina Faso who was standing up and talking about the value of this work that I think changed the minds of some representatives from recipient countries."</p>

Specific CMOs (supporting change in global policy):

Leadership		
<p>Context: UK representatives take leadership roles within multilateral funds.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: UK has a platform and opportunity to shape discussions and build consensus. • Reasoning: Consensus is built for UK's position because stakeholders realise the strength of support for the UK position. <p>Outcome: Fund stakeholders are motivated to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>7 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 with MDB/funds • 3 with other donors • 2 with UK representatives <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 1 case 	<p>"In terms of the way they've managed or fulfilled a role in chairing the meetings, and that just created a platform for getting often countries that would not necessarily say anything [...] to actually express their views on that [...]. So that one could see that this is a position that is shared amongst a much broader not just, you know, one or two countries that tend to be maybe a bit more vocal [...] [which] helped [shape the debate around the sunset clause] in a way."</p> <p>"I think the whole process was handled very well in terms of reaching consensus on the wording that would be required for moving forward and the UK played a strong role in that. I think the UK played a strong role, saying okay, let's find a happy medium [...]. So, it was really about just brokering that consensus</p>

Specific CMOs (supporting change in global policy):

UK expertise/input gives confidence		
<p>Context: MDB/fund stakeholders lack knowledge or understanding of policy area.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: UK provides input based on specific expertise and careful consideration in support of a policy change. • Reasoning: Other stakeholders without that expertise support UK proposals because they are confident that the proposed policy change will work. <p>Outcome: MDB/fund stakeholders have evidence to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>11 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 with MDB/funds • 1 with other donors • 6 with UK representatives <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 2 cases 	<p>“So, I think bringing in specialists brought in that sort of nuance and detail in terms of engagement and discussions. In many ways, it did really improve the understanding and knowledge [of stakeholders].”</p> <p>“I mean there would be a dearth of evidence and knowledge on large scale climate programmes without the UK. And you know, and they have a position of credibility anyway because they're one of the largest funders and a founding funder. And so that sort of double credibility has really, really helped the entire field.”</p> <p>“Some [officials] were able to highlight that they were able to use the evidence from the evaluation and leaning initiative in their own operations, in their policies. So, the [MDB] is a very good example - drawing from the transformation evaluation, [MDB officials] were able to use that evidence when they were doing their own strategies on climate change.”</p> <p>“If they either have technical questions or they want to understand the politics behind things going on, then very often they will reach out to us and similarly because we're quite engaged, the MDBs will very proactively reach out [to the UK] if they're thinking about new projects or new proposals which might be particularly innovative or contentious in some way. Then they will very quickly reach out to us - I don't think to other countries - but just to the UK, to see what we think. So, I think there is a sort of respect for the fact that we're engaged, and we'll take a view and we'll be informed enough to have a good discussion on things.”</p>

Experience builds capability		
<p>Context: ICF programme is delivered through MDB/fund which employs innovative approach.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: MDB/fund officials gain experience of working on new approach. • Reasoning: MDB/fund officials understand the benefits of the approach which builds their capability to implement similar approaches. <p>Outcome: MDB/fund stakeholders have capability to act.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Tentative	<p>6 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 with MDB/funds • 4 with UK representatives <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 0 cases • Some support in 1 case 	<p>“A number of projects [...] and evaluations were taking place, particularly on the transformational change. And then it started to catch attention of [fund officials]. I think they recognized that some of the lessons coming out of that were important and could also be beneficial in terms of demonstrating some of the value of the CIFs, where there were positive results coming from those evaluations. And so that was starting to be used [by fund officials].”</p>

Specific CMOs (supporting change in global policy):

Alternative explanation: Existing pressure		
<p>Context: Global pressure on MDB/fund to increase ambition with regard to climate change action.</p> <p>Mechanism:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource: MDB/fund has its own climate change targets. • Reasoning: Top-down push from senior officials within MDB/fund obliges spending teams to focus more on climate change. <p>Outcome: MDB/fund staff are motivated to consider climate change objectives when considering new policy.</p>		
Strength of evidence	Evidence from	Quotes/examples
Plausible	<p>16 interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 with MDB/funds • 3 with other donors • 9 with UK representatives • 1 with recipient country <p>Process-tracing evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong support in 1 case • Some support in 0 cases 	<p>“UK support was really helpful, but we we’re in a period of time where you’ve just had the Paris Agreement, the whole issue of climate change is high on the political agenda. And the political messaging of saying, well, we have a major global climate challenge, there’s a big challenge in finance, et cetera. Then it’s not politically palatable for countries to say that we’re going to close down a fund that is delivering on climate mitigation and adaptation.”</p> <p>“I think with the World Bank in particular, it is evident that climate change for them has become a greater priority. The share of their resources they spend on programmes which have climate carbon assets is definitely increasing. For a while, it looked like they were not going to meet their own climate finance targets, which was 28% by 2020. But in the last couple of years, they have accelerated that significantly. And that is substantially down to the [Former President] Jim Kim pushing it with the setting of divisional level targets for climate finance - so there was quite a top down push which has obliged their spending teams to focus more on climate change. And that has been that has been very helpful.”</p> <p>“So, I think it’s a common phenomenon that organisations have less scope to do nothing, public awareness is much higher. So, the reputational risk of not being seen to do something is a lot higher.”</p>

10 Case Study: Supporting change in the Climate Investment Funds policy

10.1 Introduction

This case study focusses on ICF's influence on the policy of the CIFs, and specifically the CTF as an example of ICF's influence on multilateral funds.⁶⁷ ICF was successful in supporting change in two policy areas: the agreement in 2019 to defer a decision about implementing the CIFs sunset clause and the funding of the second phase of the E&L Initiative under the core-CIF budget and associated culture change. ICF was unsuccessful in securing support in a third policy area, the proposal for CTF 2.0.

10.2 Context

The CIFs were established by the UK and two other donors (the US and Japan) in 2008 as multilateral vehicles to provide new and additional financing (in the form of grants, concessional⁶⁸ loans, and risk mitigation instruments) to complement existing financing mechanisms and to demonstrate and deploy transformational actions with the aim to mitigate and adapt to climate change. The CIFs were established with the intention that they would build momentum for global climate finance until an effective global climate finance vehicle was in place under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in the form of the GCF, at which point the CIFs would come to a close through a sunset clause (explored further in section 10.4 above).

There are a total of 14 CIF donor countries, with contributions of US\$8 billion in total.

The CIFs is comprised of the CTF and Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). Each is governed by a trust fund committee which includes eight members selected from contributor countries and another eight from recipient countries. Joint meetings of the CTF and SCF trust fund committees consider "issues and policies relating to the CIF as a whole", with 16 seats for each group of countries to maintain equal decision making. For each trust fund committee, two co-chairs (one from a contributor country and one from a recipient country) are elected from among the members of each committee to serve an 18-month term. Representatives from the private sector, civil society, and indigenous peoples may also attend committee meetings as active observers. Decisions are made on a consensus basis, with proposals being postponed or withdrawn if committee members cannot reach consensus.

The CIF Administrative Unit supports the work of the governing bodies by providing recommendations and reporting on operational, financial, and administrative matters and facilitating meetings, communications, and other services.

⁶⁷ Although the focus was due to be specifically on the CTF, with the sunset clause decision made by the joint CTF-SCF committee and the E&L Initiative relevant to both CTF and SCF, it is broader than just the CTF.

⁶⁸ Concessional refers to the extent to which a financial instrument is priced below the terms that would be available for the same instrument if it was provided by a commercial capital provider in a market transaction. A grant is, by definition, concessional as it would not be provided by a commercial capital provider. DFIs and donors also frequently provide concessional loans whereby the interest rate might be lower, or the grace period before repayments start or the term is longer, than would be available from commercial loan providers. It is also possible to provide concessional guarantees and other risk transfer instruments by pricing these instruments at lower terms than would be available in the market. Concessional equity is not normally described as such, but there are cases where equity would be provided with lower return expectations, a more subordinated position, and/or a longer 'hold' period than would be required by a private investor.

10.3 The UK's interaction with the CIFs

The UK is the largest single donor, with contributions of over US\$2 billion (£1,987.9 million in total of which DFID contributes £854.5 million and BEIS £1,133.4 million); the UK is co-chair of the joint CTF and SCF committees and attends all of the trust fund committees and sub-committees. The UK was noted by a number of interviewees as also being very active in reviewing and providing feedback on proposals and in its support of the CIF Administrative Unit. It is also an active member of the E&L initiative's advisory group "supporting the Initiative's design and providing ongoing guidance".

10.4 Outcome 1: The agreement to defer a decision about implementing the sunset clause

10.4.1 Background

A sunset clause is included in the CIFs Governance Framework and requires the respective CIF funds (CTF & SCF) "to conclude its operations once a new financial architecture [notably the GCF] is effective".⁶⁹

However, the point at which the new financial architecture, the GCF, would be considered effective was never made explicit, so there was a lack of clarity regarding when to invoke the sunset clause.⁷⁰ A decision was due to be made regarding this in 2016, but this was subsequently delayed until the Joint Trust Fund committee meeting in June 2019, with discussions beginning in January 2019. The recipient countries were in favour of the CIFs continuing as they felt that "[...] they've done a really good job [...] [and] want them to be recapitalised." Those who wanted to see the initiation of the sunset clause largely believed that the GCF could now be considered an effective climate finance tool, and therefore the CIFs were no longer necessary.

10.4.2 What did ICF do?

The UK worked on several levels to try and secure agreement to defer the decision:

- Building a coalition of support – the UK representatives focussed on lobbying and the engagement of representatives of key donors. At the same time the Administrative Unit acquired a statement signed by ministers from 47 recipient countries expressing that they did not wish to consider the sunset clause.
- Improving the evidence base for the decision – lawyers were engaged by the UK to interpret what the clauses meant and provide a legal argument on the consequences of initiating the sunset clause. Evidence from the E&L Initiative was also shared to outline the achievements of the CIFs.
- Promising further finance – the UK pledged its support for the funding of the energy storage initiative as a means of demonstrating its ongoing commitment to the CIFs.

10.4.3 What happened as a result?

In June 2019, the Joint Meeting of the CTF and SCF trust fund committees was held to discuss the sunset clause. The UK was co-chair of the meeting alongside Bangladesh. A range of views were expressed and no consensus could be reached regarding triggering or removing the sunset clause. The decision was however made to:

*"[...] postpone discussions on the sunset clause for an indefinite period of time, recognizing that the Committee does not expect to return to this discussion unless there is a significant change in circumstances."*⁷¹

⁶⁹ ICF International (2014) Independent Evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), p. 9.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Summary of the Co-Chairs Meeting of the Trust Fund Committee of the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), Washington, D.C. June 4, 2019. Available at https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/events/files/ctf_co-chairs_summary_june_6_2019_final.pdf.

10.4.4 What made the difference?

10.4.4.1 The UK had strong leadership skills in terms of building consensus and deploying evidence, which allowed for a common position to be reached.

Other committee members felt the UK demonstrated strong leadership skills, which were considered central in reaching the agreement regarding the sunset clause. The UK demonstrated a capacity to be “genuine”, “empathetic”, “forthright”, “flexible”, “articulate” and “with strong inter-personal skills” enabling convening and consultation, as well as being “knowledgeable” and “well informed”. These traits were considered key to them reconciling different perspectives and in turn allowing the UK “to forge the consensus”. As noted by one interviewee:

“I think the whole process was handled very well in terms of reaching consensus on the wording that would be required for moving forward and the UK played a strong role in that. I think the UK played a strong role, saying okay, let's find a happy medium [...]. So, it was really about just brokering that consensus, brokering that that happy medium middle ground.”

The UK, through engaging with others and by understanding their respective positions, was also able to build coalitions of support with other donors who aligned with their position. In one case for instance, they recruited another donor to pledge additional funding. In doing so, this helped to convince other donors of the position.

“I think this initiative to get cooperation between [donor] and UK was quite important because it also like gave trust for other donors [...] that's basically like a sign for other donors okay, there's two donors that are willing to make another contribution. So why should we decide sunsetting a fund where there's willingness of big donors to contribute?”

In conjunction with this, the findings from the CIFs E&L Initiative evaluations demonstrated the important and distinct contribution of the CIFs. One interviewee attributed the UK’s demonstration of the evidence as key in getting two countries who were in favour of invoking the sunset clause, to abstain from the vote:

“The UK, with the arguments they brought up were helping to get to this decision, to even make the ones that were in favour of initiating the sunset clause [...] to basically like persuade them to abstain [...]. The UK was always bringing up the arguments of the overwhelming evidence why we need to continue with the CIFs and also the argument, of course, that there is no support in this committee.”

This was made possible because the UK representative had time to engage with others and understand their position.

“[...] for some countries, you know, who is also covering six or seven different other funds or has other responsibilities so they don't have the kind of time [...] to really be engaging in the way that [the UK] do in understanding what's going on.”

10.4.4.2 The UK took on positions of responsibility (such as co-chair) providing an opportunity to engage with others to explain the UK's position and listen to others' views.

The UK's role as co-chair created a platform by which it was visible, opening up greater opportunities to engage with others to present its position and understand the perspectives of others:

"In terms of the way [the UK]'s managed or fulfilled a role in chairing the meetings, and that just created a platform for getting often countries that would not necessarily say anything [...] to actually express their views on that [...]. So that one could see that this is a position that is shared amongst a much broader not just, you know, one or two countries that tend to be maybe a bit more vocal [...] [which] helped [shape the debate around the sunset clause] in a way."

In one case, this centrality of role saw a contributor country who was unable to attend a number of meetings, consistently following up with the UK after meetings to get its input and guidance regarding what had gone on and to understand the views held by others who were in attendance.

In another example, one interviewee observed that whilst in Morocco, the UK had used its role as co-chair to be vocal in conveying a positive message regarding the CIFs in the presence of the recipient countries. They reflected that in doing so, this made it difficult for countries wanting to apply the sunset clause to justify it to those recipient countries in that setting, which in turn actively 'shaped the debate' relating to the sunset clause.

10.4.4.3 As a major donor to the CIFs, the UK is seen as putting their money where their mouth is, which builds respect for its position and sees other countries more likely to support its position.

Being the largest donor and seeing the UK pledging financial support for CIF projects, builds confidence in others that the UK is highly committed to the CIFs:

"I think there's also an important role of being the largest donor, you know, and that's the sort of unwritten rule that, you know, actually people do respect the fact that [you] have been a, you know, a consistent and large scale supporter of the CIF. So, you know, you say, well, there's a certain amount of you know, respect, for that."

This along with respect for the UK's decision making (see below) gave other donors confidence to align with the UK position. One interviewee noted that having the UK, one of the major funders, on board enabled them to convince their own government to defer the decision about sunset setting the CIFs.

10.4.4.4 The UK has a reputation for using evidence well and for consistently providing input and feedback on proposals so others respect the UK and pay attention to its position.

The UK's high level of engagement within the CIFs and notably its use of evidence and responsiveness to requests for input and feedback on proposals, has built a reputation amongst other CIF stakeholders that the UK will have considered its position thoroughly. This builds respect and support for their position, seeing others "paying attention to the position of the UK", through the belief that they "have done their due diligence thoroughly. And so, let's listen to what they have to say".

10.4.5 Are there alternative explanations?

The wider global political climate position at the time, with the Paris Agreement and climate change being high on the political agenda, may have contributed to a reluctance by countries to be seen to be closing down a major climate fund.

One interviewee noted that it was relatively easy to reach an agreement to defer a decision about sunset setting as they "were not asking the countries to sign up for anything very substantial in terms of things that they could not have the mandate to approve", and it was possible for committee members to abstain from the vote.

10.5 Summary

The UK was able to secure agreement to postpone a decision on the implementation of the sunset clause to a later date because it built a consensus among donor countries. This was possible because the UK actively engaged and collaborated with other donors who were motivated to support the UK position because it is a significant funder and has a reputation for sound, evidence-based decision making.

The UK's success in supporting policy change depended on having representatives with the time and skills to engage others, having a formal role as co-chair, there being evidence about the success of the CIFs and their willingness to commit further funding.

The ability of countries to abstain and the potential adverse reputational effect of being seen to oppose the continuation of a successful climate finance initiative made it easier to secure the desired result.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis indicated strong support for the claim that the UK showed strong leadership as co-chair and was key to consensus building in the case of the agreement to defer a decision about initiation of the sunset clause. There is strong support for the alternative explanation that at the time of the discussion (shortly after the Paris Agreement), it would have been politically difficult to sunset the fund. However, there is strong support for the claim that it was the UK who brought the evidence of the success of the fund to the attention of donor and recipient countries, through the presentation of evidence from the E&L initiative (see below), making it harder to argue for sunsetting the CIFs.

10.6 Outcome 2: Core-budget funding of Phase 2 of the CIFs Evaluation and Learning Initiative

10.6.1 Background

Before 2015, evaluation of CIF projects was conducted by the individual MDBs managing them, and there was a limited level of evaluation for the CIFs as a whole with just one mid-term evaluation planned. The UK felt this was insufficient to provide the learning needed to realise the full potential of the CIFs.

10.6.2 What did ICF do?

At the Joint Trust Fund committee meeting in May 2014, the UK proposed an E&L Initiative with the aim of improving the evaluation of CIFs overall. This proposal was rejected following opposition from other donors who felt that project evaluations were sufficient, and opposition by recipient countries who wanted as much funding as possible to be directed to projects.

The UK was unable to persuade others to change their positions and so offered additional dedicated ICF funding of £6 million for the CIFs evaluation function. Other donors and recipient countries accepted this and approved the E&L initiative in May 2015; the first tranche, solely funded by the UK, was initiated in 2017.

10.6.3 What happened as a result?

The second phase of the E&L Initiative, commencing in 2020, is now being funded under the core CIFs budget, including the utilisation of funds previously assigned to CTF projects. In line with this, there has been a noted “culture change” within the CIFs in regards to evaluation and learning:

“[...] I think this whole initiative brought about a culture change, you know, from the way people see things. Right. We've always seen evaluations as sort of they are evaluating to see who didn't do what for accountability purposes. But I think through the evaluation and learning initiative, I think it was a really huge shift.”

Those within the CIFs are now:

“seeing the value of this and [...] [they've come to] realise that you must dedicate resources from within the resources that are in the fund for this type of work.”

Countries who had initially been sceptical of the value of the E&L initiative, were persuaded of its value through the demonstrated quality and utility of the evidence that was generated:

“because it [the E&L Initiative] has worked and had some proven effects, other donors or other funders are less reluctant to fund it.”

One significant output of the first tranche of the E&L initiative was the transformational change toolkit, defining how to measure for and design for transformational change. This is now being used both within the CIFs and by other funds and MDBs more broadly:

“I think for me that was very, very influential not just to the CIF, but to the MDBs, countries and then to many others, the transformational change evaluation, they defined what do we mean by transformational change? What are the dimensions?”

10.6.4 What made the difference?

10.6.4.1 By demonstrating the potential of evaluation and that it could provide valuable insights, the UK was able to persuade other countries that it was a good use of CIF core funding.

The UK had the resource, financial resources and time, to lead the E&L Initiative and was able to do so at the right time “[...] for it not to get caught up in other political decisions that were going on at the time.” The UK’s established knowledge and expertise in evaluation also built trust in the evidence that was produced “by the UK having notable expertise in this area, [they’re] looked to as a source of credible advice”. Finally, the UK leadership skills in deploying the evidence, and engaging with key stakeholders, allowed for the value of the Initiative to be effectively communicated.

10.6.4.2 Because the results of the evaluation were positive, other donors and recipient countries were pleased to have evidence of CIF success and so supported continuation of the E&L Initiative.

The degree to which the results coming out of the E&L Initiative were positive was also noted as key to building support and persuading other countries of the value of the initiative:

“The evaluation results were super positive. And I think that was also like something that the UK could then bring forward like look, we had this evaluation initiative as well and there was [sic] those results that were positive.”

10.6.4.3 The ICF engaged and supported the CIF Administrative Unit during the first phase of the E&L Initiative which built their capacity and support for the work and in turn helped to build support for the implementation of the second phase.

The UK had built a strong relationship with the CIF Administrative Unit, through being very active in engaging

with them. The Administrative Unit also held the UK in high regard for its proactivity and diligence within the CIFs (as explored above). As a result, the CIF Administrative Unit actively reached out to the UK for input:

“I think because, you know, [the UK] have positively encouraged that. You know, [they] have asked, you know, to have those meetings and catch-up. I mean it. I mean, it works both ways. They [the CIF Administrative Unit] also, you know, reach out to [to the UK] and say, can we talk about this?”

This enabled the UK to work closely with the CIF Administrative Unit in the case of the E&L initiative and bring in specialists, which then helped to build capacity and support for the work led by the Administrative Unit:

“A number of projects [...] and evaluations were taking place, particularly on the transformational change one of the two transformational change evaluations. And then started to catch attention [...] of the CIFs admin unit as well. I think they recognised that some of the lessons coming out of that were important and could also be beneficial in terms of demonstrating some of the value of the CIFs, where there were positive results coming from those evaluations. And so, that was starting to be used within CIFs admin unit itself, and particularly some of those projects have now been funded from things that have been put front and centre in terms of demonstrating the case for why the CIFs adds value and the unique value of the CIFs.”

This helped to build support amongst others for the E&L Initiative, through the Administrative Unit’s status as independent:

“I think that [the E&L Initiative] being led by the CIFs admin unit meant that it was being led by an organisation that didn't just have to reflect the interests and priorities of one stakeholder or one stakeholder group. Its function was to be kind of independent of all the different stakeholder groups and listen and decide what was kind of like an acceptable collective position and lead the work. So, it had a different type of like credibility and status compared to [a donor].”

10.7 Summary

The UK proposed E&L initiative was adopted and funded by the CIFs because committee members were convinced of its value and the ability of the CIFs to deliver it. This was made possible because:

- The UK funded the first phase of the E&L Initiative as a demonstration.
- The UK built the capacity of the CIF Administrative Unit to deliver future evaluations and demonstrate support for it.
- The results from the first phase of the E&L Initiative were positive and considered useful by committee members. However, it is unknown to what extent the results being less positive would have created more opposition to continuing.

Strength of evidence

The process-tracing analysis showed that there is some support that the CIFs E&L Initiative gave countries a framework for thinking about CIF performance on transformation; it also presented evidence of the fund’s success, persuading those countries of the value of the Initiative which resulted in them changing their stance on where it should be funded from.

10.8 Outcome 3: CTF 2.0

10.8.1 Background

CTF 2.0 proposed using the expected repayments from the loan portfolio (reflows) to raise capital on the capital/investor market.

10.8.2 What did ICF do?

ICF was very active in championing for CTF 2.0. From a technical side, it hired external legal advisers to examine the CTF 2.0 framework proposals and offer guidance regarding the low risk nature of CTF 2.0. It was also active in meetings explaining the rationale for and benefits of CTF 2.0, emphasising the fiduciary duty that the donors hold to use public money, rather than letting it accumulate, and presenting the legal advice regarding its low-risk nature to encourage them to try and enter into the agreement. The UK also engaged UK ministers to write to their counterparts and encourage them to think about CTF 2.0. Finally, the UK provided support and encouragement to the CIF Administrative Unit to keep working on the CTF 2.0 proposals. It also worked with the CIF Administrative Unit to produce a statement of principles to amend the way in which loan contributions would be paid back under CTF 2.0.

10.8.3 What happened as a result?

Consensus could not be reached amongst the donors for CTF 2.0 and as such the policy proposal is 'on ice', with the potential for it to be revisited again in the future.

10.8.4 What made the difference?

The UK deployed similar strategies in supporting policy change to those successfully used in deferring a decision of the sunset clause. However, in this case it was unsuccessful because of political opposition of other donors who preferred to see new investment come from the GCF rather than the CIFs. Unlike in the case of the sunset clause, opponents of CTF2.0 were not prepared to abstain. This has been attributed to the fact that:

"It was easier in this context [of the sunset clause] to find a compromise acceptable to everyone [...] [whereas it was more challenging in the case of CTF 2.0] because it really involved the countries, first of all, agreeing in the utilisation of the reflows⁷² and secondly, agreeing in the creation of a very innovative structure."

10.9 Summary

Where a proposed policy change in a fund is contrary to the political position of other donor governments and where all decisions have to be made unanimously, then the UK will be unable to support change in the decisions of that fund.

⁷² Reflows are payments of principal, interest, fees, or other reflows of funds from loans or financial products (other than grants), due to be returned to a financial intermediary fund.

10.10 Conclusions

ICF has been successful in supporting policy change where it has the time and leadership skills to build consensus, demonstrated that change is practical and beneficial, and provided finance to support the change. Together these convinced other donors of the value of the policy and motivate them to support it.

ICF's support for change is enhanced by the UK's reputation for sound, evidence-based decision making and its perceived level of commitment as a significant donor and where it has a formal role such as committee chair.

ICF has been unable to support policy change where changes are contrary to the firmly held political positions of other donors.

11 Case Study: Supporting change in World Bank policy

The World Bank case study is different to the four other case studies in that it is not designed to test how ICF contributed to specific policy outcomes. This case study is designed to construct more complete and evidence-based theories about the different ways in which the UK believes it supports policy change in the MDBs.

11.1 Context

All power at the World Bank is held by the Board of Governors, made up of a governor appointed by each member. The governors delegate that power to their executive directors. The World Bank Group consists of four separate boards of directors – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The current boards of the World Bank Group have 25 executive directors, who appoint a president on a five-year term. They are responsible for the general operations of the World Bank based in Washington.

The voting power of each member country is determined by the number of shares it holds, which are allocated differently in each of the organisations within the World Bank Group. As one of the World Bank's largest shareholders, the UK appoints its own executive director to sit on the Board, along with the US, Germany, France, Japan and China. The other executive directors represent constituencies, elected by the votes of countries within those constituencies.

The IDA provides concessional finance (grants and loans) for programmes to improve economic growth, health and living conditions, and reduce inequality in the world's poorest countries. The financial resources of IDA are replenished by donor countries every three years, where they meet to review IDA's policy framework and objectives. In the past four replenishments the UK has been the largest contributor. Each IDA replenishment results in a resolution which sets out the allocation of votes to each member.

The political priority given to climate by the UK government – that reflects both changing ministers and the changing public discourse around the scale of the climate change and the importance of action – has resulted in climate now becoming the UK's number one priority when engaging with the World Bank. With the commitment to net zero, the upcoming hosting of CoP26 and the announcement that its climate finance will be doubled, UK representatives believe that the UK has taken on a credible leadership role amongst donor countries.

Climate change has also become a greater priority for the World Bank Group following the adoption of its Climate Change Action Plan in 2016 which was designed to support countries deliver on their NDC commitments under the Paris Agreement. The World Bank made a commitment that 28% of its lending volume would be climate-related by 2020 and it has already exceeded that target. There was a top-down push from the former President Jim Yong Kim that obliged the World Bank's spending teams to focus more on climate change by putting in place divisional level targets for climate finance.

The strong coalition of the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia remain vocal critics of the Paris Agreement and pro-coal, with significant influence over the World Bank. Although the World Bank made a commitment to use climate finance to accelerate the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, the newly appointed president – David Malpass – is under increasing pressure to look at all available options to accelerate the economic development of low-income countries, including the use of fossil fuels.

11.2 UK interaction with the World Bank

Most high-level, strategic engagement with the World Bank is channelled through the UK Executive Director's office based in Washington. Richard Montgomery – the Executive Director – is from a development ministry (DFID) which is rare; this is seen by the UK as an asset, positioning the Executive Director's office as an expert sounding board for the World Bank when they are seeking to consult on certain development policy areas.

Domestically, DFID works internally to convene departments within HMG to build a shared understanding around which priorities government officials should be pushing in their interactions with the World Bank, using regular meetings with senior staff in DFID, BEIS, Defra, Treasury, FCO and International Trade as a means to ensure that there is a clear coordination and agreement of what the UK is seeking on climate.

The UK delivers a large number of programmes through the World Bank and the World Bank holds a lot of ICF investments in its various trust funds. As a result, ICF programme teams work closely with World Bank counterparts on the design, delivery and performance of those programmes.

11.3 How does ICF seek to support change in the World Bank on climate change policy

11.3.1 Financial leverage

As one of the largest financial contributors to the World Bank, there are certain moments where the UK has a significant opportunity to advocate for policy change or increased ambition in a particular policy area. When the World Bank is seeking new financial commitments from the UK – around the time of the IDA replenishment for example – this presents the most significant opportunity for the UK to use its financial leverage to negotiate with the World Bank. Where senior management want to work with the UK to access funds, they will come with a number of ideas, giving the UK an opportunity to shape those into a concept note or an idea that better suits UK objectives.

Financial leverage on its own is not enough to secure policy commitments from the World Bank. Whilst the amount of UK investment is a consideration, it is not thought by UK representatives to be the most important factor in successful cases of support for policy change. Instead, it provides the UK with a platform to open up a dialogue with the World Bank to clearly set out its own priorities and what policy commitments it would like to see, or input into the design of a fund/programme. This then enables the UK to build coalitions of support, use high-level relationships at a senior minister level and provide evidence and expertise which in turn can lead to policy change.

“We might actually have the same amount of influence if we put in 20 million instead of 50 million. And I think the additional money may not always make the same impact. But sometimes, even a bit of money can really get you in the room and that's where the impact happens, not necessarily the size of the fund.”

11.3.2 Building coalitions of support

The UK can capitalise on its financial leverage by building coalitions of support with other donors – such as France, Germany, Canada and the Nordic countries – who also have financial leverage to generate a stronger lobbying voice to push the World Bank on climate. The drafting of unofficial documents, that set out a position on a particular issue, with different coalitions of World Bank board members is used during negotiations as an effective way to get a collective point across. In some cases, DFID is the main author, with others signing up, and in others the UK signs up to those of other donors.

“There are absolutely coalitions that we that we try and join. France and Germany have both been particularly strong on climate. The Netherlands to a degree. The Scandinavians also. And before any of the significant World Bank events, particularly, for example, around the IDA19 replenishment process, which is coming to a conclusion now, there are meetings of the EU++ group. So, it's Europe plus a few others, who basically try and discuss and agree the key things that collectively we want to push with the World Bank.”

At the start of 2019, the UK signed up to and supported the drafting of a non-paper on climate lead by Sweden. The non-paper had the backing of a number of different donors and clearly set out what the coalition wanted to see from the World Bank in terms of specific focus areas, policy commitments and result indicators. The coalition was able to get the World Bank to agree to the adoption of a more ambitious climate financing target, increasing its commitment that 28% of its lending would have climate co-benefits to at least 30%. The UK – along with other donors – also pushed the World Bank to be more proactive in engaging countries to improve their NDCs, with an increased commitment to support 15 countries (up from 10) to systematically update their climate related action plans.

Building a coalition of support puts pressure on the World Bank by increasing the total amount of financial leverage over them and the amount of vote share. This results in the World Bank being more motivated to increase its ambition and/or make commitments to keep the coalition happy and secure the maximum amount of funding possible.

“I think we feel of the things that we were wanting to see more ambition in those policy commitments. I think we can tick the box to most of the things that we were looking for. That's I think an example of where we, in working and in consortium with other key players who were interested in climate, have been able to encourage the bank to be more ambitious than they might otherwise have been.”

In addition to like-minded donors, the UK can also work through its offices at a country level to go to potential recipients of World Bank funding linked to specific targets (e.g. climate change adaptation) and encourage them to add their voice to the coalition. This has the additional benefit of demonstrating the demand for investment from those looking to benefit from the funds. For example, the UK worked with biodiversity loss small island states to get them to sign up and add their voice to a coalition pushing for a World Bank commitment to provide funding to address global biodiversity loss.

11.3.3 Deploying high-level UK ministers to convince the World Bank that the UK is committed to addressing climate change

UK representatives believe that visibly demonstrating the UK's commitment to addressing climate change by using senior government ministers and the Prime Minister to make public statements (e.g. the announcement that the UK will be doubling its climate finance) and attend key events has been significant in terms of the World Bank recognising how important climate is to the UK – one of its largest shareholders – and putting them under pressure to increase its ambition as a result. This is also supported by ministers and senior staff having climate as their top priority whenever they get opportunities to engage senior contacts at the World Bank.

11.3.4 Deploying high-level UK ministers to convince other donors to increase ambition with regard to climate change

The UK was also able to deploy high-level influence to encourage other member countries to adopt the ‘Helsinki Principles’. The Helsinki Principles are a set of six principles that promote national climate action through fiscal policy and the use of public finance. The Principles are endorsed by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action which consists of 43 member countries. The World Bank serves as the secretariat for the coalition, providing strategic and technical support to governments.

At the two meetings of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action to date, the UK Chancellor was the number one speaking role, making clear the UK’s commitment to the Principles. The then Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, and Sir Nicholas Stern have also been keynote speakers. In the supporting meetings around the coalition, the UK has ensured that the executive director has been in attendance to again underline how important the Principles are to the UK.

UK government officials believe that this high level of representation has translated into the UK’s ability to persuade other member countries to join the coalition. This has been supported by HMG lobbying in bilateral meetings between finance ministers and their advisors, reinforcing the UK’s position on how transformational they believe the Principles can be. Close communication between the Executive Director’s office and the UK Treasury has played a key role in ensuring that diplomatic clout can be used where possible, for example using a phone call from the UK Chancellor as leverage to get member countries who are considering joining over the line.

Case Study: World Bank commitment to biodiversity

Towards the end of the IDA 19 negotiations, as the largest contributor to the IDA replenishment, the UK was able to use its financial leverage to secure a last-minute policy commitment to biodiversity. Although the World Bank did not want to reopen the negotiations, the UK Executive Director’s office managed a policy paper on biodiversity and got a number of other chairs to sign up to it, building a coalition of support to put the World Bank under pressure to commit to the policy.

The UK pushed hard for a biodiversity event to be held at the annual meeting of the World Bank in October 2019 and was able to secure it as a keynote event. The Secretary of State for International development attended and was the most senior government representative on the panel. By deploying a senior minister, the UK was able to raise both the profile of the event and the policy issue across the World Bank, demonstrating the UK’s high-level commitment and the priority that HMG were placing on biodiversity as part of IDA 19.

The decision to push on biodiversity was also driven by the notion that the US – the largest shareholder and most powerful lobbying voice at the World Bank – was thought to be more receptive to a commitment on biodiversity than other more politically sensitive climate change issues. The strength and the momentum of the coalition was such that the UK was able to get the US on board.

To add strength to the coalition of chairs, the UK also approached potential recipients of World Bank funding who would benefit – e.g. biodiversity loss small island states – to get them on board. The UK was therefore able to demonstrate that the push on biodiversity was not only a donor initiative but also demand-led, with a list of countries who would greatly benefit from the new policy.

As part of the IDA 19 replenishment, the World Bank made a commitment for the first time to include a biodiversity indicator, agreeing to roll out a minimum of 10 pilots to work with the poorest countries to protect their biodiversity.

11.3.5 Specific UK expertise in policy area or country

Having an executive director from a development ministry is rare, which means that the UK is often in position to be used as a sounding board by the World Bank and other donors as a result of its prominent expertise in a certain climate policy area. For example, if senior management want to develop a new policy initiative or programming around forestry then the UK will be one of the first to be consulted, along with Germany and Norway who are also known to have expertise in forestry.

UK support for policy change is more influential in decisions relating to countries where DFID has strong programmes on the ground, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank is more likely to align its strategy with UK priorities in countries such as Jordan where the World Bank knows that the UK puts in a lot of money bilaterally.

“I think country wise we can have an awful lot of influence and strategically we're very well respected and can have a lot of influence because they know what we're saying isn't biased, it's evidence-based and we come from very principled foundations.”

UK government officials can also use formal meetings and informal catch-ups with World Bank counterparts to share informal UK policy advice or strategic thinking and analysis.

Case study: DFID input into World Bank framework for strategic use of climate finance to maximise climate action

In the context of the UK wanting to ensure that the GCF was using its concessional finance in countries that needed it the most, DFID started an internal initiative to create a set of principles for the allocation of ICF funding which summarised DFID thinking on how concessional finance should be best used. There was a note signed off by ministers in BEIS, DFID and Defra.

As DFID were undergoing that process at the same time as the climate team at the World Bank, who were also trying to answer similar questions, the UK was invited to provide comments and input on drafts of a formal World Bank document that sets out a guiding framework for the use of concessional finance to maximise climate action. The central principles of the document – published in 2018 – are aligned with DFID's position.

11.4 Where the UK has been less successful

The UK has been less successful at supporting change in World Bank policy on climate change when UK priorities, or the collective priorities of like-minded chairs, conflict with the political aims and objectives of other large shareholders who are pushing the World Bank in a different direction.

“So, there are various key strategy documents where we would say, this isn't going far enough for us, we want you to be doing more on this or you haven't considered that or whatever it might be, through our Executive Director's office. But then also feeding back to them are the US, or India, or China who might be in different places on these things. So, they're trying to walk a tightrope in keeping their board and shareholders happy.”

Although climate is top of the UK's agenda and the European group are continuing to push for an even more progressive stance on fossil fuels – following on from the commitment from the World Bank to stop supporting fossil fuel projects – this is being met with resistance from other shareholders at the World Bank. At the end of 2019 a group of US senators wrote a letter to the World Bank, putting the bank under pressure to recommit to ending extreme poverty by using all available options – including natural resources – to improve energy access in developing countries to support economic growth.

11.5 Conclusion: Theory of how the UK seeks to support change in World Bank policy

Where the UK is seen as having expertise in an area and can build coalitions of support with other like-minded donors, then the World Bank is motivated to adopt the policy advocated by the UK because it is seen as the right thing to do, and because there is sufficient support to overcome any opposition.

The UK's support for policy change is most effective when it is deployed at the same time as a funding round, and where there is not strong opposition from other donors. Then ICF can successfully support policy change by:

- Using its own financial leverage to push the World Bank on certain policy areas, as the bank wants to keep the UK happy to maximise its contribution to a replenishment/fund.
- Forming tactical coalitions with other member countries and like-minded chairs to build a collective voice on a particular issue, increasing the pressure on the World Bank as the coalition represents a large potential financial contribution and significant voting share.
- Deploying high-level ministers to raise the profile of a climate change issue, both in terms of convincing senior figures within the World Bank but also using bilateral diplomatic leverage to get other member countries on board.
- Using bilateral relationships with recipient countries to get them to give their backing to the UK's push in a policy area which will benefit them, showing the World Bank that there is a need and demand for funds in that area.

Outside of funding rounds, the UK can still have support for policy change by:

- Utilising expertise in a certain policy area/country to input into the design of programmes and policy. This can take the form of formal consultation (e.g. commenting on proposals) or informal sharing of information between UK officials and World Bank staff working on the same issues and/or trying to solve the same problems. This gives the World Bank a better understanding of what to and how to do it, based on evidence from the UK.

12 In what circumstances, to what extent, and for whom has ICF influenced the policy of other donors?

12.1 Introduction

Interviews were conducted with other donors during the first phase of the evaluation, and then also during the CIFs case study work. As a result of this work we developed the following theory:

Where other donors are well placed to have impact, and where those other donors are willing to collaborate with the UK, and where interests, policy and culture align, ICF enters partnerships which give it greater financial, political and technical clout. As a result, it has more influence during negotiations and can deploy its resources strategically, so the donor best suited to working with each country takes the lead, resulting in more effective outcomes.

This chapter sets out the findings of the interviews and summarises other donors' perceptions of the factors that make the UK's attempts to influence more and less successful.

12.2 Where does attempted influencing occur?

From interviews with other donors, as part of the first phase of the research and also through the CIFs case study, it became clear that the influencing of other donors mainly happens in the context of relationships formed around specific decisions to be made or specific programmes of activity – for example, within the context of the CIFs, GCF, GEF, the UNFCCC, or in relation to multi-bilateral programmes, or around the policies and programmes of work of the MDBs, such as the World Bank.

Within the multilateral funds, interaction at working level tends to occur through the donor coordination groups where the developed countries' constituency share positions and aim to align policies where possible.

“In this climate finance area, it's not something like other foreign policy that the one country influences the other. [...] through the co-ordination work the UK team is willing to influence their policy on others. But it's not quite as visible as we see in other policy areas.”

Mostly, the donors are well aligned on direction of travel; one interviewee commented:

“We do think a lot of the same thoughts, in a way, and we have the same approach.”

Where disparities do occur, they were described as resulting from political imperatives; as one interviewee put it when asked about whether UK leadership helps create shared visions,

“It doesn't really work like that because every donor has a political position that they come to the meetings, which is grounded on their government's priority.”

The examples given of differences in view were around very particular points, such as choices between which funds to replenish (e.g. the GCF v. the CIFs). Fundamentally, even countries which disagree very strongly with the UK about a specific issue can still be aligned with the UK's general position on tackling climate change; as one interviewee put it:

“We may disagree on what is good and bad, but that doesn't affect our relationship as such, I mean, it's a much stronger basis than that.”

12.3 GNU partnership

GNU is a political partnership between Germany, Norway and the UK with the aim of coordinating investments in key forest countries, aligning funding and working together on the ground in-country. GNU has a small secretariat staffed by two people which is currently hosted by Germany. It keeps things moving, ensures meetings are scheduled, that attendees are well prepared and that actions are followed up (interviewee).

The GNU cooperation was raised in a number of interviews, with one describing it as “a very strategic approach” which enables politicians to “talk to a lot of countries and their ministers” at events like CoPs. Although the three countries are very well aligned at a strategic level which is the basis of the cooperation, there are differences when it comes to the details and most of the decisions made are the result of “some type of negotiation”; as one interviewee put it:

“Definitely we are trying to influence each other, there's no doubt about it. Of course, it's not easy to always be aligned and we do have a lot of disagreements of course, and I think that we have to make compromises.”

One interviewee talked about the different strengths of the three partners being complementary, for example the in-country strength of GIZ and DFID, the history of political relations that the UK brings, and the finance capability of Norway. Another talked about the different relationships with partner countries as a result of history, culture, and foreign policies making it easier to approach some countries than others. One interviewee talked about their different fields – the carbon market for Norway, the agribusiness supply chains for the UK and the indigenous people for Germany, commenting, “we complement each other and make that a careful approach.” One interviewee felt that the collaboration was “getting stronger” and another talked about a “united front.”

One of the strengths of the collaboration was felt to be in-country, where the respective embassies coordinate and make common statements, which raises the visibility of the messaging.

“We have good examples from the past where, as GNU, we could do a common statement saying, for example, we are worried about rising deforestation Colombia but we stand ready to support. Things like that work I think quite well [...]. We have some kind of visibility compared to if we would not have GNU – I think we would be maybe more singular and not have the same attachments in that sense.”

Another interviewee commented:

“If [we] would work alone, I think that we would have less of an impact – if we say something, if we would like to get some sort of impact globally or in a country, if we stand together I think these three countries can punch a lot harder and make a lot more impact.”

Colombia is thought to be a particularly good example of the benefits of the partnership, and the approach has now been extended to Ecuador and Peru.

Another strength of the collaboration is that together the three have ‘bigger pockets’ than each would individually so impact is more significant. A further benefit is that the three partners have different political relationships with countries that they want to influence.

“Sometimes it’s the UK, sometimes it’s Norway, sometimes it’s Germany that leads the talks or the relationship in some way.”

One interviewee praised the UK for the seriousness it places on GNU, as reflected in the seniority of the people sent to represent it at meetings.

12.4 Other donors’ perceptions of the UK

Other donors mentioned numerous characteristics that the UK displays in situations in support of policy change that they felt made the UK more persuasive.

12.4.1 Credible

The UK is seen as a credible partner; one donor said:

“[...] when it comes to the climate agenda itself, nobody doubts the UK credentials, and nobody doubts the UK’s commitment [...] the UK has a very solid track record and a solid record as a reliable partner. So, I don’t think anybody really in any way would mistrust or think that they come with an agenda, as such.”

This credibility comes partly from the lack of recent party-political changes to climate change priorities; as one interviewee put it:

“If you look at the history of the UK’s engagement, irrespective of whether you had the Conservatives or Labour in charge, the climate position has always remained the same. And there hasn’t been this flip flopping from one to the other with the change in administration.”

12.4.2 Leaders

The UK has a reputation for leadership and initiating bilateral discussions. One donor talked about riding “on the coattails of the efforts and the resourcing that the UK has put into it” (the CIFs), for example. Others commented that the UK is often the first to make its position known on an issue. However, a number of interviewees commented that sometimes this can go too far, making compromise and consensus difficult to achieve if the UK’s position is too strong.

A number of interviewees commented that the UK’s strength does not depend solely on particular individuals, even though a number of individuals were singled out for praise. One interviewee commented:

“When I started there was a different team [in BEIS] than there is now; they had some changes in staff but I think it seems to me that it does not depend on the people but on a general political line, on strong leadership also from the directors level [...].”

12.4.3 Strategic

The UK has a reputation for being strategic in its choices which results in others following its lead. One interviewee commented:

“[The UK] said ‘we are not going to go to that meeting anymore because decisions are not so strategic’ and then I got inspired and said, ‘okay, when they are not going maybe I can also not go and send only [a colleague]’.”

12.4.4 Well resourced

Other donors view the UK as having a lot of staff in the centre. Donors talked about “a lot more staff than we would have”, a “big team”, “a lot more capacity”, “sufficient staff to think about issues” and “more manpower”. One particular interviewee commented:

“When we talk about our staffing needs here and what our future might look like in the climate finance group, we will usually raise the UK as an example of the right way to do it.”

Donors describe this as an advantage in influencing situations in a number of ways, including the ability to carry out background work and time to get up to speed with the issues. The fact that a number of people say the same thing also adds weight to an argument. However, the opposite is true in-country, where donors talked about the lack of staff on the ground in some countries. One interviewee talked about the UK having to rely on its embassy staff, noting “sometimes it’s really difficult for them to do more because they are stretched”. Another interview mentioned the lack of on-the-ground experience in BEIS compared with DFID, commenting:

“The representative insists a lot on private sector strategies for example and is very outspoken on that type of things, but I think there is a bit of a lack of practical experience, like what does it mean on the ground to attract private investment?”

12.4.5 Knowledgeable and engaged

The UK comes across as very knowledgeable with even quite senior staff understanding the detail of the issues. One interviewee commented that:

“at relatively high level, at senior level, I perceive that people are well briefed and interested”.

The UK is also viewed as being very well prepared from a technical point of view. One interviewee commented:

“They definitely do the work and do their homework and understand where you know their positions are based on firm analysis”.

They are also seen as being “engaged” and appropriately consulting technical staff such as analysts and economists.

12.4.6 Skilled

According to donors, the UK team comes across as polite, professional and willing to help. One interviewee commented:

“I was impressed by even the colleagues that participated in the [Fund] meetings. I have met two different, they are very young but even though they have a lot of knowledge. The age they have I was still in university; I was not leading the [Country] delegation in the Fund and having Board seats for the Fund.”

“DFID for example has a lot of people and they’re usually very highly competent people out there with special competence and the UK also uses a lot of consultants [...] like a third arm or something of the actual government activity which is usually very, very high quality.”

The skills of the staff came in for particular praise, including negotiating and diplomacy skills. Another strength is the communication skills of the staff, which is “rhetorically quite strong and present their evidence well.”

“I am quite impressed in the manner and also the quality of the work the UK team is doing. [...] And if I send an email and then sometimes even a call to them and they really respond to my inquiry quite swiftly. So, I am very much satisfied with the work.”

Other interviewees commented on the UK’s focus on building relationships and rapport with colleagues, referring to them as “collegial and constructive”. The UK’s approach of patiently taking the time to explain the background to decisions to newcomers was mentioned by two interviewees as being particularly well received.

12.4.7 Consultative

A number of interviewees talked about the UK’s tendency to reach out bilaterally to understand others’ positions and try to find consensus.

12.4.8 Proactive

Many other donors have remarked on the UK’s willingness to step up when a task needs doing.

“[...] the UK colleague volunteered to make a roadmap for all of us. And he did a huge amount of work in putting down all the things that we were complaining and what are possible steps to get through and to push things forward. So, I think this was a kind of proactive way of addressing problems that the UK saw but also that were problems that all the others also agreed on. And I was happy that BEIS did this work to have an overview and that we could make kind of a division of labour to do all these steps that they proposed.”

Another interviewee commented:

“[...] [the UK] did not hesitate to take up the role of co-chair although it really gives them a heavy burden because they have to coordinate all the time [...]. There are three to five staff members exclusively for that work so it must be very exhausting but they do that. So, we really pay respect. But they try to pursue their policies through that kind of work.”

Another interviewee commented on the apparent willingness of UK staff to go out of their way, for example, staying after multilateral meetings for bilateral meetings.

12.4.9 Humble

One interviewee commented that the UK rarely makes a big play of the work it has done, in comparison with some other donors:

“They don’t talk about it all the time. If they are part of a multi-donor fund then they would speak in favour of the whole fund whereas some other donors just constantly keep saying what they do and where they invest and they just repeat very minor things [...] a little project somewhere [...] and they talk about it whenever a minister mentions it. And the UK has much bigger investments sometimes, but they wouldn’t maybe make such a big fuss about it, which can hinder visibility but [other countries are] overdoing it sometimes just in comparison.”

13 Interactions between global, national and sub-national support for policy change

From our primary research, we found four types of interactions between ICF's work to support policy change at global, national and sub-national levels.

13.1 Global to national level

This works where ICF is able to support policy change at a global level to address climate change issues; this in turn increases the pressure on national governments to be seen to be taking action.

Through the FGMC programme ICF works with other partner governments to draw global attention to issues around illegal logging and corruption in the timber sector. The UK seconded expert resource to the EU to help design and establish the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme which allows countries to export sustainable timber to the EU market if they meet the requirements of a VPA signed with the EU. ICF has then been supporting partner governments at a national level to implement new policies to improve forest governance and law enforcement. The VPA gives the EU significant leverage – when a senior minister announced that the Indonesian government were considering relaxing some of the new regulation, the EU Commission made it clear that this would violate the rules of the VPA and Indonesia would lose its access to the timber market.

ICF's support for policy change through the MDBs – particularly the UK's leading role in the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action at the World Bank and the announcement that the UK will be doubling its climate finance – has also enabled UK representatives to use diplomatic leverage and encourage other donors to increase their ambition with regard to climate change within their own countries and adopt the 'Helsinki Principles'.

13.2 National to sub-national level

This works in countries where there are diverse range of regions which cannot be treated in the same way with regard to climate change. Each region needs its own individual consideration.

“We have five very massive regions in Colombia that are completely different from each other. So, the presidential office needs to make sure that they set out those regional plans accordingly to the different contexts. It's a very difficult to talk about a national approach. At the end, it needs to be with a regional focus.”

Through the Amazon Vision programme, ICF works with the Colombian government to gather extensive data on deforestation. This evidence is then used by national government officials to design policy which is better suited to the individual provinces. The data was used to inform the NDP which had two separate chapters detailing the government's approach to addressing deforestation in the Amazonia and Orinoquía regions respectively.

By facilitating communication between levels of government, ICF is also able to increase the coordination and collaboration between national and sub-national governments, which enables local government officials to provide feedback and recommendations on how national policies/initiatives are working at a provincial level, and how they could be improved.

13.3 Sub-national to national level

This works in countries where there is a significant degree of decentralisation and regional autonomy which makes the implementation of national policy challenging. In some cases – such as Indonesia – this is because national regulation must be translated into provincial and/or district regulation in order for local government officials to implement it.

When advocating for the new EFT policy in Indonesia, ICF found it difficult to engage with national government – especially the Ministry of Finance – as the policy was in the concept stage and there was no evidence to back up their thinking. In response, the ICF SETAPAK programme adopted a new approach which they called ‘Developing from Peripheries’. ICF went to several provinces to pilot EFT to put in place the provincial and district fiscal transfer mechanisms, including drafting best practise regulation which was passed into legislation by local governments in North Kalimantan and Papua.

This enabled ICF and the Fiscal Policy Agency to build a strong case to go back to the Ministry of Finance. By putting in place sub-national regulation and proving it met the needs of local government, ICF helped to overcome one of the main blockages to policy implementation in Indonesia (translating regulation from the national to sub-national level). This put pressure on the ministry to commit to developing a national regulation in order to support the provincial government to promote strong environmental performance. The ministry then made a public commitment to national EFT.

“Indonesia is a big country - 34 provinces - and if we start from the national level it is more complex because it's relating to many ministries – Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Environment and Forestry. So, if we start from the local government it is easier to try to find champions and then produce good practise and then share it to the national stakeholders.”

“If the initiative comes from the bottom, and then national government accommodates it and establishes the regulation then implementation is quite easy. Because the initiative comes from the sub-national level. If it comes from the national level, then it is established, and it doesn't meet the needs of the local government.”

13.4 Sub-national to sub-national level


This works where a new policy is piloted in one province as a demonstration project and the success of the pilot gives local government officials in another province the confidence to implement the policy.

Following the success of the EFT pilot in North Kalimantan and Papua, ICF convened a national event in Jakarta in November 2020 to present the new policy. They invited stakeholders from all over Indonesia, including five district heads and local government officials from over 25 sub-national governments. This event was followed up by a regional workshop in the eastern area of Indonesia and one in the western area, where sub-national government officials had the opportunity to develop the EFT indicator for their own provinces. Six sub-national governments have committed to the adoption of the policy, and three more have requested ICF's assistance to help with implementation.

13.5 Theory of change

This section presents the high-level theory in tabular and diagrammatic form. We see this theory as supporting the national and sub-national policy change that we describe in section 5.

Figure 6: Theory of Change



14 Transformational change and its relationship with supporting policy change

14.1 Background

ICF's KPI15 definition paper states:

“Transformational change is complicated and multifaceted. At its core it is change which catalyses further changes, enabling either a shift from one state to another (e.g. from conventional to lower carbon or more climate-resilient patterns of development) or faster change (e.g. speeding progress on cutting the rate of deforestation). However, it entails a range of simultaneous transformations to political power, social relations, markets and technology.”⁷³

Embedding approaches that mitigate or support adaptation to climate change into policy, legislation and regulation is a way of increasing the sustainability of changes, a key aspect of transformational change. It is also a way of signalling to others the importance of tackling the problem. ICF's focus on supporting policy change may therefore also be contributing to driving transformational change.

14.2 The role played by support for policy change in achieving transformational change

Our conceptualisation of the role support for policy change plays in achieving transformational change has developed over the course of the evaluation. This reflects the evolution of our own theories, and also the publication of ICF-supported work for the CIFs on measuring and reporting transformational change.

ICF, in its KPI15 definition paper, sets out several criteria for transformational change. ICF proposes that change is more likely to be transformational if several of the criteria prevail, including at least one criterion prevailing for each different level in the theory of change. ICF can achieve many of these criteria through supporting policy change.

⁷³ ICF KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to have a transformational impact, (p. 1).

Table 14: Ways in which supporting policy change might make the presence of a KPI15 criterion more likely

KPI15 criteria for change	Level of support for policy change	Policy-supporting approach	Example (case study)
1. (a) Political will and local ownership: There is political will for change.	Strategic	Provision of evidence to politicians and senior officials setting out the nature and scale of the problem	Provision of information on silvopastoral systems to the President (Colombia) Development of dynamic modelling system to generate evidence to support policies that reduce carbon emissions whilst retaining economic growth (Indonesia)
		High-level convening to build understanding and common purpose	Bring together different departments (Colombia)
	Tactical	Convening to gain acceptance to a policy or policy direction	
	Financing implementation	No examples found	Negotiation with UETCL, ERA and the Attorney General's office about key clauses to enable documents to be bankable (Uganda)
1. (b) Local ownership: There is local ownership of the change.	Strategic	No examples found	
	Tactical	Use of technical assistance facilities encourage ownership	Technical assistance facility provided through EAGER enabled GRD to own the direction and content of support (Uganda). Co-location of the GET FIT Secretariat enabled ERA to consult immediately on possible new projects (Uganda).
		Promising and providing resources to deliver policy change at sub-national level	Promise and provision of technical and financial support to governor of North Kalimantan to be the first province in Indonesia to pilot EFT (Indonesia)
		Building capacity of civil society to hold government to account	Support to CSOs to pressure local government officials to improve mining governance and revoke permits (Indonesia) Support to CSOs to pressure local government officials to increase the number of social forestry permits being allocated (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	No examples found	

2. Capacity: There is sufficient capacity and capability to deliver the change.	Strategic	Convening stakeholders to ensure understanding and commitment	Involving a range of stakeholders on the CIF E&L project (CIFs) Delivery of cross-government workshops with Ministry of Environment & Forestry and Ministry of Finance to discuss
	Tactical	Provision of specialist expertise to deliver pieces of work via technical assistance	Provision of a lawyer to develop of standardised documents for GET FiT (Uganda) Evaluation expertise provided to the CIFs E&L initiative (CIFs) Social forestry experts forming part of the KLHK's 'fly-in' team to accelerate implementation (Indonesia)
		Provision of technical assistance to build capacity of government officials	Technical assistance support for the GRD to take forward the geothermal energy policy (Uganda) Technical assistance support for mining inspectors to monitor compliance with regulations (Indonesia) Technical assistance provided by legal and environmental expert CSOs to help sub-national government officials review mining permits (Indonesia) Technical assistance support to increase knowledge of junior government officials to access funds for social forestry (Indonesia) Technical assistance support to Bappenas on how to use LCDI dynamic systems model to generate evidence to inform policymaking (Indonesia)
		Increased capability of civil society to support sub-national government officials	Training and support of CSOs to help process social forestry applications on behalf of communities (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	Funding to pay for technical consultants	Financing of consultants to provide expert technical support to strengthen the SVLK framework (Indonesia)
		Funding to pay for secretariat support	Funding of secretariat to support the VPA Joint Implementation Committee (Indonesia)

3. Innovation: There is some innovation involved in the change.	Strategic	Gaining high-level support for new approaches or different ways of tackling a problem	Provision of information on silvopastoral systems to the President (Colombia) Provision of evidence from EFT demonstration pilot to finance minister (Indonesia)
	Tactical	Gathering evidence to support or demonstrate a new approach or a new solution to a problem	Silvopastoral systems trials (Colombia) supporting off-grid and direct use (Uganda) Use of experts to collect data about the geothermal resource, to demonstrate it is a fault-controlled system of low to medium enthalpy (Uganda) Development of the transformational change toolkit (CIFs) Unlocking of Reforestation Fund to accelerate social forestry (Indonesia) LCDI systems model providing over 1,000 climate change indicators that Bappenas can use to simulate and test innovative policies (Indonesia) New fiscal transfer mechanism to incentivise local government officials to protect environment (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	Providing funding to make something new happen when others do not understand why it is important	UK funding and ownership of the CIFs E&L initiative (CIFs)
4. Evidence based: Evidence of effectiveness of the change is collected and shared.	Strategic	No examples found	
	Tactical	Evidence about the effectiveness of new approaches	Provision of information on silvopastoral systems to the president (Colombia) Evidence from demonstration pilots regarding the new ecological transfer policy shared with sub-national government officials at workshops across Indonesia (Indonesia) Evidence regarding the increased collection of non-tax revenue as a result of tighter mining restrictions shared across Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Indonesia)
		Advice on ways of monitoring and evaluating programmes	ICF's support for the CIFs on measuring and reporting (CIFs)
5. Incentivised: There is in-built leverage or the creation of incentives for others to act in the design of the change.	Financing implementation	No examples found	
	Strategic	No examples found	
	Tactical	Technical expertise provided to support a partner government design policies and implementation structures that incorporate incentive structures, particularly those drawing on market mechanisms	Incorporation of a deemed energy clause in the PPA (Uganda) New EFT mechanism that rewards local government officials for strong environmental performance (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	No examples found	

6. Replicable: Interventions are replicable so the change can roll out.	Strategic	No examples found	
	Tactical	Technical expertise provided to support a partner government to design template documents or approaches that can be used elsewhere	Preparation of standardised documents for the licensing and permitting of renewable energy power plants (Uganda)
		Using demonstration projects to persuade sub-national government officials to adopt similar approaches in their jurisdictions	Sub-national government officials replicating the EFT mechanism piloted in North Kalimantan and Papua (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	No examples found	
7. Scale: Interventions are at scale so the effect of the change is widespread.	Strategic	Supporting changes to include targets in strategic national documents	Work to support the inclusion of targets in NDPs (Indonesia, Colombia) LCDI supporting the Inclusion of a macro indicator for carbon emission reductions in 2020-24 National Mid-term Development Plan (Indonesia)
	Tactical	Technical expertise provided to support a partner government design delivery at scale into policies and implementation structures	Support to involve CSOs in the enforcement of timber legality assurance system (Indonesia) Technical assistance support to unlock large amounts of funding for social forestry (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	Funding to enable roll-out	
8. Sustainable: Interventions are sustainable so the effect of the change persists.	Strategic	No examples found	
	Tactical	Technical expertise provided to support a partner government design sustainability into policies and implementation structures	Incorporation of legally binding, achievable targets, with strong support from the President, into the National Development Plan (Colombia) Deemed energy clause embedded into legal documents (Uganda)
		Provision of evidence which can be used to demonstrate the need for a new approach or a new solution to a problem	Evidence to support the unlocking of a well-resourced funding stream for social forestry that has a replenishment mechanism (Indonesia)
	Financing implementation	No examples found	

ICF can support transformational change by supporting policy change in four ways, simultaneously, within any given country, fund or institutional context:

1. Evidence – to produce, gather, collate and share evidence of what works, for whom and in what circumstances.
2. Policy development – to support partner countries build a) innovative approaches, b) approaches based on best information of what works, c) that build in leverage and incentives and d) that are replicable, sustainable and deliver at scale into policies and their implementation and enforcement structures.
3. Capacity and capability – to support partner countries to ensure that those designing, implementing and enforcing policy are doing so using the best available knowledge, know-how and approaches.
4. Political will and local ownership – to persuade and, where necessary, coerce partner countries into backing change at a high level and owning it locally to maximise the chance of something happening.

14.3 Has transformational change been attained in our case studies?

In assessing whether transformational change has been seen in the cases we studied, we considered what transformation might look like:

Policy area	Case studies	What transformational change would look like
Forestry and land use policy	Colombia Indonesia	Widespread and sustainable reduction in practices that lead to deforestation, with drivers of that reduction locked into social, economic and/or political systems (e.g. land registration, local skilled enforcers).
Renewable energy policy	Uganda	A permanent move to the use of renewable energy technologies across all sectors and geographical areas, with drivers locked into social, economic and/or political systems (e.g. laws, regulatory regimes, sustained private sector interest).
Low-carbon development policy	Indonesia	Systematic and widespread incorporation of climate issues into national and regional planning policy and practice, driven by targets in the NDP, political support across all relevant ministries, local government and local stakeholders.
Evaluation and learning policy at a global level	CIFs	Widespread and sustained support at a global level for evaluation and learning, notably how to identify, measure and report on achievements, particularly of transformational change, with approaches, processes and funding embedded into policy and practice.

It is too soon for the interventions we studied to clearly show transformational outcomes. We have used new thinking about dimensions⁷⁴ and signals⁷⁵ of transformational change in combination with the KPI15 indicators⁷⁶ to establish markers of observed or likely future transformational change.

⁷⁴ Itad (2019) Evaluation of [Transformational Change in the Climate Investment Funds](#). We have excluded the fourth dimension of ‘relevance’ because the evaluation has only examined relevant activities and outcomes.

⁷⁵ CIFs and Itad (2020) [Signals of Transformational Change](#).

⁷⁶ [ICF KPI 15: Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to have a transformational impact](#).

In Table 15 below, we set out where we have observed instances of early, interim and advanced signals of transformational change. This needs further development as part of a future project because we have not been able to take account of the strength or quality of the signal, only whether or not a signal has been observed. We have also been unable to take full account of critical mass.

Table 15: Signs of transformational change in our case studies, using KPI15 criteria and the CIF formulation of early (E), interim (I) and advanced (A) signals of change

KPI criteria	Colombia forestry and land-use policy	Indonesia forestry and land-use policy	Indonesia low-carbon development policy	Uganda renewable energy policy	CIFs evaluation and learning policy
1a There is political will for change.	E I A	E	E	E	-
1b There local ownership of the change.	E I	E I	E	E	E I
2 There is sufficient capacity and capability to deliver the change.	E I	E I A	E I	E I	E I A
3. There is some innovation involved in the change.	E I	E I	E	E I	E
4. Evidence of effectiveness of the change is collected and shared and built in.	E I	I	-	E I	I
5. There is in-built leverage or the creation of incentives for others to act in the design of the change.	E I A	E I	-	E	E
6. Interventions are replicable so the change can roll out.	E I A	E I	-	E I A	E I
7. Interventions are at scale so the effect of the change is widespread.	E I	E I	E	E I	E I
8. Interventions are sustainable so the effect of the change persists.	E I	E I	E	-	E

Below we include tables setting out markers for possible transformational change observed in each of the case studies.

14.4 Colombia forestry and land-use policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	Amazon Vision embedded into Department for the Environment	Department for the Environment now has accurate information and can plan better.	None
	Building capability (skills and knowledge) to develop and implement the policy	ICF-funded Amazon Vision built skills in planning. ICF-funded SPS created knowledge in all stakeholders about what works in different areas and what it costs. Very early stages of the BioCarbon Fund have shown possible approaches that have gained traction for Orinoquía.	Officers now have the skills to develop plans and plans are in the NDP. Realistic costed targets on land conversion to SPS systems National and regional roundtables are building on the interest in SPS. Development of NDP regional plan for Orinoquía	None
	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	ICF-funded work on demonstrating the benefits of SPS have been built into the NDP and also a national policy is being finalised. Amazon Vision contributed to the development of a system for monitoring deforestation which was embedded into the Ministry of Environment run by IDEAM	Evidence from SPS programme means innovative financial mechanisms (ITPS) are being discussed as ways of sustainably funding the new way of farming. SPS regional roundtables enable farmers, academia and local government to contribute at the regional level which feeds up into the national level. Deforestation tracking system is a core part of policy tracking and development.	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it builds in leverage and incentives	None	None	None

Colombia forestry and land-use policy		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	SPS has demonstrated that silvopastoral systems have benefits for farmers and the environment. REM-funded Vision Amazonia trials are the basis of regional planning. ITPS pilots have shown a viable funding mechanism for SPS.	Development of the Sustainable Farming policy based on evidence from SPS Development of NDP regional plan for Amazonia Pilot for ITPS attracted lots of applicants and early results show promise – Ministry of Agriculture has agreed to take it forward as an official	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	ICF funding enabled upscaling of SPS pilots so they could really show that the system could be replicated elsewhere. Cascade training developed through the Extensionists and academia to roll out the Amazon Vision approach more widely	Development of the Sustainable Farming policy based on evidence from SPS NDP targets show presidential buy-in. Extensionists are a core part of delivery.	None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	ICF funding enabled upscaling of SPS pilots so they could really show that the system could be replicated elsewhere. ICF's support for Amazon Vision and its development of training material for local extensionists, via universities Pilot of new financing mechanism ITPS for SPS conversion	National government requests training of extensionists beyond the Amazonia region. Inclusion of a national target for land conversion to SPS systems in the NDP Creation of the National Sustainable Farming Policy based on SPS Creation of the regional roundtables with high levels of participation from local communities Interest in silvopastoral systems spreads widely across the country. Interest from national government to include ITPS in the new financing mechanisms for SPS conversion Tough target to increase to 1% of GDP coming from forest products (timber and non-timber) Specific and realistic target to reduce deforestation in the NDP	None

**Colombia forestry
and land-use policy**

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	ICF support helped bring about the inclusion of specific legally binding targets on a) deforestation, b) % of GDP from forest products, c) SPS land conversion, in the NDP. ICF working with the presidential office helped bring out the declaration of deforestation as a national security issue which raised the priority with the Army about enforcing the law.	Creation of the Sustainable Colombia Fund by the Treasury to finance environmental projects – Colombia playing its part and not just relying on international aid. MRV system established providing monthly reports on deforestation to feed into policy tracking, development and enforcement Development of the Strategic CONPES document on deforestation SPS National Sustainable Farming Policy in development	None
	Supporting political will	Presidential-level buy-in for silvopastoral systems as a policy approach Buy-in for environmental policy change in Amazonia region generated due to co-creation of Amazon Vision programme with Ministry of Environment Declaring deforestation a national security issue	NDP targets Policies	President interested and backing change NDP means that by law everyone needs to work towards the targets. Ministries are working together. Army incentivised to properly enforce the law. New approaches being adopted and rolled out
	Supporting local ownership of the policy	UK helped ministries of agriculture and environment working together on ICF programmes and policy – this is unprecedented and could lead to systemic change. Creation of targets linked to reducing deforestation for the military who enforce the law Regional SPS roundtables have created a sense of regional ownership, not just from Bogata.	BioCarbon Fund in Colombia led by the Ministry of Agriculture, supported as needed by the Ministry of the Environment Local ownership created by the regional roundtables	None

14.5 Indonesia forestry and land-use policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	None	Increased capacity of the social forestry task force (fly-in team) to accelerate the verification of social forestry permits Unlocking of the Reforestation Fund has opened up a well-resourced funding stream to implement social forestry. Increased capacity of mining inspectors to monitor compliance and revoke illegal permits	Increased capacity of civil society organisations to verify timber companies. They have a formal, legal role as part of the SVLK and work closely with the KLHK to ensure compliance.
	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	None	Increased technical capability of junior government officials to process social forestry permits (including accessing the Reforestation Fund)	None
	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) developing new technology to digitalise mining licensing system based on evidence from CSOs around non-compliance	Ecological Fiscal Transfer policy is a new innovative fiscal transfer mechanism that enables government officials to incentivise strong environmental performance (implemented at a provincial level).	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	None	Tighter mining regulations brought in on the basis of evidence that showed the scale of tax avoidance in the extractive industries. Expansion of the Reforestation Fund for social forestry on the basis of evidence that the fund was largely underutilised by sub-national governments.	None

Indonesia forestry and land-use policy		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Supporting change in policy design so it builds in leverage and incentives	None	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	None	The EFT model piloted in two provinces by ICF was presented at national events and regional workshops across Indonesia and 12 sub-national governments have committed to adopting EFT in their jurisdictions.	None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	New centralised data system for mining licensing (fed by information from CSOs) has increased the capacity of ESDM to monitor compliance across Indonesia and tackle corruption.	Unlocking of large amounts of funding for social forestry will enable sub-national governments across Indonesia to meet future targets.	None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	None	Securing of a well-resourced government funding stream for social forestry (Reforestation Fund), which has a replenishment mechanism. This means that social forestry has sustainable resources.	None
	Supporting political will	ESDM's buy-in to tightening mining regulations and licensing systems Ministry of Finance's public commitment to implementing the EFT mechanism at a national level	None	None
	Supporting local ownership of the policy	12 sub-national governments have voluntarily committed to implementing their own version of EFT for their jurisdictions. KLHK, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs working together to deliver policy to accelerate social forestry	Two provinces have successfully implemented their own version of EFT, independent of national policy.	None

14.6 Indonesia low-carbon development policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	Ministry of Planning now has in place a dynamic systems model that includes over 1,000 climate change indicators, delivering different scenarios and generating robust evidence regarding the relationship between emission reductions and economic growth which they can use to develop policy.	None	None
	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	Government officials within Ministry of Planning have increased skills/capability to use the dynamic systems model to generate evidence to inform their policymaking.	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	The 1,000+ climate change indicators in the LCDI model enables government officials to simulate and test innovative policies to address climate change.	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	None	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it builds in leverage and incentives	None	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	None	None	None

Indonesia low-carbon development policy		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	LCDI now has its own chapter in the 2020-24 National Mid-term Development Plan – and a macro indicator on emissions – prompting policymakers across government to consider climate change when designing new policies.	None	None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	None	None	None
	Supporting political will	Ministry of Planning has the political will to incorporate LCDI into all future planning. Senior politicians were willing to include a new chapter on climate change and disaster resilience in the National Plan (2020-24), showing willingness of the Indonesian government to mainstream climate considerations into planning.	None	None
	Supporting local ownership of the policy	LCDI has been extended so that the Ministry of Planning can run pilots at a provincial level to test new policies.	None	None

14.7 Uganda renewable energy policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	Technical experts deployed to assist in the development of geothermal policy and GET FiT Lawyer deployed to draft the PPA and IA, and negotiates it through approval process with ERA and UETCL.	GRD has reportedly got more staff and is also recruiting.	None
	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	Technical assistance trained local staff in geothermal survey techniques and data interpretation, enforcement of E&S standards for power plants, workshops on how the energy market works.	Staff at ERA, UETCL and GRD have new skills and confidence to implement them. Trained staff have left GRD as their experience makes them valuable elsewhere. Learned skills and techniques embedded into tools and institutional learning programmes at ERA	None
	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	Emphasis on off-grid and mini-grid development (not really innovative but new to Uganda policy thinking) Recognition of low and medium enthalpy resource, and therefore need for binary power plant built into new geothermal policy (not really innovative but new to Uganda policy thinking)	Request to UN CTCTN for technical assistance on developing off grid energy	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	Renewable energy policy incorporates greater emphasis on direct use for which UK has been lobbying for some time. Geothermal policy based on the reality of the Ugandan situation and transfer of experience from the US	Request to UN CTCTN for technical assistance on developing off-grid energy	None

Uganda renewable energy policy		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Supporting change in policy design so it builds in leverage and incentives	Technical assistance provided on tariff levels and ensuring bankability e.g. through deemed energy clause	Removal of deemed energy clause	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	GET FiT programme based on concept from Deutsche Bank, KfW and ERA (not a UK influence though) Transfer of knowledge from the US in terms of fault-controlled geothermal systems	GET FiT being rolled out in Zambia and also interest from other places New understanding of geothermal system included in the draft policy High enthalpy still included in draft policy	None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	Development of standardised PPA and Implementation Agreement that can be used outside GET FiT projects.	Documentation being used outside the GET FiT programme and outside Uganda	None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	Embedding PPA and deemed energy clause into legal documents Investment more attractive to private sector, which is self-sustaining Demonstrating that it's possible to build renewable energy plant in Uganda profitably.	More IPPs active in Uganda than previously due to rebalancing of risk and reward through GET FiT Temporary suspension of the deemed energy clause Some evidence that IPPs are still investing.	None
	Supporting political will	Negotiating acceptance of the deemed energy clause Already had political will in place in Uganda	Temporary removal of the deemed energy clause	None
	Supporting local ownership of the policy	Use of a facility model for both GET FiT and EAGER created sense of ownership of the technical assistance work programme and solutions. GRD was already making use of donor-funded technical assistance so was already in charge of its own work programme. ERA already owned the policy and the solutions.	None	None

14.8 Evaluation and learning at a global level

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	Involving a range of stakeholders on the advisory board for the E&L Initiative UK funding first tranche of the E&L Initiative	E&L Initiative is now being funded under core CIFs budget.	There has been a noted culture change amongst CIF representatives regarding how E&L should be conducted within the CIFs.
	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	Involving a range of stakeholders on the advisory board for the E&L Initiative and working closely with the CIF Administrative Unit.	CIF Administrative Unit continuing to lead phase 2 of E&L Initiative	There has been a noted culture change amongst CIF representatives regarding how E&L Initiative should be conducted within the CIFs.
	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	Responsible for developing first-of-its-kind Transformational Change toolkit	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it builds in leverage and incentives	Demonstrating that the CIFs would do well when assessed against E&L criteria.	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	Drawing on UK's expertise, including evaluation specialists	None	None
	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	None	None	None

Evaluation and learning at a global level

		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria	Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	Commitment made by the UK to ensuring that the E&L Initiative is able to support the design and implementation of programmes of other institutes that are being funded by the UK.	There is an indication (unverified) that other climate funds, including the GCF and the Adaptation Fund, have adopted some of the approaches in their own operations.	None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	Development of first-of-its-kind Transformational Change toolkit	None	None
	Supporting political will	None	None	None
	Supporting local ownership of the policy	The E&L Initiative used participatory methodologies, inviting other funds such as the adaptation fund and the GCF to join workshops and discussions.	There is an indication (unverified) that other climate funds, including the GCF and the Adaptation Fund, have adopted some of the approaches in their own operations.	None

15 Unintended outcomes

15.1 Negative unintended outcomes of ICF's support for policy change

We found some evidence that the burden of ICF's reporting requirements have resulted in restrictions in opportunities to support policy change. In Indonesia, one of the groups that was experiencing resource pressure to deliver its core remit withdrew from the Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF) Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) programme, so was no longer subject to ICF supporting policy change (interview with CSO).

We found some evidence of activity to support policy change in one ICF-funded programme coming into conflict with the approach of another ICF-funded programme. Efforts, through technical assistance (EAGER), to refocus Uganda's geothermal policy away from large-scale electricity to grid conflicted with the remit of the EA Geo, both of which were ICF-funded. This caused friction between the two programmes that were originally intended to be complementary (interview with UK government official; correspondence with implementing partner) and they ultimately pursued different policy goals. This is, however, reflective of diverging views in the sector as a whole about how the geothermal resource in the western branch of the rift should be used. It was therefore a likely natural aspect of the policy process that could not have been known by ICF in advance.

We found some instances where ICF's financial support for preferred policies had resulted in perverse incentives. Incentives for adopting SPS in Colombia may have resulted in increased interest in the business of cattle ranching at the expense of other sustainable ways of exploiting the forest, including production of timber and non-timber products.

Finally, we found evidence that where the UK takes a very strong position in international negotiations; this can have adverse consequences for reaching consensus and therefore making decisions in consensus-based fora such as the multilateral funds.

15.2 Positive unintended outcomes of ICF's support for policy change

We found evidence that tools intended for use only within a particular programme had been taken up outside that programme, without that being intended originally. As well as being more widely adopted for renewable energy projects in Uganda (part of the original programme objectives),⁷⁷ the standardised PPA devised for the ICF-funded GET FiT Uganda programme has been adopted as the basis of applications elsewhere in Africa and also in Zambia where the GET FiT approach is being rolled out. The transformational change toolkit developed for the CIFs, which was heavily influenced by ICF, has been taken up by MDBs and other funds.

⁷⁷ DFID (2014) Uganda Roll-Out Phase 1: contract overview. [Available at GET FiT East Africa Uganda Roll Out Contract between DFID and KfW.](#)

16 Has policy change led to adaptation or mitigation impacts?

As part of the evaluation, we took a view on whether ICF's support for policy change had contributed to substantive climate change adaptation or mitigation impacts. This information is indicative as resources did not allow us to investigate the causality associated with the theory of change links between the outcome in which policy change was supported and substantive impact.

In Table 16 below, we list each outcome in which ICF supported policy change and assess whether it could lead to substantive beneficial outcomes.

Table 16: Substantive climate change mitigation or adaptation benefits resulting from an outcome that ICF has supported

Supporting policy change outcome	Strength of evidence (from process tracing) that ICF supported the outcome	Case study	Substantive climate change adaptation impacts	Substantive climate change mitigation impacts
1. National Development Plan makes commitment to new silvopastoral targets.	Strong	Colombia	Too soon to tell, but increased land area under silvopastoral systems could increase local biodiversity and improve adaptation of livestock farmers.	Too soon to tell, but increased land area under silvopastoral systems is expected to reduce GHG emissions and increase carbon sequestration.
2. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Policy Document and Law	Some	Colombia	Too soon to tell but, because silvopastoral systems are now an option to receive additional payment, there could be benefits if taken up.	Too soon to tell but, because silvopastoral systems are now an option to receive additional payment, there could be benefits if taken up.
3. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Orinoquia region.	Strong	Colombia	Too soon to tell, but one of the chapter's objectives prioritises management of ecological systems including controlling deforestation and ecosystem degradation, which could lead to a range of adaptation impacts.	Too soon to tell, but one of the chapter's objectives prioritises boosting the productivity and sustainability of agricultural supply chains, which could lead to a range of mitigation impacts.
4. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Amazonia region.	Some	Colombia	Too soon to tell, but the chapter prioritises ecosystem conservation efforts (among other things), which could lead to a range of adaptation impacts.	Too soon to tell, but the chapter prioritises rural transport and services, and sustainable productive models for agriculture and biocommerce (among other things), which could lead to a range of mitigation impacts.
5. Stronger enforcement of the timber legality assurance system	Some	Indonesia	Too soon to tell, but reductions in illegal logging as a result of the timber legality assurance system could lead to better management of forests with regard to conservation and biodiversity.	Too soon to tell, but reductions in illegal logging could lead to avoided deforestation and the benefits of GHG emission reductions.

6. Unlocking of the Reforestation Fund for social forestry	Some	Indonesia	Too soon to tell	The protection of sustainably managed forests under the social forestry scheme is expected to protect large areas of Indonesia from the extractive industries (and associated GHG emission) as well as increasing carbon sequestration.
7. New regulation requiring that all social forestry applications are verified within 22 days.	Some	Indonesia	Too soon to tell	The protection of sustainably managed forests under the social forestry scheme is expected to protect large areas of Indonesia from the extractive industries (and associated GHG emission) as well as increasing carbon sequestration.
8. Tighter regulations to ensure that mining companies comply with licensing requirements.	Some	Indonesia	Too soon to tell, but the tightening of mining regulations with regard to post-mining land reclamation could lead to the recovery of deforested areas, which could lead to a range of adaptation impacts.	Too soon to tell, but a high number of mining licenses have now been revoked and by ensuring that all licensing processes (linked to extractive industries) include provisions for mitigating climate change impacts, this could lead to a range of impacts.
9. Implementation of ecological fiscal transfer mechanism in two provinces (North Kalimantan and Papua)	Strong	Indonesia	Too soon to tell – the regulation has only recently been introduced in two provinces.	Too soon to tell – the regulation has only recently been introduced in two provinces.
10. Incorporation of a deemed energy clause into the Ugandan standard PPA	Strong	Uganda	Marginally reduced reliance on hydroelectric power which is affected by drought conditions.	All electricity supplied to the grid is from renewable sources, mainly hydroelectric power. However, grid coverage is relatively small and is barely used for heating and cooking which still relies on biomass.
11. Improved regulation of environmental and social standards during renewable energy project development	Some	Uganda	Construction requirements imposed for reasons of climate change adaptation have been enforced where previously they may not have been.	Construction requirements imposed for reasons of climate change mitigation have been enforced where previously they may not have been.
12. Development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on an ITPS biodynamic model that incentivise sustainable farming.	Some	Colombia	Too soon to tell – still at pilot stage	Too soon to tell – still at pilot stage
13. Upcoming policy on sustainable cattle ranching	Some	Colombia	Too soon to tell – policy has only just been completed.	Too soon to tell – policy has only just been completed.
14. Increased engagement of the Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability	Strong	Colombia	Too soon to tell	Too soon to tell

15. Ministry of Finance has given a public statement committing to developing a national mechanism that enables national to provincial fiscal transfers to reward strong environmental performance.	Strong	Indonesia	Too soon to tell	Too soon to tell
16. The National Strategic Development Plan (2020-24) now contains a chapter on climate change and disaster resilience for the first time. The Plan also includes a macro indicator on emissions reductions.	Some	Indonesia	Too soon to tell	Too soon to tell, but the macro indicator on carbon emission reductions could lead to a range of mitigation impacts as the Indonesian government will be held to account on their NDC commitment for the first time.
17. Uganda's draft geothermal policy is complete, and it is now working its way through parliament.	Some	Uganda	Too soon to tell	Too soon to tell

17 Cross-cutting issues

Although not the focus on the evaluation, we identified a number of programmes for which gender and social inclusion, governance and anti-corruption, and climate change resilience were relevant to supporting policy change.

17.1 Gender and social inclusion

In Colombia, one of the pillars (themes) of Amazon Vision is promoting environmental governance that respects traditional practices and the cultural diversity of indigenous communities inhabiting forests. The areas of focus were defined in conjunction with the indigenous communities and include self-governance, woman and family, health and traditional medicine, self-education, and strengthening of indigenous languages. A series of projects are funded each year and, in some years, there has been a quota on the proportion of projects led by women (at least 10%). The projects aim to strengthen environmental governance, protect sacred places and empower indigenous women. The approach is regarded as very successful by both governments and the indigenous communities, so much so that any organisation wanting to work with indigenous communities in the Amazon region has to follow its principles.

In Indonesia, the SETAPAK programme supported a number of CSOs across Indonesia to assist communities in applying for community-based forest management licenses as part of the social forestry scheme. This enables indigenous communities – who have customary land tenure rights – to sustainably maintain their own forests and use them as a source of income and social cohesion. ICF-supported CSOs in North and East Kalimantan have supported the implementation of new legislation that protects the rights of indigenous communities from extractive industries.

In Uganda, GET FiT paid particular attention to ensuring that the social impact requirements of power plant construction were complied with by developers. This included full compensation for relocation and land loss, and retrofitting modern amenities into the housing associated with staff accommodation. ICF played no particular role, except for part-funding the programme.

17.2 Governance and anti-corruption

In Colombia, there are issues of corruption related to deforestation although ICF projects did not investigate them directly. ICF programmes did, however, contribute information, for example, to the monitoring system which gives early signs of deforestation. The British embassy also helped the Colombian government to implement a new Land Registry Policy specifically in the area where it would help to combat deforestation by exposing land grabbers, sometimes linked to local government, as was the case in Guaviare recently.

In Indonesia, the SETAPAK programme had a major focus on tackling corruption within the extractive industries. Decentralisation and the move to regional autonomy led to a sharp rise in the number of mining licenses being granted at a district level, with poor governance and many illegal permits in operation. SETAPAK supported the KPK ‘clean and clear’ initiative to tackle corruption by supporting CSOs to monitor the compliance of mining companies at a provincial level, raising freedom of information requests to gather evidence on unpaid tax revenue and overlapping permits. This evidence was used by CSOs lobbying at a national level to convince ESDM to tighten regulations and create a centralised system that enables mining inspectors to access data on permits across Indonesia. A large number of non-compliant permits have now been revoked by the ministry.

This did not arise as an issue in relation to the programmes and interventions investigated in Uganda.

17.3 Climate change resilience

In Colombia, the SPS project promotes silvopastoral systems, which not only increase biodiversity in the area and productivity of the livestock, but also reduce emission from the livestock and soil erosion. This removes the need to move to other pastures continuously and therefore prevents deforestation and increases CO2 sequestration.

In Indonesia, the LCDI programme supported the inclusion of a new chapter on climate change and disaster resilience in the National Strategic Development Plan published in early 2020, along with a macro indicator on climate change. This was the first time such a chapter had been included and it demonstrated the government's willingness to mainstream climate resilience into planning. However, this is yet to result in policy change relating to low-carbon development.

In Uganda, one of the aims of GET FiT was to diversify Uganda's energy mix to build resilience to drought which had severely affected hydroelectric power during the 2000s. This objective was only partially achieved as most of the new plant brought forward by developers were hydroelectric. Exploitation of the geothermal resource, which has taken a further step forward by ICF's support for EAGER, will also help improve the energy mix and build resilience. ICF funded the programmes of technical assistance which were involved in supporting policy change but had no more interest in the climate resilience aspects of the programme than the other donors or project partners.