



PE3 Support For Policy Change

Main Report

Support for policy change

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An important note about this report

This report is written for policymakers and their advisors. It contains an Executive Summary aimed at decision makers; it is a high-level, stand-alone description of the evaluation, our conclusions and our recommendations.

Policy-change processes are complex and cannot be meaningfully summarised in a few short paragraphs. For those with more time, there are three related outputs from the evaluation, which should be read in conjunction with one another.

- This report (the Main Report) focusses on summarising our findings and provides conclusions and recommendations.
- The Technical Report provides detail not included in the Main Report, including the full case studies on which the conclusions are built. It is written with analysts, country leads, topic leads and other evaluators in mind.
- The Appendices contain research instruments and details that only a very limited number of people will need. It is for anyone interested in quality checking, building on or replicating the study.

Executive Summary

We make nine recommendations for International Climate Finance (ICF) to consider. Recommendations are numbered and shaded. Key findings are [highlighted](#).

Key take-away messages

We found evidence that ICF had supported some aspects of policy change in the cases we studied, and that the United Kingdom (UK)'s approach was valued by most policymakers and other donors.

However, there are opportunities to support more ambitious and effective national and sub-national climate change policies by doing more to:

- Coordinate ICF's work across programmes to provide integrated support on policy.
- Generate motivation and political support for climate change policies, and make greater use of the UK's diplomatic resources.¹
- Combine strategic interventions such as memoranda of understanding with tactical and financial support for policy implementation.
- Support change in the wider systems within which climate change policies operate to ensure that they support effective implementation.

Background

ICF is a UK government commitment to support developing countries to respond to the challenges and opportunities of climate change.² It is part of concerted international action to limit and manage the impact of climate change and, in particular, ensure that the global temperature rise stays well below 2C. It contributes to progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and delivers against the UK aid strategy. One of the ways in which ICF seeks to achieve its objectives is to support the adoption of those global, national and sub-national policies which could contribute to mitigating and adapting to climate change.

This evaluation

As part of the UK government's commitment to understanding the efficacy of its support for policy change, this evaluation seeks to establish how, in what respects and in what circumstances ICF supports changes to global, national, sub-national policies to contribute to mitigating and adapting to climate change. To address the question in relation to national and sub-national governments, we focussed on forestry and land-use policy in Colombia and Indonesia, low-carbon development policy in Indonesia and renewable energy policy in Uganda. To address the question in relation to global policy, we focussed on three specific policy changes in the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), an exploratory investigation of how the UK seeks to support World Bank policy, and on the way in which the UK works with other donors. These were selected for a number of reasons, but primarily because they offered potential in answering the evaluation questions.

During our evaluation we carried out 138 interviews, including with teams working on ICF-supported programmes, implementing partners and consultants, government officials, civil society organisations (CSOs) and businesses. We also interviewed sector experts, reviewed programme documents and other relevant materials such as technical reports, websites and press reports.

¹ We understand from HMG that measures to make greater use of the UK's diplomatic resources are already in hand.

² Her Majesty's Government (June 2018) [International Climate Finance](#): Overview.

How, in what respects and in what circumstances has ICF supported change in national and sub-national policy?

Much of ICF's support for policy change is delivered through programmes.

We found little evidence of coordination of support for policy change across programmes, and there is scope to do much more in this respect.

We were able to identify 27 ICF programmes, 26 of which explicitly aim to support national and sub-national policy change; 11 of the 26 were relevant to policy change in multilateral development banks (MDBs) or funds. As ICF is included in over 300 programmes, this suggests that support for policy change may be a relatively small part of ICF's activities and there may be further opportunities to support change through other programmes.

We considered 22 bilateral and multi-bilateral programmes in detail and three types of objective were apparent. Firstly, 16 programmes were aimed at helping partner countries design more effective policies or improve the implementation of existing policies. Secondly, two programmes were aimed at helping the partner country incorporate climate considerations into high-level strategy, policy and development planning processes, such as national development plans (NDPs). Finally, four programmes were aimed at demonstrating the effectiveness of particular approaches to achieving policy goals, followed up by support for partners to embed them into policy.

Recommendation 1

A senior official should take responsibility for coordinating all the policy support work in a country including support delivered through bilateral and multilateral programmes and other aspects of the relationship with partner governments. Their aim should be to ensure that all ICF activity informs and supports the desired policy change. The official could be based in the UK, regionally or in the country concerned

ICF's support for policy change should continue to be provided by a combination of bilateral and multilateral programmes and direct government-to-government engagement. It should be coordinated with support from other donors wherever possible.

The official responsible for policy support should recognise that programmes that do not have an explicit aim to support policy change can also have potential to contribute to policy change outcomes.

We found that ICF worked with the grain, in a collaborative, non-prescriptive style, to support policy change in partner countries. ICF worked to build on existing aims and/or to improve the effectiveness of policy design and implementation; it did not attempt to impose its own policy agenda or ways of doing things. This collaborative approach created a sense of ownership by partner governments which increased the likelihood of both policy change occurring, and of that policy change being effective and sustainable.

ICF is widely regarded as a good partner to work with. We did not identify any areas where ICF took a more prescriptive approach, and understood from government officials in partner countries that they did not respond well to donors who took a more prescriptive approach.

ICF has been effective in supporting changes to some policies in the countries and policy areas we studied.

There is strong evidence that ICF supported changes to aspects of forestry and land-use policy in both Colombia and Indonesia and aspects of renewable energy policy in Uganda, specifically:

- The adoption of targets for land conversion to more sustainable agriculture and a sustainable plan for the Orinoquia region in Colombia.
- The allocation of funding for social forestry and for local government to take environmental action in Indonesia.
- Assisting the Uganda energy regulator include a clause in the standardised Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) which increased the ability of power producers to raise finance for new generating capacity.

There is some evidence that ICF supported changes to aspects of forestry and land-use policy in both Colombia and Indonesia, low-carbon development policy in Indonesia and renewable energy policy in Uganda, specifically:

- The adoption of a payment for environmental services (PES) policy and law and a sustainable plan for the Amazonia region in Colombia.
- Tighter regulations to ensure that mining companies comply with licensing requirements in Indonesia.
- Stronger enforcement of the timber legality assurance system, and a new regulation requiring all social forestry applications be verified within 22 days in Indonesia.
- The enforcement of environmental and social standards in the development of power plants in Uganda.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Early Movers (referred to hereafter as REM) in Colombia was less successful initially than expected. This was due to increased post-conflict deforestation which more recent actions have addressed; recent evidence suggests that REM may now have started to have an effect, albeit a delayed one.

ICF was not always successful at supporting policy change in the countries and policy areas studied.

For example:

- The 2050 Calculator was delivered too late in Colombia to support greater ambition for their nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) in response to the Paris Agreement of 2015.
- Ambitious targets advocated by the UK were not included in the Indonesian NDP because Government of Indonesia ministers and officials were not confident that the targets were achievable.

How does ICF support policy change?

We found ICF seeking to support national and sub-national policy change at three levels of involvement – strategic, tactical and financing policy implementation.

Strategic – Strategic support for policy change involves supporting the development of a partner government's strategy by working at political and senior official levels to create momentum for change at a national level; for example, by securing the adoption of ambitious targets in national plans and securing the support of a critical mass of political actors and senior officials across government. Strategic support for policy change is hard to deliver operationally. It requires strong diplomacy skills, is time consuming and has a high risk of failure. However, it has significant potential benefits if it is successful, particularly in building political will for change.

Tactical support – Tactical support for policy change involves providing specific pieces of support to help a partner government to implement policies that deliver on their plans – it is often targeted at building capacity and capability. Tactical action can support strategic change by demonstrating the effectiveness of action and building the capacity of advocates for action on climate change to win support from other decision makers. Tactical support for policy change is important and appreciated by partner countries, but will not on its own lead to the fundamental shifts in policy that ICF seeks.

Financing implementation – involves providing money to support the delivery of specific policies. Financing implementation can be provided on a stand-alone basis or as an essential part of strategic and tactical support. Financing policy implementation on its own can help to ensure that policies are implemented effectively and on a timely basis.

Strategic support was effective in Colombia where the UK helped to secure ambitious targets. ICF also attempted to support Indonesia's strategy for climate change mitigation but was unsuccessful. Strategic support was not used in relation to Ugandan renewable energy policy. Tactical support was used in all the countries to fill gaps in implementation and improve effectiveness, normally delivered through technical assistance. Finance was provided for policy implementation where partner governments knew what they wanted, how they wanted to do it and, in some cases, whom they wanted to do it with.

Recommendation 2

ICF should maintain its collaborative approach to supporting policy change through its bilateral programmes and other relationships with partner governments.

It should consider the combination of approaches that will be most effective in supporting the desired policy change noting that strategic, tactical and financial support are all valuable and that:

- **Strategic interventions are likely to be needed to achieve transformational change.**
- **Finance to support policy implementation will make a greater contribution to policy change when delivered in combination with strategic and tactical interventions. However, financial support alone can strengthen relationships and facilitate subsequent strategic and tactical interventions.**

What are the conditions for successful policy change?

We found that four conditions need to be in place for policy change to occur. These are not solely within ICF's control, but may be supported by ICF.

1. **Motivation – senior politicians and officials across the relevant parts of government must want the change to happen.**
2. **Evidence – key individuals must understand what successful change would look like and be satisfied that the change can be delivered efficiently and effectively.**
3. **Capacity – there must be capability (knowledge, know-how, skills) and capacity (human and financial resources) to deliver the new policy either among government officials or through consultants.**
4. **Supportive systems – relevant external conditions must be supportive, or at least must not impede the change.**

In the countries and policy contexts we studied, we found ICF tended to capitalise on its widely acknowledged strengths in generating evidence (condition 2) and providing responsive technical assistance (condition 3), and put less effort into creating political will (condition 1) and working with systems external to the policy system to create incentives for change (condition 4).

In some cases, ICF theories of change identify policy change as an intended outcome for a programme but have not explained how that will be secured, or the critical elements in delivering that outcome.

What works to support change in national and sub-national policy?

We explored how and in what circumstances ICF's policy support activities work with national and sub-national governments. We found that:

Where there is an opportunity to implement policy to address climate change but there are barriers to action, and where the UK is able to provide collaborative support that is not prescriptive in nature, then ICF is able to support policy change by equipping policymakers with the motivation, evidence and capacity to act, and by establishing the systems to support action. This results in the adoption and implementation of new or improved policy to address climate change.

The findings are shown below categorised by four types of intervention. The strength of evidence for each finding has been assessed as convincing, plausible or tentative.

Table 1: The different ways in which ICF supports national and sub-national governments to make policy change and the strength of evidence we found for each³

Creating and corraling evidence to convince people to change policy	Strength of evidence
Where there is robust, independent evidence from trusted experts, policymakers are convinced that policy change is the right thing to do and opposition is diffused because key stakeholders can see there are clear benefits to acting and that the policy change will work in practice.	Convincing
Creating and exploiting opportunities to convince a critical mass of decision makers to change	
Where the UK's view holds weight, diplomatic channels can be used to increase the attention given to climate change by ministers and senior officials and to encourage them to support action.	Tentative
Where implementation is dependent on cooperation between stakeholders who are not aligned or engaged with one other, and where ICF is viewed as a credible and neutral party. ICF brings those stakeholders together to build a shared understanding of the benefits of working together to address climate change which increases their capacity to deliver policy change.	Convincing
Co-location works to support policy change by providing an informal, direct communication channel to expert consultants allowing them to get timely, practical guidance which builds their understanding, allowing policymakers to make faster, more effective decisions.	Plausible
Where officials associated with ICF activities are perceived by other stakeholders as having access to resources and support, other stakeholders are willing to involve those officials in policy development because they are seen to have the capacity to deliver.	Tentative
Empowering others to advocate or deliver policy change through capacity building	
Where CSOs are committed to advocating for climate change issues but lack the funds, skills and/or coordination to do so effectively, and where ICF supports CSOs to contribute to policy development, provide information or scrutinise government performance. This can result in improved policy making because it better reflects community needs and/or evidence on the ground.	Plausible
Where CSOs are well connected with senior government officials, they can provide channels for evidence or advocacy that are not available to ICF directly. By working with those CSOs, ICF can engage stakeholders that would otherwise be inaccessible.	Plausible
Technical assistance works to increase the capability of government officials to deliver policy change because they have a better understanding of how to design and implement a particular policy.	Convincing
Promising and providing resources to deliver policy change	
Where senior government officials want to act but lack the resources to do so, the promise of resources increases their motivation to implement change because they have confidence that they can deliver stakeholder benefits.	Plausible
Where partner governments are motivated and have plans for policy change but lack the financial resources to implement them, ICF enables them to be put into effect by paying for activities that are required to deliver them.	Plausible

Recommendation 3

Wherever possible, ICF theories of change for bilateral programmes should clearly identify what conditions are necessary to secure policy change and how specific interventions intend to support those conditions.

The design of interventions to support policy change should reflect the specific circumstances in which different interventions can be expected to work. The teams designing programmes to support policy change in a specific country should use the findings about what interventions work in what circumstances (detailed in section 5 of the Technical Report) to inform decisions about what support is provided, to whom and how.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

How has ICF supported policy change for global institutions?

We found ICF working strategically and tactically to support decisions and approaches of the CIFs and the World Bank. The effect of the UK's support for change on some aspects of CIF policy was tested in the case study, but it was out of the scope of the case studies to test the effect of the UK's support for policy change at the World Bank.

We found some evidence that ICF supported the uptake of evaluation and learning approaches in the CIFs, and strong evidence that the UK supported the 2019 agreement to defer a decision about the CIFs sunset clause to a later date. In addition, we identified five instances where we suspect that ICF may have provided support for policy change of the CIFs and World Bank, but the strength of evidence is less than tentative.

The UK was unsuccessful in convincing the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) committee to approve CTF 2.0 which would have used expected reflows from the loan portfolio to raise capital. The UK was unable to convince others who came to negotiations with alternative political positions.

We also found evidence that the Germany-Norway-UK (GNU) partnership was perceived to be effective by other donors, and that all three partners often supported each other in multilateral bodies' decision making even in areas that are outside the scope of the formal partnership.

Recommendation 4

ICF should consider whether there is scope to extend the GNU partnership to other recipient countries and policy areas, and whether it could be replicated with other donor partners.

We explored how and in what circumstances ICF's support for policy change works with global institutions. We found that:

ICF is able to support policy change in MDBs or multilateral fund policy by using financial leverage, deploying leadership to build coalitions of support and/or consensus among stakeholders. Stakeholders support the UK's policy proposals because the proposals are based on sound evidence and they respect the UK's expertise and commitment to addressing climate change. The UK is unable to convince stakeholders who have strong principled objections to the proposed change.

The findings are shown below categorised by five types of intervention. The strength of evidence for each finding has been assessed as convincing, plausible or tentative.

Table 2: The different ways in which ICF supports policy change in global institutions and the strength of evidence we found for each

Financial leverage	Strength of evidence
When the UK offers substantial funding and articulates how it wants to see the money used, other stakeholders support the UK position because they want to maximise funding for the MDB/fund.	Plausible
Where the UK is a large donor to a fund, smaller donors who are not committed to a particular position will support the UK's preferred approach because they respect the UK's level of commitment.	Plausible
Coalitions of support create momentum	
Coalitions of support between stakeholders motivate less committed stakeholders in an MDB/multilateral fund to support a policy because they can see that key stakeholders are backing it.	Tentative
UK expertise builds confidence	
Where the UK provides input and evidence based on specific expertise and careful consideration in support of a policy change, then other stakeholders without that expertise support UK proposals because they are confident that the proposed policy change will work	Plausible
Leadership	
Where UK representatives take leadership roles within multilateral funds and where those individuals have strong leadership skills, they have an opportunity to shape discussions and build consensus to support the UK's position.	Tentative
Experience builds capability	
Where MDB or multilateral fund officials are involved in the delivery of ICF programmes which employ an innovative approach, they gain experience in, and understand the benefits of, the approach which builds their capability to implement similar approaches.	Plausible

Recommendation 5

ICF officials responsible for the relationship with global institutions should use the findings about what interventions work in what circumstances (detailed in section 9 of the Technical Report) to inform their approach to supporting policy change within those institutions.

What is ICF's influence on other donors?

We interviewed a sample of donors suggested by members of the Evaluation Steering Group (ESG). They told us that ICF's ability to support change derives from the fact that it is respected as a strong and effective leader with a significant financial and policy stake in outcomes. The donors we spoke to regarded the UK as proactive, reliable, and good to work with; as a credible participant in debates, whose position is based on careful thought and strong analysis; and a country which fields technically competent and skilled staff in support of its policy objectives.

We found that ICF has established strong global credentials in monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL), an area that is perceived by other donors to be particularly thorny and difficult to solve. Its leadership on this issue within the context of the CIFs seems to have been particularly valued and effective.

Recommendation 6

The UK should build on its reputation for expertise in MEL to support the global effort to address climate change. ICF should develop a deliberate strategy to communicate this expertise across the donor community and encourage multilateral bodies to develop MEL strategies for their work including ambitious but realistic plans for their dissemination.

What are the interactions between support for policy change at global, national and sub-national levels?

We found supportive interactions between support for policy change at different levels of government and no obstructive interactions. Support at a global level can inform work at national level by creating motivation to change national policy. Work at a national level can support policy change at sub-national level, by helping national governments understand regional needs and priorities which can be used by policymakers to design policy that works for regions. Work at a sub-national level can support national policy by helping to implement national regulations at the sub-national level, or where ICF funded local demonstration projects, can help demonstrate to national government what might work.

Recommendation 7

Programme teams delivering support for policy change should consider the level at which bilateral interventions can most effectively support change and align their work with activities at global, national and sub-national levels.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

How, in what respects, and in what circumstances is ICF's support for policy change supporting transformational change?

We saw early signals of transformational change in all the case studies, but interim and advanced signals of change were scarcer.⁴ It was only in Colombia that we saw evidence of critical mass being reached, and a strong likelihood that the change observed in the country's approach to forestry and land-use policy at both national and regional levels would be transformational.

The critical importance of political will came through in the case studies. Although there was nominal support for all the policies, including some being incorporated into law and into national plans, it was only in Colombia's forestry and land-use policy that the president was personally driving that change, due in part to ICF's role in convening stakeholders and using diplomacy to secure commitment to change.

⁴ These terms come from work for the CIFs where 'early signals' relate to the immediate results of support for policy change, 'interim signals' relate to slightly longer-term outcomes, and 'advanced signals' relate to much longer-term outcomes. See CIF and Itad (2020) [Signals of Transformational Change: Insights from the evaluation of transformational change in the climate investment funds](#).

Recommendation 8

ICF should continue to use strategic interventions to build political will for transformational change. Programme teams delivering support for policy change should identify whether all the conditions for transformation are in place and, where they are not, identify opportunities for further interventions to support transformational change.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

What are the other factors supporting policy change?

Factors supporting policy change include the international pressure that all countries face to take action on climate change and increasing levels of public awareness of climate change within emerging economies, which in turn result in pressure on politicians and officials. The main factor obstructing policy change is the presence of unsupportive local political priorities.

Two strategies were seen to mitigate obstructions:

- Working with local CSOs to ensure support for policy change is aligned with local issues and concerns.
- Working effectively at different levels of government to support the alignment of policies.

Are there examples of policy change supported by ICF resulting in adaption and/or mitigation impacts?

Investigation of the adaptation and/or mitigation impact of policy change was not within the scope of this evaluation. However, we were alert to opportunities to identify impacts. Mostly it is too soon to tell whether policies will be successful in their aims, but we have seen some examples of adaptation and mitigation impacts. These are described in section 16 ('Has policy change led to adaptation or mitigation impacts') of the Technical Report.

How is support for policy change monitored and evaluated?

Although particular successes may be mentioned in annual reports, there is no standard method or approach for monitoring support for policy change, therefore information is not being systematically or routinely captured and, consequently, learning is compromised. This is partly because policy change may not result from a single programme and, where it does, it often happens after a programme is completed, so it cannot be captured by normal programme monitoring and evaluation activities. Recommendation 1 above proposes that policy change is monitored and evaluated as part of a country-focussed approach.

Recommendation 9

HMG should monitor progress towards global, national and sub-national policy change, evaluating the role of all aspects of ICF support in delivering that policy change and identifying learning that will enable faster and/or more effective policy change.

Monitoring and evaluation of support for policy change should be conducted at the level of the institution, nation or sub-nation rather than individual programmes, and time should be allowed for the results of interventions to become apparent.

1 Introduction and background

1.1 Introduction

International Climate Finance (ICF) is a United Kingdom (UK) government commitment to support developing countries to respond to the challenges and opportunities of climate change.⁵ It is part of the concerted global action to limit and manage the impact of climate change and, in particular, ensure that the global temperature rise will stay well below 2C. It contributes to progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and delivers against the UK aid strategy.

The UK is firmly committed, alongside other developed countries, to contributing to the mobilisation of US\$100 billion of public and private climate finance a year by 2020, and ICF is a core component of the UK's contribution to this shared goal. Managed jointly by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), ICF is investing at least £5.8 billion between 2016 and 2021 in over 50 developing countries and is committed to doubling this investment for the 2021–2026 period. ICF works through diverse channels from private equity funds to small non-governmental organisation (NGO) grants to:

- Change facts on the ground, delivering results that demonstrate that low-carbon, climate-resilient development is feasible and desirable.
- Improve the international climate architecture and finance system to increase the scale, efficiency and value for money of climate spend.
- Test out new approaches to delivering climate finance that have the potential to achieve bigger and better results in the future.

Supporting policy change is one contribution towards achieving these goals. At national and sub-national levels, it can: i) encourage the setting of high ambitions; ii) help create incentives for markets and supply chains to work in favour of climate protection rather than against it; iii) develop new laws, regulations and policies and, iv) where laws are in place but ineffective, help nation states find ways to enforce more effectively. At global level, it can: i) build coalitions of stakeholders to support enhanced climate change policies; ii) prompt amendments to investment decision criteria and other decision frameworks and, iii) support countries and global institutions to design better policy.

1.2 Key definitions

We have developed the following definitions for use in this evaluation.

Policy – by policy we mean the position an organisation takes towards a topic relevant to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation, whether that organisation is governmental, private or part of civil society. This will normally be formalised (e.g. written down) and made public in some way. In Table 1 of the Inception Report (p.16), we set out what policy would look like for different policy actors.

Policy design – the first stage of policy development. It includes thinking about how to achieve policy goals and then formalising decisions in writing. It can take a range of forms including business case development, cost-benefit analysis of policy options, narrative statements of positions and drafting text of laws and regulations.

⁵ HMG (June 2018) [International Climate Finance](#): Overview.

Policy implementation – the stage of the policy process where a broad statement of intent is operationalised through policy instruments. It can include rolling out the law, setting up the institutions that will make the policy happen in reality, creating market measures, or creating templates for legal documents.

Policy enforcement – by policy enforcement we mean the activities that take place after a regulatory policy has been rolled out, to ensure that it is abided by. It can include surveillance, inspection, reporting, giving out warnings or prosecuting offenders.

Policy change – comes in a number of guises. Apparently small changes in emphasis may be just as important in facilitating change on the ground as the major changes. At design stage, it can include the adoption of an entirely new policy, a change in direction of an existing policy, a more ambitious policy, or subtle changes in emphasis. At implementation stage, it can include the creation of a new institution to oversee roll-out, the creation or amendment of regulatory documents, or the setting-up of new market mechanisms. At enforcement stage, it can include the establishment of new methods of surveillance, new reporting mechanisms or new penalty structures.

Support for policy change – by support for policy change we mean the activities carried out either by ICF staff or with the support of ICF resources that are intended to change the ambition, design, direction, implementation or enforcement of policy.

1.3 This evaluation

1.3.1 Purpose

This evaluation sets out where and in what circumstances ICF's support for policy change since 2011 has and has not been found to be effective. The critical success factors driving successful support for policy change have also been identified. Its purpose is to enable the UK government, and other donors and development partners, to learn about the effectiveness of supporting policy change to achieve the UK's international objectives on climate change, and thus drive wider transformational change. Applications for the results include:

1. To provide input into future spending reviews.
2. To inform the implementation of the UK's Africa Strategy.
3. To feed into programme planning and priority setting for future ICF activity generally, and also specifically in ICF's portfolios including forests, renewable energy and low-carbon development.
4. To inform BEIS's new technical assistance programme; UK Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transitions (UK PACT).

In addition, audiences external to the commissioning departments may also benefit including international partners, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), other government departments such as Her Majesty's Treasury, implementation partners and consultants, recipients of ICF funding, and international development bodies more generally.

1.3.2 Evaluation questions

The overarching evaluation question is: 'How, in what respects, and in what circumstances has the ICF supported change in global, national and sub-national policies relating to climate change?'

The specific evaluation questions are listed in Table 3 below, alongside the place in the Main Report (this document) and Technical Report where they are addressed.

Table 3: List of Evaluation Questions and their report location.

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Main Report	Technical Report
1a(i) What approaches have been used by ICF programmes to support change in national and sub-national policies?	Chapter 2	Chapter 4
1c(i) In what circumstances have these been successful or unsuccessful, in what respects and why (or is it too soon to tell)?		Chapter 5 (CMO) Case studies – chapters 6, 7 and 8 (Indonesia, Colombia, Uganda)
1a(ii) What approaches have been used by ICF programmes to support change in global policies?	Chapter 3 (MDBs and global funds)	Chapter 9 (global institutions)
1c(ii) In what circumstances have these been successful or unsuccessful, in what respects and why (or is it too soon to tell)?	Chapter 4 (other donors)	Case studies – chapters 10 and 11 (CIFs and World Bank) Chapter 12 (other donors)
1b What were the intended outcomes?	Not included	Chapter 3 (objectives in supporting policy change)
1d Have there been unintended outcomes?	Not included	Chapter 15
2. How and in what circumstances does ICF's work to support policy change at each of the global, national and sub-national levels support or obstruct its work at the other levels?	Chapter 5	Chapter 13
3. How, in what respects, and in what circumstances is ICF's support for policy change supporting transformational change?	Chapter 6	Chapter 14
4. What other factors support change in policies relating to climate change, how and in what circumstances do these factors support or obstruct ICF's support for policy change?	Included within each section	Included within each section
5. What are the objectives of programmes within the ICF portfolio with regards to supporting policy change?	Not included	Chapter 3
6. Are there examples of policy change supported by ICF resulting in adaption and/or mitigation impacts?	Not included	Chapter 16
7. What can be learned, by whom to improve the effectiveness of ICF's support for change on global, national and sub-national policies?	Tables 1 & 2 in the Executive Summary	Not included
8. How does ICF evaluate support for policy change and monitor the progress of ICF's objectives to support policy change, and how can this be done better?	Executive Summary	Not included

1.4 Method

The evaluation was conducted using a realist evaluation approach. This uses evidence to develop and refine ‘programme theory’ that addresses the evaluation questions. We tested our programme theories through interviews and document reviews.⁶ Throughout the evaluation, we were alert to the influence of other factors on policy change, such as the actions of other donors or changes to enabling conditions, and to the fact that policymakers are not always able to articulate or remember exactly why they changed policy design or implementation.

Using qualitative data analysis software⁷, we then mapped our evidence against the theories. This helped us develop refined programme theories which we could then retest in an iterative process. Our eventual refined theories provide an explanation of the evidence we found.

In each case where ICF had attempted to support policy change and a subsequent change had been observed, process tracing⁸ was used to assess the strength of the evidence we found that indicated that ICF activities had contributed to these changes or outcomes.

We also used formal theory⁹ to help develop and test our programme theories, including theories of the policy process, models of social organisation (markets, hierarchies and networks), communications theory, and theories of behaviour change. Our review of formal theory is included in Appendix 3 of the Inception Report.

1.4.1 Inception phase

The inception phase ran from November 2018 to March 2019.

We identified the programmes that a) had objectives to support policy change and b) were focussing on either forestry and land-use policy, or low-carbon development policy (including renewable energy policy). This process, and the rationale behind it, is described in detail in section 2.3 (‘Selecting programmes’) of the Technical Report. A total of 27 of the 300+ ICF programmes fell into those categories. They included:

- 14 DFID programmes, 12 BEIS programmes and one joint BEIS/DFID programme.
- Five multilateral programmes (Green Climate Fund and the four CIFs).
- Nine programmes funded solely by the UK, the rest being funded by a small number of donors in addition to the UK.

The table below shows the programmes included in the sample together with the evaluation questions to which they were relevant.

⁶ Realist programme theory explains some of how and why, in the ‘real world’, a programme works, for whom, to what extent and in which contexts. See for example Wong, G., Westhorp, G., Pawson, R., Greenhalgh T. (2013) [Realist Synthesis: Rameses Training Materials](#).

⁷ MaxQDA 2018 <https://www.maxqda.com>. See an example included in Appendix 11 to the Technical Report.

⁸ Process tracing is a qualitative approach for understanding how outcomes are created through the analysis of causal processes within individual cases.

⁹ Established social science theories drawn from published literature.

Table 4: Programmes investigated

Programme/Fund	Donors	Lead HMG department ¹⁰	Supporting change in national/ sub-national gov policy	Supporting policy change in MDBs and funds	Influencing other donors	Interactions between the levels
Forest Governance, Markets and Climate	UK, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden	DFID				
Tanzania Climate Change Institutional Strengthening Programme	UK only	DFID				
Results-Based Financing for Low-Carbon Energy Access	UK only	DFID				
Degraded Land Mapping for Kalimantan and Papua Provinces	Not known – supplemented an additional project	DFID				
Promoting Low-Carbon Development with Returnable Capital in Indonesia	UK, France	DFID				
Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus (StARCK+)	UK only	DFID				
Forestry, Land-use and Governance in Indonesia	UK only	DFID				
International CCS Capacity Building	UK, Norway, Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute	BEIS				
Low-Carbon Agriculture in Colombia	UK only	BEIS				
REDD Early Movers (REM)	Germany, Norway, UK (GNU partnership)	BEIS				
International 2050 Pathways Partnership	UK only	BEIS				
Improving Governance of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry in Indonesia	UK only	DFID				
International Forestry Knowledge (KnowFor)	Each partner has its own donors	DFID				
East Africa Geothermal Energy (EA-Geo)	Germany, UK, EU The EAGER element was 100% UK funded	DFID				
Climate Proofing Growth and Development in South Asia	UK only	DFID				
Low-Carbon GET FIT/On and Off-Grid Small Scale Renewable Energy in Uganda	Norway, Germany, UK, EU	BEIS/DFID				
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	Australia, Denmark, Indonesia, Korea, Norway, Qatar, UAE, UK	DFID				
Forests Carbon Partnership Facility - Carbon Fund (FCPF-C)	EU, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, UK, United States plus private sector donors	BEIS				

¹⁰ Defra did not fund any of the programmes selected for inclusion within PE3.

Programme/Fund	Donors	Lead HMG department ¹⁰	Supporting change in national/ sub-national gov policy	Supporting policy change in MDBs and funds	Influencing other donors	Interactions between the levels
NAMA Facility	Germany, Denmark, UK, EU	BEIS				
BioCarbon Fund	Germany, Norway, UK, United States	BEIS				
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience	Multilateral	BEIS				
Africa Clean Energy programme	UK only	DFID				
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	Multilateral	BEIS				
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): FIP	Multilateral	BEIS				
Investment in Forests and Sustainable Land Use Programme (IFSLU)	UK, Norway, Netherlands	DFID				
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): CTF	Multilateral	BEIS				
Climate Investment Fund (CIF): SREP	Multilateral	BEIS				

We then carried out a more detailed review of key programme documents for each programme, including as a minimum the business case, logframe results reported in annual reviews and any evaluations.

1.4.2 Phase 1 primary research

Interviews were carried out with the Her Majesty's Government (HMG) official responsible for the programme, or where this person was no longer available, an official who was familiar with the programme. The purpose of the research was to identify the type of support for policy change that occurred, the claimed outcomes and to start to test and refine our initial theories of how support works. Interviews were also carried out with other donors, to understand their perceptions of ICF support for policy change. These findings were mapped against the countries where the programmes operated to create a case study selection matrix. At the end of phase 1, we produced an interim report, setting out our plans for phase 2, for discussion and agreement by the ESG.

1.4.3 Phase 2 primary research – case study selection and data collection

The evaluation is structured around five case studies; the selection process is described in section 2.7.1 ('Selecting the countries') of the Technical Report. During inception phase and the first phase of primary research, documentary review, interviews with HMG officials responsible for programmes, and interviews with other donors identified outcomes that appeared to be due, at least in part, to ICF support for policy change. The case studies were selected with HMG to maximise the likelihood of finding evidence to support, refute or refine our theories in relation to these outcomes. Three country case studies were selected to enable us to look at ICF support for policy change across a climate-relevant policy area within one geographic location, namely:

- Colombia, on forestry and land-use policy.
- Indonesia, on forestry and land-use policy and on low-carbon development policy.
- Uganda, on renewable energy policy.

Within each country, a number of ICF programmes had potentially played a role in the policy outcome.

A geographical focus enabled us to investigate interactions between programmes, as well as interactions between different levels (global, national, sub-national) of supporting policy change.

Three CIF policy changes were also investigated: the agreement to defer a decision on the sunset clause, the decision not to proceed with CTF 2.0, and the adoption of transformational change monitoring and evaluation.

In the early phases of the evaluation, we found very limited information, and no evidence, about the way in which ICF supports policy change in multilateral development banks (MDBs). It was therefore decided that an exploratory case study would be included in the programme of work to explore how ICF seeks to support policy change in an MDB which could be tested in a future evaluation. The MDB selected for the case study was the World Bank.

This resulted in a total of five case studies being carried out, four of which were used to gather evidence with which to test our theories of supporting policy change, and one (the World Bank) was used to elaborate on our early theories. The nature and number of interviews conducted during the evaluation are shown in Tables 5 and 6 below. We are unable to provide more detail (e.g. the number of interviews of each type within each case study) because it may be disclosive.

Table 5: Purpose of case study interviews with each type of respondent

Type of respondent	Purpose of interviews	Total number
Implementing partners and consultants providing technical assistance	To confirm the key policy-relevant outcomes, the type of support for policy change that took place, to develop specific questions to ask those at the receiving end of support for policy change, and to identify useful interviewees	33
Government officials in recipient countries	Testing and refining theory	44
UK government officials in recipient countries	Developing theory and identifying key contacts in-country	15
Other key people in recipient countries, including CSOs, academics, other donors, and other stakeholders	Testing theory and gaining a broader perspective on policy change, particularly on alternative explanations	19

Table 6: Interviews completed during primary research phases 1 and 2

Phase		Interviews completed
Phase 1	HMG officials	17
	Other donors	10
	Sub-total	27
Phase 2	Colombia case study	27
	Indonesia case study	34
	Uganda case study	27
	CIFs case study	18
	World Bank case study	5
	Sub-total	111
Total		138

1.5 Limitations

In the Technical Report we include a full list of limitations, the mitigation strategy employed and our comments about any remaining limitations despite mitigation (see section 1.6). The most impactful limitations which readers need to be mindful of are:

Programme sample – We deliberately selected programmes where support for policy change had occurred, where there had been outcomes, whether positive or negative, where we were likely to find evidence (i.e. the intervention had occurred long enough ago for an effect to be seen, but not so long ago that we were unlikely to find evidence), and where there was some kind of HMG in-country presence. This study has provided insight into cases where ICF claims to have supported policy change, confirming the extent, if any, of ICF support for change and providing an understanding of how that change was achieved.

Case study selection – The countries selected for case studies all worked closely with the UK and were generally supportive of action to address climate change. We are unable to provide any insight into how supporting policy change might work in countries with a less favourable political environment.

Extrapolation – This study has provided insight into how and in what circumstances ICF programmes supported policy change which can be generalised to the supporting policy change activities of other programmes and donors. We cannot draw conclusions from this study about whether ICF activities that were not studied were successful in supporting policy change.

1.6 This report

The remainder of the report is structured by the policy-making body, starting with national and sub-national governments, then global institutions and other donors. We then look at interactions between policy change at global, national and sub-national levels, transformational change and unintended consequences. Finally, we deal with cross-cutting issues. More detail is available in the Technical Report which accompanies this report.

Quotes are provided for illustrative purposes and should be read bearing in mind that they do not represent the totality of the evidence collected.

2 Supporting national and sub-national governments

Where there is an opportunity to implement policy to address climate change but there are barriers to action, and where the UK provides collaborative support that is not prescriptive, then ICF can support policy change by equipping policymakers with the motivation, evidence and capacity to act, and establishing the systems to support action, resulting in the adoption and implementation of new or improved policy to address climate change.

2.1 ICF's approach to supporting change in government policy

In the cases we studied, we found that ICF worked with the grain of national and sub-national policies. ICF did not try to radically alter or reverse policies.

We found that a key characteristic of ICF's approach of supporting policy change is that the support was not prescriptive in nature.

Support for policy change was collaborative and respectful, and ICF treated the government as a partner. ICF did not attempt to impose its own policy agenda or ways of doing things. This collaborative approach which was often characterised by very close working, or even co-location, created a sense of ownership which increased the likelihood of policy change occurring, and the nature of the change being effective and sustainable. This way of working was identified by government officials as a key reason why they enjoyed working with the UK.

“One thing about working with the UK is that they never impose on us; they work with us, together, it is teamwork.”

Officials also said that other donors who were more prescriptive were less successful at securing policy change because they could not secure the widespread support that is necessary for action to be taken.

We did not find evidence of ICF programmes being designed to work together to support policy change; generally, each programme had its own aims for supporting policy change.

The only exception to this was in Colombia where some programmes did work together. This could be a result of the more strategic approach taken there (see section 3.3 below).

Although programmes mostly weren't designed to work together, support for policy change in Colombia and Indonesia was in the context of a long-term collaborative relationship between the partner government or particular ministries and the UK which included multiple programmes running simultaneously. In Colombia, programmes are also supported by a Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI) signed by Germany, Norway and the UK and the Colombian Government, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK and Colombian governments.

2.2 Four conditions required for successful policy change

We found four conditions need to be satisfied for policy change to take place; there must be:

1. Motivation – senior politicians and officials must want the change to happen.
2. Evidence – key individuals must be satisfied there is good reason to change, understand what successful change would look like and how to make that change happen efficiently and effectively.
3. Capacity – capability (knowledge, know-how, skills) and capacity (human and financial resources) must be in place.
4. Supportive systems – external conditions must not be working against the change and supportive systems can increase motivation and capacity for policy change. Relevant systems may differ by policy area but include political, economic, trade, legal, social, and technological systems.

This finding is consistent with formal theory which is discussed in more detail in Appendix 3 of the Inception Report.

These four conditions may be put into place in different ways, at different times and by different organisations or individuals. For example, some conditions will already be in place before ICF involvement. Others can be put in place by international pressure, programmes funded by other donors, by the multilateral funds, by business or by CSOs. Where one or more of these conditions is not fully in place, ICF is able to assist policy change by providing support to help put it in place.

2.3 Levels of supporting policy change

We observed support for policy change working at three levels – strategic, tactical and funding policy implementation.

2.3.1 Supporting policy change strategically

This approach involves ICF trying to support policy change in the partner government's strategy to address climate change. ICF does this by working initially at political and senior official levels within a partner government to create momentum for change. It then moves on to work with officials to secure effective policy change including the development of ambitious objectives, the design of the policy to achieve those objectives, and support for implementation and enforcement. The approach is characterised by promises of support, high-level diplomacy and convening across government at early stages, and by technical assistance and contingent finance at later stages.

This approach was successful in Colombia where ICF was used to support the creation of an overarching JDI, signed by Germany, Norway and the UK, and a MoU between the UK and Colombia was in place.¹¹ These placed obligations on all parties to work together to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and promote sustainable development. The high-level political buy-in for the MoU – including by the President of Colombia who attended the signing – has resulted in increased visibility and credibility of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS). The ministry has been able to leverage the partnership with the UK to engage other institutions and ministries to secure cross-government support for policy change. A government official commented:

¹¹ The JDI and MoU are not linked to any particular programme.

“[...] The fact that we had the partnership gave us the position to talk with the other ministers or the institutions, sometimes before it was very difficult [...]. Because sometimes when they received an invitation for me Ministry of the Environment, they [are] like, ‘OK, I am busy, sorry.’ But when they see UK government they say, ‘okay, okay, it’s important.’ [...] It is the fact the we have UK government endorsement; the UK government accompanying us on this has helped us had the credibility.”

In comparison, in Indonesia there was no such overarching agreement in place which put obligations on relevant line ministries. As a result, ICF’s support to establish a strategy for low-carbon development remained siloed within the Ministry of Planning and was unable to gain cross-government support. ICF’s approach may have had more success if the Low-Carbon Development Initiative for Indonesia (LCDI) had been an inter-ministerial programme, engaging all of the key line ministries to create a joint commitment to low-carbon development from the outset, or if there had been stronger support for action to address climate change from the president.

2.3.2 Supporting policy change tactically

We found that this type of intervention was the most common across all of the country case studies. This approach is characterised by ICF providing specific pieces of support to tackle issues in existing policy, such as improving the strength of policy documents, helping to achieve more effective enforcement of the law, or initiating dialogue to obtain better buy-in from affected groups.

Its purpose is to support existing aims and ambitions of a partner government who has the motivation to act, but lacks the capacity to overcome obstacles to implementation. This was often in the form of technical assistance to increase the knowledge and understanding of government officials, or providing them with the evidence they needed to persuade others of the benefits of action. In other cases, tactical support for policy change was used to build the capacity of civil society to provide information and scrutinise government performance which enabled policymakers to adapt policies to meet the needs of provinces and districts.

In Indonesia, ICF was able to use tactical support for policy change to plug the gaps in the Anti-Corruption Commission’s crackdown on corruption in the mining industry by: i) gathering evidence on the level of tax avoidance to persuade others that regulation should be tightened; ii) funding and training CSOs to monitor compliance of mining companies; and iii) providing technical assistance at a sub-national level to help review existing permits and draft new legislation. This approach was successful because it had the backing of a powerful external actor with clout (the Anti-Corruption Commission) and a high-level champion within the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. ICF’s support increased the confidence of government officials that tightening the regulations was the right thing to do – based on evidence – and increased the capability of sub-national government officials to implement the policy change by improving their technical knowledge of the licensing system.

2.3.3 Financing policy implementation

Finance can be used as part of strategic support for policy change as described in section 2.3.1 above.

We have seen examples of finance being provided for policy implementation outside of a strategic context. In these circumstances government officials already had the motivation to act, and there was strong political will and momentum behind a policy area, but there was a lack of finance to pay for what was needed to effectively implement the policy. ICF paid for the policy-related work, but it was managed by the partner government. In all the cases of financing implementation, we found that if ICF had not paid for the technical assistance then the partner government believed it would have found funding, either itself or from another donor.

These interventions had little or no influence on how a policy is designed or implemented, but the provision of financial support ensures that partner governments have everything they need to implement the policy change which can result in the policy being implemented more effectively, as the examples below explain:

- ICF paid for technical assistance under East Africa Geothermal Technical Assistance Facility (EAGER) because it aligned with the wider objectives of the East Africa Geothermal Energy programme (EA Geo) and enabled faster progress to be made towards policy change and improving the effectiveness of the EA Geo investment.
- Under GET FiT Uganda, the UK funded additional construction of transmission lines, the absence of which were preventing the plants - funded in part by UK money - feeding power to the grid. This appears to be simply bankrolling infrastructure development but it also ensured that the reputation of the GET FiT programme and the Ugandan market, which were both threatened, were maintained.
- In Indonesia, senior government officials within the Ministry of Environment and Forestry knew how they wanted to strengthen the timber legality assurance system and they had existing relationships with expert consultants whom they wanted to do the work, so ICF paid for the consultants but had no input into the design of the new regulations. This ensured that progress continued to be made.
- ICF paid for secretariat support that organised and paid for logistics to ensure key stakeholders from across Indonesia could attend important meetings regarding the implementation of the sustainable timber verification system. This enabled stakeholders to hold the government to account by attending in person and as a result the policy was implemented more effectively.

2.4 Successfully supporting policy change

We identified 11 examples of support for policy change that had led to a successful outcome (we refer to these as ‘policy outcomes’), and an additional six instances where it was too soon to tell whether ICF’s support for policy change would lead on to actual changes in policy, but where progress had been made towards policy change (we refer to these as ‘policy change interim outcomes’).

Table 7 below summarises the policy outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were found to have supported policy change. We also set out the type of intervention, the type of support and the strength of the evidence for that contribution. It is followed by Table 8 which provides a similar summary for interim outcomes.

Table 7: Policy outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions were found to have provided support¹²

	Policy outcome	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	Level of support	Strength of evidence that ICF supported the policy change
Colombia	1. National Development Plan makes commitment to new silvopastoral targets.	SPS	●		Strategic Tactical	Strong
	2. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Policy Document and Law	SPS	●		Strategic Tactical	Some
	3. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Orinoquia region.	Biocarbon Fund	●		Strategic Tactical	Strong
	4. National Development Plan includes new chapter on sustainable plan for Orinoquia region.	Amazon Vision	●		Strategic Tactical	Some
Indonesia	5. Stronger enforcement of the timber legality assurance system	FGMC	●		Tactical Funding	Some
	6. Unlocking of the Reforestation Fund for social forestry	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●		Tactical	Strong
	7. New regulation requiring that all social forestry applications are verified within 22 days.	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●		Funding	Some
	8. Tighter regulations to ensure that mining companies comply with licensing requirements.	SETAPAK (FLAG)	●	●	Tactical	Some
	9. Implementation of ecological fiscal transfer mechanism in two provinces (North Kalimantan and Papua)	SETAPAK (FLAG)		●	Tactical	Strong
Uganda	10. Incorporation of a deemed energy clause into the Ugandan standard Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)	GET FiT	●		Tactical Funding	Strong
	11. Improved regulation of environmental and social standards during renewable energy plant construction	GET FiT	●		Funding	Some

¹² For an explanation of how strength of evidence was established, see Technical Report, section 2.12 ('Credibility and strength of evidence').

Table 8: Interim outcomes in the three country case studies where ICF interventions supported policy change

	Policy outcome	Programme(s)	National	Sub-national	Level of support	Strength of evidence that ICF supported the policy change
Colombia	1. Development of a new green financial mechanism for second-tier banks based on a biodynamic model that incentivises sustainable farming.	SPS Amazon Vision	●		Strategic Tactical	Some
	2. Upcoming policy on sustainable cattle ranching	SPS	●		Strategic Tactical	Some
	3. Increased engagement of the Ministry of Agriculture in sustainability	SPS Amazon Vision BioCarbon Fund	●		Tactical	Strong
Indonesia	4. Ministry of Finance has given a public statement committing to developing a national mechanism that enables national government fiscal transfers to provincial government to reward strong environmental performance.	FLAG	●		Tactical	Strong
	5. The National Strategic Development Plan (2020–24) now contains a chapter on climate change and disaster resilience for the first time. The Plan also includes a macro indicator on emissions reductions.	LCDI	●		Strategic Tactical	Some
Uganda	6. Uganda's draft geothermal policy is complete, and it is now working its way through parliament.	EAGER	●		Strategic Tactical	Some

2.5 Other support for policy change

The payment-by-results mechanism in the ICF REDD Early Movers (REM) programme was intended to incentivise reduced deforestation in Colombia. Initially, the programme did not achieve support for policy change to the degree hoped. A rise of deforestation in the wake of the 2016 peace agreements meant that payments were at first much lower than anticipated. However, it still had some effect on raising ambition and increasing awareness, and it is felt that without it, results may have been worse. Government officials did not disregard the mechanism and the fact that results were needed to unlock the funding may have incentivised them to work harder to fight deforestation. Recent data indicates the trend is reverting and deforestation is decreasing. Targets have since been re-adjusted in the 2019 updated JDI and payment-by-results may have served to raise ambition.

We found two examples where ICF's attempts to support policy change did not result in the desired effect:

In Colombia – the 2050 Calculator, which ICF had intended would help the government set NDCs following the Paris agreement, was not used by MADS or the regional governments. This was because it was not produced until after the NDC formulation work had taken place in the case of MADS, or because the consultancies that regional governments have worked with, had developed their own systems.

In Indonesia – an ICF intervention failed to increase the ambition of the Indonesian government for reducing emissions as part of its 2020–24 National Strategic Development Plan, despite equipping the Ministry of Planning with robust evidence to promote low-carbon development to other ministries. This was because some ministries felt that the structures, capacity and financial resource were not in place to be able to deliver on more ambitious targets, so political will was lacking to get the cross-government support required.

2.6 How ICF works to support policy change

We found 10 approaches to supporting policy change in three country case studies, all of which are specific to particular circumstances. We have grouped these into four broad approaches. We also set out the strength of the evidence for the finding as described in the table below.

Table 9: Definitions of levels of strength of evidence

Strength of evidence	Definition
Convincing	The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition AND the proposition has been tested with different methods including specific and appropriate tests of causality such as process tracing or quantitative methods AND the proposition is consistent with formal theory.
Plausible	The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts, and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition.
Tentative	The proposition is supported by evidence from a smaller number of sources, has only been tested in some contexts, or there is some evidence that undermines the proposition.
No evidence	No evidence found for this combination

2.6.1 ICF creates and corrals evidence to convince people to change policy

Where there is robust, independent evidence from trusted experts, policymakers are convinced that policy change is the right thing to do and opposition is diffused because key stakeholders can see that there are clear benefits to acting and that the policy change will work in practice.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was convincing. We found evidence in six ICF programmes, with some support in four cases and two cases of strong support.

For example, in Indonesia ICF provided a set of data that detailed the amount of non-tax revenue that was lost by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources as a result of mining licences not having tax IDs. Whereas previously it had been difficult for policy change advocates to persuade key government officials that they should tighten mining regulation to benefit the environment, this evidence about the financial implications of poor governance was able to cut through. This helped to diffuse opposition and build widespread support for the tightening of licensing regulations, which have now been introduced by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.

In Uganda, the EAGER programme provided expert technical assistance that increased the understanding of the Geothermal Resources Department (GRD) with regard to how best to utilise geothermal potential within the country. This evidence enabled the GRD to propose a shift from a sole focus on electricity generation to also thinking about direct use as part of the draft geothermal policy in Uganda. The draft policy is now complete and it is now working its way through parliament.

2.6.2 Creating and exploiting opportunities for convincing a critical mass of decision makers to change

We found ICF convening technical meetings, forming networks to bring people with a common interest together, creating diplomatic opportunities, acting as a node and a conduit for knowledge transfer, and identifying and exploiting opportunities to bring together people that ICF wants to convince with people who can convince them. It does this using government officials or through contracted consultants, e.g. through technical assistance. At a high level, it deploys its own staff who use existing diplomatic relationships to persuade senior officials. At a technical level, it might use its own staff or consultants who use their knowledge to convince. We found this working successfully in four ways, each of which is discussed below.

2.6.2.1 ICF creates opportunities for persuasion at high-level diplomatic meetings

Where the UK's view holds weight, diplomatic channels can be used to increase the attention given to climate change by ministers and senior officials and to encourage them to increase the attention given to climate change and support action.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was tentative. We found evidence in three ICF programmes, with some support in two cases but no cases of strong support.

In Colombia, the involvement of the British ambassador was important in securing a high level of engagement, for example when the ambassador's presence at meetings obliged relevant ministers and presidential advisors to attend. This high-level engagement of ministers raised the profile of the Silvopastoral Systems (SPS) programme and helped to engage the Ministry of Agriculture with the programme.

"If you think about it, climate change was not a top priority for [partner government]. When there are these programmes, there is a higher commitment at national level. There are sessions where ministers and vice-ministers are learning about these projects. There are meetings with the UK embassy and German embassy. There was a lot of interaction with the ambassadors of UK, Germany and Norway around the Climate Fund. The meetings to sign the contracts with the ministers' involvement give these topics a higher visibility within the ministry."

In Indonesia, the UK helped to set up a meeting between the DFID Secretary of State and the Indonesian Minister for Planning where the LCDI was discussed. The UK endorsement was used as leverage by the minister back in Indonesia to push the LCDI agenda within the ministry.

2.6.2.2 ICF convenes disparate interests to build shared understanding and common goals

Where implementation is dependent on cooperation between stakeholders who are not aligned or engaged with one other and where ICF is viewed as a credible and neutral party. ICF brings those stakeholders together to build a shared understanding of the benefits of working together to address climate change which increases their capacity to deliver policy change.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was convincing. We found evidence in six ICF programmes, with some support in five cases and one case of strong support.

ICF works to support policy change in this way by convening workshops and meetings, creating a neutral space for stakeholders (government officials, private sector, CSOs, other donors) to exchange views and establish the different roles, responsibilities and ways of working that are required to make the proposed policy change work. In some cases, the UK does the convening itself - through its country offices - and in others this is done by implementing partners or ICF-supported CSOs.

“The ministry has to collaborate and coordinate, and also between different levels of government, the central government to provincial, to [municipality] and so on. And to make this happen, we need [ICF implementing partners] to facilitate this kind of collaboration and communication. Because if we only rely on the government, there will be bureaucracy. So, we hope that by collaborating with [ICF implementing partners] this will make the collaborations between sectors and levels of government to be easier, more communicative.”

In Colombia, the ICF REM Amazon Vision programme helped to convene meetings with a number of different departments and other non-government institutions to devise a collective strategy on how to tackle deforestation.

In Colombia, this convening effect was supported by the high-level support for action on climate change.

2.6.2.3 ICF co-locates expertise to expedite decisions and maintain momentum

Co-location works to support policy change by providing an informal, direct communication channel to expert consultants allowing policymakers to get timely, practical guidance which builds their understanding allowing them to make faster, more effective decisions.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible. We found evidence in three ICF programmes, with some support in two cases and one case of strong support.

This approach is successful where ICF’s technical assistance is dependent on informal interaction and communication between the implementing partner (or consultant) and government officials, but that close way of working is inhibited because the two parties are not in the same location.

In Indonesia, the Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP4) had an office within the Ministry of Environment and Forestry building. Both Indonesian government officials and the ICF implementing partner felt that this improved communication and made it easier for both parties to work together to solve problems when they occurred.

“If there is something important, we can talk, we just come and pop in. If we need something urgently, then it is much easier because we have the knowledge that the people are close to our office.”

2.6.2.4 Being associated with successful ICF-funded programmes creates ‘reflected glory’ which opens doors

Where officials associated with ICF activities are perceived by other stakeholders as having access to resources and support, other stakeholders are willing to involve those officials in policy development because they are seen to have the capacity to deliver.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was tentative. We found evidence in three ICF programmes, with some support in two cases but no case of strong support.

In Colombia, government officials within the MADS felt that the reputation of the department was enhanced by their involvement with ICF programmes. This raised the profile of the work they were doing to the presidential level which meant that they were taken more seriously in their engagement with other ministries.

“It is a very powerful program. So, I think [the President] got into that. And since he saw results in a very difficult time he’s facing now, he’s like this is good. This is good press. We need this now.”

2.6.3 Empowering others to advocate or deliver policy change through capacity building

We found ICF building the capacity of others to support policy change. This involved training (e.g. training of CSOs and government officials) to transfer knowledge and know-how and to build skills:

1. Civil society contributes to policy development.
2. Increased confidence of policy advocates.
3. Increased capability of government officials.

We found this working successfully in three ways which are set out below.

2.6.3.1 Building the capacity of civil society enables it to contribute to policy development

Where CSOs are committed to advocating for climate change issues but lack the funds, skills and/or coordination to do so effectively and where ICF supports CSOs to contribute to policy development, provide information or scrutinise government performance. This can result in improved policymaking because policymakers have a better understanding of community needs and/or evidence on the ground.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible. We found evidence in two ICF programmes, with some support in two cases and one case of strong support.

This approach was particularly effective in Indonesia, where the current presidential administration has made a commitment to openness and transparency, giving civil society a strong voice. The ICF SETAPAK programme coordinated national CSOs and provided training on budget advocacy to its CSO partners in the provinces, enabling them to provide local information and advocate for the repurposing of funds for social forestry to help meet regional targets set by government officials.

“We think that [ICF-supported CSO] as an organisation was an essential part of our policy making and implementing because they have been monitoring the use of the Reforestation Fund in the field, in the local governments. They monitor the [provinces] and they give us input from this monitoring and evaluation process – they give us reports and papers.”

2.6.3.2 ICF works with well-connected CSOs to provide new channels to support stakeholders

Where CSOs are well connected with senior government officials they can provide channels for evidence or advocacy that are not available to ICF directly. By working with those CSOs, ICF can support stakeholders that would otherwise be inaccessible.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible. We found evidence in two ICF programmes, with some support in one case and one case of strong support.

This approach was successful in Indonesia where informal networks play a significant role in interactions between stakeholders. ICF worked through a well-connected partner in one province who leveraged an existing relationship with a senior government official to initiate them into the SETAPAK programme, resulting in the piloting of several new policy initiatives in that province.

“The story is the [senior government official] is my friend. That’s why it is easier in [province] to advocate to the local government. We can create a programme in [province] related to the mining permits, social forestry and the environment and generate some local regulations. The government style is a top down process. If you know the top leader, you can organize, if you don’t know them then it is difficult to advocate.”

2.6.3.3 ICF increases capability of government officials by transferring knowledge

Technical assistance works to increase the capability of government officials to deliver policy change because they have a better understanding of how to design and implement a particular policy.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was convincing. We found evidence in seven ICF programmes, with some support in eight cases and four cases of strong support.

This approach is successful where government officials know what they want to achieve and they are motivated to make policy change, but progress is stalled because they do not know how to achieve it, or they lack some relevant technical information for policy design or implementation, or they are not sure whether their ideas would work.

“It gives us more confidence to do something about the idea, because at the beginning we had the initiative, but we were confused about how to follow it up. And yes, [ICF implementing partner] provided us with technical assistance on how to establish the regulation and we felt more confident.”

In Uganda, the government was already motivated to expand the use of renewable energy, and the policy environment was supportive, with a liberalised electricity market and an independent regulator. The GET FiT programme provided technical assistance to government officials helping them to understand how best to mobilise private investment, resulting in a standardised PPA that was commercially acceptable to developers.

2.6.4 Promising and providing resources to deliver policy change

We found ICF promising and providing financial resources and expert human resources to deliver aspects of policy change which leveraged change.

2.6.4.1 ICF promises support in return for policy change

Where senior government officials want to act but lack the resources to do so, the promise of resources increases their motivation to implement change because they have confidence that they can deliver stakeholder benefits.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible. We found evidence in four ICF programmes, with some support in three cases and one case of strong support.

In Colombia, the JDI is a commitment from the three donors (Germany, Norway, the UK) to support the Colombian government with financial and technical assistance in its ambition to address deforestation. This package of financial support on offer was seen by government officials as a significant driver in gaining the attention of the president who then gave his backing to a number of different policy initiatives to tackle deforestation.

“I think it’s a very strategic platform. And I would say right now with their renewal of the joint declaration, it’s giving us a visibility that we’ve never seen before in Colombia because it’s allowing us to just go straight to the President’s office and talk about issues that we’ve never thought we will be able to get this much attention. So, it’s been really, really useful.”

2.6.4.2 ICF provides financial support to ensure policy delivery

Where partner governments are motivated and have plans for policy change but lack the financial resources to implement them, ICF enables them to be put into effect by paying for activities that are required to deliver them.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible. We found evidence in two ICF programmes, with some support in four cases but no case of strong support.

In Indonesia, senior government officials within the Ministry of Environment and Forestry knew how they wanted to strengthen a policy framework, and they knew which expert consultants they wanted to do the work. ICF simply paid for the consultants.


“We have our strategic plan. And let’s say this area of priority will be funded by us and there is a gap with this area, if you would like to fill this in, please come in.”

2.7 Case studies

A small selection of case study outcomes, one for each country, is included below. More detailed descriptions of the ways in which ICF has supported policy change outcomes are included in the case studies in the Technical Report – chapters 6 (Indonesia), 7 (Colombia) and 8 (Uganda).

Policy outcome: Commitment to new silvopastoral targets in Colombia¹³

ICF’s SPS programme demonstrated the effectiveness and economic benefits of silvopastoral approaches for mitigating climate change within a range of regions and farmer types. This evidence helped to validate existing policy assumptions and provide proof-of-concept for silvopastoral systems as an effective mechanism for reducing deforestation. This evidence gave the National Planning Department the confidence that more ambitious targets could be achieved.



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¹³ This outcome (outcome 1) is discussed in more detail in section 7.3.2 of the Technical Report.

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Policy outcome: Unlocking of funding for social forestry in Indonesia¹⁴

The ICF SETAPAK programme capitalised on the pressure facing the government to meet the President of Indonesia's ambitious social forestry targets by gathering key evidence from the field with regard to underspend of the Reforestation Fund and simultaneous lack of budget allocation for social forestry at a sub-national level. This evidence was presented by national CSOs at key focus group discussions with the Ministry of Finance, giving them the confidence to unlock funding for sub-national governments that could be used to support social forestry.

Policy outcome: Transferring knowledge to create momentum in Uganda's renewable energy sector¹⁵

Although Uganda's renewable energy policy had been in place for four years, the private sector was not investing in the country. ICF provided funding, along with Germany, Norway and the EU, for the ground-breaking GET FiT programme which engaged a number of technical experts to build capacity in the Electricity Regulator Agency, ERA.

A team of international lawyers worked with ERA, the single offtaker UETCL (Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Ltd) and the Office of the Attorney General to provide background about the way private sector investment works, encouraging the government to accept risks it was previously unwilling to accept. Later in the process, ERA officials accompanied engineers from KfW (German state-owned development bank) and Multiconsult as they carried out inspections, boosting their confidence to enforce environmental and social conditions.



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¹⁴ This outcome (outcome 3) is discussed in more detail in section 6.5 of the Technical Report.

¹⁵ This outcome (outcome 1) is discussed in more detail in section 8.3 of the Technical Report.

3 How, in what respects and what circumstances has ICF supported policy change in MDBs and funds?

Where the UK is a significant funder, takes a leadership role or brings relevant expertise it is able to build consensus among MDB and fund stakeholders because they respect the UK's expertise and degree of commitment. The UK has greater leverage over policy when MDBs/multilateral funds are seeking additional funding because stakeholders are keen to secure the UK's investment.

3.1 Successful policy outcomes

We identified two policy outcomes where we found evidence that ICF interventions had supported the outcome as described in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Policy outcomes in the two global case studies where ICF interventions have supported the change

Policy outcome	MDB/ Fund	UK intervention	Strength of evidence that ICF supported the change
Core funding of the second phase of the Evaluation & Learning (E&L) Initiative	CIFs	Funding and championing a demonstration E&L pilot, and using the evidence to persuade stakeholders that it should be continued	Some
Agreement to defer a decision about the sunset clause to a later date	CIFs	Facilitated agreement to defer a decision about the sunset clause to a later date, with a particular recognition that the GCF is the primary multilateral climate fund.	Strong

3.2 Inklings of support for policy change

We identified five instances where it appears that ICF supported change in the policy of the CIFs and the World Bank, but it was out of the scope of the case studies to test the contribution of that support to policy change:

It appears that the transformational change framework developed by the CIF E&L Initiative has now been incorporated into other CIF programmes and is also being used by the GCF.

UK representatives believe that:

- ICF's support for policy change has contributed to the increased ambition of the World Bank with regard to the percentage of International Development Association (IDA) lending that would have climate co-benefits (rising from 28 to 30%) and supporting at least 15 IDA countries (up from 10) to systematically update their climate-related action plans.
- UK support for policy change at the time of the IDA replenishment led to a commitment to include a biodiversity indicator and agreement to roll out a minimum of 10 pilots to work with the poorest countries to protect their biodiversity.
- UK technical input and evidence supported the World Bank guidance document: [Strategic Use of Climate Finance to Maximize Climate Action: A Guiding Framework](#).
- UK diplomatic leverage persuaded other donors to join the Coalition of Ministers for Climate Action and to adopt the six Helsinki principles.

3.3 How ICF works to support changes to global policy

We have identified five ways in which ICF works to support changes to MDB/multilateral fund policy:

1. Financial leverage
2. Coalitions of support
3. UK expertise/support builds confidence
4. Leadership roles within multilateral funds
5. Experience of ICF programmes builds capacity

We also set out the strength of the evidence for each finding as described in Table 11 below.

Table 11: Definitions of levels of strength of evidence

Strength of evidence	Definition
Convincing	The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition AND the proposition has been tested with different methods including specific and appropriate tests of causality such as process tracing or quantitative methods AND the proposition is consistent with formal theory.
Plausible	The proposition is supported by consistent evidence from a substantial number of different sources, has been tested in different contexts, and no evidence has been found that contradicts the proposition.
Tentative	The proposition is supported by evidence from a smaller number of sources, has only been tested in some contexts, or there is some evidence that undermines the proposition.
No evidence	No evidence found for this combination

3.3.1 Financial leverage

The UK uses financial leverage in two ways:

- When the UK offers substantial funding and articulates how it wants to see the money used, other stakeholders support the UK position because they want to maximise funding for the MDB/fund.
- Where the UK is a large donor to a fund, smaller donors who are not committed to a particular position will support the UK's preferred approach because they respect the UK's level of commitment.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible.

This approach was successful in the CIFs where the UK played a major role in building consensus for agreement to defer a decision about the sunset clause to a later date. The UK pledged further financial support for CIF projects which built the confidence of other less committed donors that the UK was highly committed to the continuation of the CIFs. This enabled officials from other donors to persuade their governments that they should back the UK's position.

"I think there's also an important role of being the largest donor, you know, and that's the sort of unwritten rule that, you know, actually people do respect the fact that [you] have been a, you know, a consistent and large scale supporter of the CIF. So, you know, you say, well, there's a certain amount of you know, respect, for that."

3.3.2 Coalitions of support

Coalitions of support between stakeholders motivate less committed stakeholders in an MDB/multilateral fund to support a policy because they can see that key stakeholders are backing it.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was tentative.

During discussions about the CIFs sunset clause, the CIF Administrative Unit obtained a statement signed by ministers from 47 recipient countries arguing for the continuation of the CIFs. This demonstrated to donors that near-term agreement to sunset the CIFs was unlikely given some recipients saw continuing value in the CIF.

This approach was seen by UK representatives to be a successful tactic at the World Bank around the time of IDA replenishments where the UK wanted the World Bank to set more ambitious targets with regard to climate change action. Working with other donor countries who were aligned with their position – such as France, Germany, Canada and the Nordic countries – the UK built a coalition of support to push the World Bank to raise its commitment to the amount of lending that would have climate co-benefits. The World Bank was thought to have been motivated to increase its ambition as the coalition represented a large collective vote share and significant investment.

“I think we feel reasonably content that on many of the things that we were wanting to see more ambition in those policy commitments, I think we can tick the box to most of the things that we were looking for. That's I think an example of where we, in working and in consortium with other key players who were interested in climate, have been able to encourage the bank to be more ambitious than they might otherwise have been.”

3.3.3 UK expertise/input builds confidence

Where the UK provides input and evidence based on specific expertise and careful consideration in support of a policy change, then other stakeholders without that expertise support UK proposals because they are confident that the proposed policy change will work.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible.

Other donors and officials in MDBs and multilateral funds recognise the UK experience in climate change policy, and the time and effort they spend feeding into programmes which gives them confidence that the UK's proposals are evidence based and have a good chance of being successful.

“I mean there would be a dearth of evidence and knowledge on large scale climate programmes without the UK. And you know, and they have a position of credibility anyway because they're one of the largest funders and a founding funder. And so, you know, that sort of double credibility has really, really helped the entire field.”

There are also occasions where the UK has funded specialist input to support policy change. For example, the UK funded the E&L Initiative to enable evidence-based policy development in the CIFs. The CIF Administrative Unit used findings from this initiative to inform discussions about the sunset clause.

“These studies were mentioned over a dozen times by both supporters of the CIFs and detractors, and nearly unanimously governance members talked about how influential and helpful they were in providing the basis for decisions.”

UK representatives at MDBs and multilateral funds are recognised as bringing valuable experience and expertise and, as importantly, having time to contribute that experience and expertise to the institution.

“[...] for some countries, you know, they have one person who attends the board who is also covering six or seven different other funds or has other responsibilities so they don't have the kind of time [...] to really be engaging in the way that [the UK] do in understanding what's going on.”

3.3.4 Leadership

Where UK representatives take leadership roles within multilateral funds and where those individuals have strong leadership skills, they have an opportunity to shape discussions and build consensus to support the UK's position.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was tentative.

The UK's role as co-chair of the joint meeting of the CTF and SCF Trust Fund committees in the CIFs created a platform by which it was visible, opening up greater opportunities to engage with others to present their position and understand the perspectives of others:

“In terms of the way they've managed or fulfilled a role in chairing the meetings, and that just created a platform for getting often countries that would not necessarily say anything [...] to actually express their views on that [...]. So that one could see that this is a position that is shared amongst a much broader not just, you know, one or two countries that tend to be maybe a bit more vocal [...] [which] helped [shape the debate around the sunset clause] in a way.”

Another interviewee observed that the UK had used its role as co-chair at a meeting in Morocco to be vocal in conveying a positive message regarding the CIFs in the presence of the recipient countries. This 'shaped the debate' relating to the sunset clause by forcing countries wanting to apply the sunset clause to justify it to recipient countries.

The UK also uses leadership skills to build consensus for the proposed policy.

“I think the whole process was handled very well in terms of reaching consensus on the wording that would be required for moving forward and the UK played a strong role in that. I think the UK played a strong role, saying okay, let's find a happy medium [...]. So, it was really about just brokering that consensus, brokering that happy medium middle ground.”

3.3.5 Experience builds capability

Where MDB or multilateral fund officials are involved in the delivery of ICF programmes which employ an innovative approach, they gain experience in, and understand the benefits of, the approach, which builds their capability to implement similar approaches.

The strength of evidence for this type of support for policy change was plausible.

The World Bank is the implementing partner for a number of ICF programmes and their experience from these programmes is thought to contribute to their willingness and ability to innovate across the World Bank portfolio. One example of this is the Market Accelerator for Green Construction (MAGC) programme with the IFC which is thought by UK representatives to have supported the World Bank's wider approach to green construction projects and energy efficient building standards.

For the first phase of the CIF E&L Initiative, the UK provided consultants and specialists to work alongside CIF officials. This increased the understanding and capability of officials within the Administrative Unit to manage the second phase of the initiative and mainstream that knowledge into other projects.

“A number of projects [...] and evaluations were taking place, particularly on the transformational change. And then it started to catch attention of [Fund officials]. I think they recognised that some of the lessons coming out of that were important and could also be beneficial in terms of demonstrating some of the value of the CIFs, where there were positive results coming from those evaluations. And so that was starting to be used [by Fund officials].”

World Bank commitment to biodiversity

Towards the end of the International Development Association (IDA) 19 negotiations, as the largest contributor to the IDA replenishment, the UK was able to use its financial leverage to secure a last-minute policy commitment to biodiversity. Although the World Bank did not want to reopen the negotiations, the UK Executive Director’s office managed a policy paper on biodiversity and got a number of other chairs to sign up to it, building a coalition of support to put the World Bank under pressure to commit to the policy.

The UK pushed hard for a biodiversity event to be held at the annual meeting of the World Bank in October 2019 and was able to secure it as a keynote event. The Secretary of State for International Development attended and was the most senior government representative on the panel. By deploying a senior minister, the UK was able to raise both the profile of the event and the policy issue across the World Bank, demonstrating the UK’s high-level commitment and the priority that HMG was placing on biodiversity as part of IDA 19.

The decision to push on biodiversity was also driven by the notion that the United States – the largest shareholder and most powerful lobbying voice at the World Bank – was thought to be more receptive to a commitment on biodiversity than other more politically sensitive climate change issues. The strength and the momentum of the coalition was such that the UK was able to get the United States on board.

To add strength to the coalition of chairs, the UK also approached potential recipients of World Bank funding who would benefit – e.g. biodiversity loss in small island states – to get them on board. The UK was therefore able to demonstrate that the push on biodiversity was not only a donor initiative but also demand-led, with a list of countries who would greatly benefit from the new policy.

As part of the IDA 19 replenishment, the World Bank made a commitment for the first time to include a biodiversity indicator, agreeing to roll out a minimum of 10 pilots to work with the poorest countries to protect their biodiversity.

3.4 Less successful and unsuccessful support for policy change

Because the UK has a strong interest in the CIFs, it was very active in championing the establishment of CTF 2.0 which proposed using the expected repayments from the loan portfolio (reflows) to raise capital on the capital/investor market. The UK representatives attempted to build a consensus with other donors and persuade them to back the implementation. The UK also attempted to advance its agenda by providing expert technical assistance to the CIF Administrative Unit to help design how the proposed CTF 2.0 would operate.

Although the technical proposal played a role in convincing some countries, it was unsuccessful because the UK was unable to convince others who came to negotiations with alternative political positions. As consensus could not be reached, the CTF 2.0 policy proposal could not proceed and has been put on hold, with the option to revisit it again in the future.

3.5 Other contributing factors

The political priority given to climate by the UK government – that reflects both changing ministers and the changing public discourse around the scale of the climate change challenge and the importance of action – has resulted in climate now becoming a top priority for the UK when engaging with the World Bank. With the commitment to net zero, the upcoming hosting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP26) and the announcement that its climate finance will be doubled over the next five years, between 2021–22 to 2025–26, UK representatives believe that the UK has taken on a credible leadership role among donor countries.

We understand that DFID works to convene departments within HMG to build a shared understanding around which priorities government officials should be pushing in their interactions with the World Bank, using regular meetings with senior staff in DFID, BEIS, Defra, Treasury, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and International Trade as a means to ensure that there is a clear coordination and agreement of what the UK is seeking on climate.

Close communication between the UK World Bank Executive Director's office and the Treasury played a key role in ensuring that the UK effectively lobbies from different angles including bilateral meetings between finance ministers and their advisors, as well as deploying the UK Chancellor to attend and speak at key meetings in Washington. By reinforcing the UK's position as a champion of the Helsinki principles, diplomatic leverage was used to get member countries, who were considering joining, over the line.

“We lobby in some of our bilateral meetings with finance ministers from their countries and we would press their advisors across the chairs and say, how important it is for the UK, how transformational we think it could be.”

In addition to ICF's support for policy change, there are a number of other factors that are also operating to influence global policy change. The international gaze and global pressure on MDBs and multilateral funds, as well as donors and recipient countries, to be seen to be increasing ambition on climate action plays a key role in the MDBs and multilateral funds setting their own climate change targets. In many cases, there is a top-down push from senior management within the MDB or multilateral fund to focus more on climate change, which means that officials are motivated to take climate considerations into account when designing and implementing new policy.

4 Influencing other donors

The UK influences the positions of other donors in four main ways: i) by deploying specialists to generate robust evidence which justifies and rationally advocates the UK's position; ii) by taking up formal roles that enable it to move things forward and steer debate; iii) by putting skilled and experienced individuals into key roles where their behaviour command respect and followership; iv) and by building on the credibility that the UK has in this field, putting its money and human resources behind its public commitments. Occasionally, overuse or inappropriate deployment of these strengths can obstruct the UK's ability to influence.

4.1 Introduction

ICF works alongside other donors at global, national and sub-national levels, through multilateral funds, joint programmes, and global, national and local initiatives. It works in concert with many different donors, but has a special relationship with Germany and Norway on climate finance to tackle deforestation (i.e. the GNU partnership). Working with other donors can help the UK achieve its objectives in a more efficient and effective way by pooling finances to generate more clout, and playing to each party's strengths in supporting change in national and sub-national policy. As part of this collaborative working, the UK must influence other donors' positions in relation to multilateral decisions and joint programmes of work.

This aspect of the evaluation was deprioritised early in the evaluation, and as a result we have only interview evidence with government officials, covering just eight of the donor countries, most of whom work closely with the UK. Respondents were recommended by HMG officials. Conclusions should therefore be considered tentative.

4.2 Characteristics of the UK's approach that enhance its ability to influence

The UK is perceived to be willing to collaborate, to commit money and senior people to a collaboration, to be a reliable partner who is easy to work with, and to make the compromises collaboration requires. This works where goals, values and ways of working are broadly aligned, because other donors see the relationship as positive, productive and synergistic (achieving more than the sum of the parts).

The Germany-Norway-UK (GNU) collaboration is considered to be a successful example of inter-donor collaboration by all donors who spoke about it. Public positions taken by the three countries on forests and land-use issues are discussed and negotiated to achieve a common position, with each donor trying to influence the other and compromises being made.

"[...] We have to make compromises. And sometimes it's not ideal for one country, and sometimes it's not ideal for any country really [...]. It's a big part of the working level dialogue and also at directors' level to try and influence each other [...]."

Colombia was mentioned unprompted by a number of donors as a good example of effective collaboration where the respective GNU embassies are working together, deploying their unique strengths, for maximum impact on national policies and their implementation, including at presidential level.

A number of donors talked about the way common values, priorities and approaches to policy made the relationship an easy one; any differences could be discussed and negotiated. Several mentioned the UK's language advantage.

“[...] We think of it very similarly, where performance is important, safeguards are important [...]. So, I think we're coming from a similar place. [...] All of that makes it a very easy relationship to maintain.”

The UK is perceived to be credible – it has a high level of ambition which it supports with energy, money and human resources. Furthermore, other donors believe that the UK's position is based on careful thought and strong analysis. This works where the UK has been clear about its position and the other donor does not have a strong position; they are more likely to follow the UK's lead because they trust the UK has not come to a position lightly, and they know the UK has a real stake in the outcome of the decision.

Many donors talked about the UK's strength in carrying out thorough background work and being well prepared for decisions.

“[...] They are really good in bringing forward analysis, for example if they want to unblock something [...]. I mean they are really good in coming up with papers, a paper that analyses price scenarios and so on and so forth. So, they nurture discussions with analytical work, which is great.”

Many mentioned the UK's ability to use its technical staff appropriately and its willingness to share its analytical work. Some donors said it made it easier to convince their own directors and politicians about positions if they could state and explain the UK's position. Knowing the UK had put its expert resource into analysis meant the UK's position was respected as being evidence-based rather than politically driven.

There is a widespread perception amongst other donors that the DFID and BEIS have more staff working in climate finance than other countries. There is some professional envy of this perceived position as well as a willingness to capitalise on it as an input to decision making. This is a very valuable tool in the UK's toolbox that other countries simply don't have access to. As one donor put it:

“I will say that I feel - and I don't say this proudly - I think [...] [my country] and some of the other donors have kind of ridden on the coattails of the efforts and the resourcing that the UK has put into it. So, very much appreciated in that respect.”

The UK is regarded as showing strong and effective leadership, as a country and also at an individual level – officials are often very experienced, they take the time to reach out to other donors to understand their position and explain their own, to lead the process of getting others on board with a position; also, the UK often declares its position before others. This works because officials from other countries are clear about the background to decisions and the basis of the UK's position.

Some of these UK officials are very experienced in their international roles; they were praised for paying attention to interpersonal aspects of international diplomacy, including their efforts to bring newcomers up to speed, and spending time with other donors outside formal meetings.

“This year the meetings we had [...] were the first that I had participated in. And [individual] and [individual] were very helpful and collegial and constructive in pointing out some of the things that were going on that had history that wasn't particularly clear, and that was very beneficial to me professionally.”

An additional aspect of leadership is that the DFID and BEIS personnel are regarded as technically extremely competent and skilled at diplomacy, communication, interpersonal relations and negotiation. This works because processes are effectively managed and directed by people whom the other donors respect as leaders, not only by virtue of their formal role, but also by their behaviour. They come across as very knowledgeable, engaged with the process, committed to an outcome, willing to put in the time, and cognisant of the needs of others, both personally and organisationally.

Although one donor said that leadership didn't depend on particular individuals but on a clear and consistent line coming from director level, most thought it had a lot to do with particular individuals. One donor commented:

"[...] when [individual] speaks, people listen. But [individual] is very upfront here, so in truth I think it's because everyone has learned to respect [individual]. [Individual] takes a real champion role, as you suggested. And so, yeah, you're right. Is it the UK as a sort of abstract body there? Or is it the individuals? And I would have to say it's the individuals."

4.3 Characteristics of the UK's approach that obstruct its ability to influence

In the view of some donors, the UK can sometimes come across too strongly in its position, which compromises a group's ability to come to a common view. Although most of the time, this is viewed as a positive attribute and characterised as strong leadership, a couple of donors mentioned this could 'flip' into a negative characteristic which works against influencing:

"[...] in one situation when they did not agree with a project, their strongness of taking a position made it difficult – and also atmospherically difficult – to come to a solution."

The UK's reliance on evidence and analysis, while predominantly regarded as a strength and a means of influencing, can also from time to time 'flip' and become a negative. One interviewee mentioned the time it takes to produce business cases, and HMG's consequent reluctance to revisit assumptions once they have been produced.


The UK's approach is characterised as humble and unboastful, focussing on getting the outcome rather than overly concerned about who did what. This is typically regarded as a good thing in terms of influence at a global level. However, at a national level, kudos can sometimes result from being associated with a successful programme, and the UK may be missing valuable opportunities to influence if other donors are getting all the credit for jointly funded programmes. GET FiT Uganda is a good example of this: it is widely regarded as a German programme, despite the fact that the UK made by far the biggest financial contribution.

5 Interactions between global, national and sub-national support for policy change

We found evidence of four types of interactions between ICF's support for policy change at global, national and sub-national levels.

These interactions, shown in Figure 1, supported ICF's work to support policy change at a national and sub-national level, proving policymakers with the motivation, the evidence to justify action and the capacity to act.

Figure 1: Interaction between global, national and sub-national support for policy change.



5.1 Interactions between global and national policy

Countries are subject to pressure through the international climate change negotiations, and the UK has attempted to support increased ambition of countries' NDCs. However, our case studies did not include any examples where this had been successful. In Colombia, the timing of the 2050 Calculator programme meant that it came too late to be used by government officials in the formulation of NDC commitments in response to the 2015 Paris agreement.

Global policy influences national policy in the context of the international gaze putting pressure on national governments who want to be seen to be taking action to address climate change. The UK is able to add weight to this global pressure by positioning itself as a firm advocate for the increased collective ambition of countries to take action, and ICF provides support to global programmes that promote and support action. As national governments want to protect their international reputation, the pressure at a global level provides them with the motivation to commit to climate change action at a national level.

5.2 National to sub-national support for policy change

This works in countries where there are a diverse range of regions that cannot be treated in the same way with regard to climate change, but national policymakers lack the evidence they need to be able to come up, with individual strategies for each region. By providing support to gather data and key information from those different regions, ICF ensures that policymakers have an increased understanding of what needs to be done and what strategy will work in each region. This evidence is used by policymakers to design policy that responds to the individual needs of different regions.

For example, the ICF Amazon Vision programme works with the Colombian government to gather extensive data on deforestation. This evidence is then used by national government officials to design policy which is better suited to the individual provinces. The data was used to inform the NDP which had two separate chapters detailing the government's approach to addressing deforestation in the Amazonia and Orinoquía regions respectively.

5.3 Sub-national to national support for policy change

This works in countries where the implementation of national policy is dependent on regulation being put in place at a sub-national level. By providing support to sub-national governments to help implement new regulation at a sub-national level, ICF enables existing national policy to function in the way that it was intended. Where national policymakers lack evidence about whether or not a particular policy will work at a sub-national level, ICF can supply that evidence by running demonstration projects that pilot the policy change. This evidence gives national policymakers confidence that the new policy will work.

For example, when advocating for the new EFT policy in Indonesia, ICF found it difficult to engage with national government – especially the Ministry of Finance – as the policy was in the concept stage and there was no evidence to back up their thinking. In response, the ICF SETAPAK programme adopted a new approach which they called 'Developing from Peripheries'. ICF went to several provinces to pilot EFT to put in place the provincial and district fiscal transfer mechanisms, including drafting best practise regulation which was passed into legislation by local governments in North Kalimantan and Papua.

5.4 Sub-national to sub-national support for policy change

This works in countries where there is regional autonomy and local government officials have the power to implement policies within their own provinces. Evidence from a demonstration project in one province gives local government officials confidence that the same policy will work in their province. They can then either implement the policy as it is or adapt as they see fit.

For example, the SETAPAK programme in Indonesia piloted a new EFT mechanism in North Kalimantan and Papua to reward government officials for strong environmental performance. Following the success of the pilot, ICF invited stakeholders from all over Indonesia – including five district heads and local government officials from over 25 sub-national governments – to a national event in Jakarta to present the new policy. The event was followed by regional workshops where sub-national government officials had the opportunity to develop the EFT indicator for their own provinces. Six sub-national governments have now committed to the adoption of the policy, and three more have requested ICF's assistance to help with implementation.

6 Transformational change

Where there is political will across relevant ministries and sustained attention on climate change, ICF can support transformational change by ensuring there is an effective policy framework in place. This has been seen in the forest and land-use sector in Colombia. However, transformation has not been achieved in Indonesia because of a lack of political will. Renewable energy in Uganda has suffered a lack of sustained attention.

6.1 Introduction

ICF's key performance indicator (KPI) definition paper states:

“Transformational change is complicated and multifaceted. At its core it is change which catalyses further changes, enabling either a shift from one state to another (e.g. from conventional to lower carbon or more climate-resilient patterns of development) or faster change (e.g. speeding progress on cutting the rate of deforestation). However, it entails a range of simultaneous transformations to political power, social relations, markets and technology.”¹⁶

In analysing transformational change, we have made use of the KPI15 criteria and the recent evaluation work for the CIF which proposes four dimensions of change which together lead to transformational change:

- Change that's systemic
- Change that's sustainable
- Change that happens at scale and
- Change that is relevant to low-carbon climate-resilient development.

We also draw from recent work for the CIFs that considers signals of change – early, interim and advanced.¹⁷ More information on the approach and also the detailed outcomes for each case study is provided in section 14 ('Transformational change') of the Technical Report.

6.2 Evidence of transformational change in Colombia's approach to forestry and land use

ICF has contributed to the progress towards transformational change in Colombia's approach to tackling deforestation.

Interest and intervention from the President of Colombia catalysed activity across regional and local government and with enforcement agencies. ICF contributed to this by working at diplomatic level to help engage a critical mass of actors in a political discourse where previously, there had only been a technical discourse. This injection of political will changed the situation entirely, enabling the inclusion of legally binding targets in the NDP, based on evidence which ICF helped create. At the same time, the military has been given targets to enforce the law. The target of increasing gross domestic product (GDP) from forest products contained in the NDP and which will subsequently become law, is expected to drive changes in the way Colombia's forestry resource is used by incentivising a wide range of sustainable commercial activities related to both timber and non-timber products. Up until now, the focus has been on reducing the pressure of cattle ranching on deforestation by promoting SPS. The GDP target on forest products aims to shift the focus away from cattle ranching to the sustainable management of forests more generally.

¹⁶ ICF KPI 15: *Extent to which ICF intervention is likely to have a transformational impact* (p. 1).

¹⁷ CIF and Itad (2020) *Signals of Transformational Change: Insights from the evaluation of transformational change in the climate investment funds*.

6.3 Evidence of transformation in Indonesia's approach to forestry and land use

In Indonesia, we saw some early indications of the potential for transformational change. The increased capacity of junior government officials - with the support of CSOs - to monitor compliance within the mining industry and the process of social forestry applications, has made policy implementation in those areas work more effectively. The EFT policy, enabling government officials to incentivise strong environmental performance at provincial and district levels, has also had an effect, with the Ministry of Finance committing to adopting a similar mechanism at the national level.

We did not, however, see the same strength of political will as in Colombia, nor the rolling-out of innovation at scale, although unlocking funding for social forestry may help Indonesia meet future targets.

6.4 Evidence of transformation in low-carbon development in Indonesia

Our investigation of low-carbon development in Indonesia was more limited in scope than our investigation of forestry and land-use policy. This was because we had a limited number of interviews to allocate to the policy area, which was in any case large in scope. From the evidence we collected, there is no evidence of transformational change having occurred, just some quite limited early signals across some of the KPI criteria but not others.

Although there was strong political will from the Ministry of Planning will to incorporate LCDI into future planning, this was already in place prior to ICF support. This political will was not shared by other key line ministries creating a barrier to transformational change. There was limited evidence of increased capacity of government officials to generate evidence related to climate change indicators that may inform future planning.

6.5 Evidence of transformation in renewable energy generation in Uganda

There is some indication of the potential for transformational change in the Ugandan renewable energy sector as a result of ICF's support for policy change. There are early and interim signals across many of the criteria, but our analysis suggests that critical mass has not been achieved and is now unlikely to happen due to the reversal of the deemed energy clause within the PPA. Although GET FiT undoubtedly encouraged independent power producers to invest in the country and helped create much-needed additional renewable energy generation capacity in the country, the main contributors to meeting Uganda's electricity-to-grid needs have been the two Chinese-funded hydropower plants. It remains to be seen whether investment in smaller plant continues.

6.6 Evidence of transformation in the way global institutions think about evaluation and learning

There are interim signals that ICF's work with the CIFs on evaluation and learning may lead to transformational change in the way global institutions work. Changes that we have not been able to verify include reported culture change amongst CIF representatives regarding how the E&L Initiative should be conducted within the CIFs, and a report that these changes are also being considered by other global funds and institutions.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 How, in what respects and in what circumstances has ICF supported change in national and sub-national policy?

Our key conclusions were:

1. A small proportion of ICF programmes are explicitly designed to support national and sub-national government policy change; other ICF programmes and multilateral programmes may also influence policy.
2. Programmes often work together in supporting policy change. However, this is rarely coordinated.

Recommendation 1

A senior official should take responsibility for coordinating all the policy support work in a country including support delivered through bilateral and multilateral programmes and other aspects of the relationship with partner governments. Their aim should be to ensure that all ICF activity informs and supports the desired policy change. The official could be based in the UK, regionally or in the country concerned.

ICF support for policy change should continue to be provided by a combination of bilateral and multilateral programmes and direct government-to-government engagement. It should be coordinated with support from other donors wherever possible.

The official responsible for policy support should recognise that programmes that do not have an explicit aim to support policy change can also have potential to contribute to policy change outcomes.

3. ICF's approach of working with the grain, in a collaborative, non-prescriptive style, to support policy change in partner countries creates a sense of ownership by partner governments which increases the likelihood of both policy change occurring and of that policy change being effective and sustainable. ICF is widely regarded as a good partner to work with.
4. ICF works to support policy change at three levels strategic, tactical and financing policy implementation. All three levels are necessary for successful policy change. However, ICF does not appear to choose a holistic approach, and there is a tendency to favour tactical and financing interventions rather than strategic ones.

Recommendation 2

ICF should maintain its collaborative approach to supporting policy change through its bilateral programmes and other relationships with partner governments.

It should consider the combination of approaches that will be most effective in supporting the desired policy change noting that strategic, tactical and financial support are all valuable and that:

- Strategic interventions are likely to be needed to achieve transformational change.
- Finance to support policy implementation will make a greater contribution to policy change when delivered in combination with strategic and tactical interventions. However, financial support alone can strengthen relationships and facilitate subsequent strategic and tactical interventions.

5. Motivation, evidence, capacity and supportive systems need to be in place for policy change to occur. These are not solely within ICF's control, but may be supported by ICF.
6. ICF tended to capitalise on its widely acknowledged strengths in generating evidence and building capacity, and put less emphasis on creating motivation and supportive systems.
7. In some cases, ICF theories of change identify policy change as an intended outcome for a programme but have not articulated clearly how that will be secured and the critical elements in delivering that outcome.
8. We identified four types of intervention that work in different ways in different circumstances to support policy change in national and sub-national governments. These are:
 - Creating and corraling evidence to convince people to change policy.
 - Creating and exploiting opportunities to convince a critical mass of decision makers to change.
 - Empowering others to advocate or deliver policy change through capacity building.
 - Promising and providing resources to deliver policy change.
9. The use of local, knowledgeable, experienced and well-networked staff can be a key factor in supporting transformational change in the right circumstances. We are aware that ICF is already considering how this approach can be used in more countries.

Recommendation 3

Wherever possible, ICF theories of change for bilateral programmes should clearly identify what conditions are necessary to secure policy change and how specific interventions intend to support those conditions.

The design of interventions to support policy change should reflect the specific circumstances in which different interventions can be expected to work. The teams designing programmes to support policy change in a specific country should use the findings about what interventions work in what circumstances (detailed in section 5 of the Technical Report) to inform decisions about what support is provided, to whom and how.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

7.2 How, in what respects and in what circumstances has ICF supported policy change for global institutions?

Our key conclusions were:

1. We found that ICF works effectively to support policy within the CIFs and the World Bank.
2. The UK's partnership with Germany and Norway (GNU) on policy relating to forestry and reducing carbon emissions from deforestation is seen as particularly effective by other donors and supports cooperation in areas outside the formal agreement.

Recommendation 4

ICF should consider whether there is scope to extend the GNU partnership to other recipient countries and policy areas, and whether it could be replicated with other donor partners.

3. We identified five types of intervention that work in different ways in different circumstances to support policy change in global institutions. These are:
 - Using financial leverage.
 - Building coalitions of support to create momentum.
 - Drawing on UK expertise to create confidence.
 - Leadership to shape discussions and build consensus.
 - Building the capability of the institution's officials.

Recommendation 5

ICF officials responsible for the relationship with global institutions should use the findings about what interventions work in what circumstances (detailed in section 9 of the Technical Report) to inform their approach to supporting policy change within those institutions.

7.3 ICF's influence on other donors

Our key conclusions were:

1. ICF is recognised by other donors as a strong and effective leader with a significant financial and policy stake in outcomes. The UK is particularly valued for the competence of its staff and the careful thought and strong analysis they bring to discussions.
2. ICF has particularly strong credentials in monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL), an area that is perceived by other donors to be difficult to solve. Its leadership on this issue within the context of the CIFs seems to have been especially valued and effective.

Recommendation 6

The UK should build on its reputation for expertise in MEL to support the global effort to address climate change. ICF should develop a deliberate strategy to communicate this expertise across the donor community and encourage multilateral bodies to develop MEL strategies for their work, including ambitious but realistic plans for their dissemination.

7.4 Interactions between global, national and sub-national policies

Our key conclusions were:

1. We found supportive interactions between support for policy change at different levels of government and no obstructive interactions.
 - Support at a global level can inform work at national level by creating motivation to change national policy.
 - Work at a national level can support policy change at sub-national level, by helping national governments understand regional needs and priorities which can be used by policymakers to design policy that works for regions.
 - Work at a sub-national level can support national policy; for example, by helping to implement national regulations at the sub-national level or by local demonstration projects demonstrating what might work at a national level.

Recommendation 7

Programme teams delivering support for policy change should consider the level at which bilateral interventions can most effectively support change and align their work with activities at global, national and sub-national levels.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

7.5 How, in what respects, and in what circumstances is ICF's support for policy change supporting transformational change?

Our key conclusions were:

1. Policy change is a key component of transformational change. However, for it to be truly transformational a critical mass of changes (as set out in ICF's KPI15) needs to be in place.
2. We saw evidence of that critical mass being reached in Colombia and a strong likelihood that the change observed in the country's approach to forestry and land-use policy at both national and regional levels would be transformational.
3. The president's role in driving change in Colombia was crucial and was due, in part, to ICF's role in convening stakeholders and using diplomacy to secure commitment to change.

Recommendation 8

ICF should continue to use strategic interventions to build political will for transformational change. Programme teams delivering support for policy change should identify whether all the conditions for transformation are in place and, where they are not, identify opportunities for further interventions to support transformational change.

Where there is an official responsible for support for policy change in a country (see recommendation 1), they should coordinate this activity.

7.6 Other factors supporting policy change

Our key conclusion was:

1. Two strategies were seen to mitigate obstructions to policy change:
 - Working with local CSOs to ensure support for policy change is aligned with local issues and concerns.
 - Working effectively at different levels of government to support the alignment of policies.

7.7 Monitoring and evaluating support for policy change

Our key conclusion was:

1. Monitoring and evaluation activities are conducted by individual programmes. However, policy change may be the result of multiple programmes and is likely to occur after a programme is complete. Consequently, the effectiveness of ICF interventions to support policy change is not being systematically monitored and evaluated.

Recommendation 9

HMG should monitor progress towards global, national and sub-national policy change, evaluating the role of all aspects of ICF support in delivering that policy change and identifying learning that will enable faster and/or more effective policy change.

Monitoring and evaluation of support for policy change should be conducted at the level of the institution, nation or sub-nation rather than individual programmes, and time should be allowed for the results of interventions to become apparent.

7 Abbreviations

BEIS	Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy
CIF	Climate Investment Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTF	Clean Technology Fund
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DFID	Department for International Development
E&L	Evaluation and Learning (Initiative)
EAGER	East Africa Geothermal Technical Assistance Facility
EFT	Ecological Fiscal Transfer
ESG	Evaluation Steering Group
FLAG	Forestry, Land-use and Governance in Indonesia
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GET FiT	Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariff (programme)
GNU	Germany-Norway-UK (collaboration on deforestation climate finance)
GRD	Geothermal Resources Department (Uganda)
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
ICF	International Climate Finance
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank Group)
JDI	Joint Declaration of Intent (between Colombia and the GNU countries)
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LCDI	Low-Carbon Development Initiative for Indonesia
MADS	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Colombia)
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (between Colombia and the UK)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDP	National Development Plan
PES	Payment for Environmental Services
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
REM	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Early Movers
SETAPAK	Improving Forestry, Land Use and Governance in Indonesia (programme)
SPS	Silvopastoral System
UK	United Kingdom

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Department for International Development (DFID), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) nor any of the individuals and organisations referred to in the report.

Statement of independence

The evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference. There were no conflicts of interest between evaluators and programme implementation. Information sources and their contributions were independent of other parties with an interest in the evaluation.