



# Evaluation of the Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football programme

## **Final report**

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## Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of the British Council or ACORD or of any of the individuals and organisations referred to in the report.

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## List of acronyms

ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
CBO	Community-based organisation
CSO	Civil society organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EQ	Evaluation question
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGM	Female genital mutilation
GBV	Gender-based violence
GBVRC	Gender-based violence recovery centre
GTWG	Gender technical working group
IDI	In-depth interview
IPV	Intimate partner violence
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ToC	Theory of change
VAWG	Violence against women and girls

# Executive Summary

## About the programme

The *Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football* programme was a pilot funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the British Council in two locations (Kisumu and Mount Elgon) in Western Kenya. Known locally as 'Kenya Timz,' the programme aimed to reduce violence against women and girls (VAWG) through challenging harmful attitudes and behaviours using a sport-for-development model.

The programme combined football and education sessions to engage children and young people aged 10–20 years old, aiming to build positive relationships between participants, and challenge gender inequitable attitudes and behaviours that foster violence. Coaches were recruited from the communities and trained to deliver a curriculum focusing on knowledge, attitudes, life skills and behaviours, aiming to promote teamwork, fair play, self-confidence and respect for self and others.

The programme also worked with adult community members and duty bearers (teachers, police, county government officials, health workers and community leaders) in an attempt to shift wider social norms and improve broader policy and practice for VAWG prevention and response. Community members were involved through quarterly festivals to stimulate dialogue around issues relating to gender and violence, and targeted through a multi-media campaign during the second half of the programme. Duty bearers were engaged via the participation of programme staff in county and sub-county gender technical working groups, as well as through targeted capacity building activities focused on raising awareness, challenging attitudes and improving coordination.

## About the evaluation

Itad was commissioned to undertake an evaluation of the programme. Given the need for more rigorous and credible evidence on the effectiveness of sport for social change, the evaluation has aimed to investigate whether the programme has made a difference, and for whom; to explore how and why it has made a difference; and to draw out lessons on whether the approach can be expected to work elsewhere.

The evaluation used a theory-based approach, employing contribution analysis to explore how far the programme contributed to change. The baseline was undertaken in 2015-16 before programme activities commenced in each site, and the endline was completed in late 2017 after programme activities had ceased. The evaluation collected data through a small survey (150 households) in each site, combined with an "outcome harvesting" exercise with the coaches, and qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with young people, adult community members, service providers, community leaders, government officials and programme staff. In total, 356 individuals were consulted through focus groups and interviews at endline. The evaluation also drew on the extensive monitoring data collected by the programme alongside its activities.



*Kenya Timz participants during a football session at Kapsokwony High School, Mount Elgon*

## Has the programme made a difference, for whom, and why?

**The programme has made a difference to the thousands of young people who participated – increasing their knowledge and awareness on VAWG and helping build self-esteem and life skills.** Kenya Timz was highly successful in reaching young people through its school-based delivery model, reaching almost 4,500 young people and maintaining high retention and attendance rates. Where the programme did not match its aspirations was in the inclusion of hard-to-reach and vulnerable populations. However, the second half of the programme mitigated this to a certain extent through a more tailored delivery model, which succeeded in reaching a cohort of older and out-of-school young people. Importantly, the evaluation has found that the programme went beyond raising awareness, succeeding in shifting attitudes among its youth participants around gender and the acceptability of violence. In line with the assumptions in the programme theory of change, youth attitudes and behaviours were influenced through a well-designed curriculum, delivered effectively by coaches who also acted as role models; girls' confidence was built through participation in sport; and boys and young men were influenced to reject violence.

**Football proved a powerful entry point to communities,** helping start conversations around VAWG, maintain engagement of boys and men, capacitate coaches as role models and build young people's knowledge, confidence and skills. However, the programme rightly identified that football alone is no 'magic bullet' – tackling an issue as deeply rooted as VAWG necessitated a multi-pronged strategy, engaging different parts of the community, including duty bearers, in different ways.

**The programme succeeded in developing coaches into strong community champions who are likely to continue speaking out against violence into the future.** The coaches have acted as role models and champions for the programme, and they gave many personal examples of how participation had changed their own attitudes and behaviours. They also played a key role in gaining and maintaining programme access to the community, as well as facilitating entry into local institutions such as schools, churches and the police. However, recruiting and working with coaches was not without its challenges, given that they were members of the community and thus in some cases held the same inequitable attitudes that the programme was seeking to address. This has required careful and ongoing support and management.

**The programme has worked strategically with duty bearers, recognising the need to engage with existing structures and provide targeted rather than generic capacity support.** Programme staff successfully identified opportunities to convene, broker relationships and identify synergies with partners, helping to influence specific areas of policy and practice. There were some high-profile examples of programme contribution at county government level – most notably in catalysing the decision to build a gender-based violence recovery centre in Mount Elgon. The programme succeeded in influencing policy and practice where it focused on engaging with and strengthening existing forums, and provided strategic support that synergised with the work of other organisations.

**The programme succeeded in engaging a large number of community members, starting conversations about VAWG, and facilitating rich dialogue around the issues facing women and girls in the community.** Around 12,000 community members were reached through advocacy and outreach events, which succeeded in encouraging open and rich conversations about sensitive issues relating to gender and violence. The evaluation highlighted several anecdotal examples where the programme has contributed to some change in both attitudes and behaviours among participating adults, particularly through community conversation events, but also in some cases through young people sharing what they had learned with their parents.

**However, the evaluation found limited evidence that the programme has substantially contributed to girls being able to claim their rights or to reducing violence at a community level.** Inequitable attitudes are still widespread, particularly in relation to stigma and shame felt by survivors. The evaluation also highlighted the role that poverty and limited economic opportunities play in putting girls and women at risk and preventing them from escaping violent situations; issues which were beyond the scope of this programme to address. Across most types of violence targeted by the programme, there is no consistent evidence of change beyond anecdotal examples and perceptions. There is also limited evidence that the

programme has helped girls claim their rights on a large scale (for example, rights to attend school, choose when to marry or have children, or participate in community and political decision making). This is unsurprising given the short duration of the programme, the relatively low-intensity nature of community activities, and the deep-rooted nature of the gender norms the programme was seeking to address.

**One important exception is in relation to sexual violence in Mount Elgon, where there is more consistent evidence that cases may have reduced, although these findings should be interpreted with caution given the challenges associated with accurate measurement of violence, especially over a short duration.** Focus groups and interviews suggested that programme may have contributed to change through influencing the attitudes of boys and men – both directly through the programme and indirectly through raising awareness of the legal consequences of rape, which may have acted as a deterrent – as well as raising girls’ and women’s awareness of situations that may put them at risk.

### Can this approach be expected to work elsewhere?

The findings from the evaluation highlight a number of considerations for future programmes, in order to maximise the success of a sport-for-development approach in tackling VAWG. The following factors are likely to prove important to success:

- **Identifying a sport that has broad popularity in the targeted communities:** This might be football or another sport, but ideally should have existing infrastructure in the form of teams and pitches that can be leveraged and used to recruit coaches and attract participants.
- **Careful recruitment and support of community coaches:** The Kenya Timz delivery model was a successful one, but required ongoing support and management to ensure the values and behaviours of the coaches were in line with those of the programme.
- **Integrating football closely with thematic content:** This was a key adaptation during the course of the programme, responding to reflections about how best to engage young people with the educational curriculum.
- **Upfront investment in community sensitisation:** Communication with the community at the start of the programme is required to counter negative perceptions and unrealistic expectations that may come with a sport for development programme.
- **Choosing implementation partners carefully:** The programme faced challenges in its choice of delivery partner, which did not have a permanent presence on the ground in either site. Choosing partners with existing infrastructure has a better chance of promoting longer term sustainability.
- **Integrating sustainability considerations from the start:** The sustainability hopes for the Kenya Timz programme rest in large part on the coaches and other local champions, who will hopefully continue to support the programme’s agenda. However, it is likely to prove difficult for individuals to carry on conducting activities without structural support or resources. A phased exit plan might have maximised the chances of a longer-term legacy.
- **Employing a flexible and adaptive approach:** It is difficult to predict exactly how change in gender norms and behaviours will happen in advance and what will work and what will not. A flexible approach, allowing programmes to try out different models and respond to windows of opportunity, is likely to be more appropriate than setting rigid up-front fixed targets for programming and monitoring and evaluation.
- **Matching ambition with resourcing and sustained engagement:** Shifting social norms at a community level requires sustained engagement over time. Programmes wishing to shift deeply rooted practices such as VAWG should ideally commit to long-term engagement, to maximise opportunities for sustained change and minimise the risk that short-term gains are simply reversed when activities cease.

## Recommendations for future sport for development programmes

- 1** **Future programmes should consider using football as a mechanism for engaging communities on issues related to VAWG;** however, sport should be seen as one activity within a broader package of interventions. Making the most of this potential requires building on what attracts people to football – for example, opportunities for competitions – while giving adequate prominence to the thematic objectives.
- 2** **Tailored approaches, ideally built in from the start of the programme, are required to engage the hard-to-reach groups who are most at risk of VAWG** – considering factors including site locations, timing and supportive services such as childcare. Working through schools provides an effective entry point to reach large numbers of younger children, but one size does not fit all, and bespoke strategies (which may be more resource intensive) will be required to reach different groups.
- 3** **In relatively small-scale programmes, value can be added through strategic and targeted engagement with duty bearers through existing forums,** to help ensure increasing demand for services is matched with adequate supply and prioritisation. It is important to be realistic about what is possible to achieve through capacity building activities, especially small-scale training courses. Programmes should also carefully investigate existing services for VAWG prevention and response and the potential to strengthen these in a sustainable way over the lifetime of the programme, to avoid the risk of harm to survivors if service availability does not match increased levels of reporting.
- 4** **Future programmes should consider working with community coaches; however, this must be accompanied by adequate training and ongoing support.** It is important to recognise that coaches are members of the target communities, and thus may themselves hold some of the inequitable attitudes that programmes are attempting to address. These challenges should be identified and mitigated through activities such as group dialogue, codes of conduct, refresher training, and self-diagnosis and reflection processes.
- 5** **Where programmes seek to address VAWG, engaging adults from the very beginning is a vital complement to activities with young people, both to ensure buy-in and to begin addressing community-wide attitudes and social expectations.** Engaging parents and community members in implementation meetings can help with this, as can the use of coaches and influential community members as champions for the programme. However, programmes should recognise that change at this level will not happen overnight. The intensity of engagement needs to be carefully considered in relation to programme objectives.
- 6** **Future programmes seeking to address deep-rooted attitudes and behaviour, such as those around VAWG, should plan for more sustained and intensive engagement.** This requires longer-term funding, to ensure adequate resourcing of the multi-pronged strategy needed to reach different groups within the community.
- 7** **Sustainability should be prioritised in design decisions for programmes working to tackle VAWG, including considerations of programme length, suitable partners and appropriate phase-out and exit strategies.** A phased exit plan should be built in from the start of the programme, focused on ensuring that the programme legacy has structural support rather than relying solely on individuals as advocates of change.



# 1. Introduction

This section introduces the *Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football* programme and the evaluation.

## 1.1. About the programme

The *Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football* programme aimed to reduce violence through challenging harmful attitudes and behaviours in two communities in Western Kenya, using a sport for development model. The £1.7 million programme was funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the British Council as a pilot, with the intention of generating lessons about whether and how football can play a role in tackling violence against women and girls (VAWG). It ran for three years (2014–2017) in two locations in Western Kenya, and was implemented by the British Council, the Premier League and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD).

The programme, known as ‘Kenya Timz,’ and locally as ‘Premier Skills’,<sup>1</sup> was designed building on insights from DFID’s 2012 Theory of Change for Violence Against Women and Girls (see Box 1). It combined football and short education sessions to engage children and young people aged 10–20 years old. This aimed to build positive relationships and challenge attitudes and behaviours that foster violence against women and girls. Coaches were recruited from the communities and trained to deliver a curriculum focusing on knowledge, attitudes, life skills and behaviours, aiming to promote teamwork, fair play, self-confidence and respect for self and others. While football was the core activity, the programme also worked with adult community members and duty bearers (teachers, police, county government officials, health workers and community leaders) in an attempt to shift wider social norms and improve broader policy and practice for VAWG prevention and response.

The design of the programme was based on the Premier Skills model – a partnership

### Box 1. Insights from the literature on addressing VAWG through challenging social norms

In 2012, DFID published a *Theory of Change for Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls* (Moosa, 2012), providing an overview of the interventions that evidence suggests can help address and move towards eliminating VAWG. This was followed in 2016 by a Guidance Note on *Shifting Social Norms to Tackle VAWG* (Alexander-Scott et al., 2016), summarising insights from social norms theory and looking at what tactics have been most effective for challenging VAWG in the past. This note, and an earlier Evidence Review (Fulu et al., 2014), contain several insights into how a programme Kenya Timz can be most effective, through:

- **Working to tackle gender norms through shifting social expectations.** VAWG is sustained by gender norms that perpetuate unequal power relations between men and women, such as harmful notions of masculinity and norms around gender roles and the acceptability of violence, which contribute to shared expectations around men’s use of violence. Interventions aiming to transform these gender norms are more effective at reducing VAWG than those that address only individual attitudes and behaviours. This means shifting social expectations, not just individual attitudes – for example through promoting public debate and deliberation around the norm, advocating a positive alternative and publicising role models.
- **Working with men and boys as well as women and girls.** The evidence suggests this is more effective than single-sex interventions, as it can help address norms around gender, power and violence that all members of the community adhere to.
- **Using a multi-component, integrated approach.** This has proved more effective than standalone interventions, as it helps reinforce messages from multiple angles.

<sup>1</sup> While the local name for the programme was Kenya Timz, most community members and coaches referred to it as ‘Premier Skills.’ For consistency, it is referred to as Kenya Timz throughout this report.

between the British Council and the English Premier League that has been operational for 10 years and is currently running in 19 countries around the world.<sup>2</sup> Premier Skills aims to provide young people, including the most vulnerable in society, with opportunities to become better integrated into their local communities, to develop their skills and to raise their self-esteem. The *Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football* programme was the first time the model had been adapted specifically to address VAWG.

The programme was implemented in Western Kenya, which has the highest rates of VAWG in the country. The targeted communities were Kopsiro and Kapsokwony in the Mount Elgon region and Obunga and Nyalenda in Kisumu city. These areas were selected to provide a contrast between rural and urban locations, in order to be able to test how the approach worked in different contexts.

## 1.2. About the evaluation

**Itad was commissioned by the British Council to undertake an evaluation of the programme.** Given the general consensus on the need for more rigorous and credible evidence on the effectiveness of sport for social change, the evaluation has aimed to investigate whether the programme has made a difference, and for whom; to explore how and why it has made a difference; and to draw out lessons on whether the approach can be expected to work elsewhere. The evaluation will contribute to the sport for development sector through supporting a deeper understanding of how sport can be used to challenge attitudes and behaviours around VAWG.

This report presents the findings from the endline evaluation of the programme. It is structured as follows:

- **Section 2** presents the approach and methodology for the evaluation.
- **Section 3** describes the programme context and how the programme aimed to address violence in this context (its theory of change, ToC).
- **Section 4** discusses the key findings from the evaluation, structured around four cross-cutting areas of the ToC:
  - **Capacity:** How has the programme built the capacity of young people, coaches and the community to prevent and respond to violence?
  - **Violence:** How has the programme contributed to reducing VAWG?
  - **Rights:** How has the programme contributed to promoting girls' rights in Mount Elgon and Kisumu?
  - **Policy and practice:** How has the programme influenced policy and practice in relation to VAWG prevention and response?
- **Section 5** discusses lessons on implementation and sustainability – that is, on what this programme can tell us about how to successfully implement a sport for development programme aiming to tackle VAWG and how to ensure it is sustainable into the future. It also reflects on lessons learnt about approaches to monitoring and evaluating a similar programme in future.
- **Section 6** presents the conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation.

Further details on the methodology and tools, as well as supplementary evidence (from the monitoring data and the survey), are included in annexes and supplementary data files submitted separately to this report.

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<sup>2</sup> See <https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/sport/current-programmes/premier-skills>

## 2. Methodology

**This section provides an overview of the evaluation approach and methodology. Further details are included in the annexes to this report.**

### 2.1. Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions (EQs) were agreed with programme staff at the beginning of the evaluation, based on the desire to establish not just *what* has happened as a result of the programme but also *why* things have (or have not) changed, and what lessons can be drawn when thinking about applying the programme approach elsewhere. There are three overarching EQs:

- EQ 1** Has the programme made a difference, and for whom?
- EQ 2** How and why has the programme made a difference?
- EQ 3** Can this model be expected to work elsewhere?

The EQs implicitly underpin the narrative throughout the findings of this report, with the conclusions providing an overall summary against each EQ.

### 2.2. Evaluation timeframe

The evaluation had three stages:<sup>3</sup>

- **Baseline evaluation:** conducted in 2015, focusing on understanding the situation in each location before the programme activities commenced.
- **Midline evaluation:** conducted in 2016. This drew on monitoring data and a limited number of interviews with key informants to make an assessment of progress against the programme logframe.
- **Endline evaluation:** conducted in October–November 2017 in both Mount Elgon and Kisumu. This final evaluation report draws together findings from the data collected in the two locations after the programme finished, and also builds on the midline evaluation to make a final assessment against the evaluation questions.

### 2.3. Overarching approach

The design for this evaluation is centred on a **theory-based approach**, using **contribution analysis** and drawing on a **social norms lens**.

#### 2.3.1. Theory-based approach

The evaluation aims to track *how and why* change is happening as well as *what* change is happening, which suggests the need for an approach that opens up the “black box” between the intervention and the outcomes. A theory-based approach was therefore selected, using **contribution analysis** – an established impact evaluation approach<sup>4</sup> that is appropriate in situations where experimental and quasi-experimental designs are not feasible.<sup>5</sup> It provides a framework for looking at a programme and its theory of change, to explore whether outcomes have or have not been achieved (EQ 1). It also allows for the investigation of the links between outcomes – examining *how and why* change has happened and what the *contribution* of a programme has been to change, alongside other factors (EQ 2). By unpacking how and why an intervention

<sup>3</sup> Findings of the baseline and midline evaluations are contained in four previous reports submitted by Itad.

<sup>4</sup> Mayne (2008); Stern et al. (2012).

<sup>5</sup> For practical and ethical reasons, it was not possible to use an experimental or quasi-experimental design for this evaluation.

works, it is possible to identify programme and contextual features that enable extrapolation around what may (and may not) be expected to work elsewhere (EQ 3).

Our approach to contribution analysis was centred on four steps, as follows:

1. **Outlining a clear and coherent ToC.** This step establishes whether the chain of results and assumptions underpinning why the intervention might contribute to change are plausible. The programme ToC was developed in 2015, but it was updated prior to the final evaluation, so it could be aligned more clearly with the activities eventually undertaken.
2. **Verifying that the programme activities were effectively implemented.** Monitoring data was analysed at midline and endline, in order to build a picture of how far and how successfully programme activities were implemented. This was triangulated with insights from programme staff, youth participants, coaches and wider community members and stakeholders.
3. **Observing the results and comparing these with the ToC.** The final evaluation sought to verify the extent to which expected outcomes were achieved. As well as examining the outcomes on the ToC, this stage also involved asking: *Were there any unexpected outcomes?*, as well as *Who did the programme benefit and who was left out?*
4. **Assessing the influence of contextual factors and exploring/eliminating other possible causes for the results observed.** Finally, the evaluation sought to establish the extent to which the programme had contributed towards the identified changes. This involved examining *why* the outcomes in the ToC had or had not taken place and how far the programme had contributed to them (identifying other plausible explanations for change outside of the programme); and examining the contextual factors that may have contributed to the programme’s success.


### 2.3.2. Applying a social norms lens to the evaluation

The programme incorporates a *social norms* lens. The term “social norms” can be used in both a general and a technical sense. In a general sense, it refers to discriminatory community attitudes and behaviour towards girls and women. However, there is also a precise technical definition, which draws a distinction between *behaviour based on individual attitudes* and *behaviour influenced by social norms*.<sup>6</sup> A “social norms lens” applied within the evaluation draws on insights from social norms theory to help us understand how and why change happens. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund,<sup>7</sup> a social norm is a pattern of behaviour underpinned by an individual’s:

- Belief that the behaviour is (or isn’t) widespread among their network.<sup>8</sup>
- Belief that others from their network approve or disapprove of the behaviour.
- Motivation to carry out or avoid the behaviour owing to the desire for approval.

Behaviour influenced by social norms is therefore behaviour driven by *a person’s expectations about what other people do and what others think they should do*, rather than by a person’s own beliefs alone.

Figure 1. Components of social norms (Mackie, n.d.)



<sup>6</sup> See [http://www.grminternational.com/projects/voices\\_for\\_change\\_empowering\\_adolescent\\_girls\\_and\\_women\\_in\\_nigeria\\_v4c](http://www.grminternational.com/projects/voices_for_change_empowering_adolescent_girls_and_women_in_nigeria_v4c)

<sup>7</sup> Mackie et al. (2014).

<sup>8</sup> In social norms terminology, their “reference group.”

At baseline, the evaluation adopted a social norms lens in order to gain a deeper understanding of community attitudes and behaviours.<sup>9</sup> The social norms lens was also used in the aim of investigating whether particular attitudes and behaviours targeted by the programme were influenced by harmful social norms (rather than individual-level beliefs and attitudes) – which, in turn, would have implications for advocacy messaging. While this provided rich insights into participants' own attitudes as well as perspectives on what was viewed as acceptable in the wider community (known as empirical expectations, as per Figure 1), the data at baseline was insufficient to determine whether specific behaviours were influenced by social norms rather than individual-level beliefs and attitudes. This was in part because of the challenges involved in identifying reference groups and investigating complex concepts of expectations of behaviour from others within the survey and focus group discussion (FGDs), while retaining time to investigate a wide range of other issues important to the programme.

As a result, the endline evaluation captured data to measure behaviour, attitudes and empirical expectations across a range of issues relating to VAWG and gender, in order to provide a rich picture on the acceptability of various forms of violence at two levels: that of participants themselves and that of the community as a whole. However, given the challenges at baseline and resource limitations at endline, the evaluation did not attempt to establish definitively whether particular practices are influenced by social norms, or whether the programme had shifted social norms in a specific, rather than a general, sense. This gives rise to some lessons for future programmes in relation to grappling with social norms within a small-scale evaluation, as discussed further in Section 5.3.

## 2.4. Data sources

The evaluation drew on a household survey and qualitative interviews and FGDs, as well as monitoring data collected by the programme. The data sources and data collection and analysis methods are described briefly below, with full details contained in the Annexes to this report.



### Household survey

At baseline and endline, a household survey was conducted with 150 adults in Kisumu and 150 in Kopsiro, roughly half of whom were parents of participating young people and half of whom were parents of non-participants. The survey aimed to collect information on behaviour, attitudes and empirical expectations in relation to issues prioritised by the programme, linked to the ToC. Data analysis was conducted using SPSS software, and statistical tests (chi-squared tests) were used to analyse the extent to which there had been significant changes in responses between baseline and endline.<sup>10</sup> However, given the sample size, the survey data should be interpreted with caution – this is discussed further in Section 2.7 on limitations. The sampling approach and survey tool are included in Annexes 1 and 6, respectively.



### Focus group discussions and interviews

At both baseline and endline, a modest number of qualitative, semi-structured focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted with programme stakeholders in Kisumu and Mount Elgon (a total of 34 FGDs and 28 IDIs at endline – 356 individuals in total across the sites).<sup>11</sup> In Mount Elgon, the endline qualitative research was focussed in Kopsiro in order to allow for a more in-depth look at a single location. Details of the full sample and the process for recruitment are included in Annexes 1, 4 and 5.

Our sample was designed to capture a range of views from the community, including youth participants across different cohorts and ages, community members (both those who had been exposed to the programme and those who had not), service providers (including health centre staff, police officers and teachers), community and religious leaders and government

<sup>9</sup> This was intended to move beyond the typical 'knowledge-attitudes-practice' behaviour change pathway.

<sup>10</sup> Statistical significance was judged to be a p-value of less than 0.05.

<sup>11</sup> Mount Elgon: 18 FGDs – 14 in Kopsiro and 4 in Kapsokwony – and 14 IDIs. Kisumu: 16 FGDs, including 2 pre-test FGDs, and 14 IDIs.

officials. In addition, nine interviews were conducted with programme staff, including stakeholders from the British Council, ACORD, Premier Skills and Exp (who managed the multi-media campaign). Purposive sampling was used to identify the relevant people to speak to, based on discussions between Itad and the programme about the most appropriate people to speak to, seeking a balance of views.

FGDs and interviews discussed participants' perceptions of the programme and explored outcomes in the ToC, investigating what the situation was in relation to each of the outcomes, and at endline exploring what had changed, why and the programme's contribution. The FGD and interview guides are included in Annexes 7 and 8, respectively. Data analysis was conducted using qualitative analysis software Dedoose in order to draw out themes in the data (see Annex 10 for the coding frame).



### Outcome harvesting

At endline, the lead evaluators conducted two outcome harvesting workshops with coaches from Mount Elgon and Kisumu (see Annex 1.3 for more details). This allowed the coaches to document their perspectives on changes that had resulted from the programme, in terms of actions, attitudes, activities, relationships, policies or practices. Coaches were asked to reflect on changes for themselves, for the young people and for the wider community. The workshops were conducted before community-level data collection, to allow for triangulation of the coaches' perspectives through the FGDs and IDIs. Following the workshops, the evaluation team compiled "outcome stories" developed by the workshop participants, which were shared with programme staff for their review and comments. During the analysis stage, the revised stories were compiled in a database, and reviewed to draw out themes in the data. Throughout this report, boxes pull out some of the stories told by coaches during the workshops.



### Monitoring data

At midline and endline, the evaluators conducted a desk review of all available programme monitoring data. This consisted of registers and observation records from the sessions with young people; data from various activities to monitor the attitudes, knowledge, skills and confidence of young people and coaches; end-of-cohort questionnaires with young people and coaches; pre- and post-training assessments for coaches and duty bearers; transcripts of community conversations; minutes of meetings; and statistics from police and health centres on reported cases of violence. Annex 9 provides a full list of monitoring tools. This data was reviewed and findings extracted against the programme logframe (see Supplementary Data Annex A).

## 2.5. Approach to triangulating and synthesising data sources for the final evaluation

Each source of data was first analysed separately, as described above. Data was then synthesised thematically, through reviewing all insights relating to a particular area of the ToC (e.g. violence in intimate partner relationships) and identifying patterns of similarities, as well as inconsistencies, across the survey, IDIs and FGDs, outcome harvesting and monitoring data. As all of the data sources have specific strengths and weaknesses, and provide different insights relating to different outcomes and stakeholders, the analysis did not explicitly weight the strength of evidence from these different sources. Rather, it attempted to identify the overall pattern of findings for each theme while being clear about any outliers and potential reasons for this.

One lead evaluator analysed all data from Mount Elgon, while another analysed all data from Kisumu, in order to ensure findings were reached independently. This analysis was then drawn together in this report to present findings across the programme as a whole, while drawing out specific insights from each location and noting any contrasts.

## 2.6. Ethics and child protection

The evaluation was conducted according to Itad’s code of ethical principles and rules of conduct, as well as the British Council Child Protection policy. Fieldwork was designed to ensure informed consent of all participants, and minimise risk to participants while discussing sensitive issues. Data collection with young people was always conducted in groups, and topic guides were designed to steer participants away from discussing sensitive personal information, focussing rather on experiences and attitudes at a community level. The content of topic guides was tailored to older and younger participants, and sensitive issues such as rape and intimate partner violence were not proactively introduced with younger children but rather discussed only if raised by the participants (see topic guides in Annex 7).

An important consideration raised in the project planning was child protection – the possibility that one of the adolescents in the FGDs would disclose that they were victims of abuse, or that knowledge of particular cases of abuse would occur during the household surveys. The data collection teams were trained on these issues and how to deal with them by the British Council Child Protection Officer during their baseline meetings, with supplementary refresher training provided at endline by Itad staff. Thus, they were well prepared to deal with any instances of abuse or related disclosures. The full Itad code of ethical principles, and child protection policy is included in Annex 11.

## 2.7. Limitations

There are various limitations of the methodology and data sources, which should be taken into account when interpreting the findings of this report:

- **Small survey sample size:** It is important to note the small size of the survey sample – only 150 households in each site. The survey is also not a panel, i.e. it was not feasible to consult the same households at baseline and endline.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, findings should be considered a snapshot of the situation in each community at baseline and at endline, but they are not statistically representative of whole community populations and should not be interpreted as such.
- **Limited resources for qualitative data collection at endline:** The relatively small scope of the qualitative data collection gave rise to a number of limitations, as discussed with the British Council during the design of the endline evaluation. First, it was not possible to systematically investigate differences between the experiences of different cohorts of young people. Second, it was possible to speak to only a small number of adult community members in the time available, given that there was a need to ensure sufficient focus on capturing the views of young people, who were not involved in the evaluation in any other way. This limited the potential to investigate community-level changes in detail, including how and why community-level activities may or may not have made a difference. Third, it was not possible to speak to young people who were not involved in the programme, which would have been beneficial to gain a more rounded perspective of the programme’s contribution to change, and to counteract bias. Similarly, many of the service providers interviewed had direct interaction or involvement with the programme. Finally, the relatively small qualitative sample, combined with the broad range of questions necessary to test the programme ToC, placed constraints on the investigation of “how and why” the programme had and had not made a difference, through limiting the time available to investigate these questions in detail. Although it has been possible to draw out some interesting insights on this, further research will be required to test the emerging insights more robustly.
- **Confirmation bias and other biases of respondents:** Programme participants and community stakeholders may have told the researchers what they felt the team wanted to hear, in an attempt to paint the programme in a positive light and so potentially encourage its continuation. This is a very real risk in this case, as most participants were very positive about the programme. There is also a risk that participants attributed perceived change to the programme when actually it was a result of other factors, because the programme is viewed positively and because it is difficult to untangle the reasons for change in relation to relatively intangible attitudes and often private behaviours. This is particularly a risk in the

<sup>12</sup> Panel surveys require a different approach to data collection, and a much larger sample to account for loss to follow up as a result of people leaving the area or otherwise not reachable at endline. This was not possible with the scope of resources available for the evaluation.

outcome harvesting data collected from coaches. These risks were mitigated somewhat through the phrasing of questions and the careful triangulation of insights, both within and across data sources – particularly through comparing evidence across the survey, qualitative data and monitoring data without placing too much weight on any single source of evidence. However, sensitivity bias remained a huge risk across all the data sources. That is, stakeholders may not have been comfortable talking about their true experiences of, or feelings about, sensitive topics such as violence and gender, meaning their responses were not fully open and the data does not present a full picture of what is actually happening. Social desirability bias may also have influenced responses, with people answering questions in a manner they thought would be viewed favourably by the researchers or their peers.

- **Limitations in the quality and reliability of the monitoring data:** A huge amount of effort was involved, on the part of the programme staff and coaches, in capturing and collating monitoring data throughout the programme. This is to be commended, and has greatly strengthened the ability of the evaluation to tell the story of programme achievements and challenges. However, there have been various challenges in collecting certain data:

  - The programme attempted to collect qualitative data from participants during the first cohort but it was not feasible to pay researchers to do this or to adequately train the coaches to collect data of a sufficient quality. Thus, during the second cohort, this was not continued.
  - It was also difficult to access the quantitative data necessary to monitor key programme indicators. For example, there were some reported challenges in collecting reliable data on cases of violence at police stations and health centres, owing to closures and the fact that these services did not routinely collect this data.
  - It was not considered feasible for the programme to collect primary data on pregnancy rates and school dropouts among young people, which would have been very helpful to triangulate with the perceptions reported through FGDs and IDIs.
  - Self-reported data from young people concerning their attitudes, skills, confidence and self-esteem is likely to be subject to social desirability bias (young people expressing what they thought the coaches wanted to hear based on what they had been taught).
  - Finally, the programme team explored various possible options for monitoring the knowledge, awareness and attitudes of community members, but this was challenging given the nature of the events targeting these groups (which were generally large-scale and informal, with no participant lists and in venues that people could freely enter and exit throughout the day).
- **Short programme timeframe:** Finally, the programme was only three years long, which is a very short period of time in which to observe changes in attitudes and behaviours on such a sensitive and deeply rooted issue as VAWG. It is also too short a timeframe to detect whether immediate changes in young people's confidence, knowledge and skills will translate into change in the longer term. This is a big limitation, given the programme's theory that targeting boys and girls when they are young will help influence their behaviour in adulthood. This implies that the findings of this evaluation are by no means the last word regarding the programme's impact.



## 3. Programme context and theory of change

**This section discusses the context in which the programme was implemented, and the challenges it was set up to address. It then presents the programme ToC, describing the activities designed to tackle these challenges and unpacking how and why these were expected to address violence in Mount Elgon and Kisumu.**

### 3.1. Programme context

**Western Kenya was selected as the pilot location for the programme because of its significant social challenges and recent history of violent conflict.** Women’s experience of violence in Kenya varies significantly according to region, and the Western Region has the highest rates of violence in the country – with 56% of women experiencing violence since the age of 15.<sup>13</sup> This compares with 41% of female respondents in the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2014<sup>14</sup> who reported ever experiencing physical or sexual violence from their partners.

**The programme was implemented in the communities of Kopsiro and Kapsokwony (Mount Elgon region) and Obunga and Nyalenda (in Kisumu city).**<sup>15</sup> The context varied significantly between these locations. Mount Elgon is a post-conflict zone, having suffered intermittent ethnic violence since Kenya gained independence in 1963. The area was seriously affected by the post-election violence that followed the disputed presidential elections in December 2007 and was the site of an armed insurgency by the Sabaat Land Defence Force that began in 2005. Kopsiro is a relatively remote rural community located on the slopes of Mount Elgon, with poor infrastructure and roads that become difficult to navigate during the rainy season. While Kapsokwony town is more urban, as the administrative headquarters of the sub-county, both Mount Elgon locations are considerably less well served by public services and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) than Kisumu – where a number of organisations were already working on tackling gender-based violence (GBV) prior to this programme, including a gender-based violence recovery centre (GBVRC) providing services to survivors. However, although better served than Mount Elgon, Nyalenda and Obunga are slum communities, characterised by poor roads and infrastructure as well as frequent violence and insecurity. Annex 2 includes further details on the four targeted communities.

**The baseline evaluation found violence was widespread in all four communities – both within intimate relationships and between community members. Sexual violence was also identified as a serious problem facing girls and women.** The fieldwork suggested clear links between violence and gender-inequitable attitudes and beliefs in both locations, especially Mount Elgon. For example, a majority of community members saw violence against intimate partners as acceptable in particular situations. There also appeared to be connections between ideas of masculinity (particularly associations with strength and security) and the acceptability of violence. Inequitable beliefs about the roles of men and women were widespread – including around the man’s role as the household head with the final say on decisions in the home, men’s right to have sex with their wives and negative attitudes around birth control. The fieldwork also found that survivors of sexual violence faced high levels of stigma and shame in the community. This was one of the factors contributing to low levels of reporting, along with a lack of trust in police, particularly in Kisumu.

However, the baseline evaluation also found multiple drivers of violence and gender inequity beyond attitudes and social norms, which were beyond the scope of the programme to address. This resonates with insights in the broader literature on VAWG, which emphasises that VAWG is a result of a combination of drivers at different levels, including an individual’s predisposition, developmental history, attitudes and beliefs; relationships and household dynamics; community-level factors, including social norms but also jobs and poverty; and factors in the broader environment such as religion and market forces.<sup>16</sup> In both Mount

<sup>13</sup> FIDA (2010).

<sup>14</sup> Government of Kenya (2015).

<sup>15</sup> The programme also engaged with county government stakeholders from Bungoma, the administrative capital of Mount Elgon.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander-Scott et al. (2016).

Elgon and Kisumu, the baseline found education was a major influencing factor on both violence and girls' rights – as girls and women who are more educated appeared more likely to be listened to and have authority in the household and community. Poverty and limited economic opportunities affect violence in multiple ways – presenting an obstacle to girls' education and also contributing to circumstances putting girls and women at risk of rape and violence, including the need to undertake risky domestic and economic activities and difficulties leaving violent husbands, given the resulting financial insecurity. In both locations, poverty was found to drive girls into relationships with men in which gifts and money are repaid with sexual favours, leading to early pregnancy and school dropout. Poverty and resulting arguments over resources, particularly land, also contributed to physical violence between community and family members. In Kisumu, violence at a community level was frequently linked to insecurity, criminal activity, alcohol, drugs and gangs.

A small programme like Kenya Timz cannot hope to influence all these factors, which points to the crucial importance of partnership with other services and organisations to support a joined-up approach. The literature also highlights that programmes need to have realistic objectives and timeframes, and ideally engage over the short, medium and long term, as harmful social norms can take many years to change.<sup>17</sup>

### 3.2. Theory of change

A ToC was developed by programme staff and community stakeholders at the start of the programme, to articulate what the programme hoped to achieve in the contexts detailed above, and how. The evaluation team revised the ToC at endline (see Figure 2 below), to bring it into line with the logframe and ensure a clear framework for conducting contribution analysis through the endline evaluation (described in Section 2.2 above). Further details on the programme's areas of focus, the attitudes it hoped to address and how it understood core concepts such as "violence", "rights" and "empowerment" are contained in Annex 3.

The bottom row in the ToC diagram describes the **programme activities**, which were expected to contribute to various **outputs** in the second row:

- A. The programme began by recruiting and training around 50 coaches in each location to deliver activities on the ground. Coaches were recruited from the community – some had previous experience as football coaches, while others were advocates for gender equality. Several worked in positions of responsibility, as teachers, police officers or religious leaders. Coaches were paid a small stipend but were not salaried staff. Through regular training and engagement, the programme aimed to build coaches' capacity to work effectively with young people and deliver high-quality football and education sessions (**output 1**). This is discussed in Section 4.1.2.
- B. At the core of the programme was an integrated football and thematic curriculum, delivered to young people (aged 10–20) in Mount Elgon and Kisumu (see Box 2). Through these weekly sessions, the programme aimed to increase young people's knowledge about their rights as well as violence in their communities and how to prevent it, increase their confidence and self-esteem and develop life skills around communication, conflict resolution and the ability to speak out (**output 2**). This is discussed in Section 4.1.1.

#### Box 2. What did the curriculum cover?


The curriculum was delivered through 90-100 minute sessions once a week, initially over a period of 22 weeks. These involved a combination of football and thematic sessions delivered at the side of the pitch. The thematic curriculum covered:

- Violence and how to prevent and respond to it.
- Legal rights of girls and young people (including around sex and marriage).
- Puberty and sexual and reproductive health (the latter to young people aged 14+ only).

The curriculum was designed to be interactive and participatory, and provide girl-only and boy-only spaces to allow young people to discuss sensitive issues in single sex as well as mixed groups. In the second half of the programme it was revised substantially to shorten the delivery time and integrate the football and thematic content more closely – lessons from this are discussed further in Box 4 below.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

Figure 2. Theory of change for the programme



- C. The programme engaged parents and older community members through quarterly community festivals, which involved football matches, presentations and speeches touching on issues relating to violence and gender equality. In addition, “community conversations” were held, where large groups of men and women were encouraged to discuss scenarios involving violence and to consider how these might be averted in future. During the second half of the programme, a multi-media campaign was conducted, designed and managed by implementing partner Exp. This spanned a period of six months, and involved a radio drama aired on local stations over the course of five weeks and six “activation” events held during market days (involving further community conversations, as well as using an MC and local artists to engage community members in discussions about violence in the community and how to address it, using games, speeches and activities). The campaign worked with 60 “opinion leaders” from the community (some of whom were also coaches) who helped mobilise participants for the events and spoke out against violence on the radio shows. Together, the festivals and multi-media campaign were intended to increase knowledge and awareness about VAWG and how to prevent in the community (**output 3**). This is discussed in Section 4.1.3.
- D. The programme also engaged “duty bearers” who play an important role in preventing and responding to VAWG, including teachers, police, health workers, community and religious leaders and county government stakeholders. Programme staff participated actively in gender technical working groups (GTWGs) in both areas, and two capacity building events were held in each location to strengthen these – focusing on raising awareness, challenging attitudes and improving coordination. The programme also ran exchange trips in 2016, involving a delegation of GTWG members, coaches and young people from Mount Elgon visiting stakeholders working on GBV in Kisumu, and vice versa. Duty bearers also participated in regular programme meetings and attended community festivals, and several were recruited as opinion leaders in the multi-media campaign. Through these activities, the programme hoped to increase knowledge and awareness about VAWG among duty bearers and raise understanding about how to tackle it (**output 4**). This is discussed in Section 4.4.
- E. Finally, as this programme was a pilot, it aimed to share lessons with national and international stakeholders on what works to tackle VAWG through sport for development (**output 5**), through lesson learning and dissemination events at a local and national level. This is discussed in Section 4.4.

These activities and outputs were expected to lead to a number of **short- and longer-term outcomes** at the top of the ToC diagram, that would together help lead to the programme **impact** of reduced VAWG and more peaceful community relations. We know from existing literature on VAWG that each of these changes alone is not enough to address the root causes of violence. However, the programme hoped that together they would help shift social norms that help perpetuate VAWG and gender inequality, as follows:

- **Changing coaches’ attitudes and helping them become role models.** The programme encouraged coaches to embrace girls’ rights and reject the acceptability of violence (**outcome 2**). It also empowered female coaches in a position of authority within a traditionally male-dominated sport, enabling them to act as mentors for young women in order to build their confidence and self-esteem (**output 1**). The hope was that coaches would become role models demonstrating gender-equitable attitudes and behaviours in their interactions with young people and the wider community, including through male coaches showing boys how it is possible to be “masculine” while rejecting violence (**outcome 1**).
- **Building girls’ confidence and ability to protect themselves from violence and claim their rights.** Through rewarding and purposeful physical interaction, the programme hoped to help girls feel powerful, liberated and connected to other girls through sport (**output 2**). The hope was that, if girls came to believe VAWG was not acceptable (**outcome 2**), and built self-esteem and life skills such as communication and problem solving, then they would be more able to report violence and claim their rights in society (**outcome 6**) – as well as becoming positive and active female role models in the community who could influence the attitudes of others (**outcome 5**).
- **Encouraging boys to reject violence and take action to prevent and respond to VAWG.** Through physical activity within a rules-based environment that discouraged violence, the programme hoped

to help boys express themselves safely, and to develop and model more positive forms of masculinity in the community (**outcome 1**). The hope was, if boys saw girls and women participating in public spaces – particularly through something traditionally seen as a man’s sport – and if they also came to understand VAWG was not acceptable (**outcome 2**), then they would develop positive and respectful relationships with girls and so be less likely to perpetrate violence against them (**outcome 6**). Through building boys’ life skills and confidence, the programme also hoped to help boys reject violence to resolve conflicts and exercise power in relationships, including at community level (**outcome 4**), and to encourage boys take action to prevent and respond to violence where they saw it (**outcome 8**).

- **Challenging discriminatory attitudes and behaviour in the wider community, and encouraging community members to commit to preventing VAWG.** Through raising awareness about VAWG, showing girls as powerful football players interacting with boys in a positive way and using community leaders to champion gender equality and reject violence, the programme hoped to encourage community members to commit to action to prevent and respond to VAWG (**outcome 3**), and question attitudes that help perpetuate VAWG (**outcome 5**). An important aspect of the programme theory was the hypothesis that empowering young people as advocates and role models in the community would demonstrate more equitable behaviours and attitudes that would in turn influence parents and others, which would help create an enabling environment for girls to claim their rights as equal members of society (**outcome 6**).
- **Improving duty bearer responsiveness to VAWG.** Through bringing together duty bearers from different spheres, raising their awareness about VAWG and building their capacity to coordinate effectively, the programme hoped to challenge inequitable attitudes (**outcome 5**) and encourage changes to policy and practice (**outcome 8**) as well as improvements to coordination and referral mechanisms for survivors of VAWG (**outcome 7**). It was hoped this would help reduce barriers to girls reporting violence (**outcome 6**), and improve the effectiveness VAWG prevention and response.

Underpinning this theory are a number of assumptions that needed to hold in order for the programme to achieve its expected outcomes and impact, detailed in Box 3 below.

### Box 3. Assumptions underpinning the ToC

- Girls and boys are attracted to a programme giving them opportunities to play football, which provides a non-threatening “way in” to engage them in challenging topics.
- Football can bring together boys and girls, men and women and provide a space to challenge the gender norms that contribute to VAWG.
- Coaches are uniquely placed to work with young people and can act as role models and mentors as a result of the sustained nature of their engagement with participating young people through football.
- The attitudes and behaviours of young people and the wider community are influenced by role models from both the local community and wider society, particularly football coaches and sporting figures.
- While the attitudes and behaviours some coaches hold are likely reflective of those within the wider community, they can be changed to enable coaches to act as role models and champions for the programme.
- There is a lack of community-level understanding of the negative impact of VAWG.
- Community members and duty bearers are receptive to the programme and open to participating in programme events and to engaging in discussions around gender norms and VAWG.
- The programme can reach a critical mass of young people, including girls, in the target communities, so that peer pressure and prevailing social norms do not counteract the positive messages developed through participation in the programme.
- Young men are able to make choices not to engage in violence, resisting pressure from the wider community.
- There are opportunities to strengthen the support services for women and girls who experience VAWG and resources can be made available within communities to respond to VAWG.
- Local state institutions have the capacity and mandate to collaborate to address VAWG.
- Practitioners working in the field of VAWG and/or sports for development see the lessons learnt from the programme as worth exploring and are interested in learning more.

# 4. Findings


This section presents the findings from the endline evaluation of the **Addressing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Football programme**.

As detailed in Section 2, data collection and analysis was structured around the ToC. This allowed the evaluation to investigate the extent to which outcomes have been achieved (EQ 1) and how and why the programme has or has not made a difference (EQ 2), in order to be able to draw conclusions about whether the programme approach can be expected to work elsewhere (EQ 3). However, rather than structuring the findings around the ToC or the EQs, this section is built around four broad areas that cut across the ToC. This allows the report to tell the story of the programme in a more holistic way, reflecting the overlapping and interconnected nature of the outcomes the programme sought to achieve. The four themes are as follows:

- **Capacity:** How has the programme built the capacity of young people, coaches and the community to prevent and respond to violence?
- **Violence:** How has the programme contributed to reducing VAWG?
- **Girls' rights:** How has the programme contributed to promoting girls' rights?
- **Policy and practice:** How has the programme influenced VAWG policy and practice?

The conclusions in Section 6 then provide an overarching summary of findings, including against the EQs, in order to answer them clearly. Figure 3 illustrates the connection between the evaluation EQs, the ToC and the four key themes.

Figure 3. Link between EQs, ToC and key themes in Section 4



2. Report findings are structured around four key themes that cut across the ToC

## 4.1. Capacity

### How has the programme built the capacity of young people, coaches and the community to prevent and respond to violence?

The programme exceeded its targets for enrolment and attendance, reaching almost 4,500 **young people** across the two sites, of whom 43% were girls. Rates of retention were high, and there were very positive reflections from the young people on the quality of the sessions and what they had learnt. However, the programme did struggle to engage hard-to-reach groups (notably, older and out-of-school young people), until specific targeting strategies were introduced in the second year of the programme. The modified approach successfully reached secondary school students, young mothers and out-of-school young men, although the numbers engaged were relatively modest when compared with the participation of younger, in-school, children. The rates of participation of disabled young people were also very low.

Across the groups of young people participating, there is strong evidence to suggest the programme has successfully raised young people's knowledge and awareness about VAWG, built their confidence, self-esteem and life skills and improved interactions between girls and boys. It also appears to have had some positive unintended influences on the behaviour of young people, particularly in Mount Elgon, where communities noted improvements in discipline, respect and school performance. However, a key challenge for the programme lay in maintaining substantive engagement with young people who completed the curriculum in mid-2016 (the first cohort), which represents a potential missed opportunity to continue reinforcing messages and nurture champions.

Delivering the programme through community **coaches** was highly successful, with strong evidence that coaches developed the knowledge, ability and confidence to deliver the programme and had commitment to its aims, in many cases becoming role models who will hopefully continue advocating for girls' rights in the future. However, the approach was also not without its challenges, with dedicated and ongoing capacity building and support required, both to monitor coaches' behaviour and attitudes and to manage disciplinary incidents.

The programme was broadly successful in engaging **community members** through festivals and a multi-media campaign, despite early challenges in getting activities off the ground. It reached an estimated 12,000 people in person and 300,000 through the radio programmes, stimulating active debate and discussion around gender and VAWG.

**Football** proved an effective 'hook' for the programme – incentivising boys and girls to participate and creating interest among the community through tournaments, providing safe spaces for boys and girls to interact together and building on existing structures to create a relatively low-resource entry point. However, it is important to note that football was just one component of the programme, complemented by other thematic activities and engagement with duty bearers and the communities.

### 4.1.1. Capacity of young people

**Almost 4,500 young people participated in the programme across Mount Elgon and Kisumu, of whom 43% were girls** (see Table 1). Attendance at the weekly sessions was very high, particularly in Mount Elgon (see Table 2).<sup>18</sup> Overall, the programme exceeded its targets for both enrolment and attendance.<sup>19</sup> Across all the cohorts, consistently around 90% of young people strongly agreed that they liked taking part in the football and education sessions, and had learnt a lot from them (see Table 3).

<sup>18</sup> The midline reports found that over 87% of cohort 1 participants in Kisumu and 97% in Mount Elgon had attended at least 80% of the sessions. See Supplementary Annex, output indicator 2.1.

<sup>19</sup> The logframe target states "17 sessions" rather than "80%" – we have revised this in order to enable comparison of attendance rates for the later cohorts, which received a shorter curriculum.

Table 1. Number of youth participants in the programme, across all cohorts

Location	Girls	Boys	Total
Kisumu	813 (40.1%)	1,212 (59.9%)	2,025 (100.0%)
Mount Elgon	1,124 (45.9%)	1,326 (54.1%)	2,450 (100.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,937 (43.3%)</b>	<b>2,538 (56.7%)</b>	<b>4,475 (100.0%)</b>

Table 2. Number and percentage of participants who attended at least 80% of sessions, across all cohorts<sup>20</sup>

Location	Girls	Boys	Total
Kisumu	662 (81.4%)	1077 (88.9%)	1739 (85.9%)
Mount Elgon	1092 (97.2%)	1285 (96.9%)	2377 (97.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,753 (90.5%)</b>	<b>2,362 (93.1%)</b>	<b>4,115 (92.0%)</b>

Table 3. Percentage of participants who 'strongly agreed' to the following statements at the end of their cohort

	Girls	Boys	Total
<b>1. Thinking back over the last year and your time spent with Elgon Timz, how much have you liked taking part in the football sessions?</b>			
Kisumu	91.6%	95.5%	93.6%
Mt Elgon	91.2%	91.3%	91.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>91.4%</b>	<b>93.2%</b>	<b>92.3%</b>
<b>2. Now I want you to think about just the education sessions, how much have you liked them?</b>			
Kisumu	93.4%	91.0%	92.1%
Mt Elgon	92.6%	85.1%	88.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>93.0%</b>	<b>87.9%</b>	<b>90.3%</b>
<b>3. Now I want you to think about how much you agree with this statement: I have learned a lot from the education sessions.</b>			
Kisumu	94.5%	91.2%	92.7%
Mt Elgon	91.3%	83.8%	87.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>92.7%</b>	<b>87.3%</b>	<b>89.8%</b>

**The programme struggled to engage hard-to-reach groups until specific targeting strategies were introduced in the second year.** At the beginning of the programme, the model for recruitment involved using coaches to spread the word through schools, and encouraging participants to sign themselves up. This “self-selection” approach was successful at reaching large numbers of young people (see Table 1), but the majority were under 14 (see Table 4), in school (over 90%) and did not have children (over 95%).<sup>21</sup> This was noted as a challenge by programme staff at midline, as it excluded some of the groups most at risk of experiencing or perpetrating violence in the community – notably older youths already in romantic relationships, girls who had dropped out of school owing to pregnancy or early marriage and out-of-school boys. While schools were a very convenient location for the programme, including for child protection reasons, as it was easier to control who was coming in and out, out-of-school youths were unwilling to attend sessions in school grounds for fear of consequences.

<sup>20</sup> Please note that In Mount Elgon, the registration data from cohorts 2, 3 and the special groups could not be reconciled with the register monitoring data. The attendance data is therefore an estimation developed through comparing the two data sources and applying the calculated attendance rates.

<sup>21</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 2.1.



Table 4. Age of participants

Age	Kisumu	Mount Elgon	Total
<10	17 (0.8%)	3 (0.1%)	20 (0.5%)
10–13 years	1289 (63.7%)	1068 (43.6%)	2357 (52.7%)
14–17 years	470 (23.2%)	1135 (43.6%)	1605 (35.9%)
18+	229 (11.3%)	219 (8.9%)	448 (10.0%)
Unknown	20 (1.0%)	25 (1.0%)	45 (1.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,025 (100.0%)</b>	<b>2,450 (100.0%)</b>	<b>4,475 (100.0%)</b>

The programme also struggled to reach young people with disabilities, who represented only around 1% of participants.<sup>22</sup> Programme staff felt that holding the sessions in school fields made it difficult for this group to attend: in Mount Elgon in particular, this group are mainly not in school and were unable to travel to the delivery sites. In Kisumu, several schools catered for children with learning and physical disabilities, but the programme ruled out working with these organisations as it would have required session materials to be adapted and additional training for the coaches, which had significant resource implications.<sup>23</sup> These findings suggest the importance of carefully considering recruitment approaches, and building in explicit strategies from the beginning to engage harder-to-reach groups. As one programme staff member reflected, *“In hindsight, we made a number of assumptions around how it is to work with young people across such a huge age range. Older young people have different competing demands on their time, and the same structure won’t work for them.”*

During the second half of the programme, an explicit strategy was devised to work with older and harder-to-reach groups. This involved:

- Developing a modified version of the curriculum for three “special groups” of older youths: secondary school students, young mothers and out-of-school young men (see Box 4 below). This guide aimed to facilitate dialogue rather than teach information.
- Training some coaches to deliver this shortened curriculum to older youths.
- Conducting specific outreach to encourage participation from these groups. For example, young men were targeted through existing football clubs and secondary school students were reached in their schools, through an approach that worked in close collaboration with teachers and was aligned to the school term.
- Providing childcare support to young mothers to enable them to participate.
- Holding a football tournament for the young men, as a key incentive. Staff reflected that this group wanted more “real” competitive football, rather than the more informal approach that worked well with younger groups.

This approach proved successful in engaging these cohorts, particularly secondary school youths. Just over 20% of the total programme participants were from the special groups (see Table 5). However, it should be noted that the programme reached relatively modest numbers of the hardest to reach out-of-school participants – this group represents just under 8% of the total young people reached through the programme.

<sup>22</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 2.1.

<sup>23</sup> Programme Options Paper, August 2016.

Table 5. Number of special group participants

Group	Kisumu	Mount Elgon	Total
Secondary school youth	287	310	<b>597</b>
Young mothers	50	30	<b>80</b>
Out-of-school young men	169	100	<b>269</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>946</b>

Overall, the programme experience highlights a potential trade-off between recruiting large numbers of easier-to-reach young people through schools and channelling resources towards engaging smaller numbers of hard-to-reach groups. While working through schools may mean some of the most at-risk youth are left out, it has the advantage of engaging sufficient numbers for the programme to gain a strong foothold in the community, potentially making it easier to reach large numbers of adults (i.e. families of participants) in the attempt to shift harmful social norms.

**There is strong evidence to suggest the programme successfully raised young people’s knowledge and awareness about VAWG, built their confidence, self-esteem and life skills and improved interactions between girls and boys.** Pre- and post-cohort assessments consistently showed an increase in self-reported confidence and self-esteem. In the second half of the programme, almost 95% of participants strongly agreed that they felt good about themselves at the end of their cohort, compared with 60% at the start (see Table 6). Baseline data was not collected in Cohort 1, but at the end of the cohort, the rates of self-reported confidence, esteem, and life skills were similarly high.<sup>24</sup> Change was particularly notable for the out-of-school young mothers and young men – well over 90% in both locations said they felt good about themselves at the end of the programme, from a considerably lower baseline than for the younger groups, particularly in Mount Elgon.<sup>25</sup>

As illustrated in Table 6, the vast majority of young people at the end of their respective cohorts also strongly agreed that they felt confident playing football with people of the other sex, and in speaking up for themselves – with the biggest differences often observed among girls and the out-of-school groups. Self-assessments showed an increase in self-reported life skills, including around working with others, dealing with conflict without violence, and asking for help in a situation where young people were being hurt.<sup>26</sup>

Table 6. Percentage of Cohort 2, 3 and special group participants who ‘strongly agreed’ to the following statements at the start and end of their cohort<sup>27</sup>

	Boys	Girls	Total
<b>I feel confident playing football with people of the other sex</b>			
Start of cohort	53.2%	44.1%	<b>48.8%</b>
End of cohort	89.9%	84.5%	<b>87.3%</b>
<b>I feel confident speaking up for myself and saying what I feel</b>			
Start of cohort	38.2%	36.2%	<b>37.3%</b>
End of cohort	85.1%	83.9%	<b>84.5%</b>
<b>If I disagree with someone, I am confident to sort it out without using violence</b>			
Start of cohort	32.2%	38.9%	<b>35.2%</b>
End of cohort	88.6%	92.2%	<b>90.2%</b>
<b>If a boy or a man was hurting a girl I knew, I would do something to try and stop him</b>			
Start of cohort	43.1%	47.6%	<b>45.1%</b>
End of cohort	89.5%	91.7%	<b>90.5%</b>

<sup>24</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 2.1.

<sup>25</sup> In Kisumu, 69% of out-of-school boys and 34% of young mothers strongly agreed with the statement “I feel good about myself” at the start of the cohort, compared with 98% and 94% at the end. In Mount Elgon, only 11% of out-of-school boys and no out-of-school girls agreed with the statement “I feel good about myself” at the start of the cohort, compared with 96% and 91% at the end.

<sup>26</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 2.1.

<sup>27</sup> Data from cohort 1 is not included as the assessment was not conducted at the start of the cohort, only at the end.

	Boys	Girls	Total
<b>I feel good about myself</b>			
Start of cohort	60.1%	60.5%	<b>60.3%</b>
End of cohort	94.0%	95.1%	<b>94.6%</b>
<b>If someone was hurting me, I would feel able to ask for help</b>			
Start of cohort	50.3%	43.0%	<b>47.0%</b>
End of cohort	90.1%	93.7%	<b>91.7%</b>
<b>I can work well with other people</b>			
Start of cohort	57.8%	56.8%	<b>57.3%</b>
End of cohort	91.7%	93.0%	<b>92.3%</b>
<b>I respect other people's opinions and listen to what they have to say</b>			
Start of cohort	39.5%	47.7%	<b>43.2%</b>
End of cohort	92.6	95.5%	<b>93.9%</b>

These findings from the monitoring data were corroborated by young people, parents and duty bearers consulted for the evaluation, who overwhelmingly felt the programme had helped boys and girls make good decisions, discriminate between “good” and “bad” friends, protect themselves from violence and speak out where violence was experienced or witnessed. Many young people and adults noted the increased confidence and assertiveness of girls in particular, and several felt the programme had helped young people avoid harmful situations including alcohol, drugs and gangs.

*Children that joined [Kenya Timz] have changed. They know their rights and they also know good and bad touch. They know how to raise an alarm if anything goes wrong and know how to help themselves even if the parent is not around (Women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*[Kenya Timz] has helped me so much because nowadays I have the courage to speak in front of people. I can also speak in the school's assembly, the teachers and I also spoke in front of people in the community festival (Older girls, Kisumu).*

An informal quiz was conducted during each cohort to examine changes in knowledge around key curriculum areas. The quiz was conducted in groups using questions with multiple-choice answers, and so the data does not provide a fully robust measure of participants' knowledge; however, it does provide a general indication. The quiz covered four broad topics linked to the curriculum: examples of violence; legal rights; what to do if a girl experiences violence; and puberty and sexual and reproductive health. Across all of these topics and for all groups of young people, the proportion of correct answers increased after the weekly sessions. Overall, in three of the four curriculum areas, more than 90% of participants (boys and girls) demonstrated correct knowledge.<sup>28,29</sup> However, only 83% of participants demonstrated correct knowledge on puberty and sexual and reproductive health at the end of their cohort. This may reflect ongoing challenges in capacitating coaches to deliver sexual and reproductive health content, particularly in Mount Elgon. Table 7 shows the overall increases across the programme participants, split by curriculum area.

<sup>28</sup> This compares with 66% in Mount Elgon and 61% in Kisumu at the start of the cohort. See Supplementary Annex, output indicator 2.1.

<sup>29</sup> Overall, at the end of cohorts 2 and 3 and the special groups, more than 90% of participants (boys and girls) demonstrated correct knowledge in three of the four curriculum areas in Mount Elgon, and more than 99% in Kisumu. In cohort 1, this stood at over 80% across all four curriculum areas by the end of the curriculum in both locations.

Table 7. Proportion of young people answering correctly, summarised across cohorts by curriculum area

	Start of module 3 (%)	End of module 4 (%)
Examples of violence	50.0%	90.8%
Kisumu	54.4%	96.9%
Mount Elgon	46.4%	85.8%
Legal rights	77.1%	93.0%
Kisumu	91.5%	99.5%
Mount Elgon	65.5%	87.8%
Puberty and Sexual and Reproductive Health	48.6%	83.0%
Kisumu	43.6%	95.1%
Mount Elgon	52.5%	73.1%
What should a girl do if she experiences violence?	57.5%	91.8%
Kisumu	68.2%	99.3%
Mount Elgon	48.7%	85.8%
<b>Overall</b>	<b>56.1%</b>	<b>89.1%</b>

When asked to reflect on how things had changed for them in the endline focus groups, many young people discussed the things they had learnt – with particular emphasis on knowledge about their rights, different types of violence and “good and bad touch”,<sup>30</sup> how to avoid situations that may put them at risk of violence and what to do if violence was experienced – including how to report and what services to access.

*I know what do to in case of sexual assault. I also know how to help other girls when they are sexually assaulted... I am now aware that every individual has rights (Older girls, Kisumu).*

*A good touch is when you touch somebody that person is comfortable and individuals do not complain but a bad touch is when...the person touched feels uncomfortable (Older boys from cohort 1, Kapsokwony).*

Finally, many young people, coaches and community members suggested the programme had improved relationships and interactions between girls and boys. For example, one girl from Kisumu reported, “*In the past I didn’t have boys as my friends but now I do.*”<sup>31</sup> In Kopsiro specifically, several young people and adults suggested the programme had helped improve relationships between people from different parts of the mountain – a potentially important insight given the history of violent conflict in the area noted in Section 3.1.

*I stopped looking at individuals saying that they are from the top or bottom of the mountain. I realised that we are all human beings and we are all the same (Out-of-school boys, Kopsiro).*

<sup>30</sup> “Good and bad touch” was a module covered in the curriculum, aimed to teach young people about recognising appropriate and inappropriate behaviours.

<sup>31</sup> Younger girls, Kisumu.

#### Box 4. Moving towards a shorter, more integrated curriculum

One of the key adaptations within the programme was a change in the curriculum. In the second half of the programme, a decision was made to shorten the curriculum from 22 weeks to 17 weeks, and to develop a revised approach that integrated football more closely with thematic content. This involved reducing the number of sit-down sessions and instead delivering programme messages through activities on the football pitch, using games as a way to teach key messages and encourage young people to think about gender and VAWG.

The shortened curriculum was simplified, removing content that was felt to be too heavy and difficult to deliver (e.g. in relation to laws around violence). It had the advantage of allowing the programme to finish in time with the school term. During the first cohort, misalignment had resulted in major challenges, as participants moved schools following the holidays, which meant a great deal of effort was required from coaches to follow up with participants and get them to complete the curriculum. In addition, programme staff felt the integrated curriculum was more engaging than sit-down thematic sessions and provided an *“opportunity to break down barriers, help young people feel comfortable with each other and learn in a fun way so they feel more engaged and interactive and bring out more conversations and ideas.”* This was particularly important where young people came to the sessions directly from school, which made it harder to maintain their concentration. Although the new curriculum had considerably more integrated activities, it was predominantly still made up of sit-down sessions, and some programme staff felt this did not go far enough to really integrating practical sessions. However, staff emphasised that this approach *“requires a lot of good facilitation skills to take it beyond the play into discussing behaviours and attitudes”*, suggesting this approach demands more from the coaches.

It was not possible to investigate in any detail the difference in outcomes for young people going through the old and new curriculum, given the scope of the endline evaluation (discussed in Section 2.5 above). However, monitoring data and endline FGDs found that participants exposed to both the longer and the shorter curriculum were similarly highly satisfied with the programme, and achieved similarly positive results in the knowledge quiz and in relation to self-reported confidence, self-esteem or life skills. A slightly higher proportion of participants in both locations said they had enjoyed and learnt a lot from the education sessions in later cohorts (where activities were more integrated) compared with the first cohort, where the curriculum was longer and involved more sit-down activities; however, it is not possible to read too much into this as the difference is fairly small.

The downside to the shorter curriculum was that it *“felt a bit rushed”* (Programme staff member). Both the longer and shorter versions were also fairly rigid, leading to a tight schedule that allowed limited opportunities for open reflection or for certain issues to be discussed in more depth. One staff member reflected that more *“open spaces”* for discussion would have been beneficial, although coaches would have required support to manage these spaces effectively.

**The programme also appears to have had some unintended positive influences on young people’s behaviour, particularly in Mount Elgon. These included the promotion of discipline, respect and school performance – which may have contributed to community buy-in.** Many participants, particularly in Mount Elgon, felt the programme had helped promote *“good manners”* among young people, along with respect, obedience, discipline and responsibility – especially in relation to treatment of parents and elders (see Box 5 below for an example recounted by the coaches). Others, including a teacher from Kopsiro, felt the programme had improved students’ English and reading and writing skills, or general school performance, because the children were communicating in English during the programme. Although it was not possible to explore the reasons for these unintended outcomes in great depth, staff hypothesised that it was linked to the coaches acting as role models, as well as certain aspects of the curriculum that emphasised setting goals for the future and considering values. Especially in Kisumu, several coaches had previous experience with other NGOs, and were able to bring this to the programme to share messages around issues such as sanitation and hygiene.

These positive changes, while not a core part of the programme’s aims, seem to have helped promote community buy-in through demonstrating the value of the programme to parents, particularly in Mount Elgon. Coaches felt that *“parents came to appreciate [the programme] because they saw the change to participants.”* This was corroborated by some community members and service providers:

*The behaviour of our children at home has drastically changed for the better. When the woman of the household decides to send a child to go somewhere and bring her something currently they obey and do as they are told (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*When this programme came, people were not for it, but now the locals have accepted the programme, and the reason... is that they have seen the changes in their children. One time we were in a meeting and a teacher stood up and said that he was proud of the programme because before the children could not express themselves in English (County government, Kopsiro).*

**There is also strong evidence that young people have shared what they learned with others.** The curriculum consistently emphasised the importance of young people sharing the lessons they were learning about violence and rights. The programme activity books were also designed to support this – printed in Swahili so young people could take them home and show them to their parents. FGDs with young people and adults in both locations, but particularly in Mount Elgon, suggested this had been successful, and young people had taken the messages of the programme to their families and friends. This is supported by the minutes of the November 2016 implementation meeting in Mount Elgon, at which parents said they had been able to look at the activity books to see what their children had been learning. Several coaches, young people and adults felt this approach to sharing learning had helped influence parents and others not involved in the programme.

*On my end, I got the information about [Kenya Timz] from my children who came and told me about it. Personally, it has really helped me because it has built for me trust and respect with family and friends and also fighting with my wife has ended (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*It has made us good ambassadors to other young people through the teachings (Older girls, Kisumu).*

While these anecdotes suggest the potential value of encouraging young people to act as ambassadors and share their learning, there was no sign from the survey that parents of participants had significantly different attitudes to parents of non-participants.<sup>32</sup> There are also some real potential risks when relying on young people as young as 10 years old to discuss sensitive topics with their parents – as outlined by some stakeholders in Kisumu and one teacher in Kopsiro:

*We realised that when we teach children and then they give the same message to the parents, for instance girls and boys being equal... some families didn't take that information in a good way. It seemed that were interfering with their gender roles. There are tasks for boys and for the girls (Teacher, Kopsiro).*

While there was limited evidence to suggest a widespread backlash in either Mount Elgon or Kisumu, this is an important risk to consider and monitor in future programmes attempting to use this mechanism.

**It has been challenging to maintain engagement with young people once they have completed the curriculum.** Participants in the first cohort completed the curriculum in mid-2016. Programme staff grappled with the question of how to maintain engagement with this group, with limited resources, in parallel with running the sessions again with new groups. The approach decided upon was to encourage young people to continue attending the quarterly community festivals. However, this was a relatively

**Box 5. Changing behaviour, changing lives: a story from coaches in Kisumu**

*"An individual child from Nyalenda who was a truant in school, violent and engaged in child labour against the will of the parents and teachers, requested to get enrolled in the programme. The teachers turned down the child's request due to the bad record he had in school. However, the coaches insisted and embraced the child and incorporated him in the programme. As the programme progressed the parent came to appreciate the work the coaches were doing as the child had changed in behaviour and attitude. The teachers testified to this and the performance tremendously improved." Coaches felt the programme had contributed through the thematic sessions on values, good and bad friends, community and responsibility, but also through "coaches embracing him by showing love, giving him a sense of belonging."*

<sup>32</sup> Statistical tests predominantly showed no significant difference between the pattern of responses from parents of participants compared with parents of non-participants, across all the attitude and behaviour questions asked in the survey.

light-touch approach, and may not have been sufficient to ensure a good level of engagement and continuity. Coaches and programme staff mentioned that young people were disappointed that they were no longer allowed to take part in the weekly sessions. Although there were no signs from the FGDs with the earlier cohorts that they had forgotten what they had learnt, or lost enthusiasm for the programme, this seems to have been a missed opportunity to continue reinforcing messages with the earlier group and nurture leaders and role models among them.

#### 4.1.2. Coaches

**Delivering the programme through community coaches was highly successful. There is strong evidence that coaches developed ability and confidence to deliver the programme and commitment to its aims, in many cases becoming role models who will hopefully continue advocating for girls' rights in the future.** In total, 79 community coaches were still active at the end of the programme, of whom 48% were female (see Table 8). All of the coaches felt they had gained new knowledge and skills as a result of taking part in the programme, and self-assessments showed a steady increase over the course of the programme in coaches' confidence to deliver inclusive football coaching and to run sessions on sexual violence.<sup>33</sup> This was corroborated by a programme staff member closely involved in training the coaches, who felt that *"over time there was a real unity among them... it was inspiring to see them implementing, working in teams, men and women together."* Towards the end of the programme, a subset of 21 coaches were selected to be "coach educators", and trained to train others in delivering the Kenya Timz curriculum. The coach educators were responsible for setting up the special group projects, and training up secondary schools to co-deliver the curriculum to the secondary "special groups". While this is a potentially important mechanism for sustainability (see Section 5.2), one programme staff member flagged that this had generated some tensions among the coaches, as it was based on a competency assessment and selection process and not all the coaches were selected. This suggests this approach may have implications for team morale.

Table 8. Number of coaches still active at the end of the programme

Location	Men	Women	Total
Kisumu	18 (46.2%)	21 (53.8%)	<b>39 (100%)</b>
Mount Elgon	23 (57.5%)	17 (42.5%)	<b>40 (100%)</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>41 (51.9%)</b>	<b>38 (48.1%)</b>	<b>79 (100%)</b>

FGDs with young people throughout the programme were overwhelmingly positive about the coaches, suggesting they were viewed as positive role models and seen as knowledgeable, encouraging, respectful, hardworking, trustworthy and fair.<sup>34</sup> The outcome harvesting workshops also provided several examples of coaches mediating conflicts, encouraging positive behaviours and supporting young people, and many coaches expressed a commitment to continuing to advocate for women's rights and the eradication of VAWG after the programme was over.

**However, there have been various challenges in working with community coaches, which suggests this approach requires dedicated and ongoing capacity building and close management.** The coaches were recruited from their communities, and therefore unsurprisingly came to the programme with many of the prejudices that the programme was trying to tackle. For example, despite developing a clear code of conduct, and regularly reinforcing this through monthly implementation meetings, there were a small number of serious incidents involving coaches over the course of the programme that resulted in suspensions, including one case where a male coach assaulted a female coach. Seeking to influence coaches' attitudes over time, through regular training and engagement, was a crucial part of the programme. For example, the programme provided training and support on gender issues through Moving the Goalposts. This was reflected in coaches' self-reported attitudes: there was generally a steady movement towards more equitable attitudes among the coaches in both locations over the course of the

<sup>33</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 1.4.

<sup>34</sup> Discussed in more detail in the midline reports.

programme (see Table 9 below),<sup>35</sup> as well as in several of the stories told by coaches during the outcome harvesting workshop (see Box 6).<sup>36</sup>

*By engaging them in discussions around the violence and implications for the survivors, we have seen a transformation among coaches on attitudes and behaviours... and also teaching the children [has been a form of] experiential learning (Programme staff).*

Second, just over 20% of the 101 coaches originally recruited were no longer active at the end of the programme, meaning ongoing recruitment and capacity building was required.<sup>37</sup> At midline, programme staff reported that there were particular challenges in recruiting and retaining women, owing to lower levels of experience and confidence in coaching, and a higher proportion of female coaches left the programme because they had got married or were moving away for jobs.

**Box 6. Changing our attitudes and behaviours: stories from the coaches**

*“One coach is married and has lots of girls and boys. He was initially putting emphasis on the boys, but after going through trainings, he has changed his attitudes from on the boy child to the girl child. His daughter is now in secondary school and he will make sure that he will clear all the fees. In relation to that, his attitudes changed” (Kopsiro coaches).*

*“Before being engaged into this programme many women coaches believed that football was meant for men, and could rarely take part in football activities... They were activists of peace in the society [but could not] reach a large number of young people as they lacked a tool for reaching the participants. But after being trained... as inclusive coaches, they were able to use football as a tool for reaching young people” (Kisumu coaches).*

Table 9. Reported attitudes of coaches at the start of the programme (during training) and towards the end

Statement	Location	Reported agreement (where 1 is totally disagree and 10 is totally agree)		Trend observed in data?
		Start	End	
<b>Gender-equitable</b>				
A man and a woman should decide together whether and when to have children	Mount Elgon	9.9	10.0	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	9.9	9.3	▼ less equitable
Girls have the same right as boys to study and finish schools	Mount Elgon	10.0	10.0	no change
	Kisumu	10.0	10.0	no change
If a man sees another man beating a woman, he should stop it	Mount Elgon	9.7	9.9	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	9.7	9.7	no change
Women can be leaders in the community just as well as men can	Mount Elgon	9.9	10.0	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	9.9	10.0	▲ more equitable
<b>Gender-inequitable</b>				
A girl is to blame if she is raped or defiled	Mount Elgon	1.3	1.3	no change
	Kisumu	1.3	1.1	▲ more equitable
A man should have the final word about decisions in his home	Mount Elgon	2.4	1.3	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	2.4	1.4	▲ more equitable
If a girl is raped or defiled, it brings shame to her family	Mount Elgon	2.8	1.5	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	2.8	1.5	▲ more equitable
If a man is insulted, he should defend his name with force if he has to	Mount Elgon	1.2	1.2	no change
	Kisumu	1.2	1.2	no change
It is disgusting to see men acting like women	Mount Elgon	5.1	2.8	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	4.3	4.7	▼ less equitable
There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten	Mount Elgon	2.1	1.0	▲ more equitable
	Kisumu	2.1	1.1	▲ more equitable

### 4.1.3. Community members

**The programme has been broadly successful in engaging community members through festivals and a multi-media campaign, reaching an estimated 12,000 people in person and 300,000 through the radio**

<sup>35</sup> Note that statistical tests could not be performed on these data, thus these are trends rather than being statistically significant.

<sup>36</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.1.

<sup>37</sup> See Supplementary Annex, outcome indicator 1.1.



**programmes. These activities have encouraged active debate and discussion around gender and VAWG.**

The main activity for engaging community members was the quarterly community festivals, where youth participants played football matches and performed in awareness raising activities, and community conversations (large-scale group discussions) were held to challenge attitudes and behaviours that help support and perpetuate VAWG. In total, 22 community festival events were held across Kisumu and Mount Elgon, with over 4,000 participants (see Table 10). Programme staff reported that most participants were parents of the young people taking part in the programme – this was corroborated by the survey, which found that over 60% of respondents whose children had taken part had also attended one of the community events (compared with 17.6% of respondents whose children had not participated in Kisumu, and 6% in Mount Elgon). Records also show that a number of duty bearers attended.

The programme also involved a six-month multi-media campaign, starting in September 2016. Six market day activation events reached just under 6,000 people, and discussion forums associated with these had 1,306 participants in total.<sup>38</sup> Programme staff felt that holding these events in markets had helped boost reach, as they brought information to people where they were, rather than expecting them to come to a particular location. Listening figures for radio shows was not available from the stations, but the programme estimated that 328,215 people had tuned in.<sup>39</sup> Just under 40% of the survey respondents in Mount Elgon and 24% in Kisumu said they had listened to one or more of the radio programmes.<sup>40</sup> Over the course of the five weeks and across the three stations, 133 calls from members of the public were received, and 256 text messages.

Table 10. Number of participants in community festivals and conversations during the festivals

	Women		Men		Total	
	Attended festivals	Attended community conversations	Attended festivals	Attended community conversations	Attended festivals	Attended community conversations
Kisumu	1165 (55.8%)	770 (48.0%)	924 (44.2%)	834 (52.0%)	2089 (100%)	1604 (100%)
Mount Elgon	952 (47.7%)	650 (56.1%)	1045 (52.3%)	508 (43.9%)	1997 (100%)	1158 (100%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2117 (51.8%)</b>	<b>1420 (51.4%)</b>	<b>1969 (48.2%)</b>	<b>1342 (48.6%)</b>	<b>4086 (100%)</b>	<b>2762 (100%)</b>

Our review suggests that the community components were well designed, which aligns with evidence around approaches that are likely to be effective in challenging VAWG.<sup>41</sup> For example, the multi-media campaign recruited and trained 80 “opinion leaders” – influential members of the community – who helped drum up interest in events and participated in the radio shows. The community conversations provided regular opportunities for dialogue, to help community members reflect on social expectations and consider alternatives to the *status quo*. Programme staff felt these were “*better than any workshop we could have run*” and noted that the approach was particularly successful in facilitating separate conversations with men and women, followed by a whole-group dialogue at the end where issues raised in each group could be discussed and debated. Finally, the activities were quite well integrated, building on and reinforcing one another:

- Several of the opinion leaders were also coaches, who already had substantial training and buy-in to the programme, and were able to lead conversations during the market day activities and sit on panels during the radio shows. Other opinion leaders were duty bearers and GTWG members the programme had already been working with.
- The radio programme advertised the market day activation events, and programme staff reported that many of the participants at these events were young people and parents who had already attended

<sup>38</sup> Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 3.2.

<sup>39</sup> Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 3.2.

<sup>40</sup> Survey question 501. In both locations, significantly more parents of participants had listened to the shows than parents of non-participants.

<sup>41</sup> Alexander-Scott et al. (2016).

community festivals. *“Some people heard and came along who were already pushing for change, including victims willing to be open and share their experience with community members. Not everyone was totally new.”*

- A counsellor was present at the market day events to provide support to survivors who wished to talk about their experiences, and the programme were able to signpost survivors to specific people within the GTWG as a result of their work with duty bearers.

At the end of the community conversations, participants were informally polled, and over 95% across all festivals said they had an increased awareness of VAWG, felt their attitudes had changed and said they would change their behaviour in some way – although, as this poll was conducted through individuals raising their hands in a public space, it was likely subject to social desirability bias.<sup>42</sup> The programme also promoted the “Our Hands Are Not for Hurting” campaign, which involved participants taking a pledge to support ending VAWG. Almost all of the participants agreed to take this pledge – although this was framed as a broad commitment rather than as a pledge to take specific actions, so it was not possible to follow up on how far these commitments had been followed.

Notes from the community conversations and discussion forums suggest that sensitive topics were discussed openly, with rich debates between men and women. This was corroborated by evaluation interviews and FGDs: several participants in both locations (men, women and duty bearers) felt the programme’s events had been educational and had helped start important discussions around violence; its consequences and how to prevent it; and the roles of men and women in society. Programme staff reported that the conversations were sparking future dialogue around gender-related issues, for example in chief’s *barazas*, although it was not possible to verify this through the evaluation.

*The community events educated the villagers, even our husbands. The community events are very important – we could talk about the way we were being violated while our husbands are seated. (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*The community [Mount Elgon] is usually really closed up, but during festivals, it really opened up a lot of undiscussed issues... Afterwards they would say “Thank you, don’t fail to inform us when you’re having the next one” (Programme staff).*

**However, there are some concerns over the scale and scope of community activities relative to the objectives the programme originally hoped to achieve.** There are important questions over the likelihood of programme activities creating any major shift in community attitudes and behaviours in the two-year span of the programme, given the relatively low exposure for adult community members compared to the greater intensity of engagement with young people as the primary target audience. Attendance at events was based on self-selection, meaning the programme is likely to have mainly targeted “low hanging fruit” in the form of parents of participants and people already interested in VAWG issues. Because participation for community members was *ad hoc* rather than targeting specific individuals over a longer period of time, many community members are likely to have attended only one or two events. Finally, while the programme succeeded in reaching an impressive number of community members through its festival and market day events, this still represents a small proportion of the local population, and, while the radio drama reached many more listeners, it was very short in duration. There was some concern among a number of programme staff members that the multi-media campaign was implemented too late in the programme and was too short to achieve longer-term change – concerns that are supported by the literature on addressing VAWG discussed in Box 1 above.

*If you look at the change process, we cannot achieve change in a day. This requires longer-term engagement... to support people who are already doing the right things to influence [others] – and the ones already changing need support because in six months... if there is no close support system, they are likely to relapse (Programme staff).*

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<sup>42</sup> Supplementary annex, output indicator 3.1.

**Box 7. What difference did football make in helping engage young people and the community?**

Overall, the evaluation provided support for the programme's theory that football can provide a particularly effective vehicle for addressing VAWG.

**First, football proved the “hook” – a strong incentive for boys but also girls to participate**, in a context where it is a nationally loved sport that *“every child loves to play.”* This is true not just for young people but also for adults, providing an incentive to attend community festivals. Staff viewed football as a particularly important incentive for boys: *“Without a sport we would have struggled to work with them.”* There were initial concerns that girls would be put off by the football aspect, as it is traditionally seen as a boys' sport, but *“that was debunked,”* as recruitment figures show. Staff felt that football also kept young people interested and engaged – especially through integrated sessions that combined football with the curriculum – which is supported by the high retention rates of both boys and girls. This is important given that recruitment and engagement of significant numbers of participants (especially men and boys) is one of the key implementation challenges experienced by other programmes attempting to tackle VAWG (Alexander-Scott et al., 2016). The Premier League brand also seems to have played an important role in encouraging participation, although it also gave rise to some misunderstandings and required careful expectation management (discussed further in Section 5).

**Second, because football is traditionally considered a “man's game”, programme staff felt that actively engaging girls provided a potentially powerful contribution to breaking down negative stereotypes** and encouraging girls' confidence as well as generating spaces for girls and boys to interact in a positive way. This can help tackle issues of low self-esteem among girls alongside inequitable attitudes among boys, both of which may contribute to high rates of VAWG. The monitoring data suggests a marked increase in self-reported confidence among girls, and there is clear evidence that the programme has improved interaction and increased opportunities for friendship between girls and boys, as described above.

**Third, football provides a good and relatively low-resource entry point to communities**, as it requires relatively few resources, and some of the physical and social infrastructure may already be present – in the form of existing football pitches, teams and coaches in the area. These can provide avenues for recruiting coaches and participants, and mean capacitated coaches can be left behind to continue working with young people, potentially feeding into sustainability (see Section 5.2). This has particularly been evident in Kisumu. However, community sensitisation is required so people can understand the purpose of the programme, and how football can be used to tackle social challenges. There were some signs that community members were initially unclear about the connection between the programme and VAWG, which helped feed into unrealistic expectations, as described in Section 5.1. One service provider explained:

*When they came, I could not understand how they were talking of reducing violence against women and girls and yet they were playing football. But when they came with that programme whereby before playing, the children were taught on good touches and bad touches, how a brother and sister can relate and how a brother can protect the sister, I now realised that that was creating something on the minds of these young girls and boys... I realised that you could pass different information to people by using a different approach (Service provider, Kopsiro).*

**Finally, many young people and community members, particularly in Mount Elgon, mentioned the many benefits of football** that would potentially not be associated with a non-sport-based programme, including fitness, exercise, keeping busy and active and a structured, rules-based, team environment. Some suggested this helped young people avoid “loitering” and use up energy in a productive way, keeping out of harmful situations that might contribute to violence. One young man explained: *“As you associate with fellow young men in the field and play, you keep on correcting one another... the bad behaviour that you would have picked from home or from the community begins to fade away simply through bonding through football.”* This is supported by clear evidence that the programme influenced youth behaviour in a positive way, as described above. Programme staff also noted the added value of integrated football and thematic activities, which have the potential to be more fun, engaging and memorable than traditional sit-down educational sessions (discussed in Box 4 above).

**However, it should be noted that football is not a “magic bullet,” with the programme recognising the importance of combining football with other strategies.** Football was just one component in the project, and, where there is evidence of change to harmful attitudes and practices, this was not purely a result of the football activities, as discussed further throughout later sections of this report. Rather, football proved a very effective entry point and vehicle for a broader programme aiming to achieve attitudinal change, when combined with thematic educational activities and engagement with duty bearers and the community.

## 4.2. Violence

### How has the programme contributed to reducing VAWG?

The programme aimed to target a number of different forms of violence that occur in Kisumu and Mount Elgon, notably sexual violence, violence within intimate relationships and physical violence in the wider community. This section reflects on evidence of progress towards these goals.

Sexual violence is an ongoing problem in both communities, with rape frequently mentioned as a continual risk facing girls. While there is not much sign that this has changed since the baseline in Kisumu, in Mount Elgon there is some evidence that rape and defilement cases reduced over the course of the programme. The mechanisms of change are considered to be increasing knowledge about reporting, shifting attitudes and awareness among boys and men and increased understanding of girls about the situations that may put them at risk, as well as the legal framework. However, this finding should be interpreted with significant caution, given the inherent difficulty of accurately measuring this form of violence, the potential unreliability of the monitoring data and the risk of bias among respondents. More data is required over a longer period of time to determine whether this trend represents a true change.

There is no evidence that the programme has had an impact on intimate partner violence (IPV) or community-level violence in either Mount Elgon or Kisumu. However, this is not unexpected, given the programme's duration. The programme seems to have contributed to a shift in the attitudes of young people around the acceptability of violence, particularly in Mount Elgon. At community level, the evidence suggested that there might be a positive direction of travel; however, social expectations around the acceptability of violence, as well as inequitable gender norms, are still widespread.

In addition, while there seems to have been some shift in awareness about sexual violence and attitudes towards reporting, there is still a long way to go before survivors of sexual violence are able to report without fear of the consequences. Police, health centre and programme reporting statistics provide no evidence to suggest a notable increase in formal reporting. Stigma and shame still represent significant challenges.

#### 4.2.1. Sexual violence

**Sexual violence is an ongoing problem in both communities, with rape frequently mentioned as a continual risk facing girls. While there is not much sign that this has changed since the baseline in Kisumu, in Mount Elgon there is some evidence that rape and defilement cases reduced over the course of the programme.** In both locations and similarly to baseline, younger girls and boys spontaneously mentioned rape as a bad thing that happened to girls in the community.

*A girl may leave home and go out and come back at night when people have slept. On the road someone can kidnap them and rape them (Younger girls, Kisumu).*

*Life is bad because many people are drunkards and so when we are sent at night we risk being attacked on the way (Older girls, Kapsokwony).*

The ongoing risk of rape in both communities is supported by quantitative data from the polling booth exercise and from police and health centre reports. At endline, five of thirty-four older girls in the FGDs said they had been threatened, pressured or forced into sexual relations within the past six months.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Results from polling booth exercise "In the past six months, have you had sexual relations with someone because they threatened, pressured, forced, or hurt you?" One of six girls asked this question in Mount Elgon said "yes" (17%) as did four of twenty-eight girls in Kisumu (14%). At baseline, 13 of 67 girls across both locations said 'yes' to this question (19%).

Over the course of the programme, 60 cases of sexual violence were reported to the police, and 97 cases treated by health centres, across programme target areas in both Mount Elgon and Kisumu.<sup>44</sup>

Despite this, the vast majority of stakeholders in Mount Elgon felt that rape cases had reduced – including young people, parents, police, teachers and religious leaders. While it is not possible to put too much weight on these qualitative claims, given the real risk of confirmation bias, reports collected from police stations and health centres also show a clear reduction in reported cases from baseline, particularly for girls under 18 – this is discussed further below.<sup>45</sup> At endline, the survey also showed a statistically significant difference in the pattern of reporting of prevalence – more respondents said sexual violence “never” happened (31.3%) compared with baseline (17.3%) – see Table 11.

This was not the case in Kisumu. While some FGD participants felt sexual violence was reducing, this was much less of a clear pattern in the qualitative data. There were also no significant differences in responses to the survey question about how often violence of a sexual nature happened in the community. Also, while fewer cases of sexual violence were reported to the police and health centres in the last six months of the programme, the numbers are too small to be meaningful and represent a much less clear trend than in Mount Elgon.<sup>46</sup>

Table 11. Survey responses to Q.407 “How often does violence of sexual nature happen around here?”<sup>47</sup>

	Kisumu			Mount Elgon		
	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>
Often	18 (12.2%)	23 (15.3%)	No significant change	15 (10.0%)	16 (10.7%)	▼ reduction
Sometimes	82 (55.8%)	81 (54.0%)		104 (69.3%)	86 (57.3%)	
Never	46 (31.3%)	44 (29.3%)		26 (17.3%)	47 (31.3%)	
No response	1 (0.7%)	2 (1.3%)		5 (3.3%)	1 (0.7%)	
Total	147 (100%)	150 (100%)		150 (100%)	150 (100%)	

**Particularly in Mount Elgon and to a lesser extent Kisumu, many stakeholders felt the programme had contributed to a reduction in rape cases through increasing knowledge about reporting, shifting attitudes and awareness among boys and men and making girls more aware of situations that may put them at risk. The legal framework and other community advocates also appear to have played an important role.** FGDs and interviews – mainly in Mount Elgon but also to a lesser extent Kisumu – suggested the programme might have helped reduce sexual violence through three main pathways.

First, through increasing knowledge about reporting – making perpetrators more aware that they can be reported and jailed, and helping girls know that they can and should report.

*The figures are now going down because the perpetrators know the consequences... Of late, girls have been brought on board, so they know what is wrong and what is right and the legal mechanism or who their big brother is who they can report to (Health worker, Kopsiro).*

*Currently, everything is brought into the open... young men are now conscious of their decisions because they now know that if they fool around with girls, it is similar to having stepped on an electric wire (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

<sup>44</sup> Results from reports of violence data: Over the course of the programme, 34 cases of sexual violence were reported to the police in programme locations in Kisumu, and 56 in Mount Elgon. There were 22 cases reported to health centres in programme locations in Kisumu and 75 in Mount Elgon. See Supplementary Annex A, impact indicators.

<sup>45</sup> Results from reports of violence data: Mean reported cases of violence in Mt Elgon, across police, health centre and project reports over a three-month period at baseline, midline and endline: baseline = 2.6 cases of sexual violence for girls under 18; midline = 1.8 cases; endline = 0.4 cases. See Supplementary Annex A, impact indicators.

<sup>46</sup> Results from reports of violence data: Mean reported cases of violence in Kisumu, across police, health centre and project reports over a three-month period at baseline, midline and endline: baseline = 0.2 cases of sexual violence for girls under 18; midline = 0.3 cases; endline = 0.1 cases. See Supplementary Annex A, impact indicators.

<sup>47</sup> Full question text: “We also understand that sometimes in a community there can also be violence of a sexual nature, for example rape or attempted rape of women and girls, or inappropriate touching of women and girls. How often does this happen around here?”

Second, some duty bearers felt the programme had increased community awareness around the importance of tackling sexual violence, helping shift attitudes that downplay rape or lead to it being hidden and covered up.

*We have these community festivals where we group the old men and women, put them and teach them. I think it has had an impact; people are now coming to their senses.* (Teacher, Kopsiro)

*To begin with, the creation of awareness that was done by the programme on the need to take care of our girls and women made the community to wake to the reality of the day. They came up with ways and means of dealing with situations* (County government stakeholder, Bungoma)

In Kisumu, coaches reported that community members had formed a “community action group” after the first community festival, to “check on violations and take action where necessary.” This group had taken a child who had been raped to hospital, “against the will of the family.” However, it was not clear exactly what this group was doing or whether it was still active.

There were also a few examples of older boys testifying that they had personally stopped harassing and even raping girls, because they now knew sexual violence was wrong (see Box 8).

*Things have changed drastically, and I use that word deliberately... The creation of awareness that was done by the programme on the need to take care of our girls and women made the community to wake to the reality of the day. They came up with ways and means of dealing with situations.* (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).

*The cases of rape have reduced because of the teachings that we have had from [the programme] which has really helped us shy away from rape and other bad behaviours that we used to do to our girls. We have stopped inappropriately touching our girls’ breasts, buttocks and other bad habits* (Secondary school boys, Kopsiro).

Finally, several people suggested the programme had raised awareness of unsafe places, such as the forest, and increased girls’ and parents’ knowledge about how to avoid or reduce the risk of attacks. This is interesting because it was a strong pattern but does not relate to shifting gender norms. For example, some groups said that parents were less likely to send children out at night and girls now go to the forest in groups.

*They are being told which areas are dangerous and they can be defiled if they are in those areas by themselves. And the kind of people they should keep around them. And what they need to do if something happens. I think that is what is bringing the change* (Teacher, Kisumu).

*Initially, the women could send their children to the mill late at night and the children could be raped, we could also send our children to the forest to go and fetch firewood, and they could be raped there... since we received teachings from the [programme], we have not witnessed such incidences up to date* (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).

Crucial to this reported success has been the legal framework around sexual violence, and a perceived increase in offenders being convicted, which several stakeholders felt had created a deterrent. This suggests an important interconnection between the law and the programme, which has educated people about legal and reporting channels.

#### Box 8. Reforming a perpetrator in Mount Elgon: a story from the coaches

During the September 2017 community festival in Mount Elgon, a young man in the out-of-school boys group admitted “I have changed my behaviour as I was a perpetrator and was forcing girls to have sex with me. That is rape and I no longer rape.”

During the outcome harvesting workshop, coaches explained the case in more detail. “He used to target girls when they went to take water from the river. There is some forest and he used to hide there... he continued up until recruitment for the programme. [At the festival] he decided that he would open up and told us the whole story. Everyone was perplexed and surprised. But he said that after he had undergone this education, he actually decided to be one of the ambassadors in the community where if anyone offended then he would be the one to report to the police.”

*We had a college boy who was sentenced for 25 years for defiling an under-age child...Word spread all over the market, now they know what happens to offenders. They have been taking it for granted but now they have seen it practically. That is deterrent (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

Other factors that may help explain the reported reduction in rape cases are the role of church and other advocates, such as teachers, whom several stakeholders felt had been important.

**Most young people and adult community members said they should and would seek medical help in the case of rape and then report to the police, and many stakeholders felt the programme had helped promote reporting – particularly through teaching young people about their rights and how to report. However, police, health centre and programme reporting statistics provide no evidence to suggest a notable increase in formal reporting.** In the final community festival, several men and women said they had learnt about the importance of speaking out and reporting violence rather than staying silent. There was also some suggestion that the programme had made it easier for survivors to speak out through empowering girls to know their rights and the steps to take in reporting, increasing their confidence to talk about issues and helping tackle the stigmatisation of survivors. As well as the British Council programme, this change was attributed to the advocacy of local leaders, and the support of other NGOs.

*Before when rape cases used to happen, reporting was not being done. The survivor of the ordeal... it was not easy for them to speak about it because the moment they talked about it, it seemed like something that would bring embarrassment... and so they would painfully hold it in such an issue and in the long run it would even bring some health issues for her. However, currently when this occurs, the first thing people get to understand is that this is not something that the survivor would have wished for and as a result, the issue is brought out in the public (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

There were also some examples of the coaches and programme staff directly helping support survivors of rape. For example, Mount Elgon coaches told the story of a young girl who had been raped by her uncle, and was helped to get support by her teacher who was also a coach so “*knew what to do.*” Counselling services were also provided during market day activation activities – leading to survivors of violence being referred to community elders and police for follow-up support.

However, while the qualitative data suggests a shift in willingness to report since baseline, this is not reflected in police and health centre figures. There was no notable upwards trend in the number of sexual violence cases reported over time, and in fact reports have declined in both locations, particularly Mount Elgon (discussed above). While this may reflect a reduction in cases overall, this does not reflect the usual expected pattern noted in the literature on VAWG, where reporting initially increases as a result of women and girls being empowered. In addition, despite a robust child protection policy and procedures to deal with disclosures of violence, across Mount Elgon and Kisumu only three cases of sexual violence were formally disclosed to programme staff over the whole two years of the programme. This seems likely to be an underestimation of the problem, especially when considered alongside the polling booth data finding that five of thirty-four older girls had been pressured into sex into the past six months. Programme staff felt that the reason for this was that girls were still unwilling to disclose, especially in cases where the perpetrator was known to them, for fear of the consequences.

**Similarly to baseline, there is a sense that many people would be afraid to report or feel that reporting would not get them anywhere – including because of ongoing distrust in the police. Many stakeholders also felt that informal mechanisms of justice were still used to respond to cases of rape.** Community members talked about the ongoing barriers to reporting sexual violence in several interviews and FGDs, as well as community conversations. These were similar to those at baseline – that women fear going to the police, especially “*when the perpetrator is rich and ready to pay their way out*”<sup>48</sup> or fear the consequences of reporting, “*especially when the perpetrators are released*”<sup>49</sup> or when “*girls are raped by people they are close to, for instance their fathers and uncles.*”<sup>50</sup> Many respondents, notably in Mount Elgon, felt that

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<sup>48</sup> Young mothers, Kapsokwony.

<sup>49</sup> Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro.

<sup>50</sup> Young mothers, Kisumu.

many families would still seek to solve rape cases informally within the community, using informal mechanisms of justice – ranging from beating up or killing the perpetrator to seeking financial redress from the perpetrator’s family. As at baseline, community members felt that “perpetrators and victims would solve the cases at home with the parents”<sup>51</sup> or “the perpetrator will be killed.”<sup>52</sup>

*The girl will be afraid to tell her parents because her parents will tell her to go back to the person who made her get pregnant and kick her out of the house (Younger girls, Kopsiro).*

*The chief will not help them because he/she will accept bribe from the perpetrator. This happens sometimes (Younger boys, Kisumu).*

**In addition, while the programme has started to make participants question stigmatising attitudes towards survivors of rape, potentially helping reduce barriers to reporting, there is clearly still a long way to go. There is strong evidence from both Kisumu and Mount Elgon that the community – including girls themselves – still view a survivor of rape as partly to blame because of what she was wearing, walking in unsafe areas or being drunk.** There is some indication in both locations that the programme has helped break down some barriers to reporting, as discussed above. There was also some evidence to suggest the programme had helped to encourage questioning of stigma towards survivors of rape among the youth participants. Older girls and boys were asked at the start and end of each cohort whether they agreed or disagreed that a girl was to blame if she were raped. Across all cohorts, there was a marked reduction in the proportion of young people agreeing with this statement – from 45.7% to 13.0% overall. Table 12 shows the breakdown by cohort.<sup>53</sup>

Table 12. Reported agreement with the statement “A girl is to blame if she is raped or defiled.”<sup>54,55</sup>

	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
<b>Start of cohort</b>	37.3%	52.6%	45.7%
<b>End of cohort</b>	9.0%	16.4%	13.0%
<b>Kisumu</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	24.1%	35.9%	30.9%
End of cohort	22.5%	11.1%	17.5%
<b>Out of school young people</b>			
Start of cohort	32.0%	53.8%	48.5%
End of cohort	0.0%	2.1%	1.6%
<b>Secondary school young people</b>			
Start of cohort	23.8%	49.4%	37.8%
End of cohort	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
<b>Mount Elgon</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	31.0%	61.9%	46.5%
End of cohort	9.8%	38.1%	23.8%
<b>Cohort 2: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	32.4%	40.4%	36.2%
End of cohort	6.4%	11.3%	8.9%
<b>Cohort 3: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	79.8%	75.4%	77.8%
End of cohort	1.2%	20.5%	10.8%
<b>Out of school young people</b>			
Start of cohort	71.4%	70.0%	70.3%
End of cohort	3.4%	2.2%	2.5%

<sup>51</sup> CSO stakeholder, Kopsiro.

<sup>52</sup> Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro.

<sup>53</sup> Attitudes test activity, see Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.2 for more details.

<sup>54</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.2 for further details.

<sup>55</sup> There is no Cohort 2 weekly data from Kisumu, since younger people were not asked this question.



	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
Secondary school young people			
Start of cohort	35.7%	47.7%	41.7%
End of cohort	19.9%	42.9%	31.3%

However, the focus groups suggest that stigmatising attitudes still persist to some extent among youth participants, in both Mount Elgon and Kisumu. While several boys and girls said they would not avoid a girl who had been raped, that it was not her fault or “it is no longer a shameful thing”<sup>56</sup>; many others linked rape to girls’ clothes, manners, going out at night or walking alone in the forest; girls ‘wanting it’ or double dealing the man, or failing to scream.

*MODERATOR: Whose fault do you think it is when this happens?*

*PARTICIPANTS: Maybe the girl is putting on a short dress... Other girls are putting on clothes with cleavage, which can arouse a man (Young mothers, Kapsokwony).*

*PARTICIPANTS: Community members will make the rape victim a laughing stock. The victim could commit suicide (Younger boys, Kopsiro).*

*[Some] girls make bad things happen to them because they wear small clothes then walk in places that are not safe...when they have been raped they are the ones who are going to give birth in pain while the men feel good and leave her. (Younger girls, Kisumu)*

These attitudes are likely to discourage reporting, as noted at baseline and illustrated by this quote from younger girls in Kopsiro:

*Sometimes it’s not good to report. The girl should consider what she did to the boy before reporting... Sometimes the girl is the wrong doer. Reporting the matter will be the same as reporting herself (Younger girls, Kopsiro).*

Similarly, the survey did not find any significant change in attitudes towards survivors of rape among adult community members. While the vast majority of respondents in both Mount Elgon and Kisumu hold the perpetrators responsible for sexual violence, around a third feel the girl is also responsible, an increase from baseline (see Table 13). At endline, 83.1% of respondents in Kisumu and 88.0% respondents in Mount Elgon agreed that rape or defilement brought shame to a family – showing no meaningful change from baseline.<sup>57</sup>

Table 13. Survey responses to Q.410 a-d: “Who is responsible for sexual violence?” (multiple answers possible)

	Kisumu		Mount Elgon	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
<b>Perpetrator is responsible</b>				
Yes	141 (95.9%)	125 (83.3%)	142 (94.7%)	146 (97.3%)
No	6 (4.1%)	25 (16.7%)	6 (4.0%)	3 (2.0%)
No response	-	-	2 (1.3%)	1 (0.7%)
<b>Girl/woman is responsible</b>				
Yes	34 (23.1%)	50 (33.3%)	37 (24.7%)	51 (34.0%)
No	113 (76.9%)	96 (64.0%)	108 (72.0%)	98 (65.3%)
No response		4 (2.7%)	5 (3.3%)	1 (0.7%)
<b>Parents of girl/woman are responsible</b>				
Yes	25 (17.0%)	49 (32.7%)	16 (10.7%)	41 (27.3%)
No	122 (83.0%)	98 (65.3%)	122 (81.3%)	108 (72.0%)
No response	-	3(2.0%)	12 (8.0%)	1 (0.7%)
<b>Community is responsible</b>				
Yes	27 (18.4%)	54 (36.0%)	12 (8.0%)	35 (23.3%)
No	120 (81.6%)	92 (61.3%)	125 (83.3%)	114 (76.0%)
No response	-	4 (2.7%)	13 (8.7%)	1 (0.7%)

<sup>56</sup> Secondary school boys from cohort 3, Kopsiro.

<sup>57</sup> Survey Q409b: “If a girl is raped or defiled, it brings shame to her family. Do you agree, partially agree or disagree?” Question not asked at baseline in Mount Elgon. Kisumu: 85.5% “agreed” at baseline.

This was supported by the qualitative evidence. Although in Mount Elgon some duty bearers felt that stigma at a community level was reducing, all adult participants and some other service providers who discussed the issue felt that stigma and shame persisted, and that survivors of rape might be isolated, beaten or chased away or parents might “force her to get married to the perpetrator.”<sup>58</sup>

*[Survivors of rape] will be rejected because they will be seen as the cause, immoral or careless. [The community] will not be seeing her in a positive way. It's normally very negative (Health care worker, Kopsiro).*

**Community members discussed the implications for girls who experienced violence, in terms of trauma, low self-esteem, sometimes leading to suicide, and the girl being victimised or talked about by community members. There is a sense that stigma and shame still affect reporting.** In Kisumu, people discussed the fact that being a victim of rape was associated with a perception that the girl could have contracted diseases such as HIV. In Mount Elgon, community members and service providers described how survivors of rape might be isolated, beaten, chased away from her parents' house or forced to marry the perpetrator. In several groups and interviews across both locations, people talked about fear of stigma or repercussions being prohibitive of girls reporting, echoing the findings at baseline. While some people suggested that knowledge and acceptance were gradually growing, they represented a minority.

#### 4.2.2. Violence in relationships

##### Physical violence within intimate relationships

**In both locations, there was almost universal recognition that intimate partner violence (IPV) is still a regular occurrence, and there is limited evidence that prevalence has reduced in any significant way.** Some community members in FGDs and interviews felt that IPV was reducing. In addition, when survey participants were asked directly whether the amount of violence between intimate partners had changed over the past two years, a majority of stakeholders felt it had decreased – 64.0% in Kisumu and 88.7% in Mount Elgon.<sup>59</sup>

However, on balance the evidence does not suggest any significant change. In FGDs and interviews, there was almost universal recognition that violence in relationships was still happening, with several people noting that it was common. As at baseline, poverty came up as a common driver of IPV, as did alcohol (leading to arguments in the home) and infidelity: “Issues of extra marital affairs are so common and so it can lead to couples killing each other.”<sup>60</sup>

When asked about the situation in the community, 15.3% respondents in Kisumu and 11.3% respondents in Mount Elgon reported that “in other families around here” men hit or slap their girlfriends “often.” A further 48.0% in Kisumu and 52.0% in Mount Elgon reported that this happened “sometimes.”<sup>61</sup> This represents a similar proportion to baseline across both communities. In addition, when asked about their personal experiences of violence, 10-15% of adult respondents across both communities reported either experiencing violence from their partner (women) or perpetrating violence against their partner (men). Table 14 below shows this.<sup>62</sup> When considering the overall reported prevalence, this does not represent a statistically significant change since baseline.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Older girls from cohort 1, Kapsokwony.

<sup>59</sup> Survey Q425: “In the past two years, has the amount of violence between husbands and wives or boyfriends and girlfriends in this community increased, decreased or stayed the same?”

<sup>60</sup> Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro.

<sup>61</sup> Survey Q424: “In OTHER families around here, how often do men hit or slap their wives/partners/girlfriends? Often, sometimes or never?”

<sup>62</sup> This is not a significant change since baseline in either community for either question. In terms of perpetration, at baseline 1.9% men in Kisumu and 18.6% in Mount Elgon reported hitting or slapping their partner. 14.5% of women in Kisumu and 6.6% of women in Mount Elgon reported experiencing violence.

<sup>63</sup> However, there is some evidence of a difference between participants and non-participants. Among non-participant men in Kisumu, there was a significant increase in reported levels of perpetration between baseline and endline and among non-participant women in Mount Elgon there was a significant increase in reported experiences of violence between baseline and endline. However, the numbers reporting this are so small that we would caution reading too much into this.

Table 14. Survey responses to Q427 and Q432 on experiences and perpetration of violence within relationships

	Kisumu		Mount Elgon	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
<b>[MEN]: Have you hit or slapped your wife/partner/girlfriend in the last six months?</b>				
Yes	1 (1.1%)	6 (11.1%)	11 (18.6%)	6 (10.9%)
No	51 (58.0%)	45 (83.3%)	41 (69.5%)	45 (81.8%)
No response	36 (40.9%)	3 (5.6%)	7 (11.9%)	4 (7.3%)
<b>[WOMEN] In the last six months has your husband/partner attacked you physically or sexually in any way</b>				
Yes	12 (14.3)	12 (12.6%)	6 (6.6%)	13 (13.8%)
No	71 (54.5%)	83 (87.4%)	73 (80.2%)	75 (79.8%)
No response	1 (1.2%)	0 (0%)	12 (13.2%)	6 (6.4%)

The FGDs also suggested that violence within relationships was not unique to older couples. In Mount Elgon, none of the older boys polled after the FGDs reported hitting or slapping their girlfriends in the past six months and one girl (out of nine) reported experiencing violence.<sup>64</sup> However, in Kisumu, 30.4% (seven out of twenty-three) of older boys reported hitting or slapping their partner in the previous six months, and 25% (seven out of twenty-eight) older girls reported being hit or slapped by their boyfriend or husband.<sup>65</sup> While these numbers should be taken with caution, given the small numbers of people polled, they provide a snapshot that suggests that change does not happen overnight for participants in the programme.

**However, there is evidence that the programme has contributed to a shift in the attitudes of young people around the acceptability of violence, particularly in Mount Elgon.** The attitudes test conducted with young people at the start and end of each cohort generally demonstrated an improvement in self-reported attitudes over the course of the cohort (see Table 15). Of note is that, across both Kisumu and Mount Elgon, 25–30% of boys at the end of cohort 1 still agreed that there were times when a woman deserved to be beaten. However, by the end of cohort 2 this had reduced to 8% in Kisumu and 13% in Mount Elgon. The reasons for this shift are not clear, but it may be that the coaches became more experienced at delivering the message that violence was not acceptable.

In FGDs with young people in both communities, there was little sense that participants considered IPV acceptable. While in Kisumu this was also the case at baseline, there was a more noticeable shift in Mount Elgon from the baseline FGDs. At endline, older girls in particular felt that IPV was not acceptable, that dialogue should be used or that they would leave their partner if they experienced violence.

One important point raised by programme staff was that the majority of participants in the programme were primary school students aged 10–14, and the majority had not yet embarked on romantic relationships. One programme staff member described them as “innocent”; when discussing issues such as sex or puberty they were embarrassed or knew little. Many of these young people will not yet have been at risk of IPV, and if the programme has an impact on their relationships this will be in the future. On the other hand, the secondary school pupils as well as the out-of-school mothers and young men were more likely to be current victims or perpetrators of IPV. There were some signs in these groups particularly of a change. For example, some of the young men said they no longer beat their wives, while some of the young mothers said violence in their relationships had reduced. While this is an important finding and highlights the need to ensure older and at-risk groups are carefully targeted, there is not enough evidence to decisively conclude that violence has reduced among these groups, especially given the polling booth data described above.

*Back before the [Kenya Timz] programme began when my wife offended me or do anything wrong I would get very angry and if I got to that state I would simply beat her up. However, after the*

<sup>64</sup> At baseline, three out of thirty-six (8.3%) boys reported perpetration of violence, and nine out of thirty-seven (24.3%) girls who reported experiencing violence. See Supplementary Annex A.

<sup>65</sup> At baseline, one out of eight (12.5%) boys reported perpetration of violence, and ten out of thirty-nine (25.6%) girls reported experiencing violence. See Supplementary Annex A.

*programmes began I realised that my wife had feelings just like I do and also she is just a human being like me (Out-of-school young men, Kopsiro).*

Table 15. Findings from the agree-disagree activity with young people: reported agreement with the statement “There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten”

	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
<b>Start of cohort</b>	<b>36.1%</b>	<b>59.2%</b>	<b>48.4%</b>
<b>End of cohort</b>	<b>6.9%</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>12.0%</b>
<b>Kisumu</b>			
Cohort 1: weekly participants			
Start of cohort	23.1%	41.3%	32.2%
End of cohort	8.4%	29.6%	19.2%
Cohort 2: weekly participants			
Start of cohort	22.6%	53.4%	39.5%
End of cohort	1.3%	4.0%	2.8%
Out of School			
Start of cohort	30.0%	75.0%	64.1%
End of cohort	4.3%	17.1%	14.0%
Secondary school young people			
Start of cohort	37.7%	53.8%	46.5%
End of cohort	2.5%	7.8%	5.2%
<b>Mount Elgon</b>			
Cohort 1: weekly participants			
Start of cohort	47.1%	71.3%	59.1%
End of cohort	20.5%	25.9%	23.2%
Cohort 2: weekly participants			
Start of cohort	37.9%	59.8%	48.8%
End of cohort	1.1%	7.7%	4.4%
Cohort 3: weekly participants			
Start of cohort	71.2%	90.7%	80.4%
End of cohort	5.7%	10.0%	7.8%
Out of School			
Start of cohort	50.0%	54.0%	53.1%
End of cohort	0.0%	13.3%	10.1%
Secondary school young people			
Start of cohort	33.8%	62.6%	48.2%
End of cohort	16.7%	34.4%	25.5%

**At a community level, the survey and FGDs suggested there might be a positive direction of travel in relation to attitudes about the acceptability of IPV. However, similarly to baseline, a significant minority of respondents still agreed that there were circumstances in which it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife. It is also clear that social expectations around the acceptability of violence, as well as inequitable gender norms, are still widespread.** The household survey asked whether it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife in a number of different situations. In Kisumu, across all but one of these situations there was a significant change from baseline, with more participants disagreeing that violence was acceptable. In Mount Elgon, there were statistically significant changes in three out of the five questions, as Table 16 demonstrates. However, a significant minority of respondents still felt there were situations where it was acceptable for a husband to beat his wife, ranging from 12% to 34% in Kisumu across different scenarios, and 19% to 48% in Mount Elgon.

Table 16. Survey responses to Q422: “Sometimes a husband is annoyed by the things his wife does. Please could you let me know whether you agree, partially agree or disagree with the following statements?”

	Kisumu			Mount Elgon		
	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>
<b>A husband can hit or beat his wife if she goes out without telling him</b>						
Agree	88 (46.3%)	38 (25.3%)	▲ more equitable	76 (50.7%)	72 (48.0%)	▲ more equitable
Partially agree	9(6.1%)	10 (6.7%)		17 (11.3%)	11 (7.3%)	
Disagree	66 (44.9%)	102 (68.0%)		52 (34.7%)	67 (44.7%)	
No response	4 (2.7%)			5 (3.3%)		
<b>A husband can hit or beat his wife if she neglects the children</b>						
Agree	66 (44.9%)	51 (34.0%)	▲ more equitable	74 (49.3%)	73 (48.7%)	▲ more equitable
Partially agree	14 (9.5%)	8 (5.3%)		16 (10.7%)	8 (5.3%)	
Disagree	63 (42.9%)	90 (60.0%)		55 (36.7%)	69 (46.0%)	
No response	4 (2.7%)	1 (0.7%)		5 (3.3%)		
<b>A husband can beat or hit his wife if she argues with him</b>						
Agree	62 (42.2%)	40 (26.7%)	▲ more equitable	78 (52.0%)	60 (40.0%)	No significant change
Partially agree	10 (6.8%)	6 (4.0%)		15 (10.0%)	13 (8.7%)	
Disagree	69 (46.9%)	103 (68.7%)		54 (36.0%)	76 (50.7%)	
No response	6 (4.1%)	1 (0.7%)		3 (2.0%)	1 (0.7%)	
<b>A husband can beat or hit his wife if she refuses sex with him</b>						
Agree	42 (28.6%)	25 (16.7%)	▲ more equitable	48 (32.0%)	38 (25.3%)	No significant change
Partially agree	6 (4.1%)	3 (2.0%)		16 (10.7%)	15 (10.0%)	
Disagree	95 (64.6%)	120 (80%)		80 (53.3%)	95 (63.3%)	
No response	4 (2.7%)	3 (1.3%)		6 (4.0%)	2 (1.3%)	
<b>A husband can hit or beat his wife if she does not cook properly.</b>						
Agree	24 (16.3%)	18 (12.0%)	No significant change	33 (22.0%)	29 (19.3%)	▲ more equitable
Partially agree	6 (4.1%)	1 (0.7%)		21 (14.0%)	7 (4.7%)	
Disagree	113 (76.9%)	129 (86.0%)		91 (60.7%)	113 (75.3%)	
No response	4 (2.7%)	2 (1.3%)		5 (3.3%)	1 (0.7%)	

The FGDs generated fairly mixed findings in relation to community-level attitudes about the acceptability of violence, which was also the case at baseline. In Mount Elgon there was more of a notable difference from the baseline FGDs, with most adult men and women expressing that violence was not acceptable.

*It’s not right for a man to beat his wife. They should sit down and talk through their issues. If that doesn’t work, they should involve a third party in the dialogue (Adult men not exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*He should tell me my mistake, and I will correct it, not [through him] beating me (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kopsiro)*

However, again similarly to baseline, other respondents discussed examples of a wife’s behaviour that would justify a husband beating her, or linked violence to discipline or authority within a relationship.

*There are some things that a man has been seeing and he keeps quiet for long and then maybe you have reached his limit what do you expect him to do? ....Her husband does not beat her easily but that day it forced him to beat her because he caught her red handed (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

In addition, the focus groups and survey suggested that community members believe that violence in relationships is widespread, and while most individuals said they did not personally approve of violence they felt that it was generally approved of at a community level – which suggests the ongoing presence of social norms. When asked about the situation in the community, 15.3% of respondents in Kisumu and 11.3% of respondents in Mount Elgon reported that “in other families around here” men hit or slapped their girlfriends “often.” A further 48.0% in Kisumu and 52.0% in Mount Elgon reported that this happened “sometimes.” This represents a similar proportion to baseline across both communities, and is significantly higher than the proportion of individuals who admitted to experiencing or perpetrating

violence themselves. In interviews and FGDs, IPV was sometimes also linked to respect and exerting authority within a relationship, as well as cultural beliefs about beating being a sign of love. For example, one government stakeholder noted:

*In that community it is normal to be battered. In fact, they are saying that, if you have not battered a woman and made her jump over the fireplace, then the woman has not settled in that marriage. Therefore, wife battering is almost tolerated in the community (Government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

*PARTICIPANT 1: let's speak the truth as Sabots when a man is beating his wife, the community cannot question the man when he is beating his wife.*

*PARTICIPANT 2: When a man does not beat the wife, they will say that the woman is controlling him. (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kopsiro)*

**Among those participants in Kisumu and Mount Elgon who felt that attitudes and behaviours in relation to IPV were changing, several linked this change to the Kenya Timz programme.** The evidence on perceived contribution was stronger from Mount Elgon than that from Kisumu.

In Kisumu, the main contribution of the programme was seen as increased awareness in the community, in terms of both knowledge and dialogue around VAWG, although the evidence was fairly limited. In the outcome harvesting workshop, coaches told a story about the community conversations helping shift behaviour around the acceptability of VAWG (see Box 9). In one group, men also talked about self-policing in the community as a result of the programme, noting *“we don't tolerate wife beating our neighbourhood.”*<sup>66</sup> Another group felt that men becoming involved in the campaign against GBV had led to a decrease in perpetration, and had allowed men to open up about their own experiences of violence.<sup>67</sup>

*PARTICIPANT 2: The kind of socialisation that people go through today is different unlike before when we grew up knowing that beating of women was normal.*

*PARTICIPANT 8: [Kenya Timz] has taught the need to shun violence of any nature.*

*PARTICIPANT 10: From 2015 to date the cases are going down because of [Kenya Timz], which is attributed to the teachings that were done on VAWG (Out-of-school boys, Kisumu).*

In Mount Elgon, more people attributed changes they had observed to the Kenya Timz programme. Some felt that boys had gained the ability to deal with situations without violence, as well as changes in their attitudes about violence and knowledge of the consequences.

*Now we know and understand that you cannot just beat up any girl because she can be your mother or sister... imagine how you would feel if you beat up your own sister or mother (Older boys, Kapsokwony).*

Several others felt the programme had helped women understand their rights to live free of violence, or that community festivals had helped challenge beliefs about acceptability of violence and the roles of girls and women.

*We cannot be abused by our husbands because we have also been taught (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*Yes, it has changed because we have attended [Kenya Timz] trainings and we even vowed not to hurt women and girls (Community leader, Kopsiro).*

In both locations, some respondents also suggested that children were passing messages learnt through the programme on to their parents, which is helping raise awareness:

*The men are very afraid and their children are all at [Kenya Timz] so sometimes they come and take the book and start reading to their parent. The book says a man should not beat a woman, a girl should not be raped, so the men and women listen (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

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<sup>66</sup> Adult men exposed to the programme, Kisumu.

<sup>67</sup> Adult men exposed to the programme, Kisumu.

*Since the [Kenya Timz] programme began about two years ago, violence against women and girls has reduced a little. Because for someone like me when I attend [Kenya Timz] trainings I will leave with new information that I will go and share with people back home. As I tell them about what I have learnt, the level of violence thus begins to reduce (Secondary school boys, Kopsiro).*

**However, there are a number of other factors, outside of the programme, that appear to be contributing to changing attitudes and behaviours around IPV.** In particular, people mentioned the work of other NGOs that are working on sensitisation. For example, the Jodie Foundation in Mount Elgon has been running trainings and stakeholders felt that this had contributed to change. Several stakeholders made reference to the law, including community policing and reporting, and its role as a deterrent. In Mount Elgon, community members also felt that improved education was helping reduce the acceptability of violence, and that neighbours and elders were playing an important role in informally discouraging the practice, as were churches preaching against VAWG.

### Rape within relationships

**There was limited sense in the qualitative data collected in Kisumu and Mount Elgon of any change in the prevalence of rape within intimate relationships.** In all of the groups that discussed it, community members recognised that it was still an issue, with a couple of groups in Kisumu suggesting it was common.

In the household survey, when asked about the extent to which a wife's opinion was taken into account when deciding whether to have sexual intercourse, only 12.7% of respondents from Kisumu and 10.0% of respondents from Mount Elgon said "a lot," with a further 40.0% and 56.7%, respectively, saying "sometimes" and 25.3% and 24.0%, respectively, saying "not at all."<sup>68</sup> This does not represent a significant positive change in the pattern of responses from baseline.

Of the small number of survey respondents who had experienced violence from their partners in the past six months, most (eight out of twelve in Kisumu and eight out of thirteen in Mount Elgon) reported having been forced into sexual intercourse often or sometimes. In addition, four of the twenty-eight older girls participating in FGDs in Kisumu and one out of the eleven older girls in Mount Elgon reported that in the past six months they had had sexual relations with someone because they had been threatened, pressured, forced or hurt. While of course the numbers polled were small, this picture suggests that sexual violence within relationships is not uncommon.

**Across both communities, but particularly in Kisumu, participants discussed the negative consequences of a wife refusing to have sex with her husband.** In Mount Elgon, a few groups made implicit or explicit reference to the fact that a husband may become violent if his wife refuses:

*In our community, we don't discuss sex issues with our husbands, if he wants he will definitely have his way. He will not ask for it (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

In Kisumu, the negative consequences for women were discussed in a number of FGDs with girls and women. These included violence, being forced into sex, being dumped by their boyfriends, infidelity and even rape of their daughter:

*PARTICIPANT 6: In such a situation when the girl refuses to have sex, the man/boy will verbally abuse the girl. Sometimes girls get raped in such a scenario.*

*PARTICIPANT 8: There are men who think that a woman should give in to their sexual demands no matter what. This goes back to culture where women's roles were giving birth, cooking and taking care of her family. Some men will never change no matter how you educate them (Young mothers, Kisumu).*

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<sup>68</sup> In Kisumu this pattern of responses represents a significant change since baseline, when the percentages were 10.9%, 46.3% and 4.1%, respectively. However, it is not a significant positive change, because while the numbers saying "a lot" have increased between baseline and endline, so have the proportion of respondents saying "not at all."

*PARTICIPANT 6. When a man gets tired of pleading with you everyday he will get your daughter available and that is what brings cases of rape whereby you find a father has raped his daughter (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

**Responses were mixed on whether women had a right to say “no” to sex with their husbands. However, there were some signs that the community conversations might have helped to shift perceptions about this among adult participants, particularly in Kisumu.** In both communities, there was a mix of perspectives in relation to sexual relations within relationships. In some groups of older girls, men and women, participants felt it was OK to deny your husband sex, that it should be a woman’s choice or that “A couple should talk and agree on when to have sex.”<sup>69</sup> In some cases, people made references to their opinions changing over time.

*PARTICIPANT 2: In the past I thought it was right for a man to have sex with his partner even she didn’t want to. The woman became his property because he had paid her bride price. My perception has changed since I started taking part in [Kenya Timz] programme.*

*PARTICIPANT 4: These cases have reduced. People in this community didn’t know that marital rape existed. They knew that raped happened to girls and women on the streets. Since [Kenya Timz] started, awareness has been created among adults (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*For the case of married people, if a husband forces his wife to have sex, it’s a rape case. The wife should report the matter. If she doesn’t want to report to the police, she can talk to either the husband’s relatives or her relatives (Older girls, Kisumu).*

This perspective is reflected in the household survey, where attitudes in Kisumu at endline were considerably more equitable than at baseline (See Table 17). There is no indication from the data to suggest why this is the case in Kisumu and not Mount Elgon.

Table 17. Responses to survey questions Q308 and 409

	Kisumu			Mount Elgon		
	Baseline	Endline	Change? (statistically significant)	Baseline	Endline	Change? (statistically significant)
In your personal opinion how much should a wife’s opinion be taken in account when deciding whether to have sexual intercourse?						
A lot	53 (36.1%)	101 (67.3%)	▲ more equitable	74 (49.3%)	68 (45.3%)	No significant difference
Some	78 (53.1%)	39 (26.0%)		56 (37.3%)	57 (38.0%)	
Not at all	10 (6.8%)	7 (4.7%)		15 (10.0%)	23 (15.3%)	
No response	6 (4.1%)	3 (2.0%)		-	-	
When a husband forces the wife to have sex when she does not want he is raping her						
Agree	98 (66.7%)	116 (77.3%)	▲ more equitable	90 (60.0%)	96 (64.0%)	No significant difference
Partially agree	4 (2.7%)	7 (4.7%)		3 (2.0%)	5 (3.3%)	
Disagree	42 (28.6%)	24 (16.0%)		54 (36.0%)	47 (31.3%)	
No response	3 (2.0%)	3 (2.0%)		-	-	

Some groups felt the programme had changed attitudes around this issue through the community festivals:

*The first time we had a community festival, men realised that they belonged to jail. Previously, they were forcing their wives to have sex with them. Men’s attitudes have changed because of the information they got from the event (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*Before the [Kenya Timz] programme came, however, we simply used to tell them to turn over, simply because you are ready and you have not taken up the initiative to prepare her... we did not know*

<sup>69</sup> Adult men not exposed to the programme, Kisumu.



*that whatever we were doing was us committing violence against our women. However, the moment we came to learn about these issues in the [Kenya Timz] programme, especially, me, I, personally, I came to learn how to prepare my wife (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

However, in several FGDs with older young people and adults, there was still a sense that sex was a man's right and thus denying sex was not viewed as acceptable – although this was not a universally held attitude in any of the discussions. For example, one adult woman said, *"I don't believe that a man can rape his wife. It is his right to have sex with his wife."*<sup>70</sup> Some talked about the negative implications of women denying their husbands sex, including infidelity and rape. Others talked about the shame women experienced in the case of experiencing sexual violence within their relationship.

*Sex is a conjugal right. Some women get raped with their husbands because they use sex as a weapon to punish their husbands. They withhold sex when their husbands refuse to play their roles (Young mothers, Kisumu).*

*I will not do anything because it is his right... That cannot be termed as rape (Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*The community believes that husbands have a right to demand sex (Older girls from cohort 1, Kopsiro).*

### Reporting of IPV

**Both the survey and the qualitative data collected demonstrate that, while some women may be willing to ask for help, or report their partner if they experience violence, this is by no means universal, and there is limited sign of change from baseline.** In the three months preceding the endline survey, the monitoring data shows that there were no cases of IPV reported to the police in Kisumu or Kopsiro, and only one in Kapsokwony, despite the evidence suggesting that IPV was still a common occurrence. In the endline survey, among women who had experienced violence from their partner, four out of twelve (33.3%) women in Kisumu and seven out of thirteen (53.8%) women in Mount Elgon reported asking for help.<sup>71</sup> It should be noted here that reporting to the police is likely viewed quite differently to seeking help from health services.

The qualitative evidence from Mount Elgon suggests that there are cultural and economic barriers to reporting domestic violence. In two of the community conversations held in Mount Elgon, women talked about potential repercussions from their husband, his family or the wider community, fear of breaking up the marriage or of the children suffering and a perception that she was to blame or that it was normal.

In Kisumu, there was more sense that women may report if they experience violence; however, again this was not universal. Some people felt that women would report cases to the police station, particularly if she was raped by her husband but also if she was beaten. Some groups and interviews attributed this to increases in knowledge about where and when to report violence. However, one group of older girls and a service provider felt that survivors were not willing to report, or that they used informal mechanisms such as going through the chief or the family.

#### 4.2.3. Wider community violence

**There was some suggestion that the programme had helped discourage bullying, violence and harassment among its young participants – although a significant minority were still experiencing these challenges.** Coaches and many young people, particularly in Mount Elgon, felt the programme had helped reduce violence in their peer groups. They felt it had done this through increasing boys' skills and confidence to resolve conflicts without violence, and changing boys' attitudes about the acceptability of violence. This was largely corroborated by the monitoring attitudes activity, which found a sharp decrease in the proportion of young people who thought it was acceptable for a man to respond with force if he

<sup>70</sup> Adult woman not exposed to the programme, Kisumu.

<sup>71</sup> This compares with 14 out of 22 (63.6%) at baseline in Kisumu and 21 out of 39 (53.8%) at baseline in Mount Elgon. It was not possible to collect statistics from the health centres on

was insulted (see Table 19 below). There was also some sense among the youth groups that sexual harassment and physical violence from boys directed to girls had reduced as a result of the programme teaching boys that they should not violate girls, with some groups of boys expressing that it was wrong to beat up a girl who had abused them or to touch girls inappropriately.

*The [Kenya Timz] programme has helped me as I used to beat up other youth and I was very violent but when I joined the programme I was taught that fighting is wrong. Therefore, I stopped fighting with other young people completely (Younger boys from cohort 1, Kopsiro).*

*The chief madam Lucy reported that the crime rates especially among the young people has reduced and she said that she solves less disputes unlike before the programme started and she attributes it to the knowledge the kids are getting from the programme coaches (Mount Elgon implementation meeting minutes, May 2017).*

One group of boys in Kopsiro suggested that the programme had provided positive ways to interact with other boys, through football, which had helped reduce conflicts.

*We have mechanisms of resolving any disagreement amongst us... the moment we go and play [football] together and as a result you are able to play with the person whom you had a dispute with. After the game the two of you are able to meet and talk to each other and talk more positive and constructive things on how you will even grow your own team and as you keep on talking, you also talk about issues that are not football related such as the disputes (Out-of-school boys, Kopsiro).*

Coaches in Mount Elgon also told a story about a member of the young mothers' group, who used to fight with other women she suspected had relationships with her husband. Coaches explained that *"after learning about conflict resolution she no longer fights and instead she discusses it with the husband in a peaceful environment and sometimes she calls a coach as an arbitrator."* They suggested that the programme had helped coaches learn how to play the role of arbitrator, teaching them that *"when you are arbitrating you need to be with both parties, peaceful, not supposed to be biased, and be genuine."*

However, boys and girls who participated in the programme are still experiencing bullying and harassment. Over a third of younger boys and girls in the FGDs said that someone from the community had threatened, pressured or hurt them in the past six months.<sup>72</sup> In addition, around a quarter of boys in FGDs said they had been in a fight involving physical violence in the past six months – younger boys were much more likely than older boys to report this.<sup>73</sup> The FGDs also suggested that some participants still felt it was acceptable for boys to slap girls in certain circumstances.

*Let us say that sometimes you are in class... and you find that the empty seat is next to a boy he will tell you to go away and if you report him to the teacher he will wait for you in the bush after school with his friends and beat you up and also threaten you that if you tell the teacher he will still deal with you (Older girls, Kisumu).*

*I think that sometimes it's good for the boys to beat the girls. Girls take advantage of the fact that boys are not allowed to beat girls (Younger girls, Kisumu).*

**The evidence does not provide a clear picture of whether the prevalence of violence at a community level has changed since baseline, but the general sense is that this type of violence is an ongoing problem, and the election was flagged as a recent exacerbation.** The baseline evaluation found slightly different reasons for community-level violence in the two programme locations. In Kisumu, violence was linked to crime, gangs and unemployment, and associated with slum neighbourhoods. In Mount Elgon, violence was linked to regional insecurity harking back to the 2007 conflict, as well as land disputes and

<sup>72</sup> In Mount Elgon, seven of eighteen younger girls (39%) and nine of twenty-one younger boys (43%) said that someone in the community had threatened, pressured or hurt them in the past six months. In Kisumu, seven of twenty-one younger girls (33%) and seven of twenty-one younger boys (33%) answered yes to this question. Note that older girls and boys were not asked this question. At baseline, 22 of 67 young people across both locations (33%) answered yes to this question.

<sup>73</sup> In Mount Elgon, 12 of 30 younger boys (40%) said they had been involved in a fight involving physical violence and 3 of 27 older boys (26.3%). In Kisumu, nine of twenty-one younger boys (43%) said they had been involved in a fight and two of twenty-three older boys (9%). See Supplementary Annex A. Note that girls were not asked this question.

arguments over resources. These challenges were clearly still an issue at endline. Community members talked about family feuds, drug-motivated crimes, boundary disputes and resource scarcity as reasons for physical violence at a community level.

In both locations, around two thirds of survey participants said that conflict led to physical violence “often” or “sometimes” in the community. While these results are not substantially different from baseline,<sup>74</sup> in Mount Elgon the survey showed a large increase in the number of people who said there had been conflict between different ethnic groups or tribes in the community in the past six months (see Table 18). This conflict may be linked to the election, although this resulted in considerably more disruption in Kisumu. One county government stakeholder explained, “*We also have cases [of violence] that have resulted from the bitterness that individuals have towards the results of the elections that we had.*”<sup>75</sup>

Table 18. Survey responses to Q.203 “In the past six months has there been conflict between different ethnic groups/tribes in your community?”

	Mount Elgon		Kisumu	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Yes	3 (2.0%)	53 (35.3%)	69 (46.9%)	74 (49.3%)
No	142 (94.7%)	93 (62.0%)	72 (49.0%)	74 (49.3%)
Don't know	1 (0.7%)	4 (2.7%)	6 (4.1%)	-
No response	4 (2.7%)	-	-	2(1.3%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>

Many participants in FGDs and IDIs felt that violence was reducing at a community level, which several linked to better community relations and a reduction in conflicts over land. Some stakeholders linked this to the programme, through young people sharing the messages of the programme with their parents, and through the community festivals teaching adults.

*When we look back at the time we were at war the cause of the problem was the dispute of the Chebyuk land. It was the cause of the conflict as people of Mosop were arguing that the land was theirs while those of Soit were claiming that they came and bought the land and they could not simply just lose their property for nothing (Adult men not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*When the older people in the community see that we as the younger people have reduced the level of conflicts among ourselves, they also copy our example and try to stop violence. This is because they also know that what we have learnt from [Kenya Timz] are good things and that is why they also try to copy what we do (Younger boys, Kopsiro).*

However, several other community members gave many examples of ongoing land or boundary disputes leading to violence, men fighting over women and violence linked to gangs and militia. In Kisumu, some girls talked about harassment on the street and inappropriate touching happening on buses or when girls turn down a boy’s advances.

*Men fight over women. It happens that some men may want to use force to get another man’s wife yet they already have their own wives simply because they have at some point been sexual partners... when such disputes are not resolved fights ensue that result into death (Secondary school boys, Kopsiro).*

*Recently we have been experiencing some gun violence in Mount Elgon [and] some people were lynched to death (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

*Violence occurs because of lack of resources, when people are fighting for leadership positions, water among others. Recently there was a fight between Obunga and Kamakoha areas because the Member of County Assembly that was elected came from Kamakoha and the people there were now*

<sup>74</sup> Q. 205. Mount Elgon: baseline: often: 8.0%, sometimes: 58.0%. never: 31.3%. Kisumu: baseline: often: 8.2%, sometimes: 69.4%, never: 19.7%

<sup>75</sup> County government stakeholder, Kisumu.

*looking down upon the people from Obunga. Politics, culture and economic issues are the main causes (Community leader, Kisumu).*

*Life in Obunga for girls is more difficult. You can find some men outside there calling a girl like me to go and visit them in their houses and will do something bad to you and if they do something bad to you can get sexually transmitted infections, HIV or pregnancy (Younger girls, Kisumu).*

**In relation to attitudes about the acceptability of physical violence, there is good evidence that the programme shifted the attitudes of youth participants, but limited evidence of any change at a community level. However, in Mount Elgon, the programme may have made a small contribution to change through improving relationships between young people from different areas, contributing to community cohesion.**

Among young people the attitudes test activity showed a marked reduction in the number of boys and girls who agreed that *“If a man is insulted, he should defend his name, with force if he has to”* (see Table 19).

Table 19. Reported agreement with the statement *“If a man is insulted, he should defend his name, with force if he has to”* from the agree-disagree activity with young people

	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
<b>Start of cohort</b>	<b>57.9%</b>	<b>73.4%</b>	<b>66.1%</b>
<b>End of cohort</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>20.9%</b>	<b>16.5%</b>
<b>Kisumu</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	34.4%	75.6%	55.3%
End of cohort	8.1%	19.4%	14.0%
<b>Cohort 2: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	32.1%	51.6%	42.6%
End of cohort	2.2%	5.5%	4.0%
<b>Out of school young people</b>			
Start of cohort	44.0%	88.5%	77.7%
End of cohort	2.1%	14.4%	11.4%
<b>Secondary school</b>			
Start of cohort	55.4%	69.0%	62.8%
End of cohort	5.0%	7.8%	6.4%
<b>Mount Elgon</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	79.3%	89.7%	84.4%
End of cohort	47.4%	44.5%	45.9%
<b>Cohort 2: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	71.3%	75.7%	73.5%
End of cohort	4.3%	7.7%	6.0%
<b>Cohort 3: weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	87.8%	94.3%	90.9%
End of cohort	6.3%	43.1%	24.7%
<b>Out of school young people</b>			
Start of cohort	75.0%	44.0%	50.8%
End of cohort	10.3%	64.4%	51.3%
<b>Secondary school</b>			
Start of cohort	62.3%	69.7%	66.0%
End of cohort	17.9%	26.6%	22.3%

However, there was limited evidence of change at a community level. Similar to at baseline, the FGDs generally found boys and men were fairly negative towards community violence, and did not think it was acceptable to respond to insults with violence. Comparing baseline and endline survey findings, there was

little difference in community-level attitudes towards the use of violence in response to insults or theft, across both Kisumu and Mount Elgon (see Table 20).

Table 20. Survey responses to Q.406 a-e: situations where it is acceptable to use violence

	Kisumu		Mount Elgon	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
<b>It is okay if a man uses violence if someone insults his wife/girlfriend</b>				
Agree	28 (19.0%)	26 (17.3%)	29 (19.3%)	26 (17.3%)
Partially agree	1 (0.7%)	2 (1.3%)	13 (8.7%)	8 (5.3%)
Disagree	117 (79.6%)	122 (81.3%)	106 (70.7%)	115 (76.7%)
No response	1 (0.7%)	-	3 (1.3%)	1 (0.7%)
<b>It is okay for man to use violence if someone insults a member of his family</b>				
Agree	22 (15.0%)	22 (14.7%)	11 (7.3%)	17 (11.3%)
Partially agree	7 (4.8%)	4 (2.7%)	10 (6.7%)	2 (1.3%)
Disagree	117 (79.6%)	124 (82.7%)	128 (85.3%)	129 (86.0%)
No response	1 (0.7%)	-	1 (0.7%)	2 (1.3%)
<b>It is okay for man to use violence if someone insults him</b>				
Agree	23 (15.6%)	19 (12.7%)	10 (6.7%)	14 (9.3%)
Partially agree	5 (3.4%)	8 (5.3%)	8 (5.3%)	5 (3.3%)
Disagree	119 (81.0%)	123 (82.0%)	130 (86.7%)	130 (86.7%)
No response	-	-	2 (1.3%)	1 (0.7%)
<b>It is okay for a man to use violence if someone steals from him or his family</b>				
Agree	40 (27.2%)	26 (17.3%)	6 (4.0%)	28 (18.7%)
Partially agree	2 (1.4%)	9 (6.0%)	7 (4.7%)	4 (2.7%)
Disagree	104 (70.7%)	115 (76.7%)	129 (86.0%)	116 (77.3%)
No response	1(0.7%)	-	8 (5.3%)	2 (1.3%)

The only suggestion of change at a community level related to community cohesion in Mount Elgon. At the beginning of the programme, one of the aims was to improve community cohesion – particularly in Mount Elgon, with its history of violent conflict. This is represented in the ToC. As the programme progressed, the focus moved away from this issue somewhat, and programme staff explained that it was not a core target of programme activities. It is therefore not surprising that there was limited evidence to suggest any major changes in the level of community cohesion. However, some stakeholders in Mount Elgon suggested the programme had created connections and closeness where it did not exist before through encouraging young people to interact. This was especially important in Kopsiro, where tensions existed between groups from different parts of the mountain. Some suggested that this had in turn affected parents and helped smooth over family feuds.

*Another thing we have learnt is that we used to have a community feud being fought along ethnic lines. We used to argue that we have people from Soi and Mosop. But after the [Kenya Timz] programme came into place our children got to know one another and as we interacted with the other parents in community events and festivals our children now regard one another as human beings and we all live together as one (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*When it came to those family feuds that our parents had created, the [Kenya Timz] programme allowed our sisters and brothers to get to know one another and understand that they were all one. So, as we speak you can come to the village and find that families are able to sit together and talk as well as exchange ideas on how to grow as one (Out-of-school boys, Kopsiro).*

## 4.3. Girls' rights

### How has the programme contributed to promoting girls' rights?

The social norms literature highlights several examples of social and gender norms that support VAWG, including a man being considered socially superior and sex being a mark of masculinity and a man's right in marriage (Alexander-Scott et al., 2016). The programme aimed to address some of these norms, and also promote specific rights for girls – including the right to attend school, the right to decide whether and when to marry and have children and the right to participate in community events and decision making. This section discusses the evidence on how far girls are able to claim these rights in the targeted communities, the attitudes of young people and communities towards girls' rights, insights into broader social expectations around these issues and how far these factors have changed since baseline.

In summary, the evidence suggests there are still major ongoing challenges in relation to girls' economic, political and social and sexual and reproductive rights:

- While attitudes and community expectations about girls' rights to education are almost universally positive, girls are still dropping out of school and the barriers identified at baseline have not gone away. While some respondents suggested girls are now less likely to drop out of school, and linked this to the programme, there is limited data available to triangulate this, and the programme was also one of several underlying reasons identified why the situation may be improving slowly over time.
- There is limited evidence of change in community-level attitudes or social expectations around the roles of girls and women in the household or community since baseline, with the data suggesting that inequitable expectations around the roles of women and girls persist. However, the programme does seem to have shifted the attitudes of participating young people and in some cases their parents.
- Early marriage and pregnancy are clearly still challenges within both communities, with little strong sense of a change since baseline, despite some anecdotal reports from Mount Elgon that early pregnancies may be reducing in frequency. Similar to the baseline, there are negative attitudes expressed towards early marriage and pregnancy, but equally there are hints that in some sectors of the community social expectations persist that girls should marry young and that parents choose who a girl will marry.
- The strongest evidence for a contribution of the programme comes in examining the changes in attitudes of the participating young people in relation to decision making about having children, where there has been a clear increase in equitable attitudes across all cohorts. However, among the wider community there is still a diversity of views, and it appears there are still expectations around men's role as a breadwinner whose role it is to make decisions in the household.

Therefore, overall, while there are some anecdotal examples of girls being able to claim their rights as a result of the programme, in all cases it was not possible to verify or triangulate these. There is some evidence that the programme has been successful in influencing the attitudes of the young people participating, but very limited evidence of any significant shifts in the wider community since baseline.

#### 4.3.1. Girls' rights to education

**Both baseline and endline evaluations found that attitudes and community expectations around girls' education were almost universally positive, among both young people and adults.** Over 95% of youth participants in both communities agreed with the statement *"Girls have the same right as boys to study*

*and finish school” by the end of their cohort.*<sup>76</sup> In most cases, attitudes were mainly positive at the start of the cohort, but there were some groups in which there was a notable improvement. For example, among the male out-of-school groups in Kisumu, the proportion agreeing rose from 68% at the start of the cohort to 100% at the end of the cohort. Coaches and duty bearers showed similarly positive attitudes in relation to the rights of girls to go to school.<sup>77</sup> These patterns hold across the groups and in both the pre- and the post-training assessment forms, suggesting positive attitudes are fairly embedded.

Across both locations, evidence from the household survey demonstrates that community members also have positive attitudes: at endline, 99.3% of respondents in Kisumu and 98.0% respondents in Mount Elgon agreed that *“Girls have the same rights as boys to go to school.”*<sup>78</sup> This is broadly in line with what we found at baseline, where the proportion of respondents agreeing to this statement was 93.9% in Kisumu and 94.7% in Mount Elgon. The qualitative data collection supports this finding, suggesting people see the importance of girls’ education.

*When you educate a girl, you have educated the whole world. She will bring change from her home to her place of work* (Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kisumu).

The FGDs suggested that community expectations, as well as individual attitudes, were generally in support of girls’ education – similar to at baseline. Across all the FGDs, the sense was that girls completing their education was generally seen as normal and desirable in both communities: *“It makes parents happy when their daughter gets education because she is building her future”* (Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kisumu).

**The majority of FGD respondents suggested girls were now less likely to drop out than in the past, and felt the programme had helped reduce dropouts.** In FGDs and interviews in both locations, community members felt fewer girls dropped out of school now than in the past. Some respondents in Kisumu also highlighted the enabling environment for girls to be able to go back to school after a pregnancy:

*Of late we also have a situation where a girl may get pregnant during her studies but we encourage her to come back after delivery and clear her studies. It has changed. You know previously if they conceived, then they go for good* (Teacher, Kisumu).

Among those who felt that things were improving, most stakeholders in Mount Elgon and some in Kisumu felt the programme had contributed, through coaches emphasising the importance of education and hence changing young people’s attitudes; engaging the community on the importance of educating girls; and reducing the likelihood of participants getting pregnant and therefore dropping out.

*Many children now like going to school because they have been taught about the importance of education in the [Kenya Timz] programme... Since [Kenya Timz] started, it changed the community members as they were given the opportunity to participate in discussion on importance of education* (Community elder, Kopsiro).

*Parents now know that if a girl is educated they can become even more productive and of value than their preferred boy child. However, before [Kenya Timz] programme the community regarded educating a girl as a big loss because the girl would get married later to a different homestead and take everything there leaving you with nothing* (Younger boys, Kopsiro).

*My daughter dropped out of school due to early pregnancy but due to the teaching I got from [Kenya Timz] I took her back to school and now she is in school* (Adult women exposed to the programme, Kisumu).

The programme is likely to be one of many underlying reasons for girls being more able to stay in school, some of which those interviewed mentioned. First, there are other NGOs and programmes engaging in

<sup>76</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.2.

<sup>77</sup> By the end of the programme, 100% of the coaches reported an equitable attitude to the same statement. In the post-training assessment form from the most recent duty bearer training workshops in both Kisumu and Mount Elgon, 96.4% and 90% of duty bearers indicated their “total agreement” with this statement, with only a small number of individuals holding outright inequitable attitudes. This was also the case in the workshop held in Kisumu before the midline. There was no data for Mount Elgon at the point of the midline because activities had not commenced.

<sup>78</sup> Survey responses to Q305c “Girls have the same rights as boys to study and finish school. Do you agree, partially agree or disagree?”

sensitisation on schooling, and working on related issues, such as the provision of sanitary towels, to break down barriers to attendance. For example, in Kisumu, the DREAMS programme is advocating for girls’ education, among others. Second, across both sites, people made reference to the formal authorities or informal community monitoring as reducing school dropouts through arresting either parents or men who marry underage girls.

**However, it is clear girls are still dropping out of school in these communities, and from the qualitative evidence alone it is not possible to make a robust judgement on the extent to which the programme has actually influenced school attendance.** There is no quantitative evidence to corroborate claims that school dropouts are reducing, as it was not possible to collect data on school attendance either at community level or for participants specifically.<sup>79</sup> In the household survey, 31.3% of respondents in Kisumu and 29.3% in Mount Elgon said that “all”<sup>80</sup> of the girls were in school, with a further 68.0% and 68.7% respectively saying that “some” were – these statistics are not notably different from baseline.

FGDs and interviews suggested that the factors associated with school dropouts at baseline had not gone away. Poverty is a major factor, with dropout linked to an inability of parents to pay school fees and pressure on girls to get jobs or earn money for essential items. Early pregnancies were also flagged as a reason for school dropout, as was early marriage, often linked to mistreatment or lack of care from parents leading girls to leave the home early to go and get married. Some groups highlighted the lack of commitment of parents to their daughter’s schooling as an ongoing contributing factor.

*Another thing is that at times you get a child who really wants to go to school but the parent will give the child maize to sell after school and the child will come back home very late around 9pm (Community leader, Kisumu).*

*Girls are undermined so much in this community, the boy child is more favoured than the girl child in terms of education priority; this is because it is believed that they will leave their home. They are seen as vessels to bring wealth in terms of the dowry that the parents get when they are given away in marriage. Very few girls go to school and the role is only to do domestic chores (Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

#### 4.3.2. Girls’ political and social rights in the home and in the community

**The evidence suggests the programme has shifted the attitudes of participating young people and in some cases those of their parents.** The vast majority of young people agreed that “Women can be leaders in the community just as well as men can” by the end of their cohort – at least 95%. In some cases, this represents a big shift between the start and end of the cohort, as Table 21 shows.

Table 21. Reported agreement with the statement “Women can be leaders in the community just as well as men can” from the agree-disagree activity with young people

	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
<b>Start of cohort</b>	<b>63.4%</b>	<b>52.8%</b>	<b>57.9%</b>
<b>End of cohort</b>	<b>98.7%</b>	<b>97.1%</b>	<b>97.8%</b>
<b>Kisumu</b>			
Cohort 1: Weekly participants			
Start of cohort	77.9%	65.4%	71.5%
End of cohort	98.9%	98.5%	98.7%
Cohort 2: Weekly participants			
Start of cohort	67.1%	78.7%	73.0%
End of cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<sup>79</sup> The monitoring approach was originally designed to capture some information from schools; however, it was not considered feasible for programme staff to collect this.

<sup>80</sup> Survey responses to Q304 “How many of the girls around here are in school? All, some or none?” At baseline in Kisumu 24.1% said “all” and 75.9% said “some.” At baseline in Mount Elgon 35.3% said “all” and 62.0% said “some.”



	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
Out of school			
Start of cohort	56.0%	64.7%	62.6%
End of cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Secondary young people			
Start of cohort	72.3%	48.7%	59.4%
End of cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Mount Elgon</b>			
Cohort 1: Weekly participants			
Start of cohort	36.3%	15.7%	26.1%
End of cohort	100.0%	97.3%	98.6%
Cohort 2: Weekly participants			
Start of cohort	62.3%	46.5%	54.4%
End of cohort	100.0%	98.3%	99.1%
Cohort 3: Weekly participants			
Start of cohort	57.1%	45.7%	51.7%
End of cohort	88.8%	94.4%	91.6%
Out of school			
Start of cohort	10.7%	20.0%	18.0%
End of cohort	100.0%	85.6%	89.1%
Secondary young people			
Start of cohort	70.8%	61.3%	66.0%
End of cohort	98.7%	89.0%	93.9%

Several young people and adults in Mount Elgon also suggested that their own personal attitudes towards the role of women in social and political life had changed. This came up in some FGDs, the outcome harvesting workshop with coaches (see Box 9) and also the final community conversation in Mount Elgon.

*On my part, since I started learning in [Kenya Timz], I have discovered that both girls and boys have equal rights and girls are capable of even taking up leadership positions just like boys can. As long as they commit themselves they can even be the president of the republic. Before [Kenya Timz], I used to ignore anything a girl used to tell me thinking that it was worthless and useless (Secondary school boys, Kopsiro).*

Particularly in Mount Elgon, community members felt the programme had contributed to change through helping girls understand their rights and feel confident to speak out, improving interactions between children and parents, which had encouraged parents to listen to their children more, and providing forums through community dialogues and events for women to speak. For example, programme staff spoke about the market day engagement events, where survivors of violence were provided with a platform to talk about what had happened to them.

*They can [take part in community decision making] because I have been attending [Kenya Timz] and I can speak out... [It has changed] Because of the education*

**Box 9. Healthy relationships: a story from the coaches in Kisumu**

*“Most of the male [out-of-school] youths in Obunga had a perception and strong feeling that it is the man who had the right to decide everything in a relationship, since they would take the burden in sustaining the relationship, e.g. they would buy the lady everything they wanted e.g. clothes, phones etc. The man would get anything anytime he wants from the woman and the woman should not complain so her wishes would go silent. The man is in control of everything including whoever the lady greets and insist on going through the phone calls of the lady.*

*After several sessions the young people changed their perception. Those who were in relationships were able to say that their girlfriends were happier than before. They were able to listen to each other and come to an understanding.”*

*from the project. We also teach the men what we have been taught. We tell the men that women also have the freedom to talk (Young mothers, Kopsiro).*

*In the past, I couldn't talk to my children about certain issues. I also used to think that my decision was final. Nowadays I listen to their opinion. My relationship with them has improved (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

**However, there is limited evidence of a wider change in community-level attitudes or social expectations around the roles of girls and women in the household or community.** The survey did not find a significant shift between baseline and endline in response to questions on political and social rights. In several areas, the majority of community members expressed fairly equitable attitudes, which was similar to at the baseline. For example, the majority of respondents (94.7% in Kisumu and 90.0% in Mount Elgon) agreed that *“Women have the same rights as men to stand for leadership positions.”*<sup>81</sup> This was also the case in the post-training assessments with coaches,<sup>82</sup> and those with duty bearers. In the most recent workshop reports, reported total agreement with this statement was at 96.4% in Kisumu (similar to pre-training, which was 95%) and 90% in Mount Elgon (up from 80% in the pre-training assessment). Most community respondents in the household survey (89.1% in Kisumu and 73.1% in Mount Elgon) also agreed that *“Women have the same right as men to do work other than domestic chores.”*

However, in response to the survey question *“In your household how often is a woman's opinion considered in the management of household affairs?”* only 50.3% of respondents in Kisumu and 60% of respondents in Mount Elgon said “always” – very similar to findings at baseline.<sup>83</sup> And, as Table 22 below shows, traditional attitudes about the respective roles of men and women persist. For example, a majority of respondents agreed that a woman's most important role was to cook and take care of her family.

The qualitative data also suggests that inequitable community expectations around the roles of women and girls persist. Across a number of groups in both Kisumu and Mount Elgon, respondents highlighted that girls and women were often undermined or their opinion was not taken into account when there were men involved; and that woman's role was seen to be primarily in the household where the man is the head of the family. There are also events that women are not allowed to attend.

*The women are undermined and it's believed that she has nothing important to say among elders or men (Adult women not exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

*Culture still plays a key role in the community. Women are regarded as children and their place is in the kitchen. They have to do all the donkeywork at home. The husband goes away, and when he comes back in the evening, he wants food on the table. As a woman, you cannot question him, when you ask him anything you are beaten because you are not supposed to question anything (Government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

There are also still clear challenges in terms of women having equal rights to stand for leadership positions. Records of community conversations held in both locations highlighted the challenges that women faced in being received as community leaders or holding positions of power – for example facing abuse and being perceived as bad wives. Participants in the conversations laid the blame for this at the door of both men and women, flagging that men would discourage women from participating but also that women were not willing to support female candidates.

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<sup>81</sup> Responses to survey Q305b “Women have the same right as men to stand for leadership positions. Do you agree, partially agree or disagree?”

<sup>82</sup> Similarly, the reported attitudes of coaches in relation to this statement were almost universally equitable at the time points it was measured (midline and end of the programme), in line with the type of coaches that the programme aimed to recruit.

<sup>83</sup> Survey responses to Q302. At baseline, in Kisumu the responses were Always: 51.0%, Sometimes 43.5% and Never 5.4%. At baseline in Mount Elgon, the responses were Always: 58.7%, Sometimes 33.3%, Never: 6.7%.

Table 22. Survey responses to Q303 and 305a on the roles of men and women

	Kisumu			Mount Elgon		
	Baseline	Endline	Change? (statistically significant)	Baseline	Endline	Change? (statistically significant)
<b>A woman's most important role is to cook and to take care of her family</b>						
Agree	117 (79.6%)	104 (69.3%)	No significant change	126 (84.0%)	106 (70.7%)	▲ more equitable
Partially agree	9 (6.1%)	12 (8.0%)		9 (6.0%)	25 (16.7%)	
Disagree	21 (14.3%)	33 (22.0%)		14 (9.3%)	18 (12.0%)	
No response	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.7%)		1 (0.7%)	1 (0.7%)	
<b>Changing diapers bathing kids and feeding kids are mother's responsibility</b>						
Agree	125 (85.0%)	101 (67.3%)	▲ more equitable	123 (82.0%)	124 (82.7%)	No significant change
Partially agree	8 (5.4%)	15 (10.0%)		5 (3.3%)	14 (9.3%)	
Disagree	14 (9.5%)	34 (22.7%)		21 (14.0%)	12 (8.0%)	
No response	0 (0.0%)			1 (0.7%)	0 (0.0%)	
<b>A man deserves respect of his wife and children</b>						
Agree	130 (88.4%)	129 (86.0%)	No significant change	133 (88.7%)	142 (94.7%)	▼ less equitable
Partially agree	11 (7.5%)	11 (7.3%)		6 (4.0%)	7 (4.7%)	
Disagree	6 (4.1%)	7 (4.7%)		8 (5.3%)	1 (0.7%)	
No response	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.0%)		3 (2.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
<b>Women have same right as men to do work other than domestic chores</b>						
Agree	125 (85.0%)	131 (87.3%)	No significant change	113 (75.3%)	110 (73.3%)	No significant change
Partially agree	9 (6.1%)	10 (6.7%)		13 (8.7%)	13 (8.7%)	
Disagree	13 (8.8%)	6 (4.0%)		23 (15.3%)	26 (17.3%)	
No response	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.0%)		1 (0.7%)	1 (0.7%)	

### 4.3.3. Girls' sexual and reproductive rights

#### Early marriage and pregnancy

Although some people felt things were changing, early marriage and pregnancy are clearly still issues within both of the communities, with little sense of a particular change since baseline. Some people in Mount Elgon felt that early pregnancies might be reducing, and linked this to the sensitisation and messaging the programme had provided to young people. Others felt the programme kept participants busy, and thus had reduced the degree of sexual interactions between young participants.

*Currently we've not heard girls being impregnated and leaving school. This message [[Kenya Timz]] has really yielded great achievement towards our girls and young women (Teacher, Kopsiro).*

*It has changed in the past two years; because when I visited the principal at St Teresa girls, she told me that no girl has become pregnant since and they have not admitted any girl who has delivered (Chief, Kopsiro).*

However, this evidence is purely anecdotal, as it was not possible to collect data relating to early pregnancy. It is also not corroborated by the findings of the survey. Across both Kisumu and Mount Elgon, the findings from the household survey suggest child marriage (before the age of 18) is still happening, as Table 23 indicates. At endline, 48.7% of respondents in Kisumu and 37.3% of respondents in Mount Elgon indicated that girls "often" got married before their 18th birthday, with only 8.7% and 10.0%, respectively, saying that it never happened. This did not represent a significant improvement from baseline in either community.

Table 23. Survey responses to Q311 “In this community, how often do girls get married before their 18th birthday? Often, sometimes or never?”

	Kisumu		Mount Elgon	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Often	60 (40.8%)	73 (48.7%)	59 (39.3%)	56 (37.3%)
Sometimes	67 (45.6%)	50 (33.3%)	68 (45.3%)	77 (51.3%)
Never	15 (10.2%)	13 (8.7%)	17 (11.3%)	15 (10.0%)
Don't know	3 (2.0%)	14 (9.3%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.3%)
No response	2 (1.4%)		4 (2.7%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>147 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>

Similarly to baseline, the majority of participants expressed negative attitudes towards early marriage and pregnancy – although there are hints that in some sectors of the community social expectations that girls should marry young persist, and it is still generally expected that parents choose who a girl will marry. Many community members and young people talked about girls getting married early as one of the “*bad things*” that happened to girls.<sup>84</sup> In the endline survey, over 98% of respondents said girls should get married when they were 18 years or older, which was similar to the response at baseline.<sup>85</sup> This was echoed in the qualitative data:

*MODERATOR: Why do you think early marriage is bad?*

*PARTICIPANT 1: It deprives someone from going to school.*

*PARTICIPANT 2: It leads to early pregnancies.*

*PARTICIPANT 3: A child cannot manage to play the role of a wife because it involves hard duties that young girls can't manage (Younger girls from Cohort 1, Kopsiro).*

In general, there were limited signs that there were strong social expectations around girls marrying young, although some FGDs suggested that these expectations might persist among certain groups in the community: “*Some girls get married because of the pressure from their parents. They are constantly asked when they will get married since their age mates are already married.*”<sup>86</sup> In addition, there was some evidence from focus groups and monitoring data in Mount Elgon that female genital mutilation (FGM) is still happening among certain sub-groups in the community, which was associated with early marriage: “*Some community members still hold on to the culture of FGM; they perceive the practice of FGM as transforming young girls into good women and future wives.*”<sup>87</sup>

Across both locations, the evidence suggests parents generally still make the decision about when girls get married, although some thought this might be changing and that girls increasingly made the decision themselves.

**Early marriage and pregnancy were predominantly linked to girls' economic situation rather than to social expectations – with poverty leading to pressure on girls to get married, or putting girls in situations where they are at risk.** In Kisumu, economic reasons (including the need to procure commodities such as sanitary towels) were commonly cited for both early marriage and early pregnancy: “*Some girls are forced to get married. A mother will convince her daughter to get married because they are financially handicapped.*”<sup>88</sup> In Mount Elgon, there was a stronger link to early pregnancy as a common reason for early marriage, but again this was often attributed to economic factors around parents being unable to meet girls' needs or having to undertake risky work that can lead to early relationships and pregnancy:

<sup>84</sup> Adult men exposed to the programme, Kisumu.

<sup>85</sup> Survey responses to Q312 “In your opinion, at what age is it appropriate for a girl to get married?” At baseline, this proportion was 99.3% in Kisumu and 95.3% in Mount Elgon.

<sup>86</sup> Young mothers, Kisumu.

<sup>87</sup> Market day activation report, December 2016.

<sup>88</sup> Older girls, Kisumu.

*They are sent to the market to sell commodities where they begin to interact with people. These girls begin to be weighed down by these responsibilities. They eventually seek support from men who have been friendly to them. These men later lure them to sex, eventually they fall pregnant (Adult men exposed to the programme, Kopsiro).*

Across both locations, there was a sense of blame attributed to girls who fall pregnant and their families – linked to the perceived bad behaviour of the girls, the fact that parents are not providing sufficient information to their children about sex and protection or the general neglect of parents, leaving girls in situations where they are vulnerable.

### Decision making on when to have children

**Among the groups most directly engaged with the programme, the monitoring data suggests some shift in attitudes among young people and coaches in relation to women’s right to decide when to have children.** Between the start and the end of all cohorts, there was an increase in the proportion of young people agreeing with the statement “A man and a woman should decide together whether and when to have children,” as demonstrated in Table 24. Coaches across both Mount Elgon and Kisumu also generally held equitable views on this issue at endline: 100% of coaches in Mount Elgon and 93% of those in Kisumu.<sup>89</sup>

Table 24. Reported agreement with the statement “A man and a woman should decide together whether and when to have children” from the agree-disagree activity with young people<sup>90</sup>

	Proportion of girls reporting they agree	Proportion of boys reporting they agree	Total young people reporting they agree
<b>Start of cohort</b>	<b>62.2%</b>	<b>48.2%</b>	<b>54.5%</b>
<b>End of cohort</b>	<b>93.8%</b>	<b>90.7%</b>	<b>92.1%</b>
<b>Kisumu</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: Weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	62.1%	76.9%	70.6%
End of cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Out of School</b>			
Start of cohort	62.0%	75.6%	72.3%
End of cohort	97.9%	85.6%	88.6%
<b>Secondary</b>			
Start of cohort	69.2%	44.3%	55.6%
End of cohort	95.0%	94.6%	94.8%
<b>Mount Elgon</b>			
<b>Cohort 1: Weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	41.6%	20.4%	31.0%
End of cohort	100.0%	95.0%	97.5%
<b>Cohort 2: Weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	66.0%	50.0%	58.4%
End of cohort	85.0%	83.5%	84.2%
<b>Cohort 3: Weekly participants</b>			
Start of cohort	69.9%	58.6%	64.7%
End of cohort	92.8%	84.3%	88.6%
<b>Out of School young people</b>			
Start of cohort	28.6%	21.0%	22.7%
End of cohort	100.0%	97.8%	98.3%
<b>Secondary young people</b>			
Start of cohort	67.5%	47.7%	57.6%
End of cohort	95.5%	95.5%	95.5%

**However, there is still a diversity of views on this issue among community members, and it appears there are still community expectations around men’s role as a breadwinner whose role it is to make**

<sup>89</sup> Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.1.

<sup>90</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, outcome indicator 1.2 for further details.

**decisions in the household.** The survey asked participants how much a wife’s opinion should be taken into account when deciding how many children to have. It also asked respondents to reflect on how much women’s opinions were *actually* taken into account, in other families in the community. Similar to at baseline, there was some mismatch between respondents’ personal attitudes, which were relatively equitable, and their beliefs about what others do, which were considerably less equitable (see Table 25).

Table 25. Survey responses to Q306 and 307

	Kisumu			Mount Elgon		
	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>	Baseline	Endline	Change? <i>(statistically significant)</i>
<b>In your personal opinion how much should a wife’s opinion be taken in account when deciding how many children to have?</b>						
A lot	64 (43.5%)	98 (65.3%)	▲ more equitable	76 (50.7%)	77 (51.3%)	No significant change
Some	70 (47.6%)	41 (27.3%)		55 (36.7%)	48 (32.0%)	
Not at all	10 (6.8%)	8 (5.3%)		17 (11.3%)	24 (16.0%)	
Don’t know	-	-		2 (1.3%)	1 (0.7%)	
No response	3 (2.0%)	3 (2.0%)		76 (50.7%)	-	
<b>In other families around here how much do think a wife’s opinion is taken into account when deciding how many children to have?</b>						
A lot	21 (14.3%)	24 (16.0%)	No significant improvement	18 (12.0%)	18 (12.0%)	No significant improvement
Some	69 (46.9%)	69 (46.0%)		91 (60.7%)	97 (64.7%)	
Not at all	9 (6.1%)	37 (24.7%)		17 (11.3%)	32 (21.3%)	
Don’t know	47 (32.0%)	19 (12.7%)		22 (14.7%)	3 (2.0%)	
No response	1 (0.7%)	1 (0.7%)		2 (1.3%)	-	
<b>Total</b>	<b>147 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>		<b>150 (100%)</b>	<b>150 (100%)</b>	

There was limited evidence on this issue from the qualitative data collected in Mount Elgon, but evidence from Kisumu demonstrates a comparable mix in perspective, both in relation to what happens and in relation to what *should* happen. Among adult participants, there was evidence of a clear diversity of views, with some suggesting it should be a woman making the decision and others noting that it should be a joint decision. Some men felt that the man or “breadwinner” should take the decision, whereas others felt that this was changing.

*MODERATOR: Who decides the number of children to have in a family? Why?*

*PARTICIPANT 7: The man. He is the head and the breadwinner of the family.*

*PARTICIPANT 9: Most of the time, the husband makes this decision. If a couple gets a girl, they would want a boy as their second born. Sometimes this doesn’t happen, they end up getting many children who are girls. This is when they have a mutual agreement that they should stop trying (Adult men not exposed to the programme, Kisumu).*

*PARTICIPANT 9: Things have changed. In the past men would not seek women’s opinion about the number of children to have.*

*PARTICIPANT 11: Most of the girls are not informed; therefore they will give in to men’s demands. Religion points out that people should reproduce and fill the earth.*

*PARTICIPANT 9: There is a change as a result of education. Girls are informed unlike in the past where they didn’t know their rights (Adult men, Kisumu).*

## 4.4. Policy and practice

### How has the programme influenced policy and practice in relation to VAWG prevention and response?

Overall, the programme has made a small but important contribution to VAWG policy and practice in Kisumu, and a more substantial contribution in Mount Elgon. This represents a success story given the relatively small scope of its work with duty bearers, and the short timeframe. While capacity building through workshops and training was relatively limited in scale and had only modest results, it was well synergised with other programme activities (such as an exchange visit between Kisumu and Mount Elgon), and this combination helped the programme have a broader influence, particularly in relation to work on safe houses in Kisumu and a GBVRC in Mount Elgon.

The programme staff engaged strategically through existing coordination fora such as the GTWGs, and in the case of Mount Elgon helped support establishment of a sub-country GTWG. Through this engagement with duty bearers, there are signs that the programme has helped empower duty bearer “champions” who will hopefully continue working on issues related to VAWG in future.

There is some suggestion that services may be improving in both locations, with cases of VAWG taken more seriously and dealt with more sensitively. However, it should be noted that there are still ongoing challenges relating to service availability and responsiveness, particularly in Mount Elgon, with many of the issues noted at baseline persisting. There are also concerns about the sustainability of early gains made, given movements and transfers within government and the relatively nascent nature of the functioning of the GTWG in Mount Elgon.

**The programme worked closely with “duty bearers” – including county government staff, teachers, police, health workers, community and religious leaders and other civil society organisations (CSOs).** As detailed in Section 3.2, these stakeholders attended many of the monthly implementation meetings and quarterly steering group meetings, and some were engaged as opinion leaders in the advocacy campaign. Programme staff also participated actively in GTWGs in both areas. Two capacity building workshops were held in each location for GTWG members, focused on raising awareness, challenging attitudes and improving coordination.<sup>91</sup> The second training built on the first, through revising referral pathways developed in the first training and identifying factors that could help increase the effectiveness of these pathways. The programme also ran exchange trips in 2016, involving a delegation of coaches, young people and GTWG members from each area visiting the other location.

**Capacity building was relatively small in scale and appears to have had fairly modest results. However, it was well synergised with other activities, which in combination helped the programme influence broader policy and practice.** Participants in the workshops across both locations reported increased understanding of issues relating to GBV – including the risk factors that contribute to violence, referral and court processes and how to develop advocacy plans to influence resource allocation for VAWG. However, it should be noted that understanding of VAWG issues at the start of the training was relatively high already.<sup>92</sup> The trainings were small in scale and relatively short, with several participants recommending that they should have been longer and others complaining that certain key stakeholders in the judiciary and county executives were not able to come. Arguably, some of the training objectives were overly ambitious in light of this.<sup>93</sup> There were also very few marked differences in attitudes between pre- and post-training assessment forms – unsurprising over a two-day training course.<sup>94</sup> It was also not

<sup>91</sup> Each was two days in duration, with 57 stakeholders trained across the two workshops in Kisumu and 45 in Mount Elgon (note this figure does not represent unique participants as the majority attended both trainings).

<sup>92</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, output indicator 4.2.

<sup>93</sup> For example the July 2016 workshop in Bungoma aimed to promote attitudinal change and develop skills to manage gender issues as well as raise awareness of the context of gender inequality, create consensus on a roadmap for prevention and develop a clear action plan for the GTWG. These are very ambitious objectives for a two-day workshop.

<sup>94</sup> See Supplementary Annex A, Outcome Indicator 1.4.

possible for the evaluation to validate how far the workplans developed during the workshops were acted upon.

Crucially, however, the training successfully built on and synergised with other activities with duty bearers, which helped catalyse positive outcomes at the level of policy and practice. For example, the July 2016 workshop in Bungoma developed workplans for the Mount Elgon GTWG, which built on some of the ideas catalysed through the April 2016 exchange trip. The June 2016 course in Kisumu was able to target a gap in the referral pathway identified through programme staff participation in the Kisumu GTWG. It also appears that the workshops helped contribute to pushing for safe houses in Kisumu and a GBVRC in Mount Elgon (discussed further below), thus representing an important part of the broader advocacy strategy.

**By convening a wide range of duty bearers through various forums, the programme successfully supported coordination on VAWG issues – particularly in Mount Elgon, where a sub-county GTWG was established.** The programme strategy was to avoid setting up new structures that might crumble after the cessation of activities, but rather to engage with pre-existing structures as much as possible. This strategy was broadly successful. In both areas, programme representatives actively participated in GTWGs at county and sub-county level, and in some cases the programme funded GTWG meetings. The programme played a particularly important role in Mount Elgon. In 2015, programme staff helped establish a working group in Bungoma sub-county, charged with increasing awareness of and responsiveness to VAWG. This group was eventually asked by the county government to expand its mandate and membership to become an official GTWG – something that should officially be established at the lowest administrative level possible, according to Kenyan policy. As a result, this structure is now absorbed into county government and in theory should be sustainable now that the programme has ended, although programme staff felt there were some risks to this (discussed further below). Overall, there was a sense that the programme had injected energy and structure into the county government response to VAWG in Bungoma.

*We brought together the children's department... the police and the health sector too. Bringing together these individuals made the GTWG a place where we could collect information and data on issues of women and girls and of course put in some strategies to remedy some of the situations that were coming in... it has now become a forum where we study the statistical trends of violence... and when we realise... there are cases that are being reported, we take action (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

In Kisumu, there was already an established GTWG at both county and sub-county level, bringing together a large number of CSOs and government agencies working on issues relating to VAWG. The programme's direct contribution to improving coordination was therefore lower. However, staff felt they had been able to make strategic contributions through this forum, for example by designing the capacity building workshops to respond to noted gaps around referral pathways and conducting joint advocacy with partners, including to push for safe houses in Kisumu.

Steering committee meetings also provided some opportunities for county representatives and programme staff to discuss how best to improve responsiveness to VAWG. In the June 2016 steering group meeting, county stakeholders and programme staff discussed how the GTWG could work on issues such as ensuring police on the gender desks were qualified, and the sustainability of the GTWG. In the September 2016 meeting, the sub-county administrator agreed to share information on VAWG with other administrators as a way of creating awareness.

In both Kisumu and Mount Elgon, service providers generally felt that coordination between duty bearers had improved over the previous two years. This seems likely to be linked to the ongoing work of and strengthening of the GTWGs in both areas, which the programme made a contribution to, particularly in Mount Elgon – although in most cases stakeholders did not state this explicitly.

*[Kenya Timz] has brought unity between the county and the national government so that we can have one approach instead of having small scattered approaches which are not unifying (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).*



**There are signs the programme helped empower a number of duty bearer “champions” who will hopefully continue working to prevent and respond to VAWG in the future.** Potential champions included certain government staff who had taken part in the exchange trip or steering committees, and police officers in both Kopsiro and Obunga who mentioned the influence the capacity building and community festivals had had on them.

*The trainings were life changing... we had the training sessions, we had an opportunity to see what Kisumu was doing, and that completely changed my perspective as an individual... we are already lobbying the government to allocate funds... that is how this programme has changed me personally* (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).

*Even in Obunga, which was really down in terms of following up cases, with the British and ACORD working there, we have seen [one particular police officer], he is a very articulate person, he takes those cases head on and he follows them by himself and that is a good show* (CSO stakeholder, Kisumu).

**Through the learning exchange, the programme played a crucial role in influencing the formation of a new GBVRC in Bungoma, based on the existing centre in Kisumu.** During the exchange trip to Kisumu, the Bungoma delegation visited the Kisumu GBVRC. One of the action points from the exchange was to secure funds to establish a similar facility in Bungoma<sup>95</sup> – an idea that seems to have been around for a while but was galvanised by seeing what was possible with relatively modest funding:

*Initially, there were efforts to come up with a centre but it failed, but after the Kisumu visit, the energy was there* (County government stakeholder, Bungoma).

The idea was discussed again in the July 2016 training in Bungoma, where the chief officer for youth, sports, gender and culture (who had participated in the exchange trip) “committed to signing off such a proposal if it is presented on his desk for approval” and one of the action points from the training was writing a proposal for funding.<sup>96</sup> Programme staff explained that the county MP women’s representative was able to leverage funds from the National Action Fund (around KSH 6 million) to take the scheme forward, and by the end of the programme the facility was under construction (see Figure 4).



Figure 4. Commencement of the GBVRC in Bungoma (picture taken during exchange visit)

Programme staff explained that the centre would be larger than the one in Kisumu, offering residential accommodation and skills development services for survivors. This seems to have in turn influenced the Kisumu GTWG to “up their game”:

*Their GBVRC [in Bungoma] is huge. So we came back [to Kisumu after the exchange visit] and saw things to take forward, so we put pressure on the county government to ensure that safe houses were completed. Both counties have learned from each other here* (Programme staff member).

While this example represents an important step forward for VAWG services in Bungoma, several respondents in Kopsiro expressed dissatisfaction with the location of the centre, which is being constructed near Bungoma town rather than in Mount Elgon itself. Programme staff explained that the location was chosen to make the centre accessible to a larger number of women, but this seems to have fed into existing unhappiness that Mount Elgon is underserved.

<sup>95</sup> April 2016 report on exchange visit.

<sup>96</sup> July 2016 Bungoma training write-up.

**The programme also succeeded in advocating, alongside other organisations, for the establishment of safe houses in Kisumu.** The Kisumu midline evaluation reported that the programme was seeking to advocate for a safe house for survivors of VAWG – a critical gap in service provision in the area. This issue was subsequently discussed in a capacity building workshop, with “safe spaces” identified as a critical part of the referral pathway for survivors:

*CBO actors... cited that they rescue a number of children in the communities but are unable to settle them in a safe space because the recovery centre does not offer this facility. The health care providers, children’s officers and the police also indicated that they also have no place that can house such cases. Chiefs in the workshop also stated that they do not have community centres where these survivors can be placed. This situation presents the single biggest challenge with rescue of survivors of VAWG (Report from Kisumu duty bearers capacity building workshop, June 2016).*

Programme staff explained that the programme participated in joint advocacy activities with other civil society actors to push for the construction of a safe house. In the June 2017 Kisumu steering committee meeting, the county government representative confirmed that two safe houses for survivors of GBV were to be established in the area. It was not possible to explore the contribution of the programme to this decision in great detail, as it was not mentioned in duty bearer interviews. However, it seems likely that, through its advocacy and discussions during training workshops, as well as active participation in the GTWG, the programme made a contribution alongside other actors.

**While there were some suggestions that services were improving in both locations, there are ongoing challenges relating to service availability and responsiveness, particularly in Mount Elgon, with many of the issues noted at baseline persisting.** The baseline evaluation found limits in the individual and organisational capacity of service providers – particularly the police – to deal with VAWG effectively. While police and teachers had received some training on GBV, including from NGOs, there were clear gaps in police capacity, including to counsel effectively and work with people with disabilities. There were also negative perceptions about the ability or willingness of the police and the justice system to respond to cases of rape or other violence.

There was some suggestion in both locations that issues of VAWG were being taken more seriously and dealt with more sensitively by police and health workers than they had been in the past. Some stakeholders discussed police “gender desks” (to support police to handle cases of VAWG in a sensitive way), which they felt were now manned more regularly and were making a difference in terms of responsiveness. Some also made reference to the collection of monthly monitoring data from police stations as helpful in keeping VAWG on the agenda. Other duty bearers felt that cases of VAWG were now treated as an emergency in health facilities. Some groups of women and girls felt that the police were more responsive than they had been in the past.

*Initially it was also not much of a priority but now we classify it as emergency... before victims used to wait on the line where nobody cared, like she is a patient like any other (Health worker, Kopsiro).*

*Police and health workers are responsive in Nyalenda as a result of [Kenya Timz] intervention. This is not the case in areas like Manyatta where [Kenya Timz] is not known (Older girls, Kisumu).*

In both locations, it is difficult to untangle programme contribution to these perceived improvements in service quality. While some stakeholders attributed specific changes – such as the regular manning of gender desks – to the programme, there is limited evidence to verify this. Given the number of other actors involved, the short duration of the programme and the relatively small capacity building component, any improvements at the level of service provision are likely to be a consequence of multiple stakeholders working together, as well as a continued emphasis on VAWG at national level. For example, several stakeholders mentioned the importance of laws around domestic violence and the national framework relating to VAWG in pushing improvements in practice.

There are also clearly still major ongoing challenges and gaps in service provision, particularly in Mount Elgon. Programme staff explained that the government-run health facility in Kapsokwony had been shut for several months during the programme as a result of national strikes, and the area had recently lost a particularly committed corporal, who was replaced by a less committed individual. In both locations, the

high turnover of police officers presents a challenge to ensuring capacity relating to VAWG response is maintained. There were also still signs of distrust in services, particularly in the police, among community members. Legal processes can be onerous and full of delays, young people still had stories of police acting inappropriately and the issue of police charging for relevant forms that should be free (raised during the baseline evaluation) was mentioned at endline by government and health care staff as a continuing challenge.

*There are some police officers who are not responsible... like if you go there and you are our age some of them will talk bad... tell you that the forbidden fruit tastes sweet you were warned but you took yourself to them, we need some money to help (Older girls, Kisumu).*

*The police still ask very funny questions when a victim goes to them to report. They can ask "What were you doing at that time?" "Why were you there alone?" This kind of questions has discouraged other victims from reporting... The most unfortunate bit here is that some police still ask for money for the P3 forms and when they get to the hospital the P3 forms have to be filled and there is a fee charged for filling the form (Government stakeholder, Bungoma).*

In both locations, duty bearers felt that community members still regularly stymied cases. For example, a health worker from Kopsiro felt that "As much as the police are trying to follow up the cases, they are usually withdrawn by the complainants."

**While the GTWG in Kisumu seems to be working well, there are questions over the sustainability of VAWG policy structures in Mount Elgon, and further questions over how far government is prioritising VAWG.** Programme staff felt that the Kisumu GTWG was "self-motivated" but had concerns over the sustainability of the new structures in Mount Elgon, especially following changes in key stakeholders relating to the election. Funding for VAWG at a county level is still an issue, and currently there are no specific policies or budgets at this level for VAWG programming. For example, one official reported that the county-level GTWG in Mount Elgon "has no funding, and most of the organisations were volunteering when we had meetings. The British Council has facilitated some of our meetings. Still, it is not a sustainable process." Several stakeholders also had questions around how far the county government had prioritised VAWG, with one official feeling "the issues are considered soft issues... they are not like making roads." Some also felt that any activities undertaken in Bungoma were not being felt in Mount Elgon.

*They have an office; they have somebody called a gender officer but you don't even know what they are doing in Bungoma. Kopsiro is so remote, reaching here is stressful. They come here once in a while (Teacher, Kopsiro).*

There are some more positive signs in Kisumu in relation to prioritisation and funding for VAWG – for example funding was allocated in the 2016/17 budget for safe spaces – although stakeholders did flag that gender issues and VAWG could be given greater prominence.

**So far, the programme has focused on sharing and disseminating learning at local rather than national or international level.** Lessons learnt have been routinely shared with community-level stakeholders through implementation and steering committee meetings, as well as a final community festival in both locations, but to date there has been limited dissemination work at national or international level. The majority of activities are planned following the publication of the endline evaluation report, including a conference in Nairobi and a lessons learnt paper.

## 5. Key lessons learnt

### What are the lessons learnt from the experience of programme implementation?

**This section of the report reflects on some of the key lessons emerging from the programme – namely, around implementation, sustainability considerations and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).**

In terms of lessons learnt from the experience of **implementation**, the two contexts of Kisumu and Mount Elgon presented different challenges and opportunities for the programme. This was most notable in terms of the structures existing on the ground that the programme could leverage or link with (both government and partners). Particularly in Mount Elgon, a fairly closed community, the importance of sufficient sensitisation and clear communication on expectations and incentives from the outset was revealed, in terms of ensuring initial buy-in and longer-term engagement. Community advocacy activities were somewhat late in starting, meaning that, although they were appropriate and synergised with other parts of the programme, there was a missed opportunity for longer-term engagement.

The programme was designed as a pilot, with the intention that the model could continue in the longer term; however, the decision was taken not to extend or expand the programme, resulting in clear challenges to **sustainability**. The hope is that the coaches, young people and opinion leaders who have been engaged in the programme will continue to act as role models and champions within the community. However, this strategy is based substantively on individual goodwill and it is not clear that this will be sufficient for the programme to leave a long-term legacy in the absence of further structural support. This is particularly the case in Mount Elgon, where there is a dearth of partners operating and generally weaker government structures. Overall, there were very mixed views from programme staff and stakeholders as to the potential for changes achieved as a result of the programme to be sustained in the longer term without further engagement. This raises questions as to whether three years was long enough to deliver this kind of complex intervention and ensure sustainability.

The programme collected a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data from young people, coaches, community members and duty bearers, in order to monitor progress and support learning. Key lessons learnt on approaches to **M&E** of a programme of this kind include:

- Distinguish and balance the data required for learning with that required for accountability, to avoid over-burdening programme staff.
- Consider options for accessing secondary quantitative data, to triangulate internal programme monitoring data.
- Where a social norms approach is taken, ensure data collection is prioritised and resourced on a targeted number of behaviours to avoid the risk that depth is sacrificed for breadth.
- Take a flexible and adaptive approach to M&E, particularly in the face of an evolving programmatic focus.
- Consider opportunities to incorporate the voices of young people into the design and delivery of the programme and the evaluation, which was not possible given time and resource constraints.

### 5.1. Lessons on implementation

The programme generated several lessons about how to effectively implement a sports for development programme to address VAWG.

**Urban and rural environments presented different opportunities and challenges**, in relation to:

- **The state of existing services, policy and practice around VAWG:** In Mount Elgon there were major gaps in services available for VAWG survivors, and weaker county government structures for VAWG prevention and response. While the programme took steps to strengthen services, county government structures and referral pathways, through its work with duty bearers, there were limits to what it was possible to achieve within a small budget and short timeframe. The literature on tackling VAWG points to the risks attached to encouraging reporting in areas with poorly resourced or dysfunctional services,<sup>97</sup> and this was experienced by the programme: *“We were really challenged to know where to refer children for support.”*<sup>98</sup> This was less of an issue in Kisumu, where there was a much stronger supportive GTWG, various CSO partners working on similar issues and an active GBVRC, meaning it was much easier to signpost survivors of violence. It also meant greater possibility synergies with the work of other actors, and greater potential for others to pick up the programme’s work once it closed (discussed further in Section 5.2 below).
- **The presence of strong local implementation partners:** Implementation partner ACORD does not have a permanent presence in either location, and was working through local grassroots organisations. Programme staff pointed to the difficulty of working with a partner that did not have infrastructure on the ground – which led to several challenges. Most notably, it contributed to frequently delayed payment of coaches’ stipends, giving rise to considerable dissatisfaction. Problems were compounded in Mount Elgon, as the implementation partner was weaker than in Kisumu, and less able to help bridge the considerable gaps in service provision or support future sustainability.
- **The programme’s role in the community:** Although it took time to build up trust, the programme was able to gain a strong community presence in Mount Elgon in a context where there were few other programmes operating. This helped meet a clear need to tackle high rates of VAWG, which others were not addressing. However, this came with high expectations that could not always be met, discussed below, and meant the programme was operating in isolation rather than synergising with others, as described above. There were different challenges in Kisumu, where the programme was attempting to shift attitudes and social expectations within selected communities in a large urban area – meaning that areas that were not being reached still closely affected those that were. As one staff member reported, this *“limited the influence that we can have. You will find cases of defilement, perpetrators can come from Manyatta and can come to Obunga.”*

**The programme highlights the importance of ensuring community advocacy strategies are closely aligned with other activities from the beginning.** There were several delays in getting the multi-media component off the ground, owing to protracted discussions with the intended implementing partner and related contractual difficulties. Eventually this resulted in a new implementing partner (Exp) being contracted to design and run the campaign, which was only six months long. While the design was appropriate and it did broadly succeed in synergising with other activities (discussed in the findings Section 4.1 above), the campaign was an integral part of the programme logic, and staff and Exp felt it would have been preferable to have it up and running from much earlier on in the programme.

**The programme highlights the importance of active community engagement and expectation management from the outset, with the support of coaches to counter any negative rumours.** It appears that communication and expectation management was not clear enough during the programme’s inception in Mount Elgon, which gave rise to a number of challenges. First, because the programme was associated with well-known brands such as the Premier League and the British Council, this contributed to high community expectations around the services and resources it would provide. As the coaches in Mount Elgon explained, community members *“perceived that the programme is a source of money and nurturing of the talents, only to realise that it is about violence against women and girls.”* Second, coaches noted that members of the community who had not been selected as coaches had helped spread rumours that linked the programme with devil worshipping. The coaches played an important role in countering these rumours and bringing the community round – including through visiting schools and explaining the programme’s aims; exploring the sources of rumours in the community and inviting these individuals to implementation meetings to learn more; and leading the way through enrolling their own children in the

<sup>97</sup> Alexander-Scott et al. (2016).

<sup>98</sup> Interview with programme staff member.

programme. Overall, the programme highlights the essential nature of gaining trust and buy-in within a community to ensure activities run smoothly. Implementation meetings proved an important mechanism for this, through providing a regular forum for parents, coaches, staff and community leaders to interact and raise issues or questions.

*You know when you are very open you can learn so many things in the community. These people do not like disclosing so many things. Both men and women are not that free to talk to the people about their issues unless you become so close to them. Therefore, it is about learning their behaviours and they will tell you the problems that they are facing and what they are planning to do (CSO stakeholder, Kopsiro).*

**In Mount Elgon particularly, the programme faced challenges following the decision to offer sodas to young people as a refreshment during football sessions.** This was eventually cancelled as it was seen to be a major distraction and source of tension. Whenever sodas were not available, this generated dissatisfaction among young people and their parents, to the point where one programme staff member reported *“it became all about sodas.”* While the decision to offer refreshments may seem to be a small issue, it can prove huge in a community like Mount Elgon, where resources are scarce. Cancelling the sodas ultimately did not affect attendance, although it did cause some unhappiness within the community.

**The programme successfully navigated the election period through careful contingency planning.** The 2017 national elections posed some risks to the programme, particularly in Kisumu – an opposition stronghold that saw regular protests in the weeks preceding the election re-run in September. This led to the delay of several activities. However, the programme had a strategy in place for dealing with election activities, which was broadly successful. The election mitigation plan included careful planning for community events to ensure they were not hijacked by campaigning, and a code of conduct agreed with coaches to ensure political campaigning remained separate from programme activities.

## 5.2. Lessons on sustainability

**The programme was designed as a pilot, and the proposal makes it clear that the aim was to implement its models in a way that could continue in the longer term.** The programme’s aspirations around sustainability were detailed in the proposal, as follows:

*[The programme] aims to establish delivery models that are sustainable following the end of external funding for the projects established overseas and ownership of the project in Kenya by local partners and stakeholders will be a key focus from the outset. The British Council and Premier League will support the delivery partnerships established in Kenya to devise a sustainability strategy and will support partners to put this into action. A key basis for the sustainability of the project is the involvement of a broad range of committed Kenyan partners from the beginning.<sup>99</sup>*

The British Council hoped to continue and expand the programme with further funding from DFID or another donor. However, DFID has decided not to continue funding the programme, and no other donors have been identified. As a result, the programme has now closed in both Kisumu and Mount Elgon. DFID’s decision not to continue its funding appears to link to changing priorities in Whitehall and the decision that any extension or roll-out of the programme should be managed by DFID in Kenya. In turn, the Kenya office did not feel a programme of this nature was a priority within its portfolio.

**Central to the programme’s sustainability strategy were the coaches, young people and opinion leaders who will remain in the communities. The hope is they will continue speaking out against violence and acting as role models now that the programme has ended.** The programme was very successful in recruiting community coaches, who played a fundamental role in the delivery of the sessions with young people and thus were core to many of its achievements. As one programme staff member explained, *“When we started they were volunteers but as we contributed you have champions who remain in the community and can carry forward the discussions.”* Recruiting coach educators and training them to build the capacity of others to deliver the VAWG curriculum was a key pillar of the sustainability strategy. The outcome harvesting workshop at the end of the programme suggested clear willingness on the part of the

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<sup>99</sup> British Council (2014) Programme Technical Proposal.

coaches to continue in their roles, running sessions and facilitating discussions, and some coaches reported that they had *“formed their own teams in the community to improve talent and fight VAWG.”* The programme has also left the equipment in the possession of the schools, in the hope that coaches and teachers will continue delivering the curriculum.

The opinion leaders recruited for the multi-media campaign represent another potential avenue for sustainability. Programme staff explained that some of this group in Mount Elgon had the idea of starting a support group to support survivors of violence into the future – this was discussed in the close-out meeting for the advocacy campaign, although it was not possible to verify whether this had led to anything. Finally, programme staff reflected that they hoped the young people who had gone through the curriculum would continue spreading the programme messages in future.

**However, the sustainability strategy is based more on individual goodwill than on a clear structural legacy. It is not clear that this will be sufficient for the programme legacy to be continued in a meaningful way, especially in Mount Elgon.** In Kisumu, the programme worked on identifying ways in which some of the coaches might be absorbed into other programmes running in the city. For example, 12 coaches have reportedly been integrated into a new Kisumu Youth Football Association programme, and will be deploying their skills and experience as part of that. However, this is a great deal more challenging in Mount Elgon, where there is not the same infrastructure of programmes and NGOs operating. While there were aspirations to set up a community-based organisation (CBO) to try and continue some of the work the programme started, the ability of the coaches to move much of this forward is reliant on funding, which is not currently available (e.g. for registration of the CBO). Without structural support and now that their stipends are no longer being paid, there is a clear risk that the coaches will not be able, or motivated, to continue. One programme staff member in Mount Elgon felt the programme was continuing through coaches sharing messages with football teams they were working with, but *“not in a very big way.”* Another member of staff felt the programme should have been embedded in schools from the outset and involved teachers in a larger-scale way: *“training them, and actually having sessions in school... mapped better onto the school curriculum,”* to help create a more solid basis for continuation.

**The programme tried to encourage sustainable change in its work with duty bearers, through targeting individuals, combined with engagement through existing structures.** Programme staff recognised that sustainability would be most encouraged through engaging through existing fora, rather than through the creation of new ones. This took the form of the GTWGs in both Kisumu and Bungoma. In Bungoma, the programme seems to have been successful in some of its work to inject energy and focus into the group, which was reportedly not particularly active historically. In Mount Elgon, one county government stakeholder noted that this had been one of the sustainable legacies of the programme. That said, it is not currently clear whether the group has access to routine funding sources, thus programme staff flagged a risk that the changes seen would not continue.<sup>100</sup>

**Programme staff highlighted that one of their learnings from this programme had been related to the choice of delivery partner, and recommended that future similar programmes consider partners with more sustained presence on the ground.** The programme engaged duty bearers and other implementing partners through the field officers in each site, as well as the programme manager. However, ACORD does not have a permanent presence on the ground in either of the two programme sites. The implication of this is that, as funding stops and activities come to an end, any infrastructure around the programme also exits, removing any opportunity for continued, more *ad hoc*, support of the coaches and engagement in partner fora such as the GTWGs. Programme staff noted that, were they to implement a similar programme again, they would choose a local delivery partner, to try and maximise the long-term benefits to the community of any investments made.

**There may be a need for supplementary communication around the exit of the programme, to ensure community members, and in particular young people, are all fully aware that the programme is ending and the reasons why.** While the programme engaged in activities to effectively “end” the programme in the two sites – for example final community festivals – evidence from the qualitative data collection

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<sup>100</sup> The September 2016 Steering Committee Minutes flagged that the group did not have a budget and therefore it was difficult to hold regular meetings.

shows that there is still uncertainty among many participants and community members around whether the programme has actually finished, with several asking for more information about whether it would return or be rolled out to other areas. There are planned “lessons learned” and dissemination activities in both communities, which will hopefully respond to this issue and provide clarity to the communities.

**Overall, among programme staff and other stakeholders, there were mixed views as to the potential to sustain any changes as a result of the programme in the longer term, in the absence of further engagement. There are clear questions over whether three years is long enough to deliver this kind of complex intervention and ensure sustainability.** While some people were optimistic about the extent to which the increased attention to VAWG issues would be sustained, others flagged that the programme’s activities had not taken place for long enough to ensure this, and expressed a desire for continued engagement through follow-up activities or another grant. Stakeholders flagged risks around a perceived reliance on individuals to sustain change (as discussed above), in the context of weak governance structures (Mount Elgon), lack of committed funding and high turnover of staff, particularly duty bearers. Finally, there was a feeling among many programme participants and some staff members that the length of time for implementation had not been sufficient to achieve all that the programme set out to do, and a disappointment that what those involved considered a successful pilot had not translated into a longer-term sustained engagement.

*Three years was not long enough for working on such a sensitive area. It’s hard to break down these barriers and understand the culture... you need to understand community, form part of it before you can have any sort of tangible impact. I don’t think it’s been able to happen through this period (Programme staff member).*

### 5.3. Lessons on monitoring and evaluation

The programme collected a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data from young people, coaches, community members and duty bearers, in order to monitor progress and support learning. Key learning points are as follows:

- **There is a need to distinguish between data for learning and data for accountability.** The monitoring system was fairly intensive, capturing a great deal of data across numerous logframe indicators. This required a lot of time and energy from the coaches, and from programme staff to support the coaches and enter the data. Collecting monitoring data also meant less time actually engaging young people with the content of the programme – up to four sessions in each cohort were dedicated to assessments and attitude tests. The programme used some of the monitoring data to inform changes to the programme, for example, the decision to engage with special groups; however, in some cases, there is less evidence of ongoing use of the monitoring data. This suggests that careful thought is required upfront on exactly which indicators it is most necessary and important to collect data against. Collecting data for the purposes of the logframe needs to be balanced against information that can help the programme with course correction and learning.
- **It is important to consider various options for accessing reliable quantitative evidence relating to key changes expected by the programme.** In this programme, it proved a real challenge to access reliable data on the reporting of violence, pregnancy rates and school dropouts – three issues the programme hoped to contribute to addressing, but on which household surveys and qualitative data can only give a partial picture. Through building up relationships with health centres and police, the programme was able to collect data on reporting, although questions remain around the reliability of this data given the systemic challenges of collecting data on GBV.
- **While the social norms lens was helpful to the evaluation, actually measuring social norms requires careful thought and planning; needs to be balanced against collecting data on attitudes and behaviours; and cannot be spread too thinly across numerous target behaviours.** The social norms lens allowed the evaluation to gain useful insights into social expectations, rather than solely focusing on attitudes and behaviours. However, various challenges prevented the accurate detection and measurement of social norms in a precise sense, in order to track their change over time. Key lessons include the need to focus on a very small number of targeted behaviours, rather than spreading data



collection too thinly across numerous issues; to find ways to identify reference groups; and to train data collectors carefully on how to ask questions about social norms. The 2016 DFID Guidance Note on *Shifting Social Norms to Tackle VAWG*,<sup>101</sup> published after the design and baseline of this evaluation, is a valuable resource for future programmes wishing to adopt this approach.

- **Ideally, M&E should support a flexible and adaptive approach, allowing for the piloting, testing and refining of different activities.** This is important because it is difficult to predict exactly how change in gender norms and behaviours will happen in advance.<sup>102</sup> The programme did incorporate some flexibility and iteration, most notably in the second year, when the curriculum was shortened and revised to involve more integrated football and thematic sessions. One programme staff member reflected that this ability to adapt was a highlight, and appreciated the opportunity provided by DFID to take this path. However, the programme logframe was fairly traditional, with fixed upfront targets. This arguably limited the potential to adopt any radical changes (e.g. redirecting resources away from recruitment in primary schools and towards reaching smaller numbers of people with disabilities, or exploring ways to keep young people engaged after finishing the curriculum).
- **The programme was unable to systematically incorporate the voices of young people into the design and delivery of its interventions, or into the evaluation of the programme impact.** While the curriculum was designed to be interactive and to allow opportunities for dialogue and reflection with young people, this design was top-down and did not offer opportunities for young people to input into the content they might have liked to see. As noted above, the curriculum was also fairly packed, allowing limited opportunities for the coaches to go “off script” and spend time on issues young people might have wanted to talk about. One programme staff member felt the short timeframe of the programme meant there was a need to “*hit the ground running*” and start implementation as quickly as possible, in order to meet programme targets.

A programme like this also offers a rich opportunity for a more participatory evaluation design, in which young people play an active role in collecting and analysing data rather than simply taking part in FGDs conducted by independent researchers using pre-set interview guides. The programme and Itad did discuss whether it would be possible to collect stories, poems and pictures from the young people as a source for the evaluation. However, again this did not prove possible, given the demands of the curriculum and the resources for M&E.

A more participatory approach to implementation and M&E requires an upfront decision that a participatory approach is going to be used. In the case of the evaluation, this requires recognition that participatory approaches may provide different types of data to a “traditional” evaluation, and will require considerable time and support from programme staff or evaluators. Participatory approaches are also likely to require a longer lead-in time, to allow space for youth voices to shape design. Finally, they are likely to benefit from a more flexible programme design, which allows space for iteration and for the voices of young people to feed back into the programme in a regular and systematic way.

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<sup>101</sup> Alexander-Scott et al. (2016).

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

## 5. Conclusions and recommendations

This section presents seven key findings and associated recommendations, which draw out lessons on how and whether the programme model might work elsewhere. It then provides an overarching summary of findings against the three EQs.

### 5.4. Overarching conclusions and recommendations

- 1. The evaluation suggests football was a powerful entry point to communities, helping start conversations around VAWG, maintain engagement of boys and men, capacitate coaches as role models and build young people’s knowledge, confidence and skills. However, as recognised by the programme, football is not a magic bullet, and should be seen as one part of a broader strategy of engagement.**

The evaluation found substantial evidence that football functioned as an effective entry point into the target communities. It proved very successful at engaging large numbers of men and boys in education and discussion around VAWG, and helped keep young people engaged with an in-depth VAWG curriculum. The findings corroborate other evaluations of sport for development programmes, in that football provided a forum for positive engagement between boys and girls and played a role in increasing the confidence of young people and developing their life skills.

While football was a key “hook” for engaging the community, it should be viewed as part of a wider package of interventions, including work with duty bearers and community members. The programme rightly identified that tackling an issue as deeply rooted as VAWG necessitated a multi-pronged strategy, engaging different parts of the community in different ways.

The use of football as an entry point requires effective sensitisation with communities to ensure clarity about the purpose of the programme, and to manage expectations about what it will and will not provide – in relation to incentives ranging from equipment, pitches and refreshment to engagement with the Premier League and future opportunities for footballing careers. There is also a need to balance football with the achievement of objectives around changing attitudes and behaviours – for example in considering the balance of activities within sessions and through identifying coaches who are able both to provide football coaching and to engage young people sensitively in discussions around VAWG.

**Recommendation 1: Future programmes should consider the use of football as a mechanism for engaging communities on issues related to VAWG; however, it should be seen as one activity within a broader package of interventions.**

- In contexts where football is a popular sport, it offers a great deal of potential as a way of starting conversations and engaging a broad range of actors, particularly men and boys, on issues related to VAWG and gender dynamics.
- Making the most of the potential of football requires building on what attracts people to football – for example, in the case of men and boys, opportunities for competitions – while giving adequate prominence to the thematic objectives of a programme, for example through integration of football and educational activities.

- 2. The programme was very successful in engaging young people, teaching them about violence and building their confidence and life skills; however, it struggled to engage hard-to-reach groups. Importantly, the evaluation has found that the programme went beyond raising awareness and succeeded in shifting attitudes among its youth participants around gender and the acceptability of violence – although evidence of behaviour change is weaker.**

The programme exceeded its targets for the numbers of young people participating in the programme, and the levels of their attendance. However, where the programme did not match its aspirations was in

the inclusion of hard-to-reach and vulnerable populations, who are likely to be most at risk of violence and/or the perpetrators of violence. The second half of the programme mitigated this challenge to a certain extent through a more tailored delivery model, which succeeded in increasing the engagement of older and out-of-school young people. Key factors included a shorter curriculum, alternative locations for sessions, the availability of childcare, recruiting through existing football teams and setting up competitions to encourage the participation of older men. However, over 80% of all participants were younger, in-school, youths, and the engagement of young people with disabilities remained very limited.

For the young people participating, there is evidence that the programme helped change attitudes about the acceptability of violence, as well as some anecdotal examples of participants acknowledging that violence they committed in the past was wrong. Some inequitable attitudes persist, though, most notably around stigma and shame. It is also important to note that there is no evidence as to the sustainability of any of these changes in attitudes, or the potential to change behaviour in the longer term, in particular given that some of these young people have not yet embarked on romantic relationships. This would require longer-term follow-up that is beyond the scope of this evaluation, but could be a fruitful area for future research.

**Recommendation 2: Tailored approaches are required in order to ensure inclusion of hard-to-reach groups who are most at risk of VAWG. The design could usefully be informed by formative research at the start of the programme, to assess the specific needs and concerns of different groups.**

- Working through schools provides an effective entry point to reach large numbers of younger children. However, future programmes should recognise that “one size does not fit all” and that bespoke strategies will be required to reach different groups, including consideration of sites, timing and supportive services such as childcare. Ideally, these should be built in from the start of the programme. Effectively engaging hard-to-reach groups is likely to be more resource-intensive, in terms of both recruitment and retention, and may require compromises in terms of numbers reached.
- There is a need to balance programme reach with the length and depth of engagement with individual young people, which will likely affect the sustainability of any gains. More research in terms of the “dose” that is required for sustainable change would be a useful contribution to the field, but would require longer-term follow-up with young people.

**3. The programme has worked strategically with duty bearers, recognising the need to engage with existing structures and provide targeted rather than generic capacity support. This has helped it influence specific areas of policy and practice, particularly in Mount Elgon. However, there are ongoing concerns about county government prioritisation and funding for VAWG, as well as questions over the sustainability of some of the gains made.**

The experience in both Mount Elgon and Kisumu highlighted the importance of building partnerships and leveraging existing structures when attempting to address issues related to VAWG. The programme rightly recognised this from the start and prioritised work with pre-existing fora, notably the GTWGs, rather than developing new structures. The programme successfully identified opportunities to convene, broker relationships and identify synergies with partners, and in Kisumu particularly the field officer was considered instrumental to the programme’s ability to influence the work of other organisations.

There were some high-profile examples of programme contribution at county government level – most notably towards the building of a recovery centre in Mount Elgon. While the idea was not a new one, the exchange trip between Mount Elgon and Kisumu served to catalyse progress through opportunities for dialogue and learning between the two sites. There is less evidence of change in the capacity of service providers, or in tangible improvements in referral pathways following programme workshops. However, given the scope and resourcing of the trainings and workshops, this is not unexpected.

Overall, the experience of partnerships was very different in the two contexts, generating lessons for future programmes working in rural and urban locations. The dearth of services available in Mount Elgon made it very challenging for the programme to strengthen support for survivors. In Kisumu, by contrast, the presence of a large number of partners and an active GTWG ensured there were opportunities for the programme to link with other services, for example to refer young people for counselling.

**Recommendation 3: In relatively small-scale programmes, value can be added through strategic and targeted engagement with duty bearers through existing forums, to help ensure increasing demand for services is matched with adequate supply and prioritisation.**

- Programmes should carefully investigate existing services for VAWG prevention and response, the potential to strengthen these in a sustainable way over the lifetime of the programme and the risks of harm to survivors if service availability does not match demand for reporting. This should inform program design, in relation to what supplementary services can be leveraged or might need to be provided. Stakeholder and political economy analysis are likely to be useful tools for this.
- It is important to be realistic about what is possible to achieve through capacity building activities, especially small-scale training courses. The programme model for engaging duty bearers was a good one given its small size and limited budget: focusing on strengthening existing structures; providing strategic support where there was the potential to add value and synergise with the work of other organisations; involving stakeholders in community-wide activities as champions and advocates; and playing a convening, supporting and brokering role where possible.

**4. The programme succeeded in developing the coaches into strong community champions who are likely to continue speaking out against violence into the future.**

There is good evidence that the coaches acted as role models and champions for the programme, and they gave many personal examples of how the programme had changed their own attitudes and behaviours. As local residents, in some cases themselves police or teachers, the coaches also facilitated the entry of the programme into the target communities and local structures. However, the approach was not without its challenges, given that the coaches were members of the community and thus in some cases, despite careful recruitment, held the same inequitable attitudes that the programme was seeking to address. This necessitated careful support and management by the programme, including in some cases disciplinary procedures, as well as a process of ongoing training and self-reflection by the coaches.

**Recommendation 4: Future programmes should consider models working through community coaches; however, this must be accompanied by adequate training and ongoing support.**

- It is important to recognise that coaches are members of the target communities, and thus may themselves hold some of the inequitable attitudes that programmes are attempting to address. This should not be considered to be prohibitive to the model, but must be identified and mitigated through activities such as group dialogue and self-diagnosis and reflection processes.
- Codes of conduct may provide clear and transparent guidance for coaches, contributing to clarity on expected behaviours and disciplinary measures.

**5. The programme successfully engaged a large number of community members, providing opportunities to raise awareness of VAWG and facilitate rich dialogue around the issues facing women and girls in the community. While there are some anecdotal examples suggesting this has led to some change in both attitudes and behaviours among participating adults, there is limited evidence that this has translated into widespread community-level shifts in social norms. This is unsurprising given the short duration of the programme.**

The design of the community interventions was appropriate, and the programme reached its target number of adults through community festivals and market activation events despite initial challenges in getting the advocacy component off the ground. There is also some evidence that young people have been sharing their learning at home, thereby increasing the exposure of parents to some of the messaging of the programme.

By the end of the programme, community attitudes towards Kenya Timz were very positive. In Mount Elgon this was after a rocky start during which lessons were learnt about the importance of community sensitisation, accurate communication about programme aims and careful expectation management.

However, apart from some anecdotal examples of reported attitude and behaviour change, there is limited evidence of community-level shifts in attitudes or social expectations as a result of programme

activities. The survey and the qualitative data demonstrated mixed attitudes in many cases, particularly in relation to stigma and shame felt by survivors, as well as structural barriers such as poverty and insecurity that continue to cause violence in the communities. This lack of tangible evidence of change is not unexpected, given the scope and number of community activities and the deep-rooted nature of the gender norms the programme was seeking to address.

**Recommendation 5: Where programmes seek to address VAWG, engaging adults from the very beginning is a vital complement to activities with young people, both to ensure buy-in and to begin addressing community-wide attitudes and social expectations. However, programmes should recognise that change at this level will not happen overnight.**

- It is essential to ensure clear communication with host communities from the outset, including sensitisation around programme objectives and activities and careful expectation management. Engaging parents and community members in implementation meetings can help with this, as can the use of coaches and influential community members as champions for the programme.
- Community festivals and activation events seem to be an effective model for reaching adult community members, and community dialogues can stimulate rich discussion on sensitive issues. However, the intensity of engagement needs to be carefully considered in relation to the aims of the programme, particularly where programmes are short in duration and attempting to tackle deeply rooted norms. It is also important for programmes to monitor and reflect on *whom* they are reaching with community events, to try and reach beyond “low hanging fruit.”
- Encouraging young people to share their learning with others seems unlikely to make a substantial difference to adult behaviour, but alongside other activities it may be a mechanism worth exploring. Although there was limited evidence of backlash in this programme, it is vital to ensure young people are not put at risk through their dialogue about potentially sensitive topics with older community members.

**6. Overall, there is limited evidence that the programme has substantially contributed to girls being able to claim their rights or to reducing violence at a community level, unsurprisingly given the short duration of the programme. There is a possible exception in relation to sexual violence in Mount Elgon, but these findings should be interpreted with significant caution.**

The evaluation suggests the programme successfully influenced young people’s attitudes about rights. However, in relation to the wider enabling environment, while there are several anecdotal examples of change, there is little sign of any real shift in relation to the programme helping girls claim their rights through going to school, choosing when to marry or have children or participating in community and political decision making.

Similarly, across most types of violence that the programme sought to address, there is no consistent evidence of change beyond anecdotal examples and perceptions. The only exception to this is in the case of sexual violence in Mount Elgon, where there is more consistent evidence that cases may have reduced. Perceived contributions of the programme include influencing boys and men – both directly through the programme and indirectly through raising awareness of the legal consequences of rape, which may have acted as a deterrent – and raising girls’ and women’s awareness of situations that may put them at risk. However, while the evidence is suggestive, this issue is difficult to measure accurately, and more data would be required over a longer time period to see if this trend continues to hold.

In relation to both violence and rights, the evaluation has highlighted the many and varied factors that contribute to the vulnerability of women and girls in the targeted communities above and beyond social norms and inequitable attitudes. In particular, poverty and limited economic opportunities both put girls and women at risk and prevent them from escaping violent situations. This points to a real issue with the length and scale of the programme as against the breadth and depth of attitudes and behaviours it sought to change, as well as structural factors in the wider enabling environment. While the programme engaged thoughtfully and effectively with duty bearers and community members, the bulk of its work was with young people. The smaller scale and lower frequency of activities with adults was unlikely to be sufficient to influence community-level change during the lifetime of the programme.

**Recommendation 6: Future programmes seeking to address deep-rooted attitudes and behaviour, such as those around VAWG, should plan for more sustained and intensive engagement.**

- Sustained and intensive engagement is required to effect longer-term change in deep-rooted attitudes and behaviours at community level.
- This requires longer-term funding, to ensure adequate resourcing of the multi-pronged strategy needed to reach different groups within the community.

**7. Sustainability considerations were not adequately incorporated into the programme design, leading to an overreliance on the goodwill and commitment of individuals as the programme's activities came to an end.**

There is a hope that individual advocates (including teachers, coaches and government champions) will continue to support the programme's agenda in Kisumu and Mount Elgon; however, this is optimistic without the ongoing support and structure the programme provided. This is particularly the case in Mount Elgon: while in Kisumu there have been attempts to integrate some coaches into another programme, in Mount Elgon such infrastructure does not exist. There are some key missed opportunities that, had they been taken, might have contributed to sustainability, although programme staff flagged insufficient resources to be able to prioritise this. For example, coaches could have been trained to run their own organisation or supported with registration as a CSO.

Challenges with sustainability were exacerbated by the choice of delivery partner, since ACORD does not have a permanent presence on the ground in either site and thus cessation of programme activities is associated with its exit from the sites. While a decision has been taken not to extend the programme, there remains uncertainty in the communities and among some stakeholders. There are potentially harmful longer-term consequences of the programme's exit from these communities, given that it was introduced to communities as a pilot, and also started dialogue and conversations about challenging and sensitive topics. Sustainability considerations and an exit strategy needed to be more carefully planned and integrated from the start, to mitigate the possibility that the pilot would not be extended after three years.

**Recommendation 7: Sustainability should be prioritised in design decisions for programmes working to tackle VAWG, including considerations of programme length, suitable partners and appropriate phase-out and exit strategies.**

- A mapping of potential partners should precede programme design, to inform the choice of partner, the scope of programme activities and opportunities for partnership and synergies with other organisations.
- Programmes should consider partnering with implementers with existing infrastructure and a presence on the ground to maximise chances of sustainability and the ability to provide continued support.
- A phased exit plan should be built in from the start of the programme, focused on ensuring that programme legacy has structural support rather than looking to individuals as advocates of change.
- Programmes wishing to shift social norms should commit to long-term engagement, to maximise opportunities for sustained change and minimise the risk that any short-term gains are simply reversed when activities cease.

## 5.5. Summary of key reflections against the evaluation questions

The table below presents a summary of the evaluation findings against the EQs.

### EQ 1

*Has the programme made a difference, and for whom?*

The programme has made a difference to the thousands of young people who participated – increasing their knowledge and awareness on VAWG, helping build self-esteem and life skills and changing their attitudes around gender roles and the acceptability of violence. However, it struggled to engage large numbers of hard-to-reach groups who are potentially the most at risk of violence. A cohort of community coaches have been capacitated, and in many cases have become role models who will continue advocating for girls’ rights in the future. The programme also worked effectively with duty bearers through existing county-level forums for VAWG prevention and response. The biggest success story is arguably the programme’s role in catalysing a new rescue centre for survivors in Mount Elgon.

While the programme did succeed in starting rich conversations about gender and VAWG in the broader community through a well-designed advocacy component, there is less evidence of changes in attitudes, behaviours or social expectations at a community level. While there are several anecdotal examples of individuals changing their minds or questioning their behaviour as a result of programme messages, the survey did not find much significant change from the baseline. This is unsurprising given the short duration of the programme, the very short duration of the multi-media campaign and the relatively low exposure of most community members to these activities. The main exception to this is in relation to sexual violence in Mount Elgon, where several data sources point towards a reduction since baseline. However, this result should be interpreted with caution as this issue is difficult to measure accurately – more data is required over a longer time period to see if this trend continues to hold.

### EQ 2

*How and why has the programme made a difference?*

Using football as a vehicle to address VAWG has proved successful, through providing an entry point to communities, acting as a powerful “hook” for participation, especially for men and boys, keeping young people interested and engaged over the course of the curriculum, breaking down stereotypes and providing spaces for girls and boys to interact and bringing many benefits associated with active participation in sport. However, football did not stand alone, but rather was one part of a broader package of interventions targeting different sectors of the community.

Where there is evidence of change in attitudes and behaviours, this largely supports the hypotheses in the programme ToC. Young people were influenced through coaches acting as role models; girls’ confidence was built through participation in sport; and boys and men were influenced to reject violence. In the case of sexual violence, the programme may have helped through raising girls’ and women’s awareness of the situations that may put them at risk. There is also some anecdotal evidence to suggest that young people discussed their learning with parents, helping raise awareness at home. Finally, the programme succeeded in influencing policy and practice where it focused on strengthening existing forums, providing strategic support that synergised with the work of other organisations and playing a convening and brokering role.

### EQ 3

*Can this approach be expected to work elsewhere?*

The programme model has the potential for success in contexts where:

- Football (or another sport) has broad popularity, and there is ideally some infrastructure in the form of existing coaches, teams and pitches that can be leveraged through the programme.
- Community coaches are recruited carefully, considering their potential to act as role models and advocates for gender equality – and provided with ongoing training and support to help embed equitable attitudes.

- Specific, targeted strategies are employed to engage the hard-to-reach groups who may be most at risk of experiencing or perpetrating violence.
- Football activities are integrated with thematic content to educate and encourage dialogue about gender and VAWG in an engaging way.
- Community sensitisation is undertaken to counter negative perceptions and unrealistic expectations that may come with a sport for development programme.
- The intensity of community engagement is carefully considered in relation to the aims and duration of the programme, since change in community-level attitudes and social expectations is unlikely to happen quickly. Programmes wishing to shift social norms should commit to long-term engagement, to maximise opportunities for sustained change and minimise the risk that any short-term gains are simply reversed when activities cease.
- Implementers carefully consider existing services for VAWG prevention and response, opportunities to strengthen these and the risks of harm to survivors if service availability does not match demand for reporting.
- Implementation partners have a strong presence on the ground to maximise chances of sustainability and ability to provide continued support to survivors.
- A phased exit plan is built in from the start of the programme, focusing on ensuring that programme legacy has structural support rather than looking to individuals as advocates of change.



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