

# Portfolio Evaluation 1 – Integration of ICF

Final technical annex

7 December 2018

CLIMATE CHANGE | HM Government
COMPASS
BETTER CLIMATE FINANCE IMPACTS

# Portfolio Evaluation 1 – Integration of ICF
Final Technical Annex
7 December 2018

Charles Michaelis
Alison Radevsky
Alexina Jackson
David Wellington

Reviewed by:
Gill Westhorp
Graham Haylor
Sam McPherson

# Contents

**List of acronyms**

BEIS Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy

CLP Chars Livelihoods Programme

CMO Context Mechanism Outcome

Defra Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

DFID Department for International Development

ESG Evaluation Steering Group

GHG Greenhouse Gas

HMG Her Majesty's Government

ICF International Climate Finance

KPI Key Performance Indicator

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

ODA Official Development Assistance

QAU Quality Assurance Unit

PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme

PSSN Productive Social Safety Net Programme

SRO Senior Responsible Officer

SWC Soil and Water Conservation

TA Technical Assistance

UKCIF UK Caribbean Investment Fund

WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

# 1 Background

The UK's International Climate Finance (ICF) is managed jointly by the Department for International Development (DFID), Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). The UK invests in over 50 developing countries, working through diverse channels from private equity funds to small NGO grants. In 2015, the UK committed to spend at least £5.8bn of ICF over the following 5 years (2016-2021). ICF aims to:

- Change facts on the ground, delivering results that demonstrate that low-carbon, climate-resilient development is feasible and desirable.
- Improve the international climate architecture and finance system to increase the scale, efficiency and value for money of climate spend.
- Test out new approaches to delivering climate finance that have the potential to achieve bigger and better results in the future.

UK ICF now has a portfolio of over 300 current and completed programmes with global reach working through private sector, multilateral and bilateral channels. HMG aims to achieve a balance in ICF funding with 50% spent on mitigation and 50% on adaptation.

In 2014/15 the DFID ICF portfolio consisted largely of standalone climate finance programmes, similar to BEIS' and Defra's ICF portfolio. Since then, DFID has increasingly integrated climate finance into its wider development activities. Integrated programmes aim to deliver climate outcomes alongside wider development impacts, e.g. by making new infrastructure more resilient to changes in climate. This builds on previous efforts to mainstream[1] climate and environment risks and opportunities into DFID's broader portfolio.

## 1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation is to enable the UK government and other donors and partners to learn about the effectiveness of integration across DFID to date in achieving the UK's international objectives on climate change and driving wider transformational change – both within programming environments and within DFID and its portfolio. The lessons learned from this evaluation can help improve future UK climate finance policies and programmes, and potentially influence the integration approaches of other major international partners including other large bilateral donors and the Multilateral Development Banks. In addition, there is a more general interest in understanding how these lessons could be applied to development and planning more broadly.

The principal audience for this technical annex is evaluation specialists and others with a technical interest.

## 1.2 Integration of ICF

The approach to integration of ICF into DFID programmes has evolved over time.

---

[1] Clarification of terminology:

- 'Mainstreaming' as used here refers to awareness-raising of environmental trends and potential impacts (including by/on climate change) and the resultant behaviour change across a broadening sphere of activity to take advantage of related opportunities and to address related risks.
- 'Integration' refers specifically to the allocation of climate finance within programming which counts climate benefits as 'significant' rather than 'primary' objectives (please see ICF Integration Theory of Change).

- Integrated programmes approved prior to April 2015 fall into two categories:
  - Some programmes had applied for funding from what was then the International Climate Fund using a system of concept notes.
  - Others were categorised as ICF retrospectively (after the programme was approved) and so the integration of ICF came after the programme had been designed.
- Programmes approved between April 2015 and March 2016 were mostly designed with integrated ICF but did not use the Climate and Environment Smart Guide which was not introduced until April 2016.

DFID has a ring-fenced ICF allocation within its overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocation for the current Spending Review period. This ring-fenced ICF funding is not held centrally but is included in the overall budget allocations of departments and country offices on the understanding that programmes that they design and manage would include climate change activity of sufficient scale to deliver the DFID commitment. Progress against the cumulative total is monitored centrally.

Integration of ICF can result in additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes when adaptation and/or mitigation impacts result from the consideration of climate risks and opportunities during the process of integrating ICF in the programme design, which would not have been achieved had ICF not been integrated.

Where integrated programmes have been designed to deliver climate benefits but these would have been mainstreamed into the programme regardless of the integration of ICF then those benefits have not been considered to be additional.

Programmes without integrated ICF may have been designed to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes; these programmes may have used a different definition of additionality from the definition used in this evaluation.

SROs / programme managers seeking to allocate funding to address climate change risks and opportunities have to secure that funding from within the overall budget for their department or country office.

Programmes with integrated ICF approved since late 2017 were required to use the Climate and Environment Smart Guide which requires programmes to capture the planned climate benefits in the logframe. Progress against indicators in logframes are then assessed as part of the Annual Review along with recommendations for follow-up action and an analysis of learning. This gives the planned climate indicators a high level of visibility and helps to ensure that the intended outcomes are delivered.

Programmes with integrated ICF have been expected to report against at least one of the ICF KPIs. These are submitted annually to the ICF secretariat using an online system.

## 1.3 DFID processes

The process of designing a programme is led by a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). The SRO is responsible for the overall quality of the Business Case and needs to be satisfied that the Business Case sufficiently and proportionately sets out the case for a programme, justifies the commitment of funds and explains the key decision points and delivery milestones. The SRO is responsible for ensuring that DFID's Smart Rules[2] are complied with.

The responsibilities of key individuals and the approvals processes are set out in DFID's Smart Rules. According to the Smart Rules; Business Cases are subject to different approval processes depending on their value:

- Up to £5m approval is by the head of department or office
- Between £5m and £40m approval is by the relevant minister
- Between £40m and £100m approval is by the Secretary of State
- Business Cases over £100m are approved by HM Treasury.

Business Cases over £40m are reviewed by the Quality Assurance Unit (QAU)

The head of department or office is responsible for the portfolio within their remit and should formally approve all Business Cases that need to be submitted to the QAU and/or ministers.

# 2 Introduction to the evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to enable the UK government and other donors and partners to learn about the effectiveness of integration across DFID to date in achieving the UK's international objectives on climate change and potential to drive wider transformational change – both within programming environments and within DFID and its portfolio.

The overarching evaluation question is:

*"In what circumstances and how has climate finance integration supported progress towards transformational change within the wider DFID portfolio, and towards more effective delivery of climate change outcomes than would have been achieved without integration? What can we learn from these different examples of integration to improve the approach taken in delivery of International Climate Finance more broadly?"*

This over-arching question has been addressed through five evaluation questions; these are based on an initial set of questions that was prepared by the ESG. Each question is followed by sub-questions that were explored, where relevant, to build a deeper understanding of the issues involved.

1. How, and in what circumstances, has ICF been integrated into DFID programmes? Are there any patterns or outliers?
    a. What types of DFID programmes have integrated climate finance, and what does this integration look like?
    b. Is the sectoral breakdown of the integrated portfolio reflective of the wider DFID portfolio, what are the differences, why?
    c. Which offices/departments or areas are doing most, and which are doing the least, why?
    d. What proportion of integrated programmes have had components scored as ICF after the programme had begun?

---

[2] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/699425/Smart-Rules-External-April18.pdf

e. What is the general stage of maturity of the climate components of integrated programmes; how does this compare with the maturity of the overall programmes? What are the reasons for any differences?

2. What are the reasons for ICF being designed into, or not being designed into, potentially climate-relevant programmes? What additional[3] adaptation and/or mitigation impacts are expected to be delivered by integrated programmes, how, for whom and in what contexts? This question has been broken down into four elements:

**Relating to the guidance and advice**

a. How, by whom and in what circumstances are the Climate and Environment Smart Guide and Smart Rules used in different regions/offices/departments, what effect does this have and why?
b. For whom and how does the advice and evidence improve knowledge of climate change and convince of the value of integrating ICF, why/why not?
c. To what extent, and for whom, does a lack of interest in climate change and/or a consideration that this is not as important as other key programme priorities act as a barrier to integration, why?
d. For whom, in what respects, to what extent and how does the evidence on the effectiveness of integration within DFID change the willingness and ability of climate advisors to support programme teams to integrate ICF to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes?
e. What happens if there isn't a climate advisor on the team? Why?

**Relating to how decisions are made to integrate ICF**

f. How and by whom are decisions made to integrate climate finance (or not)? Who leads the integration of climate within the design of the programme at what stage of the process? Which other stakeholders (e.g. senior leaders, heads of office/department, partner governments, and implementing partners) have an influence and what effect does this have?
g. What factors motivate different programme teams to integrate ICF into the design of their programmes, what deters them?
h. What gives different programme team members confidence that a programme is likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, how?
i. Who considers whether implementing partners have capacity and capability to deliver integrated programmes effectively, how?

**Relating to systems**

j. In what respects, how and in what circumstances do DFID systems and approval processes support ICF integration, or not?
k. How do different programmes decide what indicators they will report against and what effect does this have? In what circumstances have integrated programmes reported against KPI15, how is transformational change likely to be achieved, or not?

---

[3] Defined as "*adaptation and/or mitigation impacts resulting from the consideration of climate risks and opportunities during the process of integrating ICF in the programme design, which would not have been achieved had ICF not been integrated*".

**Relating to outcomes**

l. What additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts are expected to be delivered by integrated programmes, how, for whom and in what contexts? Is there any evidence of actual impacts being delivered yet?
m. Are additional non-climate impacts for beneficiaries envisaged as a result of integration? What benefits, for whom and how are they expected to be delivered?
n. To what extent is the quantity of ICF allocated to a programme in proportion to the expected additional climate impact of the programme?

3. In what circumstances and how are integrated programmes likely to be delivered to achieve the anticipated benefits, in what circumstances and why are they not likely to do so? This question has been broken down into three elements:

**Relating to systems**

a. Which indicators, in what contexts and with what effect are used by integrated programmes in demonstrating progress towards climate change outcomes?
b. Do the reporting requirements and other systems encourage the delivery of integration, in what circumstances and why?
c. Are there circumstances where programme managers can adapt the quantity of ICF in their programmes as they evolve, why/why not?

**Relating to capability and capacity of teams**

d. How are programme teams assembled in different circumstances, does this have an effect on the delivery of the benefits of integration, why?
e. How, and in what respects, do programme teams develop the capability to deliver integrated programmes? What support and advice is effective for whom in developing that capability?
f. How and in what respects do Climate and other specialist advisors influence the delivery of programmes (if they are not actually managing them)? What advice provided by and to whom (programme teams, implementing partners, funding partners and partner governments) is effective in supporting the delivery of integration, why?
g. In what circumstances do programme teams have sufficient capacity to deliver climate integrated programming? In what circumstances don't they? Why?
h. To what extent, in what circumstances and how have programmes been aligned with guidance to ensure that capacity to implement climate objectives is sustained in the long term?
i. Does the central DFID ICF team influence the delivery of programmes with integrated ICF, how, in what circumstances and with what outcomes?

**Relating to delivery**

j. In what respects have integrated programmes been delivered as intended or not? Why, by whom and in what contexts were any changes made? What is the likely effect, if any, on the expected additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits?
k. What is the role of partner governments, funding partners and implementing partners, how and in what circumstances do they influence the delivery of additional benefits?
l. What additional adaptation and mitigation impacts have been delivered by integrated programmes, how, for whom and in what contexts?

m. Are there any unintended consequences from integrated programmes? What are they, how significant are they, in what circumstances do they arise, who do they affect and why do they occur?
n. Have additional non-climate impacts for beneficiaries been delivered as a result of integration? What are the benefits, for whom and how were they delivered?

4. Does the integration of ICF support progress towards DFID transformation[4], in what ways and in what circumstances, why or why not? What else could be done, by whom and how to further support transformation across the DFID ODA portfolio?
    a. In what contexts are there obstacles to programme managers integrating ICF in more programmes, why and how could they be overcome?
    b. How has programme managers' experience of integrating ICF affected their motivation for further integration, why?
    c. How has evidence of the outcomes from ICF integration been used and by whom? Has this had an effect on attitudes to mainstreaming within DFID, why?
    d. How can senior decision maker support for mainstreaming be secured? What should be done, by whom and how?
    e. Do ICF integration and senior management support for mainstreaming reinforce each other in leading to DFID transformation; how, and in what circumstances?

5. What can be learned, by whom, from the experience of integrating ICF to help to improve future design and management of integrated climate finance programmes including ICF projects, programmes and the portfolio as a whole in order to improve outcomes?
    a. In what circumstances, and how are C&E advisors learning how to make integration more effective within their programmes?
    b. To what extent is the wider team, including non-specialist climate advisers, developing their understanding of climate integration, how are they doing so?
    c. What can be learned from outliers?

For the purpose of this evaluation, transformational change within DFID was defined as:

*"A systematic and sustained consideration of climate change risks and opportunities to address climate change across DFID's work. This would be characterised by the integration of action on climate change across a broad range of sectors and would ultimately influence partners and partner governments to be ambitious in addressing climate change."*

# 3 Methodology

## 3.1 Approach

The evaluation used realist methods as set out in the Compass Evaluation Quality Framework which is published separately.

[4] Defined as *"A systematic and sustained consideration of climate change risks and opportunities to address climate change across DFID's work. This would be characterised by the integration of action on climate change across a broad range of sectors and would ultimately influence partners and partner governments to be ambitious in addressing climate change."*

Realist evaluation is a theory-based approach and the evaluation questions have been investigated by developing and refining theories. These question theories are expressed as a set of Context, Mechanism, Outcome (CMO) configurations. Theory building and testing is an iterative process that aims to result in a theory that is a satisfactory explanation of the evidence. This process is illustrated below:




**Figure 1: Theory refinement approach**

Realist evaluation aims to provide understanding in the form of middle range theories. These are sufficiently detailed and specific to provide a rich understanding but also sufficiently general to provide actionable learning. Thus, the process of theory building moves between rich, detailed evidence from specific cases and middle range theories until there is a reasonable level of satisfaction that the theories present a good explanation of all the evidence.

HMG provided a theory of change which was developed during the inception stage to build initial theories which hypothesised a number of CMO configurations. The research tested these theories and gathered evidence to inform their refinement. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 presents refined theories of change which explain for whom, how, in what circumstances and why particular outcomes are achieved from the integration of ICF. The refined theories described in this report are largely based on evidence from an in-depth review of 25 programmes. They reflect all the relevant evidence that we have obtained, and we have not found any evidence that contradicts them. The existence of contradictory evidence would require further revision of the theories. The revised theories presented in this report were found to be valid in the specific contexts explored within a sample of programmes which were purposively selected. Therefore, whilst it is intended that the learning from this evaluation would be valuable for other contexts, care should be taken not to assume generalisability of the findings.

The evidence workbook supplied separately to HMG aligns evidence from the document review to each theory (interview evidence has been redacted to preserve confidentiality).

### 3.2 Summary of work conducted

The evaluation involved:

1. The Evaluation Steering Group (ESG) developed terms of reference (see Appendix 7) for the evaluation including initial evaluation questions and a theory of change.
2. Compass worked with the ESG to refine the evaluation questions and develop an initial theory of change for investigation. The approach to be taken and the plan for the evaluation were set out in the inception report.
3. Compass conducted research to gather evidence to address the evaluation questions and to refine the theories of change. This involved:
    a. Quantitative analysis of data relating to DFID's 86 integrated ICF programmes from 2011 to 2017.
    b. Review of (mostly published) documents relating to 25 of the 86 programmes that had integrated ICF and 9 programmes that had not. Realist evaluation uses purposive sampling in which the research sample is selected to provide insight about specific aspects of the theory under investigation. The sample of programmes for this study was not intended to be representative of all programmes with integrated ICF.
    c. Interviews with 16 SROs and 8 advisors.
4. The document review and interviews together provided 830 individual items of evidence (or data 'nuggets'). This evidence was aligned against the relevant elements of the theories of change.
5. The theories of change were then refined to ensure that they reflected the evidence and to resolve any contradictions between pieces of evidence.

### 3.3 Limitations

The reader should bear in mind the following limitations:

1. The ESG decided to focus the evaluation on gaining an in-depth understanding of integrated programmes. Therefore, most of the findings are based on a detailed investigation of 25 of the 86 programmes with integrated ICF. The programmes that we investigated were selected to provide insight into specific aspects of the theory of change rather than to be representative of all programmes with integrated ICF. Therefore, while the findings are valid for the contexts investigated by the study the results should be used with caution in other contexts.
2. We reviewed 9 programmes without integrated ICF but which have similar purposes to the Integrated portfolio, which were approved since the introduction of the Climate and Environment Smart Guide in April 2016. This sample is too small to draw general conclusions about programmes without ICF but has provided some insight into how those programmes are designed for comparison purposes.
3. The programmes of particular interest for this evaluation were approved post April 2016. However, documentary evidence for the most recent programmes is limited so we have focused on those where evidence is available. This may introduce bias into the results as programmes with documentation may be different from programmes without documentation.
4. There have been five evaluations of programmes which have integrated ICF. All five programmes were initially included in the sample but subsequently excluded as the decision was made to focus on programmes approved after 2015. From a brief review of the evaluations they did not appear to contain relevant evidence for this work.
5. It has not been possible to arrange interviews with all the programmes initially identified; some potential respondents were unavailable and others have declined to be interviewed for

other reasons. This could introduce bias as those who make themselves available for interview may be different in some respects from those who do not.

6. It was difficult to arrange interviews with SROs for programmes that did not include integrated ICF. These proved hard to arrange and several potential interviewees were not willing to take part. We conducted 5 of the intended 6 interviews. It is possible that those respondents were not typical of SROs for programmes that do not have integrated ICF.
7. The sample of interviews is relatively small and, for some findings, we have relied on one or two interviews. We have indicated the strength of the evidence for each finding through the report.
8. We had originally intended to interview heads of office to understand more about the priority they place on mainstreaming and integrated ICF's role in delivering that. However, DFID advised that it would be hard to engage heads of office with this project. Therefore, while we understand how SROs and climate advisors perceive their priorities we don't know whether that perception is correct or the reasons for those priorities.
9. All interviews were limited to 45 minutes as it was agreed between Compass and DFID that any longer would reduce the willingness of respondents to take part. Since, even during a much longer interview, it would not have been possible to cover all aspects of the topic guide in depth, we prioritised areas where our review of the documents relating to the respondent's responsibilities indicated they would provide the most useful information.
10. We had intended to use programmes where ICF had been retrospectively allocated as a comparison group to represent business as usual (as these programmes were designed without ICF). However, this was not possible as DFID has not been able to identify these programmes.
11. Realist research specifically seeks evidence to test a theory and the theory is undermined where supporting evidence is not found. However, we cannot be sure that respondents to semi-structured interviews have mentioned all relevant evidence. Consequently, the absence of evidence cannot be used to definitively refute theories.
12. We have not been able to establish the additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts that are expected to be delivered by all the integrated programmes reviewed due to the stage of implementation and a lack of relevant evaluations.
13. At this stage of the work, it has not been possible to address all evaluation questions fully. The ESG recognises this and will consider whether to commission further research following their review of this report. We have included our recommendations for areas for further investigation in section 10.

## 3.4 Findings

The strength of evidence for each finding has been assessed and is indicated in the text through the use of icons as shown in table 1 below:

| Category | Description | Icon |
|---|---|---|
| Strong | We are confident that the finding applies more widely than the sample of programmes we investigated |  |
| Medium | We are confident (using the criteria set out in section 12.7 the evidence would be rated as strong) that the finding applies to the sample of programmes we investigated |  |
| Tentative | The finding applies to the sample of programmes we investigated to some extent (using the criteria set out in section 12.7, the evidence would be rated as medium) and we do not have contradictory evidence |  |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Speculative | The finding is based on one or two comments (using the criteria set out in section 12.7, the evidence would be rated as weak) but may merit further investigation |  |

**Table 1: Strength of evidence**

Each finding has been numbered to enable cross referencing.

# 4 How, and in what circumstances, has ICF been integrated into DFID programmes? Are there any patterns or outliers?

## 4.1 Evidence and analysis

This section draws on quantitative analysis of three samples of DFID's bilateral programming (it should be noted that these were drawn from DFID's internal systems and are not official statistics):

- 86 programmes with integrated ICF that were approved or had an operational start date after 1 April 2011. We have separated the 5 programmes where we know that the ICF investment arose from the concept note process on charts, these are labelled *pre-2015 C*.*
- 101 stand-alone (or full) bilateral ICF programmes that were approved or had an operational start date after 1 April 2011.
- 877 programmes approved between April 2011 and March 2017 and which did not have integrated ICF.

We have also included evidence from an in-depth review of documentation for 25 of the 86 programmes with integrated ICF.

## 4.2 What types of DFID programmes have integrated climate finance, and what does this integration look like?

***F1. ICF has been integrated through a range of approaches, the most common are: technical assistance, cash transfers, public works and infrastructure investment.***

We were able to identify how integrated ICF was used in 23 of the 25 programmes included in the in-depth document review. 21 of these used ICF to support some form of technical assistance. The assistance ranged from scientific and research-based knowledge sharing to training of farmers in climate smart practices. Examples include:

- Advising central and regional government departments as they plan, develop and mainstream their climate change policies and strategies.
- Providing experts to support local government to consult on and draw up resilience and climate adaptation and/or mitigation plans.
- Training and supporting government and implementing partner staff responsible for monitoring and evaluating climate change programmes.
- Providing technical expertise for calculations, target-setting, monitoring and evaluation
- Training farmers in climate smart practices.
- Specific sector support, e.g. agriculture, mining.

In addition to technical assistance:

- There were 5 examples of ICF funding green public works which bring climate change adaptation benefits. These works are often carried out by recipients of cash transfers under social protection programmes. Examples include construction of plinths for houses in flood zones, building latrines, wells and drains, improvements to roads and paths, work on community assets such as schools, clinics and village halls.
- 4 programmes in the social infrastructure and services sector have used ICF to improve resilience to climate change amongst the poorest people through the provision of direct support or conditional/unconditional cash transfers, which enable households to cope better with climate shocks, avoiding adverse coping strategies such as selling assets.

- There were 4 examples of ICF being used to invest in climate resilient infrastructure. This may be as part of investment in disaster recovery/resilience or WASH construction programmes, or through funding of infrastructure projects. Infrastructure investment has been included in reconstruction programmes, humanitarian support and building of schools, roads and bridges.
- ICF had also been used to support health services delivery in two cases and in two payment by results programmes

We could not identify any relationship between the activity that ICF supported and the amount or proportion of ICF integrated in the programme.

**Examples of how integrated ICF has been used**

**Technical Assistance**
*ICF funding will… support strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to generate climate change evidence and improve programme design…[and] to provide TASAF with climate change experts to support planning and implementation of the green public works.*
Business Case, PSSN Tanzania

*Training in climate smart agricultural techniques such as keyhole gardening or trench gardening.*
Business Case, The Joint Programme for El Niño Drought Response in Lesotho

**Cash transfers**
*Regular HSNP 2 beneficiaries have become more resilient to drought through improved access to credit, improved economic participation by women, and greater dietary diversity. The evaluation also showed that cash transfers had economic spill over effects by strengthening local markets and trade.*
Annual Review, HSNP2 Kenya

**Public works**
*The majority of PSNP public works activities to date have focussed upon extensive soil and water conservation (SWC) measures, including soil and stone terracing, percolation trenches, half-moon dams, and gully control structures.* Business Case, PSNP4 Ethiopia

*During a moderate flood in 2012, CLP plinths have been found very effective. They protect the CLP beneficiaries and their assets and also provide shelter for neighbours (non-recipients) and their assets, thus providing a social and communal good.* Annual Review, CLP2, Bangladesh

**Infrastructure**

*Targeted communities have more resilient WASH infrastructures and are better prepared for disasters and future climate change (UNICEF) - 90,000 people gain access to improved sanitation facilities*
Annual Review, Myanmar humanitarian support

*[climate change] impacts will be mitigated through installation of aluminium lightning arresters on electricity facilities, routine clearance of vegetation along the RoW thereby eliminating risks of tall trees falling on the power lines and use of steel poles for stability against the impacts of storms.*
Business Case, Sierra Leone

***F2. ICF has been integrated in 86 programmes since 2011 with a total committed budget of £1.32bn. Since 2015, when the current approach was adopted, 39 programmes have committed £591m to ICF. 6 programmes with integrated ICF were approved in 2017, this is the***

***smallest number since 2011. The amount of new commitments to ICF integrated programmes fell from £350m in 2016 to £131m in 2017.***[5]

Figure 2 below shows the amount of ICF included in DFID bilateral programmes approved in each year from 2011 to 2017 together with the number of programmes.




**Figure 2: Total integrated ICF approved within DFID bilateral integrated ICF programmes by year of approval (n=86)**

The amount of ICF investment committed and the number of programmes with integrated ICF has fluctuated between years. The fall in commitments in 2017 is due to fewer programmes with integrated ICF rather than less ICF in each programme. We don't know why the number of programmes has fallen.

***F3. The ICF budget approvals (commitments) committed to ICF has fallen but integrated programmes have represented a larger share. In 2017 two thirds of DFID's ICF commitments by value were in integrated programmes; this has increased from a quarter in 2015. However, the value of commitments made to ICF programmes in 2017 was lower than any year since the start of ICF in 2011.***[5]

Figure 3 below shows the split of ICF funding approved between integrated programmes and full ICF programmes:

---

[5] HMG clarification - Development programmes usually operate over several years and require their business cases to be approved prior to implementation, including their multi-year expenditure plans. In some cases, including contributions to climate multilaterals who operate on multi-year funding cycles, expenditure values can be very large over the programme lifetime. The level of programming committed (or approved) in any one year can therefore vary significantly depending on a few relatively large programmes and does not necessarily reflect the planned profile of annual expenditure.
UK ICF spending departments plan and manage delivery of these multi-year programmes within each year's UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget, monitoring carefully to ensure that climate change programming in each year is appropriate to deliver the UK's commitments on climate finance. The declining value of approvals year on year has still enabled climate finance expenditure to meet those levels agreed with HM Treasury and committed to publicly.




**Figure 3: Split of ICF funding approval between integrated (n=86) and full ICF (n=101) by year**

Since 2015 integrated ICF has become an increasingly large proportion of DFID's new ICF commitments; rising from around 25% in 2015 when the current approach to integration was introduced to 67% in 2017.

***F4. Since 2015 when the current approach to integration of ICF was established the average value of ICF approved within integrated programmes has increased from £8m to £22m.***

Figure 4 below shows the minimum, median, mean and maximum values of the ICF commitment within integrated programmes in each year.

**Figure 4: Characteristics of ICF component of bilateral integrated programmes by year (n=86)**

Since the current approach to integration was introduced in 2015 the mean and the median commitment to ICF within integrated programmes has increased:

- The median commitment has increased from £3m to £13m
- The mean commitment has increased from £8m to £22m.

One single very large programme commitment (£196m out of a total programme value of £276m) was made in 2014, which skewed the mean for that year. This programme, Productive Safety Net Programme Phase 4 in Ethiopia, was included in the sample for the in-depth review, it secured funding by applying to the International Climate Fund under the concept note system that operated before 2015.

***F5. On average, ICF accounts for 17.5% of the budget of integrated programmes. ICF represents less than 20% of the programme budget in around half of programmes and more than 50% of the budget in 13% of programmes.***

Figure 5 shows the number of programmes with integrated ICF by the proportion of the total budget accounted for by ICF:




**Figure 5: Proportion of bilateral integrated programmes' budget that is ICF (n=86)**

In around half of bilateral integrated programmes the ICF commitment is less than 20% of the total budget. The ICF commitment is more than 50% of the total budget in 13% of programmes. In all the integrated health programmes the ICF commitment accounted for less than 10% of the total budget, otherwise we could not identify any particular patterns of integration by sector.

***F6. Integrated ICF budget commitments are concentrated in five countries which account for 60% of integrated ICF budget commitments. Those five countries account for a much smaller share of non-ICF commitments (22%). The five countries with the largest share of non-ICF***

***commitments account for 42% of DFID's total commitment but only 25% of the ICF commitment.***

Table 2 below compares the share of bilateral integrated ICF commitments with the share of DFID bilateral non-ICF commitments between 2011 and 2017 for the five countries that account for the largest share of ICF.

| **Top 5 countries for Integrated ICF commitments** | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Proportion of total ICF commitment | Proportion of total non-ICF commitment |
| Bangladesh | 10% | 4% |
| Ethiopia | 21% | 10% |
| Kenya | 14% | 1% |
| Nepal | 8% | 2% |
| Tanzania | 7% | 5% |
| **Total** | **60%** | **22%** |

**Table 2: Top 5 countries for integrated ICF; proportion of total integrated ICF and non-ICF value 2011-2017 (Integrated ICF n=86, non-ICF n = 877)**

The five largest countries for integrated ICF in total account for 60% of integrated ICF but only account for 22% of non-integrated ICF. Only Ethiopia is in the top five countries for integrated ICF and non-ICF.

Table 3 below compares the share of bilateral integrated ICF commitments with the share of DFID bilateral non-ICF commitments between 2011 and 2017 for the top five countries for non-ICF commitments.

| **Top 5 countries for non- ICF commitments** | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Proportion of total ICF commitment | Proportion of total non-ICF commitment |
| Syria | 0% | 11% |
| Ethiopia | 21% | 10% |
| Nigeria | <1% | 9% |
| Pakistan | 4% | 6% |
| DRC | 0% | 6% |
| **Total** | **25%** | **42%** |

**Table 3: Top 5 countries for non-ICF; proportion of total integrated ICF and non-ICF value 2011-2017 (Integrated ICF n=86, non-ICF n = 877)**

The five largest countries for non-ICF in total accounted for 42% of non-ICF commitments but only account for 25% of integrated ICF. Ethiopia accounted for a much larger share of integrated ICF than its share of non-ICF while three countries; Syria, Nigeria and DRC accounted for a much smaller share of integrated ICF than their share of non-ICF.

***F7. 78% of the integrated ICF commitments between 2011 and 2017 were in four sectors; social infrastructure and services, humanitarian, production services and economic infrastructure and services.***

Figure 6 below shows the breakdown of the value of DFID's integrated ICF budget commitments by sector:




**Figure 6: Analysis of DFID integrated ICF budget commitments by sector 2011-2017 (n=86)**

***F8. Programmes with integrated ICF accounted for 29% of DFID's total bilateral commitments between 2011 and 2017 (excluding full ICF). The proportion of the total commitment represented by programmes with integrated ICF varied from 4% in government and civil society to 73% in social infrastructure and services.***

Figure 7 below shows DFID's total bilateral commitments excluding full ICF for programmes approved between 2011 and 2017 split between programmes with and without integrated ICF.




**Figure 7: Analysis of DFID bilateral budget commitments by sector 2011-2017 (integrated ICF n=86, non-ICF n = 877)**

The sectors with the highest share of programmes with integrated ICF (by value) are social infrastructure and services and production services while health and government and civil society had the lowest proportion. The share by number of programmes is similar.

Since 2015, when the current approach was adopted, there has been an increase in the proportion of programme commitments that have integrated ICF in the economic infrastructure and services and humanitarian sectors and a fall in the proportion of commitments with integrated ICF in the education and social infrastructure and services[6] sectors.

***F9. Where ICF has been integrated, it represents the largest share of programme commitment in the social infrastructure and services, production services and government and civil society sectors. ICF in health and education represents the smallest proportion of commitments.***

Figure 8 below shows the average ICF commitment in integrated programmes and the number of programmes analysed by sector:

[6] The social infrastructure and services sector included one very large programme with integrated ICF approved in 2014 which will have skewed the proportion of the budget for this sector prior to 2015




**Figure 8: Average ICF commitment in bilateral integrated programmes that is ICF (n=86)**

There is considerable difference in the proportion of the total integrated programme budget that is ICF in different sectors ranging from 3% in the health sector and 9% in the education sector to 27% in the social infrastructure and services sector[7] and the production services sector at 24%.

It is interesting to note that programmes in the WASH and Government and Civil Society sectors account for a relatively small proportion of the total integrated ICF commitments (F7 and F8) but, where ICF is included in programmes, it accounts for a relatively large share of the budget (18% for WASH and 22% for Government and Civil Society).

***F10. We estimate that around half of integrated programmes had components scored as ICF after the programme had begun. More economic infrastructure and humanitarian programmes and fewer health, production services and WASH programmes have integrated ICF under the current approach adopted in 2015.***

The approach to integration of ICF into DFID programmes has evolved over time.

- Integrated programmes approved prior to April 2015 fall into two categories:
  - Programmes had applied for funding from what was then the International Climate Fund, using a system of concept notes. DFID provided the concept notes and 5 integrated programmes were identified as having used this system. We cannot be certain that none of the other integrated programmes applied for funding using a concept note.
  - Others were categorised as ICF retrospectively (after the programme was approved) and so the integration of ICF did not have an effect on programme design. We have not been able to identify with confidence which integrated programmes have had components scored as ICF after the programme had begun. However, it is probable that programmes approved before 2015, and which were not identified as applying separately for ICF funding through a concept note, had components that were scored as ICF after the programme had begun. There were 42 of these; representing half the number of programmes with integrated ICF.

---

[7] The social infrastructure and services sector includes an outlier where integrated ICF accounts for 71% of the budget; if this is removed the share of ICF in integrated programme budgets in the social infrastructure and services sector is 14%.

- 39 programmes approved since April 2015 were mostly designed with integrated ICF and are unlikely to have had components scored as ICF after the programme had begun.

Programmes that had components retrospectively categorised as ICF could be considered to reflect the extent of mainstreaming before the current approach to integration.

Figure 9 below compares the number of programmes in each sector approved after 2015 with programmes approved before 2015 and which were not identified as applying for ICF funding through a concept note (i.e. those most likely to have had components retrospectively scored as ICF).




**Figure 9: Number of bilateral integrated ICF programmes by period and sector (pre-2015, n=42; 2015-2107, n =39)**

If we compare the two groups, we can see that:

- A higher proportion of programmes in the economic infrastructure and services and humanitarian sectors included integrated ICF since the current approach was adopted in 2015
- A smaller proportion of education, production services and WASH programmes included integrated ICF since the current approach was adopted in 2015.

***F11. In most cases, the ICF element of integrated programmes appears to be spent slightly later than the overall programme budget. This may be because many programmes with integrated ICF do not design the climate change related activities until the inception stage of the programme***

For almost all programmes where commitments were made after 2015 (where integrated ICF is thought to have been designed in from the start), the ICF component of the budget is spent in line with, or later than, the budget overall. There does not appear to be a difference in the rate of spending in different sectors. This may be because many integrated programmes have not fully determined what they will do to address climate risks and opportunities at the start of the programme and spend the inception stage researching the most appropriate measures to take.

## 4.3 Conclusions

**How, and in what circumstances, has ICF been integrated into DFID programmes? Are there any patterns or outliers?**

Our findings support the following main conclusions

Almost all the integrated programmes in the in-depth document review used ICF to fund some form of technical assistance. This is often supplemented by other activities including cash transfers, green public works and infrastructure investment (F1).

Between 2015 (when the current approach to integrating ICF was adopted) and 2017, 39 programmes that included £591million of ICF have been approved (F2).

**Integrated ICF investment has been focused on a few countries and sectors.** 60% of integrated ICF investment since 2011 has been focused on five countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Nepal). 78% of integrated ICF investment has been focused on four sectors of activity (humanitarian, economic infrastructure and services, social infrastructure and services and production services) (F6 and F7).

The number of programmes with ICF and the amount of funding committed has fluctuated between years. However, the overall trend appears to be that:

- **Although spending has been maintained, the budget newly committed to ICF in DFID's bilateral programmes fell in 2017 though integrated programmes represented a larger share.** In 2017 two thirds of DFID's ICF commitments by value were in integrated programmes; this has increased from a quarter in 2015. However, the commitment to ICF in 2017 was lower than any year since the start of ICF in 2011 (F3).
- **The average integrated ICF commitment has risen but fewer programmes are including integrated ICF.** The average integrated ICF commitment has increased from £8m in 2015 to £22m in 2017 (F4) but the number of new programmes that have integrated ICF has fallen from 13 in 2015 to 6 in 2017 (F2).

# 5 What are the reasons for ICF being designed into, or not being designed into, potentially climate-relevant programmes? What additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts are expected to be delivered by integrated programmes, how, for whom and in what contexts?

## 5.1 Initial theory

The initial theory developed collaboratively by the evaluation team and the ESG was:

**Where programme teams consider that programmes are likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits[8], they enhance the design to deliver benefits that would not have been achieved without integration, using trusted advice and guidance.**

**Programme teams are motivated to enhance the design of their programmes because they understand the climate change risks and opportunities relating to their programme, are confident that quality ICF integration can achieve better outcomes for beneficiaries and feel that integration demonstrates good personal performance.**

For the purpose of this evaluation, additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts are those which have resulted, or are expected to result, from the consideration of climate risks and opportunities during the process of integrating ICF in the programme design, which would not have been achieved had ICF not been integrated.

The initial theory diagram is shown in Figure 10 overleaf. This diagram shows how groups of contexts were expected to work together to trigger three key mechanisms:

1. That programme teams have a good understanding of the climate risks and opportunities for beneficiaries and how they can design their programme to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.
2. Programme teams are motivated to address climate risks and opportunities because they believe they can deliver better outcomes for beneficiaries and/or because it boosts professional pride and contributes to corporate objectives for their team/office/department.
3. Programme teams are confident that ICF integration is likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits.

Together these mechanisms generate the outcome that programme teams design quality integrated programmes that are intended to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.

---

[8] HMG defines quality climate outcomes as including a) efficiency in providing the targeted benefits for adaptation /mitigation (ie value for money); b) influencing uptake of climate-smart practices on a longer- term basis, e.g. in implementing partners/partner governments; c) using innovative practices and approaches with the potential to build models for others to follow; and d) ensuring there is a chance for others to learn from programming or for this to be scaled-up.




**Figure 10 Initial additionality theory**

## 5.2 Evidence and analysis

The theory was investigated through 13 evaluation sub questions; the findings relating to these questions are described below together with the implications for the theory.

We have used the evidence to test the three CMOs which comprise the initial theory (shown in bold in Figure 10 above):

- Motivation to address climate change risks and opportunities,
- Understanding of how to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes,
- Confidence that ICF integration is likely to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits; and,

And to test that, together, understanding, motivation and confidence lead to programmes intended to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.

These aspects of the theory were investigated through the in-depth review of available documentation for 25 programmes with integrated ICF and 9 programmes that did not have integrated ICF but which were similar to some of the integrated programmes. We conducted interviews with 14 SROs and 8 advisors. We have also drawn on the descriptive analysis of programmes with integrated ICF in section 4.

## 5.3 Motivation to address climate change risks and opportunities

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** line management encourage and make time available for integration, partner governments have climate change as a priority and the programme team is convinced of the value of integrating ICF for beneficiaries
- **Then** the programme team is motivated to address climate change risks and opportunities because they believe it can deliver better outcomes for beneficiaries and/or because it boosts professional pride and contributes to corporate objectives/priorities for their team/office/department
- **Which results in** programme teams being willing to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes.

**We found that:**

***F12. SROs of programmes with integrated ICF are aware of DFID's strategic priority to address climate change. A desire to support the Department's priorities helps to motivate SROs to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes.***

SROs' perceptions of DFID's priorities are a key factor in their motivation to include action to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes. This is reflected in several Business

Cases which refer to the UK Aid Strategy[9] (which incorporates "support for efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change" as one of its four objectives) and the Single Departmental Plan[10] (objective 2.3 is "support for efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change and prevent environmental degradation").

Interview respondents also gave these priorities as a reason for incorporating action to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes:

> *"… this programme aligns with Operational Plan objectives to make UK humanitarian response more effective and to drive action to tackle climate change through adaptation."* SRO interview

The SROs for programmes without integrated ICF who we interviewed were also aware of DFID's priority to address climate change. Two of these had included actions to address climate change risks and opportunities but had not integrated ICF, one planned to do so and also to integrate ICF. Therefore, awareness of DFID's priority to address climate change cannot be considered sufficient on its own to motivate SROs to integrate ICF.

***F13. Where the programme team believes that addressing climate change risks and opportunities will benefit poor and vulnerable people they are motivated to include actions to address those risks and opportunities in their programme.***

All the SROs that we interviewed who managed programmes that included actions to address climate change risks and opportunities considered that those actions enhanced the primary purpose of the programme by benefiting poor and vulnerable people.

Some of the SROs who were interviewed take a personal interest in climate change. They have a good knowledge and understanding of the climate change risks and opportunities that affect the beneficiaries of their programmes and regard it as routine good practice to include action to address climate change. The result is that it they would have designed programmes to incorporate consideration of climate change, irrespective of whether they integrated ICF. Interviews and Business Cases demonstrated a strong sense of the importance of climate change and its impact on beneficiaries:

> *"It's essential to think about climate change adaptation in agriculture and especially in projects with a long-time frame, this project is 18 years"* Interview SRO
>
> *"…poor people are the most vulnerable to climate"* Interview: SRO
>
> *"Climate change is likely to intensify hydro-meteorological hazards, including droughts and floods."* Business Case: HARP
>
> *"If not addressed, climate change will hamper progress towards the MDGs and disproportionately impact vulnerable groups"* Business Case: Deepening Democracy Programme

---

[9] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-international-development-single-departmental-plan/department-for-international-development-single-departmental-plan-december-2018

***F14. In addition to being motivated by DFID's priorities and the value to beneficiaries, some programme teams can also be motivated to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities by the priorities of partner governments and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.***

Interviews and documentary evidence confirmed that, in addition to being motivated by DFID's strategic priorities, other factors motivated programme teams to address climate change risks and opportunities including:

- Compliance with laws and policies in partner countries and a recognition that DFID wants to support partner governments to adopt policies to address climate change
- Awareness of the Sustainable Development Goals and a desire to support progress towards them.

A few respondents mentioned that the value of ICF is subject to scrutiny from partner governments and as a result, they are conscious that it is important to demonstrate that ICF represents additional action to address climate change risks and opportunities.

> *"[The government] is fully aware of what the international negotiations say. They will challenge donors if you just randomly re-badge a load of stuff as climate*." Interview advisor

***F15. Where the head of office provides consistent, visible support and encouragement for the mainstreaming of actions to address climate change risks and opportunities, SROs report that they are more motivated to include those actions in their programmes because they understand that it supports the office priorities.***

The head of office is responsible for the portfolio in their country and formally approves all Business Cases up to £5m as well as formally approving all Business Cases that need to be submitted to the QAU and/or ministers. The SROs and advisors that we interviewed cited support from heads of office as a very important factor in encouraging programme teams to incorporate actions to address climate change risks and opportunities.

> *"For me the big thing is, if the head of office says, "We need to see more action on this". Then people will take more action on it."* Interview advisor

> *"I think a factor in successful mainstreaming is … having a deputy director who is really clued in and touted [climate change] as the forefront of the office agenda".* Interview advisor

***F16. Many programme teams integrated ICF in their programmes in response to targets set by the head of office for the proportion of ICF to be integrated in their programming. In some cases, this has encouraged teams to explore how they can do more to address climate change risks and opportunities.***

In some cases, country offices have had targets for the amount or proportion of ICF within their programming; this was cited in interviews and Business Cases:

> *"DFID Zambia has taken an ambitious stance to make its portfolio climate smart including having 20% climate finance in 2019/20"* Business Case, Zambia Health Systems Strengthening Programme

> *"We really had to hit our targets, our ICF spending targets. It was really something that was important for the office*." Interview advisor

Some teams responded to the encouragement to incorporate ICF by seeking out opportunities to do more to address climate change risks and opportunities, often working with climate advisors or other climate experts.

> *"As the programme develops, we will consider the potential for the programme to contribute to international climate fund targets as appropriate."* Business Case, Zambia Health Systems Strengthening Programme

Where an office has targets to increase the extent of integrated ICF climate advisors reported that this provides an opportunity for them to engage with programme teams and to encourage them to include (more) action to address climate change risks and opportunities.

A few respondents mentioned that the value of ICF is subject to scrutiny from partner governments and as a result, they are conscious that it is important to demonstrate that ICF is funding additional action to address climate change risks and opportunities.

***F17. In some cases the integration of ICF does not seem to have influenced the content of the programme in which case it will not have supported additional action to address climate change risks and opportunities.***

Some interviewees reported that integration of ICF did not influence the content of the programme and they would have acted to address climate change risks and opportunities regardless. This was most often seen in cases where the SRO considered the climate-relevant actions they were taking to be normal good practice and where they had not felt the need to work with a climate expert.

In other cases, though, integration of ICF seemed to be more of an incidental factor that did not influence the content of the programme.

> *"The whole programme was designed with climate change in mind, not with climate finance in mind."* Interview SRO

***F18. The perception that ICF does not represent additional funding and the work involved in integrating ICF can act as barriers to integration. Integrating ICF was seen as more relevant to some sectors (e.g. infrastructure or agriculture) than others (e.g. health or education).***

DFID has a ring-fenced ICF allocation within its overall ODA allocation for the current Spending Review period. This ring-fenced ICF funding is not held centrally but is included in the overall budget allocations of departments and country offices on the understanding that the programmes that they design and manage would include climate change activity of sufficient scale to deliver the DFID commitment. Progress against the cumulative total is monitored centrally.

SROs / programme managers seeking to allocate funding to address climate change risks and opportunities have to secure that funding from within the overall budget for their department or country office. This appears to have given rise to a perception among some SROs, programme managers and climate advisers that there is no additional ICF funding available.

> *"People have told me that they don't want to integrate as they have to divert effort from other priorities."* Interview advisor

Several climate advisors cited the number of different issues that SROs have to consider when developing a programme and one suggested there should be stronger incentives for integrating ICF.

*“they're quite reasonably weak incentives relative to all the other issues that people have to deal with when they're developing a project.”* Interview advisor

Some climate advisors and SROs felt that there was a size level below which it was not worthwhile to integrate ICF.

*“I wouldn’t encourage ICF integration if it’s less than 10% as it’s not worth the hassle. However, it’s really rare that the ICF proportion is that low.”* Interview advisor

However, others clearly are willing to integrate a smaller percentage of ICF as over one third of integrated programmes have ICF of less than 10% of the total budget (F5).

Some SROs told us that it was hard to see how their programme could be adapted to address climate change risks and opportunities and that some sectors are more of a “*natural fit*” for climate change than others. They also want to see “*tangible examples*” which may be more available in some sectors than others. The difference in the proportion of ICF in different sectors (see section 4) seems to reflect this.

Others feel that there are more urgent problems which their programmes should be addressing; for example, a disaster relief programme had not integrated ICF because they had other priorities. However, on further investigation this programme had ensured that reconstruction work was designed to be resilient to climate change and solar energy was used to provide temporary power to homeless people. The SRO considered these adaptation and mitigation measures to be normal good practice and therefore not to be suitable for ICF.

***F19. There is a perception that climate change is a lower priority for senior management currently than it was in recent years. This reduces the motivation of SROs and climate advisors to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and results in fewer opportunities to integrate ICF.***

There is evidence from interviews that the priority attached by senior management to addressing climate change risks and opportunities has declined over the last two years.

As a result, while programme teams are not likely to ignore climate change, they are less inclined to devote extra time and effort to considering how they could be doing more.

In the past some offices had targets for the amount of integrated ICF which encouraged programme teams to seek out opportunities to integrate ICF. Where these are no longer in place this has created a sense that the priority was lower.

This perception was widespread across SROs and climate advisors; many interviewees talked about it and none of the interviewees felt the priority was higher. We don’t understand the reason for this change, particularly since there have been no changes in the formal priorities. However, some respondents attributed it to a change in personnel or to other policy priorities becoming more visible.

*“they had other things come and go around different policy priorities, youth and disability and fragility in a whole host of areas. I know because climate is long-running, long-standing, it means that it doesn't maybe get as much attention as some of the shorter-term hot topics.”* Interview SRO

*“The current head of office…doesn’t show consistent support; the result will be a much lower level of ICF.”* Interview advisor

*"[climate change] having been very much what everybody was talking about … was fading into the background"* Interview SRO

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***Programme teams include action to address climate change risks and opportunities because they believe it will deliver benefits to poor and vulnerable people (F13) and to support DFID's priorities (F12) and those of partner governments (F14). They integrate ICF within their programmes in response to encouragement from the head of office (F15) and, where they are present, to help to meet targets for their office (F16).***
- ***The integration of ICF has encouraged some teams to explore how they can do more to address climate change, often when they have worked with a climate expert (F16). In other cases, programmes have integrated ICF to finance actions they would have taken anyway (F17).***
- ***The approach to nominally allocating ICF within country budgets introduced in 2015 can act as a barrier to integration of ICF because programme teams do not perceive it as being additional money (F18).***
- ***The perception that climate change is a lower priority for DFID senior management than it was in the past appears to have reduced the motivation of SROs and climate advisors to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes (F19).***

### 5.4 Understanding of how to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** climate advisors trust the available evidence on the climate change risks and opportunities and on effective approaches to addressing them in specific contexts and where climate advisors and those in other disciplines understand how to work with each other as a result of cross cadre working
- **Then** tailored, relevant advice and expertise is available to support programme teams to integrate ICF
- **Which results in** programme teams having a good understanding of the climate change risks and opportunities for beneficiaries and how they can design their programme to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.

**We have found that:**

***F20. Where there is a climate advisor in the office and they have time available they tend to use a combination of evidence and influencing skills to provide programme teams with the understanding they need to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes.***

Many climate advisors see it as part of their role to encourage and help SROs to integrate ICF in their programmes. They use evidence about the effectiveness of actions to address climate change risks and opportunities to improve the lives of poor and vulnerable people rather than evidence of the effectiveness of integration within DFID.

In addition to evidence, advisors need influencing skills and the ability to secure support across the office.

> *"It's about convincing people that this is something they need to do. And also, something that they want to do. The second of those is about relationships, it's about proving your arguments. The first of those is about having the evidence but also the institutional levers to … make people consider it."* Interview advisor

Where they are included in a programme team, climate advisors may research potential actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and evaluate their suitability for inclusion in programmes.

Some country offices have one or more climate advisors located in the office working alongside programme teams, while others share advisors with several other countries. In other country offices there is no climate advisor. The decision whether the office will have a climate advisor is made by the office senior management, but we don't know how those decisions are made.

Where a programme has no climate advisor on the team, the ESG advised us that advice is available from DFID locally and/or from the central policy department or advisers elsewhere in DFID. However, we only found one example of this advice being used (see F36).

***F21. Evidence from programmes that the SRO has worked on in the past, or in a similar sector, has been used to convince programme teams of the value of including action to address climate change risks and opportunities. A perceived lack of evidence for approaches that work in the sector concerned can be an obstacle for climate advisors in persuading programme teams to incorporate actions to address climate change risks and opportunities.***

Programme teams use evidence from past programmes to support the integration of action to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes rather than to convince them of the value of integrating ICF.

SROs are particularly confident in replicating successful activities to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits where they have access to evidence from past programmes. Most of the evidence quoted comes from programmes in which they have been personally involved or other programmes in their sector. Further investigation of the reason for this would be valuable and could be included in the case study approach suggested in point 5 of Section 10.

> *"Through a previous programme, DFID has been providing support to the CDB [Caribbean Development Bank] to improve its capacity to commission and interrogate climate risk assessment."* (Business Case UKCIF)

> *"The programme ended …a year back. We had a lot of lessons from that programme, which helped in the design of the [programme]"* Interview SRO

Lack of evidence from the sector about the benefits of action to address climate change risks and opportunities can be an obstacle to mainstreaming.

> *"Where you've also got a dearth of evidence…it's much harder. You've got to put more effort in, to justify spending more money on climate change."* Interview advisor

Members of the evaluation team attended two cadre events in 2016 which brought together climate advisors with health, infrastructure and livelihoods advisors. One of the aims of the events was to improve understanding of how climate change could be mainstreamed.

We have identified evidence of mainly informal learning about approaches to addressing climate change risks and opportunities between phases of a programme and within sectors. However, apart from the cadre events, we have not identified any examples of systematic learning about mainstreaming or integration of ICF.

***F22. Where there is a climate advisor on the team and in the relevant country office, programmes seem to be more likely to adopt ambitious or innovative approaches to addressing climate change risks and opportunities.***

Climate advisors and SROs interviewed told us that climate advisors have helped programme teams to incorporate action to address climate risks and opportunities in programme design in a number of ways ranging from informal support, awareness raising, conducting feasibility studies or research and developing strategies.

> *"A climate advisor could take a deeper look into programmes... there is a big piece of work there, looking strategically at climate risk being handled in the region*." Interview SRO

> *"I picked her brain a little bit more about what we could do in terms of forecasting and getting better prepared"* Interview SRO

> *"We had a very good C&E advisor [in 2012/13] .really improved the level of knowledge and understanding throughout the office"* Interview SRO

Interviewees who work or have worked closely with an advisor based in the same office report that this is of great value in raising the profile of climate change, in helping them to identify risks and opportunities, and in spreading the message widely amongst all staff. In the absence of an advisor in the same office, interviewees said that an advisor on the team working remotely is valuable, though the informal suggestions and profile-raising role could be lost.

> *"I think certainly having a climate change advisor based in the office helped…those sorts of exchanges helped tremendously to define something that we had already decided would be an area we could possibly intervene on."* Interview SRO

> *"They were thinking about having shared advisers between offices, for example, like regionalising climate support... It sounds in theory like a good idea but in practice I'm not convinced. ... And the challenges of trying to work across two offices were actually really big. Because a lot of what I'm describing is face to face. Being there, being involved."* Interview advisor

Some programmes have used climate advice from their implementing partners where there wasn't sufficient climate advice in their office or where more specialist advice was needed.

> *"I think the most help has just been actually working with technical people and our implementing team and with the evaluation team as well because they've just had more understanding what it means for the sector, it's just quite niche."* Interview SRO

> *"We generally derive a lot of our climate advice from [our partners] who are more directly working on [country]."* Interview SRO

Where a programme team is planning to implement tried and tested approaches and feels that they have sufficient knowledge of the climate change risks and opportunities relevant to their programme and how to address them, they may not see the need for the help of a climate advisor in designing their approach.

> *We haven't actively gone out to get [the climate advisor] involved. [they are] very involved with other programmes within the office*…. Interview SRO

There is evidence that where offices have a full-time climate advisor they programme more ICF than where they do not:

> *"... analysis of various country offices (Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) finds that those offices with full time dedicated climate advisor have programmed much more ICF than those with part time advisors or regional advisors only."* Practical Support on Climate Information, ICF Integration and Decision Making Under Uncertainty for DFID and the CCKE Unit: Paul Watkiss Associates

> *"…it's a really obvious link in having someone in a country office, who is there for long enough to mobilise people, to raise awareness, to get that shift happening. Those countries where there is not climate input. It just doesn't necessarily happen...Where you have a country office, that had a climate advisor. You would see a greater proportion of spend on ICF, than those offices where there wasn't a climate advisor."* Interview advisor

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***Climate advisors on the team or in the office appear to be important in supporting programme teams to identify actions they could take to deliver additional climate benefits (F22). Where there is an advisor on the team, programmes are more likely to integrate ICF (F20).***
- ***Programme teams particularly value evidence from their sector in deciding how they can most effectively address climate change risks and opportunities (F21).***

## 5.5 Confidence that ICF integration is likely to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** DFID systems support ICF integration, the programme teams follow Climate and Environment Smart Guide, the programme is considered likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, implementing partners have capacity to deliver integrated programmes effectively and the programme team is willing to consider new ideas.
- **Then** the programme team has confidence that ICF integration is likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits
- **Which** enhances the programme team's willingness to incorporate actions to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in their programmes.

**We found:**

***F23. Where ICF is integrated in a programme, DFID's Smart Rules require (from late 2017) that the Climate and Environment Smart Guide is followed. Where this is done, specific climate or environment objectives are included in the Business Case and indicators to assess the planned benefits are included in the logframe. This can provide more confidence that the intended adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes will be delivered.***

In theory this approach is embedded in DFID's systems because the Climate and Environment Smart Guide from late 2017 requires programmes to capture the planned climate benefits in the logframe. Progress against indicators in logframes is then assessed as part of the Annual Review along with recommendations for follow-up action and an analysis of learning. This gives the planned climate indicators a high level of visibility and helps to ensure that the intended outcomes are delivered.

***F24. The Climate and Environment Smart Guide appears not to have been followed in many of the cases where it could be expected to have been applied.***

We investigated use of the Guide in interviews, and by examining the 6 programmes with integrated ICF that were approved in 2017 (though potentially before the Smart Rule required compliance).

Only one of the six programmes had documentary evidence that the Climate and Environment Smart Guide had been followed. The other programmes did not have specific climate or environment objectives in the strategic case or indicators in the logframe (which they would have done if they were following the guidance). This suggests that the Climate and Environment Smart Guide is not being used widely by programme teams. As these six programmes were not included in the interview sample we don't know whether there is additional documentary evidence or the reasons why the Guide was not followed.

One respondent suggested that the Guide had not been used by some programme teams because it was adopted too late to be used in the normal DFID planning cycle. It is possible that use of the guidance will increase in future years.

> *"The issue is that a lot of the guidance came late on in the day in relation to the request to identify ICF spend related to the broader DFID planning cycles. As a result, the guidance wasn't followed by all"* Email advisor.

One climate advisor reported that they don't follow the guidance.

> *"Personally, I have not used it (*the Guide*) very much, but it's a tool that we need to learn how to use and make our climate change programmes more effective.* Interview Advisor

Some respondents described the requirements of the Climate and Environment Smart Guide as burdensome; this could also be a disincentive to compliance. Although the Smart Guide is now referenced in the Smart Rules, some programme teams may not be aware of it when they are designing programmes.

***F25. The Climate and Environment Smart Guide is more likely to be followed when there is a climate advisor on the team because they provide the skills and time to do so.***

In the 25 cases included in the in-depth sample, any work to comply with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide was done by a climate advisor or implementing partner with expertise in climate change. Thus, it is possible that where there isn't climate expertise on the team, the programme is less likely to follow the guidance.

One SRO felt that the Climate and Environment Smart Guide was useful to provide an understanding of potential actions to address climate change risks and opportunities:

> *"The Climate and Environment Smart Guide is useful, it's good to dive into the topic and see what's happening*". Interview SRO

Another SRO was grateful to have the support of a climate advisor to help them to understand and interpret all the guidance.

> *"I think for somebody who's running a programme for which climate is maybe one aspect of many, it can feel a little bit overwhelming to sometimes have to digest what is coming out … [climate advisor's] role is also helping us make sense of all the guidance and see how it applies to us and how we should respond to it more sensibly."* SRO interview

The Climate and Environment Smart Guide suggests that programme teams conduct analysis to identify actions to address climate risks and opportunities and to ascertain the appropriate amount of ICF to be allocated to the programme. We requested this analysis for all the programmes reviewed in depth and were able to obtain it for three of them. In these three cases the analysis had been conducted by the climate advisor.

***F26.* The SRO is responsible for considering whether implementing partners have capacity and capability to deliver integrated programmes effectively and sets out the characteristics they are looking for in the Business Case.**

Several Business Cases set out the process for selecting implementing partners and identify that the capability required to deliver actions to address climate change risks and opportunities will be considered. For example:

> *"PKSF has substantial experience working on climate change – having managed the civil society programmes of the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), BCCRF and the GoB Trust Fund. They will be asked to draw on that experience to support (a) mainstreaming across the range of actions being undertaken and (b) monitoring during implementation.* Business Case PPEPP

***F27. We have not found evidence of programmes estimating the additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts that will be delivered as a result of the additional actions to address climate change risks and opportunities financed by ICF investment.***

Some programmes (we have seen evidence from 3) conduct an analysis as recommended by the Climate and Environment Smart Guide to assess the share of the programme budget that can be considered ICF; i.e. what additional activities the ICF investment is going to be spent on. However, we have not found any evidence of programmes estimating the additional climate related benefits that will be achieved as a result of those activities (other than where another outcome is used as a proxy for the climate benefit see F33).

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***DFID's Smart Rules and Climate and Environment Smart Guide should ensure that programmes approved since late 2017 with integrated ICF include the planned climate benefits in the logframe which would provide confidence that expected benefits would be delivered (F23).***
- ***Many of the 2017 programmes reviewed do not appear to be complying with the Guide (F24) although these were potentially approved before the Smart Rules required compliance.***

## 5.6 Together, understanding, motivation and confidence lead to programmes intended to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** programme teams are motivated to address climate change risks and opportunities, understand how they can design their programme to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes and are confident in doing so.
- **Then** they decide to incorporate action to address climate change risks and opportunities and to integrate ICF.
- **Which results in** programmes being designed to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.

We have found that:

***F28. The process of integrating ICF can lead to the delivery of additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes because teams think through how they will address climate change risks and opportunities and this can stimulate new ideas or identify opportunities to replicate tested approaches.***

SROs make decisions about whether and how they will include actions to address climate risks and opportunities and whether to integrate climate finance in a programme. Where the team includes a climate advisor they are involved in the decision. Implementing partners may also be involved in the decision where they have relevant skills. Senior leaders, heads of office and partner governments are important influencers.

SROs weigh up a range of factors in designing programmes and their decision to integrate action to address climate change risks and opportunities depends on whether there is good evidence for the benefits to participants. It is also often dependent on their personal perception of climate change as a pressing issue for beneficiaries of their programme.

Where the programme team does not have established approaches to follow and is open to designing new actions they can be prompted by encouragement, particularly from climate advisors, to use ICF to consider approaches which are more ambitious.

Where a case for ICF is developed in the Business Case, interviewees reported that this concentrated their minds and obliged those involved to think about what more they could be doing to improve climate outcomes.

> *"A study was conducted as part of the inception stage, that identified areas where [the activity] would be at risk from climate change, so the programme has changed the areas it will work in. There were also additional adaptation measures identified* […]." Interview SRO

One climate advisor explained that the process of integrating ICF is an opportunity to recognise the climate-relevant work that programmes are doing already and then to encourage them to go further.

> *"There's kind of the bit of recognizing work that you're already doing that's climate-relevant and then there's the bit beyond that, which is how ... should we be doing more here and how do we do more and what does that look like."* Interview advisor

An SRO viewed the process of integration as a way to mainstream environment and sustainability throughout the programme and also to ensure that the programme did no harm.

*"…having the environment and sustainability mainstream throughout the programme was just really key for us, both in terms of living up to … that sustainability, economic, and environmental, but also just in terms of risk mitigation for [DFID] and making sure that in terms of our safe guarding and do no harm."* Interview SRO

In many cases, money is set aside to invest in further work on developing the climate component to be carried out after the Business Case is approved.

*"More detailed mapping of the areas earmarked for development is needed to more accurately determine the amount of planned tea cultivation by different levels of altitude, rain fall and other growing conditions. More information is also needed to assess the vulnerability to climate change and variability of existing crops being grown to support a relative assessment of climate related risks associated with the growing of tea*." Business Case; Sustainable Inclusive Livelihoods through Tea Production in Rwanda

Where programme teams are already planning to implement tried and tested approaches to address the climate change risks and opportunities relevant to their programme, integration of ICF may not encourage them to do more. However, the integration of ICF can provide recognition of the climate change aspect of their programme and, through the incorporation of the planned benefits in the logframe, can help to keep a focus on the delivery of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. Climate advisors have an important role in supporting these teams to use and report on ICF KPIs.

*"the ICF aspect of it just means that it's far more intentional and far more systematic about how we've gone about approaching it... I think it's at least helped us keep our eye on the ball and keep focusing on the climate aspects."* Interview SRO

"*it [having an ICF indicator in the log frame] certainly does have an impact on how we approach that, or at least it makes sure that nothing drops off the agenda…It's the only way to actually do this sensibly and pragmatically here. But I do think it does, having it there, keeps everybody honest, and also provides a very clear way ... A way that everyone buys into"* Interview SRO

**F29. There is some evidence of a potential risk that reducing the number of standalone climate programmes in favour of integrated programming could inadvertently send the wrong messages to partner governments and funding partners. However, in one case the SRO saw integration as helping to engage partner governments.**

A few advisors reported being challenged by partner governments who saw the reduction of dedicated climate programmes as an indicator of reduced priorities. There was a suggestion that this could be communicated more effectively.

*"[partner government official would] say, "I see you've closed your climate programmes. Do you not care about climate?"* Interview advisor

One SRO felt that mainstreaming could reduce the visibility of DFID's climate change activities which could, in turn, reduce DFID's influence. They also suggested more efforts to communicate what was being done.

*"Mainstreaming generally could reduce your influence… what would help us is to step up the visibility of what we are doing…where we can."* Interview SRO

However, another SRO saw integration as helping to engage partner governments and encourage integrated programming:

> *"We had started working with the Planning Ministry and also some little work with the National Treasury. But, then we realized that the best way to get climate change work mainstreamed is to do integrated programming."* Interview SRO

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***The process of integrating ICF can stimulate programme teams to think about how they can do more to address climate change risks and opportunities which can lead them either to include actions in programmes to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes or to commission research at the inception stage to assess the climate change risks and opportunities and recommend actions that could be taken (F28).***
- ***The process of integrating ICF can support the delivery of planned climate benefits where it results in their inclusion in the logframe (F23).***

## 5.7 Revised theory of change

This section draws on the findings above to refine the initial theory of change:

Considering the first element:

**Where programme teams consider that programmes are likely to be able to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, they enhance the design to deliver benefits that would not have been achieved without integration, using trusted advice and guidance.**

We have found that:

- Programme teams draw on a range of evidence to develop their understanding of ways to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes. These sources can include; past programmes that team members have been involved in, climate expertise from advisors and implementing partners, information from cadre events and other sector activities. Where there is a lack of evidence there can be a significant barrier to including actions to address climate change risks and opportunities.
- Mainstreaming (and therefore the integration of ICF) can be perceived as being more applicable to programmes in some sectors than others (in some cases this may relate to the availability of evidence for the benefits of integration)
- Climate advisors can play an important role in supporting programme teams to identify actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and in encouraging them to integrate ICF.
- Having a climate advisor in the office can help to stimulate more action because they are able to engage regularly and informally.

Considering the second element of the initial theory:

**Programme teams are motivated to enhance the design of their programmes because they understand the climate change risks and opportunities relating to their programme, are confident that quality ICF integration can achieve better outcomes for beneficiaries and feel that integration demonstrates good personal performance.**

We have found that:

- Programme teams can be motivated to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes by DFID's priorities, the benefits to poor and vulnerable people and (where relevant) by the priorities of partner governments.
- Programme teams can be motivated to integrate ICF in their programmes by encouragement from the head of office and climate advisors. Where the SRO is open to considering additional opportunities to address climate change risks and opportunities and where there is climate expertise available, programme teams may be motivated to design their programmes to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes for their beneficiaries.
- The perceptions that there is no additional money for ICF, that climate change is a lower priority than it has been in the past, and that there is significant work involved in integrating ICF can act as barriers to the integration of ICF and to programmes being designed to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.
- The process of integrating ICF can lead to the delivery of additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes in two ways:
    1. Where teams think through how they will address climate change risks and opportunities this can stimulate new ideas or identify opportunities to replicate tested approaches.
    2. Where the planned adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes are embedded in the logframe there is increased focus on their delivery.
- Additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes are more likely to be delivered when there is a climate advisor on the team because they have the time and expertise to consider climate change risks and opportunities and gather and present convincing evidence.

Based on these findings we have revised the theory of how the integration of ICF supports the delivery of additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes to reflect four outcomes:

1. **Integration of ICF supports the delivery of additional climate benefits through replication or innovation**
    - **Where** SROs are open to exploring ways in which their programmes can deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes and where climate expertise is available to the team (from a climate advisor or implementation partner)
    - **Then** integration of ICF can provide an *opportunity* to use evidence to develop an understanding of how additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes can be delivered
    - **Which results in** programmes identifying opportunities to *replicate* successful approaches that have been implemented elsewhere **or** deciding to allocate resources to explore potential *innovative* approaches to addressing climate change risks and opportunities.
2. **Climate benefits that would have been achieved anyway are counted as ICF**
    - **Where** SROs have past experience of implementing actions to address climate change risks and opportunities or are aware of other successful approaches within their sector and they don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts
    - **Then** they feel they can support DFID's priorities by integrating ICF for actions that would have been implemented anyway
    - **Which results in** the programme including a budget allocation for ICF relating to activities to address climate change risks and opportunities that would have been implemented anyway.
3. **Climate benefits are included but it's not worthwhile to integrate ICF**
    - **Where** SROs have past experience of implementing actions to address climate change risks and opportunities or are aware of other successful approaches within their sector, they don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts and where there is a perception that integrating ICF does not provide any extra money, the programme is too small or where the amount of ICF would be small
    - **Then** the work to integrate ICF is not considered worthwhile

- **Which results in** the programme including activities to address climate change risks and opportunities that would have been implemented anyway but not integrating ICF.

4. **There is no opportunity to address climate change risks and opportunities**
    - **Where** SROs do not perceive climate change to be relevant for their programme and don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts.
    - **Then** there is perceived to be *no opportunity* to integrate ICF
    - **Which results in** the programme not including activities to address climate change risks and opportunities.

These revised theories are illustrated in Figure 11 overleaf.




**Figure 11: Revised theory of change for design for additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes**

## 5.8 Conclusions

These conclusions address the two elements of the following evaluation question:

**What are the reasons for ICF being designed into, or not being designed into, potentially climate-relevant programmes?**

1. The reasons for ICF being designed into relevant programmes are different from the reasons for actions to address climate change risks and opportunities being designed into climate-relevant programmes.
   - Actions to address climate change risks and opportunities are normally designed into programmes to provide benefits to poor and vulnerable people (F13) and to meet DFID's priorities (F12).
   - ICF is generally integrated into programmes in response to encouragement from heads of office or to help to meet country targets for the proportion of ICF included in programming (F16).

2. The current approach to integrating ICF can discourage programme teams from integrating ICF in their programmes for additional action to address climate change risks and opportunities because there is perceived to be no additional money to pay for those actions (F18).

3. Programme teams can be less motivated to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes as there is a widespread perception that the priority DFID places on addressing climate change has reduced (F19).

4. Where there is a climate advisor in the office they can help to motivate programme teams to include additional actions to address climate change risks and opportunities (F22) and can assist them to integrate ICF (F20).

5. Programme teams are more likely to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities where there is evidence about the benefits for poor and vulnerable people of actions to address climate change (F21).

**What additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts are expected to be delivered by integrated programmes, how, for whom and in what contexts?**

6. The process of integrating ICF can lead to the delivery of additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes if it:
   - Stimulates teams to consider how they will address climate change risks and opportunities; this can generate new ideas or identify opportunities to replicate tested approaches (F22).
   - Results in the inclusion of indicators of the planned benefits in the logframe (F23).

7. This is most likely to be effective if there is a climate advisor on the team and where the SRO is open to new ideas for how to address climate change risks and opportunities (F25).

# 6 In what circumstances and how are integrated programmes likely to be delivered to achieve the anticipated benefits, in what circumstances and why are they not likely to do so?

## 6.1 Initial theory for delivery

The initial delivery theory developed collaboratively by the evaluation team and the ESG was:

Programme teams are motivated to deliver integration through raised awareness within DFID of the importance of integration, both for delivering high quality outcomes[11] and in the UK political context. Integration may also align with partner government priorities further motivating programme teams. Implementing partners and funding partners are aware of these priorities and agree to deliver integrated programmes.

The provision of support from climate and environment advisors on how to address climate risks and opportunities during programme implementation, and guidance from the central DFID ICF team, builds programme teams' skills and knowledge and so their capacity to deliver integration.

Systems are put in place or upgraded to monitor and support the effective delivery of integrated programmes. The central DFID ICF team aims to generate further evidence about the additional benefits of integration and how it can be delivered effectively which further motivates and builds the skills of programme teams. Evidence also helps to secure the continuing support of partner governments, implementing partners and funding partners.

This theory is illustrated overleaf in Figure 12. This diagram shows how groups of contexts were expected to work together to trigger three key mechanisms:

1. A sustained focus on delivering the additional benefits of integration is retained through the implementation phase

   Which in turn would generate the outcome that the whole programme team is motivated to deliver additional benefits from integration.

2. The programme team having the skills and knowledge necessary to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively
3. The programme team having the capacity to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively.

   Which together would generate the outcome that the programme team understands what needs to be done to deliver integration and how to do it.

[11] HMG defines quality climate outcomes as including a) efficiency in providing the targeted benefits for adaptation /mitigation (ie value for money); b) influencing uptake of climate-smart practices on a longer- term basis, e.g. in implementing partners/partner governments; c) using innovative practices and approaches with the potential to build models for others to follow; and d) ensuring there is a chance for others to learn from programming or for this to be scaled-up.




**Figure 12: Initial delivery theory of change**

## 6.2 Background

From late 2017 programmes with integrated ICF have been required to use the Climate and Environment Smart Guide and to capture the planned climate benefits in the logframe. Progress against indicators in logframes is then assessed as part of the Annual Review along with recommendations for follow-up action and an analysis of learning. This gives the planned climate indicators a high level of visibility and helps to ensure that the intended outcomes are delivered.

Programmes with integrated ICF have been expected to report against at least one of the ICF KPIs. These are submitted annually to the ICF secretariat using an online system.

The inclusion of ICF KPIs in programme logframes depends largely on the focus of the programme. ICF KPIs are generally included in programme logframes where the programme's main (primary) objective is addressing climate change. Where a programme's main (primary) objective is not climate related, it is less likely that an ICF KPI will be included in the logframe. For example, an education programme that mainstreams climate considerations by building schools using materials that emit less GHG emissions is unlikely to include KPI 6 (GHG emissions reductions) in their logframe.

## 6.3 Evidence and analysis

The theory was investigated through 13 evaluation sub questions; the findings relating to these questions are described below together with the implications for the theory.

We have used the evidence to test the three CMOs which comprise the initial theory (shown in bold in in Figure 12 above):

- The focus on delivering the additional benefits of integration is retained through the implementation phase
- The programme team has the skills and knowledge to deliver additional benefits of integration effectively
- The programme team has the capacity to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively

These aspects of the theory were investigated through the in-depth review of 25 programmes with integrated ICF. We conducted interviews with 14 SROs and 8 advisors. We have also drawn on the descriptive analysis of programmes with integrated ICF in section 4 and analysis of reporting against the ICF KPIs.

It should be noted that we did not interview partner governments, funding partners or implementing partners.

## 6.4 The focus on delivering the additional benefits of integration is retained through the implementation phase

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** programme teams see the delivery of climate related benefits as important and there are systems in place to deliver the additional benefits of integration and where partner governments and funding partners share the ambition for additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and where implementing partners share ambitions and are required to secure additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits.

- **Then** the focus on delivering the additional benefits of integration are retained through the implementation phase
- **Which results in** the whole programme team being motivated to deliver the additional benefits from integration.

**We have found that:**

**F30. Partner governments may affect delivery if their priorities change during the lifetime of the programme, for example by heightening or reducing their climate focus and thus the level of resources they are prepared to devote to the programme**

In some cases, the level of priority devoted to climate change by partner governments has changed during the programme's implementation. This can result from a change of government or a new minister. New priorities can increase or reduce the commitment to climate change of a partner government.

> "*The new State Minister in charge of the programme appears highly committed."* Annual Review PSNP4

There are instances where programmes have been delayed because a promised budget change did not materialise, or the publication of a strategy was delayed.

Some SROs reported that partner governments' commitment can be affected by a recognition that the country is suffering from the effects of climate change.

> *" [country] has perennially suffered the effects of climate change and I think a point was reached where there was recognition of the fact it's time to put policies in place."* Interview SRO

However, in other cases, partner governments' attention to climate change can be adversely affected by natural disasters or other crises which are considered to present a more pressing need for resources.

We have seen no evidence of other funding partners influencing delivery directly once the funding has been agreed at design stage.

**F31. Implementing partners with climate expertise can provide valuable support and advice through the design and delivery of a programme**

Implementing partners have a key role in delivering the adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes of a programme and are contractually obliged to conduct the work which is expected to deliver those outcomes.

In some of the cases reviewed we found that implementing partners brought strong expertise in climate change and drove many of the innovations required to deliver the planned benefits.

> *It's really been our implementing team that's come up with the ideas of what it actually means and what it means to look at the [programme] through a climate lens, an environment lens.* Interview SRO

Implementing partners may have a particularly important role in the delivery of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits where there is not a climate advisor on the team or where they bring specialist skills or expertise. Some SROs felt that, because implementing partners had more specialist expertise in the sector or country, they may be able to provide more effective support than climate advisors.

> *"We generally derive a lot of our climate advice from [our partners] who are more directly working on [country]."* Interview SRO

**F32. Where indicators of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits are included in the logframe for a programme, they ensure that a strong focus is maintained on delivering those benefits**

Where effective indicators of the planned adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes are included in the logframe they encourage the delivery of those planned benefits.

> *"delivery against every single indicator there is on the log frame…certainly does have an impact on how we approach that… it makes sure that nothing drops off the agenda"* Interview SRO

DFID's systems ensure that they are reported in the Annual Reviews and the programme's performance against those indicators is monitored closely.

> *"In terms of mainstreaming ICF into climate change indicators into programme, the best way to ensure cooperation and compliance is to put this in the log frame and have this being collected at every Annual Review."* Interview SRO

**F33. Programme teams do not always include accurate indicators of the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in the logframe. In some cases, it is because the activities to address climate change risks and opportunities are not sufficiently well defined. In other cases, it is because it is hard to design effective indicators.**

Programme teams choose how to reflect the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in their logframes.

Only one of the 6 programmes approved during 2017 had included indicators of the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in the logframe (F24).

We know that some programme teams intend to add appropriate indicators to the logframe at a later stage, for example because they plan to design the activities to address climate change risks and opportunities during the inception phase of the programme.

Some programme teams include the intention to adopt indicators in the logframe itself; this should ensure that indicators of the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits are included in the logframe in due course. However, we are not aware of a system to ensure that this is done in all cases.

We found evidence that some integrated programmes have constructed logframe indicators that explicitly reflect the intended adaptation and/or mitigation benefits while others have used indicators of other benefits to reflect the planned climate benefits. In some cases, these indicators of other benefits do not explicitly recognise climate benefits. For example, some integrated programmes report the total number of beneficiaries against an indicator rather than disaggregating to show clearly those beneficiaries that have been directly supported against the effects of climate change. This risks diluting the focus of the logframe indicator in ensuring the delivery of the intended adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes and could, inadvertently, overstate the impact of the programme on climate change (see F34 below).

**F34. Programme teams do not always report against the ICF KPIs and where they do report against ICF KPIs these do not always provide an accurate reflection of the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits.**

41 of the 86 programmes with integrated ICF report in their logframe against at least one of the ICF KPIs. We do not have a full understanding of the reasons why all the other 45 programmes do not do so. However, the barriers include:

- Indicators may not be selected until some time after the programme has been approved and so may not have been in place at the time of this evaluation.
- Some programme teams find the process of developing indicators that align with the ICF KPIs challenging.
- The ICF indicators can be seen as a reporting requirement rather than providing useful management information to the programme team.
- The task of reporting against the ICF KPIs can be seen as onerous and some find the reporting system hard to use.
- Some felt that the guidance was too technical for people without a climate background to understand.

SROs work with advisors and partners to identify indicators that provide useful performance information and are practical to collect. Some programmes do not select indicators until the scope of the climate relevant work has been fully defined which may be a year or more after the programme starts.

However, in other cases, teams have found the process of developing the indicators challenging.

> "*How do you make sure that the indicator is one that fits nicely with the project and can be collected without too much difficulty*" Interview SRO

Many programmes use the results which would already be collected in the logframe to report against an ICF KPI. This can be a good indicator of the adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes or could have weaknesses (see finding F33 above).

Respondents reported that a common approach is to count up the number of beneficiaries of the programme and report that against ICF KPI1, the number of people supported to cope with the effects of climate change[12].

Several climate advisors felt that this approach to constructing ICF KPIs was inadequate and some felt that the guidance was too technical for people without a climate background to understand which meant that programme teams found a solution that was easy for them to deliver.

"*My biggest enemy is KPI 1 in the sense that people just count the number of beneficiaries in their programme and think that that is a way of counting the number of people helped to cope with the*

[12] The guidance for KPI1 explains that "*supporting people to cope with the effects of climate change requires the effects of climate change to be explicitly recognised and targeted by the programme in question*". This could be expected to involve some analysis to establish the number of beneficiaries of the programme that were vulnerable to the effects of climate change and the number that had been helped to cope with those effects by the programme. We have not seen evidence of such activity.

*impact of climate change. And the guidance is maybe a bit too technical for some advisors."* Interview advisor

> "*people will report on the ones that they think are the easiest to report on"* Interview advisor

This risks inadvertently overstating the impact of the programme on climate change.

The central ICF results team explained that their quality assurance process seeks to understand the underlying data that has been submitted by programmes and correct any over-statement of climate benefits. For example, when reviewing KPI 1 results data, the ICF central results team has focused on checking whether results reported are 'directly' constituting targeted support that intends to help people to adapt to the effects of climate change. Experience with several annual ICF results collections has typically led to a revising down of KPI 1 'direct' results which either get counted as KPI 1 'indirect' beneficiaries, or not counted against KPI 1 at all.

The programme team often consider the ICF indicators to be a reporting requirement rather than providing useful management information.

During delivery, programmes with integrated ICF report ICF KPI results to the ICF Secretariat in a separate system to DFID's SDP results. We don't know why the systems are separate. Those involved described the ICF system as "*clunky*" and "*rather hard work*".

> *The ICF reporting is a bit cumbersome so usually it's a rough estimate.* Interview SRO

> *Some of those indicators for the ICF, are very complex, they're very specific. They need people who are comfortable, and confident to explain the full [inaudible 00:52:31] approach to resilience, et cetera, et cetera. Who have got that breadth of understanding as to other countries, who are reporting on the same things. How they tackled some of the problems.* Interview, climate advisor

ICF reporting can be seen as a task for the climate advisor who may not be closely involved with the programme delivery.

*I think the ICF platforms can only give access to the climate advisor[13], so you end up being the one putting it into that platform and that is a lot of work.* Interview advisor

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***The integration of ICF can, where effective indicators (F32) are used and teams comply with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide (F32), help to ensure that the planned benefits are included in the logframe.***
- ***Programme teams are motivated to deliver climate benefits to poor and vulnerable people (F13); where indicators are included in the logframe (F23) this helps to maintain the team's focus on delivering those benefits.***

[13] This perception is incorrect; access to the ICF platform can be provided to any designated individual

## 6.5 The programme team has the capacity, skills and knowledge to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** trusted evidence about the benefits of climate action is available, guidance and advice from climate and environment advisors and the central DFID ICF team continues to be available through implementation and programme teams have the capacity to manage integrated programmes adaptively and implementing partners have the capacity to utilise guidance and advice effectively.
- **Then** programme teams have the skills and knowledge to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively

And…

- **Where** climate and environment advisors have sufficient capacity to support programme teams
- **Then** programme teams have the capacity to deliver the additional benefits of integration effectively

- **Which both support** the programme team in understanding what needs to be done and how to do it to deliver integration

**We have found that:**

**F35. The implementing partner will often bring the expertise necessary for the delivery of the climate change elements of integrated programmes. Climate advisors can support SROs in the delivery of programmes by helping them to brief the implementing partners. When they are based in the office climate advisors also provide ad hoc advice and support to programme teams.**

During delivery it is often implementing partners which are responsible for achieving outcomes and for resolving difficulties. They are frequently selected on the basis of their commitment to and experience in delivering climate change related work, so programme teams rely on their knowledge and expertise. Implementing partners supply the data and information which are used to report to funders and partner governments. The climate advisor can help to brief the implementing partner and ensure they understand the climate change requirements of the programme.

> *We had our climate advisor meet with our implementing partner team to discuss what it meant to include ICF KPI's … bringing the big picture to them and then the technical team go in and work on the actual nitty gritty of what it means for our particular programme*. Interview SRO

If the climate advisor is part of the team and/or in the office, they are able to help with any issues which may arise during delivery of climate related work. This is often through informal, water-cooler type conversations, during which an advisor may pick up on how a programme is progressing and hear about problems with which they might be able to offer help.

> *"I think certainly having a climate change advisor based in the office helped…. to define [the] area we could possibly intervene on*." Interview SRO

All advisors are expected to provide 10% of their time to work on programmes that are not part of their core responsibilities. One programme team described taking take advantage of this to secure the support of climate advisors during delivery to review and provide quality assurance for individual reports.

> *We would look at trying to procure some of that 10% advice from other climate change advisors with DFID, to look at the individual climate vulnerability assessments once they come in.* Interview SRO

**F36. Climate advisors can support programme teams in monitoring the delivery of the climate change related activities and in reporting the ICF KPIs to the ICF secretariat.**

There are three elements to the ICF reporting role, which the climate advisor normally carries out: inclusion and calculation of ICF at Business Case stage, encouraging teams to supply data for indicators during delivery, and submitting data to the Secretariat.

> *"…whenever there are any ICF updates or anything like that [the climate advisor] will go round and make sure that all the SROs who have got ICF funding are aware of what's going on and are keeping up to date."* Interview SRO

The process for including or not including a climate advisor on the team is not clear. It appears, from interviews with SROs, that it is up to the SRO whether to consult an advisor at all, to use him or her on an ad hoc basis, or to involve him or her as part of the programme team.

Where an advisor is available and has the capacity to get involved, he or she can maintain the focus on climate outcomes and help with climate-related issues which may arise. There was also an example of a visit to a country office from a UK based climate advisor, who was able to spread the climate message and keep attention on climate outcomes, which encourages learning.

> *"We had [a UK climate advisor] come out recently, s/he has been able to give some quite clear messages to the head of office, who was very engaged."* Interview climate advisor

**F37. The central DFID ICF team produced the Climate and Environment Smart Guide, they attend cadre events, encourage sharing of information and provide general guidance and support. They do not normally get involved with programmes directly.**

Aside from receiving the submission of ICF KPIs, the central DFID ICF team does not seem to be involved with individual programmes. We found no evidence of feedback being provided to programme teams based on their reports to the ICF Secretariat.

> *"my contact [with the central DFID ICF team] really has just been around reporting results"* Interview SRO

**F38. ICF budgets have been changed during the lifetime of a programme. In some cases this reflected changes in the resources devoted to actions designed to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. In other cases, the amount of ICF has been changed because it was not confirmed or incorrectly estimated at the start, so the change had no effect on the scope of the work being delivered.**

It is quite common for the amount of ICF allocated to the programme not to be determined until after the Business Case is approved. The budget for ICF may be indicated as a likely range, for example 25-40%. The final amount of ICF may not be decided until much later, though it is not clear exactly how such decisions are made. Calculations are normally done by the climate advisors, who seem confident in following the guidance. Where there is no climate advisor, SROs usually work out the figures, but documents indicate that calculations may be rather crude and the resultant figures may be quite rough estimates, as is the nature of the budgeting process.

There are examples of changes in the ICF amount, percentage and weighting, made during delivery, which reflect changes in the programme. The process for making these changes is not explained in the documents, although the SRO is ultimately responsible for all actions on the programme so would sign off any changes. It is not clear whether a climate advisor or the ICF Secretariat is involved or informed.

**F39. Climate advisors have limited time available to them and are not able to support all the programmes that they would like to. In some cases, implementing partners and other members of the programme team can provide climate expertise**

Most of the climate advisors that we interviewed felt that they did not have enough time to provide the as much support as they would have liked to integrated programmes. Some had extensive responsibilities on full ICF programmes and all felt the need to prioritise their input.

As noted above, programme teams can secure expertise from implementing partners, so they may be able to address this potential gap in other ways. Often non-climate members of programme teams bring valuable experience (from past programmes) and professional expertise which helps to ensure the effective delivery of actions to address climate change.

We also found that some SROs took a personal interest in climate change and had a good understanding of the climate change risks and opportunities that affect the beneficiaries of their programmes (F13).

Some interviewees told us that integration can lead to the perception that there is less need for climate advisors as they will no longer have dedicated climate programmes to manage. One advisor told us that they will be leaving their post next year and will not be replaced. It should be noted that advisors in other cadres (e.g. infrastructure, livelihoods, etc.) are also engaged on climate programming, so, even in the absence of a climate and environment advisor, there is likely to be some access to support.

> *"The head of office decides on whether there will be a climate advisor in the office. They match advisory capacity to the types of programmes but integration changes this because there are fewer climate programmes and more programmes in other areas that have climate integrated into them. Way too many heads of office conclude that they will just draw in the expertise when required rather than having a dedicated resource. This leads to less and less demand for climate advisors in country as the role is diffuse."* Interview advisor

Climate advisors also support programme teams in accessing the ICF systems (for example calculating the proportion of ICF or reporting against ICF KPIs). Where there is not a climate advisor on the team we have not seen a detailed assessment of the proportion of ICF.

**In conclusion we have found that:**

- ***Having a climate advisor on the team can make a difference to the delivery of climate benefits as they are able to help programme teams through briefing implementing partners and dealing with queries as they arise (F35).***

- ***Climate advisors are short of time and are not available in all offices; this presents a risk to the delivery of planned climate benefits (F39).***

### 6.6 Revised theory of change for delivery of additional climate benefits

This section draws on the findings and conclusions above to refine the initial theory of change:

Considering the three elements of the initial theory in turn:

**Programme teams are motivated to deliver integration through raised awareness within DFID of the importance of integration, both for delivering high quality outcomes and in the UK political context. Integration may also align with partner government priorities further motivating programme teams. Implementing partners and funding partners are aware of these priorities and agree to deliver integrated programmes.**

As identified in section 5, programme teams are principally motivated to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits to poor and vulnerable people and to support DFID's priorities. Those benefits can be delivered, and DFID's priorities can be supported, by including actions to address climate change risks and opportunities. Integration is not seen as having value in itself; it is more often seen as a way of accounting for the money.

Continuing support from partner governments is essential to the delivery of the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits (F30).

Implementing partners can play an important role in delivery bringing climate change expertise and helping to drive innovation. In many cases, they have a role in designing the actions to address climate change risks and opportunities. This gives them more influence over the successful delivery of the benefits than was suggested by the initial theory (F31, F35, F39).

**The provision of support from climate and environment advisors on how to address climate risks and opportunities during programme implementation, and guidance from the central DFID ICF team, builds programme teams' skills and knowledge and so their capacity to deliver integration.**

There was considerable evidence that climate and environment advisors play an important role in building programme teams' capacity to deliver adaptation and mitigation outcomes through;

- Helping to brief and supervise implementing partners (F35)
- Helping programme teams to construct indicators, report against ICF KPIs and to secure useful evidence and information (including from the central ICF secretariat) (F36)

The data collected by the central DFID ICF team do not seem to be used to provide feedback or guidance to programme teams directly (F37).

In the absence of a climate advisor, the implementing partner may bring climate change expertise (F39).

**Systems are put in place or upgraded to monitor and support the effective delivery of integrated programmes. The central DFID ICF team aims to generate further evidence about the additional benefits of integration and how it can be delivered effectively which further motivates and builds the skills of programme teams. Evidence also helps to secure the continuing support of partner governments, implementing partners and funding partners.**

The inclusion of the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in the logframe can be expected to motivate programme teams and keep their focus on delivering those benefits. We have identified three different ways in which DFID's systems operate (F23, F32, F33, F34):

1. **Where** the actions to address climate change risks and opportunities are central to the programme and where the programme team sees value in monitoring the delivery of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits **then** they are motivated to work with climate experts and devote the effort required to develop indicators that effectively monitor the delivery of those benefits. **This is likely to** support the effective delivery of integrated programmes.
2. **Where** there is an intention to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities which will be developed further during the inception phase of the programme **then** it's too soon to develop indicators for inclusion in the logframe; however, the programme team has an intention to do so. **This should result in** effective indicators being included in the logframe if the benefits are included in the logframe as planned. However, there is a risk that indicators will not be included and, if they are, that they might not be effective.
3. **Where** there are indicators in the logframe which could be considered to reflect the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, and which could be adapted as ICF KPIs with less effort than developing additional indicators and where developing additional indicators is considered challenging **then** programme teams may adapt existing logframe indicators as proxies for the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. **This could result in** indicators which do not accurately reflect the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and presents a risk that the programme team will not focus on delivering the climate benefits and could overstate the reported climate change impacts.

The choice of appropriate indicators and their inclusion in the logframe is a key factor in the delivery of additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. Therefore, we have developed an "indicators" theory of change to explain how and in what circumstances this process works. This is shown in Figure 13 below.




**Figure 13: Revised indicators theory of change**

We did not find that evidence about the benefits of programmes with integrated ICF was being used during implementation to motivate and build the skills of programme teams or to secure the continuing support of partner governments, funders and implementing partners.

Based on this analysis we have revised the delivery theory as follows:

- **Where** programme teams remain motivated to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits to poor and vulnerable people, implementing partners share that motivation, and the support of partner governments is maintained
- **Then** the whole programme team is motivated to deliver the additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits.

And…

- **Where** there is an advisor or implementing partner with climate expertise on the team
- **Then** the team has the capability to deliver the planned benefits.

And…

- **Where** indicators that accurately reflect the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits have been included in the logframe.
- **Then** the team's focus on delivering the planned benefits is maintained.

**Together these three elements result in programme teams being more likely to deliver quality integrated programmes that provide additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.**

This revised delivery theory is shown in figure 14 below:




**Figure 14: Revised delivery theory of change**

The potential to deliver quality integrated programmes can be compromised in three ways:

- **Where** the priorities of partner governments change (through political changes or external factors such as a natural disaster) **then** the priorities for development aid may change **which results in** resources potentially being diverted from action to address climate change risks and opportunities to other activities.
- **Where** the action to address climate change risks and opportunities is intended to be defined at the inception stage but expertise is not available to the team (either through a climate advisor or through an implementing partner) **then** there may not be sufficient skills and expertise to design actions that deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits **which could result in** actions to address climate change risks and opportunities not being integrated into programmes.
- **Where** it is challenging to design indicators to reflect the additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and there are existing indicators which could be adapted and where there isn't climate advice available to the team **then** programme teams may use those indicators as proxies for the planned benefits **which could result in** the adoption of indicators which do not properly reflect the actual benefits delivered.

## 6.7 Conclusions

These conclusions address the evaluation question:

**In what circumstances and how are integrated programmes likely to be delivered to achieve the anticipated benefits?**

Integrated programmes are more likely to be delivered to achieve the anticipated benefits where the planned benefits have been included in the logframe (F23) and where the team has access to climate expertise (either through a climate advisor or the implementing partner) (F35 and F36).

**In what circumstances and why are they not likely to do so?**

Where logframe indicators have been adapted from other non-climate indicators they may not properly reflect the planned climate benefits (F33). In these cases, there is a risk that the delivery of climate benefits will not be monitored effectively. It is possible that programmes will deliver climate related benefits regardless; however, the positive effect of monitoring performance will not be secured.

The anticipated benefits may not be achieved if partner governments' priorities change during the life of a programme to reduce the priority placed on climate change (F30).

# 7 Does the integration of ICF support progress towards DFID transformation, in what ways and in what circumstances, why or why not? What else could be done, by whom and how, to further support transformation across the DFID ODA portfolio?

## 7.1 Initial transformation theory

The definition of transformation was developed collaboratively by the evaluation team and the ESG:

*A systematic and sustained consideration of climate change risks and opportunities to address climate change across DFID's work. This would be characterised by the integration of action on climate change across a broad range of sectors and would ultimately influence partners and partner governments to be ambitious in addressing climate change.*

Transformation would be achieved through a combination of:

1. Bottom up change where integration becomes widespread in specific DFID programmes due to:
   - Evidence that integrated ICF delivers additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and supports programme managers' priorities motivates programme managers to integrate ICF in more programmes because they believe it delivers better outcomes for beneficiaries and they or their colleagues have had a good experience.
   - Systems and advice increase programme managers' capacity to integrate ICF in their programmes.
2. Top down change where senior managers support systemic change to deliver mainstreaming across DFID's activities because they are convinced by the evidence that:
   - Mainstreaming can support strategic priorities.
   - They need to take action to secure the full benefits of mainstreaming.

This theory is illustrated overleaf in Figure 15. This diagram shows how groups of contexts were expected to work together to trigger four key mechanisms which in turn would generate the outcomes of bottom up and top down change.




**Figure 15: Initial DFID transformation theory of change**

## 7.2 Evidence and analysis

The theory was investigated through 5 evaluation sub-questions; the findings relating to these questions are described below together with the implications for the theory. Where relevant we also reference evidence from sections 4, 5 and 6 above.

We have used the evidence to test the three CMOs which comprise the initial theory (shown in bold in Figure 17 above):

- Integration becomes widespread in specific DFID programmes (bottom up) because:
    - Programme managers are motivated to integrate ICF in more programmes because they believe it delivers better outcomes for beneficiaries and they (or their colleagues) have had a good experience.
    - Programme managers' capacity to integrate ICF in their programmes is increased because there is reliable advice and evidence and effective systems.
- Senior managers support systemic change to deliver mainstreaming across DFID's activities (top down) because:
    - Senior managers are convinced by the evidence that mainstreaming can support strategic priorities.
    - Senior managers are convinced by the evidence that they need to take action to secure the full benefits of mainstreaming.
- These two outcomes support and reinforce each other leading to transformation within DFID[14] (the mechanism for this was not clearly defined in the initial theory).

These aspects of the theory were investigated through the in-depth review of 25 programmes with integrated. We conducted interviews with 16 SROs and 8 advisors. We have also drawn on the descriptive analysis of programmes with integrated ICF in section 4. As noted in the Limitations (section 3.3) no interviews were conducted with senior managers.

## 7.3 Integration becomes widespread in specific DFID programmes (bottom up)

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** there is evidence that integrated ICF supports additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts and supports programme managers' priorities and where some programme managers have changed behaviour and are seen as trailblazers
- **Then** programme managers are motivated to integrate ICF in programmes because they believe it delivers better outcomes for beneficiaries and they (or their colleagues) have had a good experience.

And…

- **Where** DFID learns about challenges of integration and develops strategies to overcome them and systems are developed that support integration effectively and accessible advice and expertise is provided to programme managers to support integration
- **Then** programme managers' capacity to integrate ICF in their programmes is increased because there is reliable advice and evidence and effective systems

[14] Defined as *"A systematic and sustained consideration of climate change risks and opportunities to address climate change across DFID's work. This would be characterised by the integration of action on climate change across a broad range of sectors and would ultimately influence partners and partner governments to be ambitious in addressing climate change."*

- **With the result that** integration becomes widespread in specific DFID programmes

We found that:

**F40. Professionally and personally, programme teams with integrated ICF are proud of the benefits they are delivering and more strongly motivated to mainstream actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in future programmes.**

The SROs that we interviewed were enthusiastic about the potential for their programmes to provide adaptation and/or mitigation benefits to poor and vulnerable people (it should be borne in mind that most interviewees had included actions to address climate change risks and opportunities).

> *"It's a very good story…having a program that has long term development funding and then your humanitarian budget is covered by climate funding because we're responding to weather and climate shocks."* Interview SRO

One climate advisor reported that, after initial reluctance, programme teams communicated the benefits of integrated programmes enthusiastically.

> *They really enjoyed getting out there, and talking more about the work they've been doing, and how it's been contributing to this global challenge.* Interview advisor

Alignment with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide is normally promoted by the climate advisor, although since the Smart Rules were changed in late 2017, the SRO is ultimately responsible. In these cases, although integration of ICF could have been seen as burdensome, it has little effect on the SRO or on the core programme team, many of whom perceive themselves as being motivated to mainstream climate change regardless of ICF integration.

**F41. Where teams have successfully integrated ICF they have learned from their experience and have mainstreamed actions to address climate change risks and opportunities into future programmes in their sector.**

The most powerful examples of learning from the experience of mainstreaming have been from one iteration of a programme to another; Business Cases cite evidence from earlier phases of a programme to support continued, or increasing, actions to address climate change risks and opportunities:

> *PSNP 4 public works will build on the significant achievements seen under PSNP 3, while incorporating changes to address those areas where the suitability or quality of works need improvement. These changes include modifications designed to further increase the contribution of public works to climate change adaptation* Business Case, PSNP4 Ethiopia

In one sector there is an example of ICF integration supporting transformation within a sector; using additional funding from the International Climate Fund:

- The programme secured additional funding from the International Climate Fund to integrate innovative and ambitious actions to address climate change risks and opportunities within their programme. This was demonstrated to have made a positive contribution to the work of the programme to provide benefits to poor and vulnerable people.

- Professionally and personally, the programme team was proud of what they had achieved, and others were interested in what they had done. This motivated them to communicate the results through DFID's cadre system and more widely in the development community.
- As a result, the approach piloted in the integrated programme has been replicated many times within the sector and is now seen as standard practice.

There are also examples of integrated ICF being used to support technical assistance to assist partner governments to build their capacity to address climate change risks. This has the potential to support transformation in those partner governments:

> *"One of the things was distinct that the ICF were able to do was the mainstreaming of climate change and disaster relief management into national policy. Through our partnership with [partner], we were able to have climate change and disaster relief management mainstreamed right into the medium-term plan of the government. I think that was one of the major things that you could say was different."* Interview SRO

Before 2015, when ICF was a separate fund to which programmes had to apply, the money was "extra" and could be seen to be making it possible to achieve more adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. Now that there is no separate access to ICF, the general perception is that the money is no longer extra. Integrating ICF is instead seen by many as an accounting activity designed to meet targets, both international and internal to DFID. There are few incentives to integrate ICF, and the process can be viewed as optional.

> *"I think before, when it was additional I think it did make a difference. Country officers were desperately trying to tick the climate change box to be able to access the funds so there was a different incentive. I think the incentive now is very much on the communications of your program."* Interview SRO

***In conclusion we have found that* integrated *ICF has supported transformation within individual sectors by providing funding for new approaches which, when they proved successful, became widespread (F41).***

## 7.4 Senior managers support systemic change to deliver mainstreaming across DFID's activities and partners (top down)

The initial theory was that:

- **Where** there is evidence that integrating ICF delivers additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, supports DFID's strategic priorities and helps to meet UK financial commitments and the evidence is communicated effectively with senior management and evidence is available to show that top-down action is needed to secure the full benefits of integration.
- **Then** senior managers are convinced by the evidence that mainstreaming can support strategic priorities and that they need to take action to secure the full benefits of mainstreaming.
- **With the result that** senior managers support systemic change to deliver mainstreaming across DFID's activities and partners

No interviews could be conducted with senior managers for this study and there was no documentary evidence of their motivation for supporting mainstreaming or why interviewees felt that it had diminished over the last few years. Therefore, we have no evidence to help us to address this question.

**F42. There could be opportunities to embed mainstreaming in DFID's processes.**

Interviewees suggested that mainstreaming could be integrated in management processes; for example, by including mainstreaming in the agenda for country office team meetings. One office has regular meetings for all staff where programmes at the design stage are presented; this provides an opportunity for advisors to suggest integrating ICF.

> *"it would be great to see heads of office saying to their advisers, "Look, climate is a cross-cutting issue. We're going to have this as a standing item on SMT every three months to assess how we're doing on climate-relevance,".* Interview climate advisor

We have seen that where the Business Case template requires programme teams to answer a specific question, the matter is given attention. A specific question in the Business Case template on addressing climate change risks and opportunities could be an effective way to support transformation.

> *"....the old policy of having an obligatory set of sections on climate environment to respond to* [in the Business Case template], *perhaps would have been the lever, you know, to that kind of conversation because people are forced to write something.* Interview SRO

## 7.5 The top down and bottom up outcomes support each other resulting in DFID transformation

The initial theory for this aspect of DFID transformation was not fully developed at the inception stage. We don't have any evidence about whether and how bottom up outcomes support top down transformation, but we do have evidence that top down outcomes could support bottom up transformation.

**F43. Programme teams pay attention to the public statements of senior managers and set their own priorities accordingly.**

Many of the SROs and advisors that we interviewed spoke about paying close attention to the priorities as expressed by DFID ministers and directors. When the Secretary of State or other ministers and members of the top management group of DFID civil servants talk about climate priorities, ask questions on climate change related subjects during visits, deliver strong encouragement to engage with climate change, this has a powerful effect on programme teams' enthusiasm and commitment towards achieving more adaptation and/or mitigation benefits.

> *"I guess it would be interesting to give some thought to what DFID more centrally, is thinking about in terms of the whole kind of climate change and so on. I'm not sure at the moment what kind of level of priority it's being accorded*." SRO interview

When heads of office and other senior management give sustained attention and high priority to addressing climate risks (F15) and opportunities (such as by setting country targets) (F16), it is more likely that SROs will mainstream climate and/or integrate ICF.

***In conclusion we have found that consistent, sustained communication from top management of the importance of addressing climate change risks and opportunities is essential for DFID transformation because programme teams pay close attention to those communications and are sensitive to changes in apparent priorities (F19, F43).***

## 7.6 Revised theory of change for transformation

This section draws on the findings and conclusions above to refine the initial theory of change:

Considering the three elements of the initial theory in turn:

**Integration becomes widespread in specific DFID programmes (bottom up) because:**

- **Programme managers are motivated to integrate ICF in more programmes because they believe it delivers better outcomes for beneficiaries and they (or their colleagues) have had a good experience.**
- **Programme managers' capacity to integrate ICF in their programmes is increased because there is reliable advice and evidence and effective systems.**

As identified in earlier sections; programme managers are motivated to mainstream action to address climate change risks and opportunities rather than by integration of ICF.

Finding F40 supports the theory that successful mainstreaming motivates programme managers to mainstream actions to address climate change risks and opportunities on future programmes.

Finding F41 refines the theory to apply it specifically to programmes in the sector concerned rather than across DFID more widely.

Finding F40 also confirms the role of evidence about the effectiveness of mainstreaming in the sector in bottom up transformation. However, we don't have evidence to support the role of advice and systems.

Therefore, we have revised the theory as follows:

Mainstreaming becomes widespread in specific DFID sectors (bottom up) because programme managers are motivated to integrate ICF in more programmes because they have evidence that it delivers better outcomes for beneficiaries in their sectors and they (or their colleagues) have had a good experience.

**Senior managers support systemic change to deliver mainstreaming across DFID's activities (top down) because:**

- **Senior managers are convinced by the evidence that mainstreaming can support strategic priorities.**
- **Senior managers are convinced by the evidence that they need to take action to secure the full benefits of mainstreaming.**

We have not been able to test this element of the transformation theory so it should still be considered as a hypothesis.

**These two outcomes support and reinforce each other leading to transformation within DFID.**

We have evidence that senior management support for mainstreaming helps to support bottom up transformation (F43) but we don't have evidence that bottom up transformation helps to secure top management support. Therefore, we have revised the theory as follows:

Senior management support motivates programme teams to mainstream climate change activities in their sector. It is possible that evidence from those activities could help to convince senior managers of the need to act to secure the full benefits of mainstreaming.

The revised theory of change is shown in Figure 16 below:




**Figure 16: Revised transformation theory**

## 7.7 Conclusions

These conclusions address the two parts of the evaluation question:

**Does the integration of ICF support progress towards DFID transformation, in what ways and in what circumstances, why or why not?**

In some sectors, ICF has supported progress towards DFID transformation by providing funding for programmes to pilot new approaches which, when they proved successful, became widespread (F41).

The current funding approach and the perception that there is no additional money available for integrated ICF can present an obstacle to integration and could slow progress towards DFID transformation (F18).

**What else could be done, by whom and how to further support transformation across the DFID ODA portfolio?**

- Transformation would be further supported if DFID's senior management regularly and consistently communicated the importance of mainstreaming climate change across DFID's programming (F43).
- Heads of office could play a part in encouraging programme teams to mainstream action to deliver additional climate benefits (F15).
- Transformation would be further supported if there were climate advisors in each office with sufficient time to support programme teams to mainstream actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and to integrate ICF (F22).
- Consideration of climate change risks and opportunities could be embedded in office management and Business Case development processes (F42).

### 7.8 What can be learned, by whom, from the experience of integrating ICF to help to improve future design and management of integrated climate finance programmes including ICF projects, programmes and the portfolio as a whole in order to improve outcomes?

Because integrating ICF is a fairly new approach and people are still learning what works the planned engagement and use strategy for this work will be important to share learning and engage more widely within DFID to increase the level and quality of ICF integration. Key audiences included are:

- The ICF team within DFID to understand more about how the integration of ICF could be improved.
- Heads of office so that they understand that they have a key role in supporting the mainstreaming of climate change activities and the integration of ICF.
- Climate advisors to understand more about the motivations of teams to mainstream actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and how they can use the integration of ICF to secure additional climate benefits.

Programmes would be more likely to integrate ICF deliver additional benefits if:

- There was more clarity about the funding arrangements, so programme designers were confident that they were accessing funds dedicated to the delivery of climate benefits.
- All heads of office actively encouraged programme teams to mainstream action to address climate change and include ICF in their programming.
- The benefits to poor and vulnerable people of mainstreaming climate change in specific sectors were communicated more widely within DFID to encourage a greater take up in more sectors.
- Climate expertise was available to all programmes

Transformation would be further supported if:

- DFID's senior management regularly and consistently communicated the importance of mainstreaming climate change across DFID's programming.
- A specific funding allocation was made available to programmes to pilot innovative approaches to mainstreaming actions to address climate change.
- The results of innovative approaches were communicated within and between sectors with encouragement to replicate successful approaches using ICF.

## 8 Overarching question

The overarching evaluation question is:

*"In what circumstances and how has climate finance integration supported progress towards transformational change within the wider DFID portfolio, and towards more effective delivery of climate change outcomes than would have been achieved without integration?*

*What can we learn from these different examples of integration to improve the approach taken in delivery of International Climate Finance more broadly?"*

This section deals with the first part of the question. The second part of the question is addressed in section 9, key conclusions and recommendations.

## 8.1 Initial theory

The initial theory was developed collaboratively by the evaluation team and the ESG to address the first part of the evaluation question. It is shown in Figure 17 below.




Figure 17: Initial overarching theory

This overarching theory was explored through investigating three component theories – additionality, design and transformation which are discussed in sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 above. This section draws together the relevant findings from those sections to test and revise the overarching theory.

## 8.2 Analysis and theory revision

**1. The initial theory was that:**

Programme teams design quality integrated programmes that are intended to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes because:

- Where programme teams consider that programmes are likely to be able to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits they enhance the design to deliver benefits that would not have been achieved without integration, using trusted advice and guidance.
- Programme teams are motivated to enhance the design of their programmes because they understand the climate change risks and opportunities for their programme, are confident that ICF integration can achieve better outcomes for beneficiaries and/or because it boosts professional pride and contributes to corporate objectives/priorities for their team/office department.

We found that:

- Programme teams can be motivated to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes by DFID's priorities (F12), the benefits to poor and vulnerable people (F13) and (where relevant) by the priorities of partner governments (F14).
- Programme teams can be motivated to integrate ICF in their programmes by encouragement from the head of office (F16) and climate advisors (F20). Where the SRO is open to considering additional opportunities to address climate change risks and opportunities and where there is climate expertise available, programme teams may be motivated to design their programmes to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes (F28).

**Therefore:**

- o **The process of integrating ICF can provide an opportunity for programme teams to consider how they can design their programmes to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.**
- o **Programme teams are more likely to integrate ICF in their programmes where the head of office provides strong support for mainstreaming and integration (for example, in the form of targets for the amount of ICF).**

We also found that:

- Climate advisors can play an important role in supporting programme teams to identify actions to address climate change risks and opportunities and in encouraging them to integrate ICF (F22).
- Having a climate advisor in the office can help to stimulate more action because they are able to engage regularly and informally (F22).

**Therefore; where there is a climate advisor in the office, programme teams are more likely to integrate ICF and the process of integrating ICF is likely to result in more impact.**

**2. The initial theory was that**

Integrated programmes deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits effectively because:

- o Programme teams are motivated to deliver integration through raised awareness within DFID of the importance of integration, both for delivering high quality outcomes and in the UK political context.
- o Systems are put in place or upgraded to monitor and support the effective delivery of integrated programmes. The central DFID ICF team aims to generate further evidence about the additional benefits of integration and how it can be delivered effectively which further motivates and builds the skills of programme teams. Evidence also helps to secure the continuing support of partner governments, implementing partners and funding partners.
- o The provision of support from climate and environment advisors on how to address climate risks and opportunities during programme implementation, and guidance from the central DFID ICF team builds programme teams' skills and knowledge and so their capacity to deliver integration.
- o Integration may align with partner government priorities further motivating programme teams. Implementing partners and funding partners are aware of these priorities and agree to deliver integrated programmes.

We found that

- The inclusion of the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits in the logframe is required where ICF is integrated and can be expected to motivate programme teams and keep their focus on delivering those benefits (F23, F32).

**Therefore; integration is not, in itself, a motivation for delivery of climate benefits but, through the process of including benefits in the logframe, integration can support the delivery of those benefits.**

We also found that:

- Climate advisors play an important role in ensuring that programmes with integrated ICF are delivered effectively by helping to brief and supervise implementing partners (F35).
- Climate advisors help programme teams to construct indicators, report against ICF KPIs and to secure useful evidence and information (including from the central ICF secretariat) (F36).

**Therefore; the process of integrating ICF provides an opportunity for programme teams and climate experts to work together to consider how they can design their programmes to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes.**

3. **The initial theory was that:**
Increasing senior decision maker support and programme team capacity combine in an ongoing process of transformation because:
   - ICF integration builds the awareness and buy-in of senior management regarding climate change mainstreaming. This is based on evidence that climate change integration delivers additional benefits which support DFID's strategic priorities and the existence of UK financial commitments to provide these benefits.
   - ICF integration builds the knowledge and capacity of programme teams to consider climate change risks and opportunities and how they can be addressed across the whole of DFID's ODA.

We found that:

- Professionally and personally, programme teams with integrated ICF are proud of the benefits they are delivering and more strongly motivated to mainstream actions to address climate change risks and opportunities in future programmes (F40).
- Where teams have successfully integrated ICF they have learned from their experience and have mainstreamed actions to address climate change risks and opportunities into future programmes in their sector (F41).

Although we have no evidence about whether and how ICF integration influences senior management we found that:

- Programme teams pay attention to the public statements of senior managers and set their own priorities accordingly (F43).

**Therefore, ICF integration has supported increased mainstreaming within DFID's programming for individual sectors and it would be possible for senior managers to influence programme teams to increase the level of mainstreaming.**

4. **The initial theory was that:**
Together, these three elements result in DFID transformation; a systematic and sustained consideration of climate change risks and opportunities to address climate change across

DFID's work, integrating action on climate change across a broad range of sectors and influencing partners and partner governments to be ambitious in addressing climate change.

We don't have evidence that there is a sustained and systematic consideration of climate change risks and opportunities across DFID's work or that climate change has been mainstreamed across a broad range of sectors.

We have revised the overarching theory as follows:

- **Where** there is support from the head of office for integrating ICF and there is climate expertise available to support programme teams
- **Then** the process of integrating ICF provides an opportunity for programme teams to engage with climate expertise
- **Which results in** SROs considering how they can do more to address climate change risks and opportunities and potentially including additional actions to deliver climate benefits in their programmes.

And…

- **Where** programme teams comply with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide and include the planned climate benefits in the logframe
- **Then** the programme team maintains a focus on delivering the planned benefits
- **With the result that** the planned benefits of mainstreaming action to address climate change are more likely to be delivered.

The revised overarching theory of change is shown in Figure 18 below:




Figure 18: Revised overarching theory of change

## 8.3 Conclusions

***In conclusion we have found that:***

1. ***Where heads of office encourage, or set targets for, the integration of ICF this can stimulate programme teams to work with climate experts to explore how they can do more to address climate change risks and opportunities in their programmes. This appears to have supported DFID transformation in some sectors as, where programmes successfully adopted new approaches, these approaches have been adopted by more teams until they have become widespread in a sector. However, where there are established approaches to address climate change and where climate expertise was not used, programme teams may integrate ICF without including actions to deliver additional climate benefits.***
2. ***The Smart Rules require programmes with integrated ICF to comply with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide (from late 2017) and include planned climate benefits in the logframe. Where this requirement is complied with and the logframe indicators properly reflect the planned climate benefits, programme teams will be more motivated to deliver those benefits.***

# 9 Key conclusions and recommendations

The main conclusions arising from this report are shown below together with recommendations for actions that could be taken to increase the extent of integration and mainstreaming:

1. **Programme teams are motivated to integrate ICF when there are strong messages from the head of office, including targets. Although there were strong messages in the past this seems to have a lower priority now.**

   We recommend that the DFID ICF team should work with heads of office to encourage them to communicate the importance of integrating ICF within their programmes. The DFID ICF team should support heads of office in setting appropriate targets for the integration of ICF in their programming.

2. **Integration of ICF provides an opportunity to include additional actions in programmes to address climate change risks and opportunities.**

   To make the most of this opportunity we recommend that the requirement to follow the Climate and Environment Smart Guide should be checked during the approval process. Where programmes plan to include the adaptation or mitigation benefits in the logframe at a later date this should be followed up to check that it has been done.

3. **ICF integration helps to secure the delivery of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits through the inclusion of the planned benefits in the logframe; however, there are cases where the indicators do not accurately reflect the planned benefits.**

   We recommend that further guidance is given to programme teams on how indicators can be constructed to most effectively reflect the planned benefits. This should be reviewed by the climate advisor as part of the programme design process.

4. **The benefits of indicators (identified above) are less likely to be secured because the current system of reporting ICF indicators is cumbersome and allows consideration of the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits to be "outsourced" to the climate advisor.**

   We recommend that the DFID ICF team considers whether this is necessary if planned benefits are included in the logframe and, if it is necessary, reviewing the system to reduce the reporting burden.

5. **Climate advisors (or other climate experts) are crucial to widespread integration of ICF and their influence is most effective when they are present in the local office. Some offices are choosing to dispense with climate advisors**.

   We recommend that the DFID ICF team works with the Head of the Climate and Environment Profession to make the case for all offices to have climate advisors in house.

6. **Where sectors have a relatively high level of integration of ICF and mainstreaming of climate change they draw on evidence of past successful programmes some of which received funding for mainstreaming from outside the office or department budget.**

   We recommend that consideration is given to providing funding in addition to office or department budgets to support innovative approaches to mainstreaming, particularly in sectors that have a relatively low level of integration of ICF.

7. **The perception that integrated ICF does not represent extra money for programmes is an obstacle to greater levels of integration.**

   We recommend that the position communicated clearly throughout DFID. The DFID ICF team should provide guidance and support to heads of office and department to help them to ensure they contribute to the UK's commitments to include ICF within their programming.

8. **Suggestions were made by participants in this evaluation for changes to DFID's processes which would increase the extent of integration. These were including a question about integration on the Business Case template and having regular office meetings where planned programmes are presented to the whole team.**

   We recommend that these suggestions are considered and, if appropriate, implemented.

This evaluation has developed an insight into how the integration of ICF influences programmes to take action to address climate change risks and opportunities. It would be valuable to share this insight with heads of office and climate advisors. The ESG will consider how this can be done as part of developing the evaluation and use plan.

# 10 Outstanding questions

There are five areas where additional research could be useful to develop further understanding of the integration of ICF:

1. As we have not interviewed heads of office for this evaluation we do not understand what motivates them to support integration of ICF or not. Nor do we understand what could be done to encourage them to do more.
2. We have a reviewed very small sample of programmes without ICF and do not have a high level of confidence in our understanding of:
    a. Whether programmes that have not integrated ICF have mainstreamed action to address climate change risks and opportunities and, if not, why not.
    b. Why programmes which have mainstreamed climate change actions have not integrated ICF
3. We do not understand why some programme teams do not follow the Climate and Environment Smart Guide , why compliance is not enforced and what would make it easier to comply with the guidance and integrate ICF.
4. It is unclear whether the perception that there is no additional money for programmes with integrated ICF is simply a deterrent to integrating ICF or whether it deters SROs from mainstreaming actions to address climate change risks and opportunities. It would be useful to learn more about how this is perceived and the effect this has on SRO behaviour. It would also be valuable to learn about how country offices allocate their budgets for integrated ICF.
5. The current approach to integration is new and much of the evidence relates to programmes approved before it was in place. Our research for this evaluation provided the perspective of the SRO and in some cases the climate advisor. An in-depth examination of how programmes are designed now from multiple perspectives (SRO, head of office, climate advisor, partners, other key members of the programme team) would provide a much richer understanding of how integration operates in practice. This could take the form of a small number of rich case studies.

# 11 Learning and recommendations for future portfolio evaluations

We have learned a number of lessons from the work undertaken on this portfolio evaluation:

1. With hindsight we have learned that there were too many evaluation sub-questions and they were too complex. Greater focus would have simplified data collection, analysis and reporting.

2. About the documentary evidence
   a. There is less information available in the public domain than we had hoped. For example, although all Business Cases are published eventually, some were not available in DevTracker, unpublished Business Cases have been obtained from SROs. The Business Case and Annual Review often draw on further evidence and analysis that is not included in the published document and is not always available centrally. DFID have been able to obtain some of this evidence through contact with the programme teams and some has been provided by interviewees, but we have been unable to obtain a large amount of the document evidence that we hoped for.
   b. Many documents do not have dates; this has made it difficult to track the history of programme development from documents. so we have been reliant on interviews to provide a fuller understanding of the timeline.
   c. Many documents do not include the names of the authors, it has therefore been a challenge to understand who has been involved in contributing to the documents reviewed. Again, interviews and information from the ESG have been key in shedding light on who best to speak to and who has been influential in informing the programme's integration. This has also made it impossible to identify from the documents whether a climate advisor has been involved in the programme.
   d. The documentary evidence has provided a good insight into how ICF has been integrated into programmes and what contexts applied in each case. However, we have had to rely on interviews to learn about the reasons for integration, the role of context and the Climate and Environment Smart Guide. In the light of this, it would have been helpful to conduct interviews earlier in the process.

3. About the interviews
   a. The ESG have worked hard to arrange interviews but this has proved challenging and we have not been able to conduct interviews with everyone we had hoped to. In future we should start the process of organising interviews as early as possible and try and identify whether there are ways to provide an incentive to interviewees.
   b. 45 minutes was not long enough to cover all the areas of importance. We should consider whether there are other approaches that could supplement interviews to capture more of the information we need.

4. The emerging findings report came too early in the process to be useful to DFID and to allow them to provide proper feedback on the findings. This report is the first indication that the ESG will have of many of the findings and they will undoubtedly be able to provide further insight and have more questions that they would like us to address. In future we recommend that:
   a. A short update on progress is provided mid-way through data collection
   b. The findings are presented to the ESG before completing analysis and drafting of the draft final report to allow for their insight and steer on analysis.

5. Because it was challenging to organise interviews, data collection finished later than expected. This compressed the time available for analysis and reporting, even though the

deliverable date was extended by two weeks. Hopefully the recommendations regarding interviews will avoid this problem in the future. We recognise that we could have asked for a further extension to the deliverable date.

# 12 Methodology

## 12.1 Methods used

This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Compass Evaluation Quality Framework which is published separately.

The Inception Report was approved by HMG on 22 March 2018 and since then the Compass team has undertaken the following activities:

1. Initial review of the programmes identified in the Inception Report to identify the documents for in-depth analysis. This involved:
    a. Establishing what evidence was available. As a minimum we were looking for the Business Case, logframe and at least one Annual Review. Using DevTracker and with assistance from HMG we were able to find sufficient evidence for 35 of these programmes.
    b. We removed one programme; *CDC Programme of Support in Africa and South Asia (2015-2018)* because it was not considered a typical integrated programme.
    c. 6 programmes were added to the sample; 3 because they had evaluations despite being from before 2011 (these were subsequently removed because they had no evidence relevant to the theories of change) and 3 which had earlier been identified by HMG as potentially useful.
    d. Thus 40 programmes were available for the initial review.
2. An initial review of the documentation for the 40 programmes was undertaken to explore how integration of ICF had been done in practice and to propose programmes for the in-depth analysis. This involved developing outcome patterns and recommending 18 programmes that exemplified those patterns for further review.
3. A description of the outcome patterns was submitted to HMG and discussed with the Evaluation Steering Group (ESG) on 5 April.
4. Detailed document review was carried out on 12 programmes commencing with the Business Case, logframe and annual report(s) and any other evidence in the public domain (e.g. evaluations, websites, post-completion reviews). HMG were notified of gaps and contacted programme teams on our behalf to obtain additional evidence. Evidence from documents was captured in the Document Summary Sheets developed during the Compass Inception Phase.
5. In order to prepare for interviews a topic guide was developed. This was discussed with the ESG and revised to reflect their feedback. The topic guide was used in an interview with an SRO and was further revised based on that experience. The revised topic guides are shown in Appendix 2 of this report.
6. Early emerging findings were presented to the ESG on 24 April. Feedback and additional insight from that discussion have been incorporated in this report.
7. Following the Emerging Findings Presentation and subsequent discussion with the ESG, the decision was made to update and refine the sample of 40 programmes by sector and year of approval (according to the pre-2015, 2015-2016 and post 2016 date periods). This resulted in 26 programmes in total. After follow-up with SROs however, the team were advised that one of the programmes was no longer integrating ICF (Accountability in Tanzania Programme - Phase II) resulting in a sample of 25 programmes overall.
8. The Emerging Findings Report was submitted on 18 May 2018 and followed by a telephone meeting on 24 May 2018 to discuss priorities for the remainder of the research.
9. HMG provided feedback on the Emerging Findings Report on 4 June 2018 and these were discussed in a telephone meeting on 5 June 2018.
10. On 14 June 2018 the ESG agreed to extend the timetable for delivery of the Draft Final Report to 6 July 2018. The report was actually delivered on 9 July.

## 12.2 Changes from the Terms of Reference

| Terms of Reference | Inception Report |
|---|---|
| The Terms of Reference set out an indicative theory of change | The indicative theory of change was developed and revised in discussions between the ESG and Compass drawing on initial interviews and document review. |
| The Terms of Reference set out initial evaluation questions | The evaluation questions and sub-questions were revised to reflect the revised theory of change. |

**Table 4: Changes from terms of reference**

## 12.3 Changes from the Inception Report

| Initial plan | Revised plan |
|---|---|
| A sample of 46 programmes was selected for the initial review | The initial review covered 40 programmes because it was not possible to obtain a full set of documentation for 5 and one was out of scope. |
| Sample would be split into two by date (pre/post 2015) | Because we learned that the Climate and Environment Smart Guide was not introduced until April 2016 the sample was split into three date periods (pre-2015, 2015/2016 and post-2016) |
| | We have added modality and funding partners as contexts for analysis following discussion with the ESG<br><br>However, we have not been able to conduct quantitative analysis by these factors |
| The initial sample was intended to cover all sectors | The sample has been refined to focus on three types of sector; those with higher than expected levels of integration, lower than expected levels of integration and those with integration in proportion to the sector overall as it was felt this would provide greater insight. |
| The comparison group was to be programmes that intended to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits but that did not include integrated ICF | The comparison group was programmes that are similar to ones with integrated ICF in terms of sector and approach but which do not have integrated ICF to provide a better comparison |
| The initial analysis of the data compared programmes with integrated ICF to data from the Statistics on International Development which was not a good comparison because of the way the statistics are developed | Programmes were identified from the OECD Creditor Reporting System. |

**Table 5: Changes from inception report**

## 12.4 Quantitative analysis method

We have used three samples of programmes for the quantitative analysis:

- 86 programmes with integrated ICF that were approved or had an operational start date after 1 April 2011. Those programmes had a total value of £7.53 billion and an ICF component of £1.32 billion.
- 101 standalone (or full) ICF programmes that were approved or had an operational start date after 1 April 2011. These programmes had a total value of £2.56 billion.
- 877 programmes approved between April 2011 and March 2017 and which did not have integrated ICF. These programmes had a total value of 18.9 billion.

We have followed the following principles in conducting the quantitative analysis:

- For some analysis we have grouped programmes with integrated ICF into pre-2015 (where programmes either applied to a fund for ICF support or were retrospectively categorised as ICF) and post-2015 when the current approach to ICF was implemented. The programmes which we know applied to the fund for support using a concept note have been grouped separately (labelled on charts as pre-2015 C*).
- All analysis has been conducted by sector and country.
- We considered conducting analysis by modality and type of funding partner but the sample set where we have these data is too small for quantitative analysis.

Questions 1b and 1c explore whether the breakdown of the integrated portfolio is reflective of the wider DFID portfolio in terms of country and sector. These questions were explored in the emerging findings and inception reports by comparing the ICF integrated funding budget for programmes approved since 2011 by sector to the proportion of DFID's aid spending by sector over 2014-2016 as reported in the Statistics on International Development[15]. These two figures gave an indication of the allocation of ICF budget when compared to DFID historic spending on aid, but were not directly comparable for three reasons:

- The data cover different time periods
- The data for DFID spending as a whole are historic while those for ICF are budgeted
- ICF uses different sector categories to those used in in the Statistics on International Development

We subsequently obtained a dataset from DFID that had been produced on the same basis as the dataset of integrated programmes and so was comparable. This included 877 bilateral programmes approved between April 2011 and March 2017 and which did not have ICF.

The sample size for each segment is contained in Appendix 1 and the full analysis is contained in an Excel workbook supplied to HMG separately.

## 12.5 Sample

The sample of programmes reviewed in depth is shown in Appendix 3 and reflects the considerations discussed below. The sample was developed to enable us to investigate:

- The influence of sector on the integration of ICF and mainstreaming climate risks and opportunities

[15] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-on-international-development

- Whether and how the Smart Rules and Climate and Environment Smart Guide influenced the integration of ICF and mainstreaming climate risks and opportunities (and so the sample included programmes approved before and after 2015)
- The influence of a climate advisor, the head of office and partner governments by ensuring the sample included a range of countries

It should be noted that when the sample was developed we were relying on the Statistics for International Development to help us to identify why countries and sectors had more or fewer programmes with integrated ICF than their proportion of DFID's programming overall. Subsequently we were able to compare the number and value of programmes with integrated ICF in each sector and country with the distribution of all DFID's bilateral programme commitments in each sector and country which provided a more accurate understanding of the extent to which the opportunity to integrate ICF had been taken up.

Table 6 below shows the integrated ICF sample by timing and sector

| | Full investigation | | Partial investigation | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | | 2 | | | 2 |
| Education | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| Government and Civil Society | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Health | | 1 | | 2 | 3 |
| Humanitarian | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Production Services | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Social infrastructure and services | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| WASH | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| **Total** | **2** | **8** | **7** | **8** | **25** |

**Table 6: Integrated ICF sample by sector**

Table 7 below shows integrated ICF sample by timing and country

| | Full investigation | | Partial investigation | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | |
| Afghanistan | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Bangladesh | | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Burma | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Caribbean | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Ethiopia | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Kenya | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 4 |
| Malawi | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Nepal | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Rwanda | | 2 | 2 | | 4 |
| Sierra Leone | | | | 2 | 2 |
| Somalia | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Sudan | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Tanzania | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Zambia | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Zimbabwe | | | | 1 | 1 |

| Total | 2 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Table 7: Integrated ICF sample by country

**Modality of support**

The approach to integration of ICF, and the anticipated outcomes resulting from it, may be different for different modalities of support (e.g. technical assistance, cash transfers, green public works, infrastructure investment, etc.). This was considered in the analysis as a context; it was not used as a sampling criterion in selecting programmes for investigation.

**Multi donor**

Where programmes involve multiple donors, the processes for design, selection of indicators and reporting are likely to be different from programmes where DFID is the only donor. This was explored in the analysis but was not used as a sampling criterion in selecting programmes for investigation.

**Comparison group**

In the inception report it was anticipated that a small number of programmes which intended to deliver climate change outcomes but which did not have integrated ICF would be investigated for comparison with integrated ICF programmes. This was intended to provide insight into barriers to integrating ICF.

DFID supplied a database of 98 programmes with Rio Climate Markers which did not have integrated ICF that could be used for this comparison. The database did not have the date of approval of the programme; however, it appeared that they are well established with most being in the implementation stage or already completed. It was agreed that the most useful learning would come from investigating programmes without integrated ICF but with similar purposes, and approved since April 2015. This would allow an exploration of how, why and by whom the decision was made not to integrate ICF. Seven programmes were selected from the OECD database; the breakdown is shown below:

Table 8 below shows the sample of non-ICF programmes by timing, sector and country:

| | Full investigation | | Partial investigation | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | Pre-2015 | Post-2015 | |
| Economic Infrastructure and services | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Education | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Health | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Humanitarian | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Production services | | 1 | | | 1 |
| **Total** | **0** | **3** | **0** | **4** | **7** |
| | | | | | |
| Lesotho | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Nepal | | | | 2 | 2 |
| Sierra Leone | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Tanzania | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Multiple | | 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| **Total** | **0** | **3** | **0** | **4** | **7** |

Table 8: Programmes without Integrated ICF sample by sector and country

**Dedicated ICF**

We raised the possibility of comparing the effectiveness and efficiency of integrated ICF programmes in delivering adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes with dedicated ICF programmes that aim to deliver the same climate outcomes. This would have enabled us to consider the question of whether adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes can or cannot be more effectively delivered through integrated rather than dedicated programmes.

DFID advised that this is out of scope for this evaluation as the principle of mainstreaming climate has been widely accepted within DFID and the wider development community. Consequently, this evaluation centres on how to mainstream climate considerations most effectively, not on the principle of mainstreaming itself.

### 12.6 Interviews

Interviews were conducted with programme teams and climate advisors.

**Programme teams:** we interviewed 10 SROs for ICF programmes to explore the design process; how and why decisions were made and whether and how learning has been shared.

We interviewed 3 SROs for programmes without integrated ICF.

**Climate Advisor:** we interviewed 9 advisors (including 7 climate advisors) who are not SROs for the programmes being investigated to understand more about the process of climate advice, how they think integration of ICF has influenced programme design and delivery and to explore their views of transformation.

### 12.7 Analysis and synthesis approach

The analysis and synthesis was conducted in line with the process set out in the Compass Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework.

Relevant "nuggets" of evidence from each programme reviewed was assembled in a Document Summary Workbook (see Appendix 5).

Realist synthesis is intended to explain why programmes result in different outcomes in different contexts. Therefore, the analytical process used data to[16]:

- Provide evidence for outcomes;
- Support or refute the existence of hypothesised mechanisms (and identify others);
- Demonstrate which mechanisms cause those outcomes;
- Identify contexts that affect the firing of particular mechanisms.

The synthesis asked a range of questions about evidence to refine theories including:

- What it is evidence of
- To which elements of the Learning Question theory is the evidence relevant
- Where the evidence came from and how was it produced
- Whether the data is valid and reliable for the purpose it is being used
- What inferences are we drawing from the evidence, is the evidence sufficiently strong to support those inferences
- Whether the evidence raises any new questions or prompts any ideas
- Are there any limitations that should be taken into account when using this evidence
- Whether there are other data that support or contradict this evidence?

Pawson[17] describes realist synthesis as "absorbing primary materials into developing synthesis". For this to be transparent it is necessary to show how the evidence has been used to justify the inferences that have been made and why it can be relied upon to do so. In Pawson's words "key aspects of data extraction and quality appraisal are carried out in harness with synthesis".

The synthesis process gathers all the relevant evidence about a specific CMO proposition together in an Evidence Workbook (see Appendix 6 for a screenshot); a version of this form has been

[16] Wong et al, Realist synthesis, Rameses training materials, 2013
[17] Pawson, Evidence Based Policy, a realist perspective, Sage Publications, 2006, described in detail on pages 93-99

provided from which interview evidence has been redacted. The analyst then used a range of techniques to think about that evidence and draw conclusions. The techniques included[18]:

- Juxtaposing – using multiple studies to refine theory, for example, one study might provide evidence of patterns between contexts and outcomes while another might indicate possible mechanisms that lead to those outcomes.
- Reconciling - identifying differences which explain apparently contradictory sets of findings.
- Adjudicating – forming judgements about how far evidence can be relied upon to support, refine or refute theories.
- Consolidating – the theory is strengthened if it is supported by multiple pieces of evidence.
- Situating – using the evidence to explain that a particular mechanism fires in one set of contexts while another mechanism fires in a different set of contexts.

The analyst's intuitions and deductions (clearly identified) were captured through the analytic process. Where they could not be tested, implications for future research have been identified.

### 12.8 Assessing quality of evidence

The table below sets out the framework below to summarise the strength of evidence for each finding which has been used for the assessments in Appendix 4.

| | Weak | Medium | Strong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of independent sources providing credible evidence[19] | One -Two | Two-Three | Three-Four or more |
| Types of evidence (interviews, surveys, scientific research etc)[20] | One data type | Two data types | Three or more data types |
| Comprehensiveness | Addresses some of the groups affected | Addresses most of the groups affected, considers direct and indirect effects | Addresses all the groups affected both directly and indirectly |
| How well the proposition accounts for the evidence | Tentative | Plausible | Convincing |

**Table 9 Quality of evidence for a CMO proposition (i.e. element of theory)**

Findings are rated at a particular level if they meet each of the four criteria for that level; i.e. for a finding to be rated *strong* it must be supported by more than three independent sources from more than three types of evidence, address all the groups affected by integration both directly and indirectly and account convincingly for the evidence. Thus findings have been rated at the level for the weakest of the four criteria that they meet.

---

[18] Pawson, Evidence Based Policy, a realist perspective, Sage Publications, 2006
[19] This indicator is deliberately "fuzzy" to support an overall assessment along with the other indicators rather than to provide arbitrary cut offs. This logic is based on Charles C Ragin, Fuzzy Set Social Science, University of Chicago Press, 2000.
[20] Each type of evidence has different strengths and weaknesses; if multiple types are used each will help to overcome the inherent weaknesses of the others.

The strength of evidence for each finding has been assessed and is indicated in the text through the use of icons as shown in table 10 below:

| **Category** | **Description** | **Icon** |
|---|---|---|
| Strong | We are confident that the finding applies generally |  |
| Medium | We are confident (using the criteria set out in table 9 the evidence would be rated as strong) that the finding applies to the sample of programmes we investigated |  |
| Tentative | The finding applies to the sample of programmes we investigated to some extent (using the criteria set out in table 9, the evidence would be rated as medium) and we do not have contradictory evidence |  |
| Speculative | The finding is based on one or two comments (using the criteria set out in table 9, the evidence would be rated as weak) but may merit further investigation |  |

**Table 10: Icons for strength of evidence**

# 13 Appendix

## 13.1 Appendix 1 - Sample frame for quantitative analysis

| | Full ICF | Integrated ICF | Initial sift | KPI results |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTALS:** | **101** | **86** | **36** | **41** |
| **DATES** | | | | |
| 2017 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 2016 | 14 | 20 | 9 | 9 |
| 2015 | 14 | 13 | 3 | 7 |
| 2014 | 15 | 15 | 7 | 9 |
| 2013 | 15 | 17 | 10 | 8 |
| 2012 | 27 | 10 | 4 | 5 |
| 2011 | 12 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| Pre 2015 | 69 | 42 | 21 | 0 |
| Pre 2015 C* | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| 2015-17 | 32 | 39 | 12 | 16 |
| **SECTORS** | | | | |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 7 | 12 | 3 | 5 |
| Education | 0 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| Government and Civil Society | 3 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Health | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0 |
| Humanitarian | 1 | 16 | 4 | 8 |
| Multisector | 53 | 11 | 4 | 5 |
| Production Services | 29 | 17 | 5 | 6 |
| Social infrastructure and services | 3 | 9 | 6 | 7 |
| WASH | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| **COUNTRIES** | | | | |
| Kenya | 3 | 13 | 7 | 5 |
| Tanzania | 3 | 8 | 4 | 5 |
| Rwanda | 2 | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| Nepal | 2 | 6 | 4 | 5 |
| Bangladesh | 1 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
| India | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 |
| Pakistan | 0 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| Zambia | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Zimbabwe | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Sierra Leone | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Sudan | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Nigeria | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Somalia | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| South Sudan | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Afghanistan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Malawi | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Mozambique | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Montserrat | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Burma | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| St Helena | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Indonesia | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Uganda | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vietnam | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unspecified | 59 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Multi-country | 0 | 7 | 1 | 2 |

**Table 11: Sample composition**

## 13.2 Appendix 2 Discussion guides

### 13.2.1 Programme teams

An initial discussion guide for programme teams was agreed with HMG and then piloted on one interview with the SRO for one of the programmes under investigation. Following that pilot interview the discussion guide was amended and the resulting guide is shown below.

The discussion took the form of a realist interview and the researcher explicitly tested aspects of the theories. Each question was cross-referenced to an element of the theories of change. Responses were probed to understand the reasons for the reply.

**Introduction, overview of research:**

- Welcome, introduction of researcher
  *Thank you very much for agreeing to help with our work. I'm planning to record our conversation so that I can make sure I don't miss anything. Is that OK with you?*

- Aims of the interview:
  *We are beginning to develop ideas on how and in what circumstances climate finance integration is working to deliver climate change outcomes and have started carrying out an initial evaluation of documentation relating to a number of programmes including [name of programme]. We are interested in following this up to draw out any additional information and to understand how the process of integrating ICF has worked for the programme.*

First of all, please tell me something about yourself; what's your professional background, and your role on [name of programme]? How long have you been working on this programme?

**Programme design process (for programmes approved after April 2015)**
*Were you involved in the design of the programme? If not, ask for the name of the person responsible and skip to next section*

a) Why did you decide to integrate ICF in the programme, what benefits did you see for the programme and its beneficiaries? What evidence did you have about those benefits, were you confident in it? (A2)

   Were you encouraged to integrate ICF by your head of office? Does it help to meet objectives and priorities for your office/department? Did that make a difference to your decision to integrate ICF or the way you did it? How and why? (A1, A5, A7)

   Does your partner government have climate change as a priority; did they support the integration of ICF? Did that affect your decision to integrate ICF or the way you did it? How and why? (A1)

   Did the priorities of other donors or the capacity of implementing partners influence your decision? How and why? (A1)

b) Did integrating ICF influence the design of the programme, in what ways and why did it make that difference? Do you feel that you had a good understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with climate change? How did you develop that understanding, did you work with a climate advisor or did you attend cross-cadre events with climate advisors? Did you work with the central DFID ICF team? What difference did the support make? (A2)

   Did integrating ICF give you an opportunity to try out new ideas or approaches? What did you do and how did integrating ICF influence that? (A1)

If they are also a climate advisor. Are you confident in the evidence about the effectiveness of integrating climate actions in programmes like this, did you find the cross-cadre events helpful in building your understanding of how to work with other disciplines? (A2)

c) How did you decide on the amount of the budget that was ICF (A4)?

If post-April 2016. Did you use the Climate and Environment Smart Guide, how did that go? If not, why didn't you use the guidance? If before April 2016. Was any guidance available to you, did you use it, how did that go? If not, why didn't you use the guidance? (A4)

d) How did you decide on the climate indicators you have included in the logframe, what were the considerations? If there were other donors involved did they influence the choice, how? If bespoke indicators, did you consider using the ICF KPIs, why didn't you use them? (A4)

e) Did you have any concerns associated with integrating ICF, were there any obstacles? What were they? Do you feel you have addressed them, how? (A6)

f) Is there anything you would do differently if you were going through this process again? What, why and what difference do you think that would make? (N)

**Delivery of climate outcomes**
*Are you involved in the implementation of the programme? If not ask for the name of the person responsible and skip to next section*

a) What level of priority do you place on delivering the climate aspects of the programme? Why do you say that? (D1)

Do you feel that there is leadership support for the delivery of integrated ICF? What about support from partner governments and funding partners? Do your implementing partners prioritise it? Has that made a difference to the way you implemented the programme? (D1, D2)

b) Does having climate indicators in the logframe help to maintain the team's focus on delivering the intended climate outcomes? Have the climate indicators changed since the programme was approved, how and why? What about the Annual Review process? Has that affected how you implement the programme? Please explain. (D2)

c) Do you feel you have the skills, knowledge and time to deliver the climate aspects of the programme and to deal with problems? Do you have access to guidance and support to help you? Where from (climate advisor, central DFID ICF team, implementing partner), how confident are you in that support? (D3)

d) Have you made any changes to the programme since it was approved? Why and what effect did that have on the climate change elements? (D5)

e) Were there any unintended or unexpected outcomes? What were they, why do you think they arose and what difference did they make to the programme overall? (N)

f) What have you learned about delivering an integrated programme? Have you shared that learning, how? (N)

**Transformation**

a) Do you feel that DFID leadership supports mainstreaming of climate finance throughout the Department's programming? Why do you say that? Does that make a difference to the integration of ICF in programmes? (T2)

b) Has the experience of working on a programme with integrated ICF given you more confidence that integration can provide better outcomes for beneficiaries? Why? (T1)

c) Would you say it is important to follow the Climate and Environment Smart Guide, why? (T3)

d) Have you shared your experience of integrating ICF and lessons you have learned with others? Have you seen or used evidence based on other programmes' experience of integrating ICF? Who and how? (T4)

**Conclusion:**

a) Overall, would you say that integrating ICF has delivered, or is likely to deliver adaptation and/or mitigation benefits that would not have been delivered otherwise? What are they and how did integrating ICF make a difference? (A2 and A3)

b) Is there anything you would do to improve ICF integration? What difference would that make to climate change outcomes and why? (N)

c) Is there anything else I should know? Are there any documents I should read or other people I should speak to? (N)

Thank you for your time, that's been really helpful. If, when I am reviewing the interview, I have any more queries would it be OK to drop you an email?

### 13.2.2 Climate advisor

Welcome, introduce researcher
*Thank you very much for agreeing to help with our work. I'm planning to record our conversation so that I can make sure I don't miss anything. Is that OK with you?*

Aims of the interview:
*We are beginning to develop ideas on how and in what circumstances the integration of climate finance across DFID programming is working to deliver climate change outcomes. We're reviewing a number of programmes in a range of countries and we are interested in understanding your perspective as a climate advisor on whether and how integration delivers additional climate change benefits.*

First of all, please tell me something about yourself; what's your professional background? How long have you been in your current position? How much experience have you got with the integration of ICF?

a) In your experience how does the integration of ICF work in practice; do approaches differ between different offices? Why? (A1, A5, A7)

b) Do you think there are benefits from integrating climate finance in programming? What are they? Any disadvantages? For whom and why? Are there differences between sectors or between different intervention modalities? (A2)

   Are there trade-offs between the benefits and disadvantages of integration? How do you resolve them in practice? (A2)

   Do you think ICF can be integrated across the board or only in certain circumstances? Why and what effect does that have? (A2)

c) I presume you are familiar with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide; how do you and the programme teams you work with use it? What effect do you think its use has had on programme design? Why? (A4)

   Do you get involved in decisions about the amount of the budget that will be allocated to ICF? Does that influence programme design and activities? How and why? (A4)

Do you get involved in decisions about the climate indicators that will be included in programmes? If so, what do you think are important considerations? Why do some teams choose to use ICF indicators while others create bespoke indicators for climate outcomes? Do you think it matters? Why? (A4, D2)

Does having climate indicators in the logframe help to maintain a focus on delivering the intended climate outcomes? What about the Annual Review process? Please explain. (D1)

d) Do you think there is enough priority placed on delivering the climate aspects of integrated programmes? Why do you say that? (D2)

Do you feel that there is support from heads of office, partner governments and funding partners for delivering integrated ICF? Do your implementing partners prioritise it? What difference does that make to securing the climate benefits? (D2 and D1)

e) Do you feel that programme teams have the skills, knowledge and time to deliver the climate aspects of their programme and to deal with problems? (D3)

Do climate advisors have sufficient time and knowledge to provide the support they need? How do you allocate your time? Are you confident in the evidence about the effectiveness of integrating climate actions in programmes like this? Did you find the cross-cadre events helpful in building your understanding of how to work with other disciplines? (A2, D3, T3)

f) Do you feel that DFID leadership supports mainstreaming of climate finance throughout the Department's programming? Why do you say that? (T2, T3)

g) Overall, would you say that integrating ICF has delivered, or is likely to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits? What are they and how did integrating ICF make a difference? (A2, A3)

h) Is there anything you would do to improve ICF integration? What difference would that make to climate change outcomes and why? (N)

i) Is there anything else I should know? Are there any documents I should read or other people I should speak to? (N)

Thank you for your time, that's been really helpful. If, when I am reviewing the interview, I have any more queries would it be OK to drop you an email?

## 13.3 Appendix 3 - Programmes reviewed

| Name | Country | Purpose | Modality of support (where known) | Date range | DFID sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ICF PROGRAMMES** | | | | | |
| UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund<br>205157 | Caribbean | Create critical economic infrastructure including: bridges, renewable energy, ports, water and sea defences that will increase productivity and resilience to natural disasters and climate change. | Infrastructure investment | 2015/6 | Economic Infrastructure and Services |
| Kenya Essential Education Programme<br>202657 | Kenya | Increase access, retention and improve the quality of education in primary schools. More children enrolled and staying in schools, improvement in learning and a reduction in teacher absenteeism. | TA and construction | Pre 2015 | Education |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya Devolution Support Programme<br><br>204788 | Kenya | Build and improve public services for Kenyan citizens, particularly focusing at the county level where poverty exists and where public service delivery is poor. The programme will improve the ability of county governments to better plan, deliver and monitor the delivery of public services. | TA - governance | 2015/6 | Government and Civil Society |
| Zambia Health Systems Strengthening Programme<br><br>204640 | Zambia | Improve the health of women and girls in Zambia across the continuum of care from birth, childhood and motherhood. | TA and health services delivery | 2016-8 | Health |
| Hunger Safety Net Programme 2<br><br>204258 | Kenya | Reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability by providing the poorest households in arid and semi-arid lands with cash transfers. | Cash transfers (CTs), Direct Support (DS) and Public Works (PWs), plus Technical Assistance (TA) (capacity building) | Pre 2015 | Social infrastructure and services |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Productive Social Safety Net Programme<br><br>23473 | Tanzania | Scale up of the Productive Social Safety Net through the provision of conditional cash transfers, green public works and livelihood enhancement. Support central government to develop systems and institutions. | CTs, PWs, TA for government capability building | 2015/6 | Social infrastructure and services |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sustainable Inclusive Livelihoods through Tea Production<br><br>204941 | Rwanda | Support job creation and increase incomes by working with smallholder farmers to develop greenfield tea. | TA for capacity building and payment by results (PBS) | 2016-8 | Economic Infrastructure and Services |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Programme - Building Back better | Nepal | Establish partnerships to support (i) districts to “build back better” including leading to more resilient (including climate resilient) infrastructure and institutions; (ii) the most vulnerable to recover their livelihoods and assets; and (iii) government to manage the response to the earthquake. | Infrastructure & government capacity building through provision of support | 2016-8 | Social infrastructure and services |
| 205138 | | | | | |
| Somalia Humanitarian and Resilience Programme (SHARP) | Somalia | Meet the most urgent humanitarian needs of conflict and disaster affected populations through provision of life-saving assistance build household resilience to withstand shocks. | TA & capacity building for better M&E systems, government engagement & humanitarian networks | 2016-8 | Humanitarian |
| 205128 | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sustainable Development of Mining in Rwanda (SDMR)<br><br>205052 | Rwanda | Improve livelihoods of poor miners andincrease the contribution of artisanal and small scale mining sector to the economy by addressing key market failures facing the mining industry in Rwanda. This will benefit directly 40,000 artisanal miners and their families. this contributes towards our MDGs by reducing poverty | TA & Capacity building for an enhanced business enabling environment | 2016-8 | Production Services |
| Strengthening disaster resilience<br><br>300003 | Nepal | Strengthen disaster resilience, particularly to earthquakes: work with urban centres to build and plan more safely; strengthen public infrastructure to earthquakes; strengthen national capacity and preparedness; ensure that the UK is able to support a humanitarian response to crisis. | TA and construction | 2016-8 | Humanitarian |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Programme of Support to Agriculture | Rwanda | Sustainably increase the agricultural productivity of poor farmers by transforming Rwandan agriculture from a subsistence-based to a more commercial-based sector that accelerates agricultural growth. | TA to support government capacity | Pre 2015 | Production Services |
| 204456 | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Chars Livelihoods Programme 2 | Bangladesh | Improve the food security, livelihoods and incomes of extremely poor people living on the Riverine Char Islands | Direct asset transfers, PWs, TA | Pre 2015 | Production Services |
| 114175 | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Productive Safety Net Programme Phase 4<br><br>204290 | Ethiopia | Reduce hunger, improve livelihoods and reduce the risk of famine by providing cash and food transfers, livelihoods advice and access to microfinance, and creating local infrastructure which reverses environmental degradation and improves access to markets and basic services. | CTs, PWs | Pre 2015 | Social infrastructure and services |
| Social Protection Support to the Poorest<br><br>203641 | Rwanda | Increase the coverage of social protection and strengthen social protection systems by providing financial aid to the Rwanda Local Development Support Fund (RLDSF) and technical assistance to RLDSF and the Ministry of Local Government. | CTs, DS, PWs TA for government capacity building | Pre 2015 | Social infrastructure and services |
| Water for Three States<br><br>202520 | Sudan | Provide the people of Eastern Sudan with access to sustainable clean drinking water sources, improved sanitation facilities, and hygiene promotion in selected rural areas and design a plan for rehabilitation and expansion of Port Sudan water and sanitation systems. | Construction;<br><br>TA for planning and behaviour change | Pre 2015 | Wash and Sanitation |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |
| Water, Environmental Sanitation and Hygiene Programme<br>300067 | Sierra Leone | Provide sanitation and hygiene services in Freetown. Establish and expand sustainable waste management services in three large towns and improve water, sanitation and hygiene services in rural areas and in two small towns. | Technical assistance to Ministries and district councils will build skills and seek to embed good practices; | 2016-8 | Wash and Sanitation |
| Supporting a Resilient Health System<br>300163 | Zimbabwe | Support a resilient health system equipped to deliver quality sexual, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition services. (not in initial sample) | Not clear from BC | 2016-8 | Health |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deepening Democracy Programme<br><br>204437 | Kenya | Improve the Government's accountability by delivering peaceful, transparent, inclusive elections and providing support to NGOs, oversight bodies and independent commissions that can influence and deliver reforms. | Technical assistance – governance | 2015/6 | Government and Civil Society |
| Strategic Partnership Arrangement II between DFID and BRAC<br><br>204916 | Bangladesh | Improve access to quality basic services to help the poorest people graduate from extreme poverty, support inclusive growth and build effective formal and informal institutions. | Knowledge and technical assistance | 2016-8 | Education |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increasing access to electricity in Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone | To increase access to improved, affordable and sustainable electricity supply for human development and wealth creation in Sierra Leone by 2018. through a combination of interventions supporting hard infrastructure, institutional reform and operational improvement. | TA to improve the capability of the state owned Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority (EDSA) and infrastructural upgrade | 2015/6 | Production Services |
| 205188 | | | | | |
| Burma Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme | Burma | To save lives, reduce poverty and suffering of 400,000 crisis affected people in Burma and Burmese refugees in Thailand through providing humanitarian assistance, enhancing resilience and building local and international organisations' capacity to respond to future humanitarian need in Burma | Technical Assistance, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning. | 2015/6 | Humanitarian |
| 204196 | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Multi-Year Humanitarian Support to Afghanistan | Afghanistan | To provide support to the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan to have access to timely, appropriate and cost-effective humanitarian aid, and have fewer life-critical needs. | TA (Capacity building) project through NGOs with payment by results | Pre 2015 | Humanitarian |
| 203904 | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malawi Health Sector Support Programme<br><br>202214 | Malawi | To improve utilisation of quality, effective essential health services especially by the poor, and deliver the following outputs through an Essential Health Package: 4.3 million children under five treated for pneumonia; 63,000 patients treated for TB; 2.3 million deliveries by skilled health workers; 363,000 additional family planning users; 416,000 adults on HIV treatment in 2015; 2.4 million children fully immunised; 25 million children treated for malaria and 10 million bednets distributed. | Sector Budget support including performance related payments & TA (capacity development support to Ministry of Health (MOH)) | Pre 2015 | Health |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pathways to Prosperity for Extremely Poor People<br><br>203852 | Bangladesh | To enable two million people in Bangladesh to work their way out of extreme poverty for good. | Not clear from BC | 2017 | Social infrastructure and services |
| **NON-ICF PROGRAMMES** | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emergency UK aid for Sierra Leone landslide and flooding victims<br><br>300492 | Sierra Leone | Support, including food, water and medicine, for communities affected by the humanitarian disaster in August, 2017. | Water and sanitation infrastructure, health systems strengthening and TA - governance | 2017 | Humanitarian |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empowering Youth in Tanzania (EYT)<br>205144 | Tanzania | To empower and equip young Tanzanians to achieve their potential | Not clear from BC | 2016 | Education |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Developing and Scaling Next Generation Agricultural Technologies - Phase II<br><br>205273 | Multi | Working in partnership with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation on a set of co-investments, DFID's funding will increase the development and adoption of new agricultural technologies that build resilience to climate change, diseases and pests and increase productivity, particularly for smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. | Agricultural systems investment and training to build research capacity | 2016 | Agriculture |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sub-National Governance Programme -II (SNG-II)<br><br>204607 | Pakistan | The programme will improve government's management of its public finances and thereby the provision of basic services for the poorest, and the most vulnerable, including women, girls and people with disabilities. It will also strengthen citizens' perceptions of its performance. This programme will also work across four themes, all aimed at getting the right systems and resources in place for the effective functioning of government and the delivery of services. These themes are: Planning and reform, Budgeting and transparency, Fiscal Space and Innovations. | No business case available so cannot be determined. | 2018 | Government and Civil Society |
| Responding to Protracted Crisis in Sudan: Humanitarian Reform, Assistance & Resilience Programme<br><br>300196 | Sudan | The programme will deliver vital reforms that strengthen the humanitarian response and ways of working in protracted crisis, maintain the lives and dignity of over 550,000 vulnerable people a year across Sudan and build the resilience of communities vulnerable to conflict and displacement in Darfur. | Funding through partnerships/ Cash transfer programming. Developing Water and sanitation infrastructure. | 2017 | Humanitarian |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Cannot Wait (EiE)<br>205248 | Multi | To transform both the availability and quality of education provision in countries affected by natural and man-made emergencies and prolonged crises. This is being provided through UNICEF's Education Cannot Wait – a new global fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises. The Fund has two primary functions: 1. Breakthrough Fund (95%) to support country-level initiatives, directly funding programmes and policies to ensure that more children can access a quality education in a country. It comprises two windows: multi-year and first response. Initial multi-year funding has begun in Syria, Chad and Ethiopia, and will begin shortly in Yemen. First Response funding - including needs assessments, HRP match funding and specific proposals - will assist Peru, CAR, Somalia, Madagascar, Ukraine, Uganda and Afghanistan. 2. Acceleration Facility (5%) to invest in global public goods such as developing new approaches to delivering education programmes in crises affected countries. | Education and public goods investment | 2016 | Education |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Joint Programme for El Niño Drought Response in Lesotho<br><br>300301 | lesotho | To support an effective, coordinated humanitarian response in 2016/17 to El Nino emergency to improve the food security and resilience of drought affected households in Lesotho | Cash transfers, TA, health systems support | 2016 | Humanitarian |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nepal Health Sector Programme III<br><br>205145 | Nepal | To improve the health of women, children, the poor and socially excluded in Nepal, including by restoring health services in areas affected by the 2015 earthquake, and improving the quality and governance of health services nationwide. | Health infrastructure investment and budget systems support. | 2016 | Health |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emergency Support to Vulnerable Households – Post-Earthquake Housing Reconstruction in Nepal<br><br>300462 | Nepal | The UK will provide up to £5 million (October 2017-October 2019) to identify and support groups of households who are particularly vulnerable and at risk of being left behind in the implementation of post-earthquake housing reconstruction efforts in Nepal. These groups could include: those displaced by the earthquakes in April and May 2015 and are unable to return to their areas of origin owing to geo-hazard risks such as landslides; households currently residing in highly vulnerable sites; and those that are at risk of not being able to fully access the Government of Nepal's housing cash grant support to enable them to rebuild their houses. Addressing the housing needs of these families will require a multi-pronged approach including a package of support in the form of social mobilization, technical advice, and cash grants. | Cash transfers and technical assistance | 2017 | Economic Infrastructure and Services |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strengthening Uganda's Response to Malaria | Uganda | To support the Government of Uganda to tackle the high malaria disease burden through various interventions. This is expected to improve maternal and child mortality indicators in line with global goals for sustainable development. | Health systems strengthening and TA | 2017 | Health |
| 300249 | | | | | |

## 13.4 Appendix 4 - CMO tables

The tables below show the CMOs for each of the revised theories together with an assessment of the strength of evidence for each CMO[21]

| How and in what contexts integrated ICF supports programme design to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation impacts | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |
| **Replication (weak)** | SROs are open to exploring ways in which their programmes can deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes and, where climate expertise is available to the team (from a climate advisor or implementation partner). | Integration of ICF can provide an *opportunity* to use evidence to develop an understanding of how additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes can be delivered. | Programmes identifying opportunities to *replicate* successful approaches that have been implemented elsewhere |
| **Innovation (strong)** | SROs are open to exploring ways in which their programmes can deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes and, where climate expertise is available to the team (from a climate advisor or implementation partner). | Integration of ICF can provide an *opportunity* to use evidence to develop an understanding of how additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes can be delivered. | Programmes deciding to allocate resources to explore potential *innovative* approaches to addressing climate change risks and opportunities. |
| **Rebadging (strong)** | SROs have past experience of implementing actions to address climate change risks and opportunities or are aware of other successful approaches within their sector and they don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts. | We can support DFID's priorities by integrating ICF for actions that would have been implemented anyway | Programmes including a budget allocation for ICF relating to activities to address climate change risks and opportunities that would have been implemented anyway. |
| **Not worthwhile (weak)** | SROs have past experience of implementing actions to address climate change risks and opportunities or are aware of other successful approaches within their sector, they | *Mainstreaming climate change is important but it's not worthwhile to integrate ICF* | ICF is not integrated into the programme, although the budget does include an allocation for activities to address climate change risks and/or opportunities |

[21] See section 12.7 describing how the strength of evidence for CMOs has been assessed

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts and where there is a perception that integrating ICF does not provide any extra money, the programme is too small or where the amount of ICF would be small. | | that would have been implemented anyway. |
| **No opportunity here (weak)** | SROs do not perceive climate change to be relevant for their programme and don't feel the need to seek additional support from experts. | Perceived to be *no opportunity* to integrate ICF | Programme does not include activities to address climate change risks and opportunities. |
| **Indicators theory – inclusion of planned benefits in the logframe** | | | |
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |
| 1. **Effective indicators (strong)** | The actions to address climate change risks and opportunities are central to the programme and the programme team sees value in monitoring the delivery of adaptation and/or mitigation benefits. | They team is motivated to work with climate experts and devote the effort required to develop indicators that effectively monitor the delivery of those benefits. | This is likely to support the effective delivery of integrated programmes. |
| 2. **Good intentions (strong)** | There is an intention to include actions to address climate change risks and opportunities which will be developed further during the inception phase of the program | It's too soon to develop indicators for inclusion in the logframe; however, the programme team has an intention to do so | This should result in effective indicators being included in the logframe if the benefits are included in the logframe as planned. However, there is a risk that indicators will not be included and, if they are, that they might not be effective. |
| **3. Shoehorn (strong)** | There are indicators in the logframe which could be considered to reflect the planned adaptation and/or mitigation benefits, and which could be adapted as ICF KPIs with less effort than developing additional indicators and where developing additional indicators is considered challenging | Programme teams may adapt existing logframe indicators as proxies for the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits | **This could result in** indicators which do not accurately reflect the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and presents a risk that the programme team will not focus on delivering the climate benefits and could overstate the reported climate change impacts. |
| **Delivery of additional climate benefits** | | | |
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1. Motivation (strong)** | Programme teams remain motivated to deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits to poor and vulnerable people, implementing partners share that motivation, and the support of partner governments is maintained. | the whole programme team is motivated to deliver the additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits | Programme teams are more likely to deliver quality integrated programmes that provide additional adaptation and/or mitigation outcomes. |
| **2. Expertise (strong)** | there is an advisor or implementing partner with climate expertise on the team | the team has the capability to deliver the planned benefits | |
| **3. Focus (strong)** | Indicators that accurately reflect the adaptation and/or mitigation benefits have been included in the logframe | The team's focus on delivering the planned benefits is maintained | |
| **Additional climate benefits not delivered** | | | |
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |
| **Priorities change (medium)** | The priorities of partner governments change (through political changes or external factors such as a natural disaster) | The priorities for development aid change | Resources may be diverted from action to address climate change risks and opportunities to other activities |
| **Lack of expertise (weak)** | The action to address climate change risks and opportunities is intended to be defined at the inception stage but expertise is not available to the team (either through a climate advisor or through an implementing partner) | Insufficient skills and expertise to design actions that deliver additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits | Actions to address climate change risks and opportunities not included in programmes |
| **Ineffective indicators (strong)** | It is challenging to design indicators to reflect the additional adaptation and/or mitigation benefits and there are existing indicators which could be adapted and where there isn't climate advice available to the te | Programme teams may use those indicators as proxies for the planned benefits | Adoption of indicators which do not properly reflect the actual benefits delivered |
| **Bottom up transformation theory** | | | |
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |
| **Sector transformation (strong)** | Programme managers have evidence that mainstreaming delivers better | Programme managers are motivated to integrate ICF in more programmes | Mainstreaming becomes widespread in specific DFID |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | outcomes for beneficiaries in their sectors and they (or their colleagues) have had a good experience | | sectors |
| **Overarching role of integrated ICF in transformation** | | | |
| **Name** | **Context** | **Mechanism** | **Outcome** |
| **Support and expertise (strong)** | There is support from the Head of Office for integrating ICF and there is climate expertise available to support programme teams | The process of integrating ICF provides an opportunity for programme teams to engage with climate expertise | SROs consider how they can do more to address climate change risks and opportunities and potentially include additional actions to deliver climate benefits in their programmes. |
| **Focus on delivery (strong)** | Programme teams comply with the Climate and Environment Smart Guide and include the planned climate benefits in the logframe | Programme team maintains a focus on delivering the planned benefits | The planned benefits of mainstreaming action to address climate change are more likely to be delivered |

**Table 12: CMO configurations**

## 13.5 Appendix 5 – Example Document Summary Workbook

Nuggets of evidence were extracted from documents and interview transcripts using a document summary sheet; this is an excel workbook for each programme which includes contains a sheet for each document. An example has been supplied to HMG and screenshots from some samples are shown below. There is a full explanation of how these tools are used in the Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework.

**Document Summary sheet**

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reviewer: | AR | | | | | |
| Title: | Business case | *Rows 4-14 can be revealed/hidden by clicking the small + or - box to the left of row 15* | | | | |
| **Page** | **Evidence** | **Interpretation** | **Aspect this relates to** | **Support/ refine/ refute?** | **Importance of Nugget** | **Rigour (if different from report)** |
| 3 | *How does the project fit with the country programme or department's strategic objectives set out in the Operational Plan?*<br>*Safeguarding the future by building disaster resilience and adapting to climate change is a core part of DFID's and the UK's forward vision in Nepal, representing one of three main pillars of focus in the DFID country operational plan (draft) 2016 – 2021 and the UK National Security Council Strategy for Nepal. This new programme with build on successful UK leadership on disaster resilience, which saved lives and increased the timeliness of the recent earthquake response.*<br><br>*In terms of the wider department's strategic objectives, this programme aligns with Operational Plan objectives to make UK humanitarian response more effective and to drive action to tackle climate change through adaptation (DFID, Business Plan 2012-2015).* | *Although this nugget says the programme fits with the DFID and government priorities, there do not appear to be any specific climate change objectives* | A1 | Support | | *T15* |
| 4 | *Increasing risks from climate change. The climate of Nepal is already changing, and future climate change will exacerbate many of the natural weather hazards outlined above. Climate change is anticipated to increase flood related disasters. The impact on agriculture and the annual economic costs of these changes have been estimated at an additional 2 to 3% of current GDP by mid-century . From a humanitarian perspective, this could mean higher levels of food insecurity during lean periods due to poor harvests and greater levels of flooding and landslides causing the displacement of people.* | *Programme team recognises increased risk of flood due to climate change. However, they are already coping with frequent and serious flood risk.* | A1 | | | |
| 9 | *In parallel, DFID-Nepal is also planning on scaling up it climate change programme (sister "Climate Smart Development" programme). There is strong complementarity and synergies between the disaster resilience and climate programmes, which will enable DFID to encourage greater coherence externally on both agendas.* | *Programme teams are keen to collaborate and share knowledge of climate change work because they believe it will strengthen their ability to spread the word outside DFID.* | D1 | Refine | | *D1*<br>*also D22 - other: programme teams work with colleagues to deliver incremental benefits of climate change work.* |
| 15 | *This programme has been developed in parallel with the DFID-Nepal climate change programme, with a couple of overlapping components (Policy and Institutions Facility and MEL) to support coherence. This is based on a joint assessment of natural hazards, exposure and vulnerability........* | *Programme teams take advantage of specialist climate change knowledge in other programmes, and work together on common elements to benefit both programmes.* | A2 | Other | | |

## 13.6 Appendix 6 – Example Evidence Workbook

The nuggets of evidence were then aligned against each CMO within the theory of change. This is captured in an evidence workbook. A version of a workbook with the interview evidence redacted has been supplied to HMG and a screenshot from some examples are shown below. There is a full explanation of how these tools are used in the Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework.

| | |
|---|---|
| **How would you like to interrogate the data?** | By aspect of theory |
| Pick aspect of theory from list here: | TA |

**Reset Row Heights**

| Evidence | Interpretation | Report | Programme | Country | Sector: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| • Agri-TAF is to ensure climate resilience is better understood across the Ministry through their mainstreaming activities. Although tea and coffee are good example crops to work on, the focus of capacity development should encompass all the agricultural sectors. The draft logframe of Agri-TAF did not reflect this broadening of capacity development, but this may be reflected in the final logframe | TA is helping mainstream climate resilience work in all areas of agriculture | Annual Review 2 | Support for Agriculture | Rwanda | Production Services |
| In the area of climate change, DFID Kenya supports: Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya (StARCK) £6.8m: 2011-2013 and StARCK+ (£28m: 2013-17), which aim to substantially scale up private sector investment in climate change. This will include supporting climate change governance, i.e. stronger policy, institutional and regulatory framework to plan, budget and deliver; and limited support to civil society and the media to hold government to account on climate change delivery and impact, and demand delivery from government and stimulate the private sector on climate change products and services. | DFID encouraging mainstreaming across programmes and as such this is evidence of transformation. It is still in the early days of ICF however and referencing a pre-2015 programme. | Business Case | Deepening Democracy Programme | Kenya | Governance and Security |
| 5. A key indicator of sustainability is that under the NSNP, GoK financing, as a percentage of total social protection financing, will increase from 39% to 77% between 2012 and 2017. Under the NSNP framework, GoK proposes to fund HSNP for the first time . This will help the transition to greater GoK financial sustainability and facilitate a sustainable exit strategy for DFID. | GoK is being supported towards sustainable social protection strategies. | Business Case | Hunger Safety Net Programme HSNP 2 | Kenya | Social Protection |
| There are opportunities to build linkages with climate change programmes<br>DFID's support to UNDP on climate change has shown early positive results, including the development of policies on accountability of use of funds for disaster risk management which has resulted in two counties (Kilifi, Kwale) making budget allocations for disasters. Feedback from county visits is that climate change is a priority concern for citizens. It is recommended that DFID consider scaling up the support to UNDP to build on this initial success and that the linkages with other climate change related programmes be explored further. | DFID leadership support and cross government working | Annual Review 2017 | Devolution Support Programme | Kenya | Governance and Security |
| The success of the PSSN and ultimately the role it plays to create climate resilience may be vested in its approach of collaboration with implementing agencies or sectors. It allows the PSSN to focus on its core business, cash transfer. Other sectors use the PSSN targeting and cash transfer to reach marginal populations. By sharing mutually important objectives the PSSN leverages its relatively smaller resources. | Key role of collaboration in a large development programme - includes implementing partners and various ministries in country government. Getting them engaged and on board, and being able to rely on their skills and knowledge, results in incremental outcomes far greater than DfID could achieve within its own resources alone. | Final Report - Strengthening Resilience and Response to Crises | Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) Tanzania | Tanzania | Social Protection |
| Through work with DPs and SWG, encourage stronger linkages between GoR ministries to ensure policy harmonisation around social protection, agriculture and climate change. In addition, use CPDF inputs to strengthen GoR's capacity to carry out environmental appraisal of all public works investments | This is a mitigating action from the developmental risks section of the Risk Assessment update. Where resources are designed in, programme teams can facilitate/advise on/build local capacity | Addendum to BC (2) | Social Protection Support to the Poorest (SPSPR) | Rwanda | Social Protection |
| The Government started to put in place a framework of national policies into which the PSNP can fit, and to which it will contribute. | Since 2013 PSNP now works alongside Ethiopian government priorities. Climate outcomes integrated into PSNP 4 are aligned with these. | Business Case - Ethiopia PSNP 4 | PSNP4 | Ethiopia | Social Protection |

## 13.7 Appendix 7 – Terms of Reference

# Terms of Reference

# Evaluation of UK's International Climate Finance: Integration

## Contents

# 1. Introduction

The UK is firmly committed, alongside other developed countries, to contribute to the mobilisation of $100bn of public and private climate finance a year by 2020.

The UK's International Climate Finance (ICF) is managed jointly by DFID, BEIS and Defra. The UK invests in over 50 developing countries, working through diverse channels from private equity funds to small NGO grants. UK ICF was initially established in the form of the International Climate Fund, which delivered £3.86 billion of climate programming between April 2011 and March 2016. In 2015, the UK committed to spend at least a further £5.8bn of ICF over the following 5 years (2016-2021). ICF aims to:

- Change facts on the ground, delivering results that demonstrate that low-carbon, climate- resilient development is feasible and desirable.
- Improve the international climate architecture and finance system to increase the scale, efficiency and value for money of climate spend.
- Test out new approaches to delivering climate finance that have the potential to achieve bigger and better results in the future.

UK ICF now has a portfolio of over 300 programmes with global reach working through private sector, multilateral and bilateral channels. HMG aims to achieve a balance in ICF funding with 50% spent on mitigation and 50% on adaptation.

In 2014/15 the DFID ICF portfolio consisted largely of standalone climate finance programmes, similar to BEIS' and Defra's ICF portfolio. Since then, DFID has increasingly integrated climate finance into its wider development activities. Integrated programmes aim to deliver climate outcomes alongside wider development impacts, e.g. by making new infrastructure more resilient to changes in climate. This builds on previous efforts to mainstream[1] climate and environment risks and opportunities into DFID's broader portfolio, such as the Strategic Programme Reviews and the Future Fit initiative.

- Strategic Programme Reviews (SPRs): DFID business areas, country programmes and other major policy and spending areas completed Strategic Programme Reviews to identify climate change risks and opportunities. In some cases, this was carried forward by purpose-built teams within the department or office. The SPRs resulted in the scaling up of climate programming or the creation of new climate initiatives.

- Future Fit: This programme ran between 2013 and 2015, and used the completed Strategic Programme Reviews (SPRs) as one of various tools to support better mainstreaming going forward. Future Fit aimed to create better awareness and understanding concerning climate and environment risks, and improved information and evidence on how to address these in different contexts.

Integration is of huge strategic importance to all HMG ICF stakeholders. DFID currently delivers one third of its ICF through integrated programmes, a proportion likely to grow in the future. In addition, key multilateral partners are developing their approaches to climate finance integration, and there would be value in HMG having the opportunity to support this through learning from its experiences.

[1] Clarification of terminology:

- 'Mainstreaming' as used here refers to awareness-raising of environmental trends and potential impacts (including by/on climate change), and the resultant behaviour change across a broadening sphere of activity to take advantage of related opportunities and to address related risks.
- 'Integration' refers specifically to the allocation of climate finance within programming which counts climate benefits as 'significant' rather than 'primary' objectives (please see ICF Integration Theory of Change).

ICF programming is also delivered in line with the UK Aid Strategy's four main objectives:

- Strengthening global peace, security and governance;
- Strengthening resilience and response to crises;
- Promoting global prosperity; and
- Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world's most vulnerable.

# 2. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to enable the UK government and other donors and partners to learn about the effectiveness of integration across DFID to date in achieving the UK's international objectives on climate change and driving wider transformational change – both within our programming environments and within DFID and its portfolio. The lessons learned from this evaluation can help improve future UK climate finance policies and programmes, and potentially influence the integration approaches of other major international partners including other large bilateral donors and the Multilateral Development Banks. In addition, there is a more general interest in understanding how these lessons could be applied to development and planning more broadly.

The evaluation question is:

*"In what circumstances and how has climate finance integration led to transformational change within the wider DFID portfolio[2], and to the most effective delivery of climate change outcomes? What can we learn from these different examples of integration to improve the approach taken in delivery of International Climate Finance more broadly?"*

The objectives of the evaluation will be:

- To understand what organisational conditions (e.g. sources of leadership, how much capacity is made available and of what kind) are conducive to successful integration, both in terms of incentivising programmes to include integrated components in their designs, and in designing and implementing these components effectively
- To review the consistency with which DFID's integration guidelines have been applied, identifying good practice examples and understanding challenges to their application;
- To identify common delivery pathways for climate finance integration across DFID development areas (e.g. health, education, economic development) and modality of support (e.g. TA, infrastructure investment, purchase of assets/services) which can be used to guide future application of integration;
- To assess the extent to which the integration agenda and guidance have influenced programmes to consider climate issues and outcomes in their designs more frequently and more effectively than under business as usual conditions;
- To assess any early achieved results (if and where these are available) and expected results of integrated climate finance programmes within the DFID portfolio. This should consider how, for whom, and in what circumstances integration has been - and is expected to be - more or less effective at targeting and achieving climate specific outcomes, and to what extent expected and achieved outcomes are additional to business as usual;
- To demonstrate any transformational change that has been achieved and how transformational change is expected to be achieved through the current ICF integration approach;
- To provide learning about all of these questions that will guide and inform the design and management of future integrated programmes in DFID and in other government departments.

[2] I.e., what changes have been made from 'business as usual' in those parts of the organisation/programmes which would not previously have been delivering climate benefits?

Also to seek to influence the integration of climate finance into the ODA delivered by other stakeholders, e.g. World Bank, EU, and other bilateral and multilateral donors.

# 3. Recipient

The evaluation is being commissioned by the UK Government's ICF Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) team. This team will be the immediate recipient of the evaluation and will coordinate its dissemination and use within HMG and externally. As the evaluation progresses, a dissemination and utilisation plan will be finalised by the HMG ICF MEL team. This will identify the intended users of the evaluation and how they will engage with the evaluation and its findings. Other users of the evaluation findings will include stakeholders within DFID's Climate & Environment Department, as well as other DFID offices/departments who can potentially benefit.

The final evaluation report will be published as part of HMG's commitment to transparency and to ensuring it disseminates lessons learned to other international partners. International partners and donors, developing country governments and civil society organisations will also be primary beneficiaries of the outputs of this evaluation. It is envisaged that the outputs and their dissemination will help inform decision-making and the development of appropriate policies and programmes.

# 4. Background

## 1. Integration

The integration approach adopted by DFID in 2014 reflects the long-accepted consensus that development needs to be sustainable (as re-affirmed in 2015 by the SDGs), and a recognition that for climate finance to have maximum impact it needs to influence development decision- making and investment. All high-quality DFID ICF programming should also be delivering high- quality development objectives – but the integration approach provides scope to differentiate between those programmes which are primarily focused on doing so via building climate resilience and/or supporting low-carbon development, and those which have a significant contribution towards either/both of those aims. This has allowed DFID to recognise more of the climate benefits that were already being generated as part of good development programming. Above all, encouraging teams to address climate throughout multi-sectoral development programmes promotes a greater focus on proactively addressing climate risks and creates new opportunities to influence and promote climate objectives across key sectors.

Clear guidance is available in DFID on how to design these climate-smart programmes, and to determine the proportion that should be defined as climate finance (see Figure 1). This guidance builds on the OECD DAC guidelines on the Rio Markers, which provide examples of activities that can be classified as having either a 'principal' or 'significant' contribution to adaptation or mitigation benefits. The value of the ICF contribution should be based on the incremental costs / additionality over what would have happened anyway and / or demonstrate how additional funding will scale up climate benefits. The DFID 'Smart Guide' on climate and environment issues sets out that any programme allocating International Climate Finance within its budget should include climate objectives in the Business Case, should aim to include climate logframe indicators (if possible these should be ICF Key Performance Indicators) and must show that capacity is in place to ensure effective use of climate analysis and delivery. Current and future climate-related risks must also be considered. The guidance includes some examples of good practice and how to determine what percentage of climate finance is appropriate for allocation within the programme budget, according to intended spend by the programme on climate benefits. This approach is embedded into DFID's programme management systems, and Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) are accountable for ensuring effective use of climate finance. The

DFID Smart Rules have recently been updated to better reflect the responsibilities and accountability of the programmes' SROs. Guidance and compliance with this must also be complemented by access to learning and good practice, which has been made available through cadre networks and targeted 'learning' events.

DFID's climate and environment advisers are based across the organisation, and play a critical role in supporting and advising on programme design and implementation. The personal development events of the cadres have been remodelled to support the integration agenda, with cadre Personal Development Conferences over the past year arranged jointly for the infrastructure, health and climate and environment advisers. This has allowed greater understanding of mutual priorities, as well as the building of skills and knowledge on climate challenges amongst the other cadres. DFID has galvanised cross-specialism discussions on climate-smart development, for example through the sector-specific clinics (on climate and gender, health, water etc.). Access to climate and environment advisers will differ across DFID country offices and regions, which may have led to different approaches to seeking out climate advice at different stages of the programming process (E.g. design, procurement, implementation, review and closure).




Figure 1: guidance on ICF scoring

In addition to designing programmes with integrated components from the start, there has been a process of identifying climate-relevant activities within ongoing programmes and scoring these appropriately as climate finance. This has taken place since the adoption of the current integration approach, and is still ongoing as offices and departments continue to look more closely at possible climate benefits that can be delivered through their work.

DFID has taken an early lead in testing this integration approach and pre-empted the trends that followed Paris and the SDGs, and others have sought to learn from us. However, innovation inevitably has attendant risks so, in addition to work within the Climate and Environment Department (CED) to better understand and address these, key independent analysis has been produced. This included a 2017 external report on the implementation of integrated programming, which has both identified strengths and flagged gaps (see Section 14 below).

Please see Annex 1 ‘ICF integration Theory of Change’ for more information on the intended mechanism and outcomes of integration.

Key challenges that DFID faces in integrated programmes are:

- Ensuring an appropriate amount of finance is counted as ‘climate finance’, in line with DFID’s guidance.
- Related to the above - appreciating that in certain contexts, the expenditure-based approach to ICF allocation outlined in DFID’s guidance may not lend itself to capturing the climate impact of programmes. If the overall objectives of the programme are ultimately strengthening adaptation (by diversifying available livelihoods for example) but there are no specific costs which lend themselves to allocation as climate finance, it is challenging to determine what proportion of the programme can be scored as climate finance.
- Ensuring consistent application and use of the guidance, including:
  - Ensuring that ICF integrated programmes have appropriate climate objectives specified, which in turn are monitored to help demonstrate progress in achieving goals – and facilitating reporting against KPIs in as many sectors as possible;
  - Ensuring that there is sufficient and appropriate resource (including advisory capacity) devoted to delivering climate-integrated programming in order to ensure this is successful, including the ability to assess whether the climate finance allocation remains appropriate at strategic intervals;
- Potential lack of prioritisation of climate mainstreaming, or lack of capacity to support this, within partner governments.

## 2. Transformational change

The integration of ICF into DFID’s non-climate-specific programming is intended to be a vehicle for transformational change. It is intended to effect this change through its systemic impact on the way DFID designs and implements its cross-sectoral programming.

Climate change is a challenging issue to address in development programming. Understanding how best to factor in the uncertainty generated by this wicked problem, and its risks to the sustainability of programming, is not straightforward even for technical specialists. Devoting resources and capacity to the analysis and management of climate risks can sometimes be made more challenging when this is competing with additional priorities for the individual office or department. Integration provides a corporate incentive to mainstream climate across a wider range of programming, generating wider ownership of the UK’s commitment to deliver climate finance.

In this sense ICF integration is transformational in promoting the consideration of the risks and even opportunities which may be presented by climate change across a much broader range of sectors or contexts than would be the case under a ‘business as usual’ scenario. This should also mean that a larger volume of funding delivered by DFID has been influenced by the consideration of what climate benefits could be delivered alongside other objectives. The systemic change within DFID should lead to more sustainable and effective programming which takes better account of these risks – and is better able to influence planning and development by partners and partner governments to do the same.

Therefore, integration should be transformational at the level of individual programmes, which become more sustainable and better able to mitigate the risks and exploit any opportunities arising from climate change. It should also be transformational at the level of DFID’s whole portfolio, by incorporating action on climate change into a much broader range of sectors and contexts and consequently by influencing our international partners.

Transformational change is the ultimate aim of the UK’s ICF investments. ICF KPI 15 is also designed to measure the likelihood of transformational change at the level of individual programmes, country or thematic portfolios and the ICF portfolio as a whole. The methodology for this indicator states that at the core of transformational change is change which catalyses further changes, enabling either a shift from one state to another (e.g. from conventional to lower carbon or more climate-resilient patterns of development) or faster change (e.g. speeding progress on cutting the rate of deforestation). It also recognises that transformational change is complex and multi-faceted, and likely to vary between contexts, but identifies a set of common enablers and drivers. These are:

a. **Political will and local ownership:** need for the change is agreed locally and the process is locally owned. For widespread changes, notably changes to the patterns of development, this will require high level political buy-in and broader support from across society;
b. **Capacity and capability can be increased:** countries and communities have the capacities and capabilities necessary to bring the change about;
c. **Innovation:** innovative technologies are piloted, with the potential to demonstrate new ways of doing things, which could lead to wider and sustained change;
d. **Evidence of effectiveness is shared:** approaches which have proved successful in one location are made widely available and lessons on their usefulness are credible and shared widely;
e. **Leverage / create incentives for others to act:** the costs of climate action are reduced to the point that acting on climate is a sensible decision for commercial firms and private individuals. These cost reductions may need to be steep enough to overcome behavioural inertia;
f. **Replicable:** good ideas piloted by the ICF are replicated by others in the same country and more widely;
g. **At scale:** interventions (such as national, sectoral or regional programmes) that have sufficient reach to achieve institutional and policy reform, or drive down costs of technology deployment;
h. **Sustainable:** change is likely to be sustained once ICF support ends.

In each situation, some of these will be more relevant than others, but where there is evidence of more of them, than transformational change is more likely to occur. Please see attached ICF KPI 15 methodology for more information.

# 5. Overall Evaluation Approach

Reflecting the approach described in the over-arching Terms of Reference (ToR) for the MEL from the ICF/Compass contract (PO 7008), this ToR sets out the scope of work, requirements and reporting procedures for the evaluation of UK climate finance integration. The evaluation should be guided by the Evaluation Working Guidelines and Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework, which were designed in partnership by HMG and the Compass Supplier in 2016.

As set out in these aforementioned documents, the evaluation approach will develop relevant hypotheses (in realist terminology, Context, Mechanism, Outcome Configurations - CMOCs) to answer the evaluation question and sub-questions. These hypotheses will be based on an initial review of evaluative evidence and programme documentation and will then be presented in the Evaluation Plan/Inception Report (completion of Phase 1). After the approval of the Evaluation Plan/Inception Report, these hypotheses will be refined and tested through the review of secondary evidence from UK ICF and a wider, relevant global evidence base as appropriate. A first synthesis of findings will be submitted answering the evaluation questions based on the tested hypotheses entitled the Emerging Findings Report (phase 2, stage 1), which will allow HMG to reflect on evidence and findings to date, provide suggestions for further research and consider the format in which findings are presented. After receiving comments on this and conducting a final stage of fieldwork, the Compass supplier will submit the final report for approval (completion of Phase 2).

The DFID guidance for the integration of climate finance will act as a reference point and guide the evaluation. The approach will:

a. Unpack and assess the theory(ies) of change associated with DFID's integration ofclimate finance and develop relevant hypotheses (CMOCs) to answer the evaluation question and sub questions;
b. Use secondary evidence from within and outside of UK ICF to refine and test hypotheses. As part of this analysis, the approach must consider that as ICF integration is relatively new in its scaled form, integrated programmes will not be scheduled yet to meet their targets and will have limited results reported. Forecasts will have to be used, but that brings with it optimism bias.[3]
c. Undertake in depth qualitative interviews with DFID programme leads and other colleagues - to be identified by HMG or proposed by the Compass Supplier - in order to help answer the evaluation question.
d. Assess unintended effects of integration, both positive and negative, at different levels of the theory of change.
e. Considering most integrated programmes are at early stage of implementation, identify lessons of where integration has worked well and not so well, for whom, in what circumstances and why.

# 6. Governance and quality assurance of the evaluation

**Redacted**

# 7. Scope of the Evaluation

It will be important to consider the key categories or sub-groups within the integrated portfolio that are likely to affect implementation and impact of integration. Analysis by sector is important to help DFID advisers in the future to improve their ability to identify appropriate climate interventions in their areas of work. Other programme characteristics will be important in providing context and informing the analysis. These are outlined in Section 10.

The scope of the work will focus on understanding the integrated DFID portfolio and will not focus on other parts of DFID's portfolio, e.g. 100% climate finance programmes or DFID projects that are not integrated but potentially could be. As highlighted in the figure below, only purple programmes should be reviewed in detail for this work. That said, in some instances, the contractor may find it useful to compare to other groups within the DFID portfolio to help answer the evaluation questions. In particular, if there are identified examples of programmes that could have integrated ICF components that do not (for example through reference to programmes which are tagged with relevant Rio Markers), then it would be valuable to compare these to similar programmes that are spending ICF to understand why some do and others don't.




Note: sizes are simply illustrative and not an attempt at representing true proportions.

[4] The Independent Advisory Group consists of four external experts on monitoring, evaluating and learning (MEL) who provide advice and review to HMG's International Climate Finance (ICF) portfolio MEL work.

# 8. Evaluation questions

The evaluation question has been agreed and signed off by the DFID, BEIS and Defra Deputy Directors who sit on the ICF Management Board . The question is as follows:

*"In what circumstances and how has climate finance integration led to transformational change within the wider DFID portfolio, and to the most effective delivery of climate change outcomes? What can we learn from these different examples of integration to improve the approach taken in delivery of International Climate Finance more broadly?"*

The sub-questions for analysis are to be decided on after further discussion by the Compass supplier and ESG. The following illustrative questions indicate the types of issues that could be prioritised:

Contextual setting

1. What types of DFID programmes have integrated climate finance, and what does this integration look like (e.g. sectors, geographies, overall size of programme, % of climate finance, modality of support)? Is the sectoral breakdown of the integrated portfolio reflective of that within the wider DFID portfolio? Which offices/departments or areas are doing the most integration and which are doing the least? What proportion of integrated programmes have had components scored as ICF after the programme had begun?
    a. Are there any outliers, i.e. integrated programmes that do not fit into sub-groups or patterns identified in answering the questions above? Why don't these programmes fit these patterns?
2. How much information is available on the decision-making process for integrating climate finance for each programme? What did this look like? (including guidance this was based on and what advice was received from advisers or other experts)
3. What is the general stage of maturity of the climate components of these programmes (i.e. how far into implementation?) How does this compare with the maturity of the overall programme?

Assess early results and transformational potential

4. What sorts of climate change outcomes or outputs have been delivered or are expected to be delivered by integrated programmes? How do these vary according to the characteristics of the portfolio (sectors, geographies, overall size of programme, % of climate finance, modality of support)? How do these vary according to the characteristics of the potential beneficiaries (gender, level of poverty, other measures of marginalisation)? When considering both expected and early achieved climate outcomes or outputs, it would be useful to consider case studies to explore some of the following sub-questions:
    a. How and for whom have these climate objectives contributed to expected or actual impacts on poverty?
    b. How and in what circumstances have these climate objectives aimed to contribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation?
    c. What types and in what circumstances have there been unintended outcomes in climate integrated programmes?
    d. To what extent would any of these climate change outputs or outcomes have been achieved in the absence of integration?
5. To what extent and in what circumstances has integration been, or is likely to be, an opportunity to effect transformational change (according to the conceptualisation in Section 4 and in the KPI 15 methodology) across the DFID ODA portfolio (as part of a wider ambition to mainstream climate change and environmental concerns)? What are the expected results of this? Where integrated programmes have reported against KPI 15, what do their analyses tell us about the likelihood of transformational change resulting for

the integrated ICF portfolio? How does the likelihood of transformational change vary according to the characteristics of the portfolio (sectors, geographies, overall size of programme, % of climate finance, modality of support)?

Delivering integration

6. What are the technical and capacity challenges faced by DFID when attempting to integrate climate finance effectively? In what circumstances do these challenges differ,

e.g. across sectors or programme managers with varying levels of access to DFID's climate and environment advisers? Where there has not been a C&E adviser in the department or office, what approaches have been taken to access climate and environment expertise and how effective have these been? How have the quantity and quality of climate and environment expertise that programmes have had access to affected the design and implementation of integrated programmes? What can be done to remove these difficulties? Does the administrative burden of separate reporting and separate components deter small but useful integration from taking place?

7. Do programme leads feel they are able to adjust the proportion of ICF within their programmes in an adaptive way, as their programmes evolve? If not, what are the barriers to this?
8. How effective has the internal guidance, training and advice provided to support integration been in ensuring quality integrated programmes[5]? How closely has the guidance been followed by programmes? If not, why not? Where it has been followed, what sort of risks/issues did it help to avoid?
9. To what extent have the challenges outlined in Section 4 been present in the integrated portfolio? How and how effectively have these been dealt with by programmes? What central support (guidance, training, advice) did they access and how did it help them to deal with these challenges?
10. In addition to advice/support during design, to what extent have programmes been aligned with guidance in ensuring that capacity is available on a longer-term basis to implement climate objectives? To what extent do programme leads understand why they are integrating climate finance? What are the challenges and opportunities programme leads see when managing climate integrated programmes that differ from non-integrated programmes?

Learning lessons

11. What can we learn from these experiences to help us improve future design and management of integrated climate finance programmes, including ICF projects, programmes and the portfolio as a whole in order to improve the outcomes we deliver? To what extent does it appear that C&E advisers are learning on an annual basis how to make integration more effective within their programmes? To what extent is the wider team, including non-specialist climate advisers, developing their understanding of climate integration? What can we learn from outliers?

During the inception phase, the Compass supplier should interview a limited set of key stakeholders to finalise the evaluation questions, their associated hypotheses and their approach. The stakeholders will be members of the ESG and other individuals identified by the ESG and the Compass supplier as key informants. In addition, the Compass supplier and the ESG should

[5] HMG defines quality integrated programmes as a) efficiency in providing the targeted benefits for adaptation /mitigation (ie value for money); b) influencing uptake of climate-smart practices on a longer-term basis, e.g. in implementing partners/partner governments; c) using innovative practices and approaches with the potential to build models for others to follow; and d) ensuring there is a chance for others to learn from programming or for this to be scaled-up.

determine whether previous interviews and surveys can be used to inform this work, e.g. aforementioned internal or external papers on DFID integration and mainstreaming.

The inception phase should also further develop and test the evaluation questions to ensure all important questions have been covered and that they are all answerable. Any proposed changes to evaluation questions should be discussed and agreed with the ESG during the inception phase.

# 9. Evaluation Methodology

A realist synthesis approach will be employed for this work. The full approach is detailed in the Compass Evaluation Working Guidelines and the Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework. The Compass supplier will provide a tailored, detailed discussion of this approach in the inception report.

### 3. DFID Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation

HMG expects the research and evaluation it funds to adhere to the highest standards of integrity. See Annex 2 for further information.

# 10. Existing information sources

### 4. DFID administrative data

During the inception phase, the Compass supplier will be expected to review and gain an understanding of DFID's administrative data that relates to integration.

DFID holds a range of administrative data on its programmes. The most relevant fields will be: organisational hierarchy; date of programme start; ICF KPIs reported against; total funding; % of budget that is ICF; adaptation/mitigation split; intended programme duration; risk rating; review score; Input Sector Code; bilateral/multilateral status; geography: single/multiple country, fragile state, SID, rural/urban.

### 5. Evaluative evidence

Throughout the inception phase, the Compass supplier will speak to key informants across HMG to locate potential evidence sources and identify key programmes which should be reviewed. This will inform their proposed selection criteria for the identification and analysis of evaluative evidence to be described in the inception report.

When considering the appropriate evidence sources to include in this evaluation, the Compass supplier will build on the work it has done to:

- Assess the availability and quality of evaluations and other sources of data;
- Map ICF programmes, evaluations and other programme-level evidence to understand the breadth, depth and quality of evidence available, including when evaluative evidence from programmes will become available.
- Set guidelines for identification and assessment of evaluative evidence in the Evaluation Working Guidelines and the Evaluation Evidence Quality Assessment Framework.

Likely evaluative evidence will be publically available documentation on programmes, including programme logframes, Annual Reviews, Business Cases, Programme Closure Reports and Evaluations.

### 6. Programme delivery documentation

As listed in Section 14, DFID has developed guidance documents and other tools to help delivery the integration approach across DFID. These will be provided alongside the TOR and are listed in Section 14 in full.

# 11. Deliverables and timeframe

The Compass contract is expected to restart in January 2018. This would be the first evaluation undertaken by Compass, starting in January 2018 and finishing within 30 weeks.

All Evaluation deliverables/outputs will subject to quality assurance by the ESG; and are expected to meet OECD-DAC quality standards for evaluation. The Inception Report and Final Report will be peer reviewed by the IAG.

### 1) An Inception Report

The Evaluation Inception Phase is expected to run for the first month. During the inception phase the Suppliers will be expected to review relevant documentation (including some that will be provided by HMG to the supplier during the inception period) and speak to HMG colleagues, which will enable them to develop the relevant hypotheses and identify key evidence. At the end of the inception phase, the Supplier should produce an Evaluation Inception Phase Report that sets out:

- An updated Theory of Change.
- An agreed and finalised set of evaluation questions to be addressed by the evaluation,
- The evaluation methodology for all stages of the evaluation,
- The proposed set of hypotheses to be tested, e.g. CMOCs, and an understanding of how they relate to the theory of change and will answer the evaluation questions, e.g. an evaluation matrix.
- The proposed scope of programmes to review including rationale for this selection.
- Assessment of the probable quality and credibility of the identified evidence and datasets;
- A proposed set of in depth qualitative interviews with DFID colleagues to fill gaps in the evidence base.
- A review of the main risks and challenges for the evaluation and how these will be managed, including in which cases HMG support is needed;
- Discussion of how to ensure that the design and application of methods will be ethically sound and which relevant ethical standards will be applied
- An outline of how the Supplier will communicate with HMG during the evaluation
- A response to HMG’s dissemination and utilisation plan
- The evaluation work plan.

A draft version of this should be submitted four weeks after TOR have been received. HMG will have three weeks to review and provide comments, including seeking IAG feedback, if desired. A final version incorporating feedback should be delivered two weeks after HMG comments have been received. HMG will then have one week to sign off the final version.

### 2) Emerging Findings Report

The Emerging Findings Report should be delivered within two months of sign off of the final version of the Inception Report. The supplier should submit a draft report which includes:

- Re-stating the narrative and presentation of the descriptive statistics regarding integration to date by DFID that was included in the inception report in order to provide context.
- Emergent findings for each evaluation sub-question.
- Refined understanding of hypotheses and how this relates to the theory of change
- Areas of uncertainty that still exist and how the remaining data-gathering period will work to address these, including suggestions to changing methods or for additional data sources to tackle these gaps.
- A separate technical annex, detailing methods used to date, sources reviewed, limitations to the approach etc. The annex should give attention to any areas where the methods have deviated from those outlined in the inception report and provide explanations

The supplier should expect to present these emerging findings in person to HMG, if requested. HMG will provide comments on the report within two weeks of its receipt. The supplier would not be expected to provide a second version of the report at this time.

HMG reserves the right not to accept any report without the receipt of the technical annex in parallel.

### 3) Final Evaluation Report

The Final Evaluation Report should be delivered within a month of receiving comments on the Emerging Findings Report from HMG. The supplier should submit a final report which includes:

- A standalone executive summary (1-3 pages)
- Re-stating the narrative and presentation of the descriptive statistics regarding integration to date by DFID that was included in the inception report in order to provide context. Visual schematics of integration statistics should be considered.
- Findings for each evaluation question;
- Refined understanding of the theory of change;
- Recommendations for HMG and others on how they can learn from these experiences and refine approaches to integration in the future
- A separate technical annex, detailing methods used to date, sources reviewed, limitations to the approach etc.

The supplier should expect to present these findings in person to HMG, if requested. HMG will review and provide comments, including seeking feedback from the IAG, on the report within three weeks of its receipt. Once comments have been incorporated, a final report should be provided to HMG for sign off.

HMG reserves the right not to receive any report without the receipt of the technical annex in parallel.

HMG will identify its needs for additional communication and dissemination products (e.g. short factsheets, seminar presentations) and communicate these requirements to Compass during the inception phase. HMG will expect delivery of these completed products (where applicable) alongside the final report. HMG will lead on the use of these products in dissemination and learning activities.

### 7. Indicative Timeframe for deliverables

An indicative timeframe is provided below (see annex 3) and will be discussed with contractor before finalising.

# 12. Reporting

The Supplier will report to the lead HMG adviser for the evaluation. During the implementation phase, meetings will be held as required by agreement between the Supplier and the ESG. Compass should assume that at least 1 face to face meeting will take place during the inception phase and that two meetings throughout the rest of the evaluation will take place.

The lead HMG adviser will work with the Compass supplier to coordinate their engagement with HMG staff throughout the evaluation. The Compass supplier will be asked to draft and refine a plan for who in HMG they intend to engage with and the specific purpose of that engagement. They will share this plan with the HMG lead adviser at regular points during the evaluation and will discuss and agree it with the HMG lead adviser.

HMG will require monthly updates from the Compass Supplier on progress against the workplan, spending as compared to the budget, and updates to the analysis of risks and challenges identified in the inception report covering how successfully these are being managed.

Timing for the reporting is outlined under the deliverables section. The Evaluation Steering Group will provide any comments within 10-15 working days of receiving pre-specified reports, including any consultation the ESG undertake with the Independent Advisory Group or other HMG stakeholders. The ESG will integrate any comments from these others into their feedback to Compass.

The DFID's evaluation policy states that evaluations should be transparent. DFID therefore expects that all final reports will be published and that all raw datasets made available.

# 13. Challenges and limitations

In addition to the challenges and limitations discussed in the *Terms of Reference – Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning from the International Climate Fund* (PO 7008), challenges and limitations specific to this evaluation include:

- Timescales and the likelihood of having achieved intended programmatic climate or development outcomes at this stage. As DFID's integration implementation began in 2014, there has only been the opportunity for three years (or fewer) or programming. The likelihood of any programmes achieving their intended climate or development objectives in this time period is very low. Instead, the evaluation should look to understand the potential for achieving these, through plans, delivery activities, monitoring frameworks, Business Cases, etc. As posited at the start of this document, there is also scope to analyse the organisational and behavioural change that integration is effecting within DFID.

# 14. References

These will be provided by HMG to the Supplier as attachments to these TOR:

- Papers on integration in DFID
    - Integration paper for Strategy Board on July 24 2017.
    - Paul Watkiss Associates (2017), Independent report on ICF integration and use of climate data within DFID.
- Internal DFID Guidance on how to integrate climate finance

    - ‘Smart Guide: Climate and Environment’ (DFID, 2016)
    - ‘Climate smart development and climate finance’ (DFID, 2016)
- Administrative dataset of DFID’s data
- ICF KPI 15 methodology on transformational change
- Paper on mainstreaming of climate and environment more widely
    - [Inclusion TBD: Evidence on Demand (2016), ‘Review of Climate and Environment Assessments of Large (£40m+) DFID Programmes’]

# Annex 1: Indicative Theory of Change: Integration of climate finance across DFID




* Good quality definition: - efficiency in providing the targeted benefits for adaptation/mitigation (ie value for money)
- Influencing uptake of climate-smart practices on a longer-term basis e.g. in implementing partners; partner gov'ts
- using innovative practices and approaches with the potential to build models for others to follow
- ensuring there is a chance for others to learn from programming, or for this to be scaled-up

† In the earlier stages of the integration process, departments and offices have sought to identify opportunities for climate benefits in existing programmes – this is expected to reduce over time as we progress through this ICF period.

*[Assumptions are in italics]*

# Annex 2: DFID Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation

DFID expects the research and evaluation it funds to adhere to the highest standards of integrity. To facilitate this it has drawn up these Principles on ethical practice in research and evaluation. All research and evaluation conducted or funded by DFID (wholly or partially) is expected to uphold these Principles. These Principles should be read in conjunction with DFID's Ethics Guidance for Research and Evaluation.

**PRINCIPLES**

1. **Researchers and evaluators are responsible for identifying the need for and securing any necessary ethics approval for the study they are undertaking.** This may be from national or local ethics committees in countries in which the study will be undertaken, or other stakeholder institutions with formal ethics approval systems.

2. **Research and evaluation must be relevant and high quality with clear developmental and practical value**. It must be undertaken to a sufficiently high standard that the findings can be reliably used for their intended purpose. Research should only be undertaken where there is a clear gap in knowledge. Evaluations might also be undertaken to learn lessons to improve future impact, or in order to meet DFID's requirements for accountability.

3. **Researchers and evaluators should avoid harm to participants in studies.** They should ensure that the basic human rights of individuals and groups with whom they interact are protected. This is particularly important with regard to vulnerable people. The wellbeing of researchers/ evaluators working in the field should also be considered and harm minimised.

4. **Participation in research and evaluation should be voluntary and free from external pressure.** Information should not be withheld from prospective participants that might affect their willingness to participate. All participants should have a right to withdraw from research/ evaluation and withdraw any data concerning them at any point without fear of penalty.

5. **Researchers and evaluators should ensure confidentiality of information, privacy and anonymity of study participants.** They should clearly communicate any limits to confidentiality to prospective participants. In cases where unexpected evidence of serious wrong-doing is uncovered (e.g. corruption or abuse) there may be a need to consider whether the normal commitment to confidentiality might be outweighed by the ethical need to prevent harm to vulnerable people. DFID's fraud policy will apply if relevant.

6. **Researchers and evaluators should operate in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards**. They should also take account of local and national laws.

7. **DFID funded research and evaluation should respect cultural sensitivities**. This means researchers need to take account of differences in culture, local behaviour and norms, religious beliefs and practices, sexual orientation, gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity and other social differences such as class when planning studies and communicating findings. DFID should avoid imposing a burden of over-researching particular groups.

8. **DFID is committed to publication and communication of all evaluations and research studies**. Full methodological details and information on who has undertaken a study should be given and messages transmitted should fully and fairly reflect the findings. Where possible, and respecting confidentiality requirements, primary data should be made public to allow secondary analyses.

9. **Research and evaluation should usually be independent of those implementing an intervention or programme under study.** Independence is very important for research and evaluation; in fact evaluations in DFID can only be classified as such where they are led independently. Involvement of stakeholders may be desirable so long as the objectivity of a study is not compromised and DFID is transparent about the roles played. Any potential conflicts of interest that might jeopardise the integrity of the methodology or the outputs of research/ evaluation should be disclosed. If researchers/ evaluators or other stakeholders feel that undue pressure is being put on them by DFID officials, such that their independence has been breached, this should be reported to the Head of Profession for Evaluation who will take appropriate action

10. **All DFID funded research/ evaluation should have particular emphasis on ensuring participation from women and socially excluded groups**. Consideration should be given to how barriers to participation can be removed.

# Annex 3: Indicative timeline for evaluation