




# Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts 2002-2009

Report 6/2011 – Synthesis



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Photo: Himalaya, Nepal. Bjørnulf Remme  
Design: Agendum See Design  
Print: 07 Xpress AS, Oslo  
ISBN: 978-82-7548-597-5

# **Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts 2002-2009**

**Synthesis**

**August 2011**

Submitted by  
ITAD  
in association with  
LDP



## Preface

Donor agencies have increasingly included the fight against corruption in their overall governance agenda. In preparation for this evaluation, a literature review<sup>1</sup> was undertaken which showed that our support for anti-corruption work has sometimes had disappointing results.


Has the donors' approach to anti-corruption work been adapted to circumstances in the countries? What are the results of support for combating different types of corruption, including forms that affect poor people and women in particular? These were some of the overarching questions that this evaluation sought to answer.

The evaluation provides insights for the debate, drawing on recent evidence from five countries. The main conclusions and recommendations are presented in the synthesis report. In addition, separate reports have been prepared for each of the case countries Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia.

The evaluation was managed by the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and commissioned by this agency together with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida), the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

The evaluation was carried out by consultants lead by the consultancy company ITAD. This company is responsible for the content of the reports, including the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

September, 2011



Hans Peter Melby  
Acting Director of Evaluation

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<sup>1</sup> Anti-Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review. Study 2/2008. [www.norad.no/evaluering](http://www.norad.no/evaluering)



## Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank the many people who contributed their time and insights to this evaluation. They include headquarters and country office staff of the five commissioning donors, government officials, representatives of donor agencies and civil society organisations. The evaluation represents the combined effort of a team including consultants who participated in the country visits and support staff at ITAD.

Full responsibility for the text of this report rests with the authors. The views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the commissioning agencies or of the people consulted.





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## List of abbreviations

AC	Anti-corruption
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CCC	Committee of Concerned Citizens
CENIDH	Centro Nicaragüense para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights Defence)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CoST	Construction Sector Transparency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EPA	External Payment Arrears
EU	European Union
FRA	Fiduciary Risk Assessment
GAPAP	Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Program
GBS	General budget support
GNI	Gross National Income
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HQ	Headquarters
IMF	International Monetary Fund
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NASCAP	National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAQ	Performance Assessment Questionnaire
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
PEDP	Primary Education Development Programme
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Finance Management
POCSIS	Programme Strengthening the Capacity of the Inspectorate System
PSDRP	Private Sector Development Reform Programme
RISE	Regulatory and Investment Systems for Enterprise
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
SAI	Supreme Audit Institution
Sida	Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency

SIGFA	Sistema Integrado de Gestión Financiera y Auditoría (Integrated Financial Management System)
StAR	Stolen Asset Recovery
SWaP	Sector-wide approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TFC	Task Force on Corruption
TI	Transparency International
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VHLSS	Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey

# Executive Summary





## Executive summary

S1 This report presents the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations of a joint external anti-corruption (AC) evaluation. The evaluation was commissioned by six agencies: the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida), the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The work was managed by Norad.

### **Methodology**

S2 The study involved country visits to Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia, which took place between November 2009 and April 2010. The purpose was to obtain knowledge regarding the relevance and effectiveness of support to reduce corruption, both through specific AC efforts and in selected social and economic sectors – in order to learn lessons regarding what kind of donor support may work (for poor people and women in particular), what is less likely to work and what may harm national efforts against corruption.

S3 The approach uses the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) to map out donor AC efforts. These efforts are assessed in conjunction with donors' ways of working – from their commitment to the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) to their internal policy on AC. Main sources of data included interviews, documentation and field observations outside capital cities.

S4 The level of access to senior officials in government, the lengthy collection of project documentation, limited evidence on corruption, and the lack of shared definitions amongst donors were identified as the main limitations to this evaluation.

### **Country and donor context**

S5 The five country case studies present a contrasting picture, each being characterised by different trends and forms of corruption; level of public reporting; government commitment to AC; advancement in the legal framework; and the importance of aid.

S6 Donor interventions have ranged from good governance programmes, including public sector reforms and support to civil society organisations (CSOs) to specific AC-interventions, starting with support to dedicated AC agencies.

S7 The evaluation period saw corruption move up the political agenda of all commissioning donors, as they came to support UNCAC (2003) and shifted towards new aid delivery mechanisms in line with the Paris Declaration principles of ownership, alignment and coordination. Internal AC policies have evolved as donors channelled more aid money through the country's public finance management (PFM) systems and, in recent years, were confronted with aid-related corruption scandals of greater significance in the public sector.

S8 Not all donors have developed an all-encompassing AC policy at Headquarters (HQ), combining external interventions to support AC in partner countries with internal policy to prevent aid misuse and corruption within their agencies, Danida and to a lesser extent, the Asian Development Bank, being the exception. Consequently, strategic documents that describe donor approach to AC at country level were almost inexistent.

### **Relevance**

S9 Donors have aligned their engagement to the host countries' AC priorities as part of broader good governance goals defined in national poverty reduction strategies. They have also positively influenced the host countries' domestic agenda and helped to develop national AC policies.

S10 Their attitude to the host government's pledge to fight grand corruption has varied, depending on the reputational risk involved and quality of partnership with the host governments. Donors have not shown the same level of tolerance in countries where fighting grand corruption was not (or no longer is) part of the political agenda (Viet Nam, Nicaragua) nor the same level of support in countries where it was part of the political agenda (Bangladesh, Zambia, Tanzania).

S11 At the same time, donor analysis of corruption issues has remained infrequent and incomplete; they have not produced a comprehensive mapping of all corruption-related issues linked to a particular sector – the education sector in Bangladesh being an exception.

S12 Donors have not paid sufficient attention to the impact of corruption on poverty either, despite poverty reduction being their main mandate. Although this is in part explained by the lack of disaggregated data, donors could have made better use of the information generated by local and national surveys.

S13 The link between AC and PFM has strengthened over the years, with support to Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) being seen as particularly relevant. Elsewhere, the causal relationships between public sector corruption and the public sector reform programmes that donors support have not been fully explored in all five countries; key drivers of corruption have often been overlooked, and, only a handful of governance, as well as AC-specific, projects contain specific reference to reducing corruption as their overall goals.

S14 Donor interventions have been broadly in line with the UNCAC framework. However, measures concerned with prevention, detection and sanction of AC mech-



anisms outside criminal law; support to the independence of the judiciary and prosecution services and their role in AC; and private sector responsibility have been overlooked in the majority of their programmes, barring a few exceptions and with no other donors filling the gaps.<sup>1</sup>

### **Effectiveness**

S15 Donor support to AC agencies was relatively effective, although capacity building often took longer and required more resources than expected. Much of the relative failure or success of AC agencies in meeting their mandate was down to domestic factors, including access to skilled labour, geographical reach, strong leadership, and the strength of the judiciary. Donor support to SAIs was deemed highly effective. There were some positive, yet still isolated, examples of donor effectively promoting integrity and professionalism within law enforcement agencies, starting with police.

S16 Donor-supported PFM programmes have helped to strengthen systems but the pace of reforms was often slower than expected and all country reports show a lack of progress in strengthening internal audit mechanisms. Performance in the area of public sector reforms and judiciary reforms was found to be relatively weak. Slow progress was in large part explained by weak leadership, and in the case of business administrative reforms, the level of private sector representation.

S17 Donor support for CSOs was also deemed largely effective, although donor support varies greatly from one country to the next. Service delivery monitoring was effective in all five countries. By contrast, nationwide advocacy campaigns, some supported with donor funding, were found less consistently effective, in part because of the lack of freedom of expression.

S18 Zambia's Task Force on Corruption (TFC), the only donor intervention that dealt with asset tracking and recovery, did recover USD36m worth of assets, but with an investment of USD18m, this proved to be an expensive endeavour and the evaluation raises some concerns over the lack of civil society participation and sustainability issues.

S19 Donor interventions that were more likely to contribute positively to AC were identified as follows:

- Donor support combining evidence gathering – such as donor support for national surveys or audits – with public dissemination through the media or parliamentary debate.
- Promoting inter-agency partnerships to strengthen collective action and with it, channels of accountability. Examples of partnership working included AC Commissions with CSOs; SAIs with Parliamentary Committees; and all agencies involved in the Zambia TFC. Examples of partnership not working included AC Commissions with the judiciary.
- As part of donor support to public sector reforms and key institutions, strengthening capacity and systems with a view to promoting staff integrity and reducing

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<sup>1</sup> Some UNCAC-relevant work on money laundering and private sector responsibility is carried out by donors centrally.

identified forms of corruption. Existing AC prevention, detection, and sanction mechanisms (outside criminal law) can be used for this purpose.

- Investing in end users and other forms of external monitoring, including grass-roots initiatives that focus on strengthening the quality of service delivery at local level.

S20 The applicability of these interventions will to some extent depend on country resources and domestic leadership. The various examples supporting these findings nonetheless indicate that better dialogue and programming could already go a long way.

### **Coordination, dialogue and programme management**

S21 Donors have sought to strengthen their coordination in AC in recent years through joint programming, shared governance analysis and dialogue. Coordination has varied greatly from one country to the next, and seems to have worked less effectively when led by multilateral agencies. Differences in donors' approaches and ways of working mean that joint funding mechanisms have not always been possible. More could be done to ensure interventions are mutually reinforcing on the ground.

S22 Donors have combined programme support with high-level dialogue using complementary platforms, from diplomatic mission and European Union (EU) dialogue to sector advisory groups and general budget support (GBS). Although their influence on policy through dialogue remains low, donors may have helped to precipitate some events, when domestic conditions were ripe. The gradual approach to AC in Viet Nam was, in this context, seen as effective as well as appropriate.

S23 Although DFID and Sweden now assess the risk of corruption as part of their fiduciary risk assessment (FRA), no donor goes so far as to estimate how often corruption practices in the public sector may lead to aid misuse. Donors have responded differently to the level of fiduciary risk in partner countries, some opting for a full alignment with the country's PFM and procurement systems as part of GBS, others opting for an alignment with the country's financial reporting and auditing mechanisms as part of sector-wide approaches (SWaPs). Following aid-related corruption cases, the donor level of scrutiny has increased, some now demanding additional financial reporting and auditing requirements. Unless donors coordinate their approach, this could go against their commitment to the Paris Declaration principles.

S24 Donors have systematically responded to cases of aid misuse, whether bilaterally or in a coordinated way, although there is little evidence to show how much aid money is eventually recovered. There is a risk that donors that are bound by a political decision to remain engaged in a particular sector may stop short pressing for tougher actions. Alternatively, where donor assistance amounts to a significant share of a ministry budget, withdrawing support does not go without consequences for the population, especially in social sectors; in Zambia, using a mix of funding mechanisms has proved essential.

## **Conclusion, lessons and recommendations**

S25 Although donors have helped to strengthen country institutions and systems in support of AC in all five countries, these intermediate results have not translated into reduced levels of corruption at national levels. Nonetheless, the fact that corruption is now more openly discussed and grassroots monitoring has shown positive results in strengthening local accountability show the beginning of a cultural shift to which donors can contribute. At the same time, the risk of aid misuse remains significant and recent aid-related corruption scandals in the public sector show that aid, when inadequately managed, can perpetuate rent-seeking behaviour. Vigilance as well as better programming can help.

S26 The synthesis has translated the evaluation's key lessons on what has worked and what has not worked (as summarised in Chapter 7) into a set of recommendations, which are as follows:

S27 **Make donor approaches to AC more explicit, coherent, and evidence-based.** Practical steps include: producing an AC strategy combining external interventions with internal policies; developing a theory of change explaining the main assumptions behind donors' overall approaches to AC; and regularly update donor approaches to AC using fresh evidence from national and international surveys.

S28 **Invest in evidence gathering and public dissemination.** Practical steps include: building on the partner countries' existing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practice; making sure that all support given towards evidence gathering is equally matched with support for dissemination; and putting particular emphasis on supporting the production of disaggregated evidence.

S29 **Make good governance and AC-specific interventions more joined-up and risk-aware.** Practical steps include: identifying how key areas of interventions in civil service and PFM reforms may positively impact on reducing corruption; capitalising on, and supporting existing AC prevention, detection and sanction mechanisms within public administration; and identifying all forms of corruption that could hinder progress in donor-supported interventions.

S30 **Take a sectoral approach to AC, with special emphasis on poverty and gender.** Practical steps include: undertaking a periodic and comprehensive assessment of all forms and drivers of corruption that pervade economic and social sectors, exploring the impact of sector corruption on poverty using disaggregated data; and encouraging grassroots monitoring of service delivery at the local level.

S31 **Stop working with institutions in isolation and start promoting inter-agency partnerships.** Practical steps include: promoting better exchange of information between institutions, through shared databases; possibly using partnership-based interventions as an entry point to police, justice, and private sector; and recognising twinning arrangements between international and national agencies as good practice.

S32 **Adopt a more coordinated approach to AC.** Practical steps include: working towards a shared long-term vision on AC between bilateral and multilateral agencies; reinforcing complementarity on the ground, possibly through joint funding mechanisms; and using GBS and other forms of coordinated dialogue to identify possible gaps in funding.


S33 **Use the opportunity of short-term, reaction-driven inputs<sup>2</sup> to reinforce long-term, preventive interventions.** Practical steps include: supporting domestic accountability processes and remaining committed to alignment with country systems.

S34 **Adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach to aid, acknowledging that aid can perpetrate corrupt practices.** Practical steps include: acknowledging and assessing the risk that programmes may lead to new forms of corruption in their programme design.

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2 As defined by the OECD DAC Agenda for Collective Action.

# Main Report





# 1. Introduction

## Background

1.1. Five donors, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad, lead agency), with the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), have commissioned a joint evaluation of anti-corruption (AC) efforts over the period 2002-09.

1.2. The evaluation took place during 2009 and 2010, with case study fieldwork in Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia. The purpose and objectives of the evaluation are given in Box 1.

### Box 1: Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

#### Purpose

The purpose is to obtain knowledge regarding the relevance and effectiveness of support to reduce corruption, both through specific AC efforts and in other programmes – in order to identify lessons learned regarding what kind of donor support may work (for poor people and women in particular), what is less likely to work and what may harm national efforts against corruption.

#### Objectives

The objectives are to obtain descriptive and analytic information related to actual results of the support provided by the five commissioning donors, both overall and for each of them individually in each of the selected countries, regarding:

- corruption diagnostic work (highlighting, where relevant, information disaggregated by gender)
- underlying theory, AC strategy and expected results of their support to reduce corruption
- the implementation of support to specific AC interventions and achieved results
- other donor interventions or behaviour relevant for corruption and AC efforts, and achieved results in terms of corruption
- the extent of coherence of AC practice between specific AC activities and other programmes, for individual donors
- the extent of coherence of AC practice within the donor group
- the extent that gender and other forms of social exclusion have been taken into account in donor interventions

1.3. In the terms of reference (ToR), the objective of the evaluation is, “to cover all major specific AC activities of the five donors in the selected countries, as well as a selection of other programs of the five donors of relevance to the reduction of

corruption. The other, not-AC specific programs should preferably be found within one single area or sector in a given country [...] the overall selection in the five case countries should comprise different areas (e.g. infrastructure, extractive industries, social sectors and budget support).” The evaluation period chosen was 2002-09. To help define the scope and methodology of this evaluation, the five donors commissioned a literature review of AC approaches, under the leadership of the Norad Evaluation Department.<sup>3</sup> Norad also complemented this review with a pre-study for the evaluation.<sup>4</sup>

1.4. The first task of the evaluation team was to refine the scope of the evaluation in a way that brought consensus amongst the five donors and SADEV. This is further discussed in Chapter 2.

1.5. The five commissioning donors and SADEV are the primary audience for the evaluation. Secondary audiences include interested parties in the case countries (national authorities, civil society and others), other countries and donor organisations. The purpose and objectives of the evaluation (as defined in the ToR) are presented in Box 1. The full ToR is available in Annex A.

### The synthesis report

1.6. The synthesis report was written and edited by Charlotte Vaillant (ITAD), with substantial contributions from Derek Poate (ITAD), Deborah Mansfield (LDP) and Edmund Attridge (LDP). The synthesis report was compiled on the basis of the five country reports, an internal team meeting in June 2010, in which AC expert, Karen Hussmann, and Paul Harnett (REPIM) participated, and a round of consultations with all commissioning donors, except the ADB, at Headquarters (HQ) in August-September 2010. AC expert, Marijana Trivunovic, commented on an earlier draft version of the synthesis.

1.7. The country evaluation teams were as followed:

- Bangladesh: Derek Poate (team leader), Deborah Mansfield, Charlotte Vaillant, Imran Ahmad, Zarina Rahman Khan and Mozammel Hoque.
- Nicaragua: Derek Poate (team leader), Paul Harnett, Imran Ahmad, Mignone Vega and Jose Luis Velasquez, assisted by Adela Monge.
- Tanzania: Deborah Mansfield (team leader), Charlotte Vaillant, Imran Ahmad, Ann Bartholomew (LDP) and Isaac Kiwango (KIM Consulting).
- Viet Nam: Derek Poate (team leader), Edmund Attridge, Tim McGrath, Dang Ngoc Dung and Nguyen Minh Hai.
- Zambia: Charlotte Vaillant (team leader), Imran Ahmad, Paul Harnett, Deborah Mansfield, Gilbert Mudenda and Stephen Tembo (RuralNet). Henry Malumo supported the team in securing meetings during the field visit and Goodwell Lungu (Transparency International-Zambia, TI-Z) facilitated the discussion during a civil society workshop.

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<sup>3</sup> Norad. 2008. *Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Literature Review*. Norad: Oslo.

<sup>4</sup> Scanteam. 2008. *Anti-Corruption Approaches: Pre-Study for Joint External Evaluation Final Report*. Oslo.



1.8. The coherence between the synthesis report and final country reports has been checked. In some instances, additional materials, including new documentation and field notes, were drawn upon to complete the analysis. Footnotes were added to mention progress to date in some countries, as reported by the commissioning donors in their respective countries.

### **Report structure**

1.9. The report is structured as followed: Chapter 2 describes the methodology and analytical framework used for the evaluation. Chapter 3 looks at the donor and country context in all five countries over the period. Chapter 4 assesses the relevance of, as well as possible gaps in, key donor interventions, depending on country circumstances. Chapter 5 reviews the effectiveness of selected programmes in tackling corruption, drawing on what was identified as good practice. Chapter 6 examines donor coordination, dialogue and programme management. In Chapter 7, the team draws conclusions, puts forward some lessons and makes recommendations to the commissioning donors.

## 2. Methodology

### Summary of key points

- The approach uses the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as the basis to map out and assess donor AC efforts. In accordance with the ToR, the evaluation focuses on the evaluation criteria of relevance and effectiveness, with additional reference to interventions by other donors.
- The five countries – Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia – were chosen by the commissioning agencies. In-depth evaluation themes were selected for each country, some dealing with AC and one dealing with a specific sector (and in the case of Tanzania, general budget support (GBS)).
- Main sources of data included interviews, documentation and field visits. Attempts were made to use participatory exercises in group meetings.
- The level of access to senior officials in government, the lengthy collection of project documentation, the absence of evidence-based analysis, and the lack of shared definitions amongst donors were identified as main limitations to this evaluation.

The approach and methodology to this evaluation are set out in detail in the Inception Report.<sup>5</sup>

### Approach

2.1. Notwithstanding the pre-study, literature review and ToR, the scope of the evaluation was still the subject of discussion amongst the six commissioning agencies at inception stage.

2.2. Firstly, the evaluation team found that what distinguished AC with non-AC specific activities still needed clarification: AC efforts, as defined by the UNCAC (see below) and other international treaties, entail both activities where the primary goal is to fight corruption and activities where the goal and objectives are more broadly concerned with system strengthening, especially in the area of public sector. In other words, AC efforts must be seen as entailing AC-specific activities and wider governance programmes. As highlighted in Section 4.2 of the literature review, there is a need for greater clarity on what it is that “*the international community wants to track when it refers to results of AC interventions and whether it is governance rather than corruption that should be measured*”.

2.3. Secondly, corruption can be defined in many different ways, each definition often implicitly implying a different theory of change. The different sensitivities of the host countries taking part in this evaluation were also a particular area of concern for donors. The evaluation’s understanding of corruption versus governance is

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<sup>5</sup> ITAD. 2009. *Joint External Anti-Corruption Evaluation Inception Report*.

that an act of corruption (whether political, administrative, petty or grand) is intrinsically linked to a specific transaction between two (or more) parties, which is non-transparent and used for illicit gain.

2.4. By contrast, governance can be defined as “*the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised*” (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators). Good governance strengthens accountability (and hence helps to reduce corruption), whereas poor governance breeds corruption. This is an important distinction which the evaluation team subsequently used to assess the relevance and effectiveness of donor interventions along result chains linking inputs with reduced corruption and/or increased accountability.

2.5. The types of corruption are given in Box 2. This evaluation seeks to capture all kinds of corruption – public and private sector, grand, administrative and petty, many interlinked. The overarching definition of corruption used is “*the abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain*”.

#### **Box 2: Types of corruption**

**Public sector corruption:** This corresponds to the definition of corruption by the World Bank, “*the abuse of public office for private gain*”. This definition contrasts with the Transparency International (TI) definition “*the misuse of entrusted power for private gain*”, which implies that the private sector can also fuel corruption.

**Private sector corruption:** Private sector corruption is also used to indicate that bribery requires both a payer and a recipient. Understanding the role of businesses in fuelling state capture is also an important dimension of corruption.

**Petty corruption:** ‘Petty’ corruption (also called administrative or bureaucratic corruption) is the everyday corruption that takes place where bureaucrats meet the public directly. Petty corruption is also described as ‘survival’ corruption (“*corruption of need*”); a form of corruption which is pursued by junior or mid-level agents who may be grossly underpaid and who depend on relatively small but illegal rents to feed and house their families and pay for their children’s education. Although petty corruption usually involves much smaller sums than those that change hands in acts of ‘grand’ or political corruption, the amounts are not ‘petty’ for the individuals adversely affected. Petty corruption disproportionately hurts the poorest members of society, who may experience requests for bribes regularly in their encounters with public administration and services like hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing authorities and so on.

**Grand corruption:** High level or ‘grand’ corruption takes place at the policy formulation end of politics. It refers not so much to the amount of money involved as to the level at which it occurs – where policies and rules may be unjustly influenced. The kinds of transactions that attract grand corruption are usually large in scale – and therefore involve more money than bureaucratic or ‘petty’ corruption. Grand corruption is sometimes used synonymously with political corruption.

**Administrative or bureaucratic corruption:** Bureaucratic, administrative or ‘petty’ corruption takes place at the implementation end of politics, where the public meets public officials. Bureaucratic corruption is usually distinguished from ‘grand’ and political corruption (to the extent it is possible to distinguish administration from politics).

## Box 2 (cont.): Types of corruption

**Bribery:** Bribery is the act of offering someone money, services or other valuables, in order to persuade him or her to do something in return. Bribery is corruption by definition. Bribes are also called kickbacks, baksheesh, payola, hush money, sweetener, protection money, boodle, gratuity, etc. Bribery is widely criminalised through international and national laws. In particular, the bribing of foreign officials is outlawed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.

**Political corruption:** The term 'political corruption' is conceptualised in various ways through the recent literature on corruption. In some instances, it is used synonymously with 'grand' or high-level corruption and refers to the misuse of entrusted power by political leaders. In others, it refers specifically to corruption within the political and electoral processes. In both cases, political corruption not only leads to the misallocation of resources, but it also perverts the manner in which decisions are made.

**Systematic corruption:** As opposed to exploiting occasional opportunities, endemic or systemic corruption occurs when corruption is an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system. Systemic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice, but rather a situation in which the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in which most people have no alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials.

**State capture:** State capture is the phenomenon in which outside interests (often the private sector, mafia networks, etc.) are able to bend state laws, policies and regulations to their (mainly financial) benefit through corrupt transactions with public officers and politicians. The notion of state capture deviates from traditional concepts of corruption, in which a bureaucrat might extort bribes from powerless individuals or companies, or politicians themselves steal state assets.

Source: U4 supplemented by World Bank and TI definition

2.6. It was decided at inception stage to use UNCAC as a framework to map out donor activities with potential links with AC. The main categories of UNCAC are given in Table 1. The mapping of the commissioning donor interventions against UNCAC became a major task of the evaluation.

**Table 1: UNCAC – Main categories of AC interventions**

<b>UNCAC Headings</b>	<b>Extracts</b>
<b>Preventive measures</b>	
Article 5 Preventive AC policies and practices	.....implement or maintain effective, coordinated AC policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.
Article 6 Preventive AC body or bodies	(a) Implementing the policies referred to in Article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of those policies. (b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.
Article 7 Public sector	To adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants and, where appropriate, other non-elected public officials: (a) That are based on principles of efficiency, transparency and objective criteria such as merit, equity and aptitude, etc.
Article 8 Code of conduct for public officials	Promote, inter alia, integrity, honesty and responsibility among its public officials... establishing measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities.
Article 9 Public procurement and PFM	Establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption... ...take appropriate measures to promote transparency and accountability in the management of public finances.
Article 10 Public reporting	To enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organisation, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate.
Article 11 Measures relating to the judiciary and prosecution services	Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary.
Article 12 Private sector	To prevent corruption involving the private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures.
Article 13 Participation of society	To promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental and community-based organisations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption.

<b>UNCAC Headings</b>	<b>Extracts</b>
Article 14 Measures to prevent money laundering	To institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions ... in order to deter and detect all forms of money laundering.
<b>Criminalisation and law enforcement</b>	<b>Articles 15 to 42 which establish criminal offences and form the elements that would be found in AC legislation.</b>

2.7. In accordance with the ToR, the evaluation deals only with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria of relevance and effectiveness. In assessing relevance, the evaluation team paid attention to AC-specific and non-specific interventions carried out by other donors, including U4 members:<sup>6</sup> the US Agency for International Development (USAID), European Commission, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank, some being involved in joint programming with the commissioning donors. Mapping their interventions against UNCAC was outside the scope of this evaluation.

2.8. Finally, this evaluation also deals with donor behaviour, in recognition that their choice of aid modalities, commitment to the Paris Declaration principles (ownership, alignment, coordination, result-oriented management and mutual accountability), and internal audit and other safeguard measures, are an essential part of their AC efforts in host countries.

## Methodology

2.9. The evaluation methodology is characterised by the mapping of projects against UNCAC, as discussed in Section 2.1 (see Annex B for a full list of donor interventions per country), the use of an evaluation framework setting out the questions to be answered, and an analysis of projects in order to understand their intervention logic and evidence of relevance and effectiveness.

## Main sources of data

2.10. The main sources for data collection were documentation, key informants and field visits.

2.11. The five countries visited – Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia – were chosen by the commissioning agencies. These proved to be sufficiently varied to provide useful case studies in what donors can, or should not do, in different political contexts. A lead donor (Sweden for Tanzania; ADB for Viet Nam and Bangladesh; Denmark with DFID for Zambia; Norway for Nicaragua) was nominated in each country to support the main visit of the evaluation team. Following the experiences of the evaluation team in the first country, Bangladesh, an advance visit by the country team leader was used to brief donor staff and to identify

<sup>6</sup> U4 funding agencies are Norad (Norway), DFID (UK), CIDA (Canada), GTZ (Germany), MinBuZa (the Netherlands), Sida (Sweden), BTC (Belgium) and AusAID (Australia).

projects of interest and set out the required documentation and list of key informants.

2.12. Individual donor projects and programmes were the main units of study. The way in which projects were selected and reviewed followed a 'table-top approach'. Selection of what constituted an AC project was left to the evaluation team. All governance-related projects received a 'light' review in all five countries (the 'table top'); a smaller number were then chosen to be examined in greater depth (the 'table legs'). In this way, the evaluation took a very broad view to try and capture all interventions that might have an influence on AC, but with greater attention to more specific projects.

2.13. The 'table legs' were as follows: (in Bangladesh) donor support to the AC Commission, civil service reforms, public financial management (PFM) reforms, justice and police, elections and participation of society; (in Nicaragua) support to the AC Trust Fund, public sector reform, and the police; (in Tanzania) support to the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), financial oversight bodies, civil society, and legal sector reforms; (in Viet Nam) support to AC-specific programmes, public administration reform, the legal sector, and PFM reforms; (in Zambia) support to AC bodies, private sector, public sector management reforms, and participation in society.

2.14. In addition to evaluating major governance programmes, in accordance with the ToR, one other sector not dealing specifically with AC, was included for analysis for each country. The sectors chosen were primary education in Bangladesh, natural resources in Nicaragua, GBS in Tanzania, rural infrastructure in Viet Nam and health in Zambia.

2.15. Key informants – from donor advisers and executing agencies to beneficiaries – were selected to cover all 'table legs' in each country. In addition, a sample of civil society organisations (CSOs), media representatives, key central ministries (for example ministries of finance and justice), and donor representatives, were identified and contacted in consultation with the country lead donor. A total of 77, 93, 52, 77, 60 stakeholders – comprising project beneficiaries, civil society and media, executing agencies, donor and government officials – were interviewed in Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia, respectively.

2.16. In each country, during a short field visit, attempts were made to interview relevant stakeholders based away from the capital city. Because these tended to be in isolated locations with no possibility of random selection for representativeness, the information from these visits was used only to inform the interpretation of the evaluators, and is not reported separately.<sup>7</sup>

2.17. A feedback session was held with commissioning donor country-based staff in each country before the evaluation team departed. In Zambia, the wider AC donor group took part in this session.

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<sup>7</sup> Sirajganj district (Bangladesh), Jinotega (Nicaragua), Moshi, Kilimanjaro Region (Tanzania), Chirundu, Livingstone and Siyavonga district (Zambia).

## **Data collection tools**

2.18. In advance of each country visit, the team undertook a comprehensive overview through contextual and situational analysis, and a review of all relevant donor programmes. These were updated and extended during the visit itself as more details became available to the team. A number of conventional data collection tools were adapted for the requirements of this evaluation.

2.19. In order to investigate their relevance and effectiveness, the evaluation team developed a programme Performance Assessment Questionnaire (PAQ). The questionnaire was revised after the first country visit (Bangladesh), an abridged version of the most recent one being given in Box 3. A total of 15, 10, 12 and 23 PAQs were produced for Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Viet Nam, respectively, on the basis of documentation review. In Zambia, PAQs were not finalised. Instead, team members were asked to produce an intermediate analysis on capturing donor ways of working, to feed into preliminary findings on the choice of aid delivery mechanisms, and the use of audits and safeguard measures.

2.20. The intervention logic was examined partly through the PAQ and partly through interviews. As a proxy assessment of the results chain, analysis of objectives and indicators was undertaken for those projects most directly targeting corruption, and examples were included in the annexes of the country reports.

2.21. During the main country visit, the evaluation framework was used by each team member to capture main evidence and findings in their respective areas of expertise ('table legs'), using interviews, documentation review and field visits as main sources for triangulation.

2.22. Interview topic lists were developed from the questions in the evaluation framework and used to ensure that interviews with respondents were structured consistently by all members of the evaluation team. Attempts were made to use participatory exercises in group meetings: a card-sorting approach to stimulate discussion about how interventions are intended (according to the understanding of stakeholders) to bring about change and the nature of that change; and a qualitative discussion tool, 'Appreciative Enquiry', to learn from positive experience and develop lessons about what kind of donor support may work and what is less likely to work. In the event, Appreciative Enquiry was only used as a way of guiding interviews to ask respondents to reflect on what aspects of projects have worked and what lessons can be drawn from them. In general, low levels of familiarity with the specifics of donor programmes and the absence of any clear data relating to how project deliverables have affected corruption outcomes, reduced the effectiveness of this line of enquiry.

2.23. A focus group exercise was conducted with a sample of civil servants in Bangladesh to discuss the process of civil service and legal reform and examine potential benefits to AC using a card sorting exercise to model a results chain. It also proved possible to work with a group of AC focal points from ministries in Nicaragua, who participated in a 'Force Field' analysis to examine what factors were holding back or supporting AC efforts.



2.24. In Zambia, a civil society workshop, hosted at the Danish embassy, took place with representatives of 13 CSOs. This workshop discussed the role of CSOs in monitoring and fighting grand, medium and petty corruption, areas of success and reasons for failures, with a plenary session focusing on lessons and recommendations for donors.

### **Box 3: Joint External Anti-Corruption Evaluation: Programme Performance Assessment**

#### **Project Title/Details**

##### **Donor**

##### **Documentation available**

#### **Project/programme purpose & design**

- 1.1: *Is the project/programme purpose clear and realistic for the resources available?*
- 1.2: *Does the programme address a specific and existing problem developed from situational analysis?*
- 1.3: *Does the situational analysis take adequate account of corruption?*
- 1.4: *Does the situational analysis take adequate account of gender and poverty dynamics (including in relation to corruption)?*
- 1.5: *Were national strategies taken into account in the analysis?*
- 1.6: *Was analysis by and interaction with non-state actors taken into account?*
- 1.7: *Which UNCAC headings (and sub-headings) does the programme relate to?*
- 1.8: *Does the programme make the fight against corruption an explicit goal and/or purpose?*
- 1.9: *Does the programme clearly identify links with broader governance reforms?*
- 1.10: *Does the programme identify the risk of misuse of donor money? (If 'Yes', what preventive measures are identified?)*

#### **Monitoring and management**

- 2.1: *List project goal and purpose indicators*
- 2.2: *Does the programme have a limited number of specific performance indicators that focus on outcomes and reflect the purpose of the programme?*
- 2.3: *Do the indicators include citizens' perceptions on governance and/or corruption?*
- 2.4: *Do the indicators include progress indicators in the fight against corruption (number of audits, prosecution cases, etc.)?*
- 2.5: *Are the performance indicators in line with national indicators and/or use national sources as means of verification?*
- 2.6: *Do the indicators take gender and poverty adequately into account?*
- 2.7: *Does the donor regularly collect timely and credible performance information, and use it to manage the programme and improve performance?*

#### **Results & accountability**

- 3.1: *Is there a results chain that is being monitored?*
- 3.2: *Has the programme demonstrated progress in achieving its outcomes?*
- 3.3: *In relation to the fight against corruption, has there been any evidence that the programme has contributed to ...*
  - a) *... foster institutional monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms to fight corruption? (parliament, civil society, etc.)?*
  - b) *... foster a culture of openness and supporting progress in the area of transparency, ethics, and public reporting?*
  - c) *... deal with the forms of corruption affecting poor people and women in particular?*
- 3.4: *Do independent evaluations indicate that the programme is effective and achieving results?*
- 3.5: *What have been the results on the level or trends of corruption?*

2.25. In addition, value chain analysis was adopted in Viet Nam for the infrastructure sector, and Zambia for the health sector analysis. This systematic approach was used to examine the scope for and evidence of corruption at different stages in the planning-to-implementation life cycle of investments.

### **Limitations**

2.26. This evaluation came with a number of limitations:

- The level of access to senior officials in government varied considerably among the five countries. Wide-ranging interviews were held with senior officials in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zambia. No senior government officials were available to meet the team in Viet Nam. In Tanzania, the team experienced limited access to the Ministry of Finance and the AC Commission, owing, the team was told, to the pressure of other work on their staff.
- Collection of project documents proved to be time consuming and problematical as so many donor country offices did not have comprehensive filing systems or archives. Interviews were delayed and disrupted in Bangladesh owing to difficulties in collecting documents and so the visit structure was changed for the remaining four countries.
- The contribution of improved governance to AC was not always recognised. During interviews, some key informants principally referred to corruption in relation to the risk of aid misuse; others only discussed specific direct interventions, such as their support to AC commissions; and many (unless prompted) failed to make the link between AC and their broader governance agenda.
- As the evaluation did not have the resources to produce new political economy and context analysis,<sup>8</sup> it relied principally on available documentation from donors and other key sources. However, it was found that the quality of this analysis was often sparse or weak, and that outside Bangladesh, very little has been written on the political economy of governance (let alone AC) reforms in the other four countries.


2.27. The use of UNCAC also comes with its own limitations:

- UNCAC is a legal document committing the state parties to adopt adequate preventive and criminalisation measures. The Convention does not contain any guidance on the implementation or use of such measures. Even in countries where a compliance gap analysis has been carried out, the framework does not provide a guide as to whether donors should indeed try to support all Chapters and/or Articles of UNCAC in partner countries.
- Although UNCAC rightly locates corruption within the broader governance agenda at a strategic level, it provides no guidance on prioritisation of actions.
- UNCAC says little about the challenges of ensuring that all stages of the criminal law enforcement chain, as illustrated in Figure 1, are followed through to ensure that the fight of corruption is truly effective and sustained.

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<sup>8</sup> As specified in the ToR, "the evaluators are not supposed to prepare an extensive analysis in terms of the political economy and corruption context of the case countries. The evaluation should, however, be made against the background of a thorough understanding of this context, and this should be evident in the reports."

**Figure 1: The criminal law enforcement chain**



## 3. Country and donor context

### Summary of key points

- The five country case studies present a contrasting picture with regard to trends and forms of corruption; the level of reporting on corruption issues; government commitment to AC and advancement in the legal framework; and the importance of aid.
- The evaluation period saw corruption move up the political agenda of all commissioning donors, as they came to support UNCAC (2003) and shifted towards new aid delivery mechanisms in line with the Paris Declaration (2005) principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation.
- Many donor interventions focused principally on promoting good governance over the evaluation period. With the exception of Zambia and Nicaragua, bilateral donors started supporting AC-specific interventions relatively recently. Although donor support to dedicated AC agencies has remained central, it has recently broadened to benefit other AC bodies including, for example, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs).
- Not all donors have developed an all-encompassing AC policy, combining external interventions to support AC in partner country with internal policy to prevent aid misuses and corruption within the donor agencies.

3.1. This Chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the country and donor contexts that characterise the evaluation period. It shows that partner countries and donors alike have their own distinctive features, as well as sharing some common characteristics.

### Country contexts

3.2. The selection of countries for the evaluation, made by the commissioning donors, was intended to provide a wide range of contexts in which to examine the relevance and effectiveness of donor support. Each country situation is different and calls for tailored donor action. A number of pointers can nonetheless be used to compare situations and explore different options for engagement. The synthesis chose the following as the most useful: (a) trends and forms of corruption, using TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and results from national surveys, (b) the frequency of corruption cases in the media, a proxy indicator for effective detection mechanisms, the right to information and transparency, (c) government commitment to AC and the latest developments in the legal framework, and (d) the importance of aid. Existing analysis of drivers of corruption – which are often based on assumptions rather than evidence – are discussed separately in Chapter 4.

### **The context in Bangladesh**

3.3. Bangladesh was ranked by TI as the most corrupt country in the world in the first half of the evaluation period. Its position has since improved, in part because more countries joined the TI list and in part because perception of corruption in Bangladesh has declined as a result of a brief period in 2007- 08 when a military-backed transition government (herein referred to as the Caretaker Government) held power between elected regimes, and pledged to fight corruption. In 2009, Bangladesh ranked amongst the 13<sup>th</sup> most corrupt countries in the world (from a total 180 countries).

3.4. According to the TI-Bangladesh 2007 National Household Survey on Corruption,<sup>9</sup> 66.7% of households experienced some forms of corruption in their transactions with public services and 42.1% had to pay a bribe for receiving services from different sectors, the most corrupt sectors being law enforcement agencies, local government and land administration.

3.5. The issues of corruption have been discussed more openly in the country in the last decade than in previous decades, with the media raising cases of corruption almost on a daily basis. During the country visit, the press media had lead articles on corruption in courts and cases of corruption (some investigated by the AC Commission) within political parties, trade unions, state pensions, and line ministries (especially construction).<sup>10</sup> CSOs in Bangladesh are a major economic and political force, with TI-Bangladesh being the biggest TI Country Chapter in the world.

3.6. The period covered by the evaluation is unusual as it spans three government regimes. After the Bangladesh National Party, in power since 2001, a prolonged Caretaker Government was installed in 2006, amidst continuous political unrest. In December 2008, the Awami League-led Grand Alliance won the parliamentary elections. Little progress was made in the fight against corruption in the years before the Caretaker Government. However, this military-backed government gave high priority to fighting corruption and, with the support of donors, initiated a number of crucial reforms. Most notably, UNCAC was approved; the AC Commission was revitalised, leading to a number of high-ranking politicians, government officials and businessmen being investigated and charged with corruption; reforms were initiated – and new Chairmen appointed – for key institutions, including the Election Commission and Public Service Commission;<sup>11</sup> and partial separation of the Judiciary from the Executive was achieved in line with Article 22 of the Constitution.

3.7. Although legislative reforms under the Caretaker Government were far-reaching, the elected parliament had yet to ratify many of its Ordinances after a year in office. Some Acts of significance, including the Right to Information Act, were passed; others not.<sup>12</sup> The current government has started showing signs of back-

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<sup>9</sup> The sample size was 5,000; the households were selected for interview through a multi-stage cluster sampling design.

<sup>10</sup> Field notes.

<sup>11</sup> A constitutional body, the Public Service Commission's role is to recruit civil servants through competitive examinations and provide advice on recruitment rules, promotions, transfers and other public service matters.

<sup>12</sup> Notable among the Acts passed during the first parliamentary session were the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009, Right to Information Act 2009 and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2009. Acts that were not passed by parliament included the Anti-Corruption Commission (Second Amendment) Ordinance 2007, National Human Rights Commission Ordinance 2007, Public Procurement Act (Amendment) 2007, Government Attorney Service Ordinance 2008 and Supreme Judicial Commission (Amendment) Ordinance 2008.

tracking on some amendments, notably with regard to the AC Commission and Procurement, a matter of concern for donors and civil society alike. Consequently, only recently, the World Bank has rated Bangladesh's control of corruption as the second worst in South Asia.<sup>13</sup>

3.8. Bangladesh is not dependent on aid, with aid ranging from 1.8% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2002 to 1.3% in 2009. Barring for 2004, the total level of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has increased steadily from USD1.2bn in 2002 to USD2.9bn in 2009. Aid disbursed to the government sector is low, with the World Bank and ADB (but none of the four commissioning bilateral donors) providing GBS; the latter considering the level of fiduciary risk too high.

### **The context in Viet Nam**

3.9. TI's CPI shows a steadily improving score between 2002 and 2008, with Viet Nam ranking amongst the 16<sup>th</sup> most corrupt countries in the world in 2009. According to the Global Integrity Report for 2006, corruption accounts for 3-4% of lost Gross Domestic Product each year. Corruption ranges from bribery, theft of state assets, kickbacks, collusion in contracting, to payments for services provided. The 2005 survey of corruption conducted by the Communist Party of Viet Nam, with Sweden's support, showed that both grand and petty corruption is experienced as common at all levels (both central and local) and in all organisations. Corruption was seen by respondents as the most serious social problem then facing Viet Nam, and in that regard, as outranking inflation and unemployment. In 2008, the Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) found that corruption was serious in the courts, the police, land use and the central and local health services. In the 2008 Provincial Competitiveness Survey, 60% of the firms surveyed said that paying bribes to public officials was a moderate to serious obstacle to doing business in Viet Nam.

3.10. Led by the Communist Party of Viet Nam, the Government has been implementing a series of far-reaching reforms over the evaluation period, including in relation to corruption. Viet Nam's processes for managing change place a premium on decision-making by consensus; on using a step-by-step approach to reform; and on maintaining social stability, with the Party acting as the leading force in society. Political commitment to AC has grown over the evaluation period. The Government has been pursuing multiple efforts to contain corruption. A comprehensive set of laws and policies has been developed over the past 10 years, as well as institutional changes, culminating in a new AC strategy in 2009.

3.11. However, the space provided for the media and non state actors to participate in AC has been constrained. Some high profile cases, involving project management units in the infrastructure sector, have nonetheless been widely publicised.

3.12. ODA in Viet Nam has steadily increased from USD1.3bn in 2002 to USD3.7bn in 2009, a corresponding 4.1% and 3.7% of GNI in the respective years.

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13 Kaufmann D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi. M. 2009. *Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008*.

Most aid is disbursed to the government sector, with all commissioning donors, except Sweden, providing GBS alongside the World Bank and ADB.

### The context in Tanzania

3.13. Tanzania suffers from a high level of corruption with, reportedly, an estimated 20% of the Government's budget being lost to corruption in some years during the evaluation period.<sup>14</sup> Tanzania's TI CPI score improved between 1998 and 2007, from 1.9 to 3.2 but by 2009 the score was back to 2003 levels. In 2009, Tanzania ranked amongst the 15<sup>th</sup> most corrupt countries in the world.

3.14. Administrative corruption was perceived to have declined in the early part of the evaluation period and, particularly in rural areas, there was a perception in 2007 that the Government's corruption control efforts were bearing fruit. However, Tanzania's score on the Bribery Payment Index (corruption prevalence) has risen from 17% in 2009<sup>15</sup> to 28.6% in 2010. Perceptions data from the same survey also paint a gloomy picture with a total of 85% of respondents feeling that Tanzania is either corrupt or extremely corrupt, with a larger percentage (45.6%) feeling that it is extremely corrupt.<sup>16</sup> In addition, two of its institutions, the police and the judiciary, appear in the top 10 most corruption institutions in East Africa.<sup>17</sup>

3.15. A number of grand corruption scandals have made headlines in the press in recent years, including the External Payment Arrears (EPA),<sup>18</sup> the BAE and Richmond scandals. CSOs in Tanzania are still young and there are few that focus specifically on corruption issues.<sup>19</sup> However, CSOs have recently taken a more proactive role in the fight against corruption,<sup>20</sup> and faith-based groups are beginning to include corruption and integrity in their public agenda.<sup>21</sup>

3.16. The government attitudes towards corruption have evolved since the Nyerere administration, when discussion of corruption was taboo. President Mkapa's government commissioned the Warioba Report in 1996. This detailed the state of corruption in the country, and formed the basis for Tanzania's National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) of 1999. Under NACSAP Phase I, all ministries developed sector-specific corruption plans to improve transparency and increase public access to information. The current administration of President Kikwete came into power with the promise to combat corruption. Corruption in the mining sector, the judiciary and petty corruption were targeted for attention and NACSAP Phase II was completed in 2008.

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14 Chêne, M. 2009. *Overview of Corruption in Tanzania*. U4. (estimate from Tanzania's Auditor General); *Global Integrity Report 2006* <http://back.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/tanzania/index.cfm>; US State Department. 2006. *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*. [www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78761.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78761.htm); The Citizen. 10 July 2009. *Tanzania: Over 30 Percent of Budget Eaten by Corrupt Officials, Says President*. Reporting a speech made by President Kikwete on the opening of PCCB's new offices. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200907100964.html>

15 Transparency International-Kenya. 2009. *East Africa Bribery Index 2009*.

16 Transparency International-Kenya. 2010. *East Africa Bribery Index 2010*.

17 Ibid.

18 The EPA is an account facility at the Bank of Tanzania; the scandal involved the fraudulent payment of around Tshs 133 billion (USD96m) from the account to 22 companies in 2005-06.

19 Agenda Participation 2000 (which runs the Tanzania Corruption Tracker System) and ForDIA are the most focused on corruption although other CSOs do work linked to AC and transparency, such as policy briefs, public expenditure tracking surveys, the open budget index and the citizens' budget. Transparency International Tanzania was closed due to 'inactivity'

20 NOLA and LHRC public interest litigation on *takrima* law and legal challenge to Public Leadership Code of Ethics.

21 An example of this is the attack launched on the Government of Tanzania's handling of corruption by the Catholic Church in a pastoral letter last year. High-level officials in the ruling party, CCM, demanded withdrawal of the letter. Instead, more churches have joined the Catholic Church in its call for more commitment from the Government of Tanzania on tackling corruption in the country. [www.corruptiontracker.or.tz](http://www.corruptiontracker.or.tz)

3.17. Since 1995, the Government has introduced legislation to tackle corruption and improve accountability mechanisms and ethical guidelines in the civil service. A broadly robust legal framework to prevent and deal with corruption is now in place. There are however some legislative 'gaps', with Bills prepared which have not yet become law. These include the Whistleblowers Bill and the Right to Information Bill, which were waiting to be tabled in Parliament at the time of evaluation.<sup>22</sup>

3.18. Tanzania has been one of the largest recipients of aid in sub-Saharan Africa, with ODA steadily increasing from USD1.3bn in 2002 to USD2.9bn in 2009. The country, which receives budget support from all main multilateral and bilateral agencies, is aid dependent, with the ratio of ODA to GNI rising from 11.8% in 2002 to 13.7 % in 2009.

### **The context in Zambia**

3.19. TI's CPI score was 2.6 every year between 2004 and 2007 but improved in 2007 and 2008, as a result of improved confidence by the international community in the late President Mwanawasa's fight against corruption. With a score of 3.0, the 2009 CPI ranks Zambia amongst the 19<sup>th</sup> most corrupt countries in the world.

3.20. The 2004 National Governance Baseline Survey shows that public sector corruption in Zambia has many faces, from administrative corruption to nepotism and procurement mismanagement. Corruption is among the three top concerns of citizens, after the high cost of living and inflation. The state agencies perceived as the most corrupt were the police, the National Registration Office, the Lands Department, Zambia Revenue Authority, councils and courts of law.

3.21. Petty corruption in the form of payment of bribes remains widespread. According to TI-Zambia's Bribe Payers Index (2007), more than half of household respondents were asked for bribes to access services over the past 12 months; with 11% of them responding affirmatively that they had paid a bribe.<sup>23</sup> Although the incidence of petty corruption in the form of bribe payment remains high, some agencies or sectors are more affected than others. While less visible to the public eye, public resources mismanagement is widespread, as shown in the national audit reports.

3.22. The media and CSOs have increasingly brought the issues of corruption to the public's attention. The health corruption scandal involving donor money, in 2009, was widely reported in the written press and in 2007, TI-Zambia released a landmark report, entitled '*Show Me the Money!*', confirming that large sums of public funds had been embezzled from 1984 to 2004.

3.23. Late President Mwanawasa's fight against grand corruption during the previous regime dominated the political agenda from 2002 until 2008, with the donor-supported Task Force on Corruption (TFC) leading to high-level conviction and seizure of assets.

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<sup>22</sup> AC Network. 2008. *Key Issues Paper on Challenges in Fighting Corruption in Tanzania for the 2008 General Budget Support Annual Review*.

<sup>23</sup> These statistics are in line with an Afrobarometer survey (2005), which concluded that 79% of respondents never had to use bribe for access to services.



3.24. President Banda's record in tackling corruption has been mixed; former president Chiluba was acquitted of public theft in a Zambian court, the TFC was disbanded and a major health scandal with links to donor money broke in 2009. However, some positive trends can be seen. The National AC Policy and its implementation plan were approved and actions were taken against those involved in the health scandal scam.

3.25. Zambia's vision is to reduce aid dependency and become a middle-income country by 2030. The country, whose government has received GBS since the mid-2000s, has seen ODA steadily increase from USD0.8m in 2002 to USD1.5bn in 2006. ODA declined in the following year, to increase slightly again from 2009, reaching USD1.3bn. The ODA to GNI ratio has declined from 22.8% in 2002 to 11.1% in 2009.

### **The context in Nicaragua**

3.26. Nicaragua is perceived to be amongst the most corrupt countries in the Latin American region with a TI CPI rating of 2.6. This made Nicaragua amongst the 14<sup>th</sup> most corrupt countries in the world in 2009. Surveys<sup>24</sup> show that 75% of the population regards corruption as a problem though less than 5% have actually paid a bribe over a 12 month period before the surveys were undertaken. Community Information, Empowerment and Transparency, an internationally renowned social audit organisation, shows reduced corruption in most service delivery points outside the judiciary, including education, health, the police (though there was a modest reversal in 2008) and municipalities. In Nicaragua, grand corruption linked to political capture of state institutions is prevalent.

3.27. According to Freedom House, the quality of freedom in Nicaragua is at chronically low levels. The role of the media as a potential source of independent information and watch dog is undermined by main media outlets being controlled by a few family companies and, in some cases, having clear ties with political parties. An overall lack of mechanisms for accountability and transparency undermines citizens' ability to hold the Government and civil servants accountable.

3.28. The evaluation period spans two contrasting political regimes. In 2002, Enrique Bolaños came to power and instigated a wave of reforms, including AC, which donors actively supported. In 2007, the Sandinistas were re-elected under the leadership of Daniel Ortega. Since then, concerns about electoral fraud in the 2008 Municipal Elections, the acquittal of the ex-President Alemán for corruption charges, political capture of state institutions and the complex and non-transparent financial arrangements with Venezuela have combined to undermine donor confidence. Nicaragua has an AC legal framework in place and a series of strategies dating back to 1999, but many challenges remain with its actual implementation.

3.29. Nicaragua, until recently, received GBS from donors. ODA totalled USD70.7bn in 2009, up from USD0.5bn in 2002. ODA as a proportion to GNI has remained roughly the same over the evaluation period, at 13.1%.

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<sup>24</sup> Global Corruption Barometer. 2005.

## Donor contexts

3.30. The donors' approach to AC is equally defined by their commitment to the global fight against corruption, their choice of interventions to support partner countries' AC and good governance agenda, and the internal policy they have in place to prevent aid misuse.

3.31. Donor commitment to the global fight against corruption entails the ratification of international treaties, including UNCAC; international inter-agency cooperation in the field of money laundering and other global aspects of corruption; and support for international transparency initiatives, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).

3.32. All five commissioning donors saw their approach to AC evolve over the evaluation period alongside a shared international agenda, as they came to participate and support a number of initiatives, starting with UNCAC,<sup>25</sup> and, under the stewardship of the OECD DAC, the Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declarations on aid effectiveness and OECD DAC Principles on Anti-Corruption (2007).

3.33. At HQ, the evaluation period saw the global fight against corruption move up the commissioning donors' political agenda, as Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the UK ratified the UN Convention. While not a direct signatory, the ADB also actively supported the implementation of UNCAC as part the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, launched in 1999.

3.34. Together with UNCAC, the Paris Declaration (2005) has also shaped and transformed the donors' approach to AC over the evaluation period:

- As part of their commitment to the Paris Declaration principles, all five commissioning donors are committed to alignment with the partner countries' poverty reduction strategies, and in so doing, address corruption in the context of broader governance-strengthening efforts.
- The move from projects to programme-based approaches to aid (SWaPs and GBS) has also significantly changed the donors' approach to AC, as they started to give more attention – and support – to public sector financial management, as part of their commitment to align with partner countries' systems.
- As donors started investing more money through national systems, their programmes have also become more vulnerable to financial malpractice in the public sector, and in recent years, their concerns over the use of their own money have increased as a result of aid-related corruption scandals in government ministries, some of which – such as the health scandal in Zambia – received high publicity. This has prompted donors to strengthen their internal policy.

3.35. Annex C describes key developments over the evaluation period for each commissioning donor. It shows that not all donor agencies have developed a comprehensive and well-articulated approach to AC, linking their external interventions

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<sup>25</sup> UNCAC was adopted by the UN General Assembly by resolution in October 2003.

with internal policy. Apart from Danida, and to a lesser extent, ADB, no document was found in support of donor strategic approach to AC at country level.<sup>26</sup>

3.36. It also confirms wide differences in the size and nature of AC interventions, with projects ranging from less than USD100,000 to USD150m. For each donor, interventions also vary greatly from one country to the next, depending on their history of engagement in the country and their own particular strength or comparative advantage.

3.37. Finally, an overview of donor interventions, as given in Annex B, shows that with the exception of Zambia and Nicaragua, bilateral donors have started supporting government-led AC-specific interventions relatively recently, with many of their interventions previously focusing on governance reforms. At the same time, the commissioning donors have supported an increasingly wide range of autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions with a role to play in AC. Although support to dedicated AC agencies has remained central to their engagement, other key institutions have benefited from their support, including SAIs; Public Service Commissions; tax revenue authorities; Directors of Public Prosecution; and the national police. A few of them have received donor support in the form of financial aid and technical assistance (TA) for more than a decade; while many others have barely started, or are still in the process of receiving donor funding.<sup>27</sup>

## Conclusion

3.38. On the basis of this overview, the five countries can be to some extent classified in five categories, as shown in Box 4. This box does not look into the drivers of corruption, given the lack of coherent and substantial analysis in this area. Donor attempts to identify, and address, the causes and drivers of corruption are discussed in the following Chapter.

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26 The authors confirm this, noting that during interviews, some key donor informants principally referred to corruption in relation to the risk of aid misuse; others only discussed specific interventions, such as their support to AC Commissions; and many (unless prompted) failed to make the link between AC and their broader governance agenda.

27 At the time of the country visits, support was forthcoming for the following AC agencies: Financial Intelligence Unit (Norway) and the Ombudsman Office (Denmark) in Zambia and Ethics Secretariat, the Public Procurement Appeals Authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DFID) in Tanzania.

#### **Box 4: Five countries – five different sets of circumstances**

In **Bangladesh**, corruption is perceived as the highest amongst all five countries in the TI international survey; a perception confirmed by statistics on bribery payments, which affect the majority of the population on a daily basis. But there is an active and vocal civil society and a strong evidence base. Aid dependency is low but donors are valued for their innovation and support to policy. A period of so-called Caretaker Government created an opportunity for donors to gear up their AC involvement, even though political support has since waned. Support to civil society is a particularly strong element of donor engagement, which has remained high throughout the evaluation period.

In **Viet Nam**, aid dependency is low. Although civil society is not encouraged to work on advocacy issues in Viet Nam, and the media is closely controlled by the State, the Communist Party has shown increased commitment to AC over the evaluation period, with donors successfully building on opportunities presented by government and working in a harmonised way to improve the evidence base and strengthen policymaking in AC at a technical level.

In **Nicaragua**, aid dependency continues to be relatively high. While corruption is perceived to be high by the international community, in reality, grand corruption seems greatly to prevail over petty corruption. CSOs in Nicaragua are strong, but few are judged to be apolitical; the media is also widely seen to be partisan. The change in government in 2008, and the ambivalent position over reforms that followed, has brought a polarisation amongst the donor community between parties willing to engage with the State and parties who are not. By the end of 2010 all four commissioning donors engaged in the country had withdrawn or announced plans to withdraw, and none were continuing GBS. As a result, a promising joint donor AC initiative is now in decline.

**Tanzania** is the most aid dependent country out of the five countries. Over the course of the evaluation period, political commitment to tackle corruption has at times been high but not always consistent. As a result, donor support to AC has not always been forthcoming. At the same time, the fiduciary risk is considered sufficiently manageable for Tanzania to receive GBS from most donors, which have also focused on system strengthening as part of their move to launch basket funding mechanisms in core areas of public sector reforms. Recently, the media has been able to play a leading role in holding the Government to account over grand corruption scandals.

In **Zambia**, aid dependency has declined significantly over the years. In this country, the media and CSOs are relatively free to criticise government actions. Zambia was long portrayed as a country highly committed to AC, thanks to generous donor support. As of 2009, Zambia was the least corrupt countries amongst all five selected. Bribery payments are very high in some sectors (the police), but very low in others (health). The 2009 acquittal of former president Chiluba and recent corruption scandals, some involving donor money, have challenged the incumbent government to show genuine commitment to reforms. Like Tanzania, Zambia receives GBS, allowing donors to have close and regular interaction with key government ministries.

## 4. Relevance of donor anti-corruption interventions

### Summary of key points

- Donor engagement with AC has only been partly relevant to country circumstances.
- Donors have aligned their engagement to the host countries' AC priorities as part of broader good governance goals defined in national poverty reduction strategies. They have also positively influenced the host countries' domestic agenda by helping to build the capacity of AC agencies and develop national AC policies.
- Their attitude to the host government's pledge to fight grand corruption has varied, depending on the reputational risk involved and quality of partnership with the host governments. Donors have not shown the same level of tolerance in countries where fighting grand corruption was not part of the political agenda (Nicaragua, Viet Nam) nor the same level of support in countries where it was on the agenda (Bangladesh, Zambia, Tanzania). Part of the response lies in achieving a more effective balance between spend and non-spend interventions.
- Donor analysis of corruption issues has remained infrequent and incomplete; donors have not produced a comprehensive mapping of all corruption-related issues linked to a particular sector – the education sector in Bangladesh being an exception.
- Donors have not paid sufficient attention to the link between corruption and poverty, despite poverty reduction being their main mandate. Although this is in part explained by the lack of disaggregated data, donors could have made better use of the information generated by local and national surveys.
- The causal relationships between public sector corruption and the public sector reform programmes that donors support in all five countries have not yet been fully explored, key drivers of corruption have often been overlooked, and few governance projects contain specific reference to AC in their objectives.
- The link between AC and PFM has nonetheless strengthened over the years, with support to SAIs being seen as particularly relevant.
- Donor interventions have been broadly in line with UNCAC framework. However, prevention, detection and sanction mechanisms outside criminal law; support to the independence of the judiciary and its role in AC; private sector responsibility; increased funding and advocacy/dialogue for CSOs; focus on public reporting; and the link with the global agenda, have all been overlooked (outside isolated examples). The main exceptions include DFID and Swedish support to police in Bangladesh and Nicaragua, and ADB support for the judiciary in Bangladesh, which seek to promote integrity within the institutions themselves.

4.1. This Chapter seeks to respond to the general question in the ToR: *“Are the approaches employed by the five donors to address corruption (including its negative effects on poor people and women in particular) appropriate to country circumstances, and how could they be made more relevant?”*

4.2. The following criteria were used to assess the relevance of donor AC efforts:

- the extent to which their approach is aligned with country priorities
- the extent to which their approach and/or selected interventions are based on a comprehensive analysis of corruption in the host countries
- the extent to which their approach and/or selected interventions cover all aspects of AC, as defined by UNCAC.

4.3. The five country reports, the analysis carried out at HQ level as found in the inception report, and additional research on M&E (Annex D) form the basis of this Chapter.

### Alignment with country priorities

4.4. At a policy level, all commissioning donors have closely aligned their country strategies with partner countries' poverty reduction strategies. These strategies have provided donors with a broad framework for alignment with national AC priorities, which in turn have been typically defined as part of wider plans to promote good governance in each country.

4.5. Donors have not only aligned with partner countries' priorities, but have also helped to shape the partner countries' domestic agenda. As well as providing inputs to the poverty reduction strategies, they have provided technical expertise, and on some occasions, discussed with government, the drafting of national AC policies in all five countries. For example, DFID saw the Tanzanian government's invitation for input into NASCAP II as an opportunity to *"support it along the rather rigorous lines that have been developed and put in place for the core public sector reforms"*, and to *"help government develop a much more robust, results-oriented approach to combating corruption"*.<sup>28</sup> As part of its Good Governance Programme, the ADB has supported the drafting of a National Integrity Strategy in Bangladesh, and in Zambia, DFID worked with the AC Commission on drafting a national AC strategy and its implementation plan.

4.6. While a recent trend, the completion of national AC strategies in all five countries should help donors to strengthen their alignment with country priorities. For example, DFID's forthcoming Tackling Corruption Project in Tanzania will support NACSAP II implementation (although not through UNDP), and DFID's new programme in Zambia is also firmly based on the country's national AC policy and implementation plan (see Box 5).

4.7. Importantly, donors have also adjusted to changes in the partner countries' political agenda. They responded positively to government agendas to fight grand corruption<sup>29</sup> – some periods lasting a year; others a decade – and, in equal measure, they have adopted a 'wait and see' attitude when grand corruption remained outside the political agenda. Donor political alignment to AC comes with a number of risks:

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<sup>28</sup> DFID. 2007. *Tanzania Quality of Governance Assessment*.

<sup>29</sup> Windows of opportunities to do so included the Mwanawasa years in Zambia; the Caretaker Government in Bangladesh; the Warioba Report in Tanzania (pre-dating the evaluation period); and the Bolaños regime in Nicaragua.

4.8. Firstly, development agencies can face a strong reputational risk when supporting government-led initiatives to fight grand corruption; grand corruption cases tend unavoidably to be selective, and hence are often interpreted as politically-motivated.

4.9. A possible risk mitigation measure for donors and their embassies, it seems, is notionally to support a government's political discourse to fight grand corruption, but deliberately keep away from difficult partnerships, because of the lack of transparency and likely political interference. For example, while donors actively supported the Caretaker Government's pledge to fight grand corruption in Bangladesh, none, except for the ADB and, to a lesser extent, Denmark, have been willing to provide financial support to the AC Commission.<sup>30</sup> The politicisation of the AC Commission, and the uncertainty that comes with it, were the main reasons given by donors (including DFID) for not supporting its work.

#### **Box 5: The move to support national AC policy – an appropriate response?**

Donors have contributed effectively to the drafting of National AC policies in all five countries. The move to national AC policies remains a relatively recent phenomenon. Zambia and Viet Nam functioned without one until 2009, while Bangladesh has yet to finalise its planned National Integrity System, with support from the ADB.

Nicaragua and Tanzania have benefited from a longer experience, with AC strategies existing since the late 1990s. The recent strategies in Zambia (2009) and Tanzania (2006) share some useful characteristics in that they are based on corruption diagnosis studies as well as on a consultative process; they retain a legal focus and identify key initiatives alongside the AC chain; they identify key institutions relevant to AC and seek to involve other key actors (including the private sector); and they make the link between corruption and governance programmes. The key challenge lies in their implementation.

This evaluation finds that the main constraints to implementing national AC plans, as already shown in Zambia and Tanzania, are the lack of prioritisation, limited capacity and unclear ownership. In Tanzania, NACSAP I (the oldest national AC policy) received little buy-in from CSOs and the private sector, as this framework was not geared towards providing them with financial assistance. A key objective of NACSAP II (2006) is to complement the key public sector reform programmes and extend the focus of AC efforts beyond national ministries to local government, civil society and the private sector.

The responsibility for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the national action AC plans, is often unclear.<sup>31</sup> Even when given a clear mandate, there is a risk that a single agency may lack the political clout or capacity to coordinate and monitor the national AC action plan effectively.<sup>32</sup>

The salient question is whether national AC policies do indeed add real value to the fight against corruption. The country reports show that much can be achieved without a national AC policy: for example, Viet Nam is described in one review as having the most comprehensive AC legislative system in the region.

<sup>30</sup> Danida TA support had not yet begun by the end of 2009, despite Danida funds having been transferred to ADB.

<sup>31</sup> In Zambia, for example, the AC Commission and Cabinet Office will share the responsibility for overall M&E of the National AC Policy.

<sup>32</sup> For example, in Tanzania, Good Governance Coordination Unit has lacked sufficient capacity to monitor and coordinate NACSAP, in effect leaving PCCB in the lead.

4.10. Similarly, the PCCB in Tanzania only received funding from the UNDP (with Norwegian and Swedish support until 2005), until DFID and Norway decided to provide direct support to the PCCB specifically in the fight against grand corruption<sup>33</sup> and in the area of natural resource management<sup>34</sup> from 2008. Nevertheless, DFID recognises that the success of its new programme will hinge on the assumption that “*all legal, judicial and other organisations [...] are able effectively to play their roles without political interference*”.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, some AC institutions are clearly not open to external support, including the Permanent Office of the Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption in Viet Nam, which claims to have limited capacity to accept donor TA.

4.11. Secondly, donors can also face a high reputational risk, if they choose to ignore political corruption, as many stakeholders back home and in the partner countries put this choice down to donor preference for maintaining good relationships with the host government. Donors can indeed be seen as incoherent. In Nicaragua, some commissioning donors decided to go against government ownership and withdraw from the AC Fund because of the government lack of commitment to fight grand corruption and wider donor disengagement in this country. This contrasts with Viet Nam, where donors have favoured a gradual approach to AC and decided to keep away from the politically-sensitive issue of grand and/or political corruption.

4.12. That corruption in Nicaragua is mostly perceived as political (with sectoral indicators in service delivery corruption showing a gradual improvement in recent years) may, in part, explain donors’ stance in this country. In contrast, the Zambia National AC Plan is not explicit on how government intends to address grand and political corruption but this has not stopped donors supporting it.

4.13. Thirdly, in aligning to successive governments’ political agendas, donors face the risk of being subject to the vagaries of the host countries’ political or electoral cycle. The Bangladesh country study epitomises this situation: even though donors anticipated the possibility of a decline in political commitment after the 2008 elections, all responded positively to the Caretaker Government’s AC pledge. DFID’s interim Country Assistance Plan (2007-09), which was drafted during the Caretaker Government years, mentions the word corruption 17 times and goes as far as singling out “*corruption and messy politics*” as one of the main reasons for continued poverty in the country. Yet, its vision that “*by 2012, government will have continued the work begun by the caretaker government [...] and will be actively fighting corruption*”, was discarded by the time the Country Plan (2009-14) was drafted, indicating a less open and intentional approach by DFID to fighting corruption in the country after the 2008 elections. This lack of consistency demonstrates how challenging it can be to work in an environment where government commitment to AC fluctuates.

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33 The project, worth £6m, aims to strengthen the ability of the Government of Tanzania’s institutions related to investigating and prosecuting grand corruption to fulfil their mandate. The project had barely started at the beginning of the country visit (February 2010).

34 Norway entered into an agreement with PCCB in January 2007 for support to consultations around the ‘Whistleblower Protection Bill’ and a main agreement for supporting PCCB in June 2008.

35 DFID. 2008. *Tackling Corruption Project Project Memorandum*. Tanzania.



4.14. In conclusion, donor alignment to country priorities has remained satisfactory at policy level. Donors have positively influenced AC domestic agendas and the recent launch of national AC policies should allow for a closer donor alignment with national AC efforts. Donors have also responded positively to host governments' agendas to fight grand corruption. In countries where fighting grand corruption has not been part of the political agenda, donor attitude has nonetheless varied and appears to have lacked coherence, depending on the quality of partnerships with host governments and/or key AC institutions. This appears to determine, to a large extent, the level of donor engagement in the fight against corruption.

4.15. Establishing that donors adequately take the context into account requires more than a broad alignment with country priorities; donors also need to demonstrate they have a solid understanding of the forms and causes of corruption that prevail in partner countries, and, that their account of corruption in specific programmes is adequate. This is discussed in the following section.

### Quality of donor analysis

#### Forms of corruption

4.16. Notwithstanding their alignment with country priorities and support to key diagnosis surveys, donor analysis of corruption has overall been relatively narrow, as well as irregular. Largely produced as part of broader governance assessments, their analysis has focused principally on policy and legislative measures, grand corruption, PFM and other country systems issues.<sup>36</sup>

4.17. Petty corruption issues are hardly mentioned and there is no differentiated analysis across sectors. Similarly, donors have paid adequate attention to financial management issues (including procurement) as part of their move to SWaP mechanisms, but have given less attention to other aspects of corruption such as in the infrastructure sector in Viet Nam, and health sector in Zambia.<sup>37</sup> Even on grand corruption issues, donors (outside the TFC in Zambia) have failed to take a comprehensive approach, instead paying attention mostly to specific cases, many linked to the use of their own money.

4.18. Although this can in part be explained by the lack of available disaggregated data, documentation review shows that donors in fact rarely use the information and statistics generated by the many valuable local and national surveys to inform their analysis. This is all the more puzzling since donors have often paid for these surveys, as well as encouraged countries like Zambia and Tanzania to develop an M&E framework in support of their national AC policies. Instead, donors have continued to rely principally on TI CPI and other international data, such as those pro-

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36 In Bangladesh, the Good Governance Programme makes extensive reference to an ADB Country Governance Assessment completed in 2004. In this report and associated project documents, ADB adequately reports as well as assesses the extent of corruption in Bangladesh, by looking at 'Corruption as a key Governance Problem' as well the 'Issues and Opportunities' required to tackle the problem, especially in term of the AC Commission. ADB. *Proposed Program Loan and Technical Assistance Grant*. Good Governance Programme.

37 These two examples were based on a value chain approach, which looks at potential malpractice at all stages of the investment cycle, namely policymaking and regulation; budgeting and planning; financing; programme design and management; tendering and procurement; construction; and operation, maintenance and monitoring. It was used as key reference in the Zambia and Viet Nam country reports.

duced by the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, to monitor corruption and AC in partner countries.<sup>38</sup>

4.19. In the absence of a comprehensive, regular, and evidence-based analysis of corruption in partner countries, donors' approach to AC has been unable to inform policymaking in a convincing way. Although they have pressed for some specific actions, such as the finalisation of a national AC plan or the prosecution of grand corruption cases, they have been unable to provide genuine guidance to the host governments and institutions that they support, on how to prioritise actions, and this is often in countries that have limited resources on the ground.

4.20. There are some instances of donor support prioritising one form of corruption over another, starting with DFID's Tackling Corruption Project in Tanzania, which specifically focuses on grand corruption. Whether the focus on a particular form of corruption or sector is appropriate depends, however, on the quality of the diagnosis behind it, and this has been weak overall.

4.21. The synthesis nonetheless identifies some emerging good practices, on which donors could draw:

- **Service delivery sector:** In Bangladesh, donors started gradually to acknowledge governance and corruption issues in the education sector, after a governance working group was created to support dialogue and monitoring under their joint Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP). As a result, key aspects of mismanagement, from teachers' recruitment to school management, were looked at; and by 2009, corruption was mentioned openly in their joint monitoring report. ADB also had plans to conduct Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments in selected sectors, including education; although the drafts have yet to be widely shared with other donors.
- **Use of local/national data:** In Zambia, DFID's Acting Together programme, which started in 2010, makes some useful – yet still quite limited – reference to the local and national surveys, and, in Viet Nam, DFID-World Bank's Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Program (GAPAP) has, amongst other things, supported the successful negotiation of a new governance module for the VHLSS. Drawing from this survey, the Viet Nam Development Report 2010 contains a section on corruption which uses recent survey information.
- **Frequency of analysis:** DFID and Sweden have also started assessing the risk of corruption in all five partner countries on a more regular basis, using a wide range of international indicators, using information generated through Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reviews. Produced as part of their annual Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) since 2009, this is a significant step forward in monitoring country circumstances more closely and regularly. It is worth noting, however, that DFID's FRAs are in fact only carried out periodically, with an annual statement of progress and, are not necessarily circulated to government and among development partners.<sup>39</sup>

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38 The impartiality, quality and methodology of TI's CPI have been questioned, because the Index is mostly based on the perception of selected international actors.

39 For their FRA, donors typically use PFM assessment, such as PEFA and IMF Safeguard Assessments. Yet there are important gaps between the two – of up to 6 years. As a result, donors monitor and update the ten PEFA indicators themselves on a yearly basis, using secondary or additional evidence. Restrictions were placed on quoting from DFID FRA for one country in this evaluation.

- **Prioritisation:** Zambia's AC Commission decided to pilot Integrity Committees in all state institutions which the 2003 National Governance Baseline Survey had identified as being perceived as the most corrupt. This is a good, but rare, example of evidence-based prioritisation in AC.

### **The impact of corruption on poverty**

4.22. Another major weakness in donor analysis of corruption is that despite poverty reduction being their main mandate, donors have not made explicit the links between AC and poverty reduction. Beyond general statements,<sup>40</sup> no donors have produced an in-depth analysis on the likely impact that all forms of corruption – grand and petty – may have on different sections of the population, including women.<sup>41</sup>

4.23. Donor support for TI-Bangladesh is an exception, with the programme putting special emphasis on poverty and gender issues. Bribe payments at service delivery is where the most direct evidence on the links between corruption and poverty exists. For example, national surveys in Zambia confirm that low income households are disproportionately penalised by paying bribes that represent a greater share of their income; and that, although the incidence of bribery is roughly similar in urban and rural areas, its prevalence is higher in urban areas.<sup>42</sup>

### **Drivers of corruption and theory of change**

4.24. Donor attempts to understand what drives corruption and how to fight it have also remained limited and poorly evidenced. Since the early 2000s, partly in response to slow progress, donors have commissioned a number of key studies that seek to explore the political economy of governance reforms. These studies are based on the recognition that donors need to look beyond what their risk analysis refers to as 'the lack of political will' and dig more deeply into the many layers of incentives, rules and constraints – formal and informal – that characterise the host country's institutional make-up.

4.25. By and large, however, the evaluation finds that these governance studies, including for example, DFID's Drivers of Change in Viet Nam (2007) and Sida's Power Analysis in Tanzania (2005),<sup>43</sup> have remained too broad and generic to provide sufficient guidance for donors. Even in Bangladesh, where political economy analysis is the most advanced, thanks to the valuable contribution of national independent think-tanks, donors have struggled to produce convincing theories of change linking government interventions with reduced corruption/increased accountability in an explicit manner. As stated by Duncan et al. (2003),<sup>44</sup> *"there is widespread agreement on the nature of the problems in Bangladesh, and even on*

40 As reported in the Literature Review (op.cit.), the general argument is summed up in UNDP's Anti-corruption Practice Note (2004): *"The negative impact of corruption on development is no longer questioned. Evidence from across the globe confirms that corruption disproportionately impacts the poor. Corruption hinders economic development, reduces social services, and diverts investments in infrastructure, institutions and social services. Moreover, it fosters an anti-democratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. Corruption, therefore, reflects a democracy, human rights and governance deficit that negatively impacts on poverty and human security"*.

41 It is worth noting however, that establishing a formal policy on using the money from the disposal of recovered assets for poverty reduction was a condition for donor support to the TFC in Zambia.

42 According to Afrobarometer (2009), 79% of respondents never had to pay a bribe to a health worker in the past year.

43 Hyden, G. 2005. *Why Things Happen the Way they Do. A Power Analysis of Tanzania*. Sida.

44 Duncan, A., Sharif, I., Landell-Mills, P., Hulme, D. and Roy, J. 2003. *Bangladesh. Supporting the Drivers of Pro-Poor Change*.

what needs to be done. There is little agreement, however, on how to go about it".<sup>45</sup>

4.26. Looking more specifically at corruption, DFID has started to produce some analysis on what drives corruption as part of their FRAs (see 4.19). A summary of donor findings is given in Box 6. None of these findings are supported by empirical evidence nor have been the subject of in-depth study. Largely ad hoc, they don't form solid foundations for donor interventions. In addition, some widely-held allegations that aid, World Bank structural adjustment programmes (notably privatisation), or the introduction of multi-party politics may have contributed to corruption, are ignored.

**Box 6: Example of drivers of corruption as highlighted in donor documents**

Bangladesh: DFID<sup>46</sup> assesses that corruption in Bangladesh is driven from the top down through the public administration, leading to ineffective mid-level administration and widespread corruption at the lower level of civil society and service delivery – a conclusion with potentially important policy implications.

Tanzania: DFID identifies low pay, limited instances of prosecution, and the existence of discretionary and monopolistic powers as the main causes or vectors of corruption in the country. Yet there is overall little evidence to support these findings, with other studies, for example, arguing that the link between low pay and corruption in Tanzania remains tenuous.<sup>47</sup>

Zambia: In an issues paper on the risk of corruption produced in 2008 for the group of donors supporting the TFC, drivers of corruption are summarised as follows: *"Low salaries and a disregard for control mechanisms under the latter years of the previous administration are considered as major drivers of a culture of corruption in public life."* In fact, the empirical evidence on causes and drivers of corruption in Zambia remains extremely limited.<sup>48</sup> No cause of corruption can be prioritised or singled out, with low salary of public officials, the lack of transparent and accountable political process, poor economic policies and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms joining a long list of other factors.<sup>49</sup>

4.27. In the absence of a strong evidence base on the forms and drivers of corruption, donors at large have continued to follow a 'one-size-fits-for-all' approach to fighting systemic and endemic corruption. In recent years, they have increasingly recognised the need to combine their interventions with dialogue to influence policy (see Chapter 6). Institution building and governance reforms remain nonetheless the two main entry points by which they expect their interventions, individually or collectively, to lead to behavioural change. Their main theory of change assumptions can be summarised as followed:

45 On the donor side, Foot, S. and Mubin, A.K. 2007. *Political Economy Assessment for Review of Financial Management Reform Programme*. DFID Bangladesh, remains one of the most advanced and researched studies. This study identifies vested interest amongst top civil servants that lead to resistance in financial management and civil service reforms in Bangladesh.

46 DFID Internal Documentation. 2009.

47 Fjeldstad, O. 2003. *Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority*. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.

48 For example, the World Bank-led Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (2003) analyses the link between low pay and corruption, mostly using Tanzania as an example.

49 Government of Zambia (2004) National Governance Baseline Survey, Lusaka.

- The main entry point to reducing corruption is to enhance the capacity of the country's institutions to implement and monitor AC initiatives.
- Support is needed on the demand side of governance reforms,<sup>50</sup> the 'agents of change' being identified as civil society, but also increasingly parliament and other check-and-balance institutions.
- There is no quick fix to fighting corruption,<sup>51</sup> with institutional strengthening and governance reforms being a long-term undertaking.

4.28. Academic research has convincingly challenged some of the above assumptions, which are all based on a principal-agent model.<sup>52</sup> While collecting primary data to test the above, theories of change were outside the scope of the evaluation. The five country case studies also provide ample evidence indicating a number of 'blind spots' from the donor community. Facts that donors had yet fully to acknowledge in their response to AC include:

- Agents of change, including CSOs, let alone elected politicians, are often perceived as lacking legitimacy, and are poorly representative of the population, with many facing some instances of corruption.
- Even with rising awareness of corruption and, in some countries, strengthened whistle-blower protection mechanisms, few actors seem prepared to report acts of corruption.
- Many institutions with a role to play in AC have lacked independence, professionalism and integrity.
- Weak rule of law, and with it, the lack of effective sanction mechanisms, is a binding constraint on the fight against corruption in all five country case studies.

### **Analysis of corruption in selected donor interventions**

4.29. At project level, documentation shows that few intervention logics contain specific reference to AC in their objectives. A good practice example of a theory of change can be teased out from the TI-Bangladesh project, 'Making Waves'. As illustrated in Box 7,<sup>53</sup> this project is based on a comprehensive results chain, with clear Inputs-Outputs-Purpose-Goal statements, and a focus on behavioural change, the project goal being to increase government accountability at all levels. By contrast, as further described in Annex B, many AC-specific projects have been designed to develop capacity and improve performance of the beneficiary institutions, with only an implicit link to increased accountability/reducing corruption as the overarching goal.


50 Demand-side governance refers to actions benefiting non-state actors that have a role to play in holding government to account. Supply-side governance refers to actions targeting directly the public sector, including the executive and the judiciary.

51 As concluded by Verulam Associates Ltd. 2009. *Governance Assessment: Bangladesh Country Assistance Evaluation*. The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank: "Donor interventions have been insufficient to achieve change or have relied naively on the political will of an outgoing regime and a progressive but temporary and aptly named Caretaker Government. Given the nature of the problems, their scale and complexity, a 'quick fix' remains as elusive as it was in the early 1990s."

52 See for example, Rothstein, B. *Anti-Corruption: The Indirect "Big Band" Approach*. Review of International Political Economy; and Person, A., Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. *The failure of AC Policies : A Theoretical Mischaracterisation of the Problem*. The QOG Institute, June 2010; which question donor approaches to AC, based on a principal-agent model, bringing new evidence that drivers of corruption are instead better explained by a collective action/social trap model, under which all agents recognise that corruption is 'a bad thing' but that the costs of acting fairly would be simply too high, compared to the benefits of acting corruptly.

53 The text in Box 7 is copied from the description of project objectives. The connecting statements have been added.

### Box 7: Theory of change for 'Making Waves', support to TI-Bangladesh



4.30. To confirm the above analysis further, the five country reports show that the causal relationships between the good governance programmes that donors support in the public sector, and the fight against public sector corruption, remain largely unexplored.

4.31. Looking at the quality of analysis, donors argue that not mentioning the word 'corruption' in interventions designed to support government programmes is, to a large part, tactical. Yet not mentioning the 'C-word' seems at times to have come at the expense of an in-depth analysis of public sector corruption. Notably, some key features or drivers of corruption were clearly overlooked in donor diagnostic analysis, including; the issue of party financing in their support to the elections (all countries),<sup>54</sup> issues of irregularities in public sector recruitment in the area of civil service reforms (Zambia), and the collusion between businesses and the government in their support to private sector reforms (Viet Nam, Zambia).

4.32. Furthermore, donor support for public sector reforms, by and large, were found to have no objectives or intended policy outcomes that refer to reduced corruption or increased accountability. ADB's Good Governance Programme in Bangladesh is the only instance of a donor-supported governance programme that aims

54 See footnote 4.39.

explicitly at supporting “*improved governance and lower incidence of corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh*”.<sup>55</sup>

4.33. PFM is another exception. The link between PFM reforms and AC has indeed strengthened and become more explicit over the years. Although not measuring corruption directly, PEFA reviews in Zambia and Tanzania were found to cover fiduciary risk, corruption, and system issues in a relatively balanced and comprehensive manner. Furthermore, if PFM reform programmes launched in the early part of the evaluation period in Zambia and Tanzania do not seek directly to tackle corruption, improving financial transparency and accountability has now become an established goal for the host governments and donors that support them.

4.34. In conclusion, the quality of donor analysis – and with it, an appropriate response to the specific forms and drivers of corruption that characterise each partner country – has overall been weak. Donors do not seem to allocate enough resources to ensure that they can both help generate and use up-to-date, aggregated and disaggregated, data on forms and drivers corruption. Their appreciation of corruption taking different forms depending on sectors also appears limited. The link between donor-supported public sector reform programmes and AC remains particularly weak, as is the link between AC and poverty reduction goal.

### **Relevance of donor interventions against UN Convention against Corruption**

4.35. This section assesses the relevance of commissioning donor interventions against UNCAC, as mapped out in Annex B. It is found that not all key donor interventions selected and identified for their potential links with AC are relevant.

#### **AC laws and agencies**

4.36. As already discussed, donors have thrown their weight behind drafting national AC policies and their implementation plans (Article 5). They have also supported the drafting of relevant legal instruments. Many donor interventions in AC and governance, from DFID support to the AC Commission in Zambia to ADB’s Good Governance Programme in Bangladesh, indeed entail a component focusing on strengthening the country’s legal, policy and regulatory framework. With support from Sweden, Danida, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and UNDP, the National Assembly in Viet Nam has also become more active in the supervision of law-making, including AC issues. Furthermore, most donors intervened to support UNCAC ratification in the partner countries, by revising their own strategy, providing TA (Viet Nam), commissioning UNCAC gap analysis (Tanzania), and funding dissemination activities (Bangladesh).

4.37. UNCAC calls for the establishment of AC preventive bodies (Article 6) as well as authorities specialised in the criminalisation and law enforcement of corruption (Article 36). In Bangladesh, Zambia, and Tanzania, donors support AC agencies that

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<sup>55</sup> This programme appears to take fully on board major corruption issues within public administration – the objectives of the programme being to (i) strengthen the ongoing consensus building on good governance, integrity and AC reforms; (ii) support judicial reforms with a focus on the performance, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, particularly on its role in the AC agenda; (iii) strengthen the role and reach of the AC Commission so that it can better fight corruption; and (iv) bring good governance and AC initiatives into the mainstream within selected sectoral level agencies to enhance their effectiveness.

follow the Hong-Kong ‘dedicated’ AC Commission model, with activities ranging from prevention to prosecution. The Nicaragua and Viet Nam country reports also show that donors have supported other AC approaches. In Nicaragua, for example, the Attorney General’s Office, which receives donor support under the AC Fund, acts as the State’s legal advisor on both corruption and non-corruption matters.<sup>56</sup> In Viet Nam, the Government Inspectorate leads on AC activities.

### **Integrity of public officials and civil servants**

4.38. Donor programmes to support civil service reforms in Zambia, Bangladesh, and Viet Nam, are key in the fight against corruption (Article 7.1). Donor programmes in this area started relatively late in Bangladesh, with no support provided between 2002 and 2006; by contrast, Zambia and Viet Nam benefited from more historical engagement from DFID and ADB respectively.

4.39. The evaluation finds, however, that outside the ADB Good Governance Programme in Bangladesh, donor support for prevention, detection and sanction of AC mechanisms within public administration<sup>57</sup> has remained small-scale, ad hoc and largely uncoordinated. In Zambia, for example, service delivery charters<sup>58</sup> have been produced in four ministries as part of the DFID-supported Public Sector Management programme. Yet, according to the Mid-Term Review, *“the utility and therefore relevance of these charters are likely to be lost because of a lack of an integrated approach”*. The fact that AC Commissions in countries like Bangladesh and Zambia tend to refer many cases to relevant agencies in the public sector for administrative action, further reinforces the need for donors to pay more attention to existing AC administrative mechanisms.

4.40. All donors have supported electoral commissions whose mandate is to ensure transparent and fair electoral processes. Donors have on some occasions, and often ahead of electoral campaigns, taken a stance on the need for transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office, and where applicable, the funding of political parties (Article 7.2-3).<sup>59</sup>

### **PFM reforms**

4.41. Donor support to public procurement and management of public finances is central to the fight against corruption as defined by UNCAC (Article 9). Typically, categories of PFM programmes that can be seen as directly relevant to AC include: ensuring a consistent and harmonised legal framework; developing a more transparent budget process; strengthening internal controls; enhancing the external auditing functions and parliamentary oversight; and improving the public procurement system – all of these categories being scored in PEFA reviews. Any progress

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<sup>56</sup> In recent years, funding from the AC Fund was also spent on setting up specialised AC units in key institutions with a broader mandate, starting with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

<sup>57</sup> As well as calling for transparent recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement mechanisms in public administration, UNCAC makes reference to a range of administrative prevention, detection and sanction AC mechanisms (i.e. outside criminal law) that can be used to promote the integrity of civil service. These mechanisms (not all explicitly mentioned by UNCAC) include introducing service delivery charters and codes of conduct; implementing asset declaration mechanisms; establishing robust reporting and monitoring mechanisms; and supporting clear lines of accountability that support independent complaint handling and disciplinary mechanisms, such as those carried out by the Ombudsman and Public Service Commission.

<sup>58</sup> Typically, these client service charters lay out service standards as well as what is expected from customers, which includes not to offer any bribe.

<sup>59</sup> During completion of this synthesis, it was noted that in the course of 2010, Tanzania GBS development partners has had high focus on political party financing through dialogue in GBS Annual Review and agreed actions on the passing of the Election Expenses Act. This is in combination with support to the CSO Legal and Human Rights Centre that took a case to High Court challenging the use of bribes in election campaigns, which the CSO won and thus caused a precedent. This was then included in the Election Expenses Act.



made in these areas, thanks to donor support, can therefore be seen as adequate steps towards reducing corruption in PFM.

4.42. All countries benefited from donor support in this area. Importantly, the move to basket funding in Tanzania and Zambia allowed donor support to reach out to SAIs and procurement agencies. Sweden and Norway have long provided bilateral support to SAIs in these two countries.

4.43. Strengthening public revenue management – an important aspect of PFM, which does not come out strongly enough in UNCAC and is supported by donors outside PFM basket funding – has received increased attention from Norway, as part of its White Paper (2008-09) focus on climate, conflict and capital.<sup>60</sup> DFID has also supported Tax Revenue Authorities in Zambia, Bangladesh, and Tanzania over the evaluation period.

#### **Integrity of the judiciary and prosecution services**

4.44. Also concerning integrity, UNCAC dedicates a full article (Article 11) on measures to strengthen the integrity and independence of the judiciary and prosecution services. Insofar as actions to improve police behaviour adequately address corruption within it, police reform programmes in Bangladesh and Nicaragua were found potentially highly relevant to the fight against corruption. Because of the reputational risk involved, donor support to national police forces in these two countries has traditionally focused as much on promoting a human rights-based approach to good police behaviour as on enhancing their overall performance and capacity. This is good practice and in line with UNCAC.

4.45. By contrast, donors have paid little attention to strengthening integrity in the judiciary. Corruption within the judiciary, in fact, remains the main reason for donor lack of engagement in this sector. In Viet Nam, for example, the (then recently-launched) Justice Partnership Programme, supported by the European Commission/Sweden and Sida, did not have an explicit AC component in its work plans. Danida support to CSO in the judiciary sector and ADB Good Governance Programme<sup>61</sup> in Bangladesh were the only exceptions.

4.46. Looking beyond police and the judiciary, it was found that donors did not always seek to promote integrity in other key institutions with a role to play in AC. For example, the issue of integrity of tax revenue authorities was overlooked in countries like Zambia and Bangladesh, less so in Tanzania,<sup>62</sup> despite their being perceived as highly corrupt; tax revenue authorities have also a role to play in fighting tax evasion.

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60 This includes Norway's support to the Ministry of Finance in strengthening revenue management in the mining sector in Zambia and Norway's support to the Zambia Revenue Authority to conduct cost audits of mining companies. See ongoing study, CMI, Norwegian Support to Strengthening the Tax Systems in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

61 ADB programme goals entailed to support the separation of the judiciary from the executive; and promote better reporting mechanisms and an effective implementation of asset declarations within the judiciary sector.

62 DFID has been funding TA to the Tanzania Revenue Authority since 2001. DFID's support to the Tanzania Revenue Authority Third Corporate Plan (2008-13) includes a component dealing with improving staff competence, motivation and accountability, with Enforcement of the reviewed Code of Conduct and AC Strategy identified as a major component in the strategic goals. Similar measures were introduced in Zambia, after DFID support came to an end.

## **Private sector**

4.47. Donor-funded private sector reform programmes are at odds with UNCAC Article 12, because they do not fully acknowledge the role and responsibility of the private sector in the fight against corruption. Instead, they are mostly concerned with promoting legal, regulatory and administrative reforms in support of a more conducive environment to businesses. Even when reducing corruption is an objective, such as in the DFID Regulatory and Investment Systems for Enterprise (RISE) programme in Bangladesh,<sup>63</sup> the role and responsibility of the private sector is not fully acknowledged, as the onus for reforms falls on public institutions providing a service to businesses.

4.48. Unlike UNCAC Article 12, measures to prevent corruption involving the private sector, such as enhancing accounting and auditing standards, promoting transparency, and preventing conflicts of interest are not properly explored, notwithstanding the fact that corruption in all five countries is recognised as a two-way street.<sup>64</sup>

4.49. The evaluation also finds that donor agencies were not sufficiently involved in promoting the role and responsibility of foreign businesses in relation to AC, notwithstanding donor HQ contribution to vertical initiatives, such as the EITI (Tanzania, Zambia) and the DFID-World Bank pilot Construction Sector Transparency (CoST) (Zambia, Viet Nam, Tanzania). In fact, Norway's decision to provide TA to the Zambia Revenue Authority to conduct cost audits of mining companies is the only example of donor in-country intervention under which foreign businesses are indirectly held to account.<sup>65</sup>

## **Participation of civil society and public reporting**

4.50. With the exception of Bangladesh, donor money earmarked to non-state actors remains minimal when compared with aid allocated to the government sector. Donors are confronted with a number of external constraints when seeking partnerships with CSOs. These include a limited political space (Viet Nam)<sup>66</sup> or unconducive environment, poor absorption capacity (Tanzania, Viet Nam), and poor governance within the institutions themselves. As a result, donor spending is often restricted in this area. The country reports find that donors could nonetheless do more to scale up their support to CSOs with a strong governance and AC focus, with activities of particular relevance including service delivery monitoring, budget tracking and advocacy. Furthermore, as much as CSOs value the financial support that they receive from donors, they equally value opportunities for dialogue with donors.

4.51. In countries where freedom of expression has been limited or threatened, donors have not been seen as systematically encouraging the host governments to maintain a conducive environment for the participation of society in AC (as high-

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63 RISE programme aims to reduce the regulatory costs of doing business by 25%, and a 50% reduction in informal payments/corruption to GoB agencies.

64 UNCAC Article 12 is focused on the role of the formal private sector, which can be seen as equally a driver (through activities ranging from bribe-taking to state capture) and a victim of corruption (notably red tape). By contrast, informal businesses – while bribe payers – are more on the receiving end.

65 Norway has also funded an audit of foreign gold companies in Tanzania in 2010, with a specific focus on the use of financial instruments such as hedging.

66 In Viet Nam, there is a lack of recognition that CSOs have a relevant role.

lighted in UNCAC Article 13), although there are some exceptions.<sup>67</sup> Donors have not supported public reporting (Article 10) in a systematic manner either. There are sufficient examples to show that donors have promoted access to information laws, either through dialogue or via their support to AC Commissions.<sup>68</sup> However, their support to the media and parliament has remained ad hoc, with most commissioning donors preferring to work through other agencies, and the need for better public reporting (from host governments and donors alike) is systematically underestimated.

### **Criminalisation**

4.52. The UNCAC Chapter on Criminalisation and Law Enforcement (Chapter III) lays out the types of “*legislative and other measures [...] necessary to establish [as] criminal offences*” and promotes “*cooperation between national bodies*” and “*between national bodies and the private sector for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption offences*”. This Chapter was used to map donor programmes supporting the judiciary and police.

4.53. It was found that most of these programmes did not seek explicitly to support the judiciary and police in fighting economic crime. Instead, donors in some countries have thrown their weight behind dedicated AC agencies whose role is to prevent corruption (Articles 5 and 6) and, “*combat corruption through law enforcement*” (Article 36). Yet, while AC commissions reviewed in this evaluation have the power to prosecute, they entirely depend on the court system to ensure criminal convictions. The mapping of donor activities against UNCAC reveals that the level of donor support to the judicial system (on the supply side) has remained relatively low. Even where supported, these sectors have received no support for dealing specifically with economic crimes, the bulk of financial assistance being spent (perhaps necessarily so) on organisational reforms and infrastructure.<sup>69</sup> A notable exception is the police force in Nicaragua which benefited from the AC Fund in the later years.

### **Asset recovery and international cooperation**

4.54. Money laundering and illicit financial flows are relatively new topics for the commissioning donors, many of whom continue to work through multilateral agencies, and in doing so, support initiatives such as the World Bank-UN Office on Drugs and Crime Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative (which DFID Bangladesh also supported during the Caretaker Government), and support to the International Centre for Asset Recovery and Interpol.

4.55. The main instance of donor intervention in this area remains the TFC in Zambia, whose mandate was not only to investigate cases of corruption during Chiluba’s regime (1991-2001) but also prepare prosecution cases and recover stolen assets. The TFC addressed illicit financial flows on a number of fronts; first by involving all relevant key agencies, namely, Zambia Police, Drug Enforcement Commis-

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67 For example, donor advocacy in favour of CSOs in Zambia, whose freedom was threatened by the 2009 Non-Governmental Organisation Act, appeared limited at the time (field notes, CSO workshop). By contrast, Sweden’s decision to withhold budget support that year was in part based on concerns over this Act.

68 For example, Sweden, stressed the importance of Right to Information and Transparency in Tanzania, with the ambassador particularly active on this front during the Swedish European Union (EU) Presidency in 2009. Donor support to Nicaragua AC Fund entailed developing a legal framework, including access to information.

69 In Zambia, DFID and Norway provided some funding of training for the judiciary on handling serious economic crime cases, but this was a one-off initiative.

sion, AC Commission, and Zambia Intelligence Security Services; and second by promoting international cooperation with donor countries which actively participated in foreign investigation as well as the cost of lawyers. The disbanding of the TFC clearly leaves a gap in those areas, which the serious fraud unit within AC Commission and Norway's forthcoming support to Financial Intelligence Unit in Zambia will only partly fill.<sup>70</sup>

4.56. In light of the above, the synthesis concludes that not all donor interventions mapped against UNCAC were found to be aligned with the UNCAC proposed range of preventive and criminalisation measures. Potential gaps in donor support that do not necessarily require more money but do each call for further attention are:

- prevention, detection and sanction AC mechanisms outside criminal law (i.e. within public administration)
- support to the independence of the judiciary and its role in AC
- private sector responsibility
- increased funding and advocacy/dialogue for CSOs
- increased focus on public reporting
- fostering the link between donor in-country and HQ-led global AC efforts.

## Conclusions

4.57. The five country reports assess the relevance of donor support, taking into consideration the UNCAC legal and regulatory framework; country circumstances; and what other donors are doing. The presence, strength and comparative advantages of selected donors were noted as followed:

- German Technical Cooperation (GTZ): GTZ has delivered TA effectively to implement UNCAC in countries, including Zambia and Bangladesh. Funded under the German UNCAC Project, activities include mainstreaming, advocating compliance (in particular through gaps and compliance reviews) and capacity building.
- USAID: USAID has led business reforms (Viet Nam, Zambia) and worked closely with some AC bodies (Bangladesh, Zambia, Tanzania). USAID's approach (which is in part described in Chapter 5) seems relevant to UNCAC Article 12. USAID has also a stake in strengthening parliament in countries, like Bangladesh.
- World Bank: The World Bank is an effective lead donor in joint donor-supported public sector and PFM reforms in Viet Nam, Tanzania and Zambia. Linking up with the World Bank on asset recovery initiatives, such as StAR, is also needed.
- IMF: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays a key role in strengthening banking regulations and compliance. In Tanzania, the IMF Safeguard Assessments were used to monitor progress made following the EPA scandal.
- European Commission: The European Commission is a lead donor in the justice and police sector in many countries, including Nicaragua, where it is a partner with some commissioning partners in joint donor programmes.
- UNDP: The UNDP is a lead donor in a number of joint donor programmes, especially with regard to support to the elections and longer term democratisation. The UNDP is one of the leading donors in AC in Tanzania and supported the AC Fund in Nicaragua.

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<sup>70</sup> This initiative was initiated globally from HQ under the leadership of Eva Joly.

4.58. The synthesis conclusion regarding relevance points to significant areas where donors collectively are not doing enough. These range from strengthening the quality and frequency of analysis based on an appropriate mix of national and international, qualitative and quantitative indicators to focusing on specific AC prevention and criminalisation mechanisms as agreed under UNCAC. Box 8 complements this analysis by assessing the relevance of past and ongoing donor efforts depending on country circumstances. Overall recommendations on how to make donor interventions more relevant to country circumstances are given in Chapter 7.

#### **Box 8: Relevance of AC efforts in various country circumstances**

The ADB and bilateral donors' approach to AC in Bangladesh provides an insightful contrast; whereas bilateral donors threw their weight behind the Caretaker Government's AC pledge, only to keep AC relatively low on their agenda for engagement with the authorities before and after that, ADB retained a strong focus on AC throughout. Such an approach appears appropriate in allowing donors to show a consistent and transparent approach to AC, which is anchored in international treaties and retains independence from fluctuating domestic politics. Continued donor support for TI-Bangladesh (the 'demand' side of governance) complements this approach well. The programme 'Making Waves' focused explicitly on fighting corruption in basic public services (education and health), hence allowing a targeted approach to AC that makes explicit linkages with poverty and gender. A human rights-based approach to police reform projects allowed a sharper focus on police behaviour, including in relation to corruption. Donors have also started to put corruption at the centre of their preoccupations in the education sector.

Tanzania's use of GBS as a platform for dialogue (as further discussed in Chapter 6) has been an appropriate response to engaging the government on corruption issues in the country. Donors have remained divided over the best form of support for NACSAP I and NACSAP II, and in so doing, prevented a closer, more coordinated, alignment to government priorities. Donor support to CSOs involved in social sectors, such as Haki Elimu, was found highly relevant to AC in relation to poverty and gender, so was their support to the National Audit Office and (indirectly so) parliamentary committees<sup>71</sup> with regard to strengthening financial accountability. By contrast, the competitive grant scheme, Foundation for Civil Society, which has provided donors with an opportunity for scaling up their support to CSOs, lacked an explicit AC focus, instead financing a plethora of activities around governance, safety nets, advocacy strengthening and policy.

Donors have been pro-active in supporting the fight against corruption in Zambia, with steady and long-term support provided to the TFC (until its disbanding in 2010), the AC Commission, the Office of the Auditor General, and to a lesser extent, TI-Zambia. Joint donor support to the TFC, which was composed of key AC institutions engaged in the fight against grand corruption, from prevention to prosecution; and Norway's support to generate domestic revenue in relation to the mining sector – have been highly innovative. Donor approaches to SWaPs (health sector) have nonetheless lacked focus on corruption issues at service delivery. Like in Tanzania, the situational analysis supporting supply-side governance programmes has often left out key corruption issues.

71 Donor support to Tanzania's Public Procurement Authority (through PFM Reform Programme and DFID's Tackling Corruption Project) was also deemed highly relevant.

### **Box 8 (cont.): Relevance of AC efforts in various country circumstances**

Tanzania and Zambia have shared similar donor experience in their attempts to respond directly to grand corruption scandals (EPA in Tanzania, health corruption scandal in Zambia). Given the alleged links (direct or indirect) with donor money, not responding to these scandals was not an option. This is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Nicaragua has witnessed a U-turn from donors over the evaluation period, from 2002-09 when the Government's AC plans received steadily rising levels of joint donor support through the AC Trust Fund to 2009, to most donors withdrawing their support to the programme, owing to doubts concerning the government's commitment over good governance and political will to fight corruption, as well as a reflection of widespread disengagement from the Sandistina regime. The relevance of the AC Fund had increased in previous years, as support was extended from the Attorney General's Office and Presidency to include the National Police, the Prosecutor General Office, the Office of Public Ethics and the National Council against Drugs. On the demand side, the Civil Society Common Fund in Nicaragua was found to be adequately targeting AC and governance. Support to police reforms also adequately focused on capacity building, promoting good behaviour, and more recently, in targeting economic crimes, through the AC Trust Fund.

Donor engagement with Viet Nam on AC was first gradual and cautious in the period 2002-06. Following the 2005 publication of a corruption survey, a combination of corruption scandals and international events (such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference) there was a change in political attitude, which donors began to support by making a more explicit approach to AC. In addition to their support to the General Inspectorate, donor support for the GAPAP provides research and policy support for corruption and wider governance issues. A government-donor dialogue to discuss AC issues at sectoral level has also been established. This evidence-based gradual approach to donor engagement on AC, while technical (and with limited engagement from media and civil society), was seen as appropriate overall, as donors waited for 'the political winds to be propitious' to address politically-sensitive issues.

Tanzania and Zambia have shared similar donor experience in their attempts to respond directly to grand corruption scandals (EPA in Tanzania, health corruption scandal in Zambia). Given the alleged links (direct or indirect) with donor money, not responding to these scandals was not an option. This is further discussed in Chapter 6.

## 5. Effectiveness of donor anti-corruption interventions

### Summary of key points

- Donor interventions targeting key institutions with a role to play in AC were deemed effective against their primary objectives of capacity building, although this often took longer and more resources than expected. There were also some positive, yet still isolated, examples of donors effectively promoting integrity and professionalism within law enforcement agencies, starting with the police.
- Donor support for CSOs was also deemed largely effective. By contrast, performance in the area of public sector reforms and judiciary reforms was found to be relatively weak, outside some positive contributions in the area of PFM.
- Donor AC interventions were more likely to produce positive results towards reducing corruption/increasing accountability when combining evidence gathering with public reporting; promoting inter-agency partnerships; strengthening systems and computerisation with a view to reducing specific forms of corruption; combining capacity building with integrity measures; and, investing in grassroots monitoring at service delivery.

5.1. Chapter 5 seeks to respond to the overall ToR question: “*How effective have donor interventions been in addressing different types of corruption, including forms of corruption affecting poor people and women in particular?*” It looks at the effectiveness of donors’ main interventions and particular attention is given to good practice examples.

5.2. As discussed in Chapter 4, most donor interventions do not explicitly refer to AC, thus making it difficult to assess their effectiveness against what is in effect the ‘unintended’ goal of fighting or reducing corruption. The first section of this Chapter gives an overview of the effectiveness of donor interventions against their intended goals. In the second section, areas of donor support that have shown, or can potentially demonstrate, a positive contribution towards the objective of reduced corruption and/or increased accountability are discussed.

### Overview of performance

5.3. Donor interventions targeting key institutions with a role to play in AC were deemed effective against their primary objectives, namely capacity building, although this often took longer and more resources than expected. There were also some positive, yet still isolated, examples of donors effectively promoting integrity and professionalism within law enforcement agencies, starting with the police. Donor support for CSOs was also deemed largely effective. By contrast, perform-

ance in the area of public sector reforms and judiciary reforms was found to be relatively weak, outside some positive contributions in the area of PFM reforms.

5.4. All AC Commissions that received donor support over the evaluation period used donor financial and technical assistance effectively to obtain essential hardware infrastructure (including the construction of new regional offices),<sup>72</sup> increase their number of staff and develop their strategic plans. Although its performance was often below expectation with regard to prosecution, communication and M&E, the AC Commission in Zambia, played a key role in making AC a social agenda, advocating an enhanced legal and policy AC framework, and carrying out investigations.

5.5. The performance of AC Commissions in dealing with grand corruption was mixed. Bangladesh's AC Commission (during the Caretaker Government), Zambia AC Commission (directly and through the TFC) and Tanzania's PCCB were able to play their role in dealing with grand corruption cases to some extent, but in Bangladesh, these actions were criticised later on for being politically motivated. In addition, for cases that led to prosecution, government interference further down the criminal law enforcement chain was evident in Zambia. TI-Zambia's National Integrity Survey (2008) concludes that *"it is quite evident that Mr. Mwanawasa has influence on who is to be arrested and prosecuted by the ACC"*.<sup>73</sup>

5.6. In Nicaragua, support to the Attorney General's Office through the AC Fund helped to make significant progress in establishing the administrative and institutional elements of an AC system. In Viet Nam, the Program on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System (to 2014) centred on improving capacity in the Government Inspectorate, while also supporting five Ministry Inspectorates across a number of provinces. The project had wide ranging objectives and scope. At the time of the evaluation, implementation had not progressed sufficiently for judgements to be made about effectiveness.<sup>74</sup>

5.7. Of all the other institutions involved in AC prevention, SAIs were identified as those where donor support had been highly effective. Their financial and technical expertise was used effectively towards computerised audit tools,<sup>75</sup> the construction of new audit offices,<sup>76</sup> on-the-job training and capacity building, and an increase in staffing. SAIs also participated, and on some occasions, benefited from constructive dialogue between donors and the host government on PFM reforms.

5.8. Although donor support to institution building has helped and has been effective overall, in the long-run much of the relative success or failure of the above institutions to fulfil their respective mandate has remained outside donor control and is largely explained by the following domestic factors:

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72 For example, an important contribution from donors in Zambia and Nicaragua was the construction of regional offices for the Attorney General office in Nicaragua and the AC Commission in Zambia.

73 During the GBS Annual Review in 2007 PCCB, presented 11 cases that the PCCB were working on. Six of these cases had been submitted to the Director of Public Prosecution and formal prosecution had been initiated in five of these cases.

74 See also UNDP/EU. 2009. *Strengthening the Capacity of the Government Inspectorate and the Government of Viet Nam to Monitor and Report on Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts*. (In compliance with UNCAC, Hanoi, pp. 12-13).

75 Without which the timely production of audit reports would not have happened.

76 Which was seen as paramount to the independence of external auditors previously sitting in the auditees' office.



- **Access to skilled labour** was identified as a major constraint for AC Commissions. Because of the multi-disciplinary nature of their activities – covering prevention, investigation, prosecution, as well as research, communication and M&E – the evaluation concludes that even where they are providing long-term support, donors can only partially help AC Commissions meet their ambitious mandate. In Zambia, there was some concern that donors (DFID) were in fact adding to the AC Commission’s workload, for example by encouraging them to play a role in monitoring the implementation of national AC policy, notwithstanding their already over-stretched M&E capacity.
- **Geographical reach** was identified as key factor for success. Thanks to donor support, the Attorney General office opened 19 offices in Nicaragua, potentially allowing corruption to be investigated in every part of the country; this was a major achievement. By contrast, AC Commissions in Zambia, Tanzania and Bangladesh were all seen as suffering from a lack of resources at local level, although partnerships with CSOs have allowed filling some of the gap.
- **Strong chairmanship by reform-minded individuals** was identified as a key ingredient for success. While many of the above institutions have suffered from poor managerial capacity, positive changes have happened as soon as people with the right experience and skills were nominated (often upon presidential request) as their Head.<sup>77</sup> For example, the AC Commission in Bangladesh was actively involved in the fight against grand corruption under the former chairman, but momentum was lost after his dismissal in the aftermath of the 2008 elections.
- **Power for prosecution and sanction:** As explained in the Nicaragua report, AC agencies rely principally on a ‘single exit door (the judiciary branch) for punishment’. In addition, all AC agencies can only prosecute with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecution. As a result, only a limited number of low and high level prosecution cases reach the courts.

5.9. Similar conclusions were made in other case studies.<sup>78</sup> The above constraints make prioritisation and the search for partnership with other state and non-state agents that have a role to play in AC essential.

5.10. Besides providing capacity building, donors supported the establishment of an adequate legal framework through their support to AC agencies and SAIs, and through dialogue (see Chapter 6). This was largely successful: for example, in Nicaragua, an independent study confirmed that the AC Fund has contributed to establishing a legal framework for access to information, as well as normative and penal legal framework for corruption, drugs trafficking and money laundering. Weak rule of law in some countries, however, continued to act as a major constraint.

5.11. There were some positive, yet infrequent, examples of donors specifically supporting law enforcement agencies dealing with AC criminalisation. Under the Nicaragua AC Fund, for example, branches of the Prosecutor General’s Office were

<sup>77</sup> Such was the appointment of the new Head of the SAI in Tanzania.

<sup>78</sup> “An ACC’s potential to achieve success is dependent on creating a strategic fit between the demands of its operating environment and the organization’s own capacity to meet those demands. It will depend on the support and nurturing by donors working collectively. This means balancing what needs to be done with what the ACC is actually able to do. ACCs are easily discredited when presented with tasks that are simply too difficult” from: U4. 2005. *Measuring ‘Success’ in Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions – the Cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda & Zambia.*

established in every department of the country and the Nicaragua police force was able to start building its capacity in the areas of intelligence and investigation of economic crimes. Elsewhere, DFID provided effective support to revenue authorities in Zambia, Tanzania and Bangladesh, with the latter receiving specific support to strengthening its Central Intelligence Cell, the department dealing with tax evasion.

5.12. Donor programmes in promoting good behaviour within the police in Bangladesh and in Nicaragua performed relatively well. DFID's (with UNDP) police reform programme in Bangladesh demonstrated progress against all its outputs. A follow-up Public Attitudes Survey carried out in 2008 showed a dramatic reduction in citizens' perception of corruption in the Bangladesh police compared to baseline survey results. This included reduction in the incidence of offered or paid illegal incentives to police. In Nicaragua, lengthy and sustained donor support to the police was said to have resulted in steady progress towards a more efficient and effective force. Sustainability was raised as an issue in Bangladesh, but in Nicaragua the attitude of the police force was said to have positively changed, thanks to a combination of measures ranging from developing a code of conduct to strengthening the supervision and control of the police force, by establishing feedback mechanisms<sup>79</sup> and making information and statistics on fighting corruption within the police force public.

5.13. Concerning donor support for PFM reforms, the evaluation notes effective areas of support including changes in the policy and legislative framework, improved PFM accounting and reporting procedures, and strengthened external audit and procurement oversight mechanisms. All five country reports, however, pointed towards a general lack of progress in strengthening the countries' internal audit functions – a major weakness that undermines effective preventive AC action and has received increased attention from donors in recent years.

5.14. The pace of PFM reforms was overall found to be slower than planned in Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia. For example, in Tanzania, donors were upbeat over the pace of PFM reforms at the beginning of the evaluation period. However, little progress was made after a PFM Reform Programme basket fund was set up in 2004 with contributions from DFID, Denmark and the EU to support Tanzania's second phase of PFM reforms. The continued lack of progress and concern over the use of PFM Reform Programme money (see Chapter 6) further led to a standstill between the Tanzanian authorities and donor agencies, after a new phase of the PFM Reform Programme was launched in November 2008. Discussion had resumed at the time of the country visit in February 2010.

5.15. Elsewhere, the pace of public sector reforms was found to be generally slow, in some cases leading to a tense relationship between donors and the government. In Bangladesh, although the momentum for reforms increased temporarily in the years of the Caretaker Government, civil service reforms have made very little progress since independence. Donor support came in quite late, with mixed per-

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<sup>79</sup> The Internal Affairs Division of the National Police is the agency responsible for registering and investigating complaints against police officers for alleged human rights violations, corruption and serious infractions of disciplinary regulations, the purpose of determining administrative responsibility.

formance. DFID Managing at the Top Programme in Bangladesh started in 2007, and notwithstanding a good performance in providing training to top civil servants, the programme performed relatively poorly, because it failed to effectively engage with the Ministry of Establishment on human resource management reforms. ADB's Good Governance Programme performed well during the Caretaker Government, although capacity building for the Public Service Commission – rather than reforms *per se* – was where most progress took place. In Zambia, the pace of reforms and consolidation of the gains made in the past was said to have considerably slowed down under the 2006-10 Public Sector Reform Programme.

5.16. Most donor-supported reform programmes in the judicial system have performed relatively poorly against their own objectives.<sup>80</sup> As already mentioned in Chapter 4, donor support in Tanzania and Viet Nam does not contain components to strengthen the integrity of the judicial system. By contrast, in Bangladesh, ADB policy-based lending did take integrity explicitly into account; the programme was effective in establishing the beginnings of a culture of greater openness in the judiciary through improved public reporting and the strict implementation of the rule on declaration of assets and wealth statements. Stronger government leadership and bolder actions were nonetheless required for these results to be sustained and there was evidence of a loss of momentum after the 2008 elections.

5.17. In Tanzania, funding donors (World Bank, CIDA, Sweden and Denmark) recognise that, as it stands, the Legal Sector Reform Programme, is largely dysfunctional, with identified major shortcomings being: limited strategic engagement by donors, lack of prioritisation, limited leadership and coordination in the sector, and executive interference. In fact, donors have struggled to establish good partnership with host countries' judiciary sector in many countries.

5.18. On private sector reforms,<sup>81</sup> Phase I of the Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSDRP) in Zambia, supported by DFID and Sweden, was rated independently as ineffective.<sup>82</sup> This programme principally focused on business reforms but did not go much further than to produce proposals for policy, legal and regulatory reforms by public-private working groups. The lack of government and private sector buy-in was identified as the main reason for failure.<sup>83</sup> Notably, public/private dialogue was found to have been pitched at too high a level, with many private sector actors feeling that their participation was not relevant.

5.19. The evaluation concludes that slow progress in the area of public sector (and with it, private-sector) reforms can be traced back to nepotism, collusion, and corruption practices within government, the public sector, and/or the targeted institutions. A better understanding of these issues (in particular those already mentioned in 4.36) could help donors support better design of government-led programmes.

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80 In Viet Nam, the Justice Partnership Programme had just been launched at the time of the evaluation. Its effectiveness was therefore only partially assessed.

81 Donor support for private sector reforms was chosen as a table leg only in Zambia. Evidence is therefore limited to this country.

82 Somssich, S. Weltzien, C. 2009. *Evaluation of Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSDRP)*. Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry. Lusaka 23 February 2009.

83 At the time of completing the Zambia country report, donor discussion focused on Phase II; evidence shows that non-basket funding donors (US and World Bank) were more successful in their approach to supporting private sector development in Zambia (see 5.51).

5.20. Donor support to CSOs involved in AC activities has shown some positive results. TI Chapters in Zambia and Bangladesh have become the most recognised institutions in the fight against corruption. Both Chapters received donor support and grew over the evaluation period.<sup>84</sup> They have been accredited, amongst others, for raising public awareness of corruption and keeping AC high on the government agenda. Their size and budget vary significantly, however, and the success of TI-Bangladesh's Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) – a reflection of the active and powerful civil society in this country – contrasts with the difficulties that TI-Zambia has faced over the years in spreading to rural areas and in encouraging an active involvement from its members.

5.21. At local level, service delivery monitoring by TI Chapters and/or other CSOs in Bangladesh, Tanzania and Nicaragua appear to have been effective in increasing the population's demand for accountability. Donor support for CSOs has also shown some positive results in budget monitoring (Tanzania) and holding the judicial system to account.

5.22. Concerning nationwide advocacy, civil society performance has been mixed. Positive examples were noted in all countries (except Viet Nam) of the media and CSOs playing an effective role in disseminating research, uncovering grand corruption scandals, and calling for freedom of expression and access to information. Yet, public campaigning has remained difficult at the best of times; many CSOs face intimidation from their governments, and the lack of a united front, limited grassroots mobilisation and limited access to public information were all identified as major constraints to successful campaigns.

5.23. Donor support to the TFC in Zambia provides the only significant case study linking the fight against grand corruption with international cooperation towards asset recovery. Here, the Zambia country report finds that although the pace of investigation and prosecution was slow, the experience of the TFC showed that it is possible to fight grand corruption and recover stolen assets on a large scale. TFC was successful in recovering USD36m worth of assets. For this, USD18m was invested, mostly on foreign legal fees. As well as clearly demonstrating shared responsibility in the fight against global corruption,<sup>85</sup> the TFC was also said to have been instrumental in changing the mindset of the Zambia ruling elite, who then became more worried about the repercussions of their behaviour.

5.24. The Zambia country report concludes that the TFC provides a unique AC case study under which a high level of donor support has combined with strong political will and an inter-agency setting to investigate and prosecute grand corruption. Although external constraints explain much of the lower than expected performance, some areas of improvement that could have been better tackled by those supporting the TFC are as follows:

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84 In Bangladesh, donor support for CSOs also achieved results in policy advocacy in the area of PFM (Centre for Policy Dialogue) and in AC (TI-Bangladesh).

85 For example, the civil case brought by the Government of Zambia against Chiluba in the UK courts named two UK law firms amongst the 20 defendants. The law firms were alleged to have assisted in the laundering of funds stolen by Chiluba. They successfully appealed the decision against them and, after investigation by the Serious Fraud Office and City of London Police; no criminal charges were brought against them.

- Despite pressure from development partners, the government never articulated the formal policy on using the money from the disposal of recovered assets for poverty reduction.
- There was a lack of participation from CSOs, leading to the accusation that President Mwanawasa had in effect 'hijacked' the fight against corruption; instead of making it a social agenda.<sup>86</sup>
- The TFC was temporary in nature and drew from, rather than built on, the capacity of all agencies involved.

5.25. The country report confirms that the subsequent acquittal of former president Chiluba and the dismantling of TFC under President Banda equally showed that in a country like Zambia success in the fight against grand corruption ultimately hinges on the president's will.

### Effective links with anti-corruption

5.26. Drawing further from the five country reports, this synthesis identifies five good practice areas that deserve donor attention in the pursuit of effective AC. These are:

1. combining support for evidence gathering with external communication
2. investing in inter-agency partnerships to strengthen collective action and accountability
3. strengthening information management systems with a view to preventing corruption in the public sector
4. combining capacity building with integrity measures, including through twinning arrangements
5. investing in grassroots monitoring to promote corrupt-free service delivery.

#### **(1) Combining support for evidence gathering with external communication**

5.27. Evidence in all five countries clearly indicates that donors can help to change national awareness and debate by supporting partner countries in their capacity and efforts to gather evidence on AC and corruption related statistics, from diagnosis surveys to external audits.

5.28. In Viet Nam, for example, the first major success was Sweden's support for the corruption survey undertaken by the Communist Party. Released in November 2005, this national corruption survey raised the national debate about corruption. It also provided the government with a more informed basis for acting to address corruption. Other positive examples in this country include DFID-World Bank's GAPAP and the annual Provincial Competitiveness Index, the latter of which was said to have engendered competition between provinces to improve their position within the index so as to attract greater business investment.

5.29. In Zambia and Tanzania, thanks to donor support, the capacity of SAIs to produce timely and good quality audit reports has strengthened. As a result, these reports have been used increasingly by donors and national stakeholders alike to

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<sup>86</sup> On the basis of discussion during the CSO workshop.

oversee public sector financial management. In Tanzania, donors also helped by funding targeted short-term activities, such as an Accountability Conference and fact-finding missions for Members of Parliament to track public expenditure throughout the country. In Zambia, TI-Zambia launched a successful public campaign on the back of a report entitled '*Show Me the Money!*', which summarised findings from the National Audit Office and estimated that K348.244bn worth of public funds (USD74.891m when converted at current exchange rates) was misappropriated every year from 1984 to 2004. The launch of the '*Show Me the Money!*' book was a major success, and received broad national coverage thanks to partnerships between the Office of the Auditor General, TI-Zambia and the Post newspapers.

5.30. Finally, in Nicaragua, with Norway's Support, Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH) annual reports on Human Rights Violations were used effectively to support advocacy strategies to achieve democratic openness, transparency and progress in terms of rights.

## **(2) Investing in inter-agency partnerships to strengthen collective action and accountability**

5.31. Promoting mutually-beneficial inter-agency partnerships was identified as a common ingredient for success in AC across a number of cases studies.

5.32. In all countries except Viet Nam, partnerships established between AC agencies and CSOs have not only helped to compensate for the former's capacity constraints and limited geographical reach, but also enhanced their credibility, as well as ensuring some continuity in education and investigation activities, as those activities became in effect, demand-led. This was the case in Zambia. Bangladesh provides a good counter-example: in this country, the AC Commission's efforts to set up so-called Duprak committees at local level during the Caretaker Government were not sustained after the 2008 elections, and by the time of the country visit, the evaluation mission was told that these committees had become fairly dormant. That CSOs (while consulted during the design phase) were not involved in the management of the Duprak committees, may have explained this, as TI-Bangladesh continued to run parallel activities after the change in government.

5.33. Donor support to Zambia's TFC – by its very nature – supported inter-agency linkages. In fact, the TFC provides a unique example in which inter-agency linkages took centre stage, in effect allowing grand corruption cases to be slowly, yet successfully, investigated, prosecuted and then sanctioned.

5.34. Nicaragua's AC Fund, while not specifically focusing on inter-agency linkages, indicates that multi-actor programmes can be used to strengthen partnership and cooperation between institutions working to combat corruption. This included notably the construction of an AC database that is shared by all key AC institutions.

5.35. In Tanzania, donor financing mechanisms have contributed to developing a mutually-benefiting partnership between the SAI and parliamentary oversight committees. The oversight committees have received most of their support from donors via the SAI, which in turn drew on resources from the donor basket fund or Swedish

bilateral assistance. This has worked well: the parliamentary oversight committees see the audit institution as a 'box of knowledge' they can tap into, and in 2007, they lobbied for the New Audit Act to be established, in effect giving the audit institution more independence from the executive. Together, the SAI and parliament have now started to play a more effective role in holding the Government to account in Tanzania.

5.36. In contrast, the absence of a working partnership between AC agencies and the judicial system was commonly identified as a main reason for failure. Although their mandate stretches from prevention and investigation to prosecution, AC agencies still operate under the command of the Director of Public Prosecutions when it comes to prosecution. The courts also have an essential role to play in ensuring that economic crimes are effectively tried and sanctioned. However, the police and judiciary in Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia have shown little willingness to work with AC agencies.

5.37. A main weakness of donor support identified in the Bangladesh country report was the failure to link up with – and encourage partnerships between – between the key 'checks and balances' institutions that they support. For example, DFID (alongside the World Bank and other donors) has provided support to the Ministry of Finance, SAI and (through UNDP) parliament, yet programmes have failed to show tangible results in strengthening financial accountability overall.<sup>87</sup>

5.38. Looking forward, DFID's Tackling Corruption Project in Tanzania and DFID's Against Corruption Together programme in Zambia, two multi-actor programmes that were launched respectively in 2009 and 2010, could provide opportunities for inter-agency strengthening. DFID's Against Corruption Together programme intends to improve the coordination between the AC Commission, police and supreme audit office in relation to response to irregularities raised in audit reports. The Zambia country report notes, however, that the bulk of DFID support will stay with AC Commissions and there is still a need to clarify mandates and improve the coordination and capacity of all agencies, starting with the police and judicial system. In Tanzania, DFID's programme will provide separate funding to PCCB, Ethics Secretariat, the Public Procurement Appeals Authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions, and primarily seeks to strengthen inter-agency links through enhanced information-sharing.

### **(3) Strengthening information management systems with a view to detecting and addressing identified forms of corruption in the public sector**

5.39. As already discussed, many donor interventions focusing on promoting supply-side governance only implicitly assume that strengthening policy, rules and regulations, and/or systems will reduce the opportunity for public officials to be involved in corrupt practice. Notwithstanding the absence of objectively verifiable indicators, the five country reports indicate that system strengthening and streamlining can, under the right circumstances, help to reduce opportunities for corrupt practice.

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<sup>87</sup> The forthcoming multi-donor Strengthening Public Expenditure Management programme should provide the right opportunity for donors to adopt a more comprehensive approach to financial accountability in Bangladesh.

5.40. The five country reports note that donor support for computerised integrated financial management systems<sup>88</sup> in PFM is likely to have contributed to improved transparency of accounting, recording and reporting procedures in Viet Nam, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Zambia. The Zambia country report also shows that donor support for computerised systems can help to strengthen the payroll management system, and in so doing, address the issue of ghost workers, as shown by a first payroll and establishment data-cleaning exercise in 2002/03.

5.41. Similar interventions targeting key state agencies were also said to have reduced the opportunities for fraud. For example, donor support to the One Stop Border Post at Chirundu, Zambia<sup>89</sup> was said to have significantly reduced the time that trucks need to spend at the border – a cost saving for business – which has also minimised the interface between custom officials and customers and hence reducing opportunities for corruption. Computerisation has also contributed to enhancing the civil servant entry exam systems at the Public Service Commission in Bangladesh and reducing the incidence of tax evasion in Zambia.

5.42. The introduction of computerised information management systems has generally taken much longer than expected. For example, in Zambia, after a failed programme of support, DFID-supported Payroll Management and Establishment Control was introduced with much delay in 2004. About six years later, Payroll Management and Establishment Control (which is due for an upgrade) has now been rolled out to all the ministries, provinces and public agencies. One lesson coming from DFID in Zambia is the *“retention of ghost workers can be a source of patronage for different people in existing systems. Strategies will need to be developed for overcoming resistance at different times”* (Annual Review, 2007). In other words, resistance to rolling-out new systems is likely to be found at different stages of the process, as vested interests are threatened and opportunities for leakages are reduced.

5.43. In addition, computerisation will only address certain types of fraud (yet to be fully identified and measured by the donor-supported programmes), whereas a host of other downstream and upstream irregularities continue unabated.<sup>90</sup>

5.44. The synthesis concludes that strengthening systems, and more specifically, computerised information management systems, can contribute to a reduction in leakages if:

- they are rolled out fully. A hybrid system whereby paper trail and IT accounting system co-exist and are used variably in different ministries will only bring further confusion and lack of transparency. Similarly, a marked reduction in payroll fraud in Zambia is expected only to become apparent now that all the ministries, provinces and public agencies have moved to the new payroll management system.
- in the case of PFM, the information is made publicly available to state and non-state oversight institutions. Although budget tracking by CSOs (including public

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88 Treasury and Budget Management Information System in Viet Nam; SIGFA (an integrated financial management information system) in Nicaragua.

89 This initiative is supported by a group of donors and private sector including UK, Norway, Denmark and Sweden under the North-South Corridor Programme and the sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme.

90 These include irregularities in budget practice in PFM; in recruitment and promotion practice and identity of fraud in civil service reforms (on the latter, the interfacing of the payroll management system with third parties was to some extent taken on board in the design of Public Sector Management. This included, for example, fostering the relationship with Payroll Management and Expenditure Control and the Department of National Registration (to prevent identity fraud).



expenditure tracking surveys) – another form of external oversight – have by and large shown mixed performance, in Nicaragua, SIGFA (Sistema Integrado de Gestión Financiera y Auditoría) was said to contribute positively to greater accountability of the budget within the country, as it was made available to various oversight institutions, notably the Comptroller General of the Republic, the National Assembly but also CSOs and the media.

- effective monitoring and sanction mechanisms are in place. Evidence of reduced corruption will remain largely anecdotal in the absence of regular monitoring as well as effective and transparent sanction mechanisms. In the case of Zambia, a mid-term review (2009) notes that “*a notable major drawback to the achievements made is that by the time of the mid-term review there had been no sanctions against officers who have been found with major payroll and establishment control audit queries*”.
- promoting a result-oriented M&E culture requires effective incentive mechanisms, from sanction to promotion. In public sector PFM, it is not only the lack of regular internal auditing exercises but also the lack of sanction against those that are facing internal audit queries that explain continued mismanagement.

#### **(4) Combining capacity building with integrity AC measures, including through twinning arrangements**

5.45. Examples of police reform programmes in Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent, Bangladesh, show some positive results in donor interventions that equally focus on building capacity and promoting integrity. A combination of measures was used to promote integrity, ranging from developing a code of conduct to strengthening the supervision and control of the police force, by establishing feedback mechanisms and making information and statistics on fighting corruption within the police force public.

5.46. In Zambia, the piecemeal approach to introducing preventive AC mechanisms in the form of service charter as part of the donor-supported public sector management programme was not effective, although demand-led initiatives, such as the Service Delivery Improvement Fund confirmed that strong government ownership in the design and implementation of a project can help.

5.47. Twinning arrangements between host country agencies and their counterparts in donor countries can help towards further professionalisation. The cooperation between the SAIs in Sweden and Norway and those in Tanzania and Zambia, respectively, shows that, with the appropriate skills and experience and the right management arrangements in place, long-term expertise can help to support institutional capacity building through a range of activities, from production of audit manuals to training and strategic advice.<sup>91</sup> In Tanzania, Swedish support for the SAI included integrity components dealing with auditors’ work ethics, transparency and public reporting. Similarly, the contribution provided through TA from the Swedish Police Force was described as essential in supporting police reforms in Nicaragua.

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91 The UK SAI has also worked with its sister institution in Viet Nam.

## **(5) Investing in grassroots monitoring to promote corrupt-free service delivery**

5.48. The five country reports confirm that donors can effectively support CSOs' monitoring role in preventing corruption at service delivery level. Positive interventions included the CCCs (education, health); Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust (legal services) and SAMATA (local government) in Bangladesh; Haki Elimu (education) and Twaweza in Tanzania. In Bangladesh, the enhanced participation of parent teacher associations and school management committees in primary education, as supported by PEDP, was said to have helped to improve the management of schools.

5.49. An impact assessment of TI-Bangladesh's 'Making Waves' programme also indicates some positive results, the overall impact being seen through evidence of positive changes in the quality of service delivery in education and health centres. The Viet Nam country report also notes some positive result in increasing the role of users/villagers in monitoring and supervising infrastructure projects, but warns that users are not always aware of their rights to hold local leaders and civil servant accountable for their decisions and/or of ways to complain about corrupt behaviour and waste.

5.50. All these interventions share common characteristics in that they are clearly prioritised and seek to improve the quality of services, rather than fight corruption head-on. Key activities included empowering local communities with information and knowledge on the financing and delivery of local services; facilitating their participation and dialogue with government officials to enable grievances to be aired; and, monitoring and generating qualitative data through the use of reporting tools, such as score-cards.

## **Conclusion**

5.51. In conclusion, projects or programmes that combine all, or most, of the five good practice areas are, in theory, more likely to be effective in promoting integrity and/or fighting corruption. The evaluation team did not come across any such projects, and the above emerging good practices can only act as guidance for future programming. A case study worth mentioning is USAID USD22m Millennium Challenge Account Threshold programme in Zambia. Under this programme, USAID supported (2006-08) four target institutions (Ministry of Lands, Patents and Companies Registration Office, Zambia Revenue Authority and Immigration office), all perceived as highly corrupt in the National Governance Baseline Survey. The focus of the programme interventions was on reducing corruption and improving the business environment. USAID support combined computerisation and process re-engineering with a multi-stakeholder approach involving, on the preventive side, the active participation of the AC Commission (Integrity Committee) and use of service delivery charters, and on the monitoring side, direct involvement from end-users or beneficiaries. This approach was relatively successful for the Patent and Company Registration Office and Zambia Revenue Authority (in VAT registration).

5.52. However, assessing the effectiveness of donor AC efforts does not only encompass looking at programming decisions but also at complementary actions concerned with donor coordination, dialogue, and a stance against aid misuse. Box 9 in Chapter 6 gives a summary of the evaluation team's assessment of the effectiveness of donor AC spend and non-spend interventions combined, depending on country circumstances. Recommendations on how to make these interventions more effective are given in Chapter 7.

## 6. Coordination, dialogue, programme management and donors' links with anti-corruption

### Summary of key points

- Donors have, by and large, strengthened their coordination on AC in recent years through elements of joint programmes or shared governance analysis. Far more could be done, however, to ensure their interventions are mutually reinforcing on the ground.
- Although their influence on policy through dialogue remains low, donors can help to precipitate some events, when domestic conditions are ripe.
- In light of recent corruption scandals, bilateral donors are now demanding additional financial reporting and auditing requirements, which could go against their commitment to the Paris Declaration principles.
- A main weakness in donor response to corruption is the lack of follow-up actions, including asset recovery. There is also a risk that donors are bound by a political decision to remain engaged in a particular sector and end up showing too much leniency towards the host government. Conversely, freezing aid without supplementary support can impact significantly on development outcomes in aid-dependent sectors.
- Where they could, donors have become more sophisticated in combining programme support with high-level dialogue, in the hope that their advisory work, as well as diplomatic stance against any wrongdoing, may be able to influence the government's agenda on governance and AC issues.

6.1. This Chapter provides elements of response to the ToR overall effectiveness question: *"How effective have donor interventions been in addressing different types of corruption, including forms of corruption affecting poor people and women in particular?"* It first looks at donor coordination and dialogue, then at their own internal policy against aid misuse.

### Donor coordination in anti-corruption

6.2. Donors have, by and large, strengthened their coordination on AC in all five countries in recent years. In some countries, like in Zambia and Tanzania, donors have set up specific multi-donor coordination platforms on AC, while others have worked with the existing aid architecture, primarily consisting of governance working groups and sub-groups. Joint programming has been another avenue for strengthening donor coordination.

6.3. The scope for developing funding modalities that would support a programme-based approach to AC remains limited, given the large number of state and non-state institutions with a role to play in AC, and, more often than not, the lack of strong or clear country leadership in this area. Although the move to basket funding

mechanisms, notably PFM, has helped to strengthen donor coordination in some countries, and the five commissioning and other donors have openly shared their governance analysis in all five, the country reports indicate that donor AC interventions have remained largely fragmented on the ground, which has in turn undermined their overall effectiveness.

6.4. Joint funding mechanisms appear to be both the cause and effect of successful donor coordination in AC-specific activities. For example, donor coordination of AC efforts has worked relatively well in Zambia and Viet Nam, on the back of joint donor funding for the TFC and the Programme Strengthening the Capacity of the Inspectorate System (POCSIS) respectively. There are examples of failed coordinated donor support elsewhere.

6.5. Donor coordination of AC efforts was non-existent in Bangladesh, and in Tanzania, the Anti-Corruption Network, which was established as a subgroup of the Governance Working Group and is co-chaired by Sweden and UNDP, has not worked well. In both countries, most bilateral donors decided against funding AC through UNDP (Tanzania) and ADB (Bangladesh), the two agencies at the forefront of donor AC efforts in these two countries. Despite commissioning a joint study,<sup>92</sup> Norway and DFID failed to provide joint support to AC agencies in Tanzania.<sup>93</sup>

6.6. In Nicaragua, eight donors (Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, UK and Finland) decided to support the Government's fight against corruption through the AC Fund from 2002. However, five of the original donors subsequently pulled out, in part owing to strategic changes in their development cooperation, and in part through a loss of confidence in the present government.

6.7. This synthesis report concludes that donors could still do more to ensure that their interventions are complementary and mutually reinforcing on the ground. Even mapping exercises, such as the one conducted and updated regularly by Sweden in Viet Nam, are rarely carried out, however obviously needed.

6.8. The Bangladesh and Tanzania examples also tend to indicate that there are still wide differences in approaches to AC between bilateral and multilateral agencies, and in some cases amongst bilateral donors. Although like-minded bilateral donors do understand their respective, and in many ways similar, ways of operating, they do not fully grasp how the ADB and other multilateral agencies, such as the UNDP, approach AC both internally and in their client relationships with the host governments.<sup>94</sup> This is likely to have undermined donor incentives for coordination on AC-related issues.

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92 Pilot Review Tanzania. 2009. *Review of the Implementation of Articles 5, 15, 16, 17, 25, 46 Paragraphs 9 and 13, 52 and 53 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption*. The Netherlands and UK.

93 The reason for this decision remains unknown to the evaluation team.

94 The reluctance by bilateral donors to have multilateral agencies take the lead on AC may be partly explained by the lack of access to information. For example, the Tanzania country report notes the lack of communication and transparency between UNDP and contributing development under the Deepening Democracy Programme: UNDP commissioned an audit in response to donor concerns about finance management and procurement. However, because it covered a larger part of UNDP's portfolio, the audit was not made available outside UNDP.

## Donor dialogue on anti-corruption

6.9. In recognition that their financial assistance alone is not sufficient, donors have combined programme support with high-level dialogue, in the hope that their advisory support, as well as diplomatic stance against any wrongdoing, may be able to influence the government's agenda on governance and AC issues. Their approach has become increasingly sophisticated over the years, as the aid architecture evolved and new donor groups were created. Increasingly, donors have used complementary platforms, from diplomatic missions and EU dialogue to sector advisory groups and GBS, both to influence the country's corruption agenda and as discussed in the following sections, address grand corruption cases.

6.10. Coordinated dialogue between donors and the government has not always been effective. In Bangladesh, the generally unstable political situation has had a negative impact on donor's ability to pursue high-level dialogue with the Government. A gradual approach to dialogue on governance (and later, more explicitly, corruption) issues was nonetheless successful in the education sector, with donors primarily focusing on technical level discussion.

6.11. The Viet Nam country case study also shows what donors can achieve, when opening the dialogue gradually, at a technical level. Whereas it was difficult for donors to engage with the Government on AC back in 2002, jointly organised and chaired dialogues on AC, commencing in 2007, were seen as positively contributing to the national debate. Discussions remain technical (health and construction in 2009; education and land issues in 2010), but the level of engagement is high, with top government officials participating in the event and the dialogue results being further discussed during the Consultative Group government-donor coordinating meeting.

6.12. In Tanzania and Zambia, GBS has become central to the donor-government dialogue on AC in recent years. Performance Assessment Frameworks already include many indicators in relevant policy areas (including PFM and civil service reforms) and in recent years, new performance indicators specifically dealing with AC have been introduced. For example, in Zambia, two new indicators – one focusing on the development and implementation of the National AC Strategy – were introduced in the GBS Performance Assessment Framework in 2009.

6.13. In Tanzania, corruption was on the agenda for discussion during three consecutive annual GBS reviews (2007-09), in response to the EPA scandal. Also in this country, Denmark tied its 20% variable tranche each year to AC-related performance indicators, including tabling the revised corruption legislation to Parliament by November 2006, an audit bill being passed in 2008 and, in 2009, a corruption survey being completed by the PCCB. While the use of variable tranches sends strong signals from donors to the government, they alone are not sufficient to influence policy, as further discussed in 6.15-6.17.

6.14. In the case of ADB, the multilateral bank's partnership and dialogue with host governments are principally defined by its policy-based lending principles. This has enabled a policy dialogue on key reform commitments in the course of writing the

loans and then release of tranches as commitments are met. A few policy performance targets in the Viet Nam 2003 Public Administration Reform Programme and in the Bangladesh Good Governance Programme dealt with AC-related measures. However, the Bangladesh country report notes that, whereas some indicators focus on establishing policy, legal and institutional reforms<sup>95</sup> within a realistic timeframe, others – such as those requesting the Government to make public announcements or issue circulars to all public servants – were found too ‘soft’ to be of effective value.

6.15. Attributing policy changes to donor dialogue remains difficult, whatever the level of aid dependency of partner countries. According to the joint evaluation of GBS in Tanzania, “*GBS in Tanzania and the related dialogue and policy dialogue conditions are unlikely ever to be more than a modest influence. ... the key achievements of the last decade were driven by a strong political will and by a powerful internal constituency for change*”.<sup>96</sup> All five country reports also tend to confirm that domestic factors remain the main drivers behind policy changes.

6.16. In Bangladesh, real actions, when taken, were primarily the deeds of a progressive government at the time. There were indeed signs of reversal after the 2008 elections. In Viet Nam, positive trends in donor dialogue were attributed to the readiness of the Government to discuss sensitive AC issues, with the country report concluding that donors have, overall, remained marginal drivers of change, with little influence over policy in this country. Viet Nam’s intention to engage in global and regional forums such as the World Trade Organization, hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum and securing a seat on the UN Security Council were instead identified as a main stimulus for change.

6.17. At the same time, donor dialogue seems to have provided an effective leverage on policy changes, when the domestic conditions were ripe. As summarised by the Tanzania country report, “*the political economy context is largely outside donor influence but, nevertheless, donors can find success through identifying and capitalising on a conducive environment as and when it emerges*”. Such a conducive environment for policy changes can be driven by strong media and parliament advocacy (Tanzania) or external interests (Viet Nam). In Viet Nam, the low key and sensitive steering role played by Sweden in the dialogue between government and donors on AC was commended as particularly effective in reading the political moods and drivers of change in the country. In Tanzania, donor dialogue with the Government was said to have been instrumental in providing ammunition to the Head of the SAI to defeat any remaining resistance within civil service to have the new Audit Act enacted in 2007.<sup>97</sup> Additionally, in Zambia, where the AC policy and implementation plan were approved by the Government after many years of delay in 2008 and 2010, respectively, introducing a corresponding AC-specific indicator in GBS the performance framework has at least helped to keep the issue high on the agenda.

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95 Including, for example, (i) reconstitution of the AC Commission in line with the UNCAC provisions; (ii) separation of the judiciary; (iii) approval of a National Integrity Strategy; (iv) annual declaration of assets by civil servants and judges; (v) legislation to prescribe qualifications for recruitment of Supreme Court judges; (vi) creation of an independent prosecution service; (vii) establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman; (viii) legislation of the Right to Information Act; (ix) introduction of Citizens’ Report Cards; and (x) legislation of a Whistleblower Protection Act.

96 ODI et al. 2005. *Joint Evaluation of Budget Support, Tanzania; 1994-2004*.

97 The passing of the new Audit Act was also the single condition for the variable tranche (20% of total tranche) of the Danish budget support to Tanzania in 2009/10.

6.18. The synthesis report concludes that to make their AC efforts more effective, it is important that donors are realistic and adequately read the political moods and drivers of change in partner countries. This means that a ‘political’ lens is needed to render effective the largely technical approach that characterises GBS and other coordinated platforms. While outside the scope of this evaluation, the use of discreet diplomacy also remains key in keeping AC high on the agenda in the partnership with host governments.

### **Donor safeguard measures and responses to corruption**

6.19. There are three ways donors can help to address the risk of corruption linked to aid money: by choosing not to invest in a particular project or programmes; by choosing adequate safeguard mechanisms (including level of alignment to beneficiaries’ systems); and by taking swift action when corruption cases are unveiled.

6.20. On choosing not to invest in a particular project or programme, the evaluation noted some examples of donors withdrawing permanently from a particular sector as a result of corruption, for example, DFID-Bangladesh from the Government’s Roads and Highways Department, and Danida-Bangladesh from the Ministry of Shipping and Water Transport. Funds to selected CSOs were also stopped in most countries, owing to poor governance.

### **Safeguard mechanisms**

6.21. Safeguard mechanisms typically entail: FRAs and institutional appraisals; the contractual arrangements/Memorandum of Understanding with implementing partners; choice of aid delivery mechanisms and financial and non-financial reporting and auditing requirements; and the identification of, and support for, complementary measures to strengthen the partner’s managerial capacity. These are discussed further in the following sections.

6.22. Fiduciary risk analysis: As already mentioned in Chapter 4, DFID and Sweden FRAs, which are mandatory when financial aid to a country is provided, do now entail an assessment of the risk of corruption. However, they do not go so far as assessing how corruption practices may lead to aid misuse. Given recent corruption scandals, more could be done to acknowledge and identify that some aid-funded activities in the government sector may be prone to misuse. Examples are given in Box 9.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> The risk of corruption for aid-funded activities for non-state actors can be equally high, yet the sums at stake and the risk of publicity are often lower.



## Box 9: Examples of aid misuse in the government sector<sup>99</sup>

A significant amount of donor money for projects and in the government sector is allocated to workshops, training and seminars, alongside consultancy and TA; equipment, software and furniture; and operational costs. Recent corruption cases have prompted some respondents to refer to donor programmes as ‘per diem’ funds, indicating that workshops, training and seminars, which involve the use of allowances, are highly prone to misuse. The focus on workshops, training and seminars, is also explained by the fact that allowances are known to create negative incentives within the public sector. In Zambia, allowances have been described by the Government as “*obscure and benefiting a handful of staff*”, and by donors as “*a silent killer*” in the public sector. Other forms of misuse, such as unretired imprest, and failure to follow tender procedures, are nonetheless also frequent. The following three case studies confirm the risk that without adequate controls, donor basket fund money is prone to misuse:

### Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania (Norway)

Norway supported the Management of Natural Resources Programme in Tanzania for 12 years from 1994 to 2006. Total funding to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in Tanzania amounted to about USD60m, an average of USD5m a year. In 2006, an independent final evaluation raised doubts about the financial management of the programme, and an independent audit firm was called in. It was revealed that up to half of the USD60m may have been lost through corruption and mismanagement. Since 50-70% of the USD60m was spent on workshops and similar ‘capacity building’ exercises, the majority of the money lost relates to workshops. Other cases of financial mismanagement included the purchase of overpriced or non-existent goods and services and failure to follow procurement rules.<sup>100a, 100b</sup>

### PFM Reform Programme, Tanzania (DFID)

The PFM Reform Programme basket fund in Tanzania is fully owned by the Government and implemented by the PFM Reform Programme Component Managers. Money, which is spent using the country’s own procurement rules and procedures, is typically allocated to workshops and meetings, training, equipment, services and infrastructure. Relationships between the Government and development partners became strained in 2008, after the World Bank raised some concern over the use of the basket fund money. Because of slow procurement and pressure to spend, it was found that the basket money was mostly used on a plethora of workshops and training.

### Zambia health scandal<sup>101</sup>

The health corruption scandal started in Zambia in March 2009, when a whistleblower tipped off the AC Commission to a scam involving per diem payments for high-level government officials on training and workshops that did not take place. In its final forensic report (yet to be submitted to the Parliament Account Committee) in early July 2009, the SAI identifies USD5.7m embezzled during the period January 2008-May 2009, including USD3m from the donor basket fund (Sweden, the Netherlands and Canada), the rest being embezzled from the Global Fund, and from government money. Misuse also concerned the procurement of goods and unretired imprest. The report also confirmed that the paper trail was essentially ‘clean’, indicating a significant degree of collusion, with some documents requiring over ten signatures.

99 Aid misuse must be understood here as ‘financial misuse’, which in audit terms entails misappropriation of revenues; delayed banking; misapplication of funds; unretired imprests; unvouched expenditure; irregular payments; failure to follow tender procedures; unauthorised expenditure; non-remittance of tax; wasteful expenditures; and overpayment (National Audit Office, Zambia). By contrast, because it is hidden, the ‘private gain’ dimension that inherently defines corruption, cannot easily be detected.

100a Jansen, E.G. 2009. Does Aid Work? *Reflections on a Natural Resources Programme in Tanzania*. CMI U4 Issue. Field notes.

100b Comment from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam: Norway has pointed out that the figures quoted in the description of the Management of Natural Resources Programme are incorrect and not corroborated by audit findings. Contrary to what is stated in the evaluation report, it has not been revealed that up to half of the funds may have been lost. In fact, no audit report received by the Norwegian Embassy has arrived at such a figure.

Norway supported the Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP) in Tanzania for 12 years from 1994 to 2006. In 2006, an independent final evaluation raised doubts about the financial management of the Programme. Subsequent financial audits of various aspects of the 11 projects in the Programme showed that funds had not been utilized in accordance with the bilateral agreements. After a long and thorough process which was concluded in 2010, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism repaid the agreed amount of approx. Tshs. 2.8 billion to Norway. This amount included funds that could not be adequately accounted for and funds which should not have been covered by the Norwegian grant.

101 Field notes.

6.23. Paradoxically perhaps, given the larger sums involved, GBS donors are less directly exposed to specific cases of corruption. The fungibility of GBS – which is fully aligned to the country’s PFM reporting and accounting systems – means that there is no way of tracing public fund mismanagement back to donor funding. The reputational risk, however, remains equally high, if not higher,<sup>102</sup> which explains why DFID, as a GBS donor, has been equally concerned by the health corruption scandal in Zambia; DFID stopped providing direct support to the health sector in this country in 2005.

6.24. In some countries, national stakeholders have raised concerns that donors may be more lenient towards the way their money was being spent or used to support government programmes (as opposed to CSOs), because of the pressure to remain engaged in specific sectors. The Bangladesh country report concludes: *“There was a general concern voiced by interviewees that donors’ own internal pressure to spend may play against their zero-tolerance to corruption, and with it, lead to lower demands on promoting AC prevention measures within public service”*. In some interviews,<sup>103</sup> national stakeholders went so far as saying that host governments knew how to manipulate donors, because they understood donor dynamics and the pressure they are under to meet their annual spending targets. There are nonetheless some good examples, such as the PFM Reform Programme in Tanzania, where donors decided to delay or reduce payment, citing concerns over the slow pace of reforms and the way some of the money has been used.

6.25. Alignment to country PFM and procurement systems: The five country reports show that, although they broadly share similar diagnosis, each donor has responded differently to the level of fiduciary risk in partner countries, as demonstrated by their different choice of aid delivery and safeguard mechanisms. Their alignments to country PFM systems vary greatly. For example, Denmark is the only donor not to provide GBS to Zambia<sup>104</sup> and in Bangladesh, none of the five donor agencies, except for the ADB, provide budget support to the government.

6.26. It is worth noting that, for selected projects or programmes, donors still choose to ring-fence their own funds by setting up parallel project management units. In Bangladesh, for example, DFID set up project management units within the institutions (the Revenue Authorities and the Planning Commission) it supported, until it felt confident that these institutions had built sufficient capacity to effectively manage DFID support directly. Although DFID advisers were able to transfer their skills to Revenue Authorities in Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia, the practice of parallel implementation units runs counter to the Paris Declaration principles of alignment to country systems, and all donors remain committed to reducing their numbers, although there are again some variations, as shown in the Paris Declaration annual surveys.

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102 Donors can potentially be criticised for providing GBS each time a corruption scandal in the public sector emerges.

103 Field notes.

104 In 2007, Denmark’s rating for GBS provision in Zambia improved from (c) – unsatisfactory – to (b) – less satisfactory – which is when Denmark gained status as GBS observer, but the quality of the partnership and dialogue between donors and the Government – one of the ten criteria for Danish provision – was considered too weak to move to GBS.

6.27. **Financial reporting and auditing requirements:** Financial reporting and auditing requirements have, overall, been largely effective in allowing donors to detect and respond to aid misuse at project level.

6.28. A main deficiency, which some donors (notably Sweden) have remedied in recent years, is that auditing is often carried out during the mid-term or end-term of a project, which means that fraud is mostly detected 'after the event'. As a result, Sweden has tightened its internal policy by requesting independent audit reports to be carried out for all its interventions (outside the UN) every year. Sweden has also introduced pre-award audits<sup>105</sup> for all projects and partners as a pre-condition before starting a new project. In fact most donors have strengthened their auditing mechanisms over the evaluation period. DFID also requires annual audits and any suspicion of fraud or corruption involving DFID funds must immediately be reported to the Head of Internal Audit.

6.29. In Zambia, donors' confidence in the country's financial reporting and auditing systems reached a low ebb after it took a whistleblower, and a forensic audit, to unveil hidden financial malpractice linked to the health sector basket fund money.<sup>106</sup> The use of public expenditure tracking surveys and regular national audit reports have not proved sufficient. Consequently, they have re-introduced a number of short-term safeguard measures including, for example, more regular independent audits and separate reporting. Donors have also toughened their demands for PFM reforms in this sector, with particular emphasis on internal auditing (see 6.34).

6.30. Strengthening safeguard mechanisms by putting additional reporting demands on government ministries can add to the host government's transaction costs and run counter to the Paris Declaration principles, unless donors coordinate their demands. As shown in Zambia, this has not always been the case. For example, DFID has asked for a separate report on how their support to Medical Stores Limited was used through SWaP mechanisms, following reports that contractors on the project have not been fully paid.

6.31. **Donor support for complementary measures:** Also related to safeguard mechanisms is donor support for complementary measures to strengthen their partners' managerial capacity. This support appears to have been largely effective at project level. Some stakeholders, notably CSOs, have welcomed donor scrutiny into their financial affairs, as a way to build their reputation as reliable and honest organisations.

6.32. As shown in PEFA and other assessments, the move to government aid has also evidently helped to strengthen the countries' PFM systems – albeit at a slower pace than expected – in all five countries, with both government and donors increasingly relying on the host SAI to monitor public (and indirectly aid) spending.

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<sup>105</sup> These pre-audits, which are carried out under a framework agreement with an independent audit firm, seek to identify weaknesses in the management set-up and systems of the organisation, looking at financial, procurement and human resources management. These pre-audits are then used to identify and introduce specific capacity building measures as part of their programme of support, which are then followed on a yearly basis through project health check.

<sup>106</sup> Under SWaP mechanisms, the Ministry of Health is not compelled to report levels of expenditure per source of funding. Similarly, the Office of the Auditor General reports do not isolate expenditure of their own funds from other sector expenditures. This prevents total oversight on the use of the Office's own resources.

At the same time, the absence of real progress in strengthening the partner countries' internal audit mechanisms has made donor support for PFM strengthening a less effective measure to mitigate fiduciary risk.

### **Response to corruption**

6.33. Finally, the five country reports show that donors have been highly responsive to corruption cases involving the use of their own funds. In Bangladesh, when the audit report for 2003/04 found evidence of collusive activity in the education sector, the donors took a firm stance and, after investigation, insisted on return of their funds, reportedly around USD900,000. The Government followed suit and blacklisted the company concerned for three years.

6.34. Another example of successful coordinated response to corruption is Tanzania, where GBS donors delayed making GBS commitments for 2009/10 until the Government had drawn up an action plan to address the misuse of funds in the EPA scandal.

6.35. In Zambia, Sweden and the Netherlands swiftly responded to the health corruption scandal by putting their disbursement on hold, providing TA to the National Audit Office to conduct a forensic audit, and, with the support of other donors, starting negotiations with the Ministry of Health. Also in Zambia, Norway stopped funding to the Zambia Wildlife Authority, commissioned an audit report from the Office of the Auditor General, and started dialogue, with the direct involvement of the ambassador, as a result of misappropriation linked to procurement irregularities.

6.36. The synthesis report argues, however, that donor response to cases of aid misuse may not be sufficiently robust. For example, there is no systematic collection of evidence to show that all stolen funds are retrieved. Pressure to resume funding may also have led donors, on some occasions, to soften their demands for genuine reforms.

6.37. This is not to say that donor coordinated response to the health scandal was not effective. Indeed, after withholding payments, further discussion between donors and the Ministry of Health in Zambia resulted in a Governance Action Plan; it then took three months for the Ministry of Health to satisfy the actions required under Stage 1 of the Action Plan. After verification by an external audit firm, Sweden and the Netherlands resumed their first tranche payment in December 2009. Yet, the country report argues that the Governance Action Plan will not *per se* be sufficient to address long-term system issues, and the Ministry's genuine commitment to fighting corruption and improving systems in the health sector will only be properly tested when long-term measures for strengthening of governance, accountability and transparency are introduced in the National Health Sector Strategic Plan (2011-15).

6.38. As a result, the Zambia country report warns of a 'lowest common denominator syndrome', whereby country offices, that are bound by a political decision by HQ not to leave a particular sector, may stop short of pressing for harder actions.

6.39. The counter-argument to this is that there may be a risk of some donors feeling pressure to act tougher than their development analysis would indicate, and the fact that freezing resources without supplementary support to service delivery for the poor can impact significantly on development outcomes. Important lessons were learned in this regard from the health corruption scandal, as outlined in the following sections.

6.40. Firstly, donors may not always agree with the way forward. In Zambia, for example, all GBS donors initially agreed to disburse their budget support in 2009, after satisfactory progress (including in the health sector) was achieved. Subsequently, however, Sweden decided to freeze its 2009 GBS assistance after consultation with Stockholm, citing concerns not only in relation to the health sector but also with the Chiluba acquittal and the proposed Non-Governmental Organisation Act. This particular example demonstrates the difficulties encountered by donors in harmonising their stance on AC, while at the same time responding to the demands of their own constituencies.<sup>107</sup>

6.41. Secondly, where donor support amounts to a significant share of the ministry budget, a freeze in donor assistance does not go without any consequences. In Zambia, donors faced accusations in the press that they were being blind to the needs of the poor, despite Sweden providing funding using a different delivery mechanism.<sup>108</sup> Keeping a mix of aid delivery modalities is therefore an essential feature to risk mitigation, as it allows donors to reallocate money to other actors in key sectors.

6.42. The synthesis concludes that the move to a programme-based approach to aid has allowed donors to be more coordinated in their approach to AC and their response to specific corruption cases. However, donor alignment to country's PFM systems has also prevented them from detecting aid misuse,<sup>109</sup> with weak internal audit mechanisms being seen as a major constraint to closer scrutiny. Part of the solution lies in continuing to support strengthening countries' systems, while adopting a more gradual alignment strategy.

## Conclusion

6.43. This Chapter illustrates donors' approach to AC as part of their commitments to the Paris Declaration principles of ownership, coordination and alignment. Drawing from the report's analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, Box 10 gives a summary of the evaluation team's assessment of the effectiveness of donor spend and non-spend interventions combined in fighting corruption, depending on country circumstances. This box confirms that AC donor efforts have been more effective when they have been able to combine spend with non-spend interventions. Recommendations on how to make donor interventions more effective are given in Chapter 7.

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107 All GBS cooperation partners, including Sweden, were able to make indicative commitments for 2010.

108 Also in Tanzania, donors were accused of being responsible for slow progress in PFM reforms because of their decision to reduce disbursement (only 40% of funds pledged to the PFM Reform Programme were disbursed in 2009) and reduce commitments for the years ahead.

109 This was the case in the Zambia health sector, when aid misuse was only made apparent through whistle-blowing. In Tanzania, the per diem sham only became apparent when a World Bank employee accidentally came across a large number of government officials holding a workshop with programme funds in a 5 star hotel in Dubai.

#### **Box 10: Effectiveness of donor AC efforts depending on country circumstances**

In **Bangladesh**, the main areas of success have included supporting improvements in the legal framework and in helping build key institutions that have a role to play in AC. There are also some examples of CSOs achieving some success through their work. Joint donor efforts for addressing corruption issues through grassroots monitoring started to show results in the education sector. The Bangladesh evaluation nonetheless shows that donors can only go so far in their support to institutions and processes, and confirms that lasting achievements do not happen without strong political support. A generally unstable political situation has meant that some donor programmes have often not been given time to take root and have been slow to effect change. The lack of a structured dialogue with government, coordinated approach to AC activities, and poor mainstreaming of corruption issues and indicators are all factors that have contributed to reducing the effectiveness of donor interventions.

In **Tanzania**, donor interventions were particularly effective in helping to strengthen financial accountability, through support combining PFM strengthening, long-term partnership with the country's SAI, and dialogue as part of the GBS platform. Donor response to the EPA scandal and increased focus on grand corruption has been a good leverage point in helping (indirectly) domestic constituencies put pressure on the Government. Donor dialogue on AC has also led to further support to PCCB, with DFID initiating a multi-actor programme to fight grand corruption. Donor support to CSOs – while largely effective – has remained limited and CSOs have not received the same boost from donor renewed focus on AC. Corruption within the judiciary remains a key issue, with donor support for legal sector reforms being largely ineffective.

In **Viet Nam**, donor support, by being responsive to government wishes and opportunities, has resulted in a constructive sequence of activities that have been greater on the whole than the individual actions. Three main strands that reflect this are: a cautious approach to build trust through good governance; efforts to develop the evidence base to inform and build on the dialogue process; followed by direct support to AC activities by building the legal framework and capacity building directly with the Government Inspectorate. At the same time, the Viet Nam evaluation criticises POCSIS for being highly ambitious and not prioritised enough in its design, while noting that opportunities for support to non-state actors remained limited. Although donors in the infrastructure sector were mostly concerned with strengthening PFM (including procurement), there are effective examples of increasing the role of users in the monitoring and supervision of conclusions to draw from.

In **Zambia**, donor support has been effective in building key AC institutions in the country. Progress has nonetheless been slower than expected and has necessitated higher than planned investment overall, and the TFC drained rather than built the capacity of the main AC agencies involved. Donor response to the 2009 health scandal was well coordinated. A Governance Action Plan focusing on internal audit and financial reporting issues was successfully negotiated with the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance and National Planning, although there was some delay in meeting the second tranche disbursement requirements at the time of the country visit. Sweden's decision to freeze budget support nonetheless demonstrated the challenges of effective donor coordination.

**Box 10 (cont.): Effectiveness of donor AC efforts depending on country circumstances**

In **Nicaragua**, donor support was effective in helping to establish the administrative and institutional elements of an AC system, strengthening government budget preparation and transparency, and making the police a more efficient and effective force. The benefits of technical capacity building through the AC Fund were enhanced by working in combination with other instruments such as budget support which had greater impact at political level. However, the importance of institutional monitoring of corruption received little emphasis. Donor withdrawal from the Fund – a reflection of donors' broader disengagement in the country (starting with budget support) – may prove a tactic that will harm progress against corruption, by signalling that donors no longer treat this work as important, thus undermining the progress that has been made.

## 7. Conclusions, lessons and recommendations

### Conclusions

7.1. A main conclusion to this complex, multi-country, joint-donor evaluation can be drawn by responding to four key evaluation sub-questions, which are as followed:

- Are donor approaches responsive to country circumstances?
- How effective have donor interventions been in fostering institutional M&E mechanisms to fight corruption (parliament, civil society, etc.)?
- How effective have donor interventions been in fostering a culture of openness and supporting progress in the area of transparency, ethics and public reporting?
- How effective have donor interventions been in dealing with the forms of corruption affecting poor people and women in particular?

7.2. These four questions are inter-linked and need to be addressed together. The synthesis report concludes as follows:

7.3. Donor approaches have been in part responsive to country circumstances, as they positively responded to governments' plans to strengthen good governance and reduce corruption as part of wider national poverty reduction strategies. Donors have also adequately broadened their range of interventions to provide, not just support to dedicated AC Commissions, but also a wider range of institutions that have a role to play in AC. Yet, the role of the judiciary and private sector has often been overlooked.

7.4. Furthermore, donor understanding of the forms and drivers of corruption – and with it, ability to provide genuine guidance on AC – has been limited. Far more resources are required on the ground to ensure that (i) sufficient evidence is gathered and used to inform programming; (ii) the UNCAC proposed range of preventive and criminal actions (including in the judiciary and prosecution services) are fully considered; and (iii) lessons on what works and does not work are learned. In this way, donors can start responding more coherently to corruption in partner countries. This synthesis report should help in this direction.

7.5. Looking at effectiveness, and notwithstanding a long-term engagement and responsive approach to opportunities, donors have had mixed success in their in-country support to AC in all five countries. Positive contributions at intermediary level have included: supporting the evidence base; improvements to the legal framework and the country's PFM systems; and, helping to build key AC institutions, notably AC Commissions to SAIs. There are also ample examples of CSOs achieving some success through their monitoring work at the grassroots level.



7.6. Yet, any progress at intermediary levels has remained fragile and prone to reversals in countries where executive power is strong and fluctuates. Besides, there is little evidence to show that donor success in strengthening country institutions and systems has contributed to increased domestic accountability, and encouraging associated behavioural changes or cultural shift, at national level. Although the population has become more aware of the issue of corruption, people have yet to feel empowered or be given the tools to fight it. External audit and parliamentary recommendations are still largely being ignored by the executive, indicating strong reluctance by line ministries to take remedial actions. That many AC institutions are corrupt themselves, only further indicates that corruption is a social trap.

7.7. At the same time, TI-Bangladesh's 'Making Waves' programme – the only donor intervention that has been subject to an impact evaluation – shows what can be achieved when the population is mobilized and works in partnership with local authorities to improve the quality, and with it, integrity, of service delivery.

7.8. Another remarkable change over the evaluation period is that corruption has become significantly more openly discussed in all five countries. Although attribution is difficult, donors have made a positive contribution to this openness by maintaining AC high on their agenda for dialogue with host governments and helping to generate evidence related to corruption issues. Donors' strong stance on the need for improved governance and increased staff integrity within the institutions that they support has also been welcomed by all stakeholders as setting a good example of ethics and transparency.

7.9. Yet, recent corruption scandals, linked to aid money, confirm that aid can perpetuate rent-seeking behaviour and perverse incentives within public administration. Unless donors are able to show that credible actions are taken to fight public sector corruption, there is a risk that donors may be perceived as having fuelled rather than reduced corruption, as they continue to invest more money into government sectors.

7.10. This synthesis identifies the way donors can help strengthen their AC efforts through better programming, coherence, dialogue and coordination, on the basis that development assistance overall can help. Yet the risk of aid harming national efforts and contributing to corruption must not be overlooked, and must be tackled alongside the structural issues linked to sustainability and aid dependency.

## Lessons

7.11. In line with the ToR, this Chapter specifically focuses on *“lessons learned regarding what kind of donor support may work, what is less likely to work and what may harm national efforts against corruption”*.

7.12. Five good practices have already been identified in Chapter 5. These are further developed here, with other additional lessons.

**(1) Combining support for evidence gathering with external communication:**

7.13. Donor support for evidence gathering – whether by CSOs, SAls or other state agencies – has had significant leverage, when the evidence was disseminated publicly and used for raising awareness, fuelling national debate and advocacy purposes.

7.14. The evaluation concludes that there is much greater scope for generating, using and disseminating diagnosis analysis based on national surveys, audit reports and other national sources.

7.15. Donor support to M&E must be coordinated: many state and non-state agencies, starting with AC Commissions, have been shown to have a limited capacity for M&E, and with aid fragmentation comes the risk that the M&E landscape in some countries becomes over-loaded with indicators and frameworks, none of which are being used effectively for monitoring and advocacy purposes.

**(2) Investing in inter-agency partnerships to strengthen collective action and demand for accountability:**

7.16. Partnership working between key state and non-state agencies was identified as the main reason for key achievements in AC. Many examples and counter-examples are given in Chapter 5 to support this. As well as strengthening collective action and demand for accountability, the evaluation identifies the following potential benefits to partnership working:

- Promoting partnership should help beneficiary agencies gain clarity on their respective roles and responsibilities, build mutual trust and find common ground for collective action.
- Promoting partnership could become an entry point to the justice sector, should it remain difficult for donors to engage directly in this sector.
- Partnership working allows a better division of tasks and responsibility in countries where domestic resources are often scarce.

7.17. There are numerous options for promoting partnership along the criminal law enforcement chain, financial accountability chain and service delivery chain. With regard to the law enforcement chain, for example, promoting partnership will entail building relationships between parties involved, from detection to prosecution, from prosecution to trial, and from trial to the execution of sanction. Because these horizontal linkages inherently define domestic accountability processes, the widespread donor practice of working with an institution in isolation is less likely to work.

**(3) Investing in grassroots monitoring to promote corrupt-free service delivery:**

7.18. This good practice comes with a number of lessons: firstly, that working at sector/service delivery/provincial level can work relatively well, because it might be less dependent on central government goodwill and/or reforms; secondly, that promoting the participation of end-users will not only increase the demand for accountability, but also provide a platform for discussion and a source of data; and thirdly, that focus should be on positive incentives (increasing accountability) rather than negative incentives (reducing corruption).

7.19. What is less likely to work is if monitoring activities are carried out by CSOs that have little representation at grassroots levels. It is therefore important to identify CSOs that are membership-based and can effectively support community-led processes.

**(4) Combining building capacity and systems strengthening with integrity measures:**

7.20. Examples of police reform programmes in Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent, Bangladesh, show some positive results in donor interventions that equally focus on building capacity and promoting integrity. The same principles apply for systems strengthening and computerisation. Even if computerised systems are fully rolled out, adequate monitoring and auditing mechanisms will need to be in place and integrity and professionalism promoted, or else corruption practices will continue unabated.

7.21. Twinning arrangements between host country agencies and their counterparts in donor countries can help towards further professionalisation. The fact that international experts are not in the command line and are a step removed from the host agency's decision-making, was identified as key to a trustworthy partnership – their role being to develop good practice and build capacity.

**(5) Using coordinated dialogue in a timely and evidence-based fashion:**

7.22. In recognition that money alone does not buy reforms, donors have successfully combined AC interventions with dialogue with government. Their coordinated approach to dialogue – and the use of a mix of complementary platforms, including GBS – has further helped to raise the issue of corruption on the agenda. This should be continued.

7.23. Although donors were found to have ultimately little influence on policy changes, their dialogue process has, on some occasions, provided a useful leverage or 'last push' for a change of direction in government policy, when the domestic conditions were ripe.

7.24. The evaluation concludes that whatever the country circumstances, not only timing, but also a 'politically-savvy' and evidence-based approach to dialogue appears crucial. For this, donors, with the help of their embassies, need to cultivate their partnership and dialogue, outside government, to detect when domestic constituencies for change are sufficiently strong enough to be effectively supported.

**(6) Coordinating donor response to public sector corruption scandals, linked to aid misuse:**

7.25. The Tanzania and Zambia case studies show that donors have effectively used various platforms for dialogue to coordinate their reaction to public sector corruption cases. There are a number of pitfalls, however, that donors need to be aware of:

- Public sector corruption scandals will receive a high level of publicity, both at home and in the partner country. This calls for effective communication with HQ and the media.

- Because of the large sums involved, withdrawing payment can have immediate negative consequences, especially when dealing with service delivery. Being able to mobilise alternative funding mechanisms quickly can be crucial. This calls for retaining a mix of funding mechanisms.
- Although donors may successfully negotiate short-term safeguard mechanisms and remedial measures, the credibility of their response to corruption will ultimately hinge on their ability to push for real actions.

## Recommendations

7.26. Recommendations for donor programmes in each of the five countries were set out in the various country reports. This Chapter identifies eight overarching recommendations – focusing equally on the relevance and effectiveness of their AC interventions and their ways of working. They are based on findings from previous Chapters, and focus on finding practical solutions to the five commissioning donors to guide strategies and programming.

### **(1) Make donor approaches to AC more explicit, coherent, and evidence-based:**

7.27. Practical steps could be as follow:

- develop an AC policy – such as that by Danida – that encompasses actions to support AC in partner countries, and actions to prevent corruption within their agencies and in the use of development assistance (*strategy*)
- develop a theory of change explaining the main assumptions behind donor overall approaches to AC and how their range of interventions are expected to contribute to behavioural changes (*strategy*)
- regularly update donor approaches to AC, using fresh evidence from national and international surveys (*strategy*)

### **(2) Invest in evidence gathering and public dissemination:**

7.28. Practical steps could be as follow:

- build on the partner countries' existing M&E practices and coordinate donor efforts to address possible overlaps between various institutions' mandates, and take on board the partner countries' often scarce capacity (*strategy*)
- ensure that all support given towards evidence gathering – from perception-based surveys to financial audits – is equally matched with support for dissemination (including media) and public reporting (*programming*)
- put particular emphasis on supporting the production of disaggregated evidence (per region, section of population and gender) (*programming*)

### **(3) Make good governance and AC-specific interventions more joined-up and risk-aware:**

7.29. Practical steps could be as follow:

- make the link between promoting good governance and AC more explicit, by identifying how key areas of interventions in civil service and PFM reforms may positively impact on reducing corruption (*programming*)
- capitalise on, and support, existing AC prevention, detection and sanction mechanisms within public administration (including 'checks and balances' institutions,

such as SAI and the Ombudsman), and integrate these more fully into civil service and PFM (*programming*)

- identify all forms of corruption, nepotism, and collusion that could hinder progress in good governance and AC interventions. Other risk factors to take into account include: lack of political will, political interference, weak rule of law; barriers to partnership working and level of integrity within AC institutions (*programming*)

**(4) Take a sectoral approach to AC, with special emphasis on poverty and gender:**

7.30. Practical steps could be as follow:

- undertake a periodic and comprehensive assessment of all forms and drivers of corruption that pervade economic and social sectors, using a value chain analysis or other vulnerability to corruption tools, and a mix of fact-based, perception-based and performance indicators (*strategy*)
- explore the impact of sector corruption on poverty using disaggregated data in order to identify actions that would be most beneficial to poor people (including women) (*strategy*)
- encourage participative approaches allowing direct oversight of service delivery by end-users, focusing on measures to promote integrity (*programming*)
- create opportunities to discuss corruption issues as part of the existing government-donor dialogue mechanisms (*programming*)

**(5) Stop working with institutions in isolation and start promoting inter-agency partnerships, with particular attention given to ‘orphan’ sectors (police, justice, private sector):**

7.31. Practical steps could be as follow:

- promote better exchange of information between institutions, through shared databases (*programming*)
- use existing programmes in support of one agency, and add one component to encourage that agency to work with, and support, other agencies (*programming*)
- select key partnerships along the criminal law enforcement chain, financial accountability chain and/or service delivery chain and involve all beneficiary parties in the design phase of a new partnership-based intervention (*programming*)
- possibly use these partnership-based interventions as an entry point to police, justice and the private sector (*strategy*)
- recognise twinning arrangements between international and national agencies as good practice, in particular. This is especially relevant to areas such as lawyers and auditors but arguably can be extended more widely within the public service (*strategy*)

**(6) Adopt a more coordinated approach to AC:**

7.32. Practical steps could be as follow:

- work towards a shared long-term vision on AC, based on a mutual understanding and shared analysis between bilateral and multilateral agencies (*strategy*)

This long-term vision could embrace donor support for domestic AC efforts and make the link with their internal AC policies (*strategy*)

- map out all donor activities and reinforce their complementarity on the ground, possibly through joint funding mechanisms (*strategy and programming*)
- use GBS and other form of coordinated dialogue to identify possible gaps in funding (*strategy*)

**(7) Use the opportunity of short-term, reaction-driven inputs<sup>110</sup> to reinforce long-term, preventive, interventions:**

7.33. Practical steps could be as follow:

- support domestic accountability processes to investigate and respond to aid-related grand corruption scandals, and recognise that grand corruption scandals may be a sign of improving rather than deteriorating governance
- remain committed to alignment with country systems, by introducing short-term safeguard measures where required, and reinforce donor support to PFM systems in areas where these are the weakest, such as, in particular, internal audit mechanisms
- work with a range of state and non-state actors to both prevent sudden aid stoppage and assess the strength of domestic constituencies for future reforms (*programming and strategy*)

**(8) Adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach to aid, acknowledging that aid can perpetrate corrupt practices:**

7.34. Practical steps could be as follow:

- in fiduciary risk analysis, acknowledge and assess the risk that aid money to the government sector could perpetrate rent-seeking behaviour
- in programme design, acknowledge and assess the risk that programmes may lead to new forms of corruption
- at HQ, acknowledge and assess the risk that pressure to remain engaged in a particular sector may have led to some leniency in the past.

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<sup>110</sup> As defined by the OECD DAC Agenda for Collective Action.

# Annexes







## ANNEX A: Terms of reference

### 1 Background

Corruption undermines democratic values and institutions, weakens efforts to promote gender equality, and hampers economic and social development. In recent years, donor agencies have increasingly made the fight against corruption part of their larger governance agenda.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida), the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) will undertake a joint evaluation of anti-corruption (AC) efforts. Norad, on behalf of the six agencies, seeks consultants to undertake the evaluation.

The evaluation will take place in 2009 and 2010, with case study fieldwork expected to take place in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Zambia, and Nicaragua.

In preparation for the evaluation, a pre-study was undertaken in 2008. It included a literature review<sup>1</sup> an outline of a possible analytical framework for the evaluation (the evaluation team is not restricted to use this approach), and a partial mapping of donor support<sup>2</sup>.

The donor mapping survey showed that each of the five<sup>3</sup> commissioning donor agencies supports efforts to improve overarching anti-corruption frameworks, including laws and specialised anti-corruption bodies. Agencies also provide considerable resources for public finance accountability, in particular general public financial management systems and ministries of finance, often in conjunction with budget or large-scale financial support. The survey showed less support for financial accountability at lower levels of government, while state accountability bodies like supreme audit institutions and in some cases also parliamentary oversight bodies receive some capacity development assistance.

The pre-study reveals that while much of the corruption takes place in connection with service delivery, there seem to be only limited donor support at this level. There is little documented evidence of work to specifically address gender dimensions. The donors had different priorities when it comes to supporting non-state

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1 A published version, Anti-Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review, can be downloaded from [www.norad.no/evaluating](http://www.norad.no/evaluating)

2 The pre-study can be obtained from Norad.

3 SADEV is not a donor

actors, though in the aggregate there was considerable aid to civil society actors and the media, but little to the private sector or political parties.

## **2 Rationale and Audience**

### *Rationale*

The commissioning donors have paid considerable attention to anti-corruption in their development cooperation in recent years. Levels of corruption remain high in many countries, however, and there is a wish to find out how support in this area can become more effective.

### *Audience*

The primary audience for the evaluation is the agencies commissioning the work. Secondary audiences include interested parties in the case countries (national authorities, civil society, others), other countries and donor organisations.

## **3 Purpose, Objectives and Scope**

### *Purpose of the evaluation*

The purpose is to obtain knowledge regarding the relevance and effectiveness of support to reduce corruption, both through specific anti-corruption efforts and in other programs – in order to identify lessons learned regarding what kind of donor support may work (for poor people and women in particular), what is less likely to work and what may harm national efforts against corruption.

### *Objectives*

The objectives are to obtain descriptive and analytic information related to actual results of the support provided by the five commissioning donors, both overall and for each of them in each of the selected countries, regarding:

1. corruption diagnostic work (highlighting, where relevant, information disaggregated by gender)
2. underlying theory, AC strategy and expected results of their support to reduce corruption
3. implementation of support to specific AC interventions and achieved results
4. other donor interventions or behaviour relevant for corruption and AC efforts, and achieved results in terms of corruption
5. extent of coherence of AC practice between specific AC activities and other programs, for individual donors
6. extent of coherence of AC practice within the donor group
7. the extent that gender and other forms of social exclusion have been taken into account in donor interventions

### Scope

The evaluation shall cover all major specific AC activities of the five donors in the selected countries, as well as a selection of other programs of the five donors of relevance to the reduction of corruption.

The other, not-AC specific programs should preferably be found within one single area or sector in a given country. If necessary to study substantial programs of all of the commissioning donors present in the country, programs may be drawn from different areas. Preferably, the overall selection in the five case countries should comprise different areas (e.g. infrastructure, extractive industries, social sectors and budget support).

The evaluation shall include the issues of gender, poverty and social exclusion when possible and relevant, both as to whether these issues are dealt with by the donor interventions and the results achieved.

The initial mapping of donor work should build on and extend the information made available by the pre-study mapping, producing a comprehensive overview of the five donors' AC engagement and other major programs in the selected countries. The main emphasis shall be on the period from 2002 to the present, but the previous period shall be included whenever necessary to answer the evaluation questions or understand later engagement.

The evaluators are not supposed to prepare an extensive analysis in terms of the political economy and corruption context of the case countries. The evaluation should, however, be made against the background of a thorough understanding of this context, and this should be evident in the reports.

## 4 Evaluation Criteria and Questions. Lessons Learned

The evaluation shall concentrate on the evaluation criteria of relevance<sup>4</sup> and effectiveness<sup>5</sup>.

Due to the complexity and learning purpose of the exercise, it has been deemed less relevant to focus on efficiency, concentrating instead on effectiveness, related to results at output and outcome level. An assessment of impact would require a substantial increase of time and resources and is also not included.

Although efficiency, impact and sustainability are not specifically addressed, the evaluators are expected to include limited assessments of these and other aspects that may emerge from the analyses of relevance and effectiveness or otherwise be deemed important.

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4 Definition of relevance: "The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies" (Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, OECD/DAC).

5 Definition of effectiveness: "...an aggregate measure of (or judgement about) the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an intervention has attained, or is expected to attain, its major relevant objectives" (ibid.).

### *Relevance*

The questions should be answered descriptively and analytically for each donor in each case country. The extent of important commonalities and differences between the donors should be addressed.

#### General question:

Are the approaches employed by the five donors to address corruption (including its negative effects on poor people and women in particular) appropriate to country circumstances, and how could they be made more relevant?

#### Specific questions:

1. When did any increase in emphasis on anti-corruption efforts take place, and what were the reasons given for this change?
2. Was a state of corruption and political context mapping and analysis done prior to AC interventions, and, if so, what was the quality of this work? Were entry points and major obstacles clearly identified? Did the analysis consider possible corruptive effects of donor interventions? Were gender and poverty taken into account?
3. Did there exist venues for communication and discussion with government and non-state actors before defining the AC support programs?
4. What mechanisms have been in place for coordinating AC interventions among donors, with national authorities, and with non-state actors – at national and local levels?
5. Was the UN Convention Against Corruption, as a binding legal and political international commitment to further good governance, used and promoted?
6. What are the donor supported activities and interventions explicitly addressing corruption? Are these and other programs in agreement with prior analytic work and the priorities of national AC reforms?
7. To what extent have the donors evaluated the development of their AC approach? Has there been sufficient understanding of the nature and impact of corruption on different groups in society?
8. Have there been changes in the donors' AC agenda, implementation and results monitoring as a result of observed problems in the implementation of existing activities? Are previous analyses and approaches relevant against the current understanding of the country's corruption situation?

### *Effectiveness*

The questions should be answered descriptively and analytically, for each donor in each case country. The extent of important commonalities and differences between the donors should be addressed.

General question:

How effective have donor interventions been in addressing different types of corruption, including forms of corruption affecting poor people and women in particular?

Specific questions:

1. To what extent and how do donors promote open and transparent dialogue between governments, themselves, parliament and non-state actors to assess progress concerning anti-corruption measures?
2. To what extent and how do donors contribute to increasing the knowledge and understanding of corrupt practices, their forms, manifestations and dynamics, (including in service delivery), and are the findings widely disseminated to ensure public access to them?
3. To what extent and how do donors invest in fostering effective internal and non-state monitoring and evaluations of anti-corruption policies, e.g. from parliaments, universities and women's and civil society organisations? Does monitoring enable gendered forms of corruption to be captured and understood?
4. Do donor efforts contribute to strengthen the links between anti-corruption and governance reforms and the integration of specific anti-corruption components into core reforms?
5. Within donor organisations: what measures are taken (including risk identification and management) and what practices of financial management and control of programs are implemented to prevent corruption? To what extent have donors assessed the administrative burden for the recipient in this regard?
6. Have stated intentions with regards to anti-corruption been matched by follow-through on implementation, and have intended results been achieved?
7. What is the nature of diagnostic tools and donor reactions, individually and collectively, when partner governments do not live up to mutual agreements? What are the commonalities and differences between the donors in this regard?.
8. Do donors portray a contradiction between non-tolerance towards corruption and support to achieve development goals, or do they pursue a pragmatic middle ground?
9. Are the donor actions in line with the current international agreements with regard to harmonisation of aid and the OECD/DAC principles for donor action in anti-corruption?

#### *Lessons learned*

The evaluators should identify major lessons learned about increasing the relevance and effectiveness of donor support to anti-corruption efforts, including for improving the lives of poor people and women. Where applicable they should relate these to

individual or collective donor programs and partner countries. The following specific questions should be addressed:

1. What do the donors see as the main lessons learned after years of anti-corruption support?
2. What do the national authorities see as the main lessons learned after years of receiving donor support to reduce corruption?
3. What do non-state actors including groups representing the poor and women, consider as main lessons for future work to address corruption?
4. What does the evaluation team see as the reasons behind successful interventions?
5. What does the evaluation team see as the reasons for major disappointments?
6. Did disappointments happen after deliberately taking risks, because of poor planning and understanding, or because of changes in circumstances?
7. What can be learned from the positive and negative cases?

## **5 Methodology**

It will be part of the assignment to develop a methodological and conceptual framework to ensure objective, transparent, gender sensitive, evidence-based and impartial assessments as well as ensuring learning during the course of the evaluation. The following methods should, as a minimum, be considered:

1. Document analyses
2. Interviews of key stakeholders
3. Field visits to the five selected countries to complement and correct information, reaching out to public officials, non-state actors, donor representatives and others. The field-based evaluations may be done as one joint exercise between an international and a national team, or be divided into phases.

Some guiding principles:

1. Triangulate and validate information
2. Assess data quality (strengths and weaknesses of information sources).
3. Highlight data gaps.
4. Base assessments on factual findings and reliable and credible data and observations.

## 6 Organisation and requirements

### *Evaluation Team*

The evaluation team is expected to consist of an international team plus national teams for each of the study countries.

The international team will consist of a minimum of four persons, and will report to Norad through the team leader. The team leader will be responsible for the contact with key national stakeholders and ensure that they are allowed to contribute and comment as appropriate. The team leader should meet these requirements:

- Substantial experience in the area of development cooperation.
- Proven successful team leading; preferably with multi-country teams in complex tasks on sensitive issues
- Advanced knowledge and experience in evaluation principles and standards in the context of international development.
- Experience in reviewing principles and standards related to work against corruption

The international team as a whole should have competence, expertise and experience in relation to the following areas:

- donor policies, modalities and aid delivery systems;
- public financial management
- survey and data analysis
- political economy, governance, work against corruption, anthropology, gender
- relevant regions, countries and cultural contexts.
- Languages: English. In addition, since part of the documentation will be in Danish, Norwegian or Swedish, at least one team member should be able to read Scandinavian languages.

Gender balance will be regarded as an asset of the team.

### *National Teams*

Each team should consist of not less than two persons, one of whom should be a senior person with experience and solid knowledge in the study subject. The joint team in each country (national and international) should be gender balanced.

The national teams are expected to contribute with compilation of an inventory of relevant studies, surveys and disaggregated data (if possible), participate in the field work and contribute, as agreed with the international team, to the analysis and drafting of reports.

### *Data collection*

Each evaluation team will be responsible for data-collection. Access to archives will be facilitated by the commissioning donors.

The evaluation team may consider using research assistants in data collection. Where relevant, gender specific data shall be collected and accounted for in the findings and analysis of the report.

### *Organisation*

The evaluation will be managed by a management group of the commissioning agencies, lead by Norad's Evaluation Department (Norad). An independent team of researchers or consultants will be assigned the evaluation according to the standard procurement procedures of Norad (including open international call for tenders). The team leader shall report to Norad on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardize the assignment. The team is entitled to consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. All decisions concerning these ToR, the inception report, draft report and other reports are subject to approval by Norad on behalf of the management group.

The evaluation team shall take note of the comments from stakeholders. Where there are significantly diverging views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this should be reflected in the report.

### *Budget*

The tender shall present a total budget with stipulated expenses for fees, travel, field work and other expenses. The evaluation is budgeted with a maximum of 150 consultant person weeks for the international team plus a maximum of 75 person weeks to be distributed between the national teams, excluding possible national research assistants. The team is supposed to travel to the five case countries as well as to the five donor headquarters. Additionally, two team members are expected to participate in the following four meetings in Oslo: A contract-signing meeting, a meeting to present the inception report, and two meetings for presenting draft and final reports. The consultants may be requested to make additional presentations, but the cost of these will be covered outside the tender budget.

The budget and work plan should allow sufficient time for presentations of preliminary findings and conclusions, including preliminary findings to relevant stakeholders in the countries visited and for receiving comments to draft reports.

## **7 Reporting and Outputs**

The Consultant shall undertake the following:

1. Prepare an inception report providing an interpretation of the assignment. This includes a preliminary description of the country context, a description of the methodological design to be applied and suggested selection of donor supported programs in the five case countries. The inception report should be of no more than 10 000 words excluding necessary annexes.
2. At the end of each country visit, present preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations in a meeting to relevant stakeholders, allowing for comments and discussion.
3. Prepare draft country reports not exceeding 20 000 words plus necessary annexes, comprising an overview of the donors' AC support, key findings, conclusions, possible recommendations, lessons learned and an executive summary (of not more than 2000 words).



4. After receiving comments, prepare final country reports.
5. Prepare a work progress report not exceeding 2000 words, informing about the progress of the evaluation and possible obstacles encountered by the team.
6. Prepare a draft synthesis report not exceeding 30 000 words plus necessary annexes, based i. a. on the country reports and presenting the preliminary findings, conclusions, possible recommendations and lessons learned across countries and donors. The report should contain an executive summary of not more than 2500 words).
7. After receiving comments, prepare a final synthesis report.
8. Upon further confirmation, prepare a series of up to 6 short (4-6 pages) briefing papers summarising key findings and policy messages in an accessible format, to ensure dissemination of the most important findings of the evaluation to particular groups. The specific structure, content and audience of each paper will be agreed with the management group on completion of the synthesis report. Costs related to the preparation of these reports should appear separately in the tender budget and payment is subject to later confirmation.

All reports shall be written in English. The Consultant is responsible for editing and quality control of language. The country reports and final synthesis report should be presented in a way that directly enables publication. Report requirements are further described in Annex 3 Guidelines for Reports.

The evaluation team is expected to adhere to the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards as well as Norad's Evaluation Guidelines<sup>6</sup>. Any modification to these terms of reference is subject to approval by Norad. All reports shall be submitted to Norad's Evaluation Department for approval.

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<sup>6</sup> See. [http://www.norad.no/items/4620/38/6553540983/Evalueringpolitikk\\_fram\\_til\\_2010.pdf](http://www.norad.no/items/4620/38/6553540983/Evalueringpolitikk_fram_til_2010.pdf)

## ANNEX B:

### Key donor interventions against United Nations Convention against Corruption categories

Key diagnosis, research and evidence work		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Bangladesh	Various political economy and drivers of change assessments	DFID (internal doc)	various	
Nicaragua	Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) GTF 085 Transparency International (Anti Corruption Delivering Change 2008-2013)	DFID	2008-2013	0.198
Tanzania	Review of Anti Corruption Institutions in Tanzania	Norway, DFID	2008	
	Public Expenditure financial accountability review – PEFAR	DFID	2005-06	
Vietnam	Governance and Poverty Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP)	DFID, with World Bank and UNDP	2007-12	GBP £4.8m
	Governance Assessment with Focus on PAR and Anti-Corruption 2005	ADB		Internal to ADB
	Drivers of Change in Viet Nam and Implications for DFID CAP 2007-2011	DFID		TA
	TA support on Corruption Survey to the Committee for Internal Affairs of the Communist Party of Viet Nam	Sida	2003-2005	TA
	Implementation Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Law, How Far Has Viet Nam Come?	Danida, Sida	2008	TA
	“Implementation Assessment of the Anticorruption Law: How far has Viet Nam come at the Sector Level? A Case-Study of the Construction Sector.”	Danida	2009	TA
Zambia	Public Expenditure Review: Analysis of the Planning and Budget Process	DFID	2009	
	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) (Danida, Good Governance Programme, Phase I, Component B)	Danida, Norway, Sida, DFID,	2005-09	

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 5 Preventive AC policies and practices & Article 6 Preventive AC body or bodies* * incl. Article 36 "Combat corruption through law enforcement"				
Bangladesh	Good Governance Programme – Component A Vision and Strategy and associated TAs (Danida Human rights and Good Governance Programme Phase 2, Component 2 Transparency & Accountability)	ADB, Danida	2007-12	152.8
	Advocacy Campaign Against Corruption	Danida (with UNDP)	2006-08	
Nicaragua	Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund Nicaragua	DFID, Danida, Norway, Sida, with Finland, Germany (GTZ), Holland, Switzerland (Consude) and UNDP	2002-10	Phase I 0.8 Phase II 1.8
	Transparencia y Justicia, (Programme to support democracy and human Rights) PRODEN – what does this programme entail?	Danida	2005-10	50 m DKK (9 m USD)
Tanzania	Support to PCCB National Governance and Anti-Corruption Survey	Danida	2007-08	0.53
	Support to NACSAP	Norway		
	Support to UNCAC Participation	Norway		
	Support to PCCB	Norway	2008	6.5
	Tackling Corruption Project	DFID	2008-12	10
Vietnam	Technical Assistance to General Inspectorate to assist the Inspector-General in the Conduct of Studies and preparing for the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption	Danida	2003-2007	TA
	Capacity Building Support for the General Inspectorate, Small scale TA 4467 (1),	ADB	2005	TA
	Programme Strengthening the Capacity of the Inspectorate System (POSCIS)	Sida/Danida, Canada, Netherlands	2007 onwards	
	Small Scale Support to the General Inspectorate	Norway	2004	
	Poverty Reduction Support Credit, led by the WB	DFID, Danida, Norway (and other donors)	2004 onwards	
	Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice 2007-2012;	DFID	2007-2012	
	Ministry of Planning and Investment Inspectorate Project	DFID	2004-06	
Zambia	Support to ACC (ACCES)	DFID	2000-09	
	Acting against Corruption Together	DFID	2009-12	
	Good Governance Programme, Phase I Component A - ACC	Danida	2005-08	
	Support to the Task Force	Danida (09), DFID Norway, Sida (07)	2002-07 (*)	

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 7 Public Sector & Article 8 Code of conduct for public officials* * <i>excl donor support for elections</i>				
Bangladesh	Good Governance Programme – – Component C Prevention	ADB	2007-12	150
	Public Service Capacity Building Programme – Managing at the Top 2	DFID	2004-13	32.487
Nicaragua	Public Sector Reform (PSTAC)	Sida, Danida, DFID, with World Bank and Netherlands	2004-09	42.2
	Support for the Process of Decentralisation and Local Development in Nicaragua (Apoyo al Proceso de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local, APDEL)	Danida	2004-09	24.66
	Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund Nicaragua (support to the Public Ethic Office)	DFID, Danida, Norway, Sida, with Finland, Germany (GTZ), Holland, Switzerland (Consude) and UNDP	2002-10	n/a
Vietnam	Vietnam Public Financial Management Reform	DFID	2003-09	
	Support to the Administrative Reform Process in Dak Lak Province	Danida	2003-07	
	Support to the Public Administration Reform in 5 provinces (Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lao Cai, Lai Chau and Dien Bien)	Danida	2008-11	
	Public Administration Reform Program, and associated TAs	ADB	2003-05	45
	Civil Service Reform	ADB	2008-10	TA
	PAR Support, Ninh Binh	Norway	2006-11	
	Public Administration Reform – Pilot Project	Norway	2003-2004	
Tanzania	Local Government Reform Programme Phase I and II	Danida, Norway, Sida	2002-05 2005-08	
	Public Sector Reform Programme	Danida, DFID (with World Bank and CIDA)	2001-08	
	Performance, Results and Accountability Programme (PRAP)	DFID (with World Bank and CIDA)	2008-12	103.8
	Selective accelerated salary enhancement	DFID	2004-07	9.5
Zambia	Support to Good Governance, Phase II Component A – Commission for Investigation	Danida	2009-12	
	PEMEC (Payroll Management) – incl in. Public Sector Capacity Building Project (PSCAP)	DFID	2001-04	
	Public Service Management	DFID, Sida, with World Bank	2006-10	

<b>UNCAC Articles and related Programmes</b>		<b>Donor</b>	<b>Dates</b>	<b>US\$ (m)</b>
Article 9. Public procurement and PFM				
Bangladesh	Reforms in Revenue Administration	DFID	2002-07	3.6
	Financial Management Reform Programme	DFID, Danida	2002-07	13.1
	Public Financial Management Reform	DFID,	2007-12	0.3
	Strengthening Institutional Systems for Planning (SISP)	DFID	2002-3	2.1
Nicaragua	Public Sector Reform (PSTAC)	Sida, Danida, DFID, with World Bank and Netherlands	2004-09	42.2
	Project Transparency in Government Procurement	Norway	2001-05	0.4
Tanzania	National Audit Office Development Programme Phase 1	Sida (with Swedish National Audit Office and Government of Tanzania)	2004-07	
	National Audit Office Development Programme Phase II	Sida (with Swedish National Audit Office and Government of Tanzania)	2008-11	
	Public Financial Management Reform Programme (Danida Good Governance, Human Rights and Democracy Component 3 Public Sector Management)	Danida, Norway, DFID, Sida (with World Bank, Japan, Switzerland)	2002-08	51
	Support to Tanzania Revenue Authority	Danida, Sida, UK (with World Bank, EU, GTZ)	2003-08	35
Vietnam	Vietnam Public Financial Management Reform	DFID, Danida, Sida, Norway	2003-09	54.33
	Support to Supreme Audit Institutions' Strategies and Development Action Plans – Vietnam	DFID	2009-10	
	Support to the State Audit of Vietnam on Implementing the Law on State Audit	Danida	2005-2008	
	Multi Donor Trust Fund in Public Finance Management Reform	Danida, Norway, Sida, DFID	2009-12	
Zambia	Support to Zambian Revenue Authority	DFID		
	Support for the Office of the Auditor General	Norway	1999-05 2006-10	
	Reform of mining fiscal framework and tax administration	Norway		
	Mining Tax Audit	Norway		

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 10 Public reporting *				
<i>* incl work with parliament and media</i>				
Bangladesh	Access to information for greater participation and government accountability	DFID	2007-10	
	Strengthening Parliamentary Committees	DFID	2001-05	3.
Nicaragua	Investigative Journalism *UCA)	Norway	2003-12	3 phases
Tanzania	Deepening democracy in Tanzania programme (Danida: Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratisation. Component 1 Democratisation and domestic accountability)	DFID, Danida and Sida, (with UNDP, EC, CIDA, Netherlands)	2007-10	17.65
	Assistance to Parliament in oversight role	DFID (with USAID)	2003-05	3.3
	Media Council of Tanzania (Danida: Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratisation. Component 1 Democratisation and domestic accountability)	Sida, Norway, Danida	2008-2011	2
	Tanzania Media Fund (Danida: Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratisation. Component 1 Democratisation and domestic accountability)	DFID, Danida (with Swiss Cooperation, Irish Aid, CIDA and EKN)	2007-11	
Vietnam	Cooperation between Vietnam's National Assembly and the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) to develop democracy	Sida		
Zambia	Deepening Democracy	DFID	Forth	
	Parliamentary Reform Programme	DFID	2008-11	

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 11. Measures relating to the judiciary and prosecution services * * including criminalisation * excl civil society				
Bangladesh	Good Governance Programme – Component B Enforcement and Sanctions (Danida TA to Supreme Court Registry)	ADB, Danida	2007-12	150
	Human rights and Good Governance Programme Phase 2 Component 1: Access to Justice (Capacity Building of Judges in Lower Courts – through JATI (Judicial Administration Training Institute)	Danida	2006-11	1
	Police Reform Programme Phase I	DFID (with EU and UNDP)	2005-09	16.7
	Police Reform Programme Phase II	DFID (with EU and UNDP)	ongoing	29
Nicaragua	Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund Nicaragua (support to Prosecutor's General Office and National Police)	DFID, Danida, Norway, Sida	2002-10	See above
	Institutional and Technical support for National Police including work around gender and domestic violence	Sida	2006-11	12.0
	Access to Justice in Nicaragua Restructuring & Institutional Strengthening of the National Police of Nicaragua	Norway, Sweden	2007-10	2.0
Tanzania	Tackling Corruption Project	DFID	2008-12	10
	Legal Sector Reform Programme	Danida, Sida (with World Bank and CIDA)	2006-10	70
	Legal Reform Quick Start Project	Danida, Norway, Sida	2000-04	
Vietnam	Support to Legal and Judicial Reforms in Vietnam Phases II-III (JOPSTO)	Danida, Sida	2001-05 2005-09	7.0
	Justice Partnership Program	EU, Danida, Sida	2010	EU18.7 m
	Legal Sector Development	ADB	2002	TA
	Assistance for the Implementation of Viet Nam's Legal System Development Strategy to 2010	Danida, Sida, Norway??	2003-09	
	Support to the National Legal Aid System in Viet Nam	Danida, Sida	2005-09	
Zambia	Support to the Task Force	Danida, Norway, DFID	2002-07 (*)	
	Support to Judiciary to Undertake to Improve Processing of Serious Economic Crime and Corruption Cases (PILOT)	DFID	2003-05	

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 12. Private sector				
Bangladesh	Regulatory and investment systems for enterprise (RISE)	DFID (with IFC, World Bank, Japan, EC, CIDA)	2007-15	194
Tanzania	Financial Sector Reform Programme	DFID (with World Bank)	2007-11	64
	Business Environment Strengthening Programme for Tanzania (BEST) (Danida: Business Sector Support Programme)	DFID, Danida (with Netherlands and World Bank)	2003-13	
	Support to Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture	Sida	1997-2007	8.55
Vietnam	SOE Reform and Corporate Governance Facilitation Program Multi-tranche Financing Loan	ADB	2009	
	ADB SOE Reform and Corporate Governance Program Loan, 2000-2003,VIE 30058	ADB	2003	56.2
Article 13. Participation of society				
Bangladesh	Making Waves Programme Phase I and Phase II, Transparency International Bangladesh (Danida Human Rights and Good Governance Programme 2, Component 2) (DFID National Integrity Programme Phase II)	Norway, Sida, DFID, Danida	2003-10	
	Transparency International Bangladesh: Bridging Support	Norway	2001-05	
	Samata Empowerment through resource mobilisation programme	DFID	2001-08	10.5
	Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) (Danida Human Rights and Good Governance Programme Phase 2 Component 1 Access to Justice)	Norway, Danida, DFID	2003-10	9.1
	Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK)	Norway	2007-11	
	Manusher Jono Foundation (HUGO fund)	Norway, DFID	2002-07	
	Asia Foundation Election Monitoring	DFID	2001-02	
	Manusher Jono (HUGO fund)	Norway	2002-07	
Nicaragua	Support to the Civil Society Common Fund (CSCF) for Democratic Governance – allows Nicaraguan CSO's to apply for funding for governance projects	DFID, Danida, Norway, Sida,		
	Support for CENIDH, Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos Humanos	Norway		



<b>UNCAC Articles and related Programmes</b>		<b>Donor</b>	<b>Dates</b>	<b>US\$ (m)</b>
Tanzania	National Organisation for Legal Assistance (NOLA) (Danida: Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratisation Component 2 Human Rights and Access to Justice)	Danida, Norway, Sida	2005-ongoing	
	Legal and Human Rights Centre	Sida, Norway	2001-ongoing	
	Support to Haki Elimu – transparency in the education sector	Norway, DFID, Sida (with Ireland, Netherlands and Ford Foundation)	2004-11	
	Accountability in Tanzania Programme (ACT)	Norway, DFID	2008-13	31.7
	Support to NGO policy forum	DFID (with Hivos and NPF members)	2004-06	
	Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania Project (REDET) (currently under Good Governance, Human Rights and Democratisation Component 1 Democratisation and domestic accountability)	Danida	1992-2011	7.15
	Foundation for Civil Society	Danida, DFID (with CIDA, Netherlands, Switzerland, Irish)	2000-2008	
Vietnam	Transparency International – Strengthening Anti-corruption Demand from Society, Public & Private Sector	DFID -	2009-12	
Zambia	Good Governance Programme, Phase I, Component C : Access to Justice	Danida		
	Good Governance Programme, Phase II, Component C : Access to Justice	Danida		
	Private Sector Development Reform Programme	Sida, DFID		
	Good Governance Programme, Phase II, Component D: Strengthening civil society's engagement in governance	Danida	2009-12	
	Core Support of Transparency International, Zambia	Danida	2002-03	
	Good Governance Programme, Phase I	Danida		
	NGOs Ambassadors Fund	Danida		
	TI-Zambia	Norway	2000-03 2004-06	
	Support to Civil Society for Poverty Reduction	Danida, Sida, DFID	2006-10	
	Zambia Governance Foundation	Danida, Sida, DFID	forth	

UNCAC Articles and related Programmes		Donor	Dates	US\$ (m)
Article 14. Measures to prevent money-laundering				
Bangladesh	Support to training on asset tracing (Centre for Asset Recovery / UNODC/STAR)	DFID (with World Bank)	2007/08	
Nicaragua	Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund Nicaragua (Support to the Financial Analysis Committee of the National Council of Drugs, Ministry of Interior)	DFID, Danida, Norway, Sida, with Finland, Germany (GTZ), Holland, Switzerland (Consude) and UNDP	2002-10	n/a
Tanzania	Tackling Corruption Project	DFID	2008-2012	10
Vietnam	Anti-money laundering	ADB	2005	TA
Zambia	Support to the Task Force	Danida, Norway, DFID	2002-07	
	Financial Intelligence Unit	Norway	forth	

## **ANNEX C:**

### **Donor individual approaches (external intervention and internal policy)**

#### **ADB**

3.1. The ADB, whose anti-corruption policy dates back 1998, released its Second Governance and Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP II) in 2006, on the back of a 2005 review<sup>1</sup>, with new objectives including (i) being selective and focused and building a critical mass of expertise in a few selected sectors; (ii) using technical assistance resources strategic and efficient use of; and (iii) enhanced emphasis on project implementation and portfolio performance.

3.2. In Bangladesh and Vietnam, the ADB was one of the few donors to make some limited Technical Assistance (TA) interventions in areas that related specifically to AC in the early part of the evaluation period. The ADB now run the largest single governance and AC programme in Bangladesh under the Good Governance Programme (2007-12), which uses a development policy loan as the aid modality. The value is US\$150m plus an additional US\$2.8m for TA. This programme focuses on preventive AC policies and practices, fighting corruption and promoting accountability in the Bangladesh civil service; and strengthening the legal sector in its AC role. In Vietnam, some policy conditions included in the Public Administration Reform Program Loan of 2003 also relate to corruption and ethics. The ADB has also provided some small scale TA to the Government Inspectorate and, to support implementation of anti-money-laundering legislation.

#### **Danida**

3.3. Danida Action Plan to fight Corruption (2003-2008) combines interventions that directly support AC in recipient countries with measures to prevent corruption within their agencies and in the use of their development assistance. This Action Plan to Fight Corruption has shaped Denmark's approach to AC in all five countries; all country offices are required to report progress against implementing the Action Plan annually. This has made Danida approach to AC by far the most explicit, comprehensive and consistent across five countries.

3.4. Each country has regrouped its governance and AC interventions under the umbrella of Human Rights and Good Governance Programmes. The range of interventions has typically entailed support for CSOs, notably legal sector monitoring; support for governance reforms, including Public Financial Management (PFM) and legal sector reforms in Vietnam. Denmark is also supporting decentralisation in Bangladesh and Vietnam.

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1 ADB. 2005. Review of the Implementation of ADB's Governance and Anticorruption Policies: Findings and Recommendations. Manila

3.5. Denmark has also been active in more specific AC interventions, supporting, with ADB, the AC Commission in Bangladesh, the Task Force against Corruption and soon the Commission for Investigations in Zambia; in Tanzania, the PCCB's National Governance and Anti-Corruption Survey and, with Sweden and DFID, the General Inspectorate and a number of Ministry Inspectorates in Vietnam under Program on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System (POSCIS).<sup>2</sup> In Nicaragua, Danida contributed to the Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund; the Civil Society Common Fund; and the World Bank-led Public Sector Reform programme.

## Norway

3.6. Norway's approach to AC can be found in its 2003-04 and 2008-09 White Papers, with the former reinstating that that "corruption cannot be combated by only a set of instruments – it requires general measure to improve governance, with a number of more specific measures to fight corruption"; and the latter focusing on the global fight against corruption, and more specifically, approaches to combat illicit financial flows from developing countries, and more widely, giving developing countries more control over their own resources. Furthermore, as part of the NORAD AC Project (2008-11), Norad has played an active role in supporting the Government Expert Committee on Illicit Capital Flows; managing the Corruption Hunter Network; and, providing technical advice to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on support for multilateral initiatives. Norway also hosts the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's (EITI) international secretariat in Oslo.

3.7. By contrast, Norway's main areas of interventions vary from one country to the next. In Bangladesh and Vietnam, Norway has undergone key changes, with a transition from development cooperation to institutional cooperation and a significant reduction of staff. As a result, many projects were closed down, including some specific AC interventions, starting with their support to TI-Bangladesh.

3.8. The Embassy remained involved in supporting the inception phase of the POSCIS project in Vietnam. Norway has also played an active role in AC-related interventions in Zambia and Tanzania. The embassy has provided long-term support and become a key interlocutor to the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) in Zambia, where it also provided funding for TI-Zambia and the media in the early years of the evaluation period. In line with HQ priorities, Norway has also engaged with the government on setting up a Financial Intelligence Unit and provided support to the Zambia Revenue Authority to conduct three mining revenue audits and support the Ministry of Finance and National Planning to increase domestic revenue collection. In Tanzania, where Norway was confronted with a major corruption scandal in its long running support to the natural resources sector, Norway is providing project funding to the AC agency, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB); and is supporting PFM mechanisms/institutions both on the mainland and in Zanzibar. Norway also provided support to the AC Fund, media and other projects in Nicaragua.

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<sup>2</sup> Government Inspectorate, *Program on Strengthening the Comprehensive Capacity of the Inspectorate System (POSCIS)*, supported by Sida, Danida, Canada and the Netherlands. Norway contributed funding to the earlier inception stage.

## Sweden

3.9. The 2004 AC Regulations together with OECD DAC AC Paper “Setting an Agenda for Collective Action” define Sida AC policy. Sida has put particular emphasis on seeing corruption as a political rather than technical issue. The new government in place in 2007-10 strengthened emphasis on having robust internal procedures against corruption in place, dedicating more AC and audit resources at HQ and in Swedish embassies.

3.10. Sweden has assumed the leading donor role in working with the Vietnamese Government on corruption issues. In 2003, Sida commenced a project with the Internal Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which was, in 2005, to lead on to the release of a national survey of corruption and to assistance in drafting the AC law and establishment of the National Steering Committee on Corruption. Sida, with Denmark and DFID, has since supported the General Inspectorate through POCSIS. Sweden has also provided support in a number of important areas such as PFM, the legal sector, judicial sector and the National Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

3.11. In Bangladesh, Sweden is not directly involved with governance projects, outside support for electoral processes and participation of society. In Nicaragua, Sida is providing support to police reforms. In Tanzania, Sweden has provided long-term support to the SAI as well as contributed to public service reform programme. In Zambia, Sweden has traditionally focused on support to the Task Force on Corruption; PFM and democratic governance; yet its main stance against corruption has been its response to the health scandal in 2009, which involved Swedish money. In Nicaragua, Sweden contributed to the Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund, with other areas of support provided for PFM and public sector reforms; police reforms; the human right commission, and good governance under the joint Civil Society Common Fund.

## UK

3.12. DFID’s approach to AC is reiterated in a series of White Papers (2006, 2009) and internal documents, such as the revised Fiduciary Risk Assessment guidelines, which require country offices to assess the risk of corruption. Change in emphasis can be seen in the two White Papers: The 2006 White Paper focuses on protecting UK development assistance; building effective states by improving governance at a national level; and improving UK and international efforts to combat international corruption. By contrast, the 2009 White Paper focuses more exclusively on working with other government departments including the Metropolitan police and supporting asset recovery initiatives, including StAR. Substantial support for NGO-led, AC-specific, activities has been provided through the HQ-led Governance and Transparency Fund.

3.13. DFID has been at the forefront of donor AC efforts in Zambia and started its ongoing support to the AC Commission in the 1980s. In the early years of the eval-

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<sup>3</sup> See Country Strategy for Development Cooperation, Viet Nam, January 2004–December 2008, p.13. Thus Sida was active in capacity building in the Ministry of Justice; support for legal education at two major universities; capacity building in legal aid; support for law reform; engagement between the Swedish Parliament and the National Assembly; development of the legal profession; as well as in supporting the development and implementation of the PAR Master Program, through assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).

uation period, the UK also actively canvassed and coordinated donor support for the Task Force on Corruption. In 2010, DFID launched its new AC support programme, Against Corruption Together, to support the AC Commission and National AC Policy implementation plan.

3.14. DFID became more involved in supporting specific AC work in the later part of the evaluation in Vietnam, and in Tanzania, where it launched the Tackling Corruption Project in 2008, with planned support for PCCB, Ethics Secretariat, the Public Procurement Appeals Authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions. DFID's main area of engagement in Bangladesh is TI-Bangladesh.

3.15. Concerning governance, DFID is supporting research and diagnostic work through the Governance and Poverty Analysis Program in Vietnam; support to PFM in Bangladesh, Zambia and Tanzania; public sector reforms in Bangladesh and Zambia; Tax Revenue Authorities in Tanzania, Zambia and Bangladesh; and, police reforms in Bangladesh.

3.16. In Nicaragua, DFID principally contributed to a number of basket funds, including the Joint Donor Anti-Corruption Trust Fund, the public sector reform programme led by the World Bank, and the Civil Society Common Fund.

## ANNEX D:

### Monitoring and evaluation: Focus on results

#### Theory of change

##### **Clear objectives are important but an understanding of the theory of change is necessary to set indicators and monitor results**

It may not be appropriate for the objective of an AC project to directly reduce corruption, but if that is the case, it is important that the project design sets out clearly a description of how results under the project will contribute to reducing the scope for or incidence of corruption. Such a statement is typically known as a theory of change or might be referred to as the intervention logic or results chain. The theory of change plots the process by which activities supported under a project are expected to lead to behavioural change in support of the project goal and should be supported by a priori reasoning or research that justifies the chosen approach.

The simplest example of a results chain is the Inputs-Outputs-Purpose-Goal statements found in a logical framework. Of the projects analysed for this evaluation, only 36 per cent were identified as having a clear results chain set out in their design document, and mostly this was just in the form of a logical framework without any further descriptive narrative. However, the logical framework is often not an effective way to present a theory of change. Complex projects with multiple components are difficult to present as a linear hierarchy of objectives. For example, the Good Governance Program in Bangladesh encompassed reforms to the judiciary, support to the Anti-corruption Commission and reforms to the civil service. Each of these components would have a separate theory of change explaining how project support can influence institutional performance or behaviour, but none of these processes are described in the project document beyond the overall logic in the logframe.

An example of a theory of change can be teased out from the objectives for the project 'Making Waves', which supported Transparency International Bangladesh. Box B uses the description of the project from the project document to illustrate the theory of change.<sup>1</sup> The theory of change decomposes the sequence of actions and behaviour change in detail so that risks and assumptions can be identified and indicators chosen for critical stages in the process. The project was designed to help stimulate greater voice by citizens against corruption. By working through the theory of change it is clear that the 'purpose' statement of increased demand for transparency will not be met unless people are more alert, aware and vocal, so it is these changes that need to be monitored.


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<sup>1</sup> All the text in boxes is copied from the description of project objectives. The connecting statements have been added.

This is identified in the project indicators, two of which are:

- numbers of groups of concerned citizens demanding advice and information
- vocal demands made by poor men and women to Government of Bangladesh officials at all levels

But these indicators are highly subjective and a good illustration of the difficulties faced by many projects in developing objectively verifiable measures of performance.



## Guidance about indicators and measuring corruption

### There is a wealth of guidance about measuring corruption

A substantial literature exists about measuring corruption.<sup>2</sup> Major resources include material on the World Bank's website under the Actionable Governance Indicators initiative which brings together over 800 indicators from disparate sources.<sup>3</sup>

2 See for example: Arndt, Christiane and Charles Oman (2006). "Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators." Paris: OECD Development Centre.  
 Besancon, Marie (2003). "Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement." WPF Report no. 36. Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation.  
 Galtung, Fredrik (2005). "Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices." London: Tiri.  
 Kaufmann, Dani, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). "Governance Indicators VI." World Bank Institute.  
 Knack, Stephen (2006). "Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper  
 Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2007). "The Methodology of the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index." University of Passau and Transparency International.  
 Razafindrakoto, Mireille and Francois Roubaud (2007). "Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in sub-Saharan Africa." DIAL Working Paper 2006-17, Paris  
 Thomas, Melissa (2007). "What do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?" School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC.  
 UNDP (2004). "Governance Indicators: A User's Guide." New York: United Nations Development Program (in collaboration with Eurostat).

3 See <http://go.worldbank.org/BN5GB74IV0>



The focus of much of the literature has been on the technical difficulties of measuring corruption. Concerns have been raised about whether corruption can be measured at all, about the problems of reliance on subjective perceptions and personal experience, and the difficulties of trying to develop objective measures that go beyond institutional features such as legal frameworks, procurement regulations or budget procedures, to examine how these arrangements work in practice.<sup>4</sup>

The consensus appears to be that because corruption by its very nature is clandestine, it is virtually impossible to come up with precise objective measures. In that case 'in many areas of governance, there are few alternatives to relying on perceptions data. This is most particularly so for the case of corruption, which almost by definition leaves no paper trail that can be captured by purely objective measures.'<sup>5</sup>

But data from perceptions can be supported by other information that provides a form of triangulation and validation. That is the approach taken by the Actionable Governance Indicators initiative (AGI) which draws on indicators from 11 sources including AfroBarometer, World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), Enterprise Surveys, the Global Integrity Index, Public Accountability Mechanisms (PAM), Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability reviews (PEFA) and the Press Freedom Index. Some of these are fully accessible in the public domain, others only partially accessible.

The AGI initiative argues that there is a 'missing middle' between direct measurement of project outputs and high level international measures of corruption such as through Transparency International. The gap is the effects of institutional reform on particular governance sub-systems, which can be picked by indicators derived from sources such as PEFA and OECD/DAC Procurement Assessment.<sup>6</sup>

### **Guidance to help plan indicators for projects has received less support**

Until fairly recently, the focus of attention was on measuring corruption in ways that would be reliable and provide international comparability. Writers have given less attention to the challenges of project design and the development of monitoring systems. Two reports go some way to addressing that. The 2008 joint UNDP/Global Integrity report 'A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption' provides practical guidance on how to use corruption measurement tools for anti-corruption programming.<sup>7</sup> A guidance note produced by the AGI initiative helps with a clear and concise presentation that characterises indicators against three basic features: their scope, data type and object of measurement.<sup>8</sup>

### **What should a set of project indicators look like?**

The framework of characteristics put forward in the AGI note identifies three dimensions to indicators:

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4 Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006) *Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities*. The World Bank

5 Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009) *Governance Matters VIII. Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008*. The World Bank, Washington DC

6 Gary J. Reid (2008) *Actionable Governance Indicators – Concepts and Measurement*. The World Bank

7 June, Raymond., Afroza Chowdhury, Nathaniel Heller and Jonathan Werve (2008) *A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption*. UNDP and Global Integrity

8 Trapnell, Stephanie (2009) *Governance Indicators Explanations And Guidance For Usage*. The World Bank [https://www.agidata.org/main/video/GuidanceNote\\_GovIndicators\\_30Oct09.pdf](https://www.agidata.org/main/video/GuidanceNote_GovIndicators_30Oct09.pdf)

*Scope:*

- **Broad governance indicators** that compile information from different sources to construct an aggregate or composite indicator. Examples are the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer and the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
- **Actionable governance indicators** (perhaps better understood as specific governance indicators) which provide information on the design and performance of governance systems. Independent or 'external' examples are PEFA indicators and the disaggregated indicators in the Global Integrity Scorecard. This category would also include 'internal' indicators defined for a specific project such as 'increased ratio of convictions to prosecutions'.

*Type of data:*

- **Fact-based indicators** utilize quantitative or qualitative data that is not subject to perceptions. Examples would be PEFA and indicators based on Public Accountability Mechanisms such as laws.
- **Perceptions-based indicators** rely on the perceptions of individuals through expert assessments and surveys. Examples might deal with issues such as service delivery performance or effectiveness of the rule of law. AfroBarometer and the Transparency international Global Corruption Barometer are examples.<sup>9</sup>
- Some indicator sets mix fact-based and perception-based, such as the Global Integrity Index.

*Object of measurement:*

- **Design (or rule-based) indicators** capture data on institutional frameworks and processes of governance such as laws, policies, budgets and procedures. The indicators will tend mainly to be used at the level of project outputs. Examples include the OECD/DAC Procurement Assessment.
- **Performance (or outcome-based) indicators** provide information on the implementation of regulations, laws, budget procedures, procurement etc. Because these are highly context-specific, they are the most likely to need to be developed for a specific sector and programme. But this brings challenges about how to obtain data in ways that are reliable and consistent and how to interpret indicator values. There are some external indicators such as Enterprise Surveys, some of the Global Integrity indicators and AfroBarometer.

### **Some projects with good practice features have been identified**

Appendix Table 1 presents Goal, Purpose and Output statements for three projects from the five study countries plus a note about indicators for the Nicaragua Police Institutional Strengthening project. These examples illustrate some good practice features that reflect the findings of this evaluation.

**Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam.** This project provides broad support to governance and policy analysis. The text quoted in Appendix Table 1 is selective about corruption issues.

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<sup>9</sup> Concerns about the subjectivity of perceptions are an important factor in choice of indicators. The European Union advocates asking about peoples' personal experience with corruption rather than their perceptions of how bad it is, especially for petty corruption. (See EuropeAid Sourcebook of Corruption Assessment Tools)

- The goal includes an actionable indicator from an independent source, the World Bank CPIA.
- The purpose includes a mixture of design indicators and ad hoc actionable indicators.
- The outputs include the development of institutional monitoring mechanisms and the results from those.

**Accountability in Tanzania.** This project deals with broad governance issues with some reference to corruption.

- The goal has a broad governance indicator as source of data.
- The purpose also draws on broad governance indicators with a mixture of sources and issues: voice and accountability, women's rights, citizen participation and governance capability.
- The outputs maintain this reference to broad indicators (possibly excessively as they will not be so sensitive to project interventions) but also include actionable indicators such as PEFA, annual national surveys and a local government index.

**Anti-corruption Together – Zambia.** This specific anti-corruption project makes extensive use of ad hoc actionable indicators that are based on national surveys for goal and purpose. The main goal indicator appears to be perception-based, but at purpose level the survey data are more fact-based and there are ad hoc actionable indicators dealing with the performance of institutions, especially at the level of outputs.

**Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua.** The evaluation team did not see a logical framework for this project, but information reported in an independent evaluation highlights a well structured approach being adopted by the Nicaraguan Police, that draws together a mixture of evidence from perception-based surveys and institutional performance.

### **Concluding comments**

Taking together the experience emerging from the literature on M&E for anti-corruption and the findings of this evaluation a number of conclusions can be drawn:

- Project designs need to be more explicit about the underlying theory of change, to help identify key topics for monitoring.
- Projects are likely to need a mixture of indicators with design or rule-based measures prominent for outputs; actionable indicators with a mixture of fact- and perception-based measures for outcomes; and broad or aggregate governance indicators that might permit cross-country comparisons and trends over time, for impact.
- It is likely that actionable indicators will need to be developed for specific situations. Donors can help develop these by fostering institutional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Examples have emerged from the country studies for this evaluation: the addition of governance indicators to the regular Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey, and the two-yearly survey of corruption by CIET in Nicaragua.
- Bringing together design and actionable indicators provides a means of triangulation and validation of trends.
- There is more scope to disaggregate the indicators by gender and also to incorporate poverty dimensions than is found in current practice.

## Appendix

**Table 1: Illustration of good practice indicator features from four projects**

<b>Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam</b>	<b>Accountability in Tanzania</b>	<b>Anti-Corruption Together (ACT) – Zambia</b>	<b>Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua<sup>10</sup></b>
<p>Goal: To improve evidence-based policy making and implementation on sound governance and social inclusion in support of Vietnam's goal of becoming a middle-income country in 2010.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(ii) CPIA indicator for transparency and corruption improves from 3.0 in 2006 to 4.0 in 2011.</li> <li>(iv) Media plays an increasingly active and constructive role in the fight against corruption.</li> <li>(v) Legal reforms support increased citizen participation and the increased oversight role of legislative bodies.</li> </ul>	<p>Goal: To contribute to achievement of MDGs by ensuring that Tanzanians are increasingly able to claim and exercise their rights as citizens</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>Participation and human rights – Mo Ibrahim Index</p>	<p>Goal: A nation and its people that are zero tolerant to corruption</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>Reduced % of respondents / households that believe the corruption is high</p> <p>State of Governance Surveys</p> <p>Diagnostic of Corruption Surveys (2010, 12 and 14)</p>	<p>The Indicators constitute a comprehensive system with their respective sources of verification linked to the program logic and to the different levels of intervention. The matrix for indicators measures elements for the assessment in the following order: strategic outcome, strategic purpose, indicator's number, indicator, phenomenon that is actually measured, breakdown (by sex, national or provincial level, type of crime, etc.), formula for calculate the Indicator, annual result indicator and source of data. According to the matrix each purpose has to have its corresponding output and outcome indicator.</p> <p>All indicators are differentiated according to sex and there is a combination of indicators measurable in more quantitative terms and indicators based on perception of performance by different groups of beneficiaries. Together these should give a good picture of the overall performance of the Program. In short the most important indicators related to the program objective are:</p>

10 Sida-NPN: Annual Evaluation 2008. Fortalecimiento y Reestructuración de la Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, Mejoramiento de sus Relaciones con la comunidad y Modernización de su sistema de capacitación." (2006 -2010) Elaborado por: División de Desarrollo, Programas y Proyectos DDPN-NPN.

Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam	Accountability in Tanzania	Anti-Corruption Together (ACT) – Zambia	Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua <sup>10</sup>
<p><b>Purpose:</b> To support the development of relevant information systems, analysis and improved policy making on governance and poverty.</p> <p><b>Indicators:</b> (iii) GoV's Anti-Corruption Action Plan introduced incrementally across government and based on credible and consistent corruption information and supported by GAPAP. (iv) Strategic policy actions on accountability, corruption and participation as measured by the Policy Impact Study are consistently applied in PRSC 6-10 and attributable to GAPAP. (v) Decree 43 and citizen report cards introduced in public service delivery by 2011 based on work supported by GAPAP. (vi) Improved accountability and transparency in the system for land administration based on the work supported by GAPAP. (viii) Policy impact studies confirm the link between GAPAP supported work and policy change in: (a) targeting of vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities; (b) advancing gender policy priorities (c) accountability and transparency in public service delivery; (d) anti-corruption measures in the public sector</p>	<p><b>Purpose:</b> To increase the accountability and responsiveness of government to its citizens through a strengthened civil society</p> <p><b>Indicators:</b> Voice and Accountability (WBI Governance Matters) Women's Rights (Mo Ibrahim Index); Gender Development Index (UNI) Citizen participation (Afrobarometer – composite of several questions, citizen participation cluster); Mo Ibrahim Index Governance capability (Bertelsmann Transformation Index – management)</p>	<p><b>Purpose:</b> To reduce occurrences of corruption by enhancing the capacity of Zambian institutions to implement and monitor anti-corruption initiatives.</p> <p><b>Indicators:</b> Reduced % of respondents that have had an experience of corruption % of households experiencing corruption who make a complaint which is satisfactorily dealt with (Diagnostic of Corruption Surveys (2010, 12 and 14)) (State of Governance Surveys) (Sector specific baseline data from specific Zambian institutions)</p>	<p>Reduction of delinquency in the municipalities where the communitarian police model have been introduced Improved satisfaction among population regarding police services where the community police model have been introduced Improved satisfaction of the public in general and the direct beneficiaries of police services with relation to police performance (e.g. accessibility, quality of services, respect of human rights) Improved satisfaction among police employees regarding the police organization, tasks, service quality and accessibility, institutional image, gender equality etc. Increased number of beneficiaries of police services Reduced number of abuses and corruption within the NPN and number of complaints from the public.</p>

Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam	Accountability in Tanzania	Anti-Corruption Together (ACT) – Zambia	Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua <sup>10</sup>
<p>Output 1: Strengthened capabilities of Vietnamese institutions for data collection, analysis and monitoring of critical governance and poverty challenges over the next 5 years.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>(v) Consistent approach to collecting provincially representative governance data mainstreamed in ongoing surveys by GSO from 2009/10.</p> <p>(vi) Governance indicators in SEDP RF developed by MPI significantly improved with clear baselines and targets by 2009/10.</p>	<p>Output 1: Citizen's access to information improved</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>Public access to key fiscal information</p> <p>PEFA Budget Indicators: Comprehensiveness &amp; Transparency</p> <p>Open Budget Index</p> <p>Progress Markers in partner reports</p> <p>Number and percentage of citizens' requests for information that were met by government</p> <p>PRAP project KRA 4, indicator 3.</p> <p>Measured by annual surveys.</p> <p>Partner reports</p> <p>Partners achieving their progress markers that are relevant to this output.</p> <p>Partner reports</p>	<p>Output 1: Effective coordination and monitoring of national anti-corruption policy implementation</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>No. of MDAs that are regularly monitored for experience with corruption in service delivery</p> <p>ACC and Cabinet Office annual reports</p> <p>Agency specific survey(s) 2011</p> <p>Report of NACP implementation review</p>	
<p>Output 2. Better informed national policy and decision-making processes on governance and poverty.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>(iv) Actions set out in Anti-Corruption Action Plan increasingly informed by credible corruption data and with clear targets/benchmarks for monitoring progress.</p>	<p>Output 2. CSO engagement in policy and budget formulation processes at local and national levels increased</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.</p> <p>Global integrity 38b</p> <p>Local Government Index</p> <p>Progress markers in partner reports</p> <p>Citizens think that the local council allows them to participate in decision-making.</p> <p>Afrobarometer 53</p> <p>Local Government Index</p> <p>Progress markers in partner reports</p> <p>Partners achieving their progress markers that are relevant to this output.</p> <p>Partner reports</p>	<p>Output 2. Sector specific anti-corruption initiatives facilitated and monitored by ACC in selected public institutions</p> <p>% of respondents asked for a bribe to obtain a public service, license or permit in targeted MDA's</p> <p>Agency specific survey(s) 2011</p> <p>Corruption prevention measures are implemented in MDAs</p> <p>Attitude surveys (2010)</p> <p>Annual reports of the ACC</p> <p>Revenue comparisons</p> <p>Existence of Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments</p>	

Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam	Accountability in Tanzania	Anti-Corruption Together (ACT) – Zambia	Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua <sup>10</sup>
<p>Output 3. Better informed systems for transparency, accountability and social inclusion and improved GoV monitoring of performance.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>(ii) Systems for monitoring public service delivery incorporate user feedback supported by GAPAP.</p>	<p>Output 3. Strengthened CSO monitoring of service delivery and public resource management</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>The number of submissions to appropriate levels of government</p> <p>Afrobarometer 23a</p> <p>Local Government Index</p> <p>Progress markers in partner reports</p> <p>Corruption in government and public officials</p> <p>Transparency International</p> <p>Mo Ibrahim Index</p> <p>Partners achieving their progress markers that are relevant to this output.</p> <p>Partners reports</p>	<p>Output 3. Increased effectiveness in corruption investigations and prosecutions</p> <p>Ratio of prosecutions/administrative action to investigations</p> <p>Ratio of high level corruption cases investigated out of all authorized high level cases</p> <p>% of anti corruption cases in audit report investigated by ACC</p> <p>ACC statistics</p> <p>% of feedback to citizens within # days. Including ACC and TIZ-ALAC generated complaints</p> <p>Statistics of ACC</p> <p>Statistics of ALAC</p> <p>Strengthened human resource skills in investigations and prosecutions</p> <p>ACC statistics</p> <p>Training completion review of ACC</p> <p>Mid-term review</p> <p>Project Completion Review</p>	

Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice Programme (GAPAP) – Viet Nam	Accountability in Tanzania	Anti-Corruption Together (ACT) – Zambia	Police Institutional Strengthening Project – Nicaragua <sup>10</sup>
<p>Output 4. Strengthened focus on governance in the PRSC with strengthened policy actions on anti-corruption and accountability and improved monitoring and reporting of results.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>(ii) Evaluations show clearer policy content in the selection of policy actions and triggers for improving governance and accountability in the PRSC 6-10.</p>	<p>Output 4. Improved understanding by civil society of what works in strengthening accountability and fighting corruption</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>Number of linkages made by CSOs with national policy or legislation debates</p> <p>Survey programme reports</p> <p>Number of linkages made by CSOs with Parliament and the media</p> <p>ESP Semi-Annual Reports</p> <p>NEC/ZEC Regular Updates</p> <p>Partners – in particular the Learning Partner -achieving their progress markers that are relevant to this output.</p> <p>Partner reports</p>	<p>Output 4. Increased citizen involvement in and oversight of anti-corruption initiatives</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <p>% of respondents reporting corruption experiences</p> <p>Nr. of Partnerships / out-sourcing with CSO</p> <p>Diagnostic of Corruption Surveys (2010, 12, 14)</p> <p>Statistics of ACC</p> <p>% of positive perceptions of quality of service, including absence of abuse of office in targeted MDAs</p> <p>Nr. of MDAs where CSOs conduct monitoring exercises</p> <p>Service Delivery Survey (2011)</p> <p>Service Delivery Survey (2014)</p>	



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