



Appendices

To PE3 Support for Policy Change –
Technical Report

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1 Programme documents reviewed

Programme	Documents reviewed in-depth using MaxQDA
2050 Calculator	2050-Calculator - Annual Review 2017
	2050 Business Case and Intervention Summary 2012
	2050 Calculator - International Outreach Evaluation Report
	2050 Calculator - Second Annual Review March 2015
Africa Clean Energy (ACE)	ACE Clean Energy Business Case
	ACE Clean Energy Fiscal Analysis Zambia - Final Report
	ACE Clean Energy Fiscal Study Malawi
	ACE Energy Africa Compact for Mozambique November 2017
	ACE Energy Africa Compact Sierra Leone - Final Report
	ACE Energy Africa Ethiopia Compact Development - Final Report
	ACE Energy Africa Uganda Compact development - Final Report
	Malawi Renewable Energy Strategy Final
	ACE Annual Review 2017
	ACE Annual Review 2018
	ACE Log Frame 2018
BioCarbon Fund ISFL	BioCarbon Fund ISFL Final Report - Formatted
	ISFL World Bank Evaluation Inception Report - Final
	BioCarbon Fund ISFL MEL Framework
	BioCarbon Fund (+FCPF) Business Case 2014
	BioCarbon Fund ISFL Annual Review 2016
	BioCarbon Fund ISFL Annual Review 2017
CIF: FIP	FIP Monitoring and Reporting Toolkit
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report October 2010
	FIP Semi-annual Report on FIP Operations June 2011
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report April 2012
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report October 2012
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report April 2013
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report October 2013
	FIP Semi-annual Operational Report May 2015

Programme	Documents reviewed in-depth using MaxQDA
CIFs all	Independent Evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds 2014
	CIFs MAR Assessment
	CIF Retrospective - Full Report
	CIF An Overview of the CIF Governance and Programming Information
	CIF Annual Review 2016-2017
	CIF Annual Review 2018
	CIF EL Initiative Overview - August 2018
	CIFs Response to MAR
	CIFs Evaluation of the CIFS Programmatic Approach
	CIFs Results Note 2019
	CIFs Evidence Synthesis of Transformational Change in the CIF
Climate Proofing (CPGD)	CPGD Annual Report 2017
	CPGD Business Case
	CPGD Log Frame
Degraded Land Mapping	DLM Annual Review 2014
	DLM Business Case
	DLM Programme Completion Report
East Africa Geo-thermal	EA Geo Log Frame 2016
	EA Geo Business Case 2015
	East Africa Geothermal Energy Annual Review 2018
	East Africa Geothermal Energy Facility Concluding Report 2018
FGMC	FGMC Business Case 2012
	FGMC Annual Review 2018
	FGMC Addendum 2018-2021
	FGMC Logframe 2017
Forestry Land Use and Governance in Indonesia (FLAG)	FLAG Annual Review 2017
	FLAG Annual Review 2018
	FLAG Business Case 2016
	FLAG Log Frame 2018
Forests Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)	CONF FCPF Quality Assurance Note
	FCPF DRAFT Carbon Fund Annual Review 2018 v5
	FCPF Second Evaluation Final Report Nov 2016 (ID 94139)

Programme	Documents reviewed in-depth using MaxQDA
	FCPF Log Frame
	FCPF Extension Business Case 2015
	FCPF Annual Review 2017
	FCPF Annual Review 2015
	FCPF (+ BioCarbon Fund) Business Case 2014
	FCPF - Programme Completion Report March 2015
GET FiT	CONF GET FiT Quality Assurance Note 2019
	GET FiT Business Case 2015
	GET FiT 2015 01 28 Final Report 'challenges for private sector'
	GET FiT Learning Brochure – 03
	GET FiT Learning Brochure – 06
	GET FiT Annual Review 2018
	GET FiT Performance Review and Baseline Report
	GET FiT Final Report -
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	GGGI Annual Review 2017
	GGGI Annual Review 2018
	GGGI Business Case
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	GCF Business Case 2015
	GCF Annual Review 2017
	GCF Annual Review 2018
IFSLU	IFLSU Annual Review 2018
	IFLSU Annual Review 2017
	IFSLU - P4F LA Business Case
International CCS Capacity Building	CCUS Annual Review 2018
KNOWFOR	KNOWFOR Business Case
	KNOWFOR Annual Review 2016
	KNOWFOR Evaluation
	KNOWFOR Programme Completion Review
SPS Colombia	CONF SPS Quality Assurance Note 2019
	SPS Annual Review 2017
	SPS Annual Review 2018
	SPS Assessment of proposed extension 2017
	SPS Business Case and Intervention Summary

Programme	Documents reviewed in-depth using MaxQDA
NAMA Facility	NAMA Annual Review 2018
	NAMA factsheet 'NAMA facility lessons learned' 2015
	NAMA Facility Leaflet May 2014
	NAMA Monitoring & Evaluation Framework
	NAMA Mid-Term Evaluation Report 2017
	NAMA External Appraisal DANIDA 2014
	NAMA Annual Review 2017
	NAMA Annual Review May 2014 - April 2015
	NAMA Annual Review May 2015 - April 2016
	NAMA Business Case
Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR)	Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) First Independent Evaluation 2015
	PMR Annual Review December 2014
	PMR Business Case
Promoting LCD	Promoting LCD Business Case and Intervention Summary
	Promoting LCD Annual Review 2015
	Promoting LCD Project Completion Report 2015
RBF	RBF Business Case and Intervention Summary
	EnDev Results-based Financing for Energy Access Lessons Report
	RBFF Annual Review 2018
	RBFF Mid-Term Evaluation Report 2017
REDD for Early Movers (REM)	CONFIDENTIAL REM Quality Assurance Note 2019
	REM Business Case
	REM Annual Review 2017 LM_NL Final Draft
	REM Annual Review 2016
StARCK+	StARCK+ Annual Review 2018
	StARCK+ Learning Report - Technical Assistance
Tanzania CCISP	TCCISP Programme Completion Review 2016

2 Non-programme documents reviewed

Documents reviewed in-depth using MaxQDA	Author (Date Published)
An approach to monitoring and evaluation of institutional capacity for adaptation to climate change; the case of the United Kingdom's investment in Ethiopia's climate-resilient green economy	Rebecca Adler, Kirsty Wilson, Patrick Abbot, Ursula Blackshaw (2015)
Evaluation of the World Bank Group Engagement on Strengthening Sub-national Governments	(May 2018)
ICAT Transformational Change Guidance	(May 2018)
ICF Colombia Programme One-Pagers	-
International Climate Finance: UK aid for low-carbon development. A performance review	(February 2019)
GGGI Fact Sheet Colombia – Amazon Vision	-
Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI)	(2015)
Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI)	(2019)
Policy Access and Influence Assessment	-
Quality and reporting standards, resources, training materials and information for realist evaluation: the RAMESES II project	Geoff Wong, Gill Westhorp, Joanne Greenhalgh, Ana Manzano, Justin Jagosh and Trisha Greenhalgh (October 2017)

3 Example of a completed programme investigation strategy (PIS)

The document review process culminated in the development of a Programme Investigation Strategy (PIS). This document summarised our understanding of the programme and set out what we wanted to investigate and the theories we wished to test during interviews. The PIS leads to the production of a topic guide which was tailored for each interview, examples of which can be found below in sections 4 to **Error! Reference source not found.**.

We give below a completed example of a topic guide for national and sub-national support for policy change, referred to here as 'policy influencing'.

Programme	PIS created by	Date
[name of programme]	[name of team member]	XX/XX/XX

Relevant to ... ✓ [boxes unticked for anonymity in this example]											
Colombia		Indonesia		Nepal		Uganda		World Bank		CIFs	

Brief description of the programme						
Include summary of programme, start and end dates, intended outcomes, £ value, results and any other background information that might be relevant when preparing for an interview						
Value	£X	Start	XX	End	XX	
<p>The [programme 1] is a [type of programme] which attempts to [what they do] by [how they do it]. The fund works with countries/jurisdictions which are already successfully participating in [another programme- referred to as programme 2]. The programme is administered by [name of MDB]. The latest AR (date) considers XYZ. [more in-depth programme background]</p>						

Intended policy-influencing effect, expressed as CMO(s)
<p>Interaction between the levels</p> <p>In a country where commitments to [programme 2] have been made (C) and willingness to meet these commitments exists or can be persuaded to exist across the levels of government (C) and the prospect of financial incentives exists upon successful application to the [programme 1] (C) and technical assistance is available to support the development of an [name of document] (C) then the process itself gives a starting point and structured approach (M) for countries to begin engaging across the levels of government about [programme 2] (M) to gain consensus on what is achievable and how it will be achieved (M) which leads to support for the [document] across the levels of government (O) and commitment to delivering its intended outputs (O) including policy implementation (O).</p> <p>Influencing national policy</p> <p>In a country which is no longer eligible for [type of assistance] under previous programmes (e.g. [programme 3]) (C) but political commitments to [programme 2] have already been made (C) and policy ideas of how to achieve these have been identified (C) but technical support is needed to build the capacity of the government to implement, conform and institutionalise these policy ideas (C) and [programme 1] proves to be an effective partner (C) and there is the prospect of sufficient financial incentives if an application to the [programme 1] is successful (C) then [programme 1] technical assistance provides participating governments with a common framework and structured approach for achieving [programme 2] (M) which enables the governments of these countries to</p>

understand the potential benefits (M) and how these can be realised (M) which results in the development of an [name of document] (O).

Institutionalisation

In a country where commitments to [programme 2] have been made (C) and progress through the Readiness Fund has been strong (C) and the intention exists to develop an [name of document] for the [programme 1] (C) or the process has already begun (C) and technical assistance is available to support this process (C) and the [programme 1] continues to require a dedicated national body to oversee [programme 2] in order to approve [document] (C) then countries which want to have their [document] approved (M) in order to realise the benefits of the [programme 1] (M) and meet their [programme 2] commitments (M) initiate the process of institutionalising [programme 2] by creating dedicated bodies to implement and monitor it within the national government (O) such as the creation of a government body to [purpose] in [place] (O).

[For multilateral or multi-bilateral]

Aspects of the policy context relevant to the case study

Include any relevant policy, economic, social, legal, physical or technological contextual information here

Who are the actors?

Include here the relevant actors (organisation or job role)

MAKE SURE **OTHER DONORS** ARE IDENTIFIED HERE BUT LEAVE THE INTERVIEW TICK BOX BLANK FOR THEM

Interview?

✓

1. [name of MDB]

2. Government ministers from [name of countries]

Additional documents identified

Include here any relevant documents identified in the document review that should be requested for review (document name, author/organisation, purpose)

1. XYZ

What theories will be informed by researching this programme?		
Theory		✓ Comments Include the specific aspects of the theory of change that are relevant
1a	Raising national ambition (diplomacy, technical assistance, demonstration, finance & convening)	✓ (suspected, so question asked in PIS)
1b	Influencing national and sub-national government policy (diplomacy, technical assistance, demonstration, finance & convening)	✓ Contingent finance
1c	Influencing MDBs and Funds DIP II CNV	✓ (minor, so not focus of topic guide)
2a	Interactions between the levels (global, national, sub-national)	
4	Transformational change	

Given everything above, what SPECIFICALLY do we therefore want to know from the SRO that isn't covered by the template topic guide?		
Include specific questions that come to mind as a result of the document review, but don't duplicate what is already in the template topic guide		
Question	Who (reference number above if easier)	Theories
<p>Progress under the [programme] appears to have been strong, but as countries seek to move into the [second phase] this seems to drop off. The evaluation report suggests this is due to a number of factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficulties in the negotiation stage of agreeing [document], with unclear roles and responsibilities between the [MDB] and country in question 	SRO	1b

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Challenges developing the methodological framework for monitoring ER, which has led to delays <p>What are your thoughts on this? Are there other factors in play? Has this affected the implementation of policies agreed during the readiness process?</p>		
<p>The [year] AR says that, in an attempt to support the [document] negotiation phase, [UK government department] has stepped in to act on behalf of [country] as a 'donor representative'. It has also pushed the [MDB] to clarify the process and roles and responsibilities of the negotiation process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How successful has [UK government department] been influencing the [MDB]? 		
<p>The first [document] was signed in [year] with the [country]. What enabled [country] to achieve this ahead of other countries?</p>	SRO	1b
<p>From reading the ARs it seems that policies for achieving [programme 2] are being developed and implemented as part of the [first phase], in preparation for joining the [second phase].</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Would you agree with this? Are the delays being experienced by countries moving through the [second phase] pipeline having an impact on these policies being implemented? <p>Could you tell me about any policy change or influence on policy which the [second phase] (distinct from the first phase) has helped to realise?</p> <p>If examples provided to the above:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What did the [programme] do that led to these policy outcomes? Would these outcomes have happened without the program? Or if circumstances had been different? <p>I</p>	SRO	1b
<p>The [year] AR refers to the following as examples of policy change related to [programme]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> XYZ XYZ 	SRO	1b

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • XYZ <p>Would you say these policy changes are linked to the [two phases]?</p> <p>If the [second phase],</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What did the [programme] do that led to these policy outcomes? ○ Would these outcomes have happened without the programme? Or if circumstances had been different? 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ [programme] works with countries and jurisdictions already participating successfully under the [other programme]. Do you therefore perceive participation in the Carbon Fund as an opportunity to raise the ambition of countries who have already made commitments under REDD+? 	SRO	1a
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are many countries participating in the [programme]. Where do you feel the programme has had most success influencing policy and/or raising national ambitions? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ We are particularly interested in progress within [XYZ countries] ○ Can you tell me how the programme has specifically influenced policy change in these countries? ○ Has it been especially (un)successful? ○ Why is this? 	SRO	1a/1b
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The [year] Evaluation refers to major policy successes in [country] during the lifetime of the [programme] but these are not claimed as outcomes. Why is this? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ XYZ ○ XYZ ○ XYZ ○ XYZ 	SRO	1b
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The [year] AR identifies concerns that some countries [quote from AR] and that conditions are thus placed upon these countries in order for them to proceed with the programme. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Could you tell us more about this? Which countries does it apply to? ○ What is different about the political context in these countries? 	SRO	1b

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The [year] AR states a recommendation that 'XYZ'. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As a donor to [programme] what opportunity does ICF have to influence the policies of the fund? ○ Did this attempt at influencing the [programme] happen and was it successful? ○ Are there other examples of successfully influencing the [programme]? ▪ What are some of the ways the [UK government department] Programme Lead might try to influence the [programme]? 	SRO	1c
▪		
▪		
▪		
▪		
▪		
▪		

Background and Resources

Include links to websites reviewed and titles of documents – anything that might be useful for an interviewer to refer to

[website of programme]

There are online progress sheets for participating countries but in the language of that country. Do English versions exist?

4 Example SRO interview topic guide

A completed SRO topic guide is found in the PIS above in Section 3.

Topic guide for programme SRO interviews

When completing the topic guide before the interview, use 'search and replace' on REM to enter the name of the programme
KEY

	Interviewer information – DO NOT read out
	Relevant to all programmes – read out

Programme	Topic guide created by	Date of creation
[name of programme]	[name of Compass team member]	XX.XX.XX

Interviewee (SRO)	Interviewer	Actual date of interview	Actual time of interview
[name of interviewee]			

Theories to be investigated	✓	Opening sections to be asked for all theories	Sections to be asked for only that theory	Closing sections to be asked for all theories
1a Raising national ambition		Part A: Introduction and background	Part D	Part I: General questions
1b National and sub-national government policy influencing	✓	Part B: Outcomes	Part E	Part J: Wrapping up

2 Interactions between the levels		Part C: Activities	Part F	
3 Influencing MDBs and Funds			Part G	
4 Transformational change			Part H	

PART A**Introduction and background**

Adapt as appropriate to the interview

Thank you very much for agreeing to help with our work. We think it will be a really important contribution to thinking about how work going forward.

We are beginning to develop ideas on how and in what circumstances ICF programmes are influencing policy on climate change. During the interview, I'm hoping to test out some of our early ideas with you so that you can help us to refine them.

I'm planning to record our conversation so that I can make sure I don't miss anything. We may also include anonymised quotes in our report, is that OK with you?

The report will be published later in 2019.

I'm going to start by asking you some general questions.

So, you are/were the SRO for [programme], which I will refer to as [programme nickname] during this interview. Could you just give me a brief overview of what your role did/does involve?

Break the ice and start the interview.

And what do you understand by the term 'policy influencing'?

Build common ground to start the interview process.

PART B**OUTCOMES**

Let's move on now to talk about how successful REM was in achieving policy influence. We have reviewed the programme documents, but we are interested in your views. We will pick up on how the outcomes have been achieved a bit later on – for now we are interested in what those outcomes or achievements were.

From our review of the documents we believe the outcomes are/were:

Insert summary of outcomes from programme documents...

To record what the outcomes are to make cross-reference easy. Not just final outcomes, but also initial outcomes or steps on the way to an outcome.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy changes made by [country] government to [tackle specific climate change issue], such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ [Outcome 1] ○ [Outcome 2] ○ [Outcome 3] • [institution] in [country] approving a legal framework to support the [area of policy] <p>Have we missed any important outcomes or intermediate outcomes?</p>	
<p>So firstly, in your own words, could you sum up what you think [programme] achieved, if anything, in regards to influencing policy at a national level? What policies actually changed and what form did that take? Whose policies changed? How does that relate to what was expected? Why did you think that was important?</p> <p><i>Prompt – Were there new laws? Was a new strategy produced? Was a new tax introduced? Was there a new information campaign?</i></p>	<p>To check our understanding of the outcomes, and to look for very initial clues about what might have contributed to them in terms of mechanisms and contexts that we can pick up later in the interview.</p>
<p>And again, in your own words, could you sum up what you think [programme] achieved, if anything, in regards to influencing policy at a sub-national level? What policies actually changed and what form did that take? Whose policies changed? How does that relate to what was expected? Why did you think that was important?</p> <p><i>Prompt – Were there new laws? Was a new strategy produced? Was a new tax introduced? Was there a new information campaign?</i></p>	<p>To check our understanding of the outcomes, and to look for very initial clues about what might have contributed to them in terms of mechanisms and contexts that we can pick up later in the interview.</p>
<p>And could you sum up what you think [programme] achieved, if anything, in regards to influencing policy at a global level? What policies actually changed and what form did that take? Whose policies changed? How does that relate to what was expected? Why did you think that was important?</p> <p><i>Prompt – Did finance criteria change? Did the focus of attention change? Did new programmes addressing new needs come into being because of this programme?</i></p>	<p>To check our understanding of the outcomes, and to look for very initial clues about what might have contributed to them in terms of mechanisms and contexts that we can pick up later in the interview.</p>

<p><i>Pick up any outcomes that have not been covered</i></p> <p>From the [programme documents] it appears as if an important outcome was xxxx. Is that right?</p> <p><i>Where we don't already know</i> Where would those outcomes be documented?</p> <p><i>Prompt – ask them to send a copy if unpublished.</i></p>	<p>To pick up any outcomes not discussed above and find where they might be documented, and obtain the documents.</p>
<p>Are you aware of any progress towards policy change that hasn't yet led to outcomes?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary - I am thinking about things like getting ministers to agree that there should be a new law, or laying the groundwork with stakeholders for a new tax regime? Pick up any from the documents here.</i></p>	<p>To pick on any outcomes that may not have been fully delivered yet but which show progress has been made. Also, to prompt any that may have been overlooked.</p>
<p>Are there any examples of [programme] trying to influence policy but not being successful?</p>	<p>To start to identify important differences.</p>
<p>Were there any unexpected outcomes?</p>	<p>To identify possible alternative explanations, important contexts and possible mechanisms.</p>
<p>Thank you. We will pick up on those outcomes as we work through the interview.</p>	

PART C

ACTIVITIES

I want to move on how and ask you about what REM **did** to influence policy.

From what I have read about the programme, it appears that it set out to influence policy by ... [set out CMO(s) from PIS]

[PIS]

– Is that right? Is there anything we have missed? *Look for specific examples. Be clear whether they relate to raising national ambition (which we are asking about specifically) or other aspects of policy change.*

Understand their starting point for the interview, and also get a handle on what were the most important activities.

<p><i>If not picked up in the previous question – ask for specific examples</i></p> <p>And can I check with you which of the following things were done as part of the programme ...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was technical assistance provided to help change policy? • Did the programme make use of demonstration, by which I mean showing people what has been achieved elsewhere with the idea that they believe it could be relevant to their own area • Was finance provided, if so in what form? Were any conditions attached to that finance in terms of policy change? • Were different parties brought together to discuss and agree a way forward in terms of policy change, and did ICF use its convening power to achieve that? • Was use made of diplomacy, by which I mean high-level engagement for example between UK ministers and ministers in the partner country? • Did you try to influence policy through influencing the institutions involved, for example by getting a seat on governing bodies, or influencing who was appointed to key positions in partner organisations? • Did you try to influence other donors to the programme, or other programmes active in the country? • Was anything else done that I haven't mentioned? <p><i>Note – if they talk about working with other influencers, explain that this way of achieving influence is out of the scope of this specific evaluation, although it is something we may pick up on later. The exception is OTHER DONORS which is in scope.</i></p>	<p>To focus the rest of the interview if we haven't been able to do that through the document review alone – this question is asked again in a slightly different format later to make sure we have this right.</p>
<p>And which of the things ICF did do you think had the most effect in influencing policy?</p>	<p>To focus the rest of the interview if we haven't been able to do that through the document review alone.</p>
<p>And what, in retrospect, would you have tried that you didn't?</p>	<p>To identify possible areas of difference to explore.</p>

DO NOT READ OUT

Given the document review and the discussion so far, now decide which subjects to pursue in the interview.

CHOOSE ONE OF ...

- ☐ Raising national ambition
- ☒ Other national and sub-national policy change

CHOOSE MAX THREE OF ...

- ☒ Technical assistance
- ☐ Demonstration
- ☒ Finance (with or without conditions) **MAIN FOCUS**
- ☐ Convening
- ☒ Diplomacy
- ☐ Other activities that don't fall into these categories *there is no section for this – use your initiative!*

PART D**Theory 1: Building National Ambition**

First, I am going to ask you about the way [programme] raised national ambition

ASK ONLY IF THIS HAS NOT ALREADY COME OUT

Could you explain to me how the raised ambition manifested itself? How did you know that ambition had been raised? What exactly changed? *Link back to outcomes above, e.g. 'was this the law that we spoke about earlier?'*

When was that?

Where can we find evidence of that? *Prompt – a strategy document, a law, etc.*

Ask for a copy of any documents that are mentioned.

The question about 'when' is trying to understand the chronology of change and whether something is a necessary precursor (which would then be regarded as part of the context).

Seeking sources of evidence.

<p><i>If multi-country</i>, in which countries did you see national ambition raised in particular?</p> <p>Were there any countries where national ambition wasn't raised as a result of the programme?</p> <p>Why do you think there were those differences between countries?</p>	<p>Trying to get a handle on what might have been important in making the difference – lays the groundwork for later questions on mechanism and contexts.</p>
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
RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the technical consultancy provided to look at options”

Earlier we talked about [specific technical assistance intervention] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about *how* it did that and *why* it was successful.

Repeat this section for any further instances of technical assistance that seem important.

<p>What did [specific technical assistance intervention] do that made a difference to raising national ambition? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words, to start to get a handle on mechanisms.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific technical assistance intervention] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking</p>

<p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific technical assistance intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'no'</i> Why? What made the difference?</p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific technical assistance intervention] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'yes'</i> Why do you think that might have been?</p>	<p>this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, technical assistance <u>builds understanding</u> in decision makers about the ways in which higher levels of ambition might be delivered, and this makes them more likely to be more ambitious. Taking [specific example of technical assistance], is that how it worked?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the technical assistance create new understanding? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create new knowledge and better understanding? What was it about it that worked? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of technical assistance on creating better understanding documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance created new knowledge and understanding?</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p>  <pre> graph LR subgraph TA [TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE] direction TB A[Building confidence in decision-makers that higher levels of ambition are feasible because reliable assessments have been made based on credible and trustworthy (ICF) evidence] B[Building new understanding in key actors, for example building understanding of climate change adaptation measures that work in forest economies] end TA --> C[Enables policy change to happen more quickly] TA --> D[Enables policy change to be done more effectively] TA --> E[Creates a more conducive environment for change] TA --> F[Prompts government to act more quickly and effectively to make changes] </pre>

<p>2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, technical assistance builds confidence in decision makers that higher levels of ambition are achievable. Taking [specific example of technical assistance], is that how it worked?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the technical assistance build confidence? In whom? How? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build confidence? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances do you think contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of technical assistance on raising confidence documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance built confidence?</p> <p>3. Is there anything we have overlooked in relation to the way technical assistance worked to raise national ambition?</p>	
<p>RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF DEMONSTRATION</p> <p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. "the use of the Ethiopian case study"</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific demonstration intervention] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of demonstration that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific demonstration intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>

<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific demonstration intervention] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific demonstration intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific demonstration intervention] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works to raise ambition because it <u>creates a new understanding</u> in decision makers about what might be achievable. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], is that how it worked?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create new understanding? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create new knowledge? What</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p>

was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of demonstration on creating new knowledge documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped build knowledge?

2. Again, we have a theory that, in certain circumstances, the demonstration effect works because decision makers don't **understand the costs and benefits** of high ambition until they see them elsewhere and realise that it's better than they thought. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?


If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect help people understand costs and benefits? In whom? If not costs and benefits, what did it help people understand? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help people understand costs and benefits? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of demonstration on helping people understand the costs and benefits documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped people understand costs and benefits?

3. We have another theory, that, in certain circumstances, the demonstration effect works because it creates a desire in decision



If that's not quite right How would you reframe it?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build confidence? Whom did it have that effect with and how?

Was the effect of technical assistance on raising confidence documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance built confidence?

<p>makers to <u>reap the rewards of high ambition</u>. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create a desire to reap benefits? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to reap rewards? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration on creating a desire to reap rewards documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped build a desire to reap rewards?</p> <p>4. A further theory is that, in certain circumstances, the demonstration effects works because it provokes <u>a concern in decision makers about missing out</u> on the benefits that other countries are reaping – in other words it makes decision makers worry they might get left behind. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create a worry about getting left behind? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke a concern about getting left behind? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p>	
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<p>Was the effect of demonstration on provoking a concern of getting left behind documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped provoke a concern about getting left behind?</p> <p>5. We have another theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it <u>provokes a concern about reputational damage</u> with the international community if ambition remains low. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], is that how it worked?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create a concern about reputational damage? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke a concern about international reputational damage? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration on provoking a concern about international reputational damage documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped provoke concerns about reputational damage?</p> <p>6. Another theory is that, in certain circumstances, a demonstration of what has worked elsewhere <u>creates a competitive desire</u> amongst decision makers to do better than others, for example, neighbouring countries or regions. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work in that way?</p>	
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<p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create a competitive urge? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke a competitive desire? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration on provoking a competitive desire documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped provoke a competitive desire?</p> <p>7. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it <u>creates some excitement</u> that there is a policy area that politicians can do something about, be ambitious, and achieve good results. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect create some excitement? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create excitement? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration on creating excitement documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p>	
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<p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped create excitement?</p> <p>8. Finally, we have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it <u>reduces the perception of risk</u> in decision makers because it has been tried and has succeeded somewhere else or in a different policy area. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the demonstration effect reduce the perception of risk? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it reduce the perception of risk? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration on reducing the perception of risk documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped reduce the perception of risk?</p> <p>9. Is there anything we have overlooked in relation to the way demonstration works to raise national ambition? <i>Look for real examples and run through similar questions.</i></p>	
<p>RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF FINANCE</p> <p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the requirement to set high NDCs that was a condition of the loan”. ‘Specific aspect of a finance intervention’ means the conditions that were imposed or the specific thing that was funded.</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific aspect of finance intervention] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p>	

<i>Repeat this section for any further instances of finance (including the prospect of finance and the use of conditions on finance) that seem important.</i>	
<p>What did [specific aspect of finance intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible</i></p>	Get their views on this, in their own words.
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific aspect of finance intervention] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific aspect of finance intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific aspect of finance intervention] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because it enables infrastructure to be built that makes <u>higher levels of ambition</u> possible to achieve which in turn enables commitment to</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p>

higher levels of ambition. Taking [specific aspect of finance intervention], did it work that way?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did the finance enable higher levels of ambition because what it paid for made that ambition achievable? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it enable higher levels of ambition? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of finance on raising levels of ambition documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?


Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which finance helped raise levels of ambition?

Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?

2. We have another theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because it **overcomes the objection** that higher levels of ambition are unaffordable. Again, taking [specific aspect of finance intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did the finance overcome objections? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it overcome the objection of unaffordability? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?



<p>Was the effect of finance in overcoming objections about affordability documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which finance helped overcome affordability objections?</p> <p>3. Our most significant theory is that, in certain circumstances, conditions associated with the finance <u>force a higher level of ambition</u> to be adopted. Again, taking [specific aspect of finance intervention], did it work in that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did the finance force ambition? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did the conditions force a higher level of ambition? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of the conditions associated with finance forcing higher levels of ambition documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which the conditions associated with finance forced a higher level of ambition?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, <u>the prospect of obtaining finance</u> may make higher levels of ambition seem possible where otherwise they might not have been. Does that seem plausible to you?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does the prospect of receiving finance make ambition possible? In whom? What circumstances contributed to that?</p>	
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<p><i>If it's about right</i> What factors contributed to it working in that way? What kinds of people might be affected by that? Do you have any examples of where it might have worked like that? Is there any objective evidence of that, for example in documents? Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?</p> <p>5. Is there anything we have overlooked in relation to the way finance worked to raise national ambition?</p>	
<p>RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF CONVENING</p> <p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the meeting that you held for businesses, local government and the local community to discuss the proposals”.</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific convening intervention] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of convening that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific convening intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific convening intervention] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p>

<p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific convening intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'no'</i> Why? What made the difference?</p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific convening intervention] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'yes'</i> Why do you think that might have been?</p>	<p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
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I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.

1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it **creates a shared understanding** of the benefits of higher levels of ambition and the actions required to achieve them. Taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did the convening create shared understanding? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a shared understanding of the benefits of higher levels of ambition? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of convening on creating and a shared understanding documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?


Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening helped build shared understanding of the benefits of higher levels of ambition?

2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it **builds trust** amongst the participants around how higher levels of national ambition will be set and acted upon. Taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did convening create trust? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build trust? What was it about it

Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.



<p>that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening on building trust documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening helped build trust?</p> <p>3. We have a further theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>builds a shared desire and commitment</u> to aim higher amongst the participants. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did convening create a shared commitment? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build a shared desire to aim higher? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening on building a shared desire to aim higher documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening built a shared desire to aim higher?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it builds <u>a sense of excitement and drive</u> amongst the participants. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did convening create excitement and drive? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p>	
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<p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build a sense of excitement and drive? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening on building a sense of excitement and drive documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening helped to build a sense of excitement and drive?</p> <p>5. We have a further theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it enables <u>common positions to be developed and shared</u> amongst the participants. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did convening allow common positions to be developed? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build common positions? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening on building common positions documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening helped build common positions?</p> <p>6. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>creates a 'safe space'</u> within which everyone could</p>	
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discuss and carry out their own actions to achieve the greater goal. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did convening create this kind of 'safe space'? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a safe space? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of convening in creating a safe space documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening helped create a safe space?

7. Is there anything we have overlooked about the way convening worked to raise national ambition?

RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY

Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the diplomatic dinner in September 2016 which the UK and Ugandan Prime Ministers both attended at which climate change policy was discussed”.

Earlier we talked about [specific diplomacy intervention] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about *how* it did that and *why* it was successful.

Repeat this section for any further instances of diplomacy that seem important.

What did [specific diplomacy intervention] do that made a difference?
Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?

Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.

Get their views on this, in their own words.

I'm interested in why [specific diplomacy intervention] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do you think made the difference?

Prompt if necessary ...

- Was there anything else happening at the time?
- Was it something to do with the people involved?
- Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance?

Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...

Let's assume for a moment the [specific diplomacy intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?

If 'no' Why? What made the difference?

Are there any examples within the programme where [specific diplomacy intervention] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?

If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?

Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.

The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.

I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.

1. We have a theory that diplomacy works because it **warms up the key decision makers** to the idea of being more ambitious and as a result they go on and aim higher. Taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work that way?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did diplomacy warm people up? Whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it warm up decision makers? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?

Was the effect of diplomacy on warming up decision makers documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?


Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy warmed up decision makers?

2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, diplomacy works because it **builds a relationship of trust with the UK** and as a result decision makers are more likely to listen to our arguments and pay attention to our evidence. Taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Did diplomacy make people more likely to pay attention to what the UK says? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it make decision makers more

Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.



<p>likely to listen? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy on making decision makers more likely to listen documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy made decision makers more likely to listen?</p> <p>3. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, diplomacy works because it makes <u>appeals to self-interest or altruism</u> more convincing because they are delivered by an important person. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Did diplomacy make an appeal to self-interest or altruism more convincing? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it make that appeal to the national interest? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy on appealing to the national interest documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy made an appeal to national interest?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, there a <u>high level, face-to-face meeting</u> makes it more likely that countries will pay attention to what ICF says. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p>	
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<p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy work because it tends to be face-to-face? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did face-to-face meetings convince decision makers? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of high level diplomacy documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy helped persuade people that higher levels of ambition could be delivered in practice?</p> <p>5. We have a theory that diplomacy works because it creates a relationship in which decision makers feel they should offer something back – it appeals to <u>an idea of reciprocity</u>. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy work because it creates a demand for reciprocity? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a need for reciprocity? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy on creating a need for reciprocity documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy creates a need for reciprocity?</p>	
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6. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, diplomacy works because it creates a **desire to be seen as leaders** in climate change policy. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy work because it creates a desire to lead? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to be seen as leaders? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of diplomacy creating a desire to be seen as leaders documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy created a desire to be seen as leaders?

Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?

6. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, diplomacy works because it **diffuses opposition** in those on the receiving end of it to greater ambition. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy work because diffuses opposition? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it diffuse opposition? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

<p>Was the effect of diplomacy on diffusing opposition documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy diffused opposition?</p> <p>Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?</p> <p>7. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, diplomacy works because it created a <u>desire to engage further with ICF</u>, opening up doors to other activities such as technical assistance and convening with stakeholders. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy work because it makes countries more likely to want to work with ICF? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to further engage with ICF? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in creating a desire for further engagement with ICF documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy created this desire to engage further?</p> <p>8. Is there anything we have overlooked in the way that diplomacy worked to raise national ambition?</p>	
RAISING NATIONAL AMBITION – THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE	

<p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the voting that happened at the meeting to decide who would be funded”.</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific example of institutional influence] and the fact it played a role in raising national ambition. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of institutional influence that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific example of institutional influence] do that made a difference to raising national ambition? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words, to start to get a handle on mechanisms.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific example of institutional influence] was successful at raising national ambition. What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific example of institutional influence] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have raised national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific example of institutional influence] was used but was not successful at raising national ambition or had unintended effects on national ambition?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>That's the end of our questions about the way in which ICF works to build national ambition.</p>	

PART E**Theory 2 Influencing national and sub-national government policy**

I am going to ask you about the way [programme] influenced policy.

ASK ONLY IF THIS HAS NOT ALREADY COME OUT

Could you explain to me how the policy change manifested itself? Was it at national or sub-national level? How did you know that policy had been, or was going to be changed? What exactly changed? *Link back to outcomes above, e.g. “was this the law that we spoke about earlier?”*

When was that?

Where can we find evidence of that? *Prompt – a strategy document, a law, etc.*

Ask for a copy of any documents that are mentioned.

The question about ‘when’ is trying to understand the chronology of change and whether something is a necessary precursor (which would then be regarded as part of the context).

Seeking sources of evidence.

If multi-country, in which countries or regions did you see policy change in particular? Were there any countries or regions where policy change didn’t happen as a result of the programme?

If unclear from previous discussion ...

What exactly changed? *Link back to outcomes above, e.g. “was this the law that we spoke about earlier?”*

When was the change made?

Where can we find evidence of that? *Prompt – a strategy document, a law, etc.*

Trying to get a handle on what might have been important in making the difference – lays the groundwork for later questions on mechanism and contexts.

The question about ‘when’ is trying to understand the chronology of change and whether something is a necessary precursor (which would then be regarded as part of the context).

The final question is seeking other sources of evidence that we can triangulate with.

INFLUENCING NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY – THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the technical consultancy provided to look at options”.

<p>Earlier we talked about [specific technical assistance intervention] and the fact it played a role in influencing national and sub-national policy. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of technical assistance that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific technical assistance intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific technical assistance intervention] was successful at changing policy (at a national or sub-national level). What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific technical assistance intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have resulted in policy change at national or sub-national level?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific technical assistance intervention] was used but did not result in policy change, or had unintended effects on policy?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them</p>

1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, technical assistance builds **confidence in decision makers** that policy change will be done well and for the right reasons, and achieve the intended effect. Taking [specific technical assistance intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does technical assistance work because it builds confidence? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build confidence? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of technical assistance in building confidence documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance built confidence?


2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, technical assistance **creates better understanding** about climate change mitigation and adaptation measures amongst decision makers enabling policy change to be done more effectively and more quickly. Again, taking [specific technical assistance intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does technical assistance create better understanding, enabling change to happen more effectively and quickly? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create understanding? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of technical assistance in creating understanding documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to



<p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance created understanding?</p> <p>3. We have a theory that technical assistance enables change to happen more effectively and quickly because it provides <u>additional human capacity</u>. Taking [specific technical assistance intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does technical assistance create more human capacity? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provide additional human resource? What was it about it that worked? Whom/which organisations did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of technical assistance in creating additional human resource documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance created additional human resource?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, technical assistance <u>transfers knowledge and skills</u> to in-country staff, making change longer lasting. Again, taking [specific technical assistance intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does technical assistance transfer knowledge and skills? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it transfer knowledge and skills? What</p>	
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<p>was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of technical assistance in transferring knowledge and skills documented at the time? <i>If yes – are you able to share that with me?</i></p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which technical assistance transferred knowledge and skills?</p> <p>5. Is there anything we have overlooked in the way that technical assistance worked to influence national and sub-national policy?</p>	
INFLUENCING NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY – THE ROLE OF DEMONSTRATION <i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the use of the Ethiopian case study”.</i>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific demonstration intervention] and the fact it played a role in influencing national and sub-national policy. I’d like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of demonstration that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific demonstration intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>
<p>I’m interested in <u>why</u> [specific demonstration intervention] was successful at changing policy (<i>clarify if necessary</i>, at a national or sub-national level). What factors do you think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? 	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p>

Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...

Let's assume for a moment the [specific demonstration intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have resulted in policy change (at national or sub-national level)?

If 'no' Why? What made the difference?

Are there any examples within the programme where [specific demonstration intervention] was used but did not result in (national or sub-national) policy change, or had unintended effects on policy?

If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?

I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.

1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, the demonstration effect works because it helps decision makers **understand what could be done** to change policy. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work that way?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does demonstration help decision makers understand what could be done? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?


If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help decision makers understand what could be done? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?

Was the effect of demonstration in helping decision makers understand what could be done documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped decision makers understand what could be done?

The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.

Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.



2. Again, we have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because decision makers didn't understand the **costs and benefits of changing policy** until they saw policy activities elsewhere and realised the ratio was better than they thought. Taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?
- If that's not quite right* How would you reframe it? Does demonstration help decision makers understand the costs and benefits? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?
- If it's about right* Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help decision makers understand costs and benefits of policy change? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?
- Was the effect of demonstration in helping decision makers understand costs and benefits documented at the time? *If yes* – are you able to share that with me?
- Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped decision makers understand costs and benefits of policy change?
3. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it creates a **desire in decision makers to copy or improve** upon what has been done elsewhere. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?
- If that's not quite right* How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create this desire to copy? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?
- If it's about right* Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to copy or improve on what had been done elsewhere? What was it about it that worked?

<p>Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration creating a desire to copy or do better documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration created a desire to copy or do better?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it provokes a <u>concern in decision makers about missing out</u> on the benefits that other countries are reaping – in other words it creates concern they might get left behind. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create this concern about getting left behind? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke a concern about missing out? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration in provoking a concern about missing out? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration provoked a concern about missing out?</p> <p>5. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it provokes a <u>concern in decision makers about reputational damage</u> with the international community if policy remain unchanged. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p>	
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<p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create this concern about reputational damage from not changing? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke concern about reputational damage? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration provoking a concern about reputational damage documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration provoked concern about reputational damage?</p> <p>6. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it provokes a <u>competitive desire in decision makers to do better</u> than others, for example, neighbouring countries or regions. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work in that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create this competitive desire? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it provoke a competitive desire? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration provoking a competitive desire documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped provoke a competitive desire?</p>	
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| <p>7. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it creates some <u>excitement about a policy area</u> in which decision makers could act and achieve good results. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create this excitement or enthusiasm to act? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help create excitement? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration in creating excitement documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration created excitement?</p> <p>8. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because it <u>reduces the perception of risk of failure</u> in decision makers. Again, taking [specific demonstration intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration reduce the perception of the risk of failure? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help reduce the perception of risk? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration in reducing the perception of risk documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> | |
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<p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration reduced the perception of risk?</p> <p>9. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, demonstration works because decision makers feel there would be support available if they took the same approach. Again, taking [SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF DEMONSTRATION], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does demonstration create the idea that there would be support? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help decision makers feel there would be support available? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of demonstration in helping decision makers feel there would be support available documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which demonstration helped decision makers feel there would be support available?</p> <p>10. Is there anything we have overlooked about the way demonstration worked to influence national and sub-national policy?</p>	
INFLUENCING NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY – THE ROLE OF FINANCE	
<i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. “the requirement to set high NDCs that was a condition of the loan”. ‘Specific aspect of a finance intervention’ means the conditions that were imposed or the specific thing that was funded.</i>	
<p>Earlier we talked about contingent finance as a key aspect of the [programme] and the fact it played a role in influencing national and/or sub-national climate change policy. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of finance (including the prospect of finance and the use of conditions on finance) that seem important.</i></p>	

<p>What did the prospect of financial payments for emission reductions do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> finance with conditions attached was successful at changing policy (<i>clarify if necessary</i>, at a national or sub-national level). What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the finance had been made available five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have resulted in policy change (at national or sub-national level)?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific aspect of a finance intervention] was used but did not result in (national or sub-national) policy change, or had unintended effects on policy?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because decision makers feel more confident to change policy because they are assured that it can be delivered in practice. Taking the case of [country], did it work in that way?</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p>

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does finance increase confidence about delivery and enable policy change to happen? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it help decision makers feel more confident? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of finance in helping decision makers feel more confident documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which finance helped decision makers feel more confident?


2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because it **overcomes objections** in policy makers or those likely to challenge policy makers that change would be unaffordable. Again, taking [specific aspect of a finance intervention], did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does finance overcome objections about affordability? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it overcome that objection? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?

Was the effect of finance in overcoming the unaffordability objection documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which finance helped overcome objections of unaffordability?



3. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because **conditions associated with it** require policy to change. Again, taking the prospect offered to [country] of contingent finance, did it work like that?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Do conditions on finance require policy change? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did the conditions associated with finance requiring policy to change work? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of conditions associated with finance requiring policy to change documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which the conditions associated with finance required policy to change?

4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, finance works because the money acts as a **reward for change** for decision makers, and this positive feedback leads to *more* policy change, or *quicker* change, or *more effective* change. Again, taking the case of [country] and [programme], did it work that way?

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does finance act as a reward for policy change? Does it make change happen better or faster for that reason? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did the conditions act as a reward for

<p>change? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of finance in offering a reward for policy change documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which the conditions associated with finance helped create a reward for policy change?</p> <p>5. We have a theory that the prospect of obtaining finance may reassure decision makers that policy change is possible where otherwise it might not be. Does that seem plausible to you?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does the prospect of finance reassure decision makers that change is possible? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> What factors contributed to it working in that way? What kinds of people might be affected by that? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Do you have any examples of where it might have worked like that?</p> <p>Is there any objective evidence of that, for example in documents?</p> <p>Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?</p> <p>6. Is there anything about the way finance worked to influence national and sub-national policy that we have overlooked?</p>	
<p>INFLUENCING NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY – THE ROLE OF CONVENING</p> <p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. "the meeting that you held for businesses, local government and the local community to discuss the proposals".</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific convening intervention] and the fact it played a role in influencing national and sub-national policy. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of convening that seem important.</i></p>	

<p>What did [specific convening intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p> <p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [specific convening intervention] was successful at changing policy (<i>clarify if necessary</i>, at a national or sub-national level). What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [specific convening intervention] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have resulted in policy change (at national or sub-national level)?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [specific convening intervention] was used but did not result in (national or sub-national) policy change, or had unintended effects on policy?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it creates a <u>shared understanding of the benefits</u> of policy change and the actions required to achieve it. Taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p>

If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does convening create shared understanding? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a shared understanding of the benefits of policy change? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of convening in creating a shared understanding of the benefits documented at the time? *If 'yes'* – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening created a shared understanding of the benefits of policy change?

2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it **builds trust amongst the participants** around how policy change will be achieved and how it will impact on the various players in the system. Taking [specific convening intervention], did it work that way?


If that's not quite right How would you reframe it? Does convening build trust? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?

If it's about right Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build trust? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?

Was the effect of convening in building trust documented at the time?

If yes – are you able to share that with me?

Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening built trust?



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| <p>3. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>builds a sense of excitement and drive</u> around new policies to protect against climate change, and averts concerns around being disadvantaged by it. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does convening build excitement and drive? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build a sense of excitement and drive? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening in building a sense of excitement and drive documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening built a sense of excitement and drive?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>enables common positions</u> to be developed and shared. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does convening enable common positions to be developed? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it enable common positions to be built? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening enabling common positions to be built documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> | |
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<p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening enabled common positions to be built?</p> <p>5. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it creates a 'safe space' within which everyone could discuss and carry out their own actions to achieve the greater goal. Again, taking [specific convening intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does convening create safe space? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a safe space? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of convening creating a safe space documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which convening created a safe space?</p> <p>5. Is there anything about the way convening worked to influence national and sub-national policy that we have overlooked?</p>	
<p>INFLUENCING NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY – THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY</p> <p><i>Give real examples from the document review rather than talking generically e.g. "the diplomatic dinner in September 2016 which the UK and Ugandan Prime Ministers both attended at which climate change policy was discussed".</i></p>	
<p>Earlier we talked about [specific diplomacy intervention] and the fact it played a role in influencing national and/or sub-national policy. I'd like to think in a bit more detail now about <i>how</i> it did that and <i>why</i> it was successful.</p> <p><i>Repeat this section for any further instances of diplomacy that seem important.</i></p>	
<p>What did [specific diplomacy intervention] do that made a difference? Whom did it make a difference to? When? In what ways?</p>	<p>Get their views on this, in their own words.</p>

<p><i>Initial explanations may be quite superficial, so keep prompting to uncover how it really worked – remember that the mechanism is invisible.</i></p>	
<p>I'm interested in <u>why</u> [SPECIFIC DIPLOMACY INTERVENTION] was successful at changing policy (<i>clarify if necessary</i>, at a national or sub-national level). What factors do <u>you</u> think made the difference?</p> <p><i>Prompt if necessary ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there anything else happening at the time? • Was it something to do with the people involved? • Was there anything happening outside government that was either a help or a hindrance? <p><i>Ask the following questions if the interviewee is having difficulty coming up with contextual factors ...</i></p> <p>Let's assume for a moment the [SPECIFIC DIPLOMACY INTERVENTION] was provided five years prior to when it actually was – would it still have resulted in policy change (at national or sub-national level)?</p> <p><i>If 'no' Why? What made the difference?</i></p> <p>Are there any examples within the programme where [SPECIFIC DIPLOMACY INTERVENTION] was used but did not result in (national or sub-national) policy change, or had unintended effects on policy?</p> <p><i>If 'yes' Why do you think that might have been?</i></p>	<p>Start to get at contexts and develop links to the mechanisms.</p> <p>The 'five years ago' question and the 'other examples' question are to provide a point of comparison to highlight what factors may have been important. In asking this question it triggers people to think why something may not have worked in a different context – which then enables us to follow up about what they think is the important thing about that context – what was the difference that made the difference.</p>
<p>I want to run some of our initial theories past you to see whether they resonate with you and how you would refine them.</p> <p>1. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it warms up the key decision makers to the idea of policy change, creating a supportive environment for the change to happen. Taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy warm up decision makers? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p>	<p>Pick up our specific theories, run them past the interviewee to see whether it resonates with them, and if so check whether there is any evidence for them including sources of evidence other than interview evidence, and check whether there is anyone else we should speak to.</p> <div data-bbox="1115 1157 2027 1324"> <pre> graph LR subgraph Box1 [DIPLOMACY] direction TB B1[Key-decision makers are warmed up to the idea of change] B2[Actors, as a result of altruism, appeals to their self-interest or both, become convinced that change is desirable] B3[Reference to evidence from demonstration convinces actors that change is possible] B4[Assurances of support provided by the UK through ICF builds willingness to move ahead] B5[Creates a desire in actors to reciprocate by offering policy change] end Box1 --> Box2 subgraph Box2 [DIPLOMACY] direction TB B6[Creates a supportive opportunity for and diffuses opposition to policy change] B7[Creates a desire to engage further with ICF] B8[Creates a desire to act] end </pre> </div>

<p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it warm up key decision makers? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in warming up key decision makers documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy warmed up key decision makers?</p> <p>2. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>builds a relationship of trust with ICF and the UK</u> more generally and as a result decision makers are more likely to listen to persuasive argument and the objective evidence ICF provides. Taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy build trust? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it build trust? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in building trust documented at the time? <i>If yes</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy built trust?</p> <p>3. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because the <u>face-to-face high-level contacts</u> convinces decision makers that it is in their interests to change policy. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p>	
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<p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does face-to-face diplomacy work? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did high-level diplomacy work? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of high-level diplomacy documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which high-level diplomacy changed policy?</p> <p>4. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it creates a relationship in which decision makers felt they should offer something back, so <u>appeals to the idea of reciprocity</u>. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work that way?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy appeal to reciprocity? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it appeal to reciprocity? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in appealing to reciprocity documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy created reciprocity?</p> <p>5. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>creates a desire to be seen as leaders</u> in climate change policy. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p>	
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<p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy create a desire to lead? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to be seen as leaders? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy creating a desire to be seen as leaders documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy created a desire to be seen as leaders?</p> <p>Is there anyone else we could speak to who could tell us more about that?</p> <p>6. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it <u>diffuses decision makers' opposition</u> to greater ambition, or diffuses opposition from those who would oppose the decision maker. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy diffuse opposition? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it diffuse opposition? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in diffusing opposition documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy diffused opposition?</p>	
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<p>7. We have a theory that, in certain circumstances, convening works because it creates a desire to engage further with ICF. Again, taking [specific diplomacy intervention], did it work like that?</p> <p><i>If that's not quite right</i> How would you reframe it? Does diplomacy create a desire to work with ICF? In whom? About what? What circumstances contributed to that?</p> <p><i>If it's about right</i> Could you just explain to me in your own words how you think it worked? How did it create a desire to engage further with ICF? What was it about it that worked? Whom did it have that effect with and how?</p> <p>Was the effect of diplomacy in creating a desire to engage further documented at the time? <i>If 'yes'</i> – are you able to share that with me?</p> <p>Is there anyone else you think we should speak to who could tell us more about the way in which diplomacy created a desire to engage further with ICF?</p> <p>8. Is there anything about the way diplomacy worked to influence national and sub-national policy that we have overlooked?</p>	
That's the end of our questions about the way in which ICF works to influence national and sub-national policy.	

PART G**Theory 4: Transformational change from policy influencing**

I'd now like to put everything we have discussed into the context of transformational change. By transformational change, I mean change that is systemic, at scale and game changing. Again, I am focusing on **policy change** rather than other types of change.

*Insert here any **RELEVANT** information from KPI 15 monitoring and ask the respondent whether it matches their understanding. **Only include things that relate to policy change.***

To set the background so that we can confidently go on and ask about contexts and mechanisms that might contribute to transformational policy change rather than just policy change.

<p>IF TRANSFORMATIONAL POLICY CHANGE HAS BEEN SEEN OR IS EXPECTED</p> <p><i>If multi-country</i></p> <p>In which countries did you particularly see transformational policy change?</p> <p>Were there any countries where this outcome was not observed? Why do you think that was?</p>	<p>To understand contexts.</p>
<p>IF TRANSFORMATIONAL POLICY CHANGE HAS BEEN SEEN OR IS EXPECTED ...</p> <p><i>If time is short read out the ones that seem most likely given what has been reviewed and discussed.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One aspect of transformational change is <u>increased political will and local ownership</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 2. Another aspect of transformation change is <u>increased capacity and capability</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 3. Another aspect of transformation change is <u>innovation</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 4. Another aspect of transformational change is <u>replicability and the sharing of evidence of effectiveness</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 5. Another aspect of transformational change is <u>creating built-in incentives for others to act</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 6. Another aspect of transformational change is <u>creating change at scale</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important? 	<p>To understand contexts and mechanisms</p>

<p>7. Another aspect of transformational change is <u>creating sustainable, lasting change</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important?</p> <p>8. Another aspect of transformational change is <u>seeing systemic change</u>, for example in social systems, legal systems or the economy. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important?</p> <p>9. Another aspect of transformational change is the <u>building of institutions</u>. Did the policy-influencing activities of [programme] help create this? In what ways? For whom? What circumstances were important?</p>	
<p>IF TRANSFORMATIONAL POLICY CHANGE HAS BEEN NOT BEEN SEEN OR IS NOT EXPECTED</p> <p>What things do you think were missing? What was needed to create transformational policy change?</p> <p><i>These might be some key things to probe – choose (if any) based on the interview so far ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Was there increased political will and local ownership – how was that created? How did it work alongside policy influencing?</i> • <i>Increased capacity and capability</i> • <i>Innovation</i> • <i>Replicable and evidence of effectiveness is shared</i> • <i>Create incentives for others to act, e.g. leveraging of private finance</i> • <i>At scale, meaning more likely for change to have systemic impacts</i> • <i>Sustainable, implying it will carry on</i> • <i>Systemic change, e.g. in social or economic systems</i> • <i>Institution building, including organisations and legislative frameworks</i> 	<p>To understand contexts and mechanisms.</p>

PART H**Theory 2: Interactions between the levels (global, national, sub-National)**

<p>The next set of questions is about how they might be interaction between activities carried out at different levels, for example ICF's role in multilateral funds, and national and sub-national activities, for example bi-lateral programmes.</p> <p>First, we will talk through interactions between your programme and the global level, by which I mean the global and regional institutions, funds, multilateral development banks and global agreements.</p>	
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where policy-influencing activities of ICF at a global level affected your own programme's policy-influencing activities?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	<p>We need to understand more about how interaction between levels works, so this is a more 'theory-building' part of the interview than it is theory testing.</p> <p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where your own policy-influencing activities affected policy influencing at a global level?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	<p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>
<p>Can you think of any instances where policy-influencing activities at a global level would have helped [programme] influence policy more effectively at a national level?</p> <p>What would have been helpful?</p>	<p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>
<p>FOR PROGRAMMES THAT WORK ONLY AT A NATIONAL LEVEL</p>	
<p>Now we'll talk a little bit about interactions between your programme and the sub-national level.</p>	

<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where your own policy-influencing activities affected sub-national policy-influencing activities of ICF or others?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	<p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where sub-national policy-influencing activities affected your own programme's policy influencing?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	<p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>
FOR PROGRAMMES THAT WORK ONLY AT A SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL ONLY	
Now we'll talk a little bit about interactions between your programme and the national level.	
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where your own policy-influencing activities affected national policy-influencing activities of ICF or others?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy at a sub-national level? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p>	<p>Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.</p>

To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?	
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where national policy-influencing activities affected your own programme's sub-national policy-influencing?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did it help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.
FOR PROGRAMMES THAT WORK BOTH AT A NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL	
Now we'll talk a little bit about interactions between your different aspects of your programme, between the national and sub-national levels.	
<p>Can you think of any instances in relation to [programme] where your national policy-influencing activities affected your sub-national policy-influencing activities, or vice versa?</p> <p>What happened? Who was involved? What was the outcome?</p> <p>Did the interactions help or hinder your programme's attempts to influence national and sub-national policy? What factors were important in it, helping or hindering? <i>This question is getting at contexts.</i></p> <p>To what extent was this interaction planned and anticipated, or unplanned and unanticipated?</p>	Understand the interactions between levels and start to get at what, how and for whom and the important contexts.
PART I GENERAL QUESTIONS	
Thank you for your insights. I have three more general questions to ask before we wrap up.	

Was it any different being involved in <u>this</u> programme which aimed to influence policy, to being involved in a programme which <u>didn't</u> set out to have any policy-influencing effect? In what ways?	Pick up any overlooked contexts (and possibly mechanisms) that make a difference.
If you could change one thing about [programme] to have make it more effective at influencing policy, what would you have changed and why?	To pick up anything we have missed about contexts and mechanisms.
Is there anything that you think we should have discussed but we haven't covered about how ICF influences policy?	To ensure we capture anything that wasn't on our radar.

PART J**WRAPPING UP**

To finish off, I'd just like to ask for some guidance about our next steps.

<p>We have identified these documents ...as ones you think are important. Are there any others that come to mind that you think we should review?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [XYZ document] • [XYZ document] 	To find additional sources of evidence.
<p>Given what we have spoken about today, is there anyone else that you recommend we speak to about [programme] and the way it influenced policy?</p> <p>And thinking about ICF more generally, is there anyone else that you would recommend we speak to about policy influencing? Why?</p>	<p>To find additional informants on this particular programme.</p> <p>To find additional informants on ICF in general (we would not interview these people as a matter of course but link them to the sampling strategy to determine whether they should be interviewed).</p>
<p>Are there any specific projects that would be worth us talking to? They must include an element of policy influencing/policy change/national ambition raising and be focussed on forestry or low carbon development – and ideally in Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal or Uganda.</p>	To identify further interviewees.

Do you think any of the other donors associated with [programme] would have something to contribute on the way ICF influenced policy?	Get our sample of other donors to interview.
<p>We have identified some people from our document review that we think it may be worth us speaking to. Do you think they would have anything useful to tell us, and if so, do you have contact details?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. [implementing partner] 2. [Government ministries] 3. [programme team] <p>Anyone else?</p> <p><i>DON'T FORGET TO SEND A FOLLOW-UP EMAIL TO GET CONTACT DETAILS AND/OR DOCUMENTS.</i></p>	To find additional informants.
And finally, as we develop our thinking we may come across something that we would like to ask you that we overlooked. Please may I have your permission to contact you again for this purpose?	To ensure we have the permission in place in case we want to test theories again, or pick up on something that comes to light later.
Thank you very much for your time – it has been a very helpful interview. I will follow up with an email just confirming the actions we agreed.	

5 Example donor interview topic guide

Funder	Topic guide created by	Date of creation
[name of funder]	[name of team member]	XX/XX/XX

Name of interviewee	Interviewer	Actual date of interview	Actual time of interview
[name of interviewee]	[name of interviewer]	XX/XX/XX	XX BST

Known involvement with ICF programmes and case study countries
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. [programme 1] 2. [programme 2] 3. [case study countries]

Introduction
Adapt as appropriate to the interview and reflecting email exchanges
I'm planning to record our conversation so that I can make sure I don't miss anything. We may also include anonymised quotes in our report, is that OK with you?

Thank you very much for agreeing to help with our work. As mentioned in the email we sent, the purpose of the evaluation is to look at the role UK climate finance has played in supporting policy change – that’s policy change at global, national and sub-national level. The policy areas of focus are forestry and low carbon development.

You may know ICF’s climate investment programme as ICF – International Climate Finance. Or you may know it by the names of the two main UK Government Departments that manage it – DFID for international development and BEIS for business and climate. I am going to refer to all of these simply as ‘the UK’.

I have a series of questions to ask you, if that’s OK with you?

Firstly, I believe you have worked alongside the UK on [programme 1], [programme 2] and the [case study countries] – is that right?

We will pick up the detail later, but in general terms how are your impressions of how the UK works to influence policy?

Global Policy Influence

I’d like to start by asking you about your experience of ICF influencing the multilateral Banks, Funds and Facilities on climate change policy.

You mentioned you had worked with ICF on [programme 1]. What did that involve? How closely did you work with ICF? Who was involved? When was that?

Frames the discussion. Focusses on what and how, who and when.

You mentioned you had worked with ICF on [programme 2]. What did that involve? How closely did you work with ICF? Who was involved? When was that?

Frames the discussion. Focusses on what and how, who and when.

I’d like to ask you in a bit more detail about your experience of ICF’s approach to influencing the climate policies of global financial institutions and multilateral Funds. I’m thinking quite widely when I talk about policies and mean things like the way a Fund is defined and scoped, or the criteria applied to finance eligibility, as well as formal policies on climate-friendly investing. And I’m thinking particularly about policy that relates to [specific area of policy].

<p>Can you think of an example of a time when ICF successfully influenced the policy of a global institution, Fund or Facility, either alone or working with others?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> - What policy changed? In what way did it change?</p> <p><i>This question is getting at <u>outcomes</u> so make sure that a clear policy-influencing outcome is identified, or move to another example.</i></p>	<p>To identify a specific example that we can ask more about - and get information on outcomes.</p>
<p>What do you think it was about ICF's approach that made it successful?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – Who did that? How did that lead to the outcome?</p> <p>Do you think there was anything particular about ICF's approach, as compared to how other countries might have approached it, that made it successful on that occasion?</p> <p>This is getting at mechanisms and contexts so probe to uncover how they think things really worked</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – Who was involved? What did they do? What was it that made the difference?</p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p>	<p>To get to mechanisms and contexts.</p>
<p>Can you think of an example where ICF attempted to influence multilateral policy but was unsuccessful?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – What was ICF trying to achieve? What happened? What makes you think it was less successful? What was the outcome? Who was involved?</p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p>	<p>To get to mechanisms and contexts.</p>

<p>Do you think there is anything particular about ICF's approach, as compared to other countries' approaches to influencing, that made it more or less successful in the examples we spoke about?</p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p>	Looking at mechanisms and contexts.
<p>Have you seen any changes in ICF's approach over the time you have been involved? What has changed? Has the change been more or less successful in your opinion?</p> <p><i>Probe – Who? How? When? What?</i></p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p>	Looking at mechanisms and contexts.

BE AWARE OF TIME – ASK ONLY IF IT SEEMS FRUITFUL. [name of other interviewee] MAY BE MORE REWARDING.

National and Sub-National Policy Change	
Thanks. I am going to move on now to focus on ICF's role in influencing national and sub-national policy on forestry and low carbon development. By policy change in this context I mean things like a country introducing a new law or a province developing a new strategy in order to mitigate climate change or adapt to climate change.	
<p>You mentioned you had worked with ICF on [programme 2]. What did that involve? How closely did you work with ICF? Who was involved? When was that?</p>	Introduce the new topic and also gets to outcomes.

<p>Can you think of an example of ICF supporting or encouraging national or sub-national policy change that was particularly successful, either alone or working with partners?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – What did ICF do? What happened? Who was involved? What did they do? When was this?</p> <p>What role did you/your organisation play in that? What role did other donors play?</p> <p>What do you think it was about the approach ICF took that made it successful?</p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p> <p><i>ASK IF THERE IS TIME, AND IF IT APPEARS TO BE A FRUITFUL LINE OF ENQUIRY ...</i></p> <p>Do you have any other examples?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – What did ICF do? Who was involved? What did they do? When was this?</p> <p>What role did you/your organisation play in that? What role did other donors play?</p> <p>What do you think it was about the approach ICF took that made it successful?</p> <p>Is this documented anywhere? Is there anyone I should speak to about this to get more detail?</p>	<p>To identify a specific example that we can ask more about – identify outcomes activities and who was involved.</p>
<p>Can you think of an example of ICF supporting or encouraging national or sub-national policy change on [area of policy] that wasn't so successful?</p>	<p>To identify a specific example that we can ask more about.</p>

<p><i>Probe</i> - What happened? What policy was ICF trying to change? Where? When?</p> <p><i>This question is getting at <u>lack of intended outcomes</u> (so unintended or unexpected outcomes are fine), so make sure that a clear failure at policy-influencing is identified, or move to another example. For example, ICF advised officials drafting new legislation, but the parliament rejected the Bill.</i></p>	
<p>And what do you think it was about this example that made it less successful in influencing policy than the first example we talked about?</p>	<p>To identify mechanisms and contexts, and particularly contexts.</p>
<p>Thinking more generally now, is there anything that you think particularly stands out about ICF's approach to influencing policy that is different to the way you and your country/organisation generally approaches it?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> – How would you characterise your approach? What? Who? How? What exactly makes it different?</p> <p>Thinking about the examples we spoke about before, do you think your approach would have been more or less successful? Why? What are the important differences?</p>	<p>To identify mechanisms and contexts, and particularly contexts.</p> <p>To think about how ICF might be different to others.</p>
Joint Working	
<p>I'd like to now move on and ask you a bit more about your experience of working jointly or alongside ICF on influencing policy through the [partnership of countries].</p>	
<p>Can you think of an example where working with [countries] led to a more successful outcome than if you'd worked alone? I am thinking specifically</p>	<p>To find an example to explore and check outcomes.</p>

<p>about policy-influencing outcomes, so an example where you successfully influenced national or global policy by working together?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> - What was the outcome of that? What policy changed or was influenced? Where? When? How did it change? Who else was involved?</p> <p>What did the joint working involve? <i>Probe</i> - Who? When? How? <i>Probe to really understand who did what to whom when and how.</i></p> <p>What do you think it was about the fact you worked together than led to better policy-influencing outcomes on that occasion?</p> <p><i>Probe for mechanisms and contextual factors.</i></p> <p>Is there anything documented on that?</p> <p>Is there anyone else I could speak with to get more insight on that?</p>	<p>To understand what was done.</p> <p>Looking for mechanisms and contexts.</p>
<p>Can you think of an example where working with [countries] led to a more successful outcome than if you'd worked with different donors? Again, I am thinking specifically about policy-influencing outcomes, so an example where you successfully influenced national or global policy by working together?</p> <p><i>Probe</i> - What was the outcome of that? What policy changed or was influenced? Where? When? How did it change? Who else was involved?</p> <p>What did the joint working involve? <i>Probe</i> - Who? When? How? <i>Probe to really understand who did what to whom when and how.</i></p> <p>What do you think it was about the fact you worked together than led to better policy-influencing outcomes on that occasion?</p> <p><i>Probe for mechanisms and contextual factors.</i></p>	<p>To find an example to explore and check outcomes.</p>

Is there anything documented on that?	
Is there anyone else I could speak with to get more insight on that?	
<p>Can you think of an example when working with ICF to influence policy led to less successful outcomes than if you'd worked alone or with another donor?</p> <p><i>Probe - What happened? Where? When?</i></p> <p>What did the joint working involve? <i>Probe - Who? When? How? Probe to really understand who did what to whom when and how.</i></p> <p>What do you think it was about the fact you worked together than led to better policy-influencing outcomes on that occasion?</p> <p><i>Probe for mechanisms and contextual factors.</i></p> <p>Is there anything documented on that?</p> <p>Is there anyone else I could speak with to get more insight on that?</p>	Looking for mechanisms and contexts.

And finally, ...	
I just have a few final questions for you.	
Is there anything you would like to tell me about your experience of ICF that we haven't covered?	To give the interviewee the opportunity to tell us things they want to 'get off their chest' but also to pick up anything for future interviews that should be built into the questionnaire.
And finally, if you could advise ICF to do <u>one thing</u> differently next time you work together, what would that be?	Partly this question is for the interviewer's benefit, to round off the questions about the negative aspects of ICF before moving on. But it will give some

	insight into areas where ICF may be less successful that we can pick up in other interviews.
Thinking about the kinds of things we have discussed today, are there any documents that you think we should review?	To find additional sources of evidence.
And finally, as we develop or thinking we may come across something that we would like to ask you that we overlooked. Please may I have your permission to contact you again for this purpose?	To ensure we have the permission in place in case we want to test theories again, or pick up on something that comes to light later.
Thank you very much for your time – it has been a very helpful interview. I will follow up with an email just confirming the actions we agreed.	

6 Example implementing partner topic guide

Programme or related ICF policy initiative
[name of ICF policy initiative]

Interviewee	Role	Company	Date of interview	Time	Location
[name of interviewee]		[name of company]	XX/XX/XX	XX	Phone

Reason for Interview (Context)
<p>[name of company] are the implementing partners for [name of ICF policy initiative].</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To hear from their point of view what was done, with whom, when, and how. 2. To identify interviewees: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Individuals at the receiving end of technical assistance b. Individuals providing the technical assistance c. Government officials influenced by the technical assistance but not in direct receipt d. Others (e.g. stakeholder groups) 3. To identify other sources of evidence including documents and people to get testimony from.

Relevant section of case study plan

INTRODUCTION

Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to me today.

Are you happy for us to record our conversation so we don't miss anything? We may also include anonymised quotes in our report, is that OK with you?

- I understand that [name of company] are the implementing consultant for the Technical Assistance Facility for [name of ICF policy initiative]. Could you briefly explain the role [name of company] played (and possibly continue to play)?

And what is your role personally?

Probe: What were your main roles and responsibilities?

Establish a rapport

Background/introductions

OUTCOMES

I'm going to start by asking you about what [ICF policy initiative] has achieved in terms of creating a positive policy environment for XX in [name of country]. Our reading and interviews so far have suggested to us that there are three really important policy outcomes that [ICF policy initiative] has contributed to, and I'm interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree.

The first is the [policy outcome] Do you agree or disagree that this is an important achievement of [ICF policy initiative]?

IF 'YES' We will come back and talk about the details in a bit.

The second is the [policy outcome]. Do you agree or disagree that this is an important achievement of [ICF policy initiative]?

IF 'YES' We will come back and talk about the details in a bit.

And the third is the [policy outcome]. Do you agree or disagree that this is an important achievement of [ICF policy initiative]?

IF 'YES' We will come back and talk about the details in a bit.

Are there any other important impacts on the policy environment resulting from [ICF policy initiative]?

So, I'm going to take those one at a time and ask you, from your experience, how [name of ICF policy initiative] contributed.

OUTCOME 1 – [title]

The first thing I want to talk to you about is the inclusion of the [policy outcome]. What did [ICF policy initiative] do that contributed to that?

(Prompt – think about technical assistance, convening, diplomacy, finance)

Probe as required ...

What did you do?

Who was involved?

When was that?

<p>Where was that? Is there any independent evidence of that? Whom should we speak to about that?</p> <p>Note that we don't understand what changed – see if we can get to the bottom of this. [name of government organisation] was always against this, and suddenly it seems to have become possible. How?</p> <p>What other programmes, funders, interventions or initiatives also contributed to the [policy outcome]?</p> <p>Whom should we speak to, to find out more?</p>	
OUTCOME 2 – [title]	
<p>Next I want to ask you about the [policy outcome]. What did [ICF policy initiative] do that contributed to that?</p> <p><i>(Prompt – think about technical assistance, convening, diplomacy, finance)</i></p> <p><i>Probe as required ...</i></p> <p>What did you do? Who was involved? When was that? Where was that? Is there any independent evidence of that? Whom should we speak to about that?</p> <p>What other programmes, funders, interventions or initiatives also contributed to [policy outcome]?</p> <p>Whom should we speak to, to find out more?</p>	

OUTCOME 3 – [title]	
<p>Next I want to ask you about [policy outcome]. What did [ICF policy initiative] do that contributed to that?</p> <p><i>(Prompt – think about technical assistance, convening, diplomacy, finance)</i></p> <p><i>Probe as required ...</i></p> <p>What did you do? Who was involved? When was that? Where was that? Is there any independent evidence of that? Whom should we speak to about that?</p> <p>What other programmes, funders, interventions or initiatives also contributed to [policy outcome]?</p> <p>Whom should we speak to, to find out more?</p>	
OTHER OUTCOMES	
<p>Next I want to ask you about</p> <p>What did [ICF policy initiative] do that contributed to that?</p> <p><i>(Prompt – think about technical assistance, convening, diplomacy, finance)</i></p> <p><i>Probe as required ...</i></p> <p>What did you do? Who was involved? When was that? Where was that?</p>	

<p>Is there any independent evidence of that? Whom should we speak to about that?</p> <p>What other programmes, funders, interventions or initiatives also contributed to ...?</p> <p>Whom should we speak to, to find out more?</p>	
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ACTIVITIES	
From the documents that I have read, it seems that a wide range of technical activities were carried out to support the purely financial aspects of [ICF policy initiative]. I'd like to understand a bit more about what was done.	
<p>As I understand it, one of the areas of activity of the technical assistance Facility was to provide capacity building with [institution]. Could you explain to me <u>exactly</u> what that involved?</p> <p><i>Prompt for each:</i></p> <p>Who delivered it? Whom should I speak to? Who was it delivered to? Whom should I speak to? Intended outcome? What was the problem that it sought to overcome? Theory of change?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • XYZ intended outcomes • Least cost development planning – what is this? What did it involve? • Strategic communication expertise – what is this? What did it involve? • Targeted training – on the job and externally? Who, what, when? • Anything else? <p>Were any other contractors involved? Were they independently contracted or sub-contractors to you? How did you work together? Was there a need to work together?</p>	Be clear about precisely what was done, with/to whom, when.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE A (INFORMATION, ADVICE AND TOOLS)	
I'm now going to run through some of our theories about how technical assistance worked in this particular case to change policy outcomes.	
<p>One of our theories is that technical assistance builds confidence in government to makes policy changes because recommendations are based on high quality evidence from a credible source (ICF/UK).</p> <p>In your experience, was confidence of senior government officials and ministers increased by the technical assistance?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p> <p>Do you believe the fact evidence was high quality and from a credible source played a role in this?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p> <p>Another theory is that technical assistance creates the motivation in government to makes policy changes, for example by showing what is possible, or building knowledge about the local effects of climate change.</p> <p>Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p>	

Another theory is that **technical assistance builds government capability** to make policy changes, through building knowledge and skills, which creates a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Another theory is that technical assistance builds **capability and capacity in stakeholder groups or third parties**, building confidence and motivation.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Is there anything we might have overlooked about the way providing information, advice and tools to government works in terms of influencing policy?

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE B (PROVISION OF STAFF)

I'm now going to run through some of our theories about how technical assistance in the form of provision of staff worked in this particular case to change policy outcomes.

<p>One theory is that technical assistance creates human resource capacity to enable policy change to happen, for example through secondments or using consultancy support.</p> <p>Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p> <p>Another theory is that by sitting within government, secondees are more available and are consulted formally and informally with the result that ICF policy is considered by government officials when making policy decisions.</p> <p>Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p> <p>Another theory is that secondees build strong relationships with government officials whilst working within partner government with the result that seconding secures a higher level of trust.</p> <p>Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?</p> <p>Do you have any specific examples?</p> <p>Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?</p> <p>Is there anything we might have overlooked about the way supplying human resource to government works in terms of influencing policy?</p>	
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CONVENING

I'm now going to run through some of our theories about how convening might have contributed to policy outcomes.

One theory is that ICF and its consultants act as **honest brokers** who inject energy into the process as an impartial facilitator to help break the deadlock and persuade stakeholders to engage in a convening process with the result that key stakeholders are willing engage in a convening process.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Another theory is that a convening process creates an opportunity for the exchange of information and views resulting in a **shared understanding** being created of respective positions with respect to a particular policy change.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Another theory is that convening enables stakeholders to build on their shared understanding of each other's respective interests to reach a **common position** which serves to benefit, or not disadvantage, the convening parties meaning that stakeholders have a shared ambition to make policy change.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Another theory is that a convening process **provides momentum** and peer pressure, ensuring that each stakeholder complies with what has been agreed resulting in compliance with policy change from stakeholders.

Was that your experience in relation to the technical assistance provided through [ICF policy initiative]?

Do you have any specific examples?

Where might I find evidence for that? Documents? People to speak to who witnessed it?

Is there anything we might have overlooked about the way convening worked in terms of influencing policy in [ICF policy initiative]?

CONTEXTS

We also have some thoughts about what the important conditions might be for fostering success. I am going to run those past you now to get your thoughts on each and how they applied in the case of [ICF policy initiative]. If you can think of an example for each that would be helpful.

Clear and acknowledged 'problem' to be addressed:

How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?

Sufficient political will to address the problem/senior government officials and ministers are willing to make policy changes:

How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?

It is politically, technically, economically and practicably possible to adopt potential policy solutions?

How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?

OVERARCHING CMO FOR NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICY INFLUENCING

Where there is a 'problem' to be addressed, and where there is sufficient political will to address the problem, and where potential policy solutions can be adopted, ICF interventions build capacity for change through technical assistance, and/or increase the motivation for change through providing persuasive evidence of the benefits, convening stakeholders and offering financial and technical assistance contingent on the change, and/or provide financial and human resources to implement the change, with the outcome that government adopts policies to address climate change issues sooner, more effectively or with more ambition that would otherwise have been the case.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BOOSTS CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

Where senior government ministers (e.g. heads of department) are willing to make policy changes, and where they rely on recommendations supplied to them by other government officials, and where the recipients of the knowledge transfer have the opportunity to deploy new skills/knowledge to inform policy and make recommendations to those senior government officials then the confidence of senior government ministers to support policy change is increased because recommendations are based on high quality evidence from a credible source (ICF/UK) with the outcome that senior government ministers are motivated to support policy change.

<p>Senior government officials and ministers rely on recommendations supplied to them by other government officials:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Government officials are in a position to make policy recommendations to ministers:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>The recipients of the knowledge transfer have the opportunity to deploy new skills/knowledge to inform policy and make recommendations to those senior government officials:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p>	<p>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BOOSTS CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT</p> <p>Where senior government ministers (e.g. heads of department) are willing to make policy changes, and where they rely on recommendations supplied to them by other government officials, and where the recipients of the knowledge transfer have the opportunity to deploy new skills/knowledge to inform policy and make recommendations to those senior government officials then the confidence of senior government ministers to support policy change is increased because recommendations are based on high quality evidence from a credible source (ICF/UK) with the outcome that senior government ministers are motivated to support policy change.</p>
<p>Lack of knowledge is a barrier to effective policy change:</p>	<p>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUILDS KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS IN GOVERNMENT</p> <p>Where lack of knowledge is a barrier to effective policy change, and where ICF is a trusted</p>

<p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Lack of resource is a barrier to effective policy change:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>ICF/UK is a trusted source of knowledge:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Government officials working alongside secondees/consultants are open to gaining a better understanding of what needs to be done:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p>	<p>source of knowledge, and where training is provided and/or where experts are seconded into government, and where government officials working alongside secondees are open to gaining a better understanding of what needs to be done, and where those government officials are in a position to make policy recommendations to Ministers, then as a result of the knowledge transfer, government officials have a better understanding a) of what should be done and b) how to do it, with the result that government officials have increased capability to deliver policy change.</p>
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<p>Stakeholder groups are committed to advocating for a particular issue or set of issues:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Government officials and stakeholder groups have the capacity and willingness to learn from experts:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Stakeholder groups have the resource (both financial and human) to apply knowledge:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p> <p>Stakeholder groups have the appropriate platform to channel that advocacy:</p> <p>How important was this in achieving the changes to the policy environment we have talked about? Which outcomes was this important to?</p>	<p>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BUILDS CONFIDENCE IN STAKEHOLDER GROUPS</p> <p>Where stakeholder groups are committed to advocating for a particular issue or set of issues, and where ICF is a trusted source of knowledge, and where technical assistance is provided, and where these stakeholder groups have the capacity and willingness to learn from experts, and where stakeholder groups have the resource (both financial and human) to apply that knowledge, and where stakeholder groups have the appropriate platform to channel that advocacy then the confidence of stakeholder groups is increased because they have the knowledge and skills to advocate and lobby for policy change with the result that stakeholder groups are motivated to advocate and lobby for policy change.</p>
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Are there any other factors, conditions or contexts that you think were particularly relevant to achieving the policy changes seen through [ICF policy initiative]?	

And finally...	
Thank you very much for your help. Just to finish off:	
Is there anything that you think we should have discussed but haven't covered?	To ensure we capture anything that wasn't on our radar.
Are there any important documents that you think we should review (in addition to any already mentioned)? For example, policy recommendation papers, briefing notes, white papers, reports, etc.	To find additional sources of evidence.
May I get back in touch with you if I have any other questions?	

7 Example government official topic guide

Questions for [role] of [department] [name of interviewee]

Thank you for your time today. [compass team member] and I are working on behalf of the UK Government, evaluating the impact of the UK's climate finance. We are looking in particular at renewable energy in [country], and the [name of programme].

I wonder whether you would mind if I record our conversation? Everything will be treated in strict confidence; it just means I can focus on our conversation rather than writing everything now.

To start, could you tell me a little bit about your role in the Ministry generally, and in particular your role in the [programme]?

It seems to me that there has been a massive increase in renewable energy infrastructure over the last 10 years or so. What role did [programme] play in that?

Probe – how much was happening anyway? What did [programme] bring that was different?

I wanted to specifically ask you about the role of [programme] in influencing the policy environment. Who's idea was the [programme] in the first place? How did you make it happen? Who specified what it would include?

Do you perceive the UK has tried to influence [the country's] policy on renewable energy? What about the way [the country's] power system works – I understand it is modelled on the UK system of privatisation? To what extent was [country] committed to renewable energy without any external influence? What was driving that?

Generally, what has the role of the UK government been in terms of [the country's] energy policy?

What difference has [programme] made to [name of government department]?

Run through CMOs here – confidence, knowledge, understanding, motivation

What difference has it made to ERA?

What difference has it made to other organisations?

What do you think made [programme] so successful compared with other initiatives?

Run through contexts here – willingness to learn, [name of implementing partner], culture of [institution], already set on that path.

I'm interested in the relationships between [department], the [programme] Secretariat, [institution] and [institution] – was there conflict between the policy and regulatory bodies and those responsible for transmission? How is the transmission funded? Was extra money provided as a result of commissioning the extra capacity? How were [institution] and [institution] expected to deliver their commitments with no extra money?

Why wasn't this looked at more holistically?

If not picked up earlier

I wanted to ask you specifically about the technical assistance provided through [programme]. Were you exposed to any of that? What did you feel about it and the way it was delivered?

[if not picked up earlier] I wanted to ask you specifically about the [outcome to be explored]. I understand it was somewhat contentious. To what extent did [programme] enable that? What enabled it? Was it just that the power lay with the government and not the transmission side and government simply wanted it done? Was there any influencing at high level done on this?

What or who else apart from [programme] played a role in renewable energy policy in [country]?

Would you characterise the changes in renewable energy in [country] as transformational?

8 Example financial institution topic guide

Programme	Topic guide created by	Date
[name of programme]	[name of team member]	XX/XX/XX

Interviewee	Interviewer	Date of interview	Time of interview
[name of interviewee]	[name of team member]	XX/XX/XX	XX BST

Introduction
Adapt as appropriate to the interview
<p>Thank you very much for agreeing to help with our work. We are beginning to develop ideas on how and in what circumstances ICF programmes are influencing policy on climate change. [team member] and I are working on behalf of the UK Government to try to understand more about the UK's role – if any – in supporting policy change in Colombia around forestry and land use.</p> <p>During the interview, I'm hoping to test out some of our early ideas with you so you can help us to refine them. I'm planning to record our conversation so that I can make sure I don't miss anything. We may also include anonymised quotes in our report, is that OK with you?</p> <p>The report will be published later in 2019.</p>

Could I start by asking you just to give me a brief overview of your role at [financial institution] and on the [programme]?

Exploring for outcomes

So firstly, I'd like to get **your perspective on the outcomes** of the [programme] in [country], specifically relating to policy change (at both national and sub-national levels). What can you tell me about that?

- ☐ [list of supposed policy changes from programme documentation]

Looking for evidence of outcomes.

Follow up on the above outcomes individually if appropriate, exploring for mechanisms, approaches, contexts, etc.

For the outcomes, ask:

- ☐ What was [programme] specific contribution to that outcome?
- ☐ Why exactly did that work?
- ☐ What made the difference?
- ☐ What else could have contributed to that outcome?
- ☐ Other than providing funds, did the **UK's/ICF's involvement** make a difference here? E.g. influencing the design of the programme, how, what difference did that make/bringing in other donors, how, what difference did that make/influencing the participation/motivation of the government of [country], how, etc.
- ☐ Were there aspects of the programme that were **unsuccessful** in securing policy change? Or places where you had intended to secure policy change where it didn't happen/hasn't happened yet. What/where/why, etc.?
- ☐ What **documentary** evidence can we get to support this? I imagine we might find policy referring to the contingent funding.

Otherwise move to below table.

Exploring theories	
So now we have a picture of the policy outcomes from the programme, I want to talk to you about some of the theories that we are building and test them with you. First, we're developing some thinking around policy influencing and the different ways in which that works and does not work.	
<p>An idea we have around policy influencing is that it happens when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interventions build capacity (technical assistance and convening) - Interventions provide resources (technical assistance) - Interventions provide motivation for change (technical assistance /persuasion/contingent finance) <p>Interventions build capacity, motivation and/or resources [explain more if needed]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Which of these, if any, do you think apply to the changes seen around the [programme]? - Can you give examples? Why exactly did that work? - What made the difference? 	Testing overall theory 1a.
<p>One theory we have is that the provision of finance with conditions (i.e. [approach]) is one approach to encouraging policy change. This is obviously key to the [programme]. How exactly do you understand that to work in [programme]?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is it the promise of finance alone that motivates policy outcomes? - What is the finance used for? To move policy forward? - Why exactly is that important? - What else needs to be in place beyond the promise of finance (e.g. existing motivation?) 	Testing contingent finance.
We are also interested in the interactions between different levels of policy influence . What I mean by this is the relationship between national and sub-national policy and whether influence and change at one level affects policy at the other.	
Could you explain to me the different outcomes at regional level from the [programme]?	Add logic behind here.
We read that [policy change supposition]	Add logic behind here.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the relationship between these regional changes and national policy? - Does working at multiple levels like this have any impact on policy change going ahead, do you think? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o What impact, exactly? o Some ideas we have is that this reinforces an idea, adds urgency, increases confidence... all of which increase the motivation of policy makers to act. Does that ring true with your experience on [programme]? 	
We are also interested in your thoughts on transformation . We're interested to know what makes transformational change more likely. This would include policy change that is sustainable, at scale and approaching critical mass.	
<p>Do you think the outcomes from [programme] could be contributing to such a larger transformational change in [country]?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If 'yes', why? What else contributes to transformational change? - If 'no', why not? What needs to happen for transformation change to happen? 	

And finally ...	
Thank you for your patience. Finally...	
Is there anything that you think we should have discussed but haven't covered?	To ensure we capture anything that wasn't on our radar.
Are there any important documents that you think we should review?	To find additional sources of evidence.
Is there anyone that you think we should speak to?	To find additional informants.
<p>Could you suggest someone we could talk to at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Add organisation here • Add organisation here 	To find additional informants.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Add organisation here• Add organisation here• Add organisation here	
And finally, please may I have your permission to contact you again?	To ensure we have the permission in place in case we want to test theories again, or pick up on something that comes to light later.

Background and resources Include links to websites reviewed and titles of documents – anything that might be useful for an interviewer to refer to.

9 Example recruitment email

Dear [NAME]

Thank you so much for agreeing to help with our work. We would really like to interview you so the Compass evaluation can learn from your experiences on [programme]. If you think it would be valuable for any of your colleagues to join the call then please let me know.

ADD HERE DATE AND TIME, OR OPTIONS FOR DATE AND TIME.

The interview, which will take the form of a discussion about how you think the programme worked, will take 45-60 minutes. Our focus is on whether and how [programme] has:

- Raised national ambition on tackling climate change
- Contributed to changing national and/or sub-national policy on low carbon development and/or forestry
- Policy change has contributed to transformational change

We have already reviewed programme documents including:

ADD LIST DOCUMENTS HERE.

The purpose of the interview is to follow up on what we learned from those and explore, in some depth, your perspective on how the programme worked. On the call we will take you through a structured set of questions, but to give you an idea, below are some examples of the types of things we will be asking you about.

- What were the key programme activities and what effect did they have? For example, did they change key decision makers' minds, did they provide additional resource, or did they empower stakeholders?
- What were the important factors that made change possible? For example, were there some really charismatic individuals involved, or did the finance leverage private sector involvement, or perhaps a diplomatic intervention opened up possibilities that did not previously exist?
- What other things were going on at the time, and what role did they play in the programme's achievements? For example, were there programmes funded by other organisations that interacted with the ICF programme to enhance its effect, or were there local matters that prevented the programme from fully achieving its potential?

With your permission, I would like to record the conversation which would then be transcribed. The reason we do this is to ensure no important points are lost. It

also makes analysis quicker and more reliable as we are using a structured software-based qualitative approach. We will not share the recording or transcript outside the independent evaluation team. Any quotes used in the report will be completely anonymised, including the removal of anything that might enable to identify you by implication. However, if you would prefer for the conversation not to be recorded, please let me know.

If you are happy to take part in the evaluation, please let me know and I will send over a calendar invitation and joining instructions.

Many thanks

[YOUR NAME]



Working on behalf of the Compass Evaluation Consortium

10 Example case study plan

Indonesia Case Study Plan

The purpose of the Indonesia case study is to investigate the following theories in the context of Indonesian land use, governance and forestry policy, and low carbon development:

- 1a National and sub-national support for policy change
- 1d Other donors
- 2 Interactions between different levels of support for policy change (global/national/local)
- 4 Transformational change

We propose to focus on a group of ICF-supported interventions that have impacted forestry policy by a combination of empowering local communities, supporting provincial government, changing national regulations and facilitating compliance with global trade policies. This provides an opportunity to explore interaction between the levels and the support for policy change by multiple programmes operating at local, national and global levels.

In addition, we will explore the targeted intervention of UKCCU's technical assistance to the Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS), feeding into the LCDI programme and the national medium-term low carbon development plan (RPJMN) 2020-2024.

In the table below we have listed a number of ICF supporting policy change outcomes which we have identified through our programme document review, interviews with DFID and BEIS SROs and detailed conversations with the UKCCU team in Indonesia. These are the outcomes we are intending to investigate through in-person interviews whilst in Indonesia, mapped against the theories and related CMOs that will be tested. We have also included the types of evidence we will be looking for and a list of organisations and individuals that we intend to speak to.

	Policy change	Theory & related CMOs	Evidence we're looking for	Interviewees
National	<p>Technical assistance support to [programme] and [name of ministry] to feed into the [policy outcome]</p> <p>Increased UK credibility in the low carbon economy</p>	<p>Persuasive communication (11-13)</p> <p>Increased ambition (3)</p> <p>Technical assistance – knowledge transfer (4)</p> <p>Technical assistance – increased capacity (7)</p> <p>UK as a trusted partner (8-9)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of senior government officials within [name of ministry] that the technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. - Testimony of senior government ministers that they felt more confident as a result of the evidence provided and felt motivated to act upon the recommendations. - Evidence that the technical assistance support was provided to the right people and at the right time. - Evidence that the recommendations supplied by technical assistance (either directly or indirectly) were accepted by [name of ministry] without the need for extensive further evidence, corroboration or recommendations from other sources. - Testimony from [name of ministry] that there is now a more supportive environment for change after evidence was provided. - Testimony of senior government ministers and/or government officials that they engaged further, or sought to engage with ICF, on the [policy outcome] because they respect and trust them as a partner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Director for Environment and Climate Change – [name of ministry] - [name of ministry] government officials who worked alongside SRO/implement partners to develop [policy intervention] - Expert/implementing partner who provided the technical assistance support to [name of ministry] - [SRO] team involved in developing [policy intervention] - [implementing partner] (who worked with [SRO] on the [policy intervention]) - [consultant] (who worked with [SRO] on the [policy intervention])

National	[Outcome 1]	Increased ambition (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of [X] that they felt more confident as a result of the evidence provided and felt motivated to act upon the recommendations as a result. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
	[Outcome 2]	<p>Technical assistance – knowledge transfer (4)</p> <p>Technical assistance – increased capacity (7)</p> <p>Persuasive communication (11-13)</p> <p>Working between the levels (44, 45)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of the [X] officials receiving the technical assistance support and/or supplying the policy recommendations that the evidence was well received and increased the confidence of senior government ministers. - Testimony of [X] that the technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. - Testimony of [X] that evidence provided played a role in creating their desire to lead because it showed they could take a leadership role in this area. - Evidence that the technical assistance support was provided to the right people and evidence was used to implement initiative. - Evidence that demonstration of other successes, in comparable contexts, was provided to the right people (i.e. government officials who set, or can feed into, the policy agenda) at the right time. - Testimony of implementing partner(s) that the evidence provided to the government influenced their desire to lead. - Existence of multiple interventions driving at a similar outcome (at least one of which is by ICF) happening at different levels (global, national, sub-national) or about the same time, e.g. [other intervention]. - The combination of policy-influencing approaches applied at different levels created (at least in part) the confidence to go ahead and change policy e.g. [group] providing evidence that the [X] can then use to raise cases through the [court]. 	

National	[Outcome 3]	<p>Increased ambition (3)</p> <p>Technical assistance – knowledge transfer (4)</p> <p>Technical assistance – increased capacity (7)</p> <p>Working between the levels (45)</p> <p>Convening (18, 19)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of [ministry] [specific person] that they felt more confident as a result of the evidence provided and felt motivated to act upon the recommendations . - Testimony of the [ministry] receiving the technical assistance support and/or supplying the policy recommendations that the evidence was well received and increased the confidence of senior government ministers in social forestry. - Testimony of [ministry] that the technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. - Testimony of [ministry] that evidence provided played a role in creating their desire to lead because it showed they could take a leadership role in this area. - Testimony from key stakeholders that as a result of the process they have a shared understanding of each of the other parties' respective positions. - Testimony from stakeholders that as a result of the process they have reached a common position with the other parties. - The combination of policy-influencing approaches applied at different levels created (at least in part) the confidence to go ahead and change policy (from the national to sub-national levels). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
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National	[Outcome 4]	Persuasive communication (11, 12, 14)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of senior government ministers and/or government officials that advise them (e.g. senior figures within ministerial departments) that international pressures that have been communicated to them played a role in their motivation to comply with policy change. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee]
	[Outcome 5]	Prospect of support (technical assistance not financial) (10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that there is international pressure to commit to, and comply with, policy change, and that the pressure was at the right time. - Testimony of senior government ministers and/or government officials who advise them that the evidence provided played a role in creating their desire to lead because it showed they could take a leadership role. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
		Convening (20)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of senior government ministers and/or government officials who advise them that change is desirable as a result of evidence that has been provided. - Testimony of senior government ministers that they were motivated to make policy change due to confidence that potential support would make change feasible. 	
		Working between the levels – international pressure (44)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence of stakeholders accepting, and complying with timber accreditation policies. - Testimony from parties ([ministry], [institution], [group], [X Committee], [private sector]) that convening process has played a role in ensuring that each party remains compliant. 	
		Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony from honest broker that they were able to persuade parties to remain engaged in the convening process. - Testimony from government officials that [policy implementation] has been more effective as a result of the appointed honest broker helping to ensure parties remain compliant. - Policy maker felt a sense of urgency and drive. - Evidence of a broad global consensus about the importance of tackling the issue operating at the various different levels. - The combination of policy-influencing approaches applied at different levels created (at least in part) the motivation and drive to change policy. 	

National	[Outcome 6]	Technical assistance – knowledge transfer / increased capacity (3, 4, 7)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of [court]/[ministry] that the technical assistance provided a better understanding of what should be done and the added capacity needed to certify the 200 judges. - Testimony from [court]/[ministry] that the certification has resulted in an increase in environmental cases being brought to the court and adjudicated on. - Evidence that training/knowledge from technical assistance was used to at the right time and to the right individuals. - Testimony of the [court] that the technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
Sub-national	[Outcome 7] [Outcome 8]	Technical assistance – knowledge transfer to CSO groups (5, 6) Technical assistance – increased capacity of NIC (7, 8) 1a (5-8) Working between the levels (44, 45)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that training/knowledge from technical assistance was used by stakeholder groups in lobbying/advocacy/monitoring activities. - Evidence of stakeholder groups engaging with government officials in the policy and lobbying process. - Evidence that [type of technical assistance] and grievances escalated by [group] have resulted in [outcome 8]. - Testimony of stakeholder groups that the technical assistance increased confidence and motivation. - Testimony from stakeholder groups that technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. - Testimony from [institution] that internally there is an increased awareness of environmental issues and the implementation of [law] to tackle them. - Testimony of [implementing partner] that the extra resource provided added capacity needed to deploy [intervention]. - Evidence the [intervention] was used by stakeholder groups in lobbying/advocacy/monitoring activities. - Testimony of [government] that the information gathered using the [intervention] increased their capability and capacity to effectively tackle [problem]. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]

	[Outcome 9]	<p>Convening (18, 19)</p> <p>Working between the levels (45)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evidence that key stakeholders (e.g. [group], [local government], [private sector]) are engaged in the convening process. - Evidence that working groups/regular meetings are attended consistently by a critical mass of key stakeholders involved. - Testimony from key stakeholders that as a result of the process they have a shared understanding of each of the other parties' respective positions. - Testimony from stakeholders that as a result of the process they have reached a common position with the other parties. - Testimony from the [institution] that the local government is lobbying on their behalf. - Testimony from government officials at [ministry X and Y], that the rights of [group in province] are now being taken into consideration with [regard to outcome]. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
	[Outcome 10]	<p>Persuasive communication (11)</p> <p>Technical assistance – knowledge transfer (4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony of local government officials that increased budget allocation is desirable as a result of evidence that has been provided. - Testimony of government officials that the technical assistance gave them a better understanding of what should be done and how to do it. - Evidence that demonstration of other successes, in comparable contexts, was provided to the right people (e.g. those who make budget decisions) and at the right time (e.g. with enough time to influence budget allocation). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [name and role of interviewee] - [name and role of interviewee]
Working with other donors				
	For all of the above policy areas there are other donors directly and indirectly working in the same space as ICF. They will	Influencing the wider environment (21)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Testimony from government officials responsible for a particular policy area that multiple donors working together has made it easier for them to track progress in that policy area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [SRO] Lead and Deputy Lead - [donor country] - [donor country] - [donor country]

	be able to provide an informed perspective on the weight of ICF's influencing activities (both for the [country] government and other donors working in the same areas), as well as whether activities are more effective when working alongside one another.	Influencing other donors (41-43)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Different donor programmes interacting with and supporting one another. - Evidence that decision makers felt the existence of the partnership, and the members of the partnership, added weight to ICF's views. - Evidence that other donors in the partnership were willing to collaborate with the UK and/or evidence that other donors not in the partnership were not willing to collaborate with the UK. - Evidence that the alignment of interests, policy and culture were important to the partnership members, before the partnership started and during its operation. - Evidence that outcomes have been more effective because the appropriate donor has led in each policy area. - Evidence that other donors have changed their own position in line with ICF's position. - Evidence that decision makers, particularly other donors, have been impressed by ICF. - Evidence that persuasion and reciprocity led, at least in part, to a change of position in line with ICF position. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [ministry X] - [ministry Y] - [ministry Z]
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11 MaxQDA coding structure

Number of codes in MaxQDA for context, mechanism and outcome (CMO)	
Code type	Number of codes
Context	469
Mechanism	754
Interim outcome	86
Outcome	102
Alternative explanation	45

Number of codes in MaxQDA by theory	
By theory	Number of codes
National and sub-national policy support for policy change	543
MDB support for policy change	103
Influencing other donors	9
Interactions between the levels	14
Critical mass of complementary factors achieved	21

Number of codes in MaxQDA by theory	
For whom	Number of codes
Ministers	55
CSOs	86
Other donors	5
Junior government officials	126
Senior government officials	233

Number of codes in MaxQDA by case study	
Case study	Number of codes
CIFs	211
World Bank	66
Colombia	352
Indonesia	1118
Uganda	211

11.1 Sample MaxQDA analysis

Segments (or 'nuggets') of text were coded against a pre-defined (but regularly reviewed and evolving) set of codes. These codes, seen in the bottom right hand side of the image, represent our theories, contexts, mechanisms, outcomes, and other useful categories.

Segments of text containing evidence of policy outcomes as a result of ICF support for policy change were coded as 'outcome'. The yellow 'mechanism' codes were assigned to segments containing evidence that one of our hypothesised mechanisms were operating. The different coloured 'theory' codes were assigned alongside the other codes to indicate which of our theories the coding relates to.

For example, the coded segment highlighted in the extract below is simultaneously coded as 'Prospect of support' and 'Senior government officials'. This means that the highlighted segment contains some information relating to the prospect of support mechanism that is relevant to senior government officials.

12 Background information on the status of the investigated policies in Uganda

12.1 Overview of climate change policy in Uganda (renewable energy)

12.1.1 Uganda context

The Republic of Uganda is a landlocked biodiverse country in East-Central Africa with an abundance of renewable energy sources. With the population of nearly 44.4 million¹ and an area of 241,038 km² its population density² is above the average of countries in the region³ and grows at the rate of 3%.⁴

Uganda's ecosystems are rich in biodiversity and comprise of diverse habitats – from lakes and savannas, the mountains, to rivers and their stream banks, including the Nile River.⁵ In light of this, Uganda benefits from ample hydrological and other renewable sources of energy.⁶

This wealth of natural resources reflects in Uganda's dependence on biomass as the primary source of energy. More than 93% of its energy demand is met with biomass and the remaining 7% comprises of fossil fuel combustion (6%) and electricity from hydro and fossil fuelled thermal power plants (1%).⁷ Moreover, Uganda is challenged with power shortages caused by barriers to investment in renewable energy and implementation of renewable energy infrastructure. These include high initial investment costs and inadequate incentives to facilitate investment in renewable energy technologies, and insufficient data on the potential of indigenous renewable energy sources in Uganda.⁸

Poverty: Energy poverty is widespread⁹ as only about 10% of the population has access to electricity – this is one of the lowest rates in the world¹⁰ and further drops to less than 5% in rural areas.¹¹ As a result, as much as 93% of Uganda's energy needs are met with wood fuel.¹²

¹ World Population Review: Uganda Population 2020. Available online at <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/uganda-population/>

² of 213 people per km² of land area.

³ The World Bank: Population Density. Available online at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?locations=ZG-8S-Z4-UG>

⁴ *Ibid.* World Population Review.

⁵ Uganda Diversity Fund: Overview. Available online at <https://ugandabiodiversityfund.org/overview/>

⁶ Tumwesigye, R., Twebaze, P., Makuregye, N., Muyambi, E., (2011) *Key issues in Uganda's energy sector, Pro-Biodiversity Conservationists in Uganda (PROBICOU)*. International Institute for Environment and Development. London. See page 4. Available online at <https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16030IIED.pdf>

⁷ Energising Development (EnDev): Uganda. Available online at <https://endev.info/content/Uganda>.

⁸ *Ibid.* *Key issues in Uganda's energy sector*. See page 34.

⁹ *Ibid.* *Key issues in Uganda's energy sector*.

¹⁰ World Bank (2016) *The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016: Farms, cities and good fortune: assessing poverty reduction in Uganda from 2006 to 2013*. September 2016. Available online at <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/381951474255092375/Uganda-Poverty-Assessment-Report-2016.pdf>

¹¹ *Ibid.* Energising Development (EnDev).

¹² *Ibid.* *Key issues in Uganda's energy sector*. See page 6.

“Firewood, charcoal and crop residues provide almost all the energy used to meet the basic needs of cooking and water heating in rural and most urban households, institutions and commercial buildings”.¹³

Access to electricity in Uganda remains a barrier to socio-economic development despite Uganda's progress at reducing monetary poverty. The proportion of its population living below the national poverty line had declined from 31.1% in 2006 to 19.7% in 2013. This was primarily due to increased income of households in agriculture as a result of rising prices for agricultural produce, peace in Uganda's northern region, and favourable weather conditions. However, important non-monetary aspects of poverty, including access to electricity, have remained lagged.¹⁴ In 2016, for example, only 14% of households in Uganda were using electricity for lighting.¹⁵

Uganda is also highly vulnerable to droughts and other adverse impacts of climate change.¹⁶ This primarily affects the poorest who are heavily depend on agriculture for income.¹⁷ Lack of access to energy is one of the main barriers preventing households from moving out of agriculture. It constrains their non-agricultural income growth¹⁸ and undermines their resilience capacities. Such transition would require effective public investment in infrastructure, like regional corridors, as well as public services, and safety nets.¹⁹

Economic growth: Uganda has been further challenged by a recent economic slowdown - primarily in agriculture - affecting people's incomes and undermining long-term poverty reduction efforts.²⁰ From 2011 to 2016, the average annual growth was 4.5% compared to 7% in previous years.²¹ Real growth in GDP is expected to slowly pick up from an estimated 5.3% in 2018 to the estimate of 5.7% in 2020. One of the main drivers behind the more optimistic outlook is higher investment in infrastructure and foreign direct investment in the oil and mining sub-sectors.²²

Democracy: Although national direct elections were introduced in Uganda in 1995-96²³ and regular elections have been held since, their credibility has deteriorated over time. The country has been ruled by the same president and political party, the National Resistance Movement, since 1986. The political elites have retained their power through controversial practices like the manipulation of state resources.²⁴

12.1.2 Sector-level analysis – renewable energy

State of play: The energy sector has played a key role in Uganda's economy since the country's economic liberalisation in 1987 with energy exports representing a substantial contribution to the national budget.²⁵ To sustain this trend, the sector requires significant public and private investments

¹³ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector. See page 30.

¹⁴ World Bank. *Uganda Poverty Assessment 2016* [Fact Sheet]. September 2016. Available online at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/brief/uganda-poverty-assessment-2016-fact-sheet>

¹⁵ *Ibid.* The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016.

¹⁶ <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/uganda/uganda-economic-outlook>

¹⁷ *Ibid.* The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016. See page 76.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* The Uganda Poverty Assessment Report 2016.

²⁰ The World Bank in Uganda: Overview. Available online at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/overview>

²¹ *Ibid.* The World Bank in Uganda: Overview.

²² AfDB: Uganda Economic Outlook. Available online at <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/uganda/uganda-economic-outlook>

²³ Carbone, G. 'Populism' Visits Africa: The Case of Yoweri Museveni and No-Party Democracy in Uganda. Crisis States Research Centre. 2005. Available online at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/cscc-working-papers-phase-one/wp73-museveni-and-no-party-democracy-in-uganda.pdf>

²⁴ Freedom in the world 2019: Uganda. Available online at <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2019>

²⁵ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector.

in infrastructure. Investments made so far have been directed primarily at public infrastructure that enables electricity supply.²⁶

Led by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), Uganda formulated a Strategic Plan to reform its energy industry in 1997 with the objective to meet the growing demands for electricity. It pledged to increase the sector's efficiency and area coverage, improve the reliability and quality of electricity supply, attract private investment, and take advantage of export opportunities.²⁷

To this end, the 1999 Electricity Act established the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), an independent body to regulate the country's electricity generation, transmission, distribution, sale, and trade.²⁸ To ensure efficient and fair functioning of the sector and its financial viability, other regulatory bodies were established. These include the Electricity Disputes Tribunal, the semi-autonomous Rural Electrification Agency (REA), and the Rural Electrification Board (REB).²⁹

Uganda's legal and regulatory framework for the energy sector includes two key policies: the Energy Policy completed in 2002 and the Renewable Energy Policy introduced in 2007.³⁰ While the former aims to meet the country's energy needs and contribute to sustainable socio-economic development,³¹ the goal of the Renewable Energy Policy is to boost the share of modern renewable energy in total energy consumption. For 2017, this target was 61%.³²

Rising demand for electricity and the escalation of oil prices have incentivised investment in more accessible renewable energy sources, like generating energy from biomass on a commercial basis. ERA has issued electricity generation licenses to two such companies to generate the total of 17MW to be sold to the national grid and 8.5MW for their own use.³³

The country's installed generation capacity in 2017 was 950MW, most of which was produced by hydro power. The same year, the government declared a plan to double the total national electricity output by 2019. Such increase required investment in the upgrade of transmission networks, delivery of feasibility studies for further energy exploration, and legislative reforms to attract investment in the sector.³⁴

In terms of rural electrification, the REA is committed to achieving a universal electricity access by 2040 as per its Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan (2013-2022).³⁵ To operationalise this goal, an Indicative Rural Electrification Master Plan (IREMP) has been determined by the REB. Its implementation has been led by REA in the form of the Rural Electrification Programme.³⁶

²⁶ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA). *Legal Frameworks*. Available online at https://www.era.or.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=204:legal-framework&catid=100:renewable-energy-investment-guide

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (2002). *The Energy Policy for Uganda*. September 2002. Available online <http://www.cscsco.ug/files/downloads/THE%20ENERGY%20POLICY%20FOR%20UGANDA.pdf>

³² *Ibid.* Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA). *Legal Frameworks*.

³³ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector. See page 31.

³⁴ Think GeoEnergy: Geothermal power could be large part of Uganda's energy future. Available online at <http://www.thinkgeoenergy.com/geothermal-power-could-be-large-part-of-ugandas-energy-future/>

³⁵ Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. *Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan (2013-2022)*. July 2013. Available online at <http://www.rea.or.ug/resources/strategy%20and%20plan%202013-2022.pdf>

³⁶ The Rural Electrification Agency (REA). See website: <http://www.rea.or.ug/>

The Rural Electrification Programme is financed through the Rural Electrification Fund (REF). The REF is a consolidated fund sourced from a levy on energy sales by private generation companies³⁷ and funding from bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD).³⁸

Furthermore, the government of Uganda has been actively working with other East African Community countries to strengthen regional power interconnection and diversify supply sources and reduce investment costs in those countries as a result.³⁹ Uganda is one of the initial seven, and now ten, countries participating in the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP). Established in 2005, the EAPP coordinates the work of political leadership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) region with the aim to improve regional power system interconnectivity. Other anticipated benefits include optimised development and use of energy resources, reduced electricity costs, and a universal access to electricity power supply.⁴⁰

Opportunities: With the attempt to reduce the country's vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, the government of Uganda has adopted a climate-centric economic model and developed the Uganda Green Growth Development Strategy (UGGDS) to deliver it.⁴¹

The UGGDS seeks to accelerate implementation of the global development goals through investment in five core catalytic areas: agriculture, natural capital management, sustainable urban development, transport and energy.⁴²

To achieve this transition, Uganda needs to develop a national GHG inventory system, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), and the associated measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems.⁴³

In this context, the International Climate Fund (ICF) has been supporting the UGGDS, and Uganda's low-carbon development more broadly, through the following selected investments:

- The ICF-co-financed **Global Green Growth Institute** supports the development of the UGGDS, the UGGDS Implementation Roadmap, and the National Green City Implementation Roadmap by strengthening the capacity of policy makers and stakeholders for green growth planning and implementation.⁴⁴
- Through the **NAMA Facility**, the ICF supports and in some cases co-finances country-owned projects, policies, or programmes (NAMAs) that shift a technology or sector onto a low carbon development trajectory.
- Building on a DFID-led initiative to accelerate the household solar market in Africa called the Energy Africa Campaign, the **Africa Clean Energy (ACE) Programme** provides technical assistance to improve policy environment as well as technical assistance and start-up

³⁷ For example, the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company (UETCL).

³⁸ *Ibid.* Rural Electrification Agency (REA).

³⁹ *Ibid.* *Key issues in Uganda's energy sector*. See page 4.

⁴⁰ Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP). See website: <http://eappool.org/>

⁴¹ Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI): Uganda. <https://gggi.org/country/uganda/>

⁴² Uganda Vision 2040. *The Uganda Green Growth Development Strategy 2017/18 – 2030/31*. Available online at <https://www.ndcs.undp.org/content/dam/LECB/docs/pubs-reports/undp-ndc-sp-uganda-ggds-green-growth-dev-strategy-20171204.pdf>

⁴³ *Ibid.* Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

finance to businesses with the aim to increase access to clean, affordable energy for low-income people in Uganda and other African countries.

- The ICF-co-financed **Global Energy Transfer Feed in Tariffs (GET FiT) Programme** aims to promote private investment into renewable energy generation capacity in Uganda. The UK, together with other donors, provides technical assistance and capacity building, primarily to ERA, to introduce cost-reflective tariffs and an appropriate regulatory regime. GET FiT also supports the design and implementation of small-scale, private sector, renewable energy projects and provides guarantees to cover risks.⁴⁵
- The ICF also supports the **Results-Based Financing for Low Carbon Energy Access Programme** which aims to accelerate access to renewable energy sources, services, systems and products in Uganda and other less developed countries by incentivising the private sector.⁴⁶
- **The East Africa Geothermal Programme** comprises of the Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility (GRMF) and the East Africa Geothermal Technical Assistance Facility (EAGER). It provides grants for private and public geothermal developers in Uganda, and other countries in the region, to help fund exploration work of geothermal resources to improve investor confidence and encourage future investment. It also provides technical assistance to public and private stakeholders in Uganda, and other selected countries, to improve their strategy, policy and regulatory conditions. In Uganda, EAGER has provided support to address regulatory gaps and input into Uganda's policy-making process.⁴⁷
- The ICF-co-financed **Green Climate Fund (GCF)** has approved five projects in Uganda with the total value of US\$2.4 billion. Three of those projects support energy generation and access.⁴⁸

Barriers: Rising population growth, high poverty levels, and increasing urbanisation rates require large-scale investment to improve access to affordable, reliable and adequate energy supplies which have so far presented a challenge for the government.⁴⁹ Effective and sustainable urban planning is also required as urban population is expected to increase to over 20 million in 2040. To address high unemployment rates, primarily in urban areas⁵⁰ and among the youth, creation of green jobs also plays an essential role in achieving a transition towards inclusive low-carbon development.⁵¹

To this end, the government is challenged with institutional and legal weaknesses which present substantial bottlenecks to investment in renewable energy and energy conservation and efficiency.⁵² These include: stunted growth in generation capacity, poor transmission and distribution infrastructure, limited planning for modern energy which negatively affects access to electricity primarily in urban and semi-urban areas, and poor commercial utility practices.⁵³

Addressing such bottlenecks requires cross-sectoral coordination among key governmental departments and regulatory agencies: for example, through progressive mainstreaming of green growth into upstream development planning, creation of favourable institutional enabling

⁴⁵ GET FiT Uganda. GET FiT Business Case 2015. Available online at <https://www.getfit-uganda.org/>

⁴⁶ Mid-term Evaluation. Evaluation of the Results-Based Financing for Low Carbon Energy Access Facility (RBFF) within Energising Development (EnDev). October 2017. Available online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/701132/Results-Based-Financing-for-Low-Carbon-Energy-Access-Programme.PDF

⁴⁷ East African Geothermal Programme, Annual Report 2018.

⁴⁸ Green Climate Fund: Uganda. Available online at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/uganda>

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector.

⁵⁰ Where the unemployment rate is more than three times higher rural areas.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

⁵² *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector.

⁵³ *Ibid.* Key issues in Uganda's energy sector.

environment, and integrating the principles of resource use efficiency, sustainability, and resilience into the design of government programmes and projects.⁵⁴

12.2 Key stakeholders

12.2.1 The Government of Uganda

- **The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD)** is the lead agency in the energy sector. It is responsible for initiating legislation and policy formulation in the energy sector, as well as its promotion, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation.⁵⁵
- Established by the 1999 Electricity Act, **ERA** is responsible for regulating the generation, transmission, distribution, sale, export and import of electricity in Uganda. It is also mandated to issue licenses to the participants in the electricity sector.⁵⁶
- With a mandate to regulate the electricity sector, **REA** is responsible for setting operating standards and appropriate end user tariffs.⁵⁷ Under a public-private partnership with the government, it operationalises its rural electrification function and implements rural electrification projects in the areas of grid extension, independent grids and off-grid solutions, and renewable energy generation projects.⁵⁸ It also hosts the REB Secretariat which manages the REF.⁵⁹
- The **REB**, as the governing body of REA, provides subsidies to rural electrification projects.⁶⁰ It oversees the management of the REF on behalf of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.⁶¹

12.2.2 Third sector

Civil society and media sectors are active and vibrant, despite occasional legal and extra-legal harassment and state violence.⁶² In general, most Ugandan NGOs don't operate in the sector of energy although several NGOs have supported the introduction of improved stoves, solar systems, and solar lamps.⁶³

12.2.3 Private sector

Uganda has a decentralised energy system with several key actors responsible for electricity generation, transmission and distribution to end-users. Following the 1999 electricity sector reforms, the country adopted a single buyer electricity sector model, with **Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL)** as the system operator. As the bulk supplier and single buyer of power for the national grid, UETCL is responsible for electricity transmission and owns transmission lines above 33kV.⁶⁴ It purchases electricity from independent power producers which it then further

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

⁵⁵ Electricity Regulatory Authority. *Renewable Investment Guide*. Available online at <http://www.era.or.ug/index.php/opportunities/renewal-energy-investment-guide?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=>

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See Umeme website: <https://www.umeme.co.ug/about>.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Rural Electrification Agency (REA).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Electricity Regulatory Authority. *Renewable Investment Guide*.

⁶⁰ Rural Electrification Agency (REA) summary. Available online at <https://www.devex.com/organizations/rural-electrification-agency-of-uganda-rea-56078>

⁶¹ *Ibid.* Rural Electrification Agency (REA).

⁶² *Ibid.* Freedom in the world 2019: Uganda.

⁶³ Energypedia: Uganda Energy Situation. Available online at https://energypedia.info/wiki/Uganda_Energy_Situation

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* Electricity Regulatory Authority. *Renewable Investment Guide*.

exports to the main electricity supply company - UMEME Limited.⁶⁵ UETCL received funding from the ICF-co-financed GET FiT programme.

Other key actors include:

- **UMEME Limited** is the main electricity supply company licensed to distribute and supply electricity to customers.⁶⁶ It holds a 20-year electricity distribution concession effective as of 1st March 2005⁶⁷ with mandates for operation, maintenance and upgrade of electricity distribution infrastructure, electricity retail, and provision of related services.⁶⁸
- The country's major energy generation plants belong to the **Ugandan Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL)** and are operated by ESKOM Uganda.⁶⁹ These major power plants are Kiira, Nalubaale, Karuma, Isimba, and Muzizi hydro power stations.⁷⁰ UEGCL took over the electricity generation activities, and Nalubaale and Kira hydro power stations, from the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) in accordance with the 1991 Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture Act.⁷¹
- **ESKOM Uganda** has a mandate to operate and maintain the Nalubaale (180MW) and Kiira (200MW) hydro power stations based on the 20-year concession agreement with the government.⁷²

12.2.4 Other bilateral donors

Uganda has a large community of international partners in the energy sector, and initiatives have been set up to ensure efficient coordination and management of such investments. For example, the Germany-led Energy and Mineral Development Partners Group (EMDPG) was set up in 2010 with a clear focus and project support towards renewable energy. EMDPG represents an energy portfolio of bilateral support through 70+ projects with a combined value of more than US\$1 billion. The group provided the government of Uganda with support in the areas of electricity generation, transmission and distribution, as well as energy efficiency, and energy policy and regulation, including technical assistance.⁷³ EMDPG comprises the following partners: Germany's state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Commission, France, Ireland, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (AfDB), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Norway and the World Bank.⁷⁴

Germany: The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been a key financier of programmes promoting sustainable use of Uganda's RE sources with four programmes currently ongoing. Through the BMZ-funded Promotion of Mini-Grids for Rural Electrification programme, for example, Germany supports Ugandan MEMD's efforts to decentralise and scale out private- sector renewable energy mini-grids. In terms of energy distribution and efficiency, BMZ funds the Promotion of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme (PREEEP) implemented by MEMD. Electricity access has been further supported by the Electricity

⁶⁵ See Umeme website: <https://www.umeme.co.ug/about>

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Energypedia. https://energypedia.info/wiki/Uganda_Energy_Situation#Problem_Situation

⁷⁰ Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited. See website: <https://www.uegcl.com/>

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Eskom Uganda. See website: <http://www.eskom.co.ug/content/what-we-do>

⁷³ Joint Sector Review 2017. Available online at

<https://www.norway.no/contentassets/bcc74fcc6fdc4d10accda8b9eae7d8d3/energy-joint-sector-review-closing-remarks.pdf>

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* Energypedia: Uganda Energy Situation.

Access Impact Maximisation (E-AIM) programme commissioned by MEMD and financed by KfW. Uganda also receives assistance from the multi-country Supporting Hydro Diplomacy in the Nile Basin programme commissioned by MBZ.⁷⁵

The UK has been working with Germany to expand energy access in Uganda through a number of interventions. For example, the ICF-co-financed Results-Based Financing for Low Carbon Energy Access Programme, implemented by the Energising Development (EnDev) partnership, is a multi-country programme co-managed by GIZ.⁷⁶ Supported by the UK as well as Norway, Germany, and the European Union, the GET FIT Programme was designed by the government of Uganda and ERA, with support from KfW, to leverage private investment into renewable energy generation projects in Uganda.⁷⁷ On the energy generation front, KfW and the African Union Commission (AUC), supported by BMZ and the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU ITF), have established the Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility (GRMF) to fund geothermal development in Eastern Africa. Managed by KfW and co-financed by the United Kingdom, this multi-country programme is implemented in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania and comprises approximately US\$115 million in available funding.⁷⁸

Norway plays a key role in the development of renewable energy in Uganda.⁷⁹ In 2014, it provided NOK 147 million in support for clean energy developments, including energy access. For example, it contributes to building of a 226 km long high-voltage transmission line in Western Uganda with a funding commitment of NOK 300 million. Norway also provided NOK 196 million to six rural electrification projects with the total of 888 km of low-voltage distribution lines completed in 2014 and objective of connecting up to 25,000 households as well as small businesses, schools and medical clinics to the grid. As for energy generation, Norway co-finances the GET FIT programme which is also supported by the UK through the ICF.⁸⁰

The United States supports renewable energy development in Uganda through several large-scale multi-country initiatives and partnerships. The United States East Africa Geothermal Partnership (EAGP), for example, promotes the development of geothermal energy resources and projects in the Rift Valley region. By providing technical assistance, capacity building support and other exchanges, it aims to catalyse working relationships between the United States and key players in the East African geothermal industries, including geothermal companies, experts and suppliers, as well as national governments and regional organisations, to identify immediate geothermal goods and services needs in the region. Implemented by the United States Energy Association (USEA) and part of President Obama's Power Africa Initiative, EAGP is a partnership between USAID and the Geothermal Energy Association (GEA).^{81, 82}

Launched in 2013, the Power Africa Initiative is an international public-private partnership to promote energy generation capacity and expand electricity access in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Uganda. It engages more than 150 businesses, regional organisations, and national governments, including 12 United States overnment departments and agencies,⁸³ and

⁷⁵ GIZ: Uganda. Available online at <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/310.html>

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* Energising Development (EnDev).

⁷⁷ GET FIT Annual Report 2018. Available online at at: <https://www.getfit-uganda.org/home/get-fit-annual-report-2018/>

⁷⁸ Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility (GRMF). Available at <https://grmf-eastafrica.org/about-grmf/>

⁷⁹ Norad. *Uganda Overview*. Available at <https://norad.no/en/front/countries/africa/uganda/>

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² United States Energy Association (USEA). *East Africa Geothermal Partnership (EAGP)*. Available at <https://www.usea.org/program/EAGP>

⁸³ USAID. *Power Africa: A 2017 Update*. Available at <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-4-2017-fact-sheet-power-africa-2017-update>

draws on their technical and legal expertise as well as financial support to achieve its goal of adding 60 million new electricity connections and 30,000 megawatts of new and cleaner energy in the geographical area.⁸⁴

The Power Africa Initiative is further supported by the United States Trade and Development Agency's (USTDA) Prosper Africa which is an economic initiative to promote trade and boost investment between the United States and Africa. Through this initiative the government of the United States supports development of renewable energy solutions among other large-scale economic infrastructure projects, like information and communication technology and transport, to unlock business opportunities between the United States and Africa.⁸⁵

12.2.5 Multilateral donors

The World Bank has five active projects supporting infrastructure for energy transmission in rural Uganda. These include: the Uganda Grid Expansion and Reinforcement Project (GERP), Phase 3 of Uganda Energy for Rural Transformation Project and related Phase 3 of the Uganda Global Environment Facility (GEF) Energy for Rural Transformation Project, the Energy for Rural Transformation Project, and the Uganda Rural Electrification project with the total committed funding of US\$795.7 million.⁸⁶ Through the Energy for Rural Transformation Project, the World Bank is to contribute to the REF that funds Uganda's Rural Electrification Programme implemented by REA. The World Bank also provided a Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) for the GET FiT Programme.

As already mentioned, **the GCF** has approved three projects that promote energy generation and expand electricity access. These are: 20-year multi-country Climate Investor One project with anticipated 53.7 million tonnes of CO2 emissions avoided, the 7-year multi-country Transforming Financial Systems for Climate project with 36 million tonnes of CO2 avoided, and the 5-year multi-country GEEREF Next project with 769 million tonnes of CO2 avoided.⁸⁷

Uganda accesses finance from the **Climate Investment Funds (CIF)** through the following funding windows: The Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP), the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR), and Forest Investment Programme (FIP).

According to Uganda's SREP Investment Plan, ICF funding is used to support the government of Uganda in meeting the country's targets set in the 2015 the United Nations' Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) Action Agenda⁸⁸ by widening access to modern energy services for more than 98% of Uganda's population, and helping to double the share of renewable energy in the energy mix.⁸⁹

SREP provides technical assistance and capacity building to national institutions and players in the energy sector to promote effective implementation sectoral policies and strategies that incentivise the deployment of renewable energy across the country. With the total allocation of US\$50 million, SREP is to finance the following three energy projects: 130MW geothermal project, solar

⁸⁴ USAID: *Power Africa*. Available at <https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica>

⁸⁵ US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA): sub-Saharan Africa. Available at <https://ustda.gov/program/regions/sub-saharan-africa>

⁸⁶ World Bank: Projects in Uganda. Available at http://projects.worldbank.org/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=UG

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Green Climate Fund: Uganda.

⁸⁸ Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL). See website at <https://www.seforall.org/>

⁸⁹ Climate Investment Funds. Meeting of the SREP Sub-Committee Washington D.C. Wednesday, November 11, 2015. Available online at

https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/srep_14_8_srep_investment_plan_for_uganda_final_version.pdf

photovoltaic (PV) off-grid mini-grid and solar PV net metering, and Wind assessment, and two 10MW pilot wind farms.⁹⁰

Other institutions supporting the Ugandan energy sector include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), The Nordic Development Fund (NDF), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).⁹¹

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.* Energypedia: Uganda Energy Situation.

13 Background information on the status of the investigated policies in Colombia

13.1 Overview of climate change policy in Colombia (forestry)

13.1.1 Colombia context

Located in the northwest of South America and covering a land area of close to 111 million hectares⁹², Colombia is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world. Its landscapes are rich with biodiversity comprising of thousands of isolated ecosystems and endemic species that are particularly vulnerable to climate change.^{93,94}

While Colombia's forests covered 55% of the country's area in 2010⁹⁵ as much as three-quarters of its total area of cleared land is being used for livestock pasture.⁹⁶ With Colombia being the world's 15th largest livestock producer and cattle activity accounting for 62% of the livestock sector,⁹⁷ cattle ranching presents an increasing threat to the country's forests, including the Amazon. Steadily rising rates of livestock production, except for dips in 2009, 2010 and 2016⁹⁸, make the agriculture sector Colombia's largest GHG emitter with a share of 38.1% of the economy's GHG emissions measured in 2004.⁹⁹

Following a series of trade shocks causing gradual economic deceleration from 2014 to 2016, Colombia's economic growth reached an estimated 1.4% in 2017 and further increased to 2.7% in 2018. The recent upward trend has been encouraged by macroeconomic policies and structural reforms which achieved an important adjustment in the country's non-oil fiscal deficit in response to a recent decline in oil fiscal revenues of nearly 3.3% of GDP. However, the World Bank's projections for 2019-2021 estimate that higher profitability in the oil sector is likely to incentivise future investments in oil exploitation and exploration in Colombia¹⁰⁰ which poses future threats to Colombia's forests.

Despite the recent economic upturn, a significant proportion of the Colombian population of over 50.34 million¹⁰¹ lives in poverty. In 2013, the share of population living in poverty, including extreme poverty, accounted for 30.6% with indigenous and afro-descendant communities in rural and

⁹² Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia. Available at <https://globaforestatlas.yale.edu/amazon-forest/forest-governance/forest-governance-colombia>

⁹³ DFID. Overseas Business Risk: Colombia. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-colombia/overseas-business-risk-colombia>

⁹⁴ HMG (2019). *UK and Colombia mark new climate partnership with £8.5 million investment* [Press release]. 18 June. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-colombia-mark-new-climate-partnership-with-85-million-investment>

⁹⁵ <https://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Colombia.htm>

⁹⁶ Nepstad, D., Irawan, S., Bezerra, T., Boyd, W., Stickler, C., Shimada, J., ... & Azevedo, A. (2013). More food, more forests, fewer emissions, better livelihoods: linking REDD+, sustainable supply chains and domestic policy in Brazil, Indonesia and Colombia. *Carbon Management*, 4(6), 653 – 655.

⁹⁷ Anibal, H., Rodriguez, D.. *Farm Animal Welfare in Colombia. A country situation report*. WSPA. Available online at: https://www.worldanimalprotection.ca/sites/default/files/media/ca_-_en_files/farmanimalwelfareincolombia_tcm22-8296.pdf

⁹⁸ World Bank. Livestock Production Index. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.PRD.LVSK.XD?locations=CO&view=chart>

⁹⁹ Gutiérrez, M., M.. 'Second National Communication of Colombia to the UNFCCC' [PowerPoint presentation]. 06 February 2018. Available online at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/59270>

¹⁰⁰ World Bank. Colombia Overview. Available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/colombia/overview>

¹⁰¹ World Population Review. Colombia Population 2020. Available at <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/colombia-population/>

peripheral areas of major cities being at high risk.¹⁰² Furthermore, Colombia has been under an increasing migration pressure from Venezuela, with approximately 1.2 million Venezuelans having arrived in Colombia as of September 2018.¹⁰³

Poor communities are further affected by economic risks as a result of natural disasters with nearly 85% of the population and 86.6% of assets located in areas exposed to one or more natural disasters.¹⁰⁴

13.2 Sector-level analysis – forestry

State of play: Colombia has had environmental safeguards in place to protect its most significant forests for 60 years, and prohibited the clearing of forests in the Amazon and six other forest reserves as early as in 1959.

Despite the long-standing regulation, the FAO reported a constant rate of deforestation of 0.17% per year for 1990-2010 and according to Terra-I, a vegetation monitoring system of habitat loss in Latin America; deforestation in Caquetá, one of Colombia's 32 departments, increased by 192% in 2012, the biggest percentage increase in the Amazon region.¹⁰⁵ More recently, the Global Forest Watch and the National Meteorological Institute (IDEAM) reported a 46% increase in tree cover loss in Colombia in 2017.¹⁰⁶ Both environmental and historical socio-economic trends, including cattle ranching, illegal cropping of timber, human settlement, and mining were identified as the primary drivers.^{107, 108}

13.2.1 Opportunities

In 2009, Colombia announced an ambitious goal of reaching zero net deforestation in the Colombian Amazon by 2020. To reach this goal, the Government has developed and been implementing a comprehensive programme called the 'Amazon Vision'. The goal has also been supported by investments of the UK, through the International Climate Fund (ICF), as well as Norway and Germany.¹⁰⁹

To this end, the Colombian Government has been promoting progressive palm oil, sugarcane, and biofuels sectors that have committed to zero deforestation and low-emission supply chains.¹¹⁰ It also set out a goal of reducing the area of livestock pastures from 380,000 to 280,000 km² by 2019. If successful, this could free up land to help spare further agricultural expansion into forested areas, including the Amazon.¹¹¹

¹⁰² FAO (2017). *Colombia Resilience Programme 2017-2020*. Available online at <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7584e.pdf>

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* World Bank. Colombia Overview.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* Colombia Resilience Programme 2017-2020.

¹⁰⁵ <https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/amazon-forest/forest-governance/forest-governance-colombia>

¹⁰⁶ World Resources Institute (2018) *Colombia Becomes First Country in Latin America to Commit to Deforestation-Free Chocolate* [Press release]. 17 July. Available at <https://www.wri.org/news/2018/07/release-colombia-becomes-first-country-latin-america-commit-deforestation-free>

¹⁰⁷ Armenteras, D., Rudas, G., Rodriguez, N., Sua, S., & Romero, M. (2006). Patterns and causes of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon. *Ecological Indicators*, 6(2), 353-368.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

¹⁰⁹ Earth Innovation Institute. *Colombia's Amazon Vision Program*. Available at <https://earthinnovation.org/our-work/case-studies/colombias-amazon-vision-program/>

¹¹⁰ Nepstad, D., *et al.* .

¹¹¹ Nepstad, D., *et al.*

Set up in 2012, the ICF-co-financed Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) has supported several government-led initiatives to support the country's ambition of green growth. The most significant are:

- Support to the formulation, resource mobilisation and technical coordination of the Green Growth Taskforce (2014-2018) led by the National Planning Department (DNP).¹¹²
- Development of a 2030 roadmap to guide the Colombian economy towards green growth that was formulated in the Green Growth Policy (CONPES 3934) and approved by the Council of Economic and Social Policy in July 2018.
- Technical assistance to develop a Sustainable Cattle Ranching Policy that has been prioritised by Colombia's new Development Plan.
- Technical assistance to design and implement agro-environmental financial instruments that contribute to the sustainable productive transformation of Colombia's agricultural productive sectors.
- Support to the Fund for the Financing of the Agricultural Sector (FINAGRO) - an innovative government agricultural finance institution responsible for domestic policy and finance outside of REDD+.
- Support to the High Commissioner's Office for Post Conflict and the Colombia Peace Fund to structure a portfolio of projects to improve the livelihoods of rural families and make local productive systems more sustainable and socially inclusive.
- Support to the financial structuring and fund match-making to connect green projects with funding sources.
- Support to the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development to design and implement an innovative 'payment for results' REDD+ Early Movers Programme (REM) to reduce deforestation in the Colombian Amazon while promoting low carbon development.
- Coordination support to the REM programme that is financed by the governments of Germany, UK and Norway.¹¹³

As the agricultural sector dominated by ranching and livestock production generates 14% of the country's GDP¹¹⁴ and accounts for the largest share of the economy's GHG emissions, sustainable agricultural production and land management have been prioritised by many of Colombia's other international donors, including the ICF and the World Bank.

Working towards the 2020 zero-deforestation objective, the World Bank's Global Environment Facility (GEF) supported the 'Heart of the Amazon' initiative of Colombia's Ministry of the Environment to promote sustainable, forest-maintaining enterprises for smallholders and indigenous communities across the country. The initiative intends to balance conservation goals with the needs of local communities, including indigenous peoples, through investments in agroforestry to support the sustainable management of protected areas.¹¹⁵

Through the ICF, the UK has committed around £120 million to support Colombia's efforts to implement sustainable development approaches,¹¹⁶ including in the areas of sustainable agricultural practices and forests.

¹¹² Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). *Colombia* [fact sheet]. May 2019. Available online at https://ggi.org/site/assets/uploads/2019/05/brochureColombiaEnglish1_compressed.pdf

¹¹³ Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). Colombia Overview. Available at <https://ggi.org/country/colombia/>

¹¹⁴ Anibal, H., et al. *Farm Animal Welfare in Colombia*.

¹¹⁵ SDG Knowledge Hub. *World Bank and GEF Partner with Colombia for Forest Conservation*. Available online at <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/world-bank-and-gef-partner-with-colombia-for-forest-conservation/>

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* DFID. Overseas Business Risk: Colombia.

For example, to promote sustainable agricultural production free of deforestation, the Tropical Forest Alliance (TFA) 2020, an initiative co-financed by the ICF through the Investment in Forests and Sustainable Land Use Programme (IFSLU) programme, gained support of the Colombian Government in 2017 and launched a multi-stakeholder platform of businesses, CSOs and donor agencies to protect over 60 million hectares of the Colombian Amazon from commodity-driven deforestation. This gave rise to the TFA 2020 Colombia Alliance which is to further support the government's objective of zero net deforestation in the Amazon by 2020 by targeting all major commodity-driven causes of deforestation, including palm oil, beef, dairy, and timber.¹¹⁷ This ambition is aligned with Colombia's REDD+ commitment of zero-deforestation across the entire nation by 2020.¹¹⁸

Other examples of ICF-funded programmes include:

- ICF's **Low-carbon Agriculture in Colombia** - implemented by the Cattle Ranching Association (FEDEGAN) and managed by the World Bank - aims to convert open pasture areas in seven of Colombia's regions to silvopastoral farming systems (SPS) and by doing so promote wider adoption of the system across the country.¹¹⁹
- The above-mentioned ICF-co-financed **Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)** works with the government in three areas: policy and planning, structuring and financing of projects, and knowledge exchange.¹²⁰
- Through KfW's **REDD for Early Movers** programme the ICF co-invests, together with Germany and Norway, in 'Amazon Vision', an ambitious programme to achieve the goal of zero net deforestation in Colombia's Amazon region by 2020.¹²¹

Besides, in June 2019, the UK established a new climate partnership with Colombia and committed an additional £8.5 million to protect the country's unique ecosystem and fight climate change. £3.5 million of this commitment will help protect Colombia's ecosystems.¹²²

Barriers: Despite the long-term safeguards to protect Colombia's most biodiverse forests, including the Amazon, its climate policy is still nascent with a low-carbon development strategy approved in 2018 and additional market-based instruments, like carbon taxes and payments for ecosystem services, to further promote green growth being considered.^{123, 124}

The transition to green growth is further complicated by the country's decentralised governance structures, with around 40% of government spending distributed by sub-national governments. As a result, local environmental authorities, called Corporaciones Autonomas Regionales, have a considerable say and influence in the design and implementation of environmental policy and regulation.¹²⁵

¹¹⁷ Tropical Forest Alliance (2017). *Colombian Government Commits to Protect Its Tropical Forest* [Press release]. 28 November. Available at <https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/en/insights/news-and-events/colombian-government-commits-to-protect-its-tropical-forest>

¹¹⁸ <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/climate-and-forest-initiative/kos-innsikt/colombia/id2459245/>

¹¹⁹ See SPS business case.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). *Colombia* [fact sheet].

¹²¹ See REM business case.

¹²² *Ibid.* HMG [Press release]. June 2019.

¹²³ Calderón, S., Alvarez, A. C., Loboguerrero, A. M., Arango, S., Calvin, K., Kober, T., ... & Fisher-Vanden, K. (2016). 'Achieving CO2 reductions in Colombia: Effects of carbon taxes and abatement targets'. *Energy Economics*, 56, 575-586. Available online at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988315001620>

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

13.3 Key stakeholders

13.3.1 The Government of Colombia

- **The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development** is a key national executive ministry in charge of the management and oversight of rural development and agriculture. It is a GGGI government counterpart and is also involved in the implementation of the REM programme.
- Supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the **Colombian Fund for Financing the Agricultural Sector (FINAGRO)** developed new instruments to leverage its US\$4 billion in agricultural and forestry loans and subsidies that have been made available to farmers and agribusinesses to promote the transition to low-emission rural development.¹²⁶ FINAGRO has received support from the GGGI.
- **Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development** is a key national executive ministry in charge of the design and implementation of environmental policy to promote and oversee the country's sustainable development. It is tasked with the delivery of the REM programme. It has also engaged civil society and the private sector in setting up the Intersectoral Pact for Legal Timber (PIML) supported by the ICF-co-financed FAO-EU FLEGT programme. The ministry is a GGGI government counterpart and it participates in a four-way partnership between BEIS, the British Embassy in Bogota, and the United Nations Development Programme to deliver Colombia's 2050 Calculator.¹²⁷
- **National Planning Department (DNP)** is a GGGI government and Colombia's national designated authority; a focal point for interaction with the Green Climate Fund.
- **High Commissioner's Office for Post conflict** has received support from the GGGI as a government counterpart.

13.3.2 Third sector

NGOs play an integral role in reducing deforestation in Colombia by monitoring and reporting the loss of forested cover as well as supporting implementation of REDD+ initiatives. Organisations leading the monitoring and reporting efforts include **the World Resource Institute (WRI)**, **The Nature Conservancy**, and the above-mentioned **Global Forest Watch** and **Terra-I**.

Members in the forum for discussing REDD+ issues include many national and international NGOs like **the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)**, **Conservation International**, **Corporación Ecovera**, and **The Nature Conservancy**. The Nature Conservancy, for example, works with the national government to monitor deforestation and to improve protected areas in the Amazon.¹²⁸

Indigenous peoples and organisations, such as **The Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon (OPIAC)**, have also participated in national and international discussions on REDD+. ¹²⁹

Examples of international and national NGOs that have implemented programmes to tackle deforestation include:

- **The Colombian Federation of Cattlemen (FEDEGAN)**: Supervised by the World Bank and supported by the Colombian Government and the Ministries of Environment and Sustainable

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* Nepstad, D., *et al.*

¹²⁷ Note that Colombia's 2050 Outreach programme was developed as part of the Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy and considers some sectors beyond energy which have not been considered in the UK 2050 Calculator, including deforestation, reforestation, diets, cattle farming, and soil use practices.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

Development and Agriculture and Rural Development, FEDEGAN is a non-profit private organisation that leads the implementation of the ICF-funded Low-carbon Agriculture in Colombia programme.¹³⁰

- **WWF Colombia** and **OPIAC** provide technical support to a bottom-up model that seeks to incorporate, in an equitable and culturally appropriate way, peoples and organisations of the indigenous territories of the Amazon to the REDD+ initiatives in Colombia.¹³¹
- **OPIAC** is also an implementing partner under thematic area 1 of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI).¹³²

13.3.3 Private sector

The private sector has been targeted by Colombia's Government, international donors as well as private sector initiatives to engage in debates about sustainable forest management and adopt such practices. For example, the Colombian Ministry for the Environment and Sustainable Development set up and engaged private sector organisations, as well as civil society, in the above-mentioned PIML intending to end illegal logging, improve forest governance, and promote sustainable forest management. The PIML has grown from a membership of 24 in 2009, when it was set up, to 70 in 2017 and engaged its members in discussions on legal timber sourcing, extraction and trade and promoted sustainable use of natural resources.¹³³

Besides, several private sector organisations have also signed up to the Forest Stewardship Council Certification (FSC) in the Amazon¹³⁴ which promotes environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and economically viable management of forests by applying strict criteria for sustainable forest management and improving relationships between forestry companies and local populations in areas of their operation.¹³⁵

13.3.4 Other bilateral donors

To further support Colombia's commitment to implement an ambitious package of cross-sectoral actions to reach zero net deforestation in the Colombian Amazon by 2020, in 2015, Germany, Norway, and the UK pledged to contribute close to US\$300 million, primarily through results-based payments for reduced deforestation.¹³⁶ One of such programmes is the REDD for Early Movers (REM) programme which is co-financed by Norway and Germany and the ICF.¹³⁷

¹³⁰ HMG (date unknown). *Silvopastoral systems for climate change mitigation and poverty alleviation in Colombia's livestock sector*. Business Case and Intervention Summary. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65631/7069-business-case-and-intervention-summary-silvopastor.pdf

¹³¹ Garzón, E. (2017). 'Amazon Indigenous REDD+: an innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?', *Mongabay*. 6 January. Available at <https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/>

¹³² Norad (2017). *Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative*. Evaluation Report. Available at <https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2017/real-time-evaluation-of-norways-climate-and-forest-initiative.-empowerment-of-communities-through-support-to-ngos/>

¹³³ FAO (2017) *Colombia: Country unites to build a legal timber culture* [press release]. 12 September. Available at <http://www.fao.org/in-action/eu-fao-flegt-programme/from-the-field/stories-details/en/c/1036489/>

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* Global Forest Atlas. Forest Governance – Colombia.

¹³⁵ WWF. *Good News in the Amazon*. Available at https://www.panda.org/knowledge_hub/where_we_work/amazon/vision_amazon/models/responsible_forestry_amazon/forest_certification/

¹³⁶ Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (2018). *Colombia* [press release]. April 2018. Available at <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/climate-and-forest-initiative/kos-innsikt/colombia/id2459245/>

¹³⁷ See REM business case.

Norway: Launched in 2008, Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) aims to "save the world's tropical forests while improving the livelihoods of those who live off, in, and near".¹³⁸ Implemented in Colombia, and ten other countries, the initiative has been pledged to received up to NOK 3 billion a year from Norway until 2030.¹³⁹

Germany: Co-financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the REM programme aims to contribute to REDD interim financing in accordance with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to promote forest conservation and thereby contribute to climate change mitigation. Germany's leading provider of international cooperation services, GIZ, provides the programme with technical and policy advice on the development of functional systems for carbon financing.¹⁴⁰

USAID's current development assistance to Colombia primarily supports the country's transition out of conflict towards durable peace. Besides, working with the government of Colombia and local communities, USAID has also supported Colombia's efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change and protect biodiversity in a manner that is sustainable and financially benefits local populations.¹⁴¹ Between the years 2009 and 2013, USAID's environment programme supported climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, including sustainable management of forests and other landscapes, biodiversity protection, sustainable community development, and clean energy, with the overall funding commitment of US\$100 million.¹⁴²

13.3.5 Multilateral donors

The World Bank's lending commitment to Colombia has amounted to US\$930 million in 2019,¹⁴³ which represents a substantial drop from its peak of US\$1,687 million in 2017. Lending to the government of Colombia through the Forest Conservation and Sustainability in the Heart of the Colombian Amazon project, for example, the World Bank channels the total of US\$45.85 million from the World Bank and non-bank sources¹⁴⁴ to improve governance and promote sustainable land use and as a result, reduce deforestation and conserve biodiversity in the project area.¹⁴⁵

The World Bank also administers the ICF-funded Low-carbon Agriculture in Colombia programme which is an extension to the World Bank's project titled Colombia Mainstreaming Sustainable Cattle Ranching from 2010-2015 to improve natural resource management, enhance the provision of environmental services, including biodiversity, land, carbon, and water, and boost the productivity in participating farms.¹⁴⁶ Involving the Colombian Cattle Ranching Federation (FEDEGAN) as a lead executing agency supported by a range of NGO partner agencies, this SPS programme works

¹³⁸ Norad. *The Government of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative*. Available at <https://norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/>

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ GIZ. Colombia Overview. Available at https://www.giz.de/projektseiten/index.action;jsessionid=D83B5BA74473231F9706EE9475CCF771?request_locale=en_GB#?region=1&countries=CO

¹⁴¹ USAID. Program Overview. Available at <https://www.usaid.gov/colombia/our-work>

¹⁴² USAID. *Colombia Program at a Glance* [fact sheet]. August 2013. Available at <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Colombia%20Country%20Fact%20Sheet%20Augst%202013%20USAID%20at%20a%20Glance.pdf>

¹⁴³ This includes commitments from the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).

¹⁴⁴ With the project approved on 8th December 2014 and closing date scheduled for 30th June 2022.

¹⁴⁵ World Bank. Forest Conservation and Sustainability in the Heart of the Colombian Amazon. Available at <http://projects.worldbank.org/P144271?lang=en>

¹⁴⁶ World Bank. Mainstreaming Sustainable Cattle Ranching. Available at <http://projects.worldbank.org/P104687/mainstreaming-sustainable-cattle-ranching?lang=en>

closely with the Colombian Government and the Ministries of Environment and Sustainable Development and Agriculture and Rural Development which both participate in its implementation.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, Colombia is in receipt of a US\$20 million grant from the BioCarbon Fund ISFL which is managed and implemented by the World Bank. Led by Colombia's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, in close coordination with the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and the National Planning Department,¹⁴⁸ this ICF-co-financed programme supports farmers in Colombia's Orinoquía region to adopt sustainable and low-carbon natural resources management practices while improving their livelihoods, boosting the economy and protecting the environment, including the region's most precious forests, water sources, and biodiversity.¹⁴⁹

The Green Climate Fund (GCF): With the total amount of US\$38.5 million in approved funding¹⁵⁰, the GCF has so far invested in one project titled 'Scaling Up Climate Resilient Water Management Practices for Vulnerable Communities in La Mojana'. This eight-years-long climate change adaptation project is expected to improve resilience of 405,600 beneficiaries.¹⁵¹

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): NRM and governance of forests, lands and water was one of five pillars of FAO's country programme for 2015–2019¹⁵² which set out the organisation's objectives of advancing conservation, protecting biodiversity and promoting sustainable NRM. To this end, the FAO-EU FLEGT Programme, for example, seeks to reduce and eventually eliminate illegal logging. Co-financed by the ICF, this global programme funds projects created by governments, civil society, and private sector organisations to improve forest governance in 23 countries, including Colombia.¹⁵³

The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) invest in Colombia through the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) with an endorsed investment plan envelope of up to USD 150 million.¹⁵⁴ The CTF has financed 11 low-carbon development projects and is the only CIF to have invested Colombia so far.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Silvopastoral systems for climate change mitigation, (page 1).

¹⁴⁸ World Bank (2018) *Climate-smart Farming in Colombia's Last Agricultural Frontier* [press release]. 16 March. Available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/16/el-enfoque-de-la-agricultura-climaticamente-inteligente-la-ultima-frontera-agropecuaria-de-colombia>

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ Green Climate Fund. Colombia Overview. Available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/colombia>

¹⁵¹ Green Climate Fund. 'Scaling up climate resilient water management practices for vulnerable communities in La Mojana'. Project Overview. Available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/fp056>

¹⁵² FAO. *Colombia y la FAO* [fact sheet]. Available at <http://www.fao.org/3/az528s/AZ528S.pdf>

¹⁵³ FAO. 'FAO-EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)'. Programme Overview. Available at <http://www.fao.org/in-action/eu-fao-flegt-programme/en/>

¹⁵⁴ Climate Investment Funds. *Endorsement of CTF Investment Plan for Colombia*. Available at https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/Endorsement_of_CTF_Investment_Plan_Colombia.pdf

¹⁵⁵ Climate Investment Funds. Colombia: Overview. Available at <https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/country/colombia>

14 Background information on the status of the investigated policies in Indonesia

14.1 Indonesia context

Based in Southeast Asia, between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Republic of Indonesia is the world's largest island country with over 17,000 islands¹⁵⁶ and a population of more than 267 million.¹⁵⁷

Since the end of H. Muhammad Suharto's dictatorial rule in 1998, Indonesia has seen a surge in democracy. This more open and liberal (in the political and socio-economic sense) environment brought substantial reductions in national poverty rates from the Poverty Headcount Ratio of 21.8 million in 2008 to 5.7 million in 2017.¹⁵⁸

Indonesian economic growth has also been strong (in aggregate figures) despite the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. However, the level of income per person has remained relatively low compared to other East Asian economies.^{159,160} Indonesia's per capita GDP in 2018 was US\$3,894¹⁶¹ with GDP growth of 5.2% in the same year.¹⁶²

The country's transition to a full and functioning democracy has been supported by an array of newly emergent NGOs focussed on the defence of democracy, human rights and the environment.¹⁶³ Despite that, Indonesia continues to struggle with deep-rooted challenges like systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against some of its minority groups, and separatist tensions in the Papua region.¹⁶⁴

14.2 Sector-level analysis – low carbon development (LCD)

State of play: Being the world's 16th biggest economy and the largest in southeast Asia, Indonesia was the world's fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2015. The Climate Action Tracker ranks Indonesia's progress towards achieving its Paris Agreement targets as 'highly insufficient'. If Indonesia does nothing to address its growing emissions and continues on a BAU trajectory, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) will

¹⁵⁶ Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C.: Facts and Figures. Available online at <https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/basic-facts/>

¹⁵⁷ The World Bank. Population Total – Indonesia. Available online at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ID&most_recent_value_desc=false

¹⁵⁸ The World Bank. Poverty & Equity Data Portal: Indonesia. Available at <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IDN>

¹⁵⁹ Henstridge, M., De, S. and Jakobsen, M. (2013). *Growth in Indonesia: Is it sustainable? Drivers of Recent Economic Growth*. Oxford Policy Management. Available online at: <https://www.opml.co.uk/files/Publications/8057-analysis-growth-indonesia/growth-in-indonesia-drivers-of-recent-economic-growth.pdf?noredirect=1>

¹⁶⁰ The World Bank: GDP per capita (current US\$) - Indonesia, Malaysia. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ID-MY>

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.* The World Bank. Poverty & Equity Data Portal: Indonesia.

¹⁶³ The American Foreign Service Association (2018). 'Democracy in Indonesia: A Progress Report'. *The Foreign Service Journal*, 18 May. Available online at <https://www.afsa.org/democracy-indonesia-progress-report>

¹⁶⁴ Freedom in the world 2019: Indonesia. Available online at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/indonesia>

increase to 1,491-1,522 MtCO₂e/year, about six times 1990 levels, and 183% to 187% higher than its emissions in 2014.¹⁶⁵

Opportunities: Focusing on re-establishing Indonesia's energy independence, the 2014 National Energy Plan (NEP14) introduced an ambition to increase renewable energy to 23% of total primary energy supply by 2025. The envisaged energy mix also includes a 25% share of natural gas and 30% of coal. If achieved, this target would more than double the use of gas, use of coal would more than triple, and renewables would grow more than elevenfold by 2025. This energy plan also calls for substantial reductions in energy subsidies both for fossil fuels and for electricity and a completion of the country's electrification by 2020. This ambition informed Indonesia's INDC.¹⁶⁶

Barriers: Although achieving NEP14's energy targets would increase the share of energy from renewable sources in Indonesia's energy mix, the sustained dominance of coal suggests that the overall increase in energy production will put Indonesia on a pathway of unsustainable development that's locked in energy produced by coal-fired power plants.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, ambition of the target for renewables was not fully reflected in the country's Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) for 2019–2028 which prioritised investment in coal fired power plants. Planned coal capacities under the RUPTL compared with 2018 went up from 26.8 to 27.1 GW while renewable energy from 14.9 to 16.7 GW. Gas went down from 14.3 to 12.4 GW. The Climate Action Tracker predicts that the installed capacity of 27 GW of coal-fired power plants will emit up to 200 MtCO₂e/year. If kept in use for their entire lifespan, these facilities will continue to emit this amount of emissions over the next 40 years.¹⁶⁸

While achieving the NEP14 targets would result in emission reductions compared to BAU, the emphasis to puts on coal, oil and gas makes Indonesia's economy carbon-dependent and substantial reduction of emissions in the future extremely difficult and expensive.¹⁶⁹

14.3 Sector-level analysis – forestry

State of play: Indonesia has the world's third largest tropical forest after the Amazon and Congo Basin rain forests. While its rainforests are some of the most biologically and culturally rich landscapes and home to thousands of plant and animal species,¹⁷⁰ Indonesia is the world's fifth largest emitter of greenhouse gases. This is primarily as a result of the conversion of its forests and carbon-rich peatlands. With direct dependence of over one fifth of Indonesians on the forests for their livelihoods, these shifts in land use have had substantial ecological as well as social consequences.¹⁷¹ As already mentioned, another source of Indonesia's emissions is its dependency on coal and robust coal-fired power generation pipeline.¹⁷²

Opportunities: To deliver on the President's commitment from 2009 to reduce emissions by 26% against BAU, the government developed a national and sub-national emission reduction action plan (RAN-GRK and RAD GRK). Indonesia aims to achieve 87% of this goal by reducing emissions from

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ International Energy Agency (IEA). Available at <https://www.iea.org/countries/indonesia>

¹⁶⁷ Climate Action Tracker. Indonesia: Overview. Available at <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia/current-policy-projections/>

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Rainforest Action Network: Indonesian Rainforests. Available at <https://www.ran.org/indonesian-rainforests/>

¹⁷¹ World Resources Institute: Forests and Landscapes in Indonesia. Available at <https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/forests-and-landscapes-indonesia/climate-change-indonesia>

¹⁷² *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker.

deforestation and peat land conversion. Simultaneously, the government aims to increase agricultural production of Indonesia's major crops. To achieve the target of 7% annual growth in GDP while achieving its climate goals, Indonesia aspires to double palm oil production by 2020 from 2009 levels.¹⁷³

Emission reduction efforts started by RAN-GRK have been reinforced through the REDD+ Task Force which focusses on improving governance of forests with the objective to turn Indonesia's forests and lands into a net carbon sink.¹⁷⁴

In order to achieve its economic targets whilst reducing emissions from LULUCF, the government has made a number of changes to policy and regulation on forestry. In partnership with the government of Norway, it instituted a moratorium on clearing of primary forests¹⁷⁵ which was further extended in 2013, 2015 and 2017.^{176,177, 178} It prohibited conversion of peat lands from 2010-2016¹⁷⁹ and introduced changes in national, provincial and district legislation and law enforcement.¹⁸⁰ This is in addition to the National Strategy for Forest Law Enforcement in Indonesia, a programme to combat illegal logging introduced in 2005.¹⁸¹

Restoration efforts have become widely recognized a strategy for green growth and reflected in Indonesia's Medium-Term National Development Plan 2015–2019. The plan emphasises the importance of inclusive and sustainable growth, increasing value of natural resources and the environment, and mitigation of natural disasters and climate change.¹⁸²

Other strategies include development of rural and remote areas, eradication of illegal logging and illegal mining, and improved governance in natural resources with a particular emphasis on increased community participation in forest management.¹⁸³

Barriers: While Indonesia's deforestation rates have peaked in 2016 with 0.8% of Indonesia's forests lost in 2017 compared to 1.5% in 2016, the biggest driver for deforestation is still commodity-driven. In 2015 alone, commodity-driven deforestation resulted in around 1.5 Mha of Indonesia's annual tree cover loss.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷³ HMG (2015). *Forestry, Land-use and Governance in Indonesia*. Business Case.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker.

¹⁷⁵ Republic of Indonesia (2015). Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). Available online at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Indonesia/1/INDC_REPUBLIC%20OF%20INDONESIA.pdf

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* HMG (2015).

¹⁷⁷ World Resources Institute (2017) '6 Years After Moratorium, Satellite Data Shows Indonesia's Tropical Forests Remain Threatened', 24 May. Available at <https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/05/6-years-after-moratorium-satellite-data-shows-indonesia-s-tropical-forests-remain>

¹⁷⁸ Reuters (2017) 'Indonesia president approves two-year extension of forest moratorium', 24 May. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-environment-forests/indonesia-president-approves-two-year-extension-of-forest-moratorium-idUSKBN18K0CV>

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* Republic of Indonesia (2015).

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* HMG (2015).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker.

¹⁸² Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (2015) *National Medium Term Development Plan 2015-2019 (RPJMN 2015-2019)*. Available at <https://climate-laws.org/cclow/geographies/indonesia/policies/national-medium-term-development-plan-2015-2019-rpjm-2015-2019>

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker. See Global Forest Watch (2018).

This has been confirmed by the Climate Action Tracker which states that LULUCF emissions are a substantial uncertainty factor in assessing the extent to which Indonesia is in line with meeting its INDC.¹⁸⁵

Summary of Indonesia's pledges and targets¹⁸⁶

INDONESIA		
Summary of pledges and targets		
PARIS AGREEMENT	Ratified	Yes
	2030 unconditional target(s)	29% below BAU by 2030 incl. LULUCF [535% above 1990 by 2030 excl. LULUCF] [158% above 2010 by 2030 excl. LULUCF]
	2030 conditional target(s)	Up to 41% below BAU by 2030 incl. LULUCF [469–502% above 1990 by 2030 excl. LULUCF] [131–145% above 2010 by 2030 excl. LULUCF]
	Condition(s)	International support
	Coverage	Economy-wide, incl. LULUCF
	LULUCF	Included with significant contribution
COPENHAGEN ACCORD	2020 target(s)	Unconditional: 26% below BAU by 2020, incl. LULUCF [81% above 2005 by 2020 excl. LULUCF] Conditional: 41% below BAU by 2020, incl. LULUCF [280% above 1990 by 2020 excl. LULUCF] [55% above 2010 by 2020 excl. LULUCF]
	Condition(s)	International support

14.4 Key stakeholders

14.4.1 The Government of Indonesia

The Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) is responsible for formulation of the NDP, related budgeting, evaluation of its implementation, as well as design of large-scale infrastructure projects. It also coordinates domestic and international development finance and its disbursement.¹⁸⁷ Through the DFID-funded Promoting LCD programme, BAPPENAS receives support for building a national energy model. As a government counterpart, it is also assisted by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).

The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MoEMR) supports the government's affairs in the field of energy and mineral resources. MoEMR is involved in several activities of the Promoting LCD programme. These include the smart street lighting initiative and framework contract activity through which it received technical assistance on energy efficiency project screening. MoEMR is also a GGGI government counterpart.

The Ministry of the Environment and Forestry (MoEF) is a cabinet-level ministry responsible for managing and conserving Indonesia's forests.¹⁸⁸ MoEF is a recipient of technical assistance from SETAPAK and a GGGI government counterpart.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Climate Action Tracker.

¹⁸⁷ Bappenas. Overview: Role and Function of Bappenas. Available at <https://www.bappenas.go.id/en/profil-bappenas/tupoksi/>

¹⁸⁸ Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Menlhk): Overview. Available at <https://www.neliti.com/kementerian-lingkungan-hidup-dan-kehutanan>

Fiscal Policy Agency at the Ministry of Finance is a Focal Point, also called the National Designated Authority, for interaction with the Green Climate Fund and a GGGI government counterpart.

HMG has engaged with other parts of the government of Indonesia. **Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)**, for example, received technical assistance from SETAPAK-supported civil society organisations to build pressure on the government to improve law enforcement, oversee policy implementation, and achieve policy reforms.

The ICF has also supported implementation of Indonesia's forest sector reform process and provided technical assistance, like technical inputs into draft regulations and co-development of palm oil standard, through FLAG. Through the FGMC programme, it worked with the government to sign the VPA with the European Union.¹⁸⁹ Through the International Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) programme, the ICF engaged selected government officials in a week-long workshop to support development of a regulatory framework for CCUS.

14.4.2 Third sector

Since 2008, national and international NGOs have played key role in improving transparency and the government's accountability. Moreover, a new Presidential Regulation (No. 16 2018) made it easier for NGOs and CSOs to supply the government with services. This further confirmed the shift in the relationship between the government and the third sector.¹⁹⁰

The ICF has supported the work of a number of national and international NGOs in Indonesia. These include:

- **The Asia Foundation** to implement an environmental governance programme SETAPAK which promotes good forest and land governance with the aim to reduce GHG emissions and ensure sustainable management and equitable distribution of natural resources.¹⁹¹
- **The World Resource Institute (WRI)** received ICF-funded FGMC grant to improve access to forest users, including in remote regions, and improve transparency on forests and forest-risk commodity supply chains. The ICF also supports the POTICO project, WRI's initiative on forests and landscapes in Indonesia, which uses innovative mapping techniques and community engagement to help shift palm oil development from forested to already-degraded lands.¹⁹²
- **Kehati ISPO**, an Indonesian NGO, received a grant from ICF-funded FLAG programme and has been particularly prominent in supporting change at policy level¹⁹³
- Through KNOWFOR, **the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)** received ICF funding to apply knowledge and learning with a focus on tropical forests and poverty and in particular a global comparative study on REDD+.

¹⁸⁹ As part of the programme, two DFID staff were seconded to the Ministry of Forest and Environment.

¹⁹⁰ Elizabeth Jackson (2018) 'Indonesian NGOs can now access government funds to provide services to communities', *The Conversation*, 24 August. <http://theconversation.com/indonesian-ngos-can-now-access-government-funds-to-provide-services-to-communities-101451>

¹⁹¹ SETAPAK: Programme Overview. Available at <https://programsetapak.org/en/about/>

¹⁹² World Resources Institute. *The Idea Behind POTICO: Palm Oil In Indonesia*. Available at <https://www.wri.org/resources/data-visualizations/idea-behind-potico-palm-oil-indonesia>

¹⁹³ The interview with the SRO highlighted this, and more information is available online at <http://www.revampingispo.com/home/index?lang=en>

14.4.3 Private sector

Despite the Asian economic crisis, which ended President Suharto's pro-business 'New Order' regime in 1998 and had a considerable adverse impact on private enterprises, both domestic and foreign,¹⁹⁴ Indonesia's economic performance in the last 20 years has been impressive. This rapid growth came at the cost of slashing forests, spewing greenhouse gases, and burning increasing amounts of coal.¹⁹⁵

BAPPENAS's recent report sets out key actions to be taken to achieve LCD and emphasises the role of private investment in their delivery. These include: investments in sustainable infrastructure, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources, and protection and restoration of valuable natural infrastructure, such as wetlands and forests, including peat land systems and mangroves.¹⁹⁶

To promote LCD, the ICF has supported a number of key players in Indonesia's energy sector, like the State Electricity Corporation (PT PLN) and Bank Mandiri, both of which have received ICF funding through the Promoting LCD programme.

14.4.4 Other bilateral donors

Agence Francaise de Development (AFD) contributes to public investments in Indonesia's energy sector, with a particular focus on renewable energies and energy efficiency. It also finances renewable energy and energy efficiency projects through loans to the public electricity utility (PLN) and provides lines of credit to local banks supporting private or public investors. Energy investments make up for 51% of AFD's overall spent in Indonesia.¹⁹⁷ AFD is a lead delivery partner for the ICF-co-financed PLCD programme in Indonesia. The bilatera's overall commitment between 2007 and 2016 was EUR 1.9 billion.¹⁹⁸

Norway's Climate and Forest Initiative has established a series of partnerships with key forest countries, including Indonesia.¹⁹⁹ It has been financing REDD+ processes in Indonesia since 2010 - incentivising the government to take a number of policy steps, including instituting a two-year moratorium on forest and peatland conversion, and establishing a REDD+ agency and a credible institution for monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) reductions in GHG emissions; and proposed to establish an acceptable financial intermediary. Established in 2013, the REDD+ Agency continues to be the focal point for Norwegian support.²⁰⁰ Norway is also a joint funder of the International CCS programme and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta is actively engaged in Norway-Indonesia cooperation on climate change and forests.

Germany's Forests and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME) is its main forestry and land-use programme in Indonesia. It started in 2009 and is scheduled to run until 2020 and has a budget of

¹⁹⁴ ADB (2006). *Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia*. ADB Discussion Paper No. 46. Available at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156683/adb-dp46.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ World Resources Institute (2019) 'Indonesia Charts a New, Low Carbon Development Path. Will Other Countries Follow Suit?', 25 March. Available at <https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/03/indonesia-charts-new-low-carbon-development-path-will-other-countries-follow-suit>

¹⁹⁶ BAPPENAS (2019). *Low Carbon Development: A Green Economy in Indonesia*. Available online at <https://drive.bappenas.go.id/owncloud/index.php/s/ZgLfHeVguMi8rG#pdfviewer>

¹⁹⁷ Agence française de développement (AFD). Indonesia: Overview. Available at <https://www.afd.fr/en/page-region-pays/indonesia>

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Norad. The Government of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Overview. Available at <https://norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/>

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.* HMG (2015).

EUR 20 million.²⁰¹ Germany also helps the Indonesian government to implement forestry reforms that facilitate sustainable forest management and handing over forests to local authorities. It supports set-up and expansion of protected areas and biodiversity protection. It also provides advice to rural communities on the development of sustainable supply chains, especially for palm oil, cocoa and rubber.²⁰² To boost Indonesia's production of renewable energy, Germany supports the expansion of supply networks and rural off-grid electrification and provides support to the Indonesian government's national geothermal energy programme.²⁰³

The U.S. Agency for International Development Agency's (USAID) FOREST Programme ended in mid-2015. USAID currently implements programmes to support conservation and improved management of Indonesia's forest and marine ecosystems. In close collaboration with the government of Indonesia and other partners, USAID also helps increase resilience to disasters and contributes to improved forest and marine management.²⁰⁴

With support from the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Denmark and USAID and in close collaboration with the New Climate Economy Partners (including GGGI and WRI), BAPPENAS initiated Indonesia's LCDI in 2017. The resulting report (BAPPENAS, 2019) set out this paradigm shift towards the country's low carbon development growth.²⁰⁵

Australia-funded and jointly administered by the Australian Department of Climate Change and AusAID, Indonesia–Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) came to an end in June 2014. Launched in 2018, Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Economic Development (PROSPERA) is a five-year programme with a budget of AUS\$145 million to foster more effective Indonesian economic institutions and policies that contribute to strong, sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Other on-going programmes include the Indonesia-Australia Partnership for Environmental Governance. Launched in 2015, this five-year environmental governance programme with a budget of AUS\$10 million supports Indonesia's efforts to promote sustainable land management practices, and strengthen governance and law enforcement.²⁰⁶

14.4.5 Multilateral donors

- **The World Bank** operations approved for financial year 2019 are valued at US\$1,950 million. It currently finances 46 active projects of which three support environmental policies and institutions and 12 finance rural services and infrastructure. Through an existing trust fund, the World Bank manages the ICF-co-financed International CCS Capacity Building programme. It also manages financial implementation of the Forest Investment Programme of the Climate Investment Funds and the ICF-co-financed BioCarbon Fund – Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes.
- As of 31st December 2018, the **Asian Development Bank's (ADB)** cumulative investment in Indonesia, comprising of lending, grant, and technical assistance commitments, reached US\$37.6 billion which translated into the total of 944 projects of which 102 projects (US\$ 7.3 billion) are in the area of energy and 278 projects (US\$4.93 billion) in the sectors of

²⁰¹ *Ibid.* HMG (2015).

²⁰² Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Indonesia: Overview. Available at https://www.bmz.de/en/countries_regions/asien/indonesien/index.html

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ USAID, Indonesia: Environment. Available at <https://www.usaid.gov/indonesia/environment>

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* BAPPENAS (2019).

²⁰⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Development Assistance in Indonesia. Available at <https://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/development-assistance/Pages/effective-economic-institutions-infrastructure-in-indonesia.aspx>

agriculture, natural resources and rural development.²⁰⁷ Through an existing trust fund, the ADB manages the ICF-co financed International CCS Capacity Building programme.

- **The Green Climate Fund (GCF)** has approved two climate mitigation projects in Indonesia to which it contributes with US\$200 million of approved funding. This brings the total amount of the projects' value at US\$1.2 billion. The Fiscal Policy Agency of the Ministry of Finance is the National Designated Authority (NDA); a focal point for interaction with the GCF.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Asia Development Bank: Indonesia: By the Numbers. Available at <https://data.adb.org/dashboard/indonesia-numbers>

²⁰⁸ Green Climate Fund, Indonesia: Overview. Available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/indonesia>

15 Summary of transformational change signals in the case studies

15.1 Colombia forestry and land-use policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Driver of transformation	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amazon Vision embedded into Department for the Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Department for the Environment now has accurate information and can plan better. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Driver of transformation	Building capability (skills and knowledge) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICF-funded Amazon Vision built skills in planning. ICF-funded SPS created knowledge in all stakeholders about what works in different areas and what it costs. Very early stages of the BioCarbon Fund have shown possible approaches that have gained traction for Orinoquía. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Officers now have the skills to develop plans and plans are in the NDP. Realistic costed targets on land conversion to SPS systems National and regional roundtables are building on the interest in SPS. Development of NDP regional plan for Orinoquía 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICF-funded work on demonstrating the benefits of SPS have been built into the NDP and also a national policy is being finalised. Amazon Vision contributed to the development of a system for monitoring deforestation which was embedded into the Ministry of Environment run by IDEAM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence from SPS programme means innovative financial mechanisms (ITPS) are being discussed as ways of sustainably funding the new way of farming. SPS regional roundtables enable farmers, academia and local government are able to contribute at the regional level which feeds up into the national level. Deforestation tracking system is a core part of policy tracking and development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPS has demonstrated that silvopastoral systems have benefits for farmers and the environment. REM-funded Vision Amazonia trials are the basis of regional planning. ITPS pilots have shown a viable funding mechanism for SPS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of the Sustainable Farming policy based on evidence from SPS Development of NDP regional plan for Amazonia Pilot for ITPS attracted lots of applicants and early results show promise – Ministry of Agriculture has agreed to take it forward as an official approach if it is shown to work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICF funding enabled upscaling of SPS pilots so they could really show that the system could be replicated elsewhere. Cascade training developed through the Extensionists and academia to roll out the Amazon Vision approach more widely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of the Sustainable Farming policy based on evidence from SPS NDP targets show presidential buy-in Extensionists are a core part of delivery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICF funding enabled upscaling of SPS pilots so they could really show that the system could be replicated elsewhere. • ICF support for Amazon Vision and its development of training material for local extensionists, via universities • Pilot of new financing mechanism ITPS for SPS conversion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National government requests training of extensionists beyond the Amazonia region. • Inclusion of a national target for land conversion to SPS systems in the NDP • Creation of the National Sustainable Farming Policy based on SPS • Creation of the regional roundtables with high levels of participation from local communities • Interest in silvopastoral systems spread widely across the country • Interest from national government to include ITPS in the new financing mechanisms for SPS conversion • Tough target to increase to 1% the percentage of GDP coming from forest products (timber and non-timber) • Specific and realistic target to reduce deforestation in the NDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Enabler of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICF support helped bring about the inclusion of specific legally binding targets on a) deforestation, b) % of GDP from forest products, c) SPS land conversion, in the NDP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of the Sustainable Colombia Fund by the Treasury to finance environmental projects – Colombia playing its part and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICF working with the presidential office helped bring out the declaration of deforestation as a national security issue which raised the priority with the Army about enforcing the law. 	<p>not just relying on international aid.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MRV system established providing monthly reports on deforestation to feed into policy tracking, development and enforcement. Development of the Strategic CONPES document on deforestation SPS National Sustainable Farming Policy in development 	
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in political will	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presidential-level buy-in for silvopastoral systems as a policy approach Buy-in for environmental policy change in Amazonia region generated due to co-creation of Amazon Vision programme with Ministry of Environment Declaring deforestation a national security issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NDP targets Policies 	<p>CRITICAL MASS has been achieved:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> President interested and backing change NDP means that by law everyone needs to work towards the targets. Ministries are working together. Army incentivised to properly enforce the law. New approaches being adopted and rolled out.

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in local ownership of the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK helped ministries of agriculture and environment working together on ICF programmes and policy – this is unprecedented and could lead to systemic change. Creation of targets linked to reducing deforestation for the military who enforce the law Regional SPS roundtables have created a sense of regional ownership, not just from Bogata. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BioCarbon Fund In Colombia led by the Ministry of Agriculture, supported as needed by the Ministry of the Environment Local ownership created by the regional roundtables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

15.2 Indonesia forestry and land-use policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

			Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Driver of transformation	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">None	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Increased capacity of the social forestry task force (fly-in team) to accelerate the verification of social forestry permitsUnlocking of the Reforestation Fund has opened up a well-resourced funding stream to implement social forestry.Increased capacity of mining inspectors to monitor compliance and revoke illegal permits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Increased capacity of civil society organisations to verify timber companies. They have a formal, legal role as part of the sustainable timber verification system (SVLK) and work closely with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to ensure compliance.
	Driver of transformation	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">None	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Increased technical capability of junior government officials to process social forestry permits (including accessing the Reforestation Fund)	None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources developing new technology to digitalise mining licensing system based on evidence from CSOs around non-compliance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ecological Fiscal Transfer policy is a new innovative fiscal transfer mechanism that enables government officials to incentivise strong environmental performance (implemented at a provincial level). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tighter mining regulations brought in on the basis of evidence that showed the scale of tax avoidance in the extractive industries Expansion of the Reforestation Fund for social forestry on the basis of evidence that the Fund was largely underutilised by sub-national governments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

			Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EFT model piloted in two provinces by ICF was presented at national events and regional workshops across Indonesia and 12 sub-national governments have committed to adopting EFT in their jurisdictions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New centralised data system for mining licensing (fed by information from CSOs) has increased the capacity of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to monitor compliance across Indonesia and tackle corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unlocking of large amounts of funding for social forestry will enable subnational governments across Indonesia to meet future targets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Enabler of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Securing of a well-resourced government funding stream for social forestry (Reforestation Fund), which has a replenishment mechanism, means that that social forestry has sustainable resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in political will	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources buy-in to tightening mining regulations and licensing systems Ministry of Finance public commitment to implementing the EFT mechanism at a national level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in local ownership of the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 subnational governments have voluntarily committed to implementing their own version of EFT for their jurisdictions. Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs working together to deliver policy to accelerate social forestry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two provinces have successfully implemented their own version of EFT, independent of national policy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

15.3 Indonesia low carbon development policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Drivers of transformation	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Planning now has in place a dynamic systems model that includes over 1,000 climate change indicators, delivering different scenarios and generating robust evidence regarding the relationship between emission reductions and economic growth which they can use to develop policy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
		Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government officials within Ministry of Planning have increased skills/capability to use the dynamic systems model to generate evidence to inform their policymaking. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
		Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 1000+ climate change indicators in the LCDI model enables government officials to simulate and test innovative policies to address climate change. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
		Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Mechanisms for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
		Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LCDI now has its own chapter in the 2020-24 National Mid-term Development Plan – and a macro indicator on emissions – prompting policymakers across government to consider climate change when designing new policies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts					

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Enabler of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in political will	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Planning have the political will to incorporate LCDI into all future planning. Senior politicians were willing to include a new chapter on climate change and disaster resilience in the National Plan (2020-24), showing willingness of the Indonesian government to mainstream climate considerations into planning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
		Supporting change in local ownership of the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LCDI has been extended so that the Ministry of Planning can run pilots at a provincial level to test new policies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

15.4 Uganda renewable energy policy

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Driver of transformation	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical experts deployed to assist in the development of geothermal policy and GET FiT Lawyer deployed to draft the PPA and Implementation Agreement and negotiate it through approval process with ERA and UETCL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GRD has reportedly got more staff and is also recruiting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Driver of transformation	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical assistance trained local staff in geothermal survey techniques and data interpretation, enforcement of E&S standards for power plants, workshops on how the energy market works 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff at ERA, UETCL and GRD have new skills and confidence to implement them. Trained staff have left GRD as their experience makes them valuable elsewhere. Learned skills and techniques embedded into tools and institutional learning programmes at ERA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on off-grid and mini-grid development (not really innovative but new to Uganda policy thinking) • Recognition of low and medium enthalpy resource, and therefore need for binary power plant, built into new geothermal policy (not really innovative but new to Uganda policy thinking) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Request to UN CTCN for technical assistance on developing off-grid energy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renewable energy policy incorporates greater emphasis on direct use for which UK has been lobbying for some time. • Geothermal policy based on the reality of the Ugandan situation and transfer of experience from the USA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Request to UN CTCN for technical assistance on developing off-grid energy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GET FiT programme based on concept from Deutsche Bank, KfW and ERA (not a UK influence though) • Transfer of knowledge from the US in terms of fault-controlled geothermal systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GET FiT being rolled out in Zambia and also interest from other places • New understanding of geothermal system included in the draft policy • High enthalpy still included in draft policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of standardised PPA and Implementation Agreement that can be used outside GET FiT projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentation being used outside the GET FiT programme and outside Uganda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Enabler of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedding PPA and deemed energy clause into legal documents • Investment more attractive to private sector, which is self-sustaining • Demonstrating that it's possible to build renewable energy plant in Uganda profitably. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More independent power producers (IPPs) active in Uganda than previously due to rebalancing of risk and reward through GET FiT • Temporary suspension of the deemed energy clause • Some evidence that IPPs are still investing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design and/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in political will	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negotiating acceptance of the deemed energy clause Already had political will in place in Uganda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary removal of the deemed energy clause 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in local ownership of the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of a facility model for both GET FiT and EAGER created sense of ownership of the technical assistance work programme and solutions. GRD was already making use of donor-funded technical assistance so was already in charge of its own work programme. ERA already owned the policy and the solutions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

15.5 Evaluation and learning at a global level

(Brackets indicate a signal working against transformation)

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design. And/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
Systemic change Fundamental shifts in system structures and functions	Driver of transformation	Building capacity (resource) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involving a range of stakeholders on the advisory board for the E&L Initiative UK funding first tranche of the E&L Initiative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> E&L Initiative is now being funded under core CIFs budget. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a noted culture change amongst CIF representatives regarding how E&L Initiative should be conducted within the CIFs.
	Driver of transformation	Building capability (skills) to develop and implement the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involving a range of stakeholders on the advisory board for the E&L Initiative and working closely with the CIF Administrative Unit. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CIF Administrative Unit continuing to lead phase 2 of E&L Initiative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a noted culture change amongst CIF representatives regarding how E&L Initiative should be conducted within the CIFs.
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so that innovation is built in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible for developing first-of-its-kind Transformational Change toolkit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Driver of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is based on evidence of effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Drawing on UK's expertise, including evaluation specialists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design. And/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it replicates existing good ideas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Scale Contextually large-scale transformational processes and impacts	Mechanism for transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is capable of creating change at scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commitment made by the UK to ensuring that the E&L Initiative is able to support the design and implementation of programmes of other institutes that are being funded by the UK. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is an indication (unverified) that other climate funds, including the GCF and the Adaptation Fund, have adopted some of the approaches in their own operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Sustainability The robustness and resilience of changes	Enabler of transformation	Supporting change in policy design so it is designed to be self-sustaining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of first of its kind Transformational Change toolkit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in political will	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

Dimension of transformational change	ICF KPI 15 criteria		Early signals that change may be transformational.	Interim signals that change may be transformational.	Advanced signals that change may be transformational.
			Relevant policy design and implementation signals (preconditions for transformation) supported by ICF	Next-step outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting change in policy design. And/or implementation	Long-term, self-sustaining outcomes due, at least in part, to ICF supporting policy change at earlier stages in the process
	Cross-cutting	Supporting change in local ownership of the policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The E&L Initiative used participatory methodologies, inviting other funds such as the adaptation fund and the GCF to join workshops and discussions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is an indication (unverified) that other climate funds, including the GCF and the Adaptation Fund, have adopted some of the approaches in their own operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None

