itad

Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA)

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE TILITONSE FUND, MALAWI

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Submitted by Itad
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Kadale Consultants

CaDeCo

Results in development

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADC	Area Development Committee
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AECDM	Association of Early Childhood Development in Malawi
ATI	Access to Information
BWB	Blantyre Water Board
CAWVOC	Centre for Alternatives for Victimised Women and Children
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CCODE	Centre for Community Organisation and Development
CEPA	Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy
CHREAA	Centre for Human Rights, Education, Advice and Assistance
CMD	Centre for Multiparty Democracy
CONGOMA	Council for Non-Government Organisations in Malawi
COVISODE	Common Vision for Social Development
CSGF	Civil Society Governance Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CU	Concern Universal
DCA	Dan Church Aid
DCT	Development Communications Trust
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DRC	Development Research Centre
E&A	Empowerment and Accountability
ECOBO	Enukweni Community-Based Organisation
ECOYA	Environmental Concerned Youth Association
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FEDOMA	Federation of Disability Organisations in Malawi
FOCCAD	Foundation for Community and Capacity Development
GMIS	Grant Management Information System
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IIEA	Independent Impact Evaluation Agent
LCC	Lilongwe City Council
LGA	Local Government Act
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MACOHA	Malawi Council for the Handicapped
MALGA	Malawi Local Government Association
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MHRRC	Malawi Human Rights Resource Centre
MIJ	Malawi Institute of Journalism
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
NAMISA	National Media Institute for Southern Africa
NAPHAM	National Association of People Living with HIV and AIDS
NAYORG	Nkhadze Alive Youth Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICE	National Initiative for Civic Education
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PACENET	Pan African Civic Educators Network
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PEAG	Political Economy Analysis Group
PTA	Parent teacher association
RCT	Randomised Control Trial
RLC	Radio Listening Club
RMEC	Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
RT	Results Tracker
SAVI	State Accountability and Voice Initiative
SMC	School Management Committee
SWET	Story Workshop Education Trust
TAC	Transparency and Accountability Clubs
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VDC	Village Development Committee
WfP	Water for People
WUA	Water User Associations
YONECO	Youth Net and Counselling

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Executive summary

E1. Tilitonse is a multi-donor fund that has been designed to develop and encourage civil engagement in Malawi, to support more accountable, responsive and inclusive governance in Malawi through the grant funding of projects led by civil society and other local organisations. The programme was established in late 2011 by the UK Department for International Development, Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy. At that time, Tilitonse drew on research evidence available, which suggested that citizen action can lead to improvements in service delivery, contribute to the development of new accountability frameworks, and help poor and marginalised groups realise political rights and democracy. The research literature also suggested that civil society can play a significant role in empowering citizens to hold public officials to account, as well as work with the state and other actors to address collective action problems.

E2. This report summarises the evaluation findings of the Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA), which was implemented in parallel to the Tilitonse programme (2012–16). The overarching purpose of the IIEA was to evaluate and document the impact of the Tilitonse Fund. The evaluation is a theory-based design drawing on contribution analysis to make claims of plausible causation. It focuses on two interconnected levels of the theory of change: the first operating at the programme level, and the second operating in the highly contextualised situations of 18 detailed IIEA case studies (almost a quarter of the 74 Tilitonse grants). Where appropriate, this has been triangulated with data from a Civil Society Organisation (CSO) survey, Tilitonse's M&E, and other documentation.

E3. **Key findings.** The strongest evidence of Tilitonse's contribution to change is in the many examples at the interface between government, CSOs and citizens. Tilitonse has achieved most success where it has supported grantees to take action to influence government, especially in relation to national-level policy, and to some extent in assisting grantees to act as mediators between citizens and government.[1] The work of grantees as *mediators* and *influencers* has led to noticeable changes: a greater participation of citizens and, to a lesser extent, some improvements in the quality of citizen-government engagement.[2] Evidence is weaker around grantees conducting routine monitoring that forms the basis of a system of improved accountability – rather than ad hoc monitoring, or activities dependent on continuation of funding.

E4. In terms of *overall impact*, there are, however, far fewer examples of tangible governance impact, in the form of government responding to citizen priorities and being transparent, inclusive and accountable. There are examples of Tilitonse grantees contributing to the responsiveness of government,[3] with strongest evidence at the national policy level. However, while successes are to be commended, grantees tended to focus more on policy-level processes, rather than policy implementation through government spending its resources differently to better meet the needs of its citizens.

E5. There are also some examples of community-level impacts, particularly from the CBO Call, although in-depth analysis shows many ad hoc solutions to local problems rather than institutionalised change that will be sustained after funding ceases. Nonetheless, these examples do offer potential, but need to be scaled up, joined together and linked to district and national-level change.

E6. For the other impact objectives of the programme, there is generally weaker evidence in relation to improvements in transparency, outreach and inclusion by government.[4] There are some signs that government transparency has improved through increasing citizen pressure, setting up local forums and improving

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[1] These correspond to output 3 and output 2, respectively.
[2] These correspond to outcome 1 and outcome 2, respectively.
[3] This corresponds to impact 4 in the theory of change.
[4] This corresponds to impacts 1, 2 and 3.

civil society-government relations, but there is weaker evidence of the contribution of Tilitonse to outreach and inclusion by government. Changes are noted, but are as much to do with general shifts such as around the inclusion of women.

E7. The contribution of Tilitonse to these changes is primarily through its provision of funding to grantees to support their projects, rather than through additional support (capacity building, lesson learning, etc.). There are mixed results regarding how far Tilitonse has succeeded in building the capability of civil society. It is strongest in relation to the organisational development of CSOs (financial management, reporting, etc.). Although awareness on 'thinking politically' has increased, it is not widespread in terms of making a difference to project delivery. Indeed, feedback from the case studies show that while most Tilitonse grantees were positive about the support provided by the programme, they also cited common problems of not enough contact time, training being insufficient, and the need for more learning between grantees.

E8. A number of lessons can be drawn from the evaluation analysis to inform future work, including:

- The importance of mentoring and accompaniment from the start

- Redressing the balance between developing CSOs as organisations, and building capacity of civil society

- Focusing more on implementation of existing policies rather than policy-making advocacy

- Having sufficient governance skillsets of programme staff

- Better connecting national, district and community-level work

- Being more realistic about governance objectives, and specific impacts

- Implementing systematic ways of incrementally documenting governance change.

E9. There are a number of recommendations on ways forward, some of which imply a shift from the primacy of a grant-funding mechanism. In terms of increasing overall governance impacts, consideration should be given to:

- Recommendation 1a. Strategically cluster support, particularly around mutual problem solving.

- Recommendation 1b. Increase 'evaluability' and impact by evidencing parts of the programme, rather than pursue an 'aggregation' of the whole.

E10. In terms of improving the design and the way in which the programme works, consideration should be given to:

- Recommendation 2a. Support partners to think and work politically – with an emphasis on doing Political Economy Analysis (PEA) through ongoing practical mentoring.

- Recommendation 2b. Shift the monitoring (and learning) around governance results to better support adaptive programming.

- Recommendation 2c. Think carefully about the use of programme funds, including the potentially distorting effects of grants on sustainable processes of citizen engagement.

Chapter 1.   Introduction

1. This report presents the findings, lessons and recommendations from the Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA) of the Tilitonse Fund in Malawi.[5] Tilitonse is a grant-making facility that aims to support more accountable, responsive and inclusive governance in Malawi through the funding of projects led by civil society and other local organisations. The £12 million Fund was established in late 2011 to run for 4 years, and follows on from a long line of empowerment and accountability (E&A) programmes in both Malawi and elsewhere. Tilitonse is a multi-donor facility supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Irish Aid and the Royal Norwegian Embassy.[6] It is managed by the Tilitonse Secretariat, provided by a consortium of DAI (previously known as HTSPE International) with O&M Associates based in Malawi. The Secretariat reports to the Tilitonse Board consisting of donors and other stakeholders from academia and civil society; while the IIEA reports to the Board through the Research, Monitoring and Evaluation sub-Committee (RMEC).

2. The IIEA ran in parallel to the Fund's implementation from 2012 to 2016, and provided an independent evaluation of the impact of Tilitonse. This chapter provides a brief overview of Tilitonse and the IIEA, while the remainder of the report is structured as follows: **Chapter 2** provides an overview of the evaluation design, including the methods for data collection, analysis and synthesis. **Chapter 3** draws together lessons from the literature, explaining how the global evidence base is reflected in the design of Tilitonse and developments in thinking since. **Chapter 4** provides an overview of the implementation history of the programme, followed by **Chapter 5**, which summarises the main evaluation findings, exploring what Tilitonse has delivered (its outputs) and the evidence for consequential governance changes (outcomes and impacts). **Chapter 6** pulls together the final conclusions, including key lessons and recommendations.

1.1 Background to Tilitonse

3. Tilitonse was designed to develop and encourage civil engagement in Malawi, to support both greater public accountability and to contribute to progress on development outcomes. It drew on evidence at the time[7] that suggested that citizen action can lead to improvements in service delivery, contribute to the development of new accountability frameworks, and help poor and marginalised groups realise political rights and democracy. Furthermore, there was recognition that civil society can play a significant role in empowering citizens to help hold public officials to account, as well as work with the state and other actors to achieve common development aims. This evidence from the existing literature, and how it influenced the design and implementation of Tilitonse, is discussed in more detail in **Chapter 3.**

4. When the Tilitonse programme was designed in 2009, the government had a large majority in parliament and there was wide interest in better governance. The political situation deteriorated in 2010, however, which led to protests by Malawian organisations demanding better governance and economic management, culminating in demonstrations in July 2011.[8] The government reacted with pre-emptive arrests of civil society leaders, and violence leading to deaths and injuries. The inception period for the Tilitonse project started later in 2011 and the programme was reoriented to take into account these challenges to democracy. In order

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[5] The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the IIEA are provided in Annex 1.
[6] The European Commission was also a donor, but later withdrew.
[7] For example, explicit reference in the Civil Society Governance Fund ToR is made to the work of the 'Citizen Participation and Accountability' Development Research Centre hosted by the Institute of Development Studies, and specifically the publication on 'Putting Citizens at the centre: linking state and societies for responsive governance'.
[8] Malawi Human Right Commission (2011), *Report on the July 20 Demonstrations*, accessed June 2016.

to appear less confrontational, the original name of the Civil Society Governance Fund was changed to 'Tilitonse' (*we are together*) to better reflect a reconciliatory approach between the demand and supply sides of governance. Accelerated grants were disbursed during the inception period to a number of 'well-regarded' civil society organisations (CSOs) to provide a continuity of funding to the non-governmental sector and to fulfil donor disbursement requirements.

5. With the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika in April 2012, the political landscape changed once more resulting in a perceivable improvement in the 'policy space' in which civil society could operate. The first Open Call of Tilitonse grants was made later that year. In 2013, however, the 'Cashgate' financial scandal proved to be another turning point, in which looting, theft and corruption were discovered across government, involving a number of government officials and others connected to the political elite – they had amassed large amounts of money that was traced back to government funds.

6. Tilitonse evolved in other ways during its implementation, making changes in the grant funding windows provided to civil society. Initially seven grants were disbursed through the Accelerated Grants window during the inception period, and three funding windows were originally proposed for the remainder of the programme: the general Open Call, the Thematic Call and issue-based projects. At the end of the inception phase, the Board approved the first Open Call window to inform the design of the other calls. The issue-based projects were subsequently dropped, and the final windows included the Thematic Call, the second Open Call and the strategic opportunities window (under which the CBO Call and rapid response windows were approved). In total, the Tilitonse programme provided 74 grants (detailed further in Chapter 4.1), to:

- 7 CSOs under the **Accelerated Grants Window** (April 2012 to September 2013)[9]

- 28 CSOs under the first **Open Call** (from October 2012)

- 6 partnerships of CSOs under the **Thematic Call** (from September 2013)

- 6 CSOs under the **second Open Call**

- 26 **community-based organisations (CBOs)** (2014 to August 2015)

- 1 CSO under the **rapid response window**

7. In addition to being a grant-making facility, the original design of Tilitonse also aimed to address some of the common challenges faced by CSOs in the country. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the programme specified the need to address institutional weaknesses such as poor capacity and financial management, and specifically to *"contribute both to the institutional development of civil society and improving internal good governance, as well as to strengthening the role of civil society to implement programmes to promote more responsive and accountable government"*.[10] The approach to capacity building evolved over the period of the programme. This is detailed further in Chapter 4.2.

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[9] It was agreed that the Accelerated Call grants were not to be covered by this evaluation. This was because they were started during the inception periods of both Tilitonse and the IIEA, and were not designed to be linked directly to the programme's overall theory of change (which was still being developed at the time). The grants were a means to address donor disbursement pressures, ensure a continuity of funding to the non-governmental sector, and achieve governance results from existing civil society organisations.

[10] ToR for the Civil Society Governance Fund, Malawi, 2011.

1.2 The purpose of the IIEA

8. The overarching purpose of the IIEA was to evaluate and document the *impact* of the Tilitonse Fund in its aim to improve the accountability, inclusion and responsiveness of Malawian governance through increased citizen engagement.[11] This includes outcomes of supported projects, appropriateness of support mechanisms, and the overall impact of Tilitonse. During the inception period, the IIEA agreed to focus on five core evaluation questions which are detailed in Chapter 2.[12]

9. A particular challenge for the IIEA was to help bridge the 'attribution gap' in ways that meaningfully measure governance impacts, while being able to plausibly claim these changes to be due, at least in part, to the work of Tilitonse. Many past E&A programmes, particularly funded by DFID in the period before around 2010, were able to develop monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks that could claim 'impact' in ways that were barely linked to the funded interventions. For instance, past logical frameworks (logframes), particularly for large multi-donor E&A funds, often cited high-level governance indices as goal/impact-level changes that would be brought about as a consequence of the programme, e.g. the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index ranking, or the country rankings and values of the Human Development Index. The milestones and targets set were often meaningless, such as a '0.2' improvement over a 5-year period). In reality, such changes were likely to occur over a much longer period of time beyond the usual programmatic 5 years, and due to a multitude of inter-related factors in which the programme itself may barely register. Typically, linkages between funded activities and these high-level goals were assumed, or explored only to a very limited extent.

10. The IIEA addressed these weaknesses in past programme assessment through an evaluation design that sought to establish 'plausible causation' in order to assess both the change itself as well as the extent to which the intervention led to these changes. This is particularly challenging for E&A programmes such as Tilitonse, where likely impacts are highly contextualised and dependent on political-economic dynamics, and where the design of the programme responds to multiple demands from locally based organisations (i.e. through the grant-making mechanisms). The IIEA evaluation design uses a theory-based approach, which defines both programme- and grant-level theories, against which cause-effect relations can be evidenced and evaluated. Although for a few causal links it was originally thought that an experimental approach might be possible to test attribution to the programme, this proved unfeasible, and as such the agreed design relies on an assessment of generative causality[13] using a form of contribution analysis. This approach acknowledges that, "*Causality in relation to socio-economic interventions is usually of the probabilistic form: that the intervention is most likely to have made a difference. Contribution analysis provides an argument with evidence from which it is reasonable to conclude with confidence that the intervention has made a contribution and why*" (Mayne 2012: 273). More details of the evaluation design are provided in the following chapter, as well as in Annex 6.

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[11] See ToR, in Annex 1.

[12] The ToR for the IIEA does not specify questions for the evaluation, but rather during the inception period requires the IIEA to "*work with management board, managing agent and a wider selection of stakeholders to set and agree evaluation questions*".

[13] Causal attribution is central to people's ability to understand and make sense of the world. It is therefore a necessary part of an evaluator's toolkit for explaining why impacts occurred, to help predict the consequences of interventions, to assign credit and to learn lessons. Counterfactual frameworks depend on the difference between two otherwise identical cases, and provide the basis for experimental evaluation approaches. Generative frameworks meanwhile investigate in depth the different mechanisms at play in a particular case which explain cause and effect.

Chapter 2.   Evaluation Design and Methods

11. This chapter presents our evaluation design alongside the methods we have used for data collection, analysis and synthesis. The final evaluation design was based on its appropriateness to answering the *evaluation questions* (particularly those around impact and understanding causation), the *programme attributes* (the characteristics of governance interventions, the programme's ToC,[14] as well as planned outcomes and impacts), and the *local context*.[15] This chapter explains this by first outlining the rationale for a theory-based approach, then detailing how we have applied contribution analysis in this evaluation. The middle part of the chapter provides details on the methods of data collection, before ending with a summary of how we have approached the analysis and synthesis of the evidence. More details are provided in Annex 6.

2.1 Rationale for a theory-based approach

12. Our theory-based evaluative approach adopts a logical model of cause-effect through which the validity of Tilitonse's ToC can be empirically explored.[16] The approach enables detailed examination of the nature of linkages between a complex set of causes and effects which, in the case of Tilitonse, vary in the extent to which they are susceptible to quantifiable measurement. In a theory-based design, "*causation is established by collecting evidence to validate, invalidate or revise the hypothesised explanations, with the ultimate goal of rigorously documenting the links in the actual causal chain*".[17] Ultimately, this approach will largely test 'plausible contribution' rather than 'attribution' by measuring the extent of contribution that can be reasonably associated to the interventions of Tilitonse.

13. The attributes of the Tilitonse programme mean that a typical impact evaluation (using a large N survey, with treatment and control groups) was considered inappropriate to evaluate the programme's overall effect. This was for four reasons:[18]

(a) **The Fund was designed to respond to demand over time**. The CSO/grant-based interventions formed the basis of the programme's overall impact, and these were not know-able at the start of the programme – only becoming apparent after each grant call. For this reason, there was considerable in-built *agency* within the programme, as many individual CSOs operated independently to design and implement their proposals on the ground.

(b) As a consequence of (a) above, there were **too many unknown interventions even during the life of the programme, making it problematic to define questionnaires, control populations and devise sampling strategies.** The number of grant windows, number of grants, and the interventions to be funded all changed and only become known during implementation – with some interventions being designed in the third year of a 4-year programme, e.g. the CBO call.

(c) T**he concentration of grants in any one place was diffuse and heterogeneous.** From an analysis of the first Open Call alone, it was evident that grants would be highly disbursed by geographic location, intervention type, sector and at different levels of government (national,

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[14] There are many interpretations of a theory of change. A theory of change is defined as an explicit theory or model about how a programme is intended to produce the intended outputs, outcomes and impacts, and the factors affecting or determining its success (based on Bamberger *et al.*, 2006). Its purpose is to explain how the intervention will bring about change, and in doing so, expose the important assumptions and contextual factors.

[15] This approach is in line with current guidance on impact evaluation, such as the NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation (Leeuw and Vaessen, 2009) which defines quality impact evaluations as: *"those which ask relevant questions, use appropriate methods, apply methods rigorously, and deliver policy and program relevant conclusions"*. See also Stern et al. (2012).

[16] Todd and Brann (2007).

[17] White and Phillips (2012: 28).

[18] Barnett (2013).

district and village).[19] Even with a programme of Tilitonse's size, the disparate nature of grants by region, sector and so forth meant it was unlikely that discernible impact could be traced on national-level indicators within a 4-year period. For instance, the sample sizes of national-level surveys (such as the Afrobarometer) are insufficient to provide measurable change that can be associated with even a (theoretical) concentration of several Tilitonse's grants operating in any one district or location.[20]

(d) **Governance impacts are concerned with power, and political dynamics and change are highly contextualised**. A large-scale survey has many limitations in measuring political change, particularly given the spread and diversity of Tilitonse-funded interventions across many contexts. Plus, many governance activities deliberately set out to work across an entire population (e.g. national policy change) or encourage diffusion (e.g. advocacy for rights), and this can make control groups infeasible or inappropriate.

14. The potential use of experimental approaches was also explored for individual grants. However, the results of an internal review showed that this was only technically feasible for a very small proportion of grants (with around 8% having a potential for an experimental design);[21] none were approved by the Tilitonse Board for various reasons, including ethical, value for money, and timeliness.[22] Furthermore, the cost of one randomised control trial (RCT) for one grant would have been similar to the amount received by the grantee, and although the resulting evidence may have been highly robust for that particular grant, it would have provided little evidence of the programme's overall impact, that is, 1 out of 74 grants made by the programme, which is less than 2%.

2.2 Evaluation questions and indicators of change

15. The core evaluation questions cover different aspects of the programme's impact. Unlike many service delivery interventions (e.g. vaccinations, bed-nets, etc.), where shifting the balance of power is generally not a key objective, it is inherently problematic to separate governance interventions from the specific contexts in which they operate. Asking generalisable impact questions about whether "*x type of intervention produces y type of impact*" is often of limited value.[23] Rather, a more useful question to ask is: What are the factors – enabling and disabling – that shape the possibility of Tilitonse achieving its stated goals in a particular context? Hence, the evaluation questions below focus more on how and why Tilitonse might have contributed to a difference. As McGee and Gaventa (2011:19) summarise: "*Such an approach binds the analysis of impact both to the broad contexts in which the intervention exists, and to the theory of change underpinning their application in a particular setting*".

16. The ToR for the IIEA does not specify questions for the evaluation, but rather during the inception period the IIEA worked with the "*management board, managing agent and a wider*

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[19] An IIEA review of the first Open Call showed a very diverse set of interventions. There were, for example, 10 different sectors covered by nearly 50 grantees (e.g., the environment, health, education, media, etc.), with grants covering national, district and community levels (and sometimes all three) working with different sets of stakeholders in different locations across all three regions (southern, central and northern).

[20] The sample size of the Afrobarometer is approximately 2,000 respondents spread across the three regions of Malawi (northern, central and southern). According to the Afrobarometer survey team: "*The sample is large enough for disaggregation by sex, administrative regions (north, centre and south) and area status (urban – cities; semi-urban – bomas and towns). The size is not large enough for any further disaggregation... District level analysis would require samples 10,000 and above*".

[21] The desk-based review of the first Open Call resulted in four possible randomised controlled treatments (RCTs) out of nearly 50 concept notes, of which two were approved by the Tilitonse Board for further consultations with the grantee. This resulted in one RCT design brief, but due to delays this became unfeasible because a baseline was no longer possible.

[22] The lessons from the review of the first Open Call are summarised in the IIEA Note on *Lessons on scoping RCTs for Tilitonse*, August 2013.

[23] McGee and Gaventa (2011).

selection of stakeholders to set and agree evaluation questions". During the inception period, the IIEA presented an initial set of evaluation questions (based on the original technical proposal) to the Board at a workshop held in Malawi during April 2012. A Scoping Note[24] was then produced with consultations taking place with the Secretariat and Board, including presentation at the Board meeting on 10th August 2012. The main feedback at that time was a broad acceptance of the questions, with feedback around wanting to ensure that the data collected against the questions also captured issues of gender, age, etc.; plus, a desire to gather understanding on the different approaches employed by the programme. The final set of evaluation questions were presented and approved in the IIEA Inception Report,[25] and then repeated in the updated methodological working paper.[26] These questions can be summarised as:

- Has the intervention made a difference (impact)?

- How has the intervention made a difference (impact)?

- Can this be expected to work elsewhere?

- Has Tilitonse built the capacity of organisations for effective governance and accountability?

- Has Tilitonse built useful knowledge on governance and accountability for organisations and others to use in Malawi?

17. Over time, the focus of the IIEA and the evaluation questions has evolved in consultation with RMEC, with more specific questions developed for the CSO survey and case study work.[27] Given the diversity of interventions funded under Tilitonse and the eventual need to be able to generalise at the *programme-level ToC*, we developed a series of IIEA sub-indicators (see Annex 3). Along with the Tilitonse ToC, these sub-indicators have been used to develop a more specific framework of questions for the evaluation. This focuses primarily on whether Tilitonse has had an impact and how this impact has come about, with more generalisable lessons, including on capacity and broader civil society drawn out through the analysis against the ToC.

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[24] "*Evaluation Questions for the Impact Evaluation of Tilitonse: Scoping Note for consultation*", IIEA internal draft, 1st May 2012.
[25] IIEA (2012).
[26] IIEA (2013).
[27] For example in the endline case study briefing note (IIEA 2014).

Figure 1. Evolution of Evaluation Questions (and link to IIEA sub-indicators)

18. Based on this framing, the evidence is presented in Chapter 5 (main findings) against the programme-level ToC, showing both the change at each level and how outputs have led to outcomes and governance impacts. Chapter 6 takes this further and draws out more generalisable lessons and conclusions against the original evaluation questions.

2.3 Methods of data collection

19. Data collection for the evaluation employed a mix of methods to reveal information along the main themes of the evaluation, focusing primarily on a quantitative survey complemented by qualitative case study methods and secondary data sources. This allowed the IIEA to collect different types of evidence and to triangulate the results. Annex 6 provides full details of the data collection methods and tools. In summary, the IIEA's data collection approach consisted of:

- **A survey of CSOs (grantees and non-grantees)**, who act as intermediaries between citizens and government. A rolling baseline was conducted at the start of each grant-making round, with an endline CSO survey conducted at the end of each round. In order to establish a proxy counterfactual, a random sample was also drawn from 'unsuccessful CSO grant applicants' and more generally from 'CSOs engaged in E&A activities' who did not apply for grants.

- **A longitudinal qualitative case study approach** focusing on a sub-set of grants, in order to capture government, CSO and citizen perspectives, as well as the results in particular contexts. This involved two snapshots in time, a baseline case study focusing on the grantee context and ToC, and an endline study focusing on evidence of change and reasons for change since baseline. In all, 12 CSO case studies and an additional 6 CBO case studies were conducted; the latter used a reduced methodology in proportion to the relatively small size and duration of these grants.[28]

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[28] IIEA Briefing (Number 6) on '*Tilitonse CBO Case Studies Methodology Paper*', updated in October 2014.

- **Triangulation with secondary sources of evidence**, including a review of the end of project evaluations commissioned by the Secretariat,[29] the grantees' own M&E data through the Grant Management Information System (GMIS), plus additional analysis of policy and other documentation.

20. The IIEA sub-indicators (Annex 3) provided a common framework around which to design the CSO survey questions as well as analyse the qualitative case study data. This meant that while each individual case study was analysed around the context-specific ToC of the grantee's intervention, it was also possible to analyse the data against the IIEA sub-indicators that related to the *programme-level ToC* – thus allowing a means by which to generalise for the programme overall.

2.4 Analysis, synthesis and generalisation

21. Contribution theory (Mayne, 2011 and 2012) provides the overarching conceptual framework for the evaluation. Under this umbrella a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to uncover comprehensive evidence on observed results, each of the links in the causal chain, and other influencing factors. This evidence is compared with the ToC to reach robust conclusions about an intervention's contribution to observed outcomes, and the relative importance of other influences.[30] Contribution analysis sets out to demonstrate a plausible association between a programme and observed outcomes, by building a credible contribution story in which each step lying between programme inputs and outcomes is clearly evidenced, with the result that a *"reasonable person, knowing what has occurred in the programme and that the intended outcomes actually occurred, agrees that the programme contributed to these outcomes"*.[31]

22. There are **six iterative steps** in contribution analysis. Each step builds the contribution story and addresses weaknesses identified in the previous stage. As White and Phillips (2012) summarise:

> *Analysis should be carried out iteratively, with new evidence sought out to strengthen the contribution story and increase understanding of how outcomes occurred. Where settings are complex and there are multiple 'arms' or elements to interventions, separate contribution stories should be developed for each arm, as well as for the intervention as a whole.*

This involves six main steps:

- Step 1: Set out the attribution problem to be addressed
- Step 2: Develop the ToC and risks to it
- Step 3: Gather the existing evidence on the ToC
- Step 4: Assemble and assess the contribution story and challenge to it
- Step 5: Seek out additional evidence
- Step 6: Revise and strengthen the contribution story

23. Full details of these steps are provided in Annex 6. Contribution analysis was applied on two levels: at the level of the individual case study grantees; and at the level of the programme as a whole. Once analysis was complete at the level of each individual case, in which data was

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[29] All End-of-Project Evaluations received by 3 June 2016 were reviewed for evidence of change against the outcome and impact levels of the theory of change. A total of 19 End-of-Project Evaluations were included in this review.
[30] White and Phillips (2012).
[31] Mayne (2012).

analysed against *grantee ToCs*, we synthesised the 18 CSO/CBO cases against the outputs, outcomes and impacts of the *programme-level* ToC. The extent to which the empirical evidence of the individual case studies support or refute the overarching theory provided a basis for generalisation (i.e. what do these case studies tell us about more general principles or theories), which may apply elsewhere. This type of theory building is an inductive approach, which uses *"one or more cases to create theoretical constructs [and] propositions … from case based, empirical evidence"*.[32]

2.5 Inherent risks, potential biases and mitigation strategies.

24. As with any methodology, there are strengths and limitations. This section explores a number of potential biases in the evaluation design, and explains how we have dealt with some of the methodological challenges faced in evaluating a complex programme such as Tilitonse.

25. *Validity* (or internal validity) refers to whether or not the data and/or the evaluators actually measure the concepts they intend to measure. This is a challenge for governance programmes such as Tilitonse, where key governance concepts and the ToC can be vague or perceived differently by different stakeholders over time. We have addressed this by further elaborating the ToC (including contextually specific ones for each case study), and using a common set of IIEA sub-indicators (as defined in Annex 3) to provide a consistent framework for data collection and the analysis. The IIEA sub-indicators are defined in detail, and provide the basis for questionnaires and checklists used in the survey, interviews and focus groups.

26. *External validity* refers to the "*extent to which theoretical constructs and postulates generated or tested are applicable across groups*". The evaluation achieves this through analytic generalisation where the case studies in effect provide evidence to test how much the programme ToC operates (or not) at the local level. By coding data from the case studies in a consistent manner it has been possible to consider confirmatory (or alternative) evidence of contribution for each part of the ToC.

27. *Selection bias.* The nature of a grant programme such as Tilitonse is that there is self-selection bias in the categories of grantees, unsuccessful applicants and non-applicants. Selection of CSOs for the award of grants is not on a random basis but along defined selection criteria, so there are non-random differences between those applying for and receiving, and those applying for but not receiving a grant. This has implications for evaluation including the possibility of over-estimating impact – for example, if there is a difference at the start in 'quality' of CSO receiving a grant. For this reason, the IIEA has selected from three 'populations' for the CSO survey (recipients, unsuccessful non-recipients, and non-applicant non-recipients). In addition, the criteria for selecting case studies has deliberately included a cross-section of different grants from each call.

28. *Subjective indicators.* The contextual nature of governance programmes means that responses to many of the CSO survey, focus group and interview questions are subjective. They depend on the knowledge, interpretation and honest reflection of the respondent. In the CSO survey, this is minimised as much as possible by explaining the question in the same way and interviewing the same respondent. While the qualitative data of the case studies is open to interpretation, the coding has been designed to categorise findings in a consistent manner, linking them to the definitions of the IIEA sub-indicators.

29. To minimise bias and address methodological issues set out above, the evaluation was designed around a number of structured steps and procedures:[33]

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[32] Eisenhardt Graebner (2007).
[33] Based on White and Phillips (2012: 23–4).

- A clear plan detailed the nature of data to be collected and sources, including instrument design. Protocols for selection and gathering data were designed and followed for all case studies. See Annex 6.

- Interviews were independently carried out and recorded (with consent), with processes to check meaning and precision of recording.

- Qualitative data was analysed systematically using coding and cross-checking by two or more researchers.

- The mixed-methods design allowed the IIEA to triangulate results across a range of methods. Sampling across a range of respondents and stakeholders ensured a diversity of sources to further minimise bias.

Chapter 3.   Lessons from the Literature

30. Since the 2000s, there has been massive international donor investment in 'demand-side' governance[34] programmes on the assumption that reform towards more responsive and accountable governance will promote more effective and sustainable development across the board.[35] Multi-country comparative research has been conducted from the outset assessing the overall impact of these programmes on governance processes, and making recommendations for improved programming and impact. This chapter starts by summarising the evidence base available *at the time of the design and inception of Tilitonse* and then goes on to explain how this was reflected in the conceptual approach taken by the Fund. It concludes with an overview of research and debates that have emerged since the design of Tilitonse and which are influencing the new generation of Empowerment and Accountability programming.

3.1 Summary of the evidence base at the time of the Tilitonse design

31. A major study of demand-side governance interventions was conducted by McGee and Gaventa in 2010, which found very weak evidence of the effectiveness and impact of the programmes examined.[36] Too many programme planning frameworks were characterised by a general vagueness about impact, with untested assumptions and underspecified relationships linking the planned activities of 'demand-side' actors with outcomes and impacts requiring government action. Some planning frameworks claimed impact in ways that were barely linked to the funded intervention, citing high-level governance indices or contributions to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as goal/impact-level changes. In reality such changes were likely to occur over a much longer period of time and as a result of a multitude of complex and inter-related factors in which the programme itself may barely register.

32. Extensive, multi-country DFID-funded governance research programmes, conducted in the 2000s,[37] touching on the impact of these investments, found no overall trend of improved citizen engagement in governance. Some E&A programmes were found to have had positive impacts on 'short route accountability' (community-level services) and on intermediate outcomes such as attitude and behaviour change, but these effects tended to be highly localised.[38] The impact of E&A programmes on deeper accountability and power relationships, or on wider development outcomes such as progress against MDGs or poverty elimination, were found to be neither direct nor obvious.

33. This research also highlighted some worrying negative side effects of E&A funding. These include the damaging effect funding has had on some citizens' movements,[39] the proliferation of donor-dependent advocacy CSOs with weak links to ordinary citizens, the danger of monetising processes of citizen demand, and weak sustainability of citizen engagement beyond the period of donor funding.[40] In general, positive results are mostly visible during the funding period, but diminish towards the phasing out of E&A programme funding.

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[34] These programmes are variously described as 'demand-side governance', 'voice and accountability', 'empowerment and accountability', 'transparency and accountability', 'social accountability' and 'political accountability' programmes. We will use the term 'empowerment and accountability' as the term most commonly used by DFID.

[35] See, for example, 2004 World Development Report and 2006 DFID White Paper Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272330/6876.pdf

[36] McGee and Gaventa (2011).

[37] Citizenship, Participation and Accountability DRC (2001–11); Africa Power and Politics Programme (2007–12); Centre for Future State (2000–10).

[38] Citizenship, Participation and Accountability DRC (2011); Benequista, Gaventa and Barrett (2010); Menocal and Sharma (2008).

[39] Bano (2012).

[40] Booth (2011, 2012); Menocal and Sharma (2008).

34. Key conclusions on ways forward are consistent across several studies, and were well known and well-articulated by the time the Tilitonse programme was designed. These are:

- **Context is everything.** Citizen engagement in governance is a process of struggle and negotiation that occurs uniquely in each setting – there is no one-size-fits-all, no 'silver bullet'. What works in one context does not work in another. The design of E&A governance interventions and expectations of change needs to be based on clear understanding of the political economy of the context and 'work with the grain' of local ways of doing things.[41] This requires project interventions that are adaptive and about learning.

- **Demand and supply need to work together.** Bottom-up pressure for change is not a significant factor on its own in bringing about better governance: change is *not* about one set of people (the demand side) trying to get the other set (the supply side) to behave better. Governments become more accountable and responsive when state-led reform and social mobilisation occur together. This indicates a need to work across supply and demand sides in alliances and platforms, and identify issues with the potential to galvanise action across government and civil society.

- **Work with the grain.** The way formal systems work is fundamentally affected by informal ways of doing things. Most successful E&A action is addressing 'collective action' problems[42] that relevant stakeholders actually face, and involves acts of initiative and imagination by local leaders. Instead of importing 'best practice', programmes should facilitate space for local problem solving and collective action, building on existing concerns, initiatives and skills.

- **Limitations of CSOs.** CSOs have been the main beneficiaries of E&A programmes. There are major concerns about 'briefcase' CSOs with weak links to citizens and an unclear mandate – as well as concerns from CSOs about the imposition of donor planning, reporting and monitoring frameworks that favour elite groups. Ways forward suggest paying attention to integrity, quality and ties to the grassroots in selecting CSO partners; broadening out from the comfort zone of CSO partners to a wider constituency of non-government actors; and building partners' capacity to work in a politically intelligent ways – with enhanced political economy analysis, networking, research and communication skills.

- **Gradual reduction of role of CSOs.** One of the challenges in the E&A programmes is that of identifying and recording results that are lasting changes in behaviour that emanate from the actions of the citizenry (rather than CSOs working as "agents" between government and communities). It is therefore crucial that from the onset of a programme CSOs should build capacities of communities / citizens so that they gradually take responsibility in problem solving and collective action, rather than CSOs being seen as mobilisers and agents of the masses.

- **Expectations of change.** Research highlights a tension between donors' common need for quick results, and the long-term complex processes of governance change. Recommendations are for robust evaluation evidence of E&A projects, and more realism about what can be achieved in the short term. M&E processes, ToC and impact assessments should locate results in their political economy context and focus expectations of change on a middle ground of attitude and behaviour change rather than high-level achievements against the MDGs (or equivalent).

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[41] Booth (2011, 2012); Menocal and Sharma (2008); McGee and Gaventa (2011); Unsworth and Moore (2010).

[42] The term '*collective action problem*' refers to situations in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but the action has an associated cost that makes it implausible that any one individual can or will undertake to solve it alone.

3.2 Reflection of this thinking in the design and concept of Tilitonse

35. Much of the above thinking was reflected in the 2012 design and concept of the Tilitonse programme. The Tilitonse Inception Report notes "*evidence emerging from studies especially by ODI and by IDS show that efforts to raise accountability through enhanced voice (the popular Voice and Accountability programmes implemented by donors quite widely across developing societies) have generally failed to produce the results expected of them*". In contrast to this approach, Tilitonse planned to:

- Broaden out from a narrow focus on CSOs and citizen voice – to engage with middle classes, business and religious groups who have potentially greater say in what the government does.

- Build the capacity of CSOs to connect with these more influential groups, and ensure that the interests of the poor and excluded are heard.

- Build coalitions of interest around 'issue-based projects' (complementing a general call for proposals and a Thematic Call) focused on objectives that are mutual and positive for citizens and the government such as practical service delivery and economic development.

- Identify issues through research and political economy analysis.

- Provide a context where government agencies are themselves willing to engage, partly by involving more powerful groups to diminish government fears. [43]

3.3 Developments in thinking since the design of Tilitonse

36. Since Tilitonse was designed, several further strands of thinking and research have begun to influence E&A practice: work that has collectively come to be referred to as a "second generation" approach to E&A. This includes innovation coming from E&A programmes such as the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) in Nigeria – which is experimenting with different ways of using donor money to support demand-side governance – and the growing trend for adaptive programming, championed variously as 'Doing development differently', 'Thinking and working politically' and 'Politically smart, locally led programming'.[44]

37. **Second generation approaches to E&A:** In 2016, the Transparency and Accountability Initiative (T/AI) – a collaborative undertaking of five private and public funders active in the governance field – commissioned Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to collect and edit a series of think pieces by leading scholars and activists on the future of the transparency and accountability movement.[45] In his overview, Carothers notes that collectively the ideas and themes raised in this set of papers might be called a "second generation" approach to E&A, which the contributors believe should replace the core features of first generation work. Key themes are the need for deeper understanding of local contexts; longer term, iterative, more organic engagements; more focus on how transparency translates into accountability; doing more to bring private sector actors into E&A efforts and processes; and moving away from small scale fragmented efforts into building larger coalitions.

38. The influential academic, Jonathan Fox, one of the contributors to the above paper, in his 2014 review of 'What the evidence says' on the impact of social accountability initiatives,[46] makes an important distinction between 'tactical' and 'strategic' initiatives in order to move beyond the impasse associated with the notion of 'mixed results'. Tactical initiatives are bounded, localised and information led – but information alone often turns out to be insufficient to influence

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[43] Tilitonse Inception Report, pp. 3–5.
[44] Andrews (2013); Carothers and de Gramont (2013).
[45] http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/02/ideas-for-future-work-on-transparency-and-accountability-pub-63318
[46] Fox (2014).

significant change. Strategic initiatives, in contrast, bolster enabling environments for collective action, scaling up citizen engagement beyond the local arena and attempting to promote government capacity to respond.

39.   Fox concludes that it is strategic initiatives that show far greater promise in achieving impact. This suggests a need to focus not only on citizen 'voice' but also on government 'teeth' to respond. It also highlights the importance of scale-up. 'Horizontal' scale-up increases citizen participation and representation. 'Vertical' scale-up links community-level monitoring with policy advocacy, and citizen-led reform with more official oversight bodies (such as parliaments, media and ombudsmen) to gain power and clout. Both require flexibility and adaptation.

40.   Fox's most recent work on 'connecting the dots',[47] reporting from a workshop of selected programmes seeking to work in these ways, expresses some concern about ways in which funding models can undermine strategic interventions. Concerns include the imposition of simplified linear logic and expectation of measurable short-term impacts on complex, dynamic and unpredictable processes; funding models fracturing and undermining the type of social movements and loose coalitions needed to shift power structures; and M&E systems that prioritise accountability to donors over learning for decision making. In Tilitonse's case, its role as a funding and implementing agent is likely to have an inherent challenge of perception by CSOs benefiting from the grants. Striking a balance between funding or grant provision and the grantees' own processes can be a challenge. The concern here is that the quality of interventions can be undermined because of the time spent ensuring due diligence as demanded by donors.

41.   **New thinking from E&A programmes:** SAVI is a DFID-funded 'demand-side' governance programme working at state level in Nigeria, which is gaining some attention as an innovative programme achieving results. Instead of supporting partners with grants, SAVI invests in recruiting and supporting in-house State Teams, to facilitate locally led change from behind the scenes. The aim is to demonstrate a replicable and effective model of engaging citizens in governance, not defined or driven by donor funding, and capable of taking on a life of its own without external funding. In each target state, SAVI State Teams engage with select media organisations, the State House of Assembly and multi-stakeholder issues-based advocacy partnerships. SAVI supports partners through mentoring and capacity building to think and work politically and adaptively; by brokering working relationships among demand-side players and between demand-side players and the state government; and through small amounts of seed funding. Key lessons – that chime with the wider research concerns noted above – are about taking the money off the table; using broader coalitions of non-state actors and citizens (beyond the narrowly defined organised civil society); taking a hands-off facilitative approach from the onset; and building in vertical linkages between levels of governance, and horizontal linkages between diverse formal and informal representatives of citizen voice.

42.   **Thinking and working politically, Doing Development Differently and PDIA (Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation):** The importance of donor agencies and programmes working on governance and institutional reform 'thinking and working politically' – grappling with the messy realities of local power and politics and 'working with the grain' of local culture – is widely discussed and agreed. Otherwise, institutional reform programmes all too easily produce results characterised by what Andrews terms "*isomorphic mimicry*"[48] – "best practice" reforms and solutions that look good to an external funder, but do not necessarily change anything or engage significantly with the complexities of the local political economy. Typical examples are policies and laws that are debated and passed but never implemented. Too much focus on this type of result in turn leads to "*capability traps*", as those seeking donor support focus on the types of reform

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[47] Fox and Halloran (2016).
[48] Andrews (2014), Andrews et al. (2012)

that leverage funding, rather than the types of reform that make a real difference in their own context.[49]

43. To date, political economy analysis (PEA) has been the main tool promoted to facilitate this. However, a number of recent studies have indicated that the impact of PEA on programmes has been disappointing and "*donors have found it hard to move from thinking politically to working differently*".[50] The concern is that in practice, PEA has largely been reduced to a high-level technical input, with limited impact on development practice.

44. There is a convergence of current thinking on the need for approaches to move beyond PEA to action, to find ways of accommodating the context-specific, iterative, messy and un-plannable nature of change. Related to this, case studies are emerging on what works in development across sectors.[51] These are challenging blue-print planning and the delivery of pre-planned solutions.[52] Common to all these stories of achievement is that staff and partners have been able to work in ways that are problem driven and adaptive, politically smart and locally led. There is a growing and influential body of development analysts and practitioners committed to drawing on these principles to 'do development differently'. DFID, USAID and the World Bank are all beginning to call for and invest in more flexible and adaptive approaches to programming.

45. In Malawi, it similarly is well known that shortcomings in the delivery of services (such as falling exam results, deteriorating access to water, or stock-outs of key medicines) arise largely out of institutional or governance problems. Earlier work, including case studies in Malawi, recognise that citizens faced with a common problem may not act on it because of the complex web of interests and incentives – and there have been similar calls to take a more politically aware, 'learning by doing' approach (Tembo 2013). There is also a deeper recognition of the context; that achieving collective action in Malawi is often undermined by policy incoherence with unclear mandates and overlapping jurisdictions (O'Neil et al 2014) and a small political elite held in power by patronage and informal relationships (Khan 2010, cited in O'Neil et al 2014; Booth et al 2006). These need to be understood within the context-specific areas of governance that each Tilitonse grantee is attempting to address. As such, in each of the case studies, the particularities of the context are considered through a document review of the grey literature, media coverage, speeches and other information available through Secretariat and grantee reporting (e.g. the political economy studies conducted by Tilitonse were reviewed for the Thematic Call grants).

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Derbyshire et al. (2014); Fisher and Marquette (2014); Booth, Harris and Wild (2016).

[51] That is, not only in relation to governance reform, but in many aspects of development and change.

[52] Booth and Unsworth (2014), Wild et al. (2015).

Chapter 4.   Implementation History of Tilitonse

46. Building on the preceding chapters that set out the background to Tilitonse, its design and lessons drawn from the literature, this chapter explains how the programme evolved during its implementation. This provides an overview of the main turning points in its history, covering the main functional areas managed by the Secretariat: the grant-making rounds; capacity building and knowledge management; monitoring and evaluation; and financial management.

4.1 Grantee rounds: design and management

47. The design of the different grantee rounds has evolved considerably throughout implementation. At the outset of the Tilitonse programme, around 200 grants were expected to be disbursed. In June 2013, the Board indicated that this number was to be reduced to around 60. The eventual figure was 74 (including the seven funded under the Accelerated Call). The following section describes how the various grant funding windows evolved:

48. **Accelerated Call.** At the beginning of the programme, the donors requested the Tilitonse Secretariat to implement 'Accelerated Grants' in order to meet financial requirements of their disbursement cycles. The time window for this grant window was relatively short, as the programme had only started its inception in November 2011. Seven CSOs were successful and proposals worth approximately £1.4 million were approved to be implemented over the period of one year.

49. The Accelerated Call started with a scoping study to identify organisations, and it was assumed that more traditional CSO partners would have the capacity to implement the projects under the Tilitonse programme at minimal risk (especially given that the Fund's procedures were still being established). The organisations selected were quite different from one another, but they were considered the strongest organisations at the time in the governance sector in Malawi. However, it soon became clear that there were some considerable capacity issues. For example, proposals were not context-specific – they were weak in defining activities, and unclear in term of how project aims would be achieved and measured. M&E was identified as a key capacity gap, alongside strengthening an understanding of PEA and corporate (organisational) governance.

50. The experience of the Accelerated grant window influenced the approach of the subsequent Open Call, where proposals were used to more deliberately identify issues relevant to the ToC of Tilitonse – including bringing together coalitions around particular themes and issues.[53]

51. **Issue-based projects.** The Tilitonse Inception Report (April 2012) proposed that the programme would design and implement two to three issue-based projects per year. These were to be projects identified, designed and managed by the Secretariat, and based more 'purely' on issues identified by PEA and where different stakeholders (government, CSOs, citizens, private sector) could find traction for change. The Board, however, had concerns about how the "issues" were going to be identified for the window, and this eventually was dropped and replaced by the Thematic Call.

52. **Open, Thematic and CBO Calls.** In March 2012 the Board approved the first Open Call, which would be used to inform subsequent calls. This was followed by the Thematic Call and second

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[53] Tilitonse inception report, April 2012.

Open Call. CSOs with limited capacity, including small-sized CBOs, were later targeted by a CBO Call.[54]

53. In 2012, the Thematic Call was designed by the Secretariat to deal with policy issues from a political economy perspective, and for CSOs to work in partnership or coalition around key issues. The majority of projects submitted for the Thematic Call were said to be of poor quality and the Board recommended funding only six proposals out of 54 received.[55] The Political Economy Analysis Group (PEAG) was set up by Tilitonse to assist with this selection process, and tasked to develop PEA studies on the selected topics to assist grantees in the implementation of their projects. Four political economy research studies[56] were undertaken by members of the PEAG, discussed at an internal workshop.[57] The Board approved three topics: (1) mining, (2) access to information, and (3) local governance / legal frameworks. CSOs were then invited to work on one of these three specific thematic areas, identify areas of traction, and work in coalitions. CSO strategic partnerships were expected to build complementary knowledge, contacts and credibility as well as achieve greater access and influence.[58]

54. In January 2014, the Secretariat confirmed that a CBO Call had been approved by the Board.[59] This was under the strategic opportunities umbrella and aimed to target the 'grassroots' CBOs. The Secretariat and Board explained that this has been a difficult decision, because funding CBOs was considered high risk. CBOs were facing particular capacity building challenges and the application of PEA needed to be simplified. For example, only six of the organisations selected had their own M&E staff, and the Secretariat had to closely supervise most of these organisations in the implementation of their projects.

4.2 Capacity building and learning

55. Tilitonse aimed to combine grant making with capacity building and other activities in recognition that CSOs face many challenges such as poor capacity and financial management. The approach to providing capacity support to grantees has evolved considerably over the period of implementation. Originally, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) was to lead the capacity building support, but this was not supported by the Tilitonse Board. This was after a review that revealed that CCJP Lilongwe Diocese (as a consortium member tasked with coordinating capacity developed) was politically compromised, had limited capacity, and used training as its main approach. It was decided instead to establish a position for capacity building within the programme.

56. The first Annual Review of Tilitonse[60] found that the capacity building provision by Tilitonse was not fit for purpose, because experience from elsewhere showed that an entirely training-led approach to building capacity is unlikely to achieve its objectives and that effective capacity building and organisational development is generally best achieved through a combination of learning, coaching, mentoring and implementation support. The review team recommended that the capacity building component be redesigned, including revisions to the ToC and logframe to better capture this work. Recommendations included: (i) the use of a

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[54] Minutes of Management Board Meeting, 30 March 2012.

[55] Minutes of Tilitonse Board Meeting, 26 June 2013.

[56] The political economy studies covered: Public Sector provision (Tambulasi and Nkhoma 2013); Land Rights – Mining (Chisinga and Kachika 2013); Access to Information (Kayongolo and Mpesi 2013); Local Governance (Chioweza and Kalengamaliro 2013).

[57] An IIEA internal report (written by Cadeco) on the 'Research Validation Workshop on Possible Thematic Areas to Address', hosted by the Tilitonse Secretariat at the Capital Hotel, Lilongwe on 18th January 2013.

[58] The difference between the issue-based projects and the Thematic Call was that with the issue-based projects, the Secretariat was meant to do research to identify relevant issues (initially together with CCJP) and then to manage the projects; whereas the thematic call topics emerge from the initial call and are manged by selected grantees. Source: discussions with the Secretariat, May 2016.

[59] Meeting minutes between IIEA and Tilitonse Secretariat, 21 January 2014.

[60] Coffey (2013).

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wider range of approaches, tailored to needs of grantees; (ii) CSOs to be supported to sub-grant to CBOs; (iii) CSOs to be supported to develop capacity that would improve working relationships with groups outside of civil society; (iv) ongoing mentoring support to be provided to grantees; (v) full responsibility for capacity development to be reassigned to the Secretariat, away from CCJP; and, (vi) the promotion of technological software that can aid CSOs.

57. In June 2013, the Board agreed that capacity building should be institutionalised by linking up with the University of Malawi to offer tailor-made courses reaching out to civil society, and that 'NGO in a box' or similar technology to help CSOs with programming and organisational development should be promoted.[61] Two months later the Board agreed that special attention should be made to target CBOs. Ongoing mentoring support should be provided to grantees and the Secretariat should have full responsibility of capacity development. It was agreed that a plan should be drafted to promote wider civil society capacity development, with an action plan and cost implications.[62]

58. By September 2013, capacity self-assessments had been completed by all grantees, facilitated by a team from Tilitonse and validated by an external consultant alongside CSO staff. The assessment shed more light on the extent to which the organisations were truly focusing on governance-related issues and was therefore a good starting point. In March 2014, the Capacity Assessment Report and Consolidated Capacity Action Plan for first Open Calls were submitted to the Board.[63]

59. **Mentorship.** In 2014, Tilitonse adopted a new way of providing capacity development having developed a capacity development strategy which placed the portfolio in the Secretariat. In the new strategy, mentorship was the key among the other approaches. UN Women and Management International (Human Resources experts) were engaged alongside individuals to provide mentorship. An assessment of the first implementation of the mentorship programme revealed challenges associated with the organisations providing mentorship – as opposed to individual mentors who seemed to be more effective. Support was provided in different areas and tailored to the learning needs of each individual organisation – this included supporting organisational management by providing accounting packages or establishing HR procedures, as well as strengthening technical skills (M&E, etc.). An essential aspect of this support was that the mentors 'leave something behind', referring to systems that the organisation can continue using after end of the mentorship support, such as salary structures, financial management documents, strategic plans, theories of change, etc.

60. For the CSOs funded under the Open and Thematic Calls, the mentorship support was provided towards the end of their Tilitonse-funded projects. This meant that there were limited opportunities to apply newly acquired skills or benefit from the new mentorship programme within the timeframe of their Tilitonse projects. CBOs, on the other hand, were supported by mentors to develop their project proposals before disbursement of funding. See Chapter 6.1.

61. **Learning events and conferences**. Initially it was envisaged that Tilitonse would conduct learning events quarterly. It was then decided by the Secretariat to organise such events around particular opportunities. For example, issues of common interest and best practices (e.g. working with radio listening clubs) were identified during the review of monitoring reports and provided the basis of discussion for learning events. These were held with CSOs with the purpose of enhancing peer learning by grantees, using an action learning cycle

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[61] Minutes of Tilitonse Board Meeting, 26 June 2013.
[62] Minutes of Extra-ordinary Board Meeting, 19 August 2013.
[63] Synopsis Report and Capacity Action Plans, Tilitonse Secretariat.

approach.[64] Learning events held with CSOs (local and international) included: (i) unpacking the ToC and political economy analysis; (ii) M&E and the reporting of results; and (iii) knowledge management and applying a new monitoring tool known as the Results Tracker (RT). Government and private sector stakeholders were also involved in some learning events; for example, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Democratic Consolidation Programme from the Ministry of Justice, and the Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Reflections on earlier workshops[65] indicated that these events were less successful because the schedule tended to be overloaded and there were too many presenters (most of whom were more theoretical in their approach). There was also very little time allocated to practical exercises. Subsequent events learnt from these reflections and became more discussion-focused with lead presenters from the Secretariat (and the IIEA). These tended to introduce topics for discussion, some selected by participants to share their experiences, challenges and lessons learnt. Participants were also grouped to discuss practice questions and seek guidance from the Secretariat and/or IIEA (represented by Cadeco).Two CBO regional workshops were also held. The purpose of these events was: (i) to impart skills in financial reporting; (ii) acquire knowledge and practical experience in tracking and reporting results using the RT; (iii) raise awareness on capacity development support available and reporting on this support; and (iv) use baseline reports to finalise the grantees' results frameworks. These were considered to be more successful,[66] with ample time given to share lessons from implementing Tilitonse-funded projects. It was, however, less clear how grantees made use of the RT to systematically gather evidence on results (see paragraphs 65-66 below)

62. The Tilitonse Secretariat also organised 14 conferences at both regional and national level for its grant partners, plus two national CSO conferences where different stakeholders were invited (e.g. the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Advisor to the President on NGO Affairs, the World Bank and others). There were also conferences organised by the grant partners as part of their projects, e.g. mining indabas (meetings that involved bringing together communities, government stakeholders and mining companies to hold discussions on issues affecting citizens), and a national local governance conference among others. One example is the "*5th All-Inclusive Conference: Defining Solutions to Economic and Political Direction of Malawi*", which was organised by the Public Affairs Committee.[67] About 200 delegates from government, civil society, academia, the media and the private sector attended the event,[68] which gave an opportunity for civil society to lead discussions on their concerns on the economic and political situation in Malawi.

4.3 Monitoring and evaluation results management

63. The Secretariat had responsibility for the M&E of the programme through the logframe and annual reporting cycles. They also supported grantees' own monitoring and reporting through support to the development of grantee results frameworks, and oversight of quarterly and annual reporting. Annual reviews were undertaken independently by external consultants in 2013 for the first year of implementation, and in 2014 for the mid-term. While the Secretariat focused on capturing evidence on outputs and outcomes, the IIEA focused primarily on the contribution to impact-level changes, including the pathway from outputs to outcomes and impacts. The IIEA provided capacity support on M&E, including review of a sample of grantee

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[64] This was guided by a set of questions around what they planned to implement, what worked well, what did not work well, what lessons could be drawn from the project, and what changes the grantees would undertake as a consequence of these lessons.
[65] Based on IIEA discussion with participants and the Secretariat, which indicated that this was the key challenge.
[66] Based on IIEA (Cadeco) attendance at the CBO Southern Regional workshop.
[67] Interviews with Tilitonse Board, the PEAG, the Ministry of Local Government, NAMISA and PAC, May 2016.
[68] PAC website: http://www.pacmw.org/pac-communique-of-the-5th-all-inclusive-stakeholders-conference-february-2016/ [accessed 15/06/2016.

results frameworks, a mapping assessment of grantee indicators against the programme-level ToC, contributions to learning events, and collaboration with developing the RT.

64. **Review of result frameworks.** In July 2013, the IIEA reviewed a sample of six Open Call 1 results frameworks. In five of the six projects, IIEA found serious weaknesses, such as an absence of impact and outcome-level indicators, vague or overambitious indicators and, in some cases, weaknesses in project design. See Box 1 for details. Subsequent reviews were also made of the results frameworks for the Thematic Call and second Open Call, with the Secretariat undertaking further work with these grantees across several months to improve the frameworks. The Secretariat shared with grantees the IIEA's interpretation of impact and outcome-level change and the need to reflect the use of PEA and strategic partnerships in results frameworks.[69]

Box 1. Early lessons on grantees' results frameworks and project design

Under the first Open Call, a number of lessons were shared on the quality of the grantees' approach to results frameworks and project design. This was a first stage review, and the Secretariat undertook subsequent support to these grantees. While the following summary refers to the IIEA review of the first submission (though there were also reviews of the Accelerated grants, and the Thematic and second Open Calls), the issues below highlight some recurring themes:

First, the grantees often had poorly articulated ToCs that did not make clear the assumptions underlying the project and did not specify the causal links in the theory. In some cases, grantees were able to express a more coherent theory orally through the IIEA case study interviews, but for others there were important weaknesses – such as an apparent 'missing middle' between well-articulated activities (e.g. workshops, sensitisation), and overambitious statements around impact (e.g. policy changes, resource allocations).

Second, the project documentation provided by grantees often described working with government agencies and service providers, but in IIEA baseline case studies there was found a greater focus on community engagement. This approach of working with citizens first (through information provision, education about rights, awareness-raising, etc.) and only later bringing government actors, risked focusing on reform issues where there was limited government motivation or traction.

Third, there was a lack of focus on governance solutions to community problems. In early stages of several grants, individuals, companies or NGOs were being persuaded to make a donation to a health facility/ ambulance/etc. as a result of lobbying, rather than addressing underlying reasons of government under-funding or misaligned prioritisation.

And fourth, most grantees at the baseline were not systematically recording or tracking changes in government actions as a result of their activities – relying instead on anecdotal, often vague notions of tracking evidence. *Source: IIEA Briefing Note, Number 1.*

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65. In September 2013, the RMEC acknowledged that improvements had been noted on the quality of results frameworks, but that there were still concerns in terms of not capturing all the expected indicators in the logframe – with a risk that grantees were not either sufficiently aligned to the Tilitonse overarching ToC, or that it would not be possible for the Secretariat to capture cumulative impact. Following this, the IIEA mapped all Open Call and Thematic Call grantee results frameworks against the impact and outcome-level changes the IIEA was responsible for measuring. In January 2014, the IIEA submitted a briefing note to RMEC, shared with the Secretariat, which summarised the main findings of the result framework mapping exercise, namely: (i) the Open Call grants lacked a focus on equity, transparency and inclusiveness; (ii) there was a lack of focus on measuring grantees' mediation role; and (iii)

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[69] Email correspondence between the IIEA and Secretariat, 24/07/13.

there were concerns about grantees' understanding and use of the results framework format.[70] See Box 2 for details.

Box 2. Lessons on alignment of grantee results with programme-level results

The aim of this mapping exercise was to uncover gaps in the coverage of grantee results frameworks, as well as weaknesses in their (potential) contribution to the higher level impacts of the Tilitonse programme. This was seen as important because the results frameworks are the basis for the Secretariat's M&E system, as well as a source of triangulation for the IIEA. There were a number of key findings from this review:

First, the Open Call grants lacked a focus on equity, transparency and inclusiveness (impact indicators 1 to 3), with most grantees focused on measuring government responsiveness, especially in relation to service delivery (Impact Indicator 4).

Second, there was a lack of focus on measuring the grantees' mediation role, such as the quality of engagement between civil society and government – and related areas of thinking and acting politically, and forming strategic partnerships.

And third, the mapping analysis reiterated previous concerns about: (i) the grantees' understanding of the results framework format – with evidence of considerable confusion and vagueness about levels, and inconsistency in defining, specifying and aggregating/disaggregating indicators and targets; (ii) grantees' levels of ambition, with many instances of impacts and outcomes being unrealistic, which raised concerns about their realism to achieve governance change within the period of the grant; and (iii) grantees' ability to measure meaningful change, with almost all measurement being quantitative (e.g. 'number of the initiatives that have been developed to improve service delivery'), when the type of change envisaged is often wholly qualitative.

Source: IIEA Briefing Note and results framework mapping, January 2014.

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66. **Results Tracker.** As noted above, many grantees struggled to produce results frameworks and theories of change, and to systematically monitor their contribution to governance changes. Given these ongoing challenges faced by grantees the IIEA developed a new monitoring tool, the Results Tracker (RT), and worked with the Secretariat to adapt it for their situation. The RT approach took into account the difficulties with setting indicators *ex ante* as part of the results frameworks, as well as the very nature of many governance interventions that have uncertain pathways in which change will occur (given the need to remain flexible and adjust to political and strategic opportunities). The RT instead focused on key questions based around harvesting outcome-based evidence so that this could be captured systematically on an ongoing basis. In June 2014, the IIEA provided the final version of the RT to the Secretariat for circulation to grantees. By April 2015, the Secretariat reported to RMEC that few grant partners were using the RT and the assumption was made was that CBOs found it difficult to use the tool in its current state. Tilitonse Secretariat therefore modified the RT and introduced it during the Learning events as a tool for reporting results.[71]

67. In November 2015, the IIEA carried out monitoring visits to eight selected grantees to learn lessons about how the RT had been viewed and applied by grantees.[72] These grantees were from the central and southern regions of Malawi (CCJP, CCODE, MIJ, WfP, PACENET, Samaritan Trust, and YONECO).[73] The findings of this review showed that half of the grantees had made use of the RT, while four had not. Those that had used the RT had found it useful when reporting results and writing case studies – although some felt that the main purpose was to

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[70] IIEA Briefing on '*Lessons from mapping the Result Frameworks*, November 2013.
[71] Tilitonse Secretariat Paper on Updates for RMEC meeting, 23 April 2015.
[72] *Report on the Results Tracker Monitoring Visits*, IIEA internal report conducted by Chiku Malunga and Charles Banda, November 2015.
[73] CCJP – Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace; CCODE – Centre for Community Organisation and Development; MIJ – Malawi Institute of Journalism; WfP – Water for People; PACENET – Pan African Civic Educators Network; YONECO – Youth Net and Counselling.

produce a good case study for Tilitonse. They also used the tool to modify their results framework. The key reasons found for not making full use of the RT were:

- The RT may not have been perceived as a core activity by Secretariat and therefore by grantees. Many grantees viewed the RT as additional paperwork.

- Learning events were generally scheduled for two days at most. This did not provide adequate time for coverage of all items on the Learning and Sharing programme. From the interviews conducted by the IIEA during the monitoring visits, it became clear that some grantees had not fully understood the purpose and use of the RT. The learning events did not provide adequate time for practice as schedules were overloaded. The approach to learning in these sessions became more of question and answer discussions rather than a practical approach where grantees practiced writing and completing the RT.

- More time and resources should have been invested in supporting grantees with the use of the tool.

68. **End of project evaluations.** The Secretariat supported the grantees in conducting end of project evaluations. In October 2014, the IIEA reviewed the generic end of project evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) circulated by the Secretariat, and suggested more specific objectives, and clearer evaluation questions. The IIEA additionally highlighted the need to either require a prescribed methodological approach, or work collaboratively against clear standards with selected consultants during an inception phase to achieve robustness and clarity.

69. **Grant Management Information System (GMIS).** The GMIS was introduced as a new document management system. Initially the Secretariat originally aimed to use the system for monitoring purposes, but design flaws hampered the configuration of the reporting processes including those related to M&E, grant-making and capacity development. This meant that the eventual system was unable to capture monitoring data, including the aggregation of indicators. It was not until the final years of Tilitonse that the GMIS became functional, although more as a repository for managing documents (including as part of the grant application processes) rather than for M&E purposes. In March 2016, the IIEA received log-in details for GMIS, although prior to this had been accessing it through visits to the Secretariat office in order to locate documents for the case study analysis. Some GMIS documents have been useful for triangulation purposes (e.g. reports, newspaper clippings, speeches, etc), and as part of the case study process these documents along with other searches were reviewed and incorporated into the findings. The individual case study reports were shared with RMEC and the Secretariat, comments addressed and any additional evidence added from the GMIS.

70. **IIEA briefing notes.** A total eight briefing notes were produced during implementation, sharing issues from reviews, capacity support and baseline data collection by the IIEA. The briefing notes mainly provided a means to share lessons with the Secretariat and RMEC, but also informed sessions at learning events and other support (such as the RT).

4.4 Financial management

71. While weaknesses in organisational capacity cut across several areas (gender, M&E, etc.), this section focuses on financial management. Here, the Secretariat found that it had originally overestimated the financial management capacity of the CSOs funded under the Accelerated Call. Although the CSOs funded under this call were recognised to be the most prominent in the governance field, most of these organisations had not previously managed large amounts of money.

72. The consortium partner O&M Associates was brought on board to lead the financial management of the programme. According to the Secretariat, grantees were generally achieving good results in financial management but 'financial mismanagement' sometimes occurred once they were given larger amounts of money before the end of the financial year. Sometimes this was related to a lack of financial management and reporting skills, especially when projects (or project components) were being implemented by partner organisations. Also, during the 'Cashgate' scandal in 2013, several donors suspended contributions to the Government, which had a spillover effect on funding to some in the civil society sector. Where cases of financial mismanagement occurred, these were mostly in 2013/2014 and funding for PACENET, Concern Universal (CU), Dan Church Aid (DCA), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Centre for Human Rights, Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) and four CBOs was suspended.

Chapter 5.   Evaluation Findings

73. This chapter sets out the main evaluation findings. The evidence presented is predominantly based on a synthesis of the IIEA's in-depth CSO case studies (12 cases out of 48 grants, or 25% of the Tilitonse portfolio); and CBO case studies (6 cases out of 26 grants, or 23% of the portfolio). This is triangulated where possible with evidence from across the portfolio. This evidence includes the CSO survey; the Secretariat's self-reporting (including grantee reporting accessed through the GMIS); endline interviews conducted with the Tilitonse Secretariat, Board, the PEAG, grantees, and other governance stakeholders in May 2016; and a review of the end of project evaluations. This chapter is structured around the intended outputs, outcomes and impacts of the revised programme ToC, presented in Annex 4. A summary of the evidence base and the strength of evidence underpinning specific findings is presented in Annex 5.

74. The paragraphs that follow provide detail of the supporting evidence of these overall findings. Output, outcome and impact findings are ordered according to significance, rather than in numerical order.

5.1   Capability, mediation influencing and monitoring by CSOs (outputs)

This section considers output-level changes, referring to CSO actions or behaviour as a result of their involvement in the Tilitonse programme. This section does not discuss whether these actions or behaviours were successful or not (i.e. led to a change in citizen or government behaviour), as this is covered under outcomes and impacts later in the Chapter.

75. Overall, the evidence is strongest for Tilitonse's contribution to two of the four outputs, with particularly strong evidence that **grantees have acted as mediators between government stakeholders and citizens** (output 2), and to lesser extent, **have taken action to influence government especially at the national level** (output 3). For the grantees' role in monitoring policy, budget or service delivery (output 4), where evidence is weakest, there is still a high level of activity – however, the case studies suggest that this has tended to be one-off or occasional monitoring, rather than engaging in routine monitoring and systems of accountability that can be sustained beyond the grant. In relation to work on enhancing civil society capability (output 1) there is likewise a high level of activity, but the focus has been more on organisational development (financial management, project management, etc.) than key governance capacities of civil society (e.g. to think and act politically). This last point is particularly important as it partly explains less encouraging governance results, discussed later in reference to the Fund's overall impacts. The following section discusses each output in turn, in order of where the evidence is strongest, from output 2 to 3 and then 1 and 4.

Civil society act as effective mediators between citizens and government e.g. to improve access to *information. This change relates to CSOs acting as a mediator between citizens and government, to help citizens engage with and make demands of government and claim their rights. (Output 2)*

76. Overall, **there is strong evidence of grantees acting as mediators between citizens and government, by creating or strengthening spaces and platforms to facilitate dialogue**. In 11 of the 12 CSO case studies, grantees aimed to engage citizens and mediate between them and the government (CCODE, NCA, WfP, Development Communications Trust (DCT), NAMISA, CHREAA, CU, Story Workshop Education Trust (SWET), DCA, PACENET, CMD). In nine of these cases (CCODE, NCA, WfP, DCT, NAMISA, CHREAA, CU, SWET, DCA) grantees successfully linked citizens with government. They did this through establishing or strengthening existing spaces and platforms for engagement, in various forms – including organising interface meetings, establishing new fora for engagement, helping citizens to attend meetings with community

leaders, setting up health groups in prison, and organising outreach activities. For example, WfP organised interface meetings between Water User Associations (WUAs), Blantyre Water Board (BWB) and water users. In these meetings, WUAs and BWB explained how they were operating and asked people if they were satisfied, which triggered a discussion with specific points to be followed up. In CHREAA, health groups were set up in prisons, with membership comprising 65% prisoners, 25% prison officers and 10% prison clinical officers. This was done to give prisoners a platform to raise their concerns to the prison officers. In SWET, RLC members mentioned that they collaborated with chiefs, area development committees (ADCs) and village development committees (VDCs) and that SWET had facilitated their participation in their forums. One RLC member reported that *"SWET asked the ADC to try and include us in some of their meetings so that if there are any issues that we have picked up in the community we should be able to tell them."*

77. Furthermore, in all six CBO case studies (COVISODE, ECOBO, FOCCAD, St Jude's, NAYORG, and ECOYA),[74] citizens – including young people and people with disabilities – stated that they had acquired more knowledge of rights and responsibilities from their engagement with Tilitonse grantees. In two cases (COVISODE, ECOBO), this has enabled them to engage with government. In COVISODE, evidence was particularly strong as three citizen groups, project staff, one CSO stakeholder and one government stakeholder all mentioned citizens' increased awareness of the responsibilities of local governments. A female citizen reported: "*We are [now] able to arrange meetings and engage with the chief and the committee for information from the district."*

78. In several cases, grantees succeeded in encouraging the inclusion of women, and in some cases young people (but less so other marginalised groups) in programme activities. In six CSO cases (CCODE, WfP, DCA, CU, SWET, DCT) grantees promoted inclusion in their activities. For example, CCODE specifically targeted women, encouraging them to attend meetings, participate in network exchange visits and join committees. Citizens in communities targeted by CU mentioned that the organisation had informed people about the importance of including marginalised groups in development activities, including their participation in public works programmes, and that more marginalised groups have become aware of their right to public services. In the CBO cases, there appears to be a strong focus on targeting marginalised groups, including youth (NAYORG), people with disabilities (St Jude's) and women (FOCCAD). This is linked to the inclusion findings for impact 3 for CBOs.

Box 3. Radio Listening Clubs as means to facilitate citizen engagement

In both SWET and DCT, the radio listening clubs (RLCs) focused on issues affecting marginalised groups. Most citizens, government and CSO stakeholders interviewed for the SWET case attributed increased youth engagement to the RLCs' focus on engaging young people in their activities.

"*The RLC – as you can see – is composed of mostly the youths and they are the ones that are spearheading development in this area […]."* (SWET, RLC member).

In DCT's project, RLCs made big efforts to reach out to marginalised groups, particularly people living with HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities, youth and the elderly.

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[74] COVISODE – Common Vision for Social Development; ECOBO - Enukweni Community Based Organisation, FOCCAD – Foundation for Community and Capacity Development, St Jude's – St Jude Thaddeus Relief Services, ECOYA – Environmental Concerned Youth Association.

79. The self-reported evidence from the Secretariat[75] highlights significant activity under this output, including: 207 information products developed in funded projects; 1,281,937 people informed through funded projects about their rights to public services;[76] and, 900,086 people 'empowered' to hold duty bearers to account.[77] This evidence should, however, be interpreted with caution, as although the numbers are high, there is no information about the quality of these activities – with terms like 'empowered' and 'people informed' open to considerable differences in what is actually aggregated.

80. In terms of drawing out <u>how</u> the grantees have contributed, then the case studies highlight some important findings about the strategies and approach taken:

- **While raising awareness and providing information was viewed by many grantees as a strategy to enable citizens to claim their rights (and make demands on government), this alone was not always effective**. In 10 CSO case studies (SWET, CCODE, WfP, NCA, DCA, DCT, CHREAA, NAMISA, CMD, CU), there is evidence that citizens received information from grantees, often alongside other organisations. While this has resulted in citizens being able to better understand their rights, low literacy and education levels were seen as barriers to citizens' increased understanding (NCA, CMD, CU, CCODE). Further, in two CSO case studies (NAMISA, NCA), the grantees' provision of information did not appear to be adequate. In NAMISA, citizens felt that their engagement with the grantee had not been sufficient to acquire a thorough understanding of access to information (ATI). Citizens who had gained some understanding on ATI, stated that their engagement around ATI had not been enough, as NAMISA (or the council) only visited them once. Generally, it does not seem that citizens have demanded the adoption of the ATI Bill – in part due to fear of repercussions, respect for authorities, and the fact that MPs are rarely in the districts and are often inaccessible to citizens. In the case of NCA, the nature and manner of information provision to communities about risks and rights related to mining seemed to perpetuate tensions, rather than creating an enabling environment for positive engagement and progress. This is discussed further in Box 5 below.

- **In some cases, mediation activities were dependent on the CSO's ability to provide allowances, which suggests that such activities may not be sustainable beyond the funding period.** In five CSO case studies (NAMISA, CU, WfP, SWET, NCA), it was mentioned that government stakeholders expected to be paid allowances to take part in meetings with citizens. For example, in SWET the main obstacle to mediating between citizens and government stakeholders was that at district level the project was not prioritised by government stakeholders, because SWET was not able to pay them allowances to take part in activities. Similarly, CU project staff explained that one of the challenges in facilitating engagement between citizens and government authorities was that councillors expected to be given allowances to attend meetings in the communities and that their rates were considered too low. "*The government revised its allowances so our rates were considered very low and this affected representation in the meetings*". In fact, in one in-depth interview, a councillor from Ntcheu expressed concern about the low allowances that they were getting from CU to attend meetings. As a NCA project staff explained: "*Tilitonse has to accept that Malawi is operating in an environment that was poisoned on issues of allowances. Even though we are working to improve this, we have to loosen our nuts so that we get support from these people.*"

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[75] Annual Review 2015–16, March 2016.
[76] This is a more narrowly defined interpretation of output 2, primarily around the provision of information to citizens about their rights; whereas the revised ToC is more focused on civil society acting as mediators to improve access to information, as enable citizens to make demands of government.
[77] DFID HQ indicator.

- **And lastly, in many cases the work on setting up platforms and dialogue was a continuation of work started many years before Tilitonse; and so claims of contribution need to be moderated accordingly**. The CSO survey found that 22 out of 43 grants (51%) were a continuation/extension of a previous initiative, with the rest being completely new or a pilot. In this respect, the Tilitonse grantees are similar to the counterfactual sample, where 13 out of 28 CSOs (46%) were a rollout of previous interventions. Also, according to the survey, the vast majority of Tilitonse grantees had previously worked in the same locations (33 out of 43 grants, or 77%) and been involved in the sector before (34 out of 43 grants, or 79%).[78] Again, the counterfactual sample is very similar, with 21 out of 28 CSOs (75%) having worked in the same location previously, and 22 out of 28 CSOs (79%) having been involved in the sector before. While we would expect the counterfactual sample to share many of the same characteristics as the Tilitonse grantees, this does demonstrate the context into which each 'new' E&A programme is placed, with the Tilitonse funding often being only the latest tranche to support the ongoing work of CSOs. In at least eight CSO cases (CCODE, NCA, WfP, CHREAA, CMD, DCA, NAMISA, SWET), the grantees' Tilitonse-funded work was a continuation of previous projects or similar work. For example, CCODE was funded by Tilitonse to carry out the 'Activating Urban Poor Community Voice' project, which is a continuation of existing work in informal settlements in Blantyre and Lilongwe. The work of WfP in Blantyre began in 2009, when WfP secured funding from the European Union to establish eight WUAs. Likewise, CHREAA's project builds on its already well-established presence in prisons in Malawi, and SWET received funding from Tilitonse to conduct a 2-year project which is a continuation of the DFID-funded Deepening Democracy project. The fact that so many projects represent a continuation of existing work makes it difficult to determine whether changes observed by participants are a result of the *Tilitonse-funded* project, as opposed to work undertaken prior to Tilitonse. This limitation is discussed further in Annex 6.

Civil society takes action to influence government policies, strategy and resource allocation. This is about the actions CSOs have taken to influence government, rather than mediation between citizens and government (Output 3)

81. Overall, **there is strong evidence that Tilitonse grantees have been working to influence national government policies, often in collaboration with other CSOs and government stakeholders, and making use of the media to attempt to influence change**.[79] For example, the Secretariat reports 624 dialogue initiatives aimed at influencing policies, strategies and resource allocations relating to service delivery.[80] While in all CSO case studies it is difficult to disentangle the contribution of grantees to these processes from that of other organisations, there were five cases (CHREAA, CMD, NAMISA, NCA, DCA) where evidence is strongest of the grantees taking an important role in collaborating with – and in most cases leading – CSO and government stakeholders in national-level advocacy and policy-influencing activities. These include: CHREAA on prisoner rights, NCA on mining issues, NAMISA on the Access to Information Bill, CMD on the Local Government Amendment Bill, and DCA on national-level advocacy to review fiscal policy.

82. CHREAA, for example, brought CSO and government stakeholders together around the issue of prison rights, including through a Health SWAp sub-committee that included the Ministry of Home Affairs, the judiciary, the police, prisons staff, the media and other NGOs. There were also joint initiatives, such as the World AIDS Day events held by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and CHREAA, and collaborative approaches by the Paralegal Services Institute and

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[78] CSO Survey, questions 1.6.1 and 1.6.2.
[79] From our 12 case studies, 7 grantees were aiming to influence government policies. In 6 cases (NCA, CHREAA, CEPA, NAMISA, CMD, DCA) grantees have taken actions to influence government policies. In one case (PACENET), the grantee failed to do so.
[80] Annual Review 2015–16, Tilitonse Secretariat, March 2016.

CHREAA. As one CSO put it: *"CHREAA made us realise that we [CSOs] can do more, not just work in the prisons, but try and improve general conditions in the prison through national campaigns".* Of course, improved coordination is not something that can be solely attributed to CHREAA, particularly given the range of CSOs working in this area, including MSF, African Bible College, Lighthouse Foundation, etc. Nevertheless, the overall sense from the case study interviews and focus group discussions was that CHREAA had played a central and facilitative role in improving CSO coordination and increasing interest in the issue of prison health among CSOs, particularly through the Health SWAp sub-committee. In a similar vein, the NAMISA case study found that much of the progress made in revising and promoting the ATI Bill was explicitly attributed to NAMISA by interviewees. While it was emphasised that it was a collaborative effort among different players, NAMISA was recognised to have played a key role in facilitating the process of promoting ATI. CMD was also seen to have played a central role in facilitating the review of the Local Government Act (LGA), which has led to the drafting of a Local Government Amendment Bill. Tilitonse encouraged CMD to work in partnership with other organisations and project staff reported that they had learnt from this approach. Respondents from the Ministry of Justice, the Law Commission, as well as the Ministry of Gender, stated that CMD worked very effectively on the LGA revision. As the respondents from the Ministry of Local Government and Decentralisation and the Law Commission explained, CMD provided the right leadership to CSOs in dealing with government.

83. **Although the evidence is weaker, there appears to have been less success by grantees aiming to influence and support the implementation of policies** *at district level*. For example, in two CSO case studies (PACENET, CU), grantees did not succeed in making significant progress. PACENET aimed to involve CSO partners in facilitating structural reforms of the council by-laws and guiding principles of the Local Development Fund and Constituency Development Fund, but only managed to initiate the review in one council. PACENET project staff explained that the revision of the by-laws has not been very successful, because of the financial constraints of the councils. Generally, the evidence from this case study also suggests that PACENET had difficulties working with some council officials and Members of Parliament. A CSO partner felt that the revision of by-laws was restricted by traditional influence: *"Some chiefs are still of the idea that introducing the VDC and the ADC reduced their powers. They deliberately hinder the revision process because they feel like more power is being taken away from them."* CU aimed to roll out Service Charter policies, but Service Charters in Dedza and Ntcheu Districts had not been officially launched at the time of the endline research. However, CU continued to use the concept of Service Charters to inform citizens about their rights regarding public service provision and raise the issue of minimum service standards in their interface meetings. The CBO case studies found one successful case of district level influence, although most CBOs visited for the case studies were working solely at a community level. Nkhadze Alive Youth Organisation (NAYORG) reported influencing the district council to create two permanent positions for the youth at the full council. This was confirmed by interviews with council and other CSO officials. Youth representation has thus been guaranteed at the district level in Balaka District.

84. In terms of <u>how</u> grantees influenced government, **the engagement of the media has been an important strategy in influencing policies and raising public awareness.** The Secretariat reports[81] 752 instances of media coverage of issues related to funded projects; and in 5 CSO case studies (CHREAA, NCA, NAMISA, CMD, CEPA)[82] this has been part of grantees' work. In three of these cases (NAMISA, CHREAA, NCA), the collaboration with the media has been a central element of the work, gaining a lot of public attention. For example, CHREAA in

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[81] Annual Review 2015-2016, Tilitonse Secretariat, March 2016.
[82] CEPA – Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy.

partnership with ADECOTS,[83] Blantyre Newspapers, MIJ, Zodiak, Malawi Broadcasting Company (MBC), Nation Newspaper and the Sunday Times produced news content and advocacy materials (health posters and newsletters), designed to draw attention to and encourage people (including parliamentarians and ministers) to take responsibility for poor conditions in prisons. NAMISA, a media institute, also used the media in an active role in lobbying and advocating for the Access to Information Bill. NCA had a large number of reports relating to project activities published in national newspapers – suggesting good use of media to promote activities. NCA worked with Zodiac Broadcasting Station, Maziko Radio, MIJ FM Radio, Capital FM, Nkhoma Radio, and Nation Publications.[84]

> *Enhanced civil society capability. This relates to the knowledge and skills grantees have acquired and applied as a result of Tilitonse capacity building and mentorship. This includes the use of political economy analysis to inform project strategies and select strategic partnerships, as well as CSOs' knowledge and skills in working with / targeting marginalised groups. (Output 1)*

85. **The evidence of improved capability shows a stronger focus on the organisational development of CSOs (financial management, project management, etc.) rather than governance issues or 'ways of working' to build civil society.** As noted in Chapter 4.2, there were challenges with the implementation of the capacity development strategy – with delays and a shift in recent years towards a mentoring approach. Over the life of the programme, the Secretariat has been supporting CSO capacity in nine thematic areas including corporate governance, operations, financial management, political economy, networking and advocacy. In the CSO case studies, grantees were asked about their relationship to Tilitonse, and whether and how Tilitonse's training and support has helped them implement their projects. All 12 grantees reported that their relationship with Tilitonse has been positive and the support and mentorship was valued. Grantees reported that Tilitonse helped them acquire skills in:

- Report writing (WfP, CMD, DCA)
- ToC, documenting case studies, using the results matrix and other monitoring activities (WfP, CCODE, DCA, NCA, NAMISA, CU, PACENET)
- Financial management and the allocation of resources (WfP, CMD, CU)
- Gender and inclusion (WfP, NAMISA), PEA (NAMISA, CU, SWET, PACENET, CEPA, CMD)
- Working in partnership (PACENET, NAMISA, CMD, SWET, DCA).

Similar examples of Tilitonse capacity building were provided in a workshop conducted by the IIEA in May 2016 with eight representatives from seven grantee organisations.[85] The participants reported that they have been supported in financial management, corporate governance, leadership and development, M&E (documenting results, developing ToC) gender and gender mainstreaming, governance and PEA. When asked how this had helped them in project implementation, they reported a strong focus on developing their organisations in terms of:

- Improving organisational structures and systems (including management structures, corporate governance, financial management and reporting)
- Developing strategies to seek impact-level changes and identify gaps to improve programme implementation

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[83] ADECOTS is the Applied Development Communication and Training Services, a Malawian organisation that offers training and produces TV and radio programmes in order to promote communication and behavioural change in relation to development aims.
[84] Additional evidence from a web search and review of GMIS documentation for NCA.
[85] Malawi Council for the Handicapped – MACOHA, Maziko Radio Station, CCODE, DCA, CMD, Malawi Local Government Association – MALGA, Theatre for a Change.

- Developing strategies to involve national and local government, and focus on governance-related issues
- Strengthening networking and coordination with partner organisations
- Monitoring progress of their activities, identify and document success stories
- Mainstreaming gender in project activities.

86. **While grantees' appear to have sometimes gained a greater understanding of political and power dynamics, there is weak evidence that this is making a difference to project design and delivery.** In the CSO survey (endline), 39 out of 43 grantees (91%) were familiar with the term 'political economy analysis', in contrast with 16 out of 27 counterfactual CSOs (59%), which seems consistent with Tilitonse grantees gaining greater awareness.[86] In the same survey, however, only 8 out of 40 grantees (20%) said 'a lot' of research into the political economy influenced their project, which shows some progress by a small minority of grantees and better than the counterfactual sample (2 out of 31 CSOs, or 6%). Similarly, in the CSO case studies there was a mixed understanding of PEA. In 6 CSO case studies (NAMISA, CU, SWET, PACENET, CEPA, CMD) the evidence shows that grantees gained more understanding on PEA, including in identifying and working with the right government and CSO stakeholders and in being more strategic in seeking government support. In five CSO case studies (CMD, NAMISA, SWET, CU, PACENET) Tilitonse's capacity building has, to some extent, contributed to this way of working. For instance, NAMISA project staff explained that they had learnt more about PEA over the course of their project, and that they ensured that PEA thinking shaped their work. One example was stated to be their strategic decision to actively involve a wider range of ministries to champion the revised ATI Bill, thereby seeking to provide more support within the government.

87. For the CBO case studies, improvements in their ability to engage partner organisations and demonstrate PEA skills was similarly mixed. In five cases (COVISODE, FOCCAD, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA) grantees engaged partner organisations with the aim to achieve more collectively. Tilitonse seems to have contributed to this through their trainings – this is, however, not entirely clear in all cases. Then there are three specific examples of grantees (NAYORG, St Jude's, ECOYA) demonstrating good PEA skills, of which two cases (NAYORG, St Jude's) seem to mainly relate to Tilitonse's training. For instance, St. Jude's noted a change in their ability to understand the political situation and identify departments to work with. Tilitonse provided St. Jude's with training on PEA (but only one aspect, i.e. stakeholder analysis) and the mentor was pleased with their progress. In three cases (COVISODE, ECOBO, FOCCAD), there were gaps in grantees' strategies to engage stakeholders, which points to a lack of understanding and effective use of PEA to work politically. For example, COVISODE failed to engage chiefs and councillors and ECOBO initially did not engage mother groups and chiefs.

88. **This varied picture – of some gains, but inconsistent application – can be linked to concerns about the value of one-off capacity building support on PEA, and how best to provide ongoing support to grantees to think politically as a 'live issue.'** This was also noted by Secretariat staff, who reported that many grantees viewed PEA as a one-off exercise and did not use PEA to inform project implementation on an ongoing basis. [87] It was also highlighted that grantees did not fully understand the principles of PEA, but tried to mechanically apply a rather abstract concept.[88]

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[86] CSO Survey, question 5.1.
[87] Interviews with Tilitonse Secretariat, May 2016.
[88] Interviews with Tilitonse Secretariat, Board, RMEC, PEAG, May 2016.

89. Feedback from grantees highlights lessons on <u>how</u> the Secretariat contributed less than effectively to capacity building. Notable feedback for future support includes:[89] mentorship support was provided very late;[90] support was quite theoretical and less practical; and it sometimes took a long time before getting feedback and resources from Tilitonse. In the CSO case studies, grantees reported that they had not enough contact with Tilitonse (CCODE); that Tilitonse should have provided more support in responding to problems grantees were facing (NAMISA, CU); and that the training was not sufficient (CHREAA, CU, PACENET, SWET, DCA). Also, it was suggested that Tilitonse could have facilitated more interaction (sharing and learning) between grantees by linking grantees with similar approaches (CCODE, SWET). It was also suggested that training should have been provided on an ongoing basis – taking into account project staff turnover (DCA).

> *Civil society monitors and facilitates citizens to monitor policy, budgets and service delivery.*
> *This relates to CSOs' activities to monitor the implementation of government policies, allocation of resources and provisions of services. It also relates to CSOs' work to help citizens to monitor government. (Output 4)*

90. Overall, **there have been a lot of monitoring activities by grantees but weak evidence of routine systems of monitoring and accountability being established**. The Secretariat's Annual Review[91] cites 423 monitoring initiatives undertaken, 122,375 people consulted on the quality of public services, and 498 representations based on monitoring initiatives made to traditional leaders and officials responsible for public services. While these numbers suggest a high level of activity it has not been possible to verify the robustness of the method used to calculate these figures. The case studies suggest that that there is often an unclear distinction between 'monitoring' and 'claiming rights' – with both often being merged together as "monitoring activities" in relation to any type of government engagement.

91. From the CSO case studies, **there is limited evidence of grantees engaging in routine monitoring and accountability systems, compared with one-off/occasional monitoring**. In three CSO case studies (NCA, CHREAA, CU), grantees conducted limited monitoring of service delivery (CU, CHREAA) and mining activities (NCA). For example, NCA's implementing partner, Church and Society, engaged in seemingly ad hoc pollution monitoring by visiting a mine twice in 2015. In six CSO case studies (SWET, PACENET, CMD, CU, DCA, CEPA) grantees engaged other stakeholders, including CSOs, citizens, journalists, Area Development Committees (ADCs), Transparency and Accountability Clubs (TACs), councillors, and political parties, to conduct monitoring activities. For example, under the CU project, citizens started monitoring the selection of beneficiaries for public works programmes and the CU engaged journalists to report on the provision of services. However, there are only a few specific examples of effective monitoring activities and in some cases (CMD, CEPA, PACENET) there have been considerable obstacles, because grantees operated in the absence of government buy-in, or outside legal frameworks or existing governance structures (see examples in Box 4 below). In two cases (CU, WfP), grantees were planning to use scorecards and Service Charters as monitoring tools, but failed to do so – the case of CU is described in paragraph 82 above.

> **Box 4. Obstacles to successful grantee monitoring: examples of grantees operating in the absence of government buy-in, or outside legal frameworks or existing governance structures**
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> In the **CMD** case, it appeared that political parties made some efforts to monitor development activities, budgets and services and tried to apply what they had learned from CMD. CMD project

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[89] Based on feedback from grantees who attended the May 2016 workshop (MACOHA, Maziko Radio Station, CCODE, DCA, CMD, MALGA and Theatre for a Change).

[90] This corresponds with the mentorship being provided for the Open and Thematic Calls towards the end of their grant; as well as, CBO mentorship which was provided mostly for proposal preparation or post-award, for financial management only.

[91] Annual Review 2015–16, Tilitonse Secretariat, March 2016.

staff explained that political parties have become more active outside of political campaigns, getting involved in development initiatives. The evidence suggests that political party members have been playing an informal governance 'championing' role, attempting to hold government to account.

However, political parties were facing major constraints, stating that they had been unable to engage with the district council in order to monitor development activities. One of the main obstacles was that they were not included in district development meetings, and one political party representative reported: "*We do not have access to information that can help us effectively monitor the council and development funds.*"

Many respondents stated that political parties did not have an official mandate to monitor services and were hence not able to take up an effective role in monitoring the allocation and utilisation of resources in district councils. CMD does not seem to have engaged the people who have this mandate and there was no evidence of an effective collaboration between political parties and citizens to hold local government to account.

In **CEPA**'s project, CSO partners monitored Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) compliance, analysed budgetary allocations for EIA activities to understand sector trends, and conducted a policy assessment of EIAs. This was enabled by the training provided by CEPA. CSOs including CEPA conducted evidence-based advocacy work on the Environmental Management Bill and the Land Amendment Bill. Also CEPA quarterly reports state that CSO partners analysed budgetary allocations for EIA activities to understand sector trends. In interviews, project staff members stated that this activity was done during the second year of the project, but was problematic because there was not a legal framework to support its implementation. Without a legal framework, CEPA decided to drop this activity.

In the case of **PACENET**, ADCs, TACs and councillors had gained skills and were better able to 'push' for development. Changes were partly associated with PACENET's project (alongside other organisations – World Vision and WORLEC had also conducted trainings on the CDF, LDF, as well as on social audits). However, district council officials were negative about PACENET's engagement with ADCs and VDCs, because PACENET decided to train ADCs and VDCs on their own – without letting the DC lead on this. Project staff explained that they have not been able to gain support from the district council and in the end they have worked in isolation.

> *[…] in the end, government has not supported their [PACENET's] activities and that is why they do [not] have any impact […] The current state shows that PACENET cannot succeed in improving local governance*. (Respondent from district council Chiradzulu).

92. In the CBO case studies, there are three cases (COVISODE, ECOBO, NAYORG) where there were attempts but ineffective capacity to enable the community, the youth, parent teacher associations (PTAs) and school management committees (SMCs) to conduct monitoring activities. In COVISODE, for example, monitoring resource allocations was difficult, because the Member of Parliament or councillor did not explain Local Development Fund and Constituency Development Fund allocations. In ECOBO, there were incidents of teachers taking advantage of committee members to misappropriate funds. In ECOBO and COVISODE monitoring activities were relying on the grantees' financial support and therefore raised some questions in terms of how sustainable they are.

5.2 Engagement of citizens, government and other stakeholders (outcomes)

This section discusses outcome-level changes, which move beyond grantees' activities to consider how the outputs discussed in the previous section contribute to actions and behaviours of citizens and government.

93. Overall, there is evidence of change for 2 of the 3 outcomes. The most notable progress has been in **grantees facilitating citizen participation in government and CSO decision making** (outcome 1), leading to some observable change (such as with CCODE, SWET, DCT and CU). These have included strengthened citizens' skills and confidence, the creation of community structures (e.g. RLCs or local committees), and enabling citizens to engage through interface meetings with different government stakeholders. In addition, there is some evidence **of effective mediation leading to more positive engagement between civil society, citizens and government** (outcome 2) – such as CCODE, CU, CHREAA, WfP and DCT enabling citizens to engage in dialogue between CSOs, citizens and government. However, there is very limited evidence of grantees attempting to reach beyond the citizen-government relationship to involve the private sector (outcome 3).

Citizens participate in and influence decision making. This is about citizens' direct engagement with government, as a result of the mediation efforts undertaken by CSOs. It includes citizens making demands of government to claim their rights. (Outcome 1)

94. **Overall, there is strong evidence that grantees have facilitated increased citizen participation in government dialogue, although not necessarily in decision making**. There is a strong perception among the Tilitonse Secretariat, Board and other stakeholders from civil society and government that Tilitonse-funded CSOs have created improved spaces for dialogue between citizens and government.[92]

95. The IIEA review of 20 end-of-project evaluations showed that 15 grantees (75%) were observed to have evidence of changes at this outcome level.[93] These included interventions by Action Aid, the Association of Early Childhood Development in Malawi, Maziko Radio Station, Southern African AIDS Trust, Care Malawi, Centre for Legal Assistance, World Vision, CCODE, Oxfam Malawi, Theatre for a Change, WUSC, SWET, MIJ, Malawi Human Rights Resource Centre (MHRRC), and NCA. These grantee evaluations showed that citizens – including marginalised citizens (i.e. youth, women, prison inmates) – from the targeted areas have participated more in dialogue or consultation processes. The grantees' efforts in setting up regular meetings and committees to enable engagement between citizens and government seem to have played an important role in these cases – with some examples of this being more structural than just one-off meetings. For example, in Maziko Radio Station, the RLCs have improved citizens' participation in identifying development problems, proposing solutions and engaging with government duty bearers in meetings. With support from Maziko Radio, communities now assemble on their own, and invite service providers or other duty bearers to meetings. Citizens' engagement with the RLCs has also improved their opportunities to make demands. In another example, World Vision's work contributed to students and parents being able to voice grievances and make demands in terms of the schools' infrastructure through their involvement in meetings. It should, however, be noted that the quality of the evidence in a lot of these evaluations is weak, and it is often unclear how and to what extent organisations funded under Tilitonse have contributed to such changes.

96. Evidence is similarly strong in the CSO case studies. The majority of grantees succeeded in increasing citizen participation in dialogue processes, often alongside similar citizen empowerment work conducted by other CSOs. Nine case studies (CCODE, SWET, DCA, DCT,

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[92] Interviews with Tilitonse Secretariat, Board, and grantees, May 2016.
[93] This evidence needs to be considered with caution as 12 of the 33 changes reported in the evaluations (36%) were supported by unclear or weak evidence.

WfP, NAMISA, NCA, CU, PACENET) show that citizens have participated more often in dialogue processes, the exceptions being CEPA, CMD and CHREAA.

97. In four CSO case studies (CCODE, SWET, DCT and CU) there has been increased participation, and evidence that citizens have made demands of government, with grantees seemingly having made a significant contribution to these changes. They did this by strengthening citizens' skills and confidence, creating effective community structures (RLCs and committees – CCODE, SWET, DCT) that facilitated citizens' participation, and enabling citizens to engage more through meetings with different government stakeholders (CU). For instance, CCODE has helped citizens to develop new skills in identifying community needs (including through the use of settlement surveys), and gain practical and technical knowledge in community planning and in engaging with local authorities. The committees set up by CCODE are reported to have played a significant role in enabling citizens to make more demands and in following up on their demands. As a result, citizens have become more engaged, often making demands as a result, and CCODE committee structures filled gaps left by the absence of local councillors prior to the 2014 elections. It was also observed that citizens have made more informed demands of service providers, because CCODE community profiles have helped equip citizens with evidence they can use and allowed them to talk to authorities about the substance of the issues, including the layout of their communities, populations, and the numbering of structures. Furthermore, citizens have more often followed up on demands made, because committees set up by CCODE also perform a follow-up function – when authorities do not provide the services they have requested, they continue going to government officers and reminding them of their requests.

98. Similarly, SWET's use of RLCs influenced services, putting pressure on government to respond to citizens' demands. It was stated in focus groups with RLC members that because of the training on PEA received from SWET, RLCs were aware of the different responsibilities of service providers and knew where to direct their demands. Almost all citizens interviewed stated that the RLCs have been effective in monitoring government agencies and service providers and putting pressure on them to respond to citizens' demands. As one citizen said: "*In the past, service providers decided for us what we needed but now things are gradually changing as we are now able to sit down as a community and propose what we need and can contribute.*" CU has also helped citizens to engage with government stakeholders by conducting meetings, which enabled citizens to monitor services, discuss problems and make demands for better services. One citizen reported: "*We had an interface meeting with government officials just last week where we gave the complaint and were told that there are only four ambulances that go in the villages … They have promised to bring an ambulance bicycle.*"

99. A similar improved level of citizen participation was found in all of the CBO cases (COVISODE, FOCCAD, NAYORG, ECOYA, St Jude's, ECOBO). This has included young people (NAYORG) and people with disabilities (St Jude's), participating in dialogue activities and claiming their rights from service providers and policy makers, because of their engagement with Tilitonse grantees. This change was mainly attributed to the development of skills and confidence of citizens by grantees (COVISODE, FOCCAD, NAYORG, ECOYA, ECOBO). In the St Jude's case study, change was associated with the forums – consisting of representatives from all village disability clubs, ADC representatives and community members – the grantee had established to discuss issues. NAYORG influenced the local government to see the value of working with the youth, which has enabled their participation in VDCs and ADCs.

100. In terms of understanding the relative contribution of Tilitonse grantees, in just over half of the CSO case studies (CCODE, WfP, CU, SWET, DCA, DCT and PACENET), other factors have contributed to the progress made, primarily similar work of other CSOs. The support of community and traditional leaders and the appointment of councillors have also been key

contributory factors. In six CSO case studies (CMD, CU, DCA, NAMISA, PACENET, SWET), local councillors were mentioned as a supporting factor in helping citizens to communicate with government and make demands (CU, DCA, CMD, PACENET, SWET), facilitate government outreach to and consultation with citizens (CU, CMD, PACENET), improve the provision of information to citizens (NAMISA, PACENET) and encourage government to respond to citizens' demands (PACENET, SWET). For example, in PACENET, councillors were perceived to have played an important role in bringing citizens' concerns to the attention of the district council and therefore promoted a quicker response in the provision of teacher houses, roads and bridges. In two CBO cases (COVISODE, NAYORG) other CSOs have been a contributory factor, including NICE and CCJP, while in ECOYA, some respondents associated changes with the councillor.

> ***More positive engagement between civil society, citizens and government.*** *This is about changes in the quality of engagement between civil society, citizens and government. It incorporates 'early signs' of government responsiveness, as a direct result of CSO and citizen engagement – that is changes in attitudes and early behaviour change (e.g. government listening more to demands).* **(Outcome 2)**

101. This outcome shifts the focus from the participation of citizens (i.e. CSOs linking downwards to their constituency), to a more distinct focus on the quality of engagement *between* citizens and government. The focus is also less on whether CSOs set up or undertook mediation/dialogue activities (output 2), and more on the consequence of this work (i.e. a change in the way citizens participate with CSOs, or how citizens and government engages).

102. **The evidence here is less strong, with some examples of grantee mediation between government and citizens/CSOs resulting in more positive engagement, but this is not generalisable across the case studies.** In the IIEA review of 20 end-of-project evaluations, five grantees (25%) were observed to have contributed to changes in quality of engagement, with far fewer examples (7) compared with changes (33) in citizen participation.[94] The five end-of-project evaluations to refer to more positive engagement were Maziko Radio Station, MHRRC, Council for Non-Government Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA), Theatre for a Change, and CMD). For example, in MHRRC, the working relationship between police and media seems to have improved, which is reflected in the fact that a memorandum of understanding was developed. In CONGOMA, there is an improved relationship between CSOs and government stakeholders. There is also an improved relationship between CSOs and government stakeholders, because CMD actively involved government in the policy review processes. There is, however, limited information across all the end-of-project evaluations in this area, and in most cases it is not clearly evidenced.

103. The CSO case studies provide more in-depth understanding of this outcome, showing that where there are positive changes in the quality of engagement this has been through CSOs learning how to engage more effectively with government, and through platforms providing opportunities for interaction, improved understanding and active involvement of citizens and government. This links with the strong mediation role played by Tilitonse grantees, as observed earlier in the output 2 findings.

104. Out of the 12 CSO case studies, 11 grantees aimed to empower citizens to engage with government. In five of these cases (CCODE, CU, CHREAA, WfP, DCT) there are examples of more positive engagement between citizens and government. This is due to Tilitonse grantees contributing to mediation between government and citizens, increasing opportunities to come together (CCODE, CU, CHREAA), actively involving government in the discussions (WfP), making citizens' problems more visible to government (CCODE), and highlighting constraints

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[94] This evidence needs to be considered with caution as 7 of these 18 changes (39%) were observed to have unclear of weak evidence.

of government to citizens (DCT). In CHREAA, health groups improved links between prisoners and guards. Some prisoners reported that these groups had helped act as a bridge between prisoners and wardens, and informed fellow inmates how to access medical care if needed, while others felt the groups made it easier for health issues to be identified and reported. Government stakeholders reported that effective and vigorous collaboration was CHREAA's strongest area and that CHREAA were the 'leading partner' in the quest to improve prison health accountability and responsiveness through a health sub-committee set up by CHREAA and comprising representatives from CSOs and from the government. In CCODE, there is strong evidence that attitudes of service providers regarding investment in infrastructure in informal settlements changed, because CCODE has provided a voice for the people and made settlements visible to the government – having an organisation behind them encouraged government to listen to citizens. There is some evidence that there is a more constructive and harmonious relationship between citizens and the government because of CCODE's committees, which enabled issues to be raised and, importantly, where citizens expressed willingness to play a role in development. However, in the case of NCA the project was not successful in promoting a less hostile relationship between citizens/CSOs and the mining sector – described in Box 5 below.

Box 5. Distrust, animosity and resentment between a community and a mining company in the NCA case

The Thematic Call grantee NCA envisaged that the Tilitonse project *Tonse Tipindile ('We should all benefit')* would lead to improved engagement between citizens, mining investors and government stakeholders. However, there is strong evidence that relationships had not improved in the case study fieldwork location, with a clear sense of distrust, animosity and resentment towards a particular company (Paladin). In the case of alleged pollution and safety failures around Kayelekera mine, the case study paints a picture of intense media and CSO scrutiny forcing Paladin to account for and justify its actions, with a correspondingly negative and combative relationship between communities, CSOs and the company. It was not possible for the case study to determine how far the problem is a lack of transparency and the adoption of unsafe practices on Paladin's part, and how far it was one of sensationalist engagement with the issue by CSOs and the media – but the case found some signs of hyperbole on the part of CSOs including NCA, which may be contributing both to unnecessary fear within communities and continuing hostilities with Paladin. Another issue is that the project is perpetuating citizens' expectations around corporate social responsibility – by raising awareness and mobilising citizens to demand community services from mining companies – in the absence of legislation forcing companies to provide these resources. This is contributing to continued frustration and hostilities between community members and Paladin.

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105. Similarly in the CBO case studies there are both successful and unsuccessful examples, with three examples (FOCCAD, ECOYA, NAYORG) of improved engagement between civil society, citizens and the government. ECOYA's relationship with the city council has changed over the course of the project, which was an enabling factor for change. Based on interviews with government stakeholders, they said that the meetings held by the community had changed their opinion towards the communities. In the NAYORG case, councillors and the committees changed their perception about the youth and started engaging them more.

106. However, in two cases (FOCCAD, ECOYA) there were also examples of hostile or negative relationships between government, CBOs and citizens. In FOCCAD, one hospital reported to be no longer willing to attend meetings with FOCCAD. In FOCCAD's third quarterly report, the grantee reflected that this might be a sign of resistance to change. In the ECOYA case, the community were very negative in their assessment of their engagements with government.

> ***Cooperative working between civil society and private sector, involving excluded groups.** This is about CSOs' engagement with the private sector in order to maximise their influence on government.* ***(Outcome 3)***

107. **There is very little evidence of grantees attempting to work or engage with the private sector in their project activities. This reflects a lack of relevance in many cases, but also the context in Malawi and little prioritisation of this activity by the Tilitonse programme**. This was also stated by a member of the PEAG,[95] who explained that CSOs' engagement with the private sector is a relatively new area in Malawi. In the IIEA review of 20 end-of-project evaluations, just one grantee had results relating to this outcome. The end-of-project evaluation of the Samaritan Trust reports that private sector links led to the consideration of two graduates from the Samaritan Trust to be employed at PG Glass in Blantyre. Shoprite and other private sector institutions have also occasionally provided some support in kind to the Trust. But overall, it is unclear how these links were established, and the engagement is more akin to corporate social responsibility than a governance change. Likewise, in the five CSO case studies that worked with the private sector (CEPA, DCA, NAMISA, DCT, NCA), there has been some engagement, but in most cases this has been minimal.

108. In one case (NCA), there is strong evidence that there was a hostile relationship between CSOs and the private sector (mining companies), as discussed in Box 5 above. While there is some evidence that mining companies were generally more willing to engage with CSOs at a national level than they were before, this seems likely to be a result of a confluence of factors, including the advocacy of multiple CSOs, and the ongoing review of the mining legal framework being conducted with support from a large World Bank project.

5.3 Responsiveness, transparency and inclusion of government (impacts)

This section considers the governance impacts of the work of Tilitonse, with the focus on changes driven by government (or government as a service provider) – i.e. being more responsive, being transparent, and seeking outreach to citizens and inclusion of marginalised groups.

109. Overall, there is far less evidence of change at the impact level. The strongest evidence is of **some increase in the responsiveness of government and government service providers around policies, plans, budgets and services** (impact 4). Here, most examples relate to community-level change, although there are also a few examples that are significant at national policy level. However, even at community level, impacts more often relate to grantees acting as mediators between government and civil society to help solve specific local problems, rather than any more structural shift in the responsiveness of government. This in part reflects the limited timeframe, particularly of CBO grants which were generally about a year in length.

110. In terms of grantee aims in relation to more systemic/institutional change (i.e. in transparency, outreach and inclusion) these are often vague and unclear (impacts 1, 2 and 3). There was some limited evidence that grantees improved transparency (impact 1) by increasing pressure from citizens, strengthening platforms and local forums (such as RLCs, TACs). But, in terms of improved government outreach to citizens (impact 2), and inclusion of women and marginalised groups (impact 3), examples are far fewer – and discernible impacts appear to be more a function of general shifts in the Malawian context, rather than the more specific contributions of Tilitonse-funded grantees.

> ***Improved responsiveness of policies, resource allocations and services.** This relates to government's responsiveness to citizens, focusing on the ways in which target government*

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[95] Interview with the PEAG, May 2016.

> *agencies at the national, district, or service provider level have responded to citizens' views in designing their policies and plans, in setting their budgets, and in providing services. (**Impact 4**)*

111. There are examples of grantees influencing changes in policy, or at least policy processes; with **a few successes viewed as significant at a national policy level. For those grantees more focused at the community level, impacts tend to relate more to grantees acting as mediators between government and civil society to help solve specific local problems**. Often the observed changes are ad hoc or micro-level, not usually linked to national policy making or implementation.

112. In the IIEA review of 20 end-of-project evaluations, 16 of the evaluations (Action Aid, Association of Early Childhood Development in Malawi (AECDM), Maziko Radio Station, MHRRC, YONECO, South African Aids Trust, Care Malawi, Centre for Legal Assistance (CELA), CCODE, the Samaritan Trust, Oxfam Malawi, Theatre for a Change, SWET, MIJ, NCA, CMD) demonstrated some evidence of change in relation to government responsiveness (impact 4).[96] In 12 of these 16 cases (Maziko Radio Station, MHRRC, YONECO, South African Aids Trust, Care Malawi, CCODE, the Samaritan Trust, Theatre for a Change, SWET, MIJ, NCA, CELA) the change related to improvement in the provision of services and infrastructure. Other examples relate to increased budget allocations (AECDM), improved access to resources and services (Action Aid, SWET, Care Malawi, CELA) and changes in policies and plans (Oxfam Malawi, CMD). Eight cases (AECDM, MIJ, Theatre for a Change, CCODE, the Samaritan Trust, CELA, SWET, NCA) indicate how Tilitonse grantees contributed to these changes. This includes engaging the media to cover issues of concern (AECDM, MIJ, Theatre for a Change), mobilising communities and enabling more engagement with the government (Theatre for a Change, CCODE), training government stakeholders, setting up forums and lobbying for change (the Samaritan Trust, CELA, SWET, NCA). In four cases (Action Aid, AECDM, NCA, CMD), it is indicated that other actors – including councillors and other CSOs – have also contributed to changes.

113. All 12 of the CSO case study grantees were aiming to improve government responsiveness in relation to specific plans, policies, resource areas or services. Six grantees were working to influence national-level policy or resources. Four grantees were working to influence policy or resource allocation decisions at a district level. Ten grantees were working to improve government services or at a community (and in one case prison) level.

114. Tilitonse stakeholders consulted at endline felt that CSOs' successes in influencing national policy / legislation formulation (on ATI, Local Government, and mining) were one of the important contributions made by the Tilitonse programme. The engagement with the media is perceived as a key factor in facilitating this change.[97] In four of the six CSO case studies where grantees were working to influence national-level policy processes, grantees have succeeded in influencing change. Two of the grantees most successful in influencing policy (CMD and NAMISA) played a key role in driving and funding policy processes (coordinating, providing leadership, facilitating and drafting policy) rather than or as well as <u>advocating</u> for change from an external perspective. CMD appear to have effectively facilitated the process of drafting the LGA Bill, with CSOs having been able to contribute to a new LGA Bill. For example, a respondent from the Ministry of Local Government and Decentralisation explained:

> *I think the successes we are talking about are a result of this leadership of CMD. […] This collaboration [with CSOs] was very formal, because we even organised a CSO taskforce and steering committee and our view is that the structures will help in*

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[96] This evidence needs to be considered with caution as 18 of the 28 changes reported (64%) were observed to have unclear or weak evidence.

[97] Interviews with Tilitonse Secretariat and Board, and selected grantees, May 2016.

> *building a long-term relationship between CSOs and the government … For me one thing that stood out with this project is how much they [CMD] insisted on collaboration. CMD did not make any individual decisions without consulting the rest of the taskforce. There was adequate interaction which is good because it assured us that the draft Act was a collective effort.*

However, the LGA Bill has not yet passed into legislation and stakeholders listed barriers such as changes in leadership of different ministries, a focus on electoral reforms which led to delays in the LGA Bill and the difficulty of organising meetings with key stakeholders during the national elections in 2015.

115. Other CSO case study grantees have successfully participated in broader advocacy work, alongside other CSOs, to input into policy content (NCA) or influence resource allocations (CHREAA). For example, several government stakeholders attributed the increase in prison health budgets to the advocacy work of CHREAA and other CSOs, including through the Health SWAp sub-committee set up by CHREAA. It is, however, difficult to substantiate this change from the actual budget allocation totals, particularly since budgets for prison health have been increasing steadily since 2009,[98] before the beginning of Tilitonse project.

116. **From the CSO survey and case studies, while most grantees focus on the responsiveness of government by increasing citizen demands, evidence that demands have led to change is more limited and, where it occurs, relatively minor**. The CSO survey finds that over a third of grantees (14 out of 36 grants, or 39%) observed 'no response' or 'little response' from target government agencies to demands from citizens/CSOs.[99] Only 3 of 36 observed 'a lot of response' (8%). Similarly, there is only strong evidence to link improvements in government responsiveness to CSO or citizen demands in three of the 12 CSO case studies, and even then, only in minor ways.

117. NCA has had some success in forcing Paladin to account for and justify its actions in response to CSO pressure – but to a limited extent, and using confrontational tactics that resulted in a perpetuation of hostile relationships (see Box 5 above). Within both DCT and SWET cases, there are examples of improvements in community-level services which respondents link to the work of the RLCs in holding government to account. However, in most cases the examples of change are limited and micro rather than strategic. In the SWET case study, most citizens claimed that the RLCs have been able to influence government and service providers which resulted in responding to citizens' requests in terms of improving services. These examples seem to relate to one-off spending decisions or micro-level change, rather than budget reallocations, but still they may represent the beginnings of a change in responsiveness. For example, one citizen said that RLCs encouraged the health committee to work harder at lobbying for increased drug availability and that now things are changing. Although these examples cannot be corroborated, they suggest that some citizens perceive the RLCs as successful in changing service provider behaviour. In DCT, some citizens also explicitly attributed improved service provider responsiveness to the work of the RLCs who set up meetings with the citizens, health centre workers and community leaders. The meetings provided a platform for citizens to express their grievances and for the government to directly respond to complaints. But in many cases, health service providers were more responsive to smaller, less materially intensive demands (although evidence is limited). Examples of responsiveness by health service providers included the government providing home care for the chronically sick, youth accessing voluntary counselling and testing services, installing boreholes at hospitals, stocking adequate medical supplies and longer hospital opening hours.

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[98] It is unclear from the respondent interviews whether this is actually an increase in real terms.
[99] CSO Survey, question 4.5. The sample from the counterfactual survey is too small to include here.

118. With regard to the CBO case studies, four grantees (ECOBO, St Jude's, ECOYA, NAYORG) were aiming to achieve changes in government's response to citizens' views on resource allocations and services, but it does not seem they have achieved this. Governments' financial constraints were mentioned as a major obstacle towards change in all six CBO cases (ECOBO, St Jude's, ECOYA, FOCCAD, NAYORG, COVISODE) – although this suggests that grantees' governance change objectives had limited traction, as the focus should have been on better using limiting resources, rather than objectives being contingent on more resources being made available. For example, St Jude's aimed to get the district council to commit to at least two disability specific projects, but did not succeed in this. NAYORG were targeting the district council to consider the views of young people in budgets and services, but there are no signs of this being achieved except that young people have been allocated permanent seats at the full council meeting. ECOYA aimed to pressure the government to remove a dumping site, which at the time of the case study research had not happened.[100]

119. ECOBO aimed to improve the quality of services for marginalised groups, and although the management of resources improved through the grantee's engagement with PTAs and SMCs, it is not clear whether this has made a difference to the misappropriation of resources.

120. In two CBO case studies (COVISODE, FOCCAD) there appear to be some improvements in services, and the grantees have influenced these by supporting communication between citizens, governance committees and government. Other factors, including the councillors' engagement, other CSO actors, as well as pre-existing government efforts have contributed to this. In FOCCAD, for example, there have been observed improvements in health services for people living with HIV. Evidence suggests that the stakeholder panels FOCCAD established have created channels of communication and dialogue between citizens and duty bearers which have led to the changes.

> *Impact 1: Improved government transparency and citizen access to information.* *This is about how far the government/other official body is transparent about its decision-making processes and how far information is made available to citizens, for example through the media.*

121. **There is a strong focus on improving government transparency among the grantees**. Of the 12 CSO case studies, 11 had explicit aims to improve transparency, in either their results framework or the implicit ToC developed by the IIEA. Only DCA had no explicit transparency aims. Six of the grantees were aiming to improve the transparency of community governance structures (PACENET), service provision (WfP, SWET, CU), or access to information at community level (NCA on mining, and NAMISA in general). Three were aiming to improve transparency at a District or City level – through more transparent health governance structures (DCA), or key documents being made available by District or City councils (CMD, CCODE). Four were aiming to improve transparency at a national level. NCA was aiming to promote increased transparency of the mining regime, CHREAA aimed to make information available about health conditions in prisons, and NAMISA's whole project was aiming to increase access to information at a national level through their work to support the ATI Bill. CEPA's goals in relation to transparency were very vague, despite having an indicator in their results framework.

122. **There are some limited signs that grantees have promoted improved transparency.** The CSO survey indicates that 13 out of 43 grantees (31%) observed 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' of government

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[100] IIEA field researchers report that that a fence was built around the dumpsite as an intermediary measure, after the end of the ECOYA project. However, this initiative was taken after the IIEA case study fieldwork was completed, and so could not be validated.

agencies or service providers making available information to citizens or CSOs at endline.[101] This is better than the counterfactual sample (where 5 out of 28 CSOs, or 18% observed this). Yet, twice as many grantees (26 out of 43) perceived that either 'moderate' or 'limited' information was being made available by government agencies or service providers – with a further four grantees feeling that no information was being made available to the public. From the perspective of citizens/communities being able to access information from government, there was similarly only 'some evidence' of improved transparency, with access tending to be one-off or for poor quality information (21 of 43 grants, or 49%)[102] – with a further 9 grants (21%) having no access to relevant information or only via well-connected individuals. This is better than the counterfactual sample, where 14 out of 28 CSOs (50%) have no access to information or only through well-connected individuals.

123. **From the CSO case studies, where there is evidence of improved transparency this seems to have been achieved in three main ways. First, by increasing pressure from citizens and strengthening platforms**. Nine CSO case studies were targeting change at district or community and/or service provider level. In four cases (CCODE, CU, DCT, WfP) where grantees aimed to improve transparency at a community level, there is evidence that information provision has improved due to increased pressure and demand from citizens and the establishment or strengthening of platforms or forums that enable information flow. WfP work through the WUAs to become more transparent and share more information about their operations. This improvement was primarily driven by the increase in meetings with the community, in particular citizen meetings with BWB organised by WfP. A water user from one focus group put it as follows:

> *The WUA is more open to tell the community what they are planning whether on policies, budgeting or planning on anything concerning the citizens on water issues. WUA do inform us about what they do to make sure that we access quality water in the community*. [And as a BWB representative added:] *It is easier to access information about water services now than it was a few years back. That it is because WfP, since coming they have trained the WUA's to keep up with what the BWB is doing as well as keep track of the kiosks and liaise with the people on the ground whenever there is need to do something together*.

In another example, information provision from local service providers, such as the police and Health Committees, has improved, due to efforts from CU in encouraging dialogue between citizens and service providers – by establishing new platforms and relationships through which information can flow, and by encouraging community members to make demands. For example, it was found that as a result of meetings, an action plan was developed and community members started demanding information from SMCs which led to improved transparency from the SMCs and head teachers.[103]

124. **Second, through local forums playing a role in monitoring service delivery.** In three of the nine CSO case studies (PACENET, DCT, SWET), local forums such as RLCs and TACs have played a role in improving transparency by monitoring service delivery. PACENET have supported the provision of information through their work with TACs – which monitored projects, such as the registration of the Public Works Programme. The increase in information provision noted by citizens was, however, mainly linked to the appointment of councillors alongside the work of other organisations (World Vision), and so only partly linked to PACENET. For DCT, the primary driver of improvements in 'professionalism and transparency' seems to be RLC's work in monitoring service providers – citizens raising concerns to RLCs and others, who then take

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[101] CSO Survey, question 3.1.
[102] CSO Survey, question 4.6.
[103] CU case study document published by the Secretariat, July 2014.

up issues on their behalf. RLCs working alongside CSOs, health advisory committees and community leaders. As a result of citizens becoming aware of their rights, there is a sense that they are less afraid to raise concerns to RLCs or through other committees who could take up issues on their behalf. One citizen gave an example of a community meeting canvassing citizens' views on health services that RLCs broadcast on the radio, resulting in officials visiting a local committee to discuss the issues that were raised.

125. **And third, by improving relationships between civil society and government at a national level, facilitating greater access to information for media or CSOs.** In three of the four CSO case studies working to influence transparency at a national level (CEPA, CHREAA, NAMISA), better relationships between civil society and government (in part but not exclusively promoted by grantees) have helped to facilitate information exchange or greater access to information. The NCA case study found that Malawi has started the process of joining the international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, indicating a move towards greater transparency in the mining sector. However, the case study did not find any evidence on why this decision was made (and nothing to link it to better relationships), although NCA's partner CCJP is one of the four CSO stakeholders on the group established to steer the process of becoming a full member.

126. Interviews with the Tilitonse Secretariat, the PEAG, and grantees suggested that transparency and access to information is largely associated with the debate around the ATI Bill NAMISA (in collaboration with other players) has been advocating for. 'Cashgate' and the related pressure from the donor community for more ATI has put this debate into the spotlight. Due to the ATI campaign, the government has been more transparent in declaring public resources. It was also highlighted that since Cashgate, other incidents of misappropriation of government funds have been revealed and the government has initiated audits to fight corruption. However, the prosecution of corruption cases takes a long time and more than 80 cases are still unresolved.[104]

127. **In the five CBO case studies (COVISODE, ECOBO, NAYORG, ECOYA, St Jude's) there is some evidence of improvements in government's provision of information to citizens**. In two CBO case studies (COVISODE, ECOBO), the government has provided more information (including about the use of community funds) by providing reports, organising meetings and involving citizens in Local Development Fund activities. In these cases, the change was attributed to the grantees' engagement, but other factors (including the councillor and pre-existing government initiatives) seem to have played a role. In three CBO case studies (St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA), information provision has reportedly improved, but the grantees' contribution is not entirely clear. For example, NAYORG and St Jude's worked with VDCs and ADCs, who were associated with improved provision of information. However, neither project was focusing on improving transparency. In two CBO case studies (ECOYA, COVISODE), changes were not perceived to be substantial. For example, in COVISODE, some citizens and other stakeholders reported that there had not been a substantial change in the provision of information, because the district council was resistant to change.

128. The most significant change from the CBO case studies seems to have happened in the ECOBO case, where all consulted citizens saw improved information provision as the biggest achievement of the project. They attributed the improvements in information provision to interface meetings ECOBO organised, as well as ECOBO's training of the PTAs and SMCs. It is likely, however, that the schools' annual trainings for the committees have also contributed to this change.

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[104] Interviews with Tilitonse Secretariat, the PEAG, grantees, May 2016.

> ***Impact 2: Improved government outreach to citizens.*** *This relates to how far the government/other official body makes efforts to reach out to citizens, find out their views, and incorporate them into policy making and service provision.*

129. **There is little evidence of institutional/systemic change in relation to government outreach at local level** – that is, changes that are <u>driven by government actors</u> to reach out more effectively to citizens, as opposed than changes initiated and driven by CSOs. This raises concerns about the sustainability of mediation activities, the participation of citizens and the engagement of government. From the CSO survey, 11 out of 43 grants (26%) indicated either 'a lot' or 'quite a bit' of consultation by target government agencies or service providers in seeking out citizen views.[105] This is better than the counterfactual sample where just 4 of the 28 CSOs (14%) indicated either 'a lot' or 'quite a bit' of consultation. Still, a large proportion of grantees (18 out of 43, or 42%) said that there is 'no' or 'little' consultation. In 7 of the 12 CSO case studies, grantees were explicitly aiming to improve government outreach – in the form of targeted government stakeholders reaching out to, listening to and consulting with citizens (CCODE, CMD, NCA, PACENET, SWET, WfP) or CSOs (CEPA, NCA) more frequently. Four CSO case study grantees may have implicitly been aiming to improve outreach to citizens (CU, DCA, DCT CHREAA: prisoners) – they did not have any specific indicators relating to it in their results framework, but referenced greater 'accountability and responsiveness'.

130. **There are some examples from the CSO case studies, from projects focusing on improving service delivery, of improved consultation and outreach *driven by government* as a result of the structures or processes supported by grantees.** In SWET, for example, the majority of consulted RLCs and citizens felt that government stakeholders, including chiefs, social welfare officers, ADC members, health staff, school staff, child protection officers and agricultural staff, have been consulting with them more often on development issues and resource distribution. Most government and demand-side stakeholders stated that the activities organised by the RLCs made it easier for government stakeholders to consult citizens. Two stakeholders gave examples: RLCs have helped ADCs and Child Protection Officers to consult communities on the abuse of children's rights; and on citizens' priorities before they write proposals to higher levels of government. For CCODE, most citizens and government stakeholders felt that government stakeholders have increased engagement with citizens in part through CCODE-established committees, networks and urban talks, alongside other factors. But, other consultation processes and platforms also exist, such as the participatory budgeting process used by the Lilongwe City Council (LCC), other committees and LCC meetings with block leaders. This introduces some confusion into the attempt to establish attribution for this change – as many government stakeholders did not explicitly mention CCODE when discussing the role of committees, making it difficult to ascertain whether they were talking about CCODE or a separate structure. Given some of the government stakeholders' expectations around being paid allowances to take part in community meetings (highlighted under output 2), it is unclear whether examples are dependent on allowances or refer to more permanent changes in the way government does outreach.

131. **While there has been some national-level change in the level of CSO consultation, this appears to reflect national shifts rather than necessarily the work of specific Tilitonse grantees.** Among the three case study grantees implicitly or explicitly working to promote outreach at a national level (CEPA, CMD, NCA), there is some evidence of improvements in government consultation with civil society in relation to specific policy issues. There is,

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[105] CSO Survey, question 3.3.

however, a lack of evidence of grantees' contribution. There is also no evidence that grantees have encouraged direct citizen participation in national-level consultation processes.

132. **The evidence from CBO cases shows few instances of improved outreach and consultation, with most examples of outreach linked to existing structures at community or district levels.** In five CBO cases (COVISODE, FOCCAD, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA), there was no evidence that district officials and service providers have reached out more to citizens. In four of these cases (COVISODE, St Jude's, ECOYA, NAYORG) it was, however, mentioned that VDCs, ADCs, (COVISODE, St Jude's, ECOYA) the local councillor (NAYORG), and chiefs (ECOYA) have reached out to citizens. In COVISODE, the grantee's engagement in restructuring the VDCs and ADCs seems to have played a role in this change. In one case (ECOBO) the PTAs and SMCs are engaging more with the community and it is likely that the grantee has contributed to this through training them in their responsibilities and the importance of citizen engagement. It is, however, unclear how proactive PTAs and SMCs are as many of the activities have been funded by the grantee.

> ***Impact 3: Improved government inclusion and recognition of women and marginalised groups.***
> *This is about how far the government/other official body makes efforts to include women and marginalised groups (such as people with disabilities; people living with HIV/AIDS; youth; elderly people) in outreach activities, and in targeted services/policies/plans.*

133. **The positive impacts relating to inclusiveness appear less due to contributions of Tilitonse grantees, and instead reflect general shifts in Malawi.** The CSO survey shows that 25 out of 43 grantees (58%) observed 'no' or 'little' consultation by target government agencies and service providers in seeking out the views of women.[106] This is fairly similar in proportion to the counterfactual sample, where 15 of 28 CSOs (54%) observed 'no' or 'little' consultation. Similarly, CSO survey respondents observed 'no' or 'little' participation of women in interacting or seeking to influence government or service providers (19 out of 43, or 44%) – with another nine respondents observing 'moderate' participation by women. This similarly compares with the counterfactual sample, where 11 out of 28 CSOs (39%) observed 'no' or 'little' participation of women in interacting or seeking to influence government or service providers. In the CSO case studies, 7 of 12 grantees had specific aims in relation to promoting more inclusive governance at local (WfP, SWET, DCA, DCT, CU) and/or national (CMD, CHREAA, DCA) level. At the local level, the focus was on improving policies and services specifically targeted to, or in ways that consider the needs of, marginalised groups. At the national level, this was about considering gender issues in policy creation (CMD) and contributing to various policies to advance economic empowerment of women (DCA).

134. Among the five CSO case study grantees specifically aiming to improve the inclusivity of services or policies at local level, three showed evidence of change, but only in the case of CU was there some evidence to link grantee activities to this change. CU encouraged greater inclusiveness at community and district level by encouraging government stakeholders to consider marginalised groups. For CU, a considerable number of respondents stated that government stakeholders have been making efforts to be inclusive of marginalised groups. Citizens said government had made efforts to facilitate participation of marginalised groups in public works programmes, as members of committees, and to fill leadership roles.[107] Several stakeholders felt that CU has helped government stakeholders to realise that it is important to respect the views of everyone regardless of their gender or social status.

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[106] CSO Survey, question 3.4.
[107] A GMIS case study suggests that CU's efforts in tackling corruption in the SMCs led to the re-election of committee members which was inclusive of marginalised groups who had previously been excluded on the grounds that they were unable to read and write.

135. In several CSO case studies (CU, PACENET, SWET, CMD, DCA, CCODE, DCT), there was evidence to suggest there have been gradual shifts towards greater inclusiveness, particularly of women, in Malawi that are independent of Tilitonse. There are many other CSOs working on these issues in Malawi. In PACENET, citizens in both areas targeted by the project and the counterfactual felt there has been a stronger focus on marginalised groups over the past 2 years, and greater representation in community governance structures. They felt this was a result of sensitisation on gender equality of NGOs, like CAWVOC, FEDOMA, NAPHAM and ADRA,[108] as well as radio programmes. In SWET, two stakeholders felt the '50/50 campaign' has promoted gender equality, and several stakeholders felt that government officials, NGOs (CAWVOC, ADRA, FEDOMA, NAPHAM, Zodiak), and radio programmes have been promoting the representation of women, youths and people with disabilities in committees. In CCODE, a CSO stakeholder pointed to a general improvement in women's empowerment in Malawi: "*For most of the projects that are being done nowadays you see a large number of women willing to participate because of the advancement of the idea of gender equality*."

136. **In the CBO work, there seems to be slightly better evidence of improved inclusion.** In all CBO cases (COVISODE, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA, ECOBO, FOCCAD) there is at least some evidence of improved inclusion and recognition of marginalised groups and grantees have played a role in enabling these changes. However, levels of success vary – in three cases (St Jude, NAYORG, ECOYA) there seem to be considerable improvements in marginalised groups' involvement, representation and recognition. In these cases, other CSOs' work has contributed to changes. In two CBO case studies (ECOBO, FOCCAD) changes seem to be rather minor. In four CBO case studies (St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA, FOCCAD), marginalised groups have increasingly been involved in development activities and this was attributed to the grantees' engagement, including through their awareness-raising activities. In three CBO case studies (COVISODE, St Jude's, NAYORG) there has been an improvement in the representation of women, people living with disabilities (PLWDs) and youth in ADCs and VDCs – which the grantees targeted through their projects. In St Jude's the attitude of chiefs and committees towards PLWDs has improved and in NAYORG duty bearers started taking the youth more seriously. This was, again, attributed to the grantees' engagement.

137. In two CBO case studies (ECOBO, FOCCAD), there is limited evidence of substantial changes. In ECOBO, one of the project's main objectives was to lobby for the inclusion of women in PTAs and SMCs, but there was mixed evidence on whether women's participation had improved and ECOBO seem to have been unable to challenge the overriding inequalities in the community. In FOCCAD, there is very little evidence of involvement of people living with HIV in decision making.

5.3 Comparing different grant calls

138. The preceding sections summarised the overall findings at each level of the programme ToC (from outputs through to impacts). Within Tilitonse, different types of grants attempted to achieve these impacts in different ways, from the Open Calls through to the Thematic and CBO Calls. While the Thematic Call was designed to test an 'issue-based' (and more political economy informed) approach, it was not set up in a particularly evaluable way. There were only six grants in this round, and each involved several partners and more resources than previous calls – all covering three different topics (mining, ATI, and local governance). The grants were not set up as 'pilots' or 'experiments' to test and learn about what works and incrementally learn about what might be replicated about a particular approach or intervention. Thus while the IIEA undertook detailed case studies for half (three out of six) of

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[108] CAWVOC – Centre for Alternatives for Victimised Women and Children; FEDOMA – The Federation of Disability Organisations in Malawi; NAPHAM – National Association of People Living with HIV and AIDS in Malawi; ADRA – Adventist Development and Relief Agency.

the Thematic grants, the total number of Thematic grants issued by the Secretariat is very small and each is very different – so it is not possible to generalise given the small population size and differences between each grant. Similarly, the first Open Call and second Open Call supported such a wide range of grants that it is difficult to generalise between the relatively small numbers of grants funded under each window. The following section on comparisons between calls is therefore not as robust as the early sections. It comprises observations based on interviews with the Secretariat combined with the evidence from case studies.

139. The Tilitonse Secretariat and Board perceive the Thematic Call as more strategic and more successful compared to the Open Call.[109] The findings above suggest that two of the three Thematic Call case study grantees indeed succeeded in influencing national level government responsiveness in their focal areas (NAMISA in relation to the ATI Bill, and CMD in relation to the LGA Bill). The IIEA findings, however, suggest that Thematic Call grantees are not discernibly different from the Open Call grantees in terms of use of political economy analysis (or thinking in a politically-informed way) in the design and delivery of their projects. While formal PEA studies informed each of the Thematic Call topic areas (mining, ATI, local government) and the selection of grantees, subsequent application of political economy thinking was not noticeably different from the Open Calls. This may in part be due to a lack of mentoring support on PEA after awarding the Thematic grants (see Section 4.2); and an apparent disconnect between grantees' understanding of the concept of PEA and their ability to apply it in practice. The grantees examined for the Thematic Call case studies (NCA, CMD, NAMISA) followed some, but not all of the recommendations of the commissioned PEA studies. CMD and NAMISA have been able to form alliances/strategic partnerships for their policy influencing work, which was a recommendation from the Tilitonse PEA studies. NCA has also worked with other Tilitonse-funded projects at a local and national level, and in some areas even merged community structures with those of Action Aid to avoid duplication. However, NCA did not follow the recommendation to develop a framework for engagement between mining investors and communities in order to improve relationships at a community level. CMD were not able to systematically track expenditure of District Council activities, because they engaged political parties, which do not have a mandate to do this. NAMISA did not follow the recommendation to consider issues of inclusion in their advocacy for the ATI Bill, and did not make an effort to reach out to women or marginalised groups in the development of and advocacy for the Bill.

140. One of key aspects of the Thematic Call was the promotion of CSOs working together at local and national level. In the three Thematic Call case studies conducted by the IIEA, grantees were conducting activities at both local and national level, and there were various examples of achievements at these levels – discussed throughout the preceding section. However, there was relatively little evidence that local and national activities were 'joined up' towards higher level strategic goals – rather, the local and national components seemed relatively separate and generally involved different actors. For example, there appeared to be little connection between NAMISA's successful national-level advocacy and policy development work, and their local-level community dialogue sessions. The community dialogue sessions were also based on an implicit theory that through knowing more information about ATI, citizens would make greater demands of their MPs and this would add to pressure to pass the Bill – but this did not take account of citizen fear of repercussions, respect for authorities, and the fact that MPs are rarely in the districts and are often inaccessible to citizens. CMD successfully facilitated the process of drafting a new LGA Bill, but again there appeared to be little connection between this national level work, and CMD's work to raise citizen awareness of the roles of MPs and councillors. The NCA case study found that NCA had conducted a variety of advocacy and community-level activities in conjunction with other CSOs, but did not find

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[109] Interviews with Tilitonse Board and Secretariat, May 2016.

any evidence that the project had used these community-based activities as a basis of national level advocacy to contribute to changes in the national mining regime. Similarly, although both NAMISA and CMD supported civil society participation in their national level advocacy work, neither explicitly sought to bring *citizen* voices and views into the national components of their project.

141. The Secretariat views the CBO call as being noticeably more successful in terms of effectiveness than pervious calls.[110] Certainly many community-level changes have been identified through the IIEA analysis, as discussed above. The CBO window received additional support from the Secretariat, including a more intensified mentoring approach moving away from more academic mentors, to those with more appropriate expertise for local settings and the level of capacity of the CBOs. In its latest report the Secretariat highlights:[111]

The results in terms of achievements have surprised us so far. Although we had a few cases of weak performance, the majority of the CBOs achieved results beyond their targets. This is due to the fact that most of them are based in the project locality and understand the ensuing governance issues better and truly represent their constituencies. They also have not yet adopted the bad habits in terms of mismanagement of resources, as yet.

142. However, there is an issue of magnitude which makes the impacts of CBO and CSO grantees inherently difficult to compare. CBO grants are generally tens of thousands of pounds and run for a year in one locality, while the other grant rounds were hundreds of thousands pounds for more than one year and across more than one location. The IIEA analysis shows that it has yet to be proven that the CBO interventions (and the initial changes) will lead to ongoing changes in local government responsiveness.[112] There are many community-level changes achieved, described in the preceding section. These are a mix of CBOs intervening to resolve a particular local problem (a positive development change), with those working to set up or improve dialogue, accountability and other processes that support citizen's rights and needs being brought to government – and potentially influence prioritisation, resource allocations, budget execution and service delivery (governance changes). However, in order for these observed changes to move beyond ad-hoc pockets of very localised success, they need to be shared and replicated with other communities, as well as being embedded over the long term through stronger links with the formal and informal structures, policies and processes of local government.

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[110] Based on interviews with the Secretariat during the week of 16 May 2016, and the Annual Review 2015–16.
[111] Annual Review 2015–16, Tilitonse Secretariat, March 2016.
[112] The literature on E&A highlights concerns with sending money to smaller CBOs with strong links to citizens on the ground. This is because the money can all too easily start to distort incentives for engagement. In other words, money can become the driver for activities that were previously driven by local leaders and desire to solve collective problems.

Chapter 6.   Conclusion and Recommendations

143. This chapter collates the overall findings from the preceding chapters, and sets out recommendations for a future phase of governance programming in Malawi. The overall findings and conclusions are structured around the evaluation questions (outlined in Chapter 2.2), drawing together the overall analysis in terms of governance impacts, and the contribution and added value of Tilitonse's approach.

6.1 Overall findings and conclusions

144. **Governance impacts:**[113] The greatest contribution of Tilitonse has been at the interface between government, CSOs and citizens – instigated by grantees playing an active role in mediation and influencing efforts (outputs 2 and 3) leading to increased citizen participation and some examples of better citizen-government engagement (outcomes 1 and 2). There are, however, far fewer examples (as evidenced by the case study analysis) of a tangible governance impact, where government (often also the service provider) is responding to citizen priorities and is transparent, inclusive and accountable. In some respects, this could be viewed as something that will be achieved in a matter of time, but there are differences in the impacts against the programme's theory of change that are worth exploring further based on the empirical evidence:

145. First, there are examples of Tilitonse grantees contributing to the responsiveness of government (impact 4), and the evidence is strongest at national policy levels. From the CSO case study sample, for instance, one policy has been passed into law at the national level; and there are some other examples of policy processes where CSOs have been playing a leading role in consultation and formulation – such as CMD and its work on the LGA Bill. However, while these are notable successes and often under challenging circumstances, they are at the 'low end' of the spectrum of government responsiveness; ultimately the aim is for an impact on how government is spending its resources to better meet the needs of its citizens. Indeed, this focus on policy implementation is not mentioned by any of the CSO case study grantees – although CHREAA does mention shifts in resource allocations in prisons.

146. Second, there are examples of community-level impacts (also under impact 4), particularly drawing on the CBO case study analysis, but also based on some of the community-level work of other Tilitonse grantees (e.g. the RLCs). The evidence shows that several of these examples are more ad hoc solutions to local problems, which, while having a developmental value (e.g. SWET's work changing one-off spending decisions), are not necessarily institutionalised change that will persist after the project ends. Therefore while these offer potential, they need to be scaled up, joined together and linked to district and national-level change.

147. Third, governance impacts in relation to transparency, outreach and inclusion are more weakly evidenced (impacts 1, 2 and 3). In part, this corresponds to generally weaker specifications of objectives by grantees, as particularly evidenced in the CSO cases – and, a lesson for future support (see Box 6). Nevertheless, in terms of government transparency, there are some signs of improvements, with the contribution analysis showing that this has been achieved by Tilitonse grantees through a combination of: (i) increasing pressure from citizens and strengthening existing platforms (e.g. CCODE, CU, DCT, WfP); (ii) setting up local forums playing a role in monitoring service delivery (e.g. PACENET, DCT, SWET); and (iii) improving relationships between civil society and government at a national level (e.g. CEPA,

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[113] This relates to the evaluation question: Has the Tilitonse made a difference (had an impact)?

CHREAA, NAMISA). It is important to build on lessons from these ways of working within the context of Malawi.

148. Fourth, there is weak evidence of Tilitonse contribution to impacts in terms of outreach to citizens (impact 2). There are a few examples of improved consultation and outreach being driven by government as a result of processes supported by grantees (e.g. SWET, CCODE), with a few instances at the community-level (e.g. COVISODE, St Jude's, ECOYA, NAYIRG). These, however, tend to be isolated instances, of ADCs, VDCs, chiefs and local councillors, and so difficult to draw general conclusions on Tilitonse's contribution. Evidence of improved inclusion of women and marginalised groups (impact 3) is similarly weak: there are examples, but the synthesis of case study evidence does not find much in terms of generalisable patterns. Indeed, in terms of contribution analysis, the synthesis finds stronger evidence of general shifts towards including women, rather than anything more attributable to Tilitonse grantees.

149. **Contribution of Tilitonse:**[114] The Tilitonse fund has achieved change through the efforts of its grantees, rather than direct development activities of the programme. In this respect it is primarily a grant-making mechanism providing some additional capacity support. The overall impact is thus difficult to aggregate as it is highly disbursed across 74 grants – operating in different sectors, different parts of the country, and at different levels of government. Therefore, while there is evidence of individual grants contributing to governance change (as summarised in the previous chapter), the aggregate picture is much harder to evidence. The following analysis explains important findings from the synthesis of cases, focusing on where within the programme-level theory of change Tilitonse has made a plausible difference.

150. First, there is an important output-outcome linkage between Tilitonse grantees acting as *mediators* and *influencers* (outputs 2 and 3), and some observable changes in citizen participation (outcome 1) and the quality of engagement between citizens and government (outcome 2). There is strong evidence of grantees acting as mediators between citizens and government (e.g. CCODE, NCA, WfP, DCT, NAMISA, CHREAA, CU, SWET, DCA), including CBOs (COVISODE, ECOBO, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA). There is more limited evidence of grantees working to influence national government policy, often in collaboration with other CSOs and government stakeholders, and making use of the media to attempt to influence change (CHREAA, CMD, NAMISA, NCA, DCA). The combined effect has been strongest in terms of a contributory effect on citizen participation (outcome 1). Here, there is evidence across several case studies of a contributory cause linked to the Tilitonse grantees, although often alongside similar work of other CSOs, the support of community and traditional leaders, and the appointment of local councillors. The evidence of a linkage to a more positive engagement between civil society, citizens and government is less strong (outcome 2), though it exists across several examples (e.g. CCODE, CU, CHREAA, WfP, DCT).

151. Second, there are causal links within the programme-level theory of change where the evidence is weaker, and worthy of more attention in future interventions. This includes:

- The monitoring by civil society and citizens of policy, budget and service delivery (output 4). Self-reported evidence (from the Secretariat) shows that there have been many monitoring activities undertaken by grantees (423 monitoring initiatives undertaken). The CSO case studies consider these activities in more depth, and find weak evidence of *routine* monitoring, and particularly regular monitoring that is part of a system of improved accountability. Only two CSO cases conducted monitoring activities, but some of this was ad hoc (such as NCA's implementing partner, which did pollution monitoring

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[114] This relates to the evaluation question: e. through the funding of grantees). This also answers the evaluation question on: Can this be expected to work elsewhere? (by drawing generalisable lessons against the theory of change), although this is also picked up in the recommendations section.

twice in 2015). There was also some engagement of citizens, journalists, ADCs, TACs, etc. in monitoring activities. But, overall, the monitoring of policy implementation – particularly existing policy commitments – requires more attention in future initiatives.

- The evidence on how far Tilitonse have built CSO capability is mixed (output 1), with a greater emphasis on organisational development for CSOs, rather than ways of working than in terms of political thinking and working strategically (output 1). This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

152. Third, the work of grantees was often the continuation of work started many years earlier, with Tilitonse providing only the latest tranche of funding. This is based on both the CSO survey data, and the analysis of the individual case studies where consideration is given to the context and the role of other causal factors. Indeed, some of the work could be directly linked back to the same project many years earlier (e.g. NAMISA in 2004, CHREAA in 2009). This finding has important implications for donor-led E&A programming: in terms of both the humility and realism required about achieving governance impacts within a 3–5 year period, and of the need to view evidence and change over a longer time period. This has implications for design (see lessons and recommendations).

153. **Added value of Tilitonse:**[115] The Tilitonse programme was intended to have a contribution beyond the direct funding provided to grantees, including the 'added value' it provides compared to other resourcing that CSOs receive. The focus in this section is particularly on support provided to grantees and achievements in relation to capacity building (output 1).

154. There are mixed findings of improved capability of CSOs and CBOs, with a much stronger focus on organisational development (having robust financial management, project management and reporting systems) rather than building civil society. Based on the CSO case studies, most Tilitonse grantees were positive about the support provided, arguing that it helped them acquire skills in report writing, theories of change, documenting case studies, using the results matrix and other monitoring activities, financial management and the allocation of resources, gender and inclusion, and working in partnership. But they also cited common problems of not enough contact time with Tilitonse, training being insufficient, the need for more facilitation of interactions and learning between grantees, and technical support being provided too late. In addition, while grantees appear to have gained a greater understanding of political and power dynamics, there was a disconnect in this actually making a difference to project design and delivery. There are examples of grantees applying politically informed approaches, but it is not widespread or embedded across the CSO cases. This shift towards mentoring in the latter years (in particular) may be beginning to have results but its implementation was towards the end of the CSO grants and only reached the start of the CBOs (as outlined in Chapter 4.2).

155. Based on these conclusions, there are several lessons from the implementation of Tilitonse that have a broader applicability for similar E&A programmes in Malawi. These are summarised in Box 6 below.

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[115] This relates to the evaluation question: How has Tilitonse built the capacity of organisations? (i.e. through its support to grantees). It also partly answers the evaluation question: How has Tilitonse built the knowledge/capacity of the civil society overall?

Box 6. Lessons from the implementation of Tilitonse

This box draws together the main lessons from Tilitonse, many of which would be useful for other similar programmes working on empowerment and accountability in Malawi. The lessons are based on the evidence presented in the preceding chapters.

- **Mentoring and accompaniment is important to prioritise from the start.** Findings show that the latter years of Tilitonse are beginning to be more effective in building capacity, and this has been through a strengthened mentoring approach – drawing on a core pool of individual mentors.

- **Redressing the balance between CSO organisational development and building citizen / government capability.** While sound financial and project management is important for donor accountability, the lesson is that much more support is needed to build 'ways of working' (facilitation of processes, thinking and acting politically, partnering in strategic ways, forming alliances, etc.).

- **Sufficient focus on policy implementation.** Notable successes of Tilitonse relate more to policy-making processes (at the national level) or solutions to local problems (community-level), with weaker evidence of the effectiveness of routine monitoring of existing policy commitments.

- **Ensuring sufficient time/resources for developing governance aspects of the programme**. Running a grant-making mechanism requires a lot of work, and creates its own momentum around issuing calls, reviewing applicants, selection, fund disbursement, supervision and reporting. While more was done on sharing lessons, knowledge and communications in the latter years, it is the governance aspects that require particular investment (e.g. responding to changing circumstances, connecting different interventions in the policy cycle, working in areas where there is traction, thinking and acting politically, etc.).

- **Better connecting national-level work with the district and community levels (and vice versa).** While some grants attempted to do this within a single grant (with mixed success), there is a lesson about the programme playing a more active role in connecting different interventions working on different parts of the policy-making / policy implementation cycle. This would increase the strategic value of the programme beyond a collection of different projects.

- **Being realistic and specific on governance objectives.** In particular, the case studies show that grantees were particularly vague in their impact objectives to improve transparency, inclusion and outreach. Vague objectives meant that they often found it difficult to evidence change in these areas, and it is was harder to use evidence to improve effectiveness.

- **Operationalising systematic ways of documenting governance change, as it is often difficult to specify governance results *ex ante*.** The experience of implementing the Results Frameworks, and the challenges around monitoring and evaluation, is not unusual for many E&A programmes. The Results Tracker (and to some extent the GMIS) began to offer ways forward for systematically harvesting results, and evidencing incremental change on an ongoing basis.

6.2 Recommendations for future programme design and implementation

156. Following on from the conclusions above, the following section provides a set of recommendations for a future programme and other work on governance in Malawi. At present, the current Tilitonse programme has been extended, with a new round of funding to grantees. This has been provided to ensure some continuity during a transition period, while a locally registered foundation[116] is being setup. The design of this new foundation is being led by the European Commission, with the view to establishing the foundation in early 2017. In addition, DFID-Malawi are in the process of designing a new accountability programme, which is likely to provide some support to the newly setup foundation. The design for this programme is likely to be ready in late 2016 or early 2017. With this in mind, consideration should be given to recommendations, which are grouped into two main areas:

157. The findings show that while there have been some examples of success (such as in terms of the responsiveness of government), the impacts are not as strong in other impact areas. This first set of recommendations considers ways to enhance the overall impact of a governance programme such as Tilitonse.

- **Recommendation 1a. Strategically cluster support, particularly around mutual problem solving.** The strategic starting point should be about government and citizens working together in mutually beneficial ways to bring about better services – therefore grounded from the outset in *what is possible*, rather than *what is desirable* in an ideal world. The Tilitonse grant windows funded many different grantees to do many different things, dispersed widely by policy reform area, sector, level of government, size of intervention and so on. This design meant that at the end of Tilitonse, the overarching results are more a collection of examples than a coherent aggregation of different interventions designed to complement each other. For example, there are some community-level examples with potential (e.g. from the CBO round), but these are not linked to district or national processes. Impact is likely to be greater where there is traction for change, and where support is clustered around a particular issues or problems, addressing different parts of the policy-making / implementation cycle. In this way it will be possible to encourage 'vertical' and 'horizontal' linkages, enabling scale-up of effective approaches, and effective synergies between national-level advocacy and community-level priorities and experiences.

- **Recommendation 1b. Increase 'evaluability' and impact by focusing evidence collection on *parts* of the programme, rather than pursue an 'aggregation' of the whole.** This requires evidence gathering (research, evaluation, learning) to be better able to influence impact, with a more direct relevance for programme decision-makers to learn, adapt and scale-up. Realistically, most large multi-donor programmes such as Tilitonse are overly complex because of the multiple interests that shape programme design and implementation. The way the Tilitonse programme was configured did not lend itself to being easily evaluated – with Open Calls financing very diffuse interventions, several changes around the number and type of calls, the introduction of new calls late in the programme (e.g. CBOs) and so on. Therefore, rather than attempt to make the whole programme more 'evaluable', resources would be better focused on supporting a handful of 'testable' interventions in context. Evidence gathering could then be used to incrementally accumulate of evidence of 'what works and under what circumstances' so that it is both useful for management within the programme lifespan, as well as for policy

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[116] This builds on recommendations from the Mid-term Review of Tilitonse, and follows a similar model to the Zambia Governance Foundation. See: www.zambiagovernance.org

makers over a longer time horizon (i.e. not just every 3–5 years of a donor funding cycle, but rather over decades of development in Malawi).

158. This second set of recommendations is based on the way the fund is managed, and the weaker evidence on capacity support and the added value provided by Tilitonse to grantees.

- **Recommendation 2a. Support partners to think and work politically – not doing PEA as a separate exercise, but through ongoing practical mentoring that deals with the political economy as a 'live issue'.** While Tilitonse has been moving in this direction, it is important to build on this from the start of a programme's implementation. This approach requires providing capacity support through mentoring delivered as ongoing accompaniment to civil society actors – creating space for partners to respond to opportunity and momentum, to look at the bigger picture and understand where they fit in. As such, there is a need to focus much more effort on strategic and political 'ways of working', with less focus on building CSOs and more on building the capability of citizens and civil society.

- **Recommendation 2b. Shift the monitoring (and learning) around governance results to better support adaptive programming.** This requires flexibility in the M&E system so it is not reporting against pre-set objectives (e.g. fixed results frameworks, standard indicators), but instead is about the more incremental documenting of evidence – around governance outcomes, such as shifts in power relations. Given the intrinsic nature of governance change (contextualised, multiple causes, and political), monitoring approaches need to shift away from a 'plan-and-implement' culture to more flexible monitoring approaches that systematically capture change.[117] The GMIS in its latter stages, and the Results Tracker, began to point to better ways of systematically capturing evidence over time, but there is still a need to better link this to decision making and the prioritisation of staff effort and support of interventions.

- **Recommendation 2c. Think carefully about the use of programme funds, including the potentially distorting effects[118] of grants on sustainable processes of citizen engagement.** Tilitonse is viewed by many grantees as primarily a funding agency, especially given that the learning approach and much of the capacity support do not seem to have had the impact that might have been expected – and as a consequence, grantees have generally continued to do what they have already done for some time. To change the way people operate, this may require taking the money off the table (not using money as the driver of activities), and instead using funds to catalyse citizen-government engagement that has the potential to take on a life of its own. It is likely to require more flexibility for the provision of non-financial support to civil society – such as facilitating others, mentoring support, lesson learning, and convening.

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[117] For example monitoring approaches that focus more on logging incremental change and accompanying evidence, such as a suite of methodologies around outcome harvesting, participatory impact pathways, network mapping, political change diaries etc.

[118] This is described as a 'potentially distorting effect' as evidence is not strong of a systematic/widespread distorting effect under Tilitonse, although there are some examples from the CSO cases around a reliance on allowances to gain government participation. The literature also points to a distorting effect.

Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

Below is the original Terms of Reference for the IIEA. Please note that this needs to be read in conjunction with the IIEA's Inception Report, as many aspects of the ToR were further specified and agreed during this period. For example, the ToR states that the evaluation questions will be developed during the inception period, and so these are only specified in the Inception Report.

Civil Society Governance Fund - Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA)

Terms of Reference

1.1   Introduction

1.1.1   DFID, EU, Norway and Irish Aid are jointly establishing a Fund to support Malawi's Civil Society in its efforts to improve governance- especially elements of accountability, responsiveness and inclusion. Through improvements to the governance context the Fund hopes to have a positive impact on service delivery, poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. The Civil Society Governance Fund (CSGF) will run for an initial four years from September 2011 – August 2015 with the possibility of an extension of up to three years. The overall pool to be used for grants will be in the region of £7.2 million with the possibility of additional donor funds also coming on board.

1.1.2   DFID, on behalf of its partners (EU, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Irish Aid), wish to appoint an Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA) to evaluate and document the outcomes of specific projects supported by the CSGF, the impact of the CSGF as a whole and the appropriateness of the mechanism, and to identify and share best practice within programme partners. This contract is expected to run for an initial 4 years from January 2012 – December 2015, including a 6 month inception period. There will also be the possibility of an extension of up to three years.

1.1.3   Both Malawian and international institutions are invited to bid for this contract with a preference that a consortium is established to deliver this work.

1.2   Objective

1.2.1   The objective of this contract is to evaluate and document the impact of the Civil Society Governance Fund in its aim to improve the accountability, inclusion and responsiveness of Malawian governance through increased citizen engagement. This includes outcomes of supported projects, appropriateness of support mechanisms and overall impact of the CSGF.

1.3   Recipient

1.3.1   The recipient of the services is DFID (on behalf of the funding development partners) .

1.4   Civil Society Governance Fund - Draft Programme Results Framework

1.4.1   The overall impact of the CSGF is "Governance in Malawi is increasingly inclusive, accountable and responsive to citizens".

1.4.2   The outcomes we hope to achieve are "Citizens engaged in participatory governance processes and able to hold decision-makers and duty-bearers to account over social inclusion, political rights and delivery of basic services".

1.4.3   The Terms of Reference for this programme, the draft Results Framework and Theory of Change are attached. These documents, and the exact results expected, will be further defined and finalised by the IIEA, with support from the CSGF managing agent, in the inception phase, and agreed with the management board.

1.4.4   Currently the CSGF has 4 programme outputs:

Output 1: Civil society initiatives promote transparent, accountable and responsive governance

Possible Specific sub-results:

-         Citizens are well informed about public matters and are willing and able to hold the state accountable.

-         Citizens provide input into budget processes, discussions and monitor allocation, expenditure and results.

-         Citizens are aware of their rights and the roles of their representatives and are confident to claim their rights and exercise their responsibilities.

-         MPs are held accountable for their legislative performance.

-         Political parties aggregate and articulate citizens' interests in political programmes.

-         Political and campaign finance increasingly transparent and civil society able to monitor

-         A free and balanced media informs citizens and holds government to account, and facilitates public debate.

-         Increased demand for transparency and accountability on the allocation and use of resources by government.

-         Civil society organisations strengthen their internal accountability mechanisms and become more transparent in their operations.

-         More evidence-based policy-making, based on civil society inputs.

Output 2: Civil Society supports citizens to promote social inclusion

Possible Specific sub-results:

-         Disabled people increasingly aware of their rights to services and able to access them

-         Women and other excluded groups (definition to be agreed during inception phase) increasingly involved in local decision-making processes

-         Women and excluded groups have increased access to financial services

-         Groups representing women and other excluded groups increasingly able to represent their views at local, district and national level

-         Groups representing women and other excluded groups increasingly able to influence policy processes and resource allocation, and track expenditure

-         Change in attitude and behaviour of mainstream population in relation to the rights of excluded groups

 Output 3: Civil society supports citizens to hold service providers to account for service delivery performance

Possible Specific sub-results:

-         Citizens well informed about the operation of local services and willing and able to demand services and hold providers accountable

-         Citizens able to form local users groups and create positive relationships with local service providers to improve services

-         Citizens able to feed back views on service provision to local, district and national level decision-makers

-        Citizens able to influence policy development and resource allocation

-        Citizens able to access and understand information about local services, including budget information and key challenges to improve their operation

-        Local service delivery improved through citizen action

Output 4: Capable, accountable and responsive civil society organisations able to build coalitions with others

Possible specific sub-results:

-        Civil society increasingly accountable to beneficiaries

-        Civil society capacity to deliver results is increased

-        Civil society works with state actors and local communities to improve social services

-        Civil society works with private sector and trader's associations to improve neighbourhood security/environment and sanitation etc

-        Civil society brings together a range of actors from outside civil society to engage on social inclusion

1.5   Scope of Work

1.5.1   The CSGF itself will be run through a Management Agent, appointed through an international competitive tendering process, which is currently underway.

1.5.2   The CSGF Independent Impact Evaluation Agent (IIEA) will be responsible for the evaluation of (i) project level outcomes, (ii) the impact of the portfolio (and therefore the CSGF) as a whole and (iii) the appropriateness of the support mechanism (e.g capacity building, grant-making etc) in aiding the achievement of impact. It will also be expected to play a knowledge management role, sharing best practice with partners, and along with the Board will keep the CSGF focused on the delivery of results.

1.5.3   Key deliverables include:

-        Design and implementation of an evaluation strategy and plan to achieve the three aspects of this scope of work (project outcomes; CSGF impact; and appropriateness of mechanism)

-        Develop and apply methodologies and tools for measuring some indicators of impact/results, as found in the results framework and agreed with management board and CSGF managing agent (possible examples might be tools for measuring level of social inclusion; citizen action; legislative and policy changes; community input to budget; acceptance/inclusion of disabled people; civil society capacity and legitimacy; service delivery satisfaction and improvement etc)

-        A clear and realistic strategy for analysis and dissemination of evidence gathered, contributing to on-going improvements in projects supported, the way the mechanism is operated and the development of a stronger evidence base for future governance interventions in Malawi

-        Provide on-going assistance to those developing projects for the CSGF and grant recipients to support them in project design in order to ensure they have appropriate results frameworks, are able to monitor and gather useful data and build into projects the opportunity for robust evaluation with realistic levels of attribution e.g use of randomisation techniques

-        Annual work plans and budgets which will deliver these Terms of Reference and help the fund achieve its purpose

-        Design and commission national baseline, mid-point and end point public opinion (and other) surveys on issues the project aims to impact

-        The opportunity for the commissioning and co-ordination of two randomised control trials will be considered during the inception phase, and should be added as a separate component of any bid for these ToRs, indicating additional costs etc

-        Undertake/Commission evaluations (appropriate to the scale of project investment) of a sample of projects in the portfolio

-        Develop lessons-learning papers for use by the CSGF and its partners to improve the impact of its work

-        Analysis of the portfolio composition in terms of:

o   Spread of risk

o   The three result areas (outlined above)

o   Value for money/cost-benefit analysis

o   Geographical balance

-        Disaggregation of all results possible so that the differential impact on different groups, including men, women, girls and boys are better understood

-        Report to the Board on the findings of their work and make actionable and prioritized annual recommendations on how the programme could improve its overall impact

1.5.4   Throughout the programme, the Independent Impact Evaluation Agent will be required to:

-        Develop and operate an appropriate management structure to enable an on-the-ground presence, interaction with the CSGF grantees, management agent and management board, and the undertaking, sub-contracting and oversight of independent evaluations as per the agreed evaluation strategy and plan, maintaining sufficient flexibility to scale-up in response to additional funding

-        Attend meetings of the Management Board and advise on the performance of the CSGF and its projects, the opportunities to pursue new thematic priorities and necessary modifications to selection criteria and processes of the CSGF mechanism, to ensure outcome achievement and maximise impact

-        Take responsibility for: selection, recruitment, terms of reference and assignment definition, contracting and organising the assignments of any short and long term consultants, trainers, local capacity development service providers, seminar/workshop leaders, participants and mentors.

-        Pursue value for money by avoiding duplication, using data from other sources and working with others wherever possible

-        Undertake additional relevant tasks as agreed with the Management Board.

1.5.5   The IIEA will be required to successfully complete a six month inception phase (December 2011 – May 2012) for the programme during which time they will:

-        work with the CSGF managing agent and the Board to finalise the draft results framework and theory of change;

-        work with management board, managing agent and a wider selection of stakeholders to set and agree evaluation questions;

-        develop a detailed evaluation and knowledge management strategy and plan to be agreed with the Board;

-        and gather data and where necessary design and conduct baseline surveys.

Progress to full implementation will be dependent on the successful agreement of this strategy and completion of the inception phase.

1.5.6   The programme will be a multi-donor pooled fund that is co-managed by DFID, EU and Norway and Irish Aid. New funding from existing or new partners may come on stream - and into the pool - during implementation. The Independent Impact Evaluation Agent will need to provide clear indication that they are able to respond to such a scale up, which may also include new areas of emphasis.

1.6   Methodology

1.6.1   The bidders will need to develop and submit a methodology to achieve these ToRs. However it is expected that successful bidders must display the following:

-        the capacity to successfully co-ordinate multiple, concurrent evaluations within Malawi, in a strategic manner. These do not necessarily need be implemented directly by this service provider, but could be sub-contracted to other providers;

-        expertise in the successful application of both in-depth qualitative and quantitative approaches to evaluation;

-        excellent understanding of the existing availability of data to create baselines and the periodic exercises already taking place to measure changes in the area of governance in Malawi (e.g Afrobarometer, Government-led initiatives, NSO programming etc);

-        the analytical capacity to draw implications from evaluation findings, developing robust suggestions for improvements in the fund's approach;

-        an in-depth understanding of the challenges and emerging innovative methodologies applied to measuring results of governance interventions, especially those relating to initiatives in empowerment, transparency and accountability;

-        the ability to build relationships with a number of different stakeholders

-        the expertise to be an effective broker of knowledge within Malawi, ensuring evaluation lessons and information are shared widely but sensitively;

-        the ability to design an evaluation strategy that represents good value-for-money and shows an understanding of how efficiencies can be achieved by one service provider undertaking evaluation over the lifetime of a programme;

-        and, as far as possible, the IIEA will align the Fund baseline and indicators to the national democratic accountability sub-sector framework in Malawi (currently under preparation), and contribute towards the inclusion of civil society perspectives in this framework.

1.7   Programme Management Arrangements

1.7.1   Both the CSGF Management Agent and the Independent Impact Evaluation Agent will be overseen by the Management Board, which will be made up of funding partners and local Malawian representatives, as well as the CSGF managing agent and IIEA in an observing capacity. Specific functions of the Board include:

-        Ultimate responsibility for the performance of the CSGF and its overall impact;

-        Reviewing reports and work-plans from the IIEA, making changes where necessary;

-        Receiving and reviewing regular reports from the IIEA, asking for clarifications where necessary;

-        Strategy setting for overall Fund, including agreeing its evaluation strategy, ensuring the fund continues to respond effectively to changes in the political context, that the evaluation strategy remains appropriate to the interventions and that the results framework/theory of change is reflective of CSGF work and planned evaluations;

-        Investing in creating political cover for the Fund by publishing its work and keeping government informed of developments with the Fund; and

-        Commissioning annual reviews of the Fund to assess the achievements at output level; their contribution to the Fund purpose; and the success of both Management and Independent Evaluation arrangements.

1.7.2   The Independent Impact Evaluation Agent will report to DFID, who will ensure the Management Board have access to all relevant documents.

1.7.3   The IIEA will also have to develop a good working relationship with the Managing Agent for the CSGF. Both parties will report to DFID and be answerable to the Management Board. However they will be required to work together on a day-to-day basis, and develop clear mechanisms for managing this relationship. The specific "ways of working" will be agreed during the inception phase, but will have to take note of the below, among other matters.

o   The need to work together during the overlap of their inception phases to suggest to the MB and agree a final version of the results framework and theory of change

o   The need to maintain an on-going relationship to enable the IIEA to work with CSGF grantees to help quality assure their M&E strategies

o   The need to work with CSGF to agree specific projects to undertake more thorough evaluation of, as per their evaluation strategy and plans, and identify projects which might be suitable for randomised control trials and other impact evaluation methodologies

o   The need to share information on what works and what doesn't in achieving the CSGF goals, and create ways in which to ensure civil society take this on-board in their work and their proposals

1.8   Timeframe

1.8.1   The selected Independent Impact Evaluation Agent is expected to be available to commence work by December 2011. The contract will run for four years to match the four year duration of the Fund. There will be the opportunity to negotiate an extra 3 years, depending on performance, availability of funding and continuing need. The IIEA contract will start and end slightly later than the CSGF management agent (which will run from September 2011 to August 2015), to reflect the need to complete end-line and other evaluation survey work. The fund will have a 6 month inception phase (September 2011-February 2012) which will have a 3 month overlap with the IIEA inception phase (December 2011- May 2012), allowing for partners to get final agreement of results framework, evaluation plans and strategy, as well as how to manage collaborative working.

1.8.2   As with all DFID contracts there will be routine review points. These may signal a restructuring of the timeframe, or the scale or scope of work in a particular area.

1.9   Reporting

1.9.1   At the end of the inception phase the Independent Impact Evaluation Agent will prepare an Inception Report (in a format agreed with DFID). The report will set out the results and findings from all inception activities as well as incorporate the proposed priorities and work programmes; programme budget; management budget; any commentary required on specific issues especially any that differ from the original Technical Proposal. If necessary, the Terms of Reference should be updated/revised in the light of inception phase analysis and planning.

1.9.2   In addition to the Inception Report, the following reports will be prepared and copied to the Board for comments:

-        Evaluation strategy, framework and plan for the duration of the CSGF.

-        Annual work plans, procurement plans and budgets. These will be approved by the Management Board.

-       Quarterly Progress Reports against delivery of these plans, especially at activity and output levels, shall be submitted to the Board in an agreed format.

1.9.3   Mandatory financial reports:

-       Annual forecast of expenditures (the budget) disaggregated monthly – for the financial year April to March. This should be updated at least every 6 months

-       Six-monthly comparison of budget with actual expenditure

-       External audit report on the annual financial statements

1.9.4   These financial reports will present data by output as well as by type of expenditures (such as grants, training, workshops, consultancies etc). The detailed requirements will be agreed with DFID and the Management Board during the inception phase.

1.9.5   The Management Board will undertake:

-       An inception review within 6 months of award of contract;

-       Annual reviews thereafter;

-       A full mid-term review; and

-       A final evaluation at least 3 months before the end of the project

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Annex 3. IIEA Indicators

Broadly speaking, the IIEA impact indicators concern action by **government or service providers targeted by grantees**, while the outcome indicators concern action by **grantees/CSOs**. 'government/service providers' may include national or district level government actors, but also local official service providers such as police, Water Boards and health facilities. The impact and outcome indicators and sub-indictors are as follows:

Impact indicator 1: Equitability, transparency, and inclusiveness of institutions targeted for change in funded project. This indicator relates to *governmental* activities and behaviour. It refers to the *processes* of governmental engagement with citizens, i.e. the ways in which the government/official bodies are reaching out to hear the views of citizens, and the efforts it is making to facilitate citizen engagement.

The sub-indicators are:

1.1. **Transparency:** how far the government/other official body is transparent about its decision-making processes and how far information is made available to citizens, for example through the media.
1.2. **Citizen outreach:** how far the government/other official body makes efforts to reach out to citizens, find out their views, and incorporate them into policy making and service provision.
1.3. **Inclusion:** how far the government/other official body makes efforts to include women and marginalised groups (such as people with disabilities; people living with HIV/AIDS; youth; elderly people) in outreach activities, and in targeted services/policies/plans.

Impact indicator 4: Performance in service delivery around selected themes and issues. This indicator relates to **governmental** activities and behaviour. It is about government's *responsiveness* to citizens, focusing on the ways in which target government agencies at the national, district, or service provider level have responded to citizens' views in designing their policies and plans, in setting their budgets, and in providing services. Consideration of government responsiveness involves a secondary consideration of how well the government **performs** in its policy making and implementation, its allocation of resources, and its provision of services. Performance is only relevant to this indicator insofar as **improved performance is a result of the government responding to citizens' interests and demands** (although IIEA will also note any examples of improvements in performance that do not appear to be a result of increased responsiveness).

The sub-indicators are:

4.1. Changes to target government's policies
4.2. Changes to target government's budgets and resource allocations
4.3. Changes to target government's delivery of services

Outcome indicator 4: Quality of engagement between civil society and government around funded projects. This indicator refers to **grantee and CSO** activities and behaviour**.** It relates to the *intermediary role of grantees* and their partner CSOs in facilitating constructive and effective engagement between citizens and target government agencies.

The sub-indicators are:

a.   Grantee/CSO use of PEA to inform decision making. '**Political Economy Analysis'**[119] does not necessarily imply a formal PEA exercise; although for some grantees this would be helpful. It is instead primarily about:

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[119] PEA "*focuses on how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, and the implications for development outcomes. It gets beneath the formal structures to reveal the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or frustrate change*" DFID Political Economy Analysis How-To Note.

- Valuing and improving grantees'/civil society partners' *own* political analysis (formal or informal) and their understanding of power dynamics.

- Building this analysis into grantees' strategic (long-term) and everyday decision making (who to work with, over what issue, and how, in order to achieve the most change).

- Identifying issues to work on where there is at least some government buy-in and likely win-wins between government interests and citizen priorities. These include issues and processes where citizens' engagement can help the government achieve its goals – pushing against open (rather than closed) doors.

b. Grantee/CSO use of strategic partnerships to increase access and influence. '**Strategic partnerships**' are about grantees choosing relationships carefully – not just working with organisations doing roughly similar things. A strategic partnership is about:

- Partners' goals being clearly aligned so that partners are working towards the same end goal, even if their ways of getting there are very different.

- Partners contributing complementary knowledge, contacts, and credibility, i.e. grantees *contributing* to partnerships as well as *gaining* from them.

- Partners being able to achieve more collectively than they can alone such that partners should not duplicate each other's work, but rather add something extra.

c. Grantees/CSOs playing an effective mediation role between citizens and target government agencies. Activities relevant to this sub-indicator are about the **interface** between citizens and government, for example through processes and platforms that bring together citizen voices, experiences, and concerns with government representatives. This relates both to grantees' **downwards** role in engaging, informing, and facilitating citizens to engage with government and grantees' **upwards** role in influencing and monitoring government. It is worth reflecting here on the links between this outcome sub-indicator and the Tilitonse outputs, which the IIEA is not primarily responsible for measuring:

- Tilitonse output 2, *improving citizen access to information*, relates to **downwards engagement**.
- Tilitonse outputs 3 and 4, *CSO monitoring* and *CSO influencing*, relate to **upwards engagement**.
- Tilitonse outcome 4 sub-indicator 3 is about the **interface** between citizens and government, e.g. through processes and platforms that bring together citizen voices, experiences, and concerns with government representatives. Therefore relevant activities **bring together upwards and downwards engagement.**

The case studies have adopted the approach of examining both upwards and downwards engagement in making an assessment of the situation at baseline, even if this does not reflect true mediation between citizens and government. This should provide a benchmark for CSO achievements in mediation later.

Figure 2. Links between civil society, citizens and government (outcome indicator 4)

Annex 4. Overview of the Theory of Change

159. This annex sets out the programme-level ToC in detail. It is this 'theory' that provides a basis for generalising from the empirical data collected in the CSO and CBO case studies, the CSO survey, and other monitoring and documentary evidence. This annex focuses on the outputs (what was delivered to and by the grantees), outcomes (responses or behaviour change by citizens and other stakeholders, as a consequence of these outputs), and impacts (changes in government attitudes and behaviour, such as increased transparency and inclusiveness).

160. Despite adjustments to the logframe indicators, the ToC underlying the programme has remained largely unchanged for the period under evaluation. This ToC is described by the Secretariat as follows:

> *Our Theory of Change states that increased levels of citizen voice, action, and interaction with government, private sector and like-minded interest groups, can create increased responsiveness in duty bearers and power holders leading to greater social inclusion, increased accountability and improved delivery of basic services. Tilitonse seeks to provide a platform for improving inclusivity, accountability and responsiveness in governance in Malawi through strengthened citizen voice.*

161. Tilitonse has ToCs operating on at least at two levels. First, there is the *programme-level ToC* which encapsulates how the programme intends to deliver governance changes. Then, there are the individual *grantee's ToCs,* which, although they vary considerably in their articulation, are meant to show how change will occur as a consequence of a specific set of activities working within a particular context. With a grant facility like Tilitonse, the extent to which the *grantee's ToCs* are sub-sets of the *programme-level ToC* is generally more limited due to the greater agency given to each funded organisation (particularly for the Open Calls).

162. For the evaluation, the programme's ToC provides the 'mid-range theory'[120] against which to test and assess particular causal contributions to achieving effectiveness and impact. At endline, the IIEA revisited Tilitonse's original ToC and refined it into a model that encompasses the IIEA indicators more clearly, ensured that output-level changes are distinct from higher level changes, and avoided ambiguous wording. This enabled precise coding and contribution analysis, while remaining as true as possible to the original design (for further details of the original, see below). The IIEA version of the Tilitonse ToC remains true to the original, but simply provides a more precise, evaluable description.[121]

Output-level changes

163. The output-level change is about the programme's deliverables and about changes in grantee and partner CSOs' activities and capabilities. It is about what CSOs do (differently) as a result of the funding and support received from Tilitonse. The programme aimed to deliver four core outputs: (i) an improvement in civil society capability; (ii) CSOs acting as mediators between citizens and government; (iii) upward engagement by CSOs to influence government, and (iv) monitoring of policy, budgets and service delivery. These are explained in more detail below:

- **Enhanced civil society capability** (e.g. using PEA thinking and creating strategic partnerships). This relates to the knowledge and skills grantees have acquired and applied as a result of Tilitonse capacity building and mentorship. This includes the use of PEA to

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[120] Defined here as a theory that links grand, overarching social theory (from the literature) to the specifics of this programme design and the empirical evidence. The mid-range theory provides an overall basis against which to gather evidence, assess contributions of the programme and generalise (Merton, 1968; George and Bennett, 2004).

[121] This a slightly amended version of the original and was shared and discussed with the Tilitonse Secretariat during meetings held in Lilongwe during the week of 16 May 2016. An opportunity was also given for email feedback so that any adjustments could be made. None was received.

inform their project strategies and select strategic partnerships, as well as CSOs' knowledge and skills in terms of working with / targeting marginalised groups.

- **Civil society act as effective mediators between citizens and government** (e.g. to improve access to information). This change relates to CSOs acting as a mediator between citizens and government, to help citizens engage with and make demands of relevant government departments and officials. This includes 'downwards engagement' (e.g. CSOs' activities to provide information to and train citizens in order to be better able to engage with government and claim their rights).

- **Civil society takes action to influence government policies, strategy and resource allocation**. This is about 'upwards engagement', rather than mediation between citizens and government. It is about the actions CSOs have taken to influence government.

- **Civil society monitors and facilitates citizens to monitor policy, budgets and service delivery**. This relates to CSOs' activities to monitor the implementation of government policies, allocation of resources and provisions of services. It also relates to CSOs' work to help citizens to monitor government services.

Outcome-level changes

164. The outcome level reflects changes that are envisaged when civil society capacity increases, when CSOs act as effective mediators, when they take action to influence government, and when they monitor government, budgets and service delivery. This includes changes influenced by grantees in what citizens do; the quality of their influence on CSO and government decision making; and improvements in the quality of interaction between government, citizens, CSOs and other actors (e.g. the private sector). It is about how Tilitonse grantees contribute to a changed power relationship and influence between duty bearers (government) and rights holders (citizens), and between citizens, government, and other actors. Outcome-level changes are defined in terms of:

- **Citizens participating in and influencing decision making**. This is about citizens' direct engagement with government, as a result of the mediation efforts of CSOs. It includes citizens making demands of government to claim their rights.

- **More positive engagement between civil society, citizens and government**. This is about changes in the quality of engagement between CSOs, citizens and government. It incorporates 'early signs' of government responsiveness, as a direct result of CSO and citizen engagement – i.e. changes in attitudes and early behaviour change e.g. government listening more to demands. It does not yet incorporate responsiveness in the form of systematic government level change.

- **Cooperative working between CSOs and private sector, involving excluded groups**. This is about CSOs' engagement with the private sector in order to maximise their influence on government.

Impact-level changes

165. The impact level reflects changes in government and in government service provider activities and behaviour. This includes responses by government and service providers (usually also government) to citizen demands, such as noticeable changes in government policy, budgets, expenditure and in the targeting, timeliness and quality of government-provided services. It also includes more institutional shifts, such as increased transparency, outreach to citizens and inclusion by government officials and associated service providers. These governance impacts are focused primarily on improvements in transparency, accountability and the responsiveness of government actors/bodies to citizens' priorities and rights. In the Tilitonse ToC, these impacts were defined in terms of:

- **Improved government transparency and citizen access to information.** This is about how far target government departments, officials and service providers are transparent in their decision-making processes and how far information is made available to citizens, for example through the media.

- **Improved government outreach to citizens.** This relates to how far target government departments, officials and service providers make efforts to reach out to citizens, find out their views, and incorporate these into policy making and service provision.

- **Improved government inclusion and recognition of women and marginalised groups.** This is about how far target government departments, officials and service providers make efforts to include women and marginalised groups (such as people with disabilities; people living with HIV/AIDS; youth; elderly people) in outreach activities, and in targeted services/policies/plans.

- **Improved responsiveness of policies, resource allocations and services**. This relates to government's responsiveness to citizens, focusing on the ways in which target government agencies at the national, district, or service provider level have responded to citizens' views in designing their policies and plans, in setting their *budgets, and in providing services*.

Figure 3. Revised ToC diagram

Original Tilitonse ToC

The original Tilitonse theory of change started with CSOs using Tilitonse grants for activities aimed at:

- Enhancing capacity of CSOs to enable citizens, particularly poor and excluded groups, to claim their rights;

- Improving access to information on rights, entitlements and responsibilities, particularly for poor and excluded citizens;

- Improving the monitoring by Malawian organisations of government policy and budget commitments, service delivery and public resource management;

- Improving the engagement of Malawian organisations in influencing policies, strategies and resource allocations at local and national levels.

These programme **outputs** are then achieved via:

- CSOs working with interest groups with influence, such as middle classes, businesses (private sector) and religious organisations;

- CSOs working to enable interaction of these more powerful groups with poor people, focused on linking groups with poor people around issues of mutual positive interest.

This involves working with a range of actors in a variety of forums. Achievement of the outputs also implies a number of stated assumptions:

- that resources are available for monitoring of governmental activities;

- freedom of expression of the press.

The aim is that these outputs lead to CSOs effectively positioning themselves in an intermediary role in order to achieve the **intermediate outcomes** of:

- More positive engagement between CSOs and citizens;

- More positive engagement between CSOs and government;

- Cooperative working between CSOs and the private sector involving excluded groups. Together, it is expected that these contribute to achieving the overarching outcome of strengthening citizens' voice in achieving more inclusive, accountable, and responsive governance.

Achieving these outcomes is expected to lead to **intermediate impacts** of:

- More equitable, transparent, and inclusive rules of the game around selected themes and issues;

- Changes in power relations around selected themes and issues;

- Impact on service delivery around selected themes and issues.

Figure 4. Original ToC diagram

Detailed description of refinements to the original theory of change

In refining the original description of the Tilitonse theory of change, there were two adjustments made to the wording at the output level. First, the second output was adjusted away from simply the provision of information ("*Improving citizenship access to information: increased media coverage and access to information*") to reflect all changes relating to civil society acting as mediators between citizens and government. This was based partly on the evidence collected through the IIEA case studies, which showed that grantees involved citizens in different ways, and the 'provision of information' was just one aspect of this work. Plus, the change that results in citizens' gaining access to information (in contrast to the output-level 'provision of information' by CSOs) is anyway encompassed in the impact-level change relating to transparency, which reflects a higher level change. Similarly, the original third output-level change ("*Influencing by CSOs – policy, strategy and resource allocation influenced by CSOs*") was already encompassed at the outcome level. Therefore, this output was rephrased to better reflect actions by CSOs to influence government policies (i.e. rather than the resultant outcome-level change as a consequence of this influence).

There were also a number of alterations at the impact level.

1. All the impact indicators now align exactly with the IIEA indicators, and sub-indicators (as detailed in Annex 3). For evaluative purposes, the IIEA has split out transparency, outreach and inclusiveness; and grouped together the three responsiveness sub-indicators – this is based on experience from the data collected through the case studies, as reality shows that these changes often overlap.
2. Vague terms including 'rules of the game' and 'changes in power relations' have been taken out, as although these are often used in political economy research, it is not clear what exactly this terms refers to in terms of specific impact-level changes – and furthermore there are no clear indicators in the Tilitonse logframe to guide a more precise interpretation.
3. The IIEA has taken out the impact and outcome statements from the original Tilitonse ToC, as they are already contained within the 'intermediate' outcomes and 'intermediate impacts' and are indeed summaries of these statements. And the IIEA has added in some feedback loops, as the IIEA methodology paper highlights the 'multiple, non-linear causal pathways' of governance changes.
4. In the original ToC changes in transparency, outreach and inclusiveness are on the same level as changes in policies, plans, services, budgets.

It is not clear whether Tilitonse envisaged that the former will come before the latter – they are indicated to be mutually reinforcing, parallel processes. The idea of two levels of impacts, with 8, 9 and 10 feeding into 11, is reflected in the logframe, which states: "*institutional change will often be the necessary pre-condition for improved service delivery*" and "*the ultimate impact of Tilitonse – improved service delivery*". The evaluation methodology paper raises the possibility of two potential 'levels' of institutional change: change in targeted policies, plans, services; and 'more systemic institutional change in governance in Malawi'. The revised ToC groups them separately to show this distinction, but makes no explicit assumption about whether they occur in parallel or in sequence, but rather this is explored through the empirical data.

Annex 5. Summary of High-level Findings and Strength of Evidence

Key findings	CSO case study evidence (key patterns analysed across case data[122])	CBO case study evidence (key patterns analysed across case data[1])	CSO survey	Other evidence (Secretariat, GMIS, project evaluations)
Output 2. There are many examples of grantees acting as mediators between citizens and government through creating spaces and platforms to facilitate dialogue (output 2) HIGH	In 11 CSO case studies, grantees aimed to engage citizens and mediate between them and the government (CCODE, NCA, WfP, Development Communications Trust (DCT), NAMISA, CHREAA, CU, Story Workshop Education Trust (SWET), DCA, PACENET, CMD). **HIGH** In nine cases (CCODE, NCA, WfP, DCT, NAMISA, CHREAA, CU, SWET, DCA) grantees linked citizens with government by organising interface meetings, establishing new platforms for engagement, helping citizens to attend meetings with community leaders, setting up health groups in prison, and organising outreach activities. **HIGH**	In all CBO case studies (COVISODE, ECOBO, FOCCAD, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA)[123] citizens – including youth and people with disabilities – stated that they had acquired more knowledge of rights and responsibilities from their engagement with Tilitonse grantees **HIGH**	Not covered in CSO survey.	**Secretariat M&E:** The Secretariat reports significant activity including: 207 information products developed in funded projects; 1,281,937 people informed through funded projects about their rights to public services; and, 900,086 people 'empowered' to hold duty bearers to account (HIGH – in numerical terms; data quality considered **LOW**)
In some cases it is questionable how sustainable the mediation efforts of grantees are – with the need for allowances of grantees to instigate meetings. LOW / MEDIUM **Contributory causes: In many cases, the work on setting up platforms and dialogue was a continuation of work started many years before Tilitonse; and**	In five CSO case studies (NAMISA, CU, WfP, SWET, NCA), it was mentioned that government stakeholders expected to be paid allowances to take part in meetings with citizens. **MEDIUM** **While raising awareness and providing information was viewed by many grantees as a strategy to enable citizens to claim their rights (and make demands on**		In the CSO survey, 22 out of 43 grants (51%) were a continuation/extension of a previous initiative, with the rest being completely new or a pilot. **MEDIUM** According to the same survey, the vast majority of Tilitonse grantees had previously worked in the same locations (33 out of 43 grants, or 77%); and been involved in the sector before (34 out of 43 grants, or 79%) **HIGH**	

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[122] Qualitative analysis using Dedoose to identify key patterns where the evidence base is strongest.

[123] COVISODE – Common Vision for Social Development; ECOBO - Enukweni Community Based Organisation, FOCCAD – Foundation for Community and Capacity Development, St Jude's – St Jude Thaddeus Relief Services, ECOYA – Environmental Concerned Youth Association.

so claims of contribution should be moderated accordingly. HIGH	**government), this alone is not always effective. LOW** In at least eight CSO cases (CCODE, NCA, WfP, CHREAA, CMD, DCA, NAMISA, SWET), the grantees' Tilitonse-funded work was a continuation of previous projects or similar work. **HIGH**			
<u>Output 3.</u> Many CSOs have been working to influence national government policies, often in collaboration with other CSOs and government stakeholders, and making use of the media to attempt to influence change (output 3) **MEDIUM / LOW** **Grantees aiming to influence and support the implementation of policies** *at district level*, **appear to have been less successful** – but evidence from the CSO case studies is limited to substantiate this finding **LOW** Grantees have often engaged the media in order to influence policies and raise public awareness **LOW**	Five cases (CHREAA, CMD, NAMISA, NCA, DCA) where grantees took an important role in collaborating with – and in most cases leading – CSO and government stakeholders in national-level advocacy and policy influencing activities. **MEDIUM** In two CSO case studies (PACENET, CU), grantees did not succeed in making significant progress. **LOW** In 5 CSO case studies (CHREAA, NCA, NAMISA, CMD, CEPA) this has been part of their work. In three of these cases (NAMISA, CHREAA, NCA) the collaboration with the media has been a central element of the work. **LOW**	Not captured in CBO cases – evidence is stronger at the national level.	Not covered in CSO survey.	**Secretariat M&E:** The Secretariat reports 624 dialogue initiatives aimed at influencing policies, strategies and resource allocations relating to service delivery; and 12 incidents where CSOs have made available quality information and evidence to policy makers and implementers for decision making The Secretariat reports, 752 instances of media coverage of issues related to funded projects. (HIGH – in numerical terms; data quality considered **LOW**)
<u>Output 1.</u> **Evidence of improved capability of CSOs funded by Tilitonse is difficult to substantiate across the portfolio; it is inconsistent at the best. (output 1) – with a stronger focus on the organisational development of CSOs, rather than building civil society.** **Grantees' appear to have gained a greater understanding of political and power dynamics (MEDIUM), but there is little**	In the CSO case studies there was a mixed understanding of PEA, with some good examples of applying a more politically informed approach, but many not. In 6 CSO case studies (NAMISA, CU, SWET, PACENET, CEPA, CMD) there is evidence that grantees gained more understanding on PEA. **MEDIUM**	In five cases (COVISODE, FOCCAD, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA) grantees engaged partner organisations with the aim to achieve more collectively. Tilitonse seems to have contributed to this through their trainings – though not much evidence of acting and thinking politically. **MEDIUM**	In the CSO survey (endline), 39 out of 43 grants (91%) were familiar with the term 'political economy analysis', in contrast to 16 out 27 counterfactual CSOs (70%), which seems consistent with Tilitonse grantees gaining greater awareness**.** In the same survey, however, only 8 out of 43 grantees (19%) said 'a lot' of research into the political economy influenced their project. **LOW**	**Secretariat M&E**: The Secretariat reports that for six of these they have achieved an average score of more than '3', which is said to represent a high level of capacity (Data quality considered **LOW**) **Stakeholder Interviews.** Examples of Tilitonse capacity building were provided in a workshop conducted by the IIEA in May 2016 with eight representatives from seven grantee organisations. 7 grantees

evidence that this is making a difference to project design and delivery. **(MEDIUM / LOW).** This may be realised in time (given the late change in capacity development strategy), but there is a concern that too much focus is put on organisational development (financial management, project management, etc.). **MEDIUM**				who participated suggested that Tilitonse capacity building informed the way they sought partnerships and gained a better understanding of the political economy (**MEDIUM** – not a representative sample, but still examples cited) **Programme design & implementation:** Late capacity development strategy and implementation of mentoring approach. Focus on organisational development of CSOs (less on governance). **MEDIUM**
<u>Output 4.</u> **In general there is contradictory evidence on the extent to which grantees are monitoring policy, budgets or service delivery.** (output 4) (Self-reported monitoring data suggests lots of activities, but the case studies show little engagement in routine monitoring). **LOW**	From the CSO case studies, this area of work has been undervalued as **there is little evidence of grantees engaging in routine monitoring and accountability systems, compared to one-off/occasional monitoring. LOW**	In the CBO case studies, there are three cases (COVISODE, ECOBO, NAYORG) where there were attempts but rather ineffective capacity to enable the community, the youth, parent teacher associations (PTAs) and school management committees (SMCs) to conduct monitoring activities. **MEDIUM / LOW**	Not covered in CSO survey.	The Secretariat's Annual Review which cites 423 monitoring initiatives undertaken, 122,375 people consulted on the quality of public services, and 498 representations based on monitoring initiatives made to traditional leaders and officials responsible for public services. (HIGH – in numerical terms; data quality considered **LOW**)
<u>Outcome 1.</u> Overall, Tilitonse grantees have made notable progress in facilitating citizen participation in government and CSO decision making, leading to some notable changes (such as with CCODE, SWET, DCT and CU) (outcome 1, causal link between output 2 and outcome 1) **HIGH** **Contributory causes:** In just over half of the CSO case studies (CCODE, WfP, CU, SWET, DCA, DCT and PACENET), other factors	In 10 of the CSO case studies, grantees were attempting to increase citizen participation in dialogue processes. The majority succeeded in this aim, often alongside similar citizen empowerment work conducted by other CSOs. **HIGH**	A similar improved level of citizen participation was found in all of the CBO cases (COVISODE, FOCCAD, NAYORG, ECOYA, St Jude's, ECOBO). This has included young people (NAYORG) and people with disabilities (St Jude's), participating in dialogue activities and claiming their rights. **HIGH**	Not covered in CSO survey.	**Stakeholder interviews** with the Tilitonse Secretariat, Board and other stakeholders from civil society and government suggested that a general perception that CSOs funded under Tilitonse have created more and better spaces for dialogue between citizens and government. **End-of-project evaluations:** Of 20 end-of-project evaluations, 15 grantees (75%) were observed to

have contributed to the progress made, primarily similar work of other CSOs. The support of community and traditional leaders and the appointment of councillors have also been key contributory factors. **MEDIUM**				have evidence of changes at this outcome level, with 33 changes observed overall. **HIGH**
<u>Outcome 2.</u> There are some examples of effective mediation leading to more positive engagement between civil society, citizens and government – such as CCODE, CU, CHREAA, WfP and DCT enabling citizens to engage in dialogue between CSOs, citizens and government (outcome 2). **MEDIUM / LOW**	Out of the 12 CSO case studies, 11 grantees aimed to empower citizens to engage with government. But in terms of evidence of change, in five of these cases (CCODE, CU, CHREAA, WfP, DCT) there are examples of more positive engagement between citizens and government. **MEDIUM** The CSO case studies provide more in-depth understanding of these achievements; showing that changes in the quality of engagement to be more positive have been through CSOs learning how to engage more effectively with government…	In three CBO cases (FOCCAD, ECOYA, NAYORG) there are examples of more positive engagement between civil society, citizens and the government. **MEDIUM**	Not covered in CSO survey.	**End-of-project evaluations:** Of 20 end-of-project evaluations, five grantees (25%) were observed to have evidence of changes in quality of engagement. **LOW** Across these 5 grants, there were 7 examples of change – far fewer than the 33 examples of changes in citizen participation (outcome 1).
<u>Outcome 3.</u> Very few cases attempted to reach out beyond the citizen-government relationship to involve the private sector, so there is very little evidence of change in this area (outcome 3) **LOW**	Only five CSO case studies worked with the private sector (e.g. CEPA, DCA, NAMISA, DCT, NCA). Of these, there has been some engagement but evidence suggests this has been a limited involvement. **MEDIUM** Evidence about the nature of this engagement suggests this is often payments or donations in kind, rather than governance shifts around accountability, etc. **LOW**	Little evidence of engagement with private sector in CBO cases. **LOW**	Not covered in CSO survey.	**End-of-project evaluations:** IIEA review of 20 evaluations finds just one grantee had some relevance to this outcome. **LOW** **Stakeholder interviews:** A member of the PEAG who explained that CSOs' engagement with the private sector is a relatively new area in Malawi. No strong evidence from Secretariat. **Programme design:** Little attention paid to private sector in the theory of change (e.g., output-level, and activities).
<u>Impact 4.</u> There is some evidence of improved government responsiveness as a result of	All 12 of the CSO case study grantees were aiming to improve government responsiveness in relation to specific	With regard to the CBO case studies, four grantees (ECOBO, St Jude's, ECOYA, NAYORG) were aiming to	The CSO survey finds that most grantees (23 out of 43 grants) observed 'no response' or 'little	**End-of-project evaluations:** Of 20 end-of-project evaluations, 16 grantees had some evidence of

grantee projects, including a few examples that are quite significant at national policy level (impact 4) **MEDIUM** However, at the community level, impacts generally relate more to grantees acting as mediators between government and civil society to help solve specific local problems, rather than any more structured or systemic shifts.	plans, policies, resource areas or services. 6 of 12 CSO case studies were working to influence national-level policy processes. 4 of these grantees have succeeded in influencing change. **MEDIUM**	achieve changes in government's response to citizens' views on resource allocations and services, **but they do not seem to have achieved this**. **LOW**	response' from target government agencies to demands from citizens/CSOs. Only 6 of 43 observed 'a lot of response'. **MEDIUM**	change in government responsiveness, with a total of 27 examples of such changes. **HIGH**
Impact 1, 2 and 3. Grantee aims in relation to more systemic/institutional change (i.e. in transparency, outreach and inclusion) were often vague and unclear in how activities were intended to contribute to such change (impacts 1, 2 and 3).	Evidence for all three impacts (1–3) is detailed below.	Evidence for all three impacts (1–3) is detailed below.	Evidence for all three impacts (1–3) is detailed below.	IIEA review of results frameworks shows many weaknesses around impact-level indicators (IIEA Briefing 2) **MEDIUM**
Impact 1. **There are some signs that grantees have promoted improved transparency (impact 1) MEDIUM / LOW** **From the CSO case studies, any evidence of improved transparency seems to have been achieved in three main ways:** **(1) Increasing pressure from citizens and strengthening platforms.** **(2) local forums playing a role in monitoring service delivery** **(3) through improving relationships between civil society and government at a national level**	Of the 12 CSO case studies, 11 had explicit aims to improve transparency, in either their results framework or the implicit ToC developed by the IIEA. Nine CSO case studies were targeting change at district or community and/or service provider level. In 4 cases (CCODE, CU, DCT, WfP) where grantees aimed to improve transparency at a community level, there is evidence that information provision has improved due to increased pressure and demand from citizens and the establishment or strengthening of platforms or forums that enable information flow. **LOW / MEDIUM**	**In the five CBO case studies (COVISODE, ECOBO, NAYORG, ECOYA, St Jude's) there is some evidence of improvements in government's provision of information to citizens**. **MEDIUM**	The CSO survey indicates that 13 out of 43 grantees observed 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' of government agencies or service providers making available information to citizens or CSOs. **LOW** A far larger number (26 out of 43 grants) showed either 'moderate' or 'limited' information being made available by government agencies or service providers **MEDIUM**	

Impact 2. There is little evidence of institutional/systemic change in relation to government outreach at local level (impact 2) **LOW** **Contributory causes:** There are some examples from the CSO case studies of improved consultation and outreach driven by government as a result of the structures or processes supported by grantees.	In 7 of the 12 CSO case studies, grantees were explicitly aiming to improve government outreach – in the form of targeted government stakeholders reaching out to, listening to and consulting with citizens. For 3 case study grantees implicitly or explicitly working to promote outreach at a national level (CEPA, CMD, NCA), there is some evidence of improvements in government consultation with civil society in relation to specific policy issues. **LOW**	**The evidence from CBO cases shows few instances of improved outreach and consultation, with much being linked to existing structures at community or district levels LOW**	From the CSO survey, 11 out of 43 grants indicated either 'a lot' or 'quite a bit' of consultation by target government agencies or service providers in seeking out citizen views. **LOW**	
Impact 3. There is evidence of some positive impacts relating to inclusiveness (impact 3) **MEDIUM / LOW** **Contributory causes:** But mostly appear to be less due to contributions of Tilitonse grantees, and instead reflect general shifts in Malawi.	In the CSO case studies, 7 of 12 grantees had specific aims in relation to promoting more inclusive governance at local (WfP, SWET, DCA, DCT, CU) and/or national (CMD, CHREAA, DCA) level. Among the five CSO case study grantees specifically aiming to improve the inclusivity of services or policies at local level, **three cases showed evidence of change,** but only in the case of CU was there some evidence to link grantee activities to this change. **LOW**	In the CBO work, there seems to be slightly better evidence of improved inclusion (than the CSO cases). In all CBO cases (COVISODE, St Jude's, NAYORG, ECOYA, ECOBO, FOCCAD) **there is at least some evidence of improved inclusion** and recognition of marginalised groups and grantees have played a role in enabling these changes. **MEDIUM / LOW**	The CSO survey shows that 26 out of 43 grantees observed 'no' or 'little' consultation by target government agencies and service providers in seeking out the views of women. **MEDIUM** CSO survey respondents observed 'no' or 'little' participation of women in interacting or seeking to influence government or service providers (19 out of 43) – with another nine respondents observing 'moderate' participation by women. **MEDIUM / LOW**	

Note: Ratings of Certainty based on the following scale.[124] LOW = little evidence (less than a quarter of the case studies, CSO survey sample, End of project evaluations, etc.) confirm the observed finding; MEDIUM = approximately half (of the case studies, CSO survey sample, End of project evaluations, etc.) confirm the observed finding; HIGH = around three-quarters of studies confirm the finding, or it is observed across a range of evidence sources.

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[124] Adapted from Biggs et al. (2014).

Annex 6. Evaluation Design and Methods

(Available as a separate document)

Annex 7. Selected Summary Tables from the CSO Survey

Q1.6.1. Is/Was the project a roll out of a previous initiative(s) or a completely new/pilot initiative?	C1 Grantee		OC1 Counterfactual		OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual		TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Roll out	5	31.3%	4	28.6%	3	42.9%	8	61.5%	14	70.0%	1	100.0%
New/Pilot	11	68.8%	10	71.4%	4	57.1%	5	38.5%	6	30.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Q1.6.2. Does/Did the project involve locations/Districts where the CSO had not worked before?	C1 Grantee		OC1 Counterfactual		OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual		TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	4	25.0%	2	14.3%	3	42.9%	4	30.8%	3	15.0%	1	100.0%
No	12	75.0%	12	85.7%	4	57.1%	9	69.2%	17	85.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Q1.6.2. Does/Did it involve sectors (health, education etc.) that the CSO had not worked in before?	C1 Grantee		OC1 Counterfactual		OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual		TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	3	18.8%	3	21.4%	1	14.3%	2	15.4%	5	25.0%	1	100.0%
No	13	81.3%	11	78.6%	6	85.7%	11	84.6%	15	75.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Political economy analysis:

Q.5.0. Are you familiar with the term 'political economy analysis'?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual		OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual		TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	14	100.0%	7	53.8%	7	100.0%	8	61.5%	18	90.0%	1	100.0%
No	0	0.0%	6	46.2%	0	0.0%	5	38.5%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
Total	14	100.0%	13	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Q.5.1. To what extent did your understanding of and research into the political economy of your target government agency and context influence your project, design and activities?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual		OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual		Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		#	%	#	%
No research	1	6.3%	6	42.9%	0	0.0%	3	23.1%	1	5.9%		1	25.0%
A little research	3	18.8%	1	7.1%	0	0.0%	6	46.2%	5	29.4%		0	0.0%
A moderate amount of research	4	25.0%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	2	15.4%	11	64.7%		1	25.0%
Quite a bit of research	4	25.0%	2	14.3%	2	28.6%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%		0	0.0%
A lot of research	4	25.0%	2	14.3%	4	57.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%		0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	3	21.4%	0	0.0%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%		2	50.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	17	100.0%		4	100.0%

Responsiveness of government (impact 4):

Q.4.5. By the end of your project, to what extent were the policies, plans, budgets or services of your target government agencies/service providers reflecting/taking into account contributions and demands from citizens/CSOs in this particular context?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No response to citizen/CSO demand	0	0.0%	3	21.4%					4	20.0%	0	0.0%
Little response	3	18.8%	6	42.9%					7	35.0%	0	0.0%
Moderate response	3	18.8%	0	0.0%					7	35.0%	1	100.0%
Quite a bit of response	6	37.5%	0	0.0%					2	10.0%	0	0.0%
A lot of response	3	18.8%	3	21.4%					0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	1	6.3%	2	14.3%					0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%					20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Transparency (impact 1):

Q.3.1. By the end of your project, to what extent were your target Govt agency/service provides making available information to citizens/CSOs (e.g. on planning cycles, on budgets etc.) to enable their engagement in this particular policy, planning, budget or service context?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No information made available to the public	2	12.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
Little amount and poor quality of information	1	6.3%	7	50.0%	1	14.3%	4	30.8%	11	55.0%	1	100.0%
Moderate amount of limited quality of information	5	31.3%	4	28.6%	3	42.9%	6	46.2%	5	25.0%	0	0.0%
Quite a bit of moderate quality of information	5	31.3%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	1	7.7%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
A lot of good quality of information	3	18.8%	3	21.4%	2	28.6%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Q.4.6. By the end of your project, to what extent were the groups/communities you represent able to access information from government necessary for them to participate effectively in advocacy and monitoring activities	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No access to relevant information from government	1	6.3%	3	21.4%	0	0.0%	2	15.4%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
Information accessible only to well connected individuals	1	6.3%	5	35.7%	1	14.3%	3	23.1%	4	20.0%	1	100.0%
Some evidence of improved transparency from government, but one off or poor quality	5	31.3%	5	35.7%	5	71.4%	7	53.8%	11	55.0%	0	0.0%
Quite a bit of information available from Government - clear evidence of efforts to improve ordinary citizens access to information	6	37.5%	1	7.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	5.0%	0	0.0%
Ordinary citizens well able to access the information they need from government in a timely way	3	18.8%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	1	7.7%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Government outreach (impact 2):

Q.3.3 By the end of your project, to what extent were your target Government/service provider seeking out citizen views and experiences to inform this particular policy, planning, budget or service context?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No citizen consultation	1	6.3%	1	7.1%	0	0.0%	2	15.4%	4	20.0%	0	0.0%
Little consultation	4	25.0%	7	50.0%	2	28.6%	7	53.8%	7	35.0%	1	100.0%
Moderate amount of consultation	4	25.0%	2	14.3%	3	42.9%	3	23.1%	7	35.0%	0	0.0%
Quite a bit of consultation	4	25.0%	2	14.3%	1	14.3%	0	0.0%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
A lot of consultation	3	18.8%	1	7.1%	1	14.3%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	1	7.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Inclusion by government (impact 3):

Q.3.4. By the end of your project, to what extent were your target Government/service provider seeking out about women's views and experiences to inform this particular policy, planning, budget or service context?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No consultation with women	2	12.5%	3	21.4%	1	14.3%	5	38.5%	9	45.0%	1	100.0%
Little consultation	4	25.0%	4	28.6%	2	28.6%	2	15.4%	7	35.0%	0	0.0%
Moderate consultation	4	25.0%	4	28.6%	2	28.6%	4	30.8%	3	15.0%	0	0.0%
Quite a bit of consultation	5	31.3%	1	7.1%	1	14.3%	1	7.7%	1	5.0%	0	0.0%
A lot of consultation	1	6.3%	2	14.3%	0	0.0%	1	7.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	100.0%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%

Q.4.4. By the end of your project, to what extent were women interacting with and seeking to influence target government agencies/service providers?	OC1 Grantee		OC 1 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	OC2 Grantee		OC2 Counterfactual	Counterfactual	TC Grantee		TC Counterfactual	Counterfactual
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
No participation of women	1	6.3%	2	14.3%	1	14.3%	4	30.8%	2	10.0%	0	0.0%
Little participation of women	2	12.5%	3	21.4%	2	28.6%	1	7.7%	11	55.0%	1	100.0%
A moderate amount of participation of women	4	25.0%	3	21.4%	0	0.0%	7	53.8%	5	25.0%	0	0.0%
Quite a bit of participation of women	5	31.3%	2	14.3%	1	14.3%	0	0.0%	1	5.0%	0	0.0%
A lot of participation of women	4	25.0%	4	28.6%	1	14.3%	1	7.7%	1	5.0%	0	0.0%
Does not know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	28.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	16	100.0%	14	100.0%	7	71.4%	13	100.0%	20	100.0%	1	100.0%