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Macro Evaluation of DFID's Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability

Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2016: What Works for Social Accountability

Annexes Volume 1

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itad

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CMO	Context-Mechanism-Outcome
CMC	Consistent Modal Case
COC	Consistent Outlier Case
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
E&A	Empowerment and Accountability
EQ	Evaluation Questions
ESID	(Manchester) Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GNI	Gross National Income
GPAF	Global Policy Action Fund
IMC	Inconsistent Modal Case
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
ODA	Official Development Assistance
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ToC	Theories of change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women

Annex A Framing the social accountability macro evaluation

Social accountability (SAcc) comprises the range of mechanisms that informed citizens (and their organisations) use to engage in a constructive process of holding government to account for its actions and helping government become more effective.[1] Proponents believe that when citizens participate in social accountability processes – whether through participatory planning or through oversight and advocacy – their views and perspectives are more likely to be heard and to influence government policies and service delivery, leading to better quality services.[2] Critical observers of support to SAcc have, however, flagged the dangers of an absence of strategic, higher-level support. Jonathan Fox, notably, draws on a review of case study evidence to describe an 'accountability trap' in which SAcc's contribution to improved services remains localised and short-lived in the absence of strategic intervention.[3]

In this annex we frame the SAcc macro evaluation. We first summarise the key theoretical influences on DFID's approach to empowerment and accountability (E&A), consider how these influences are reflected in DFID's meta narrative of contribution to changes in E&A in general and SAcc in particular, and show how a set of social accountability hypotheses emerges from this discussion.

The global evidence base: what do we know?

This section summarises a selection of key studies cited in our background literature review.[4] Received wisdom on social accountability describes a 'short route' relationship of social accountability between service providers and service users.[5] Current interest in evaluating this relationship is illustrated by three recently published studies that analyse large bodies of evidence.

The first is a study of over 500 examples of interventions (government and donor-supported) that have sought to induce participation, including the World Bank's effort to support participatory development.[6] The findings from their review of evidence are generally modestly positive about the results of participatory approaches, but emphasise that the main beneficiaries tend to be the most literate, least geographically isolated, and most politically well-connected communities. They found '*little evidence that induced participation builds long-lasting cohesion, even at the community level*' and that '*group formation tends to be both parochial and unequal*.'[7]

[1]Malena, C. et al. (2004), 'Social accountability: An introduction to the concept and emerging practice', *Social Development Papers* No. 76, Washington, DC: World Bank, December.
[2] World Bank (2003) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
[3] Fox, J. (2014), Social Accountability: What does the evidence really say? GPSA Global Forum PowerPoint Presentation, 14 May. Available at http://issuu.com/thegpsa/docs/social-accountability-04-13
[4]Shutt, C. (2014), op. cit.
[5] World Bank (2003), op. cit.
[6]Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. (2012), *Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?* A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC, World Bank.
[7] Ibid, p.9.

Second, in a review of the experience of participatory governance mechanisms as a strategy for increasing government responsiveness and improving public services, Speer[8] assesses the evidence on the impact of such mechanisms as positive, but limited:

> *Overall, the reviewed literature suggests that the public policy benefits of participatory governance on government accountability and responsiveness remain to be proven and that implementing participatory governance effectively is likely to be a challenging enterprise in many places.*[9]

Third, a meta-analysis of a sample of 100 case studies of citizen engagement[10]identified citizen engagement through local associations as having the highest proportion of positive outcomes, with both local associations and social movements scoring more highly than participation through formal governance structures.

Social accountability in service delivery has also been shown to work with women and for women. UNIFEM's landmark *State of the World's Women Report*[11] (Goetz 2009) is a rich source of good practice in strengthening accountability for gender-responsive service delivery. Recent case study search in Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal, for instance, confirmed the empowering impact of women's collective action in accountability relationships.[12] Nonetheless, the UNIFEM report, while describing access to services as 'a rallying point for women's collective action', cautions on the importance of understanding context, including those contexts where women's relative powerlessness and lack of mobility results in women's relationship to the public sphere being mediated by men so that they effectively seek accountability 'at one remove from states and markets'.[13]

Based on our literature review, a number of consensus issues emerge from the academic and practitioner literature relevant to SAcc interventions:

- Service delivery failures stemming from weak public sector accountability are, at root, a political economy challenge as much as a technical one.
- Activating 'political voice' is more likely to emerge when citizens organise collectively around issues that immediately affect their lives, and often the barrier to citizen action is the capacity for collective action itself.[14]
- Support for accountability processes can have an empowering effect on women's political voice and capacity for collective action, but this effect is mediated by gendered social norms and the gendered division of labour.
- Transparency and access to information is necessary but insufficient to stimulate action (voice), and thereby accountability, although it often has an inherent value.
- Working on both voice and accountability more consistently and systematically, is more effective than assuming that one leads to the other.

[8] Speer, J. (2012), 'Participatory governance reform: a good strategy for increasing government responsiveness and improving public services?' *World Development* 40(12): 2379, December 2012.
[9] Ibid, 2385.
[10]Gaventa, J. and Barrett, C. (2012), 'Mapping the outcomes of citizen engagement', *World Development* 40(12): 2399–410.
[11] Goetz, A. (2009), *Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability*, Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009, New York: UNIFEM.
[12] Holland J., and Rued, L. (2012), in P. Scott-Villiers and H. Sheppard, (eds) "Tackling the Governance of Socially Inclusive Service Delivery", *Public Management Review* 14(2): 181–96.
[13] Goetz, A. (op. cit. p.6).
[14] See Joshi, A. (2013: 8), Empowerment and Accountability Research: A Framing and Rapid Scoping Paper, unpublished paper. University of Sussex: IDS, May.

- Donors need to be more realistic about what can be achieved in the shorter term, and extend funding horizons as much as possible.

Finally, a review of approaches to social accountability globally conducted by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS)[15] also concluded: that the evidence base was thin and uneven, often being based on speculative and even anecdotal information, and sometimes reflecting institutional biases; that theories of change (ToC) were weak and incomplete, with gaps or missing links; that many evaluations assessed effectiveness (largely focused on output measures) rather than impact; and some claiming attribution where it was not plausible in a complex environment with multiple interventions.

Social accountability within DFID's E&A framework[16]

The above 'what do we know?' review of the global evidence base iterates closely with DFID's conceptualisation of E&A (see Figure 1) which has been shaped by a number of key (empirically supported) theoretical influences. In particular, there is within DFID a renewed emphasis on the *political* nature of E&A interventions and DFID's role. The narrative is of pursuing inclusive 'political settlements' with '*an opportunity set … and set of political outcomes that are better for the poor*'.[17] To this end, DFID is strongly influenced by the 'golden thread' narrative of inclusive development, in which nations are built sustainably and successfully on inclusion, participation and collective action.[18]

The operational implication of this narrative is that DFID must think and intervene in state-society relations in a way that goes beyond, for example, citizen participation as the empowerment of subordinate outside groups.[19] Hence, DFID is aware of the need to shift from 'demand-side' programming to a multi-pronged approach. This policy discussion reflects Jonathan Fox's[20] coining of the distinction between 'tactical' (bounded, society-side and information-focused) and 'strategic' (multiple tactics, encouraging enabling environments for collective action and coordinating citizen voice with governmental reforms that bolster institutional responsiveness) approaches to accountability. It also takes note of Fox's conclusion that a narrow focus on 'tactical' approaches results in localised and short-term SAcc impacts.

Significantly, too, for this macro evaluation, DFID thinking on accountability and the pursuit of political outcomes has embraced *economic* empowerment. This expansion of empowerment in accountability terms to include a focus on economic empowerment at first viewing sits somewhat uncomfortably in the E&A framework. Our interviews with DFID staff, however, elicited a narrative around 'market accountability' and economic entitlements that achieves some coherence with the framework as a whole. While an important part of this area concerns transferring economic assets and skills, particularly to the poorest, DFID is also keen to focus on the 'enabling environment' for economic empowerment. The thinking is influenced in part

[15] McGee, R. and Kelbert, A. (2013), Review of Approaches to Social Accountability for Citizens' Engagement Programme, Mozambique, draft unpublished report. University of Sussex: IDS, 18 June.
[16] This section has been discussed with DFID staff, and largely represents an accepted view.
[17] Dercon, S. and Lea, N. (2012), *The Golden Thread: Towards a Coherent Narrative*. London: DFID.
[18] Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012), *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*. London: Crown Business.
[19] Hickey, S. (2012), Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach, ESID Working Paper No. 1, October. University of Manchester: ESID.
[20] Fox (2014), op. cit.

by the ongoing work of the Manchester Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) team on shifts in 'growth regimes' via 'critical junctures' from closed, rentier capitalist economies to 'open access orders' that are predictable and transparent economies with fuller participation of economic actors and entrepreneurs.[21]

The above overview provides some important context for the emerging DFID ToCs relating to E&A, presented here by DFID as three overlapping lenses: political accountability, social accountability, and economic empowerment (see Figure A1). Around this, DFID has developed a 'meta' ToC that maps entry points, processes and outputs through which poor people are enabled to 'have choice, to challenge and to change through action in state, society and market' (see Figure A2). Towards this goal of 'voice, choice and control', DFID seeks to promote inclusive, open and accountable institutions characterised by open politics, open societies and open economies. It does so by investing in a range of mechanisms that include increasing individual capabilities, enhancing individual and collective bargaining power, increasing access to political space, strengthening channels and institutions for engagement, and building strategic alliances and coalitions with elite actors.

Figure A1: DFID's three lenses of empowerment and accountability



Source: DFID (pers. com.)

Breaking this meta theory down into ToC for each lens, first **social accountability** bounds interventions that seek to influence the 'short route of accountability' through increased engagement between service users (demand-side) and service providers (supply-side). The underpinning ToC is that voice, choice and accountability in service delivery will improve the quality, accessibility and reliability of services and secure longer-term improvements in well-being.

DFID-supported SAcc processes can either be the primary focus of a stand-alone project or can be one integrated element in a sector (e.g. health or education) or cross-sector project. The SAcc elements typically focus on a mix of the following three groups of mechanisms: (a)

[21] Sen, K. (2012), The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth, ESID Working Paper 05, Manchester: ESID, April. Available at http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_05_sen.pdf

demand-side awareness raising around rights and entitlements/construction of citizenship, social mobilisation, local feedback and oversight; (b) supply-demand deliberative discussions and spaces/platforms; and (c) building supply-side capacity and incentive structures to respond effectively.

These SAcc interventions support processes of change that often start at the point-of-service delivery, but which are intended either to feed up through the system or to integrate with higher-level sector reform processes in order to improve service delivery design and delivery more comprehensively. Furthermore, during inception phase discussions with DFID's E&A steering group, colleagues expressed their awareness that accountability interventions that are limited to demand-side 'bolt-ons' (such as scorecards) are unlikely to bring institutional change and improved delivery unless they effectively bridge supply and demand and tackle the hierarchy of levels of governance of service delivery.

Political accountability bounds interventions that seek to influence the 'long route' of accountability, through citizen voice and engagement in political processes and policy cycles. This cluster of interventions is bound by the ToC that more inclusive and accountable political systems result in more progressive and better sustained policy impacts. DFID projects with political accountability elements support and strengthen inclusive and democratic electoral systems, public policy consultation mechanisms, transparent and responsive policy processes and budget/financial mechanisms, independent oversight of policy, and policy advocacy by issue-based coalitions of interest. As with social accountability, DFID is aware that political accountability is best strengthened by promoting change in both supply and demand. To bridge supply and demand, DFID political accountability projects support mechanisms of both external/vertical oversight by non-state actors and internal/horizontal mutual oversight by state institutions, or mixes of the two.

Drawing on evidence of what works, DFID privileges collective action and pro-accountability networks across state and society in influencing social and political accountability.[22] Evidence also suggests that effectiveness is increased when this action is 'organic' rather than 'induced' and where accountability mechanisms are locally legitimate.[23] Furthermore, issue-based, rather than generic support for accountability relationships is likely to be more effective and sustained, particularly where these issues are locally perceived to be important.

Economic empowerment bounds interventions that seek to lower barriers to accessing markets and jobs. The ToC here is that sustained growth and poverty reduction must link accountability in public policy delivery with market accountability that delivers greater choice and opportunity in private wealth creation. In this sphere, DFID-supported economic empowerment projects or project elements include: (a) mechanisms that tackle the enabling environment for 'market accountability' economic empowerment; or (b) mechanisms that support individuals and groups to pursue their economic entitlements and related opportunities.

This enabling environment can be influenced via mechanisms that tackle policies and laws governing the distribution of economic entitlements and which provide contract enforcement on economic transactions. Enabling environment mechanisms may also directly tackle the conditions that enable or disable foreign and private investment and for regional/international

[22] See for example, Gaventa and Barrett (2012), op. cit.
[23] Mansuri and Rao (2012), op. cit.

trade, as well as in economic infrastructure for market integration. Projects that directly support economic empowerment will support economic actors or groups to take up opportunities and access resources through mechanisms – in the form of awareness raising and economic literacy, for instance – that in some cases mirror the support to citizenship and citizen engagement in the pursuit of social and political accountability.

Figure A2: DFID's E&A Theory of Change



Source: Kate Bishop (pers. comm.)

Annex B Methodology for the macro evaluation

The methodology for the macro evaluation applied a mixed-method design to generate evidence of what works, for whom, in what contexts and why. In 2015, we completed the portfolio synopsis[24] which presented background descriptive level statistics on the total 'population' of DFID empowerment and accountability (E&A) projects based on a screening and tabulated mapping of the DFID universe of projects. Thereafter, we focused on synthesising and analysing a set of projects relevant specifically to **social accountability** (for a discussion of the positioning of social accountability within DFID's E&A project portfolio, see Annex A above). The social accountability project set analysis, presented in this report, was the core of the macro evaluation and synthesised a wide range of evidence to identify and interpret underlying causal mechanisms.

Our approach sequenced a pattern-finding qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) method that identified significant 'causal configurations' of factors[25] (or conditions) that were associated with a given project outcome. The approach also included an interpretive narrative analysis method that examined these causal configurations in greater depth and explored how they worked in different contexts and under what conditions. Figure B1 below illustrates the approach visually. More details on both methods applied can be found below and in the inception report for the macro evaluations.[26]

Figure B1: Macro evaluation methodology



Developing testable hypotheses

To facilitate our mixed-method approach, we focused on hypothesis testing. Developing testable hypotheses was a key element of the process and was completed through collaborative consultation with DFID stakeholders. This involved a review of relevant applied

[24] Portfolio Synopsis in Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2015, May 2015, ePact.
[25] Called 'conditions' in QCA language.
[26] Macro Evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability: Inception Report Final Version, 18 March 2015, ePact.

research literature and discussions with the DFID macro evaluation Reference Group as well as individual key informants. This insight complemented our understanding of change processes gleaned through the screening of projects for evaluative data quality (described below). Once an initial set of hypotheses for the social accountability project set was developed, this was further reviewed by DFID colleagues to ensure a sufficient level of buy-in and ownership of the macro evaluation.

For QCA analytical purposes, we developed hypotheses linked to our categorisation, coding and scoring of all 'conditions' in DFID interventions in the form of **context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) strings**. Hence each hypothesis was expressed as a combination of different contextual factors, project mechanisms and anticipated outcomes. The approach is particularly suited to the objectives of this evaluation because it sets out to test a 'middle-range theory', analysing what mixes of project 'mechanisms' lead to outcome changes and under what contextual conditions these changes happen.

For the purpose of the macro evaluation we defined outcome, context and mechanism as follows:

Outcome refers to longer-term development results to which the project aspires and contributes, but which are not entirely within the control of the project, linked particularly to changes in behaviours, relations, authority, laws, policies, procedures and norms. The outcome for this social accountability project set analysis, and shared by all sampled projects, is that of improved quality, accessibility and relevance of services. We distinguished in our analysis, however, between improved service delivery at local/project level, and improved higher-level/at-scale service delivery as well as improved service delivery for marginalised groups. This distinction becomes important as we begin to 'interrogate' the hypotheses introduced below. Under the general outcome of improving service delivery, we identified the following three outcomes:

- **Outcome 1**: Improved local-level (project area) service delivery. The quality, accessibility and/or relevance of local service delivery in the project area has improved.
- **Outcome 2**: Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. The quality, accessibility and/or relevance of service delivery at levels of provision higher than the project area(s) (e.g. district, provincial, regional and/or national) has improved.
- **Outcome 3**: Services improved for marginalised social groups. An observable increase in the quality, accessibility and relevance of services to marginalised social groups, including women and girls.

We also identified a number of ***intermediate outcomes*** that feature commonly in DFID project theories of change (ToC). These intermediate outcomes typically represent changes in social accountability-related processes, relations or behaviours en route to improved service delivery. These include elements of changes in 'demand-side' and 'supply-side' behaviour in the social accountability relationship. A key reason for including intermediate outcomes in our analysis was the outcome homogeneity observed in the pilot phase of the macro evaluation. We found that the outcome of improved services at the local level was almost always achieved, leaving us with insufficient diversity to generate interesting findings using QCA. By identifying these intermediate outcomes, we created more diversity of outcomes within a shortened 'causal chain', thus strengthening the utility of the QCA analysis. We identified the following intermediate outcomes:

- **Intermediate Outcome 1**: Enhanced openness/ responsiveness among local service providers/ discretionary budget holders. Local service providers/ discretionary budget holders invite engagement, listen and respond to the voices of users.
- **Intermediate Outcome 2**: Increased formal citizen engagement in local platforms. Increase in sustained and effective citizen engagement through invited formal channels/ platforms.
- **Intermediate Outcome 3**: Increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups. Socially marginalised groups, including women, excluded castes, ethnic minorities, participate meaningfully (rather than tokenistically) in local channels/platforms and have their voices heard.
- **Intermediate Outcome 4**: Increased informal/independent citizen action. Civil society individuals and/or groups independently increase strategies and actions to hold local service providers/grant holders accountable and/or challenge public policy and governance of service delivery.
- **Intermediate Outcome 5**: Public policy and/or budgets progressively revised and/or increased in the relevant sectors. Progressive policy revision and/or, or increase, in budget investment in service provision (policy content).
- **Intermediate Outcome 6**: Governance of service delivery improved at higher levels (above the facility or local discretionary budget level). Improvement in higher-level organisational arrangements and procedures to deliver services, including greater openness to citizen engagement.

Context refers to aspects of the environment that affect the achievement of project outcomes, often in complex and unpredictable ways. We identified a set of contextual conditions that are particularly significant to social accountability, adapted from O'Meally's (2013) categorisation of context domains.[27] For instance, social accountability interventions will vary according to political society context, including state fragility and the nature of the 'social contract' underpinning state-society relations. We would also expect social accountability to be affected by civil society capacity, by the nature of pro-poor policy provision and by how equal society is. To measure context conditions, we used proxy indicators from nationally comparable indices such as the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (see Table B1). Based on our information gathering process, we identified the following significant contextual conditions:

- **Context 1: Civil society capacity**. The capacity of civil society actors and groups to engage in social accountability relations with the service providers and other duty bearers. Dimensions of civil society capacity include: organisational performance; technical capacity; financial sustainability; mobilisation skills; political literacy; and connectivity.
- **Context 2: State fragility**. The levels of conflict in political society between actors or groups with competing interests. Dimensions of state fragility include: capacity to maintain political stability; capacity to reach agreements across conflicting groups; and levels of documented conflict.
- **Context 3: Pro-poor policies**. The benefits from policy decision making accruing to the poor and marginalised in society. Dimensions of pro-poor policies include: levels

[27] O'Meally describes five overlapping contextual domains that sit within a sixth, global domain. See O'Meally, S.C. (2013), *Mapping Context for Social Accountability*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

of investment in delivering public goods and services; time horizons for using public resources; tendencies towards redistribution; and safety net provision for the most vulnerable.

- **Context 4: State-society relations**. The relationship between state service providers and citizen service users in respect of a shared understanding of obligations and entitlements. Dimensions of state-society relations include: levels of clientelistic or patronage-based allocation of goods and resources; levels of rent seeking behaviour by public officials; and incidences of participatory spaces or channels for state-citizen communication and monitoring.
- **Context 5: Equality**. The equality of social relations between societal groups in terms of social, economic and political well-being and inclusion. Dimensions of equality include: income equality; gender equality; and social equality.
- **Context 6: Donor influence**. The reliance of the state on international donor funding to deliver public goods and services.

Mechanisms comprise interacting project elements that collectively contribute to the project outcome according to the project's ToC. There are a number of intervention mechanisms that are employed by projects in different mixes. These mechanisms encompass local-level demand and supply-side support to promote short route accountability but in some projects extend to supporting change in higher-level 'governance of service delivery' and policy dialogue processes. We identified the following significant mechanisms in social accountability interventions:

- **Mechanism 1**: Supporting inclusive forms of collective action among service users. Creating and or strengthening collective action taken by service users, including socially differentiated groups.
- **Mechanism 2**: Supporting local-level evidence gathering and oversight by service users, service providers or by partnerships. Supporting gathering of activity, output, outcome or impact data (including perception data) in the form of surveys, scorecards or opinion gathering.
- **Mechanism 3**: Involving local and national media in information dissemination, oversight and discussion. Supporting the invitation (including possibly capacity strengthening) of local or national media (such as newspapers, radio or TV) in providing coverage and airing discussion of aspects of service delivery.
- **Mechanism 4**: Constructing citizenship through information access, rights awareness and critical reflection. Raising consciousness and awareness of rights and entitlements among individuals and socially differentiated groups that would typically lack these attributes.
- **Mechanism 5**: Building/strengthening local policy deliberative platforms and facilitating dialogue. Supporting the development of local spaces or platforms that bring service providers and service users together to discuss aspects of service delivery.
- **Mechanism 6**: Building/strengthening national policy deliberative platforms and facilitating dialogue. Supporting the development of national spaces or platforms that bring policymakers and citizens together to discuss aspects of policy.

- **Mechanism 7**: Strengthening provider capacity/ responsiveness. Strengthening the technical and organisational capacity of service providers and enhancing their ability and willingness to respond to the voices of service users in different forums.
- **Mechanism 8**: Engaging multi-stakeholders including elites/vested interests. Encouraging people with different positions in society that have a shared interest in specific policy or service delivery issues to talk to each other, including the poor, civil society groups, private sector actors, journalists, government officials, retired government officials and academics.
- **Mechanism 9**: Integrating/ linking to state horizontal accountability functions. Making explicit links between social accountability relationships and accountability relationships that exist between different (executive, legislative and judicial) arms of the state.
- **Mechanism 10**: Supporting constitutional and/or legislative reform. Supporting research, advocacy and dialogue that promotes pro-poor constitutional and/or legislative reform.

We then developed clear definitions for each condition and a rubric for measuring the presence or absence of each condition (as explained below). Table B1 defines our outcome, context and mechanism conditions in detail:

Table B1: Summary of QCA conditions (context, mechanism, intermediate outcome, outcome) definitions and data sources

Contexts	Score a 1 if:
C1: *Civil society capacity* The capacity of civil society actors and groups to engage in social accountability relations with the service providers and other duty bearers	CIVICUS civil society index, impact of activities dimension: score above 2: http://www.civicus.org/csi/
C2: *State fragility* The levels of conflict in political society between actors or groups with competing interests	Country listed on the harmonised list of fragile situations: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Fragilityandconflict/FY14FragileSituationList.pdf
C3: *Pro-poor policies* The benefits from policy decision making accruing to the poor and marginalised in society	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average: score above 3: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.SOCI.XQ
C4: *State-society relations* The relationship between state service providers and citizen service users in respect of a shared understanding of obligations and entitlements	CIVICUS enabling environment index: score above 0.5: http://civicus.org/eei/
C5: *Equality* The equality of social relations between societal groups in terms of social, economic and political well-being and inclusion	Gini-coefficient below 50% (data: World Bank): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI
C6: *Donor influence* The reliance of the state on international donor funding to deliver public goods and services	ODA as % of GNI above 10% (data: World Bank): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS

Mechanisms	Score a 1 if, on the balance of reported evidence available, we assess that the mechanism is characterised by:
M1: Directly supporting higher-level policy change and governance of service delivery	Supporting the higher-level policy and governance changes that create an 'enabling environment' for citizens to hold service providers accountable for the delivery of goods and services to which they are entitled
M2: Supporting citizen evidence gathering, monitoring and feedback	Supporting gathering of evidence by groups of service users or their representatives: in the form of surveys, scorecards or opinion gathering
M3: Supporting media oversight	Supporting the invitation (including possibly capacity strengthening) of local or national media (such as newspapers, radio or TV) in providing coverage and airing discussion of aspects of service delivery
M4: Citizen awareness raising and mobilisation	Raising consciousness and awareness of rights and entitlements among individuals and socially differentiated groups that would typically lack these attributes as the basis for mobilisation
M5: Building local deliberative platforms	Supporting the development of local spaces or platforms that bring service providers and service users together to discuss aspects of service delivery
M6: Social inclusion targeted in design of local platforms	Local deliberative platforms have social inclusion conditionalities such as gender quotas
M7: Feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions	Supporting higher-level deliberations (above facility level) on governance of service delivery based on evidence, including from what works in project areas
M8: Strengthening provider capacity/ responsiveness	Strengthening the technical and organisational capacity of service providers and enhancing their ability and willingness to respond to the voices of service users in different forums
M9. Supporting long-term initiatives	Supporting multiple programme phases and/or supporting an embedded initiative
Intermediate outcomes	**Score a 1 if, on the balance of reported evidence available, we assess that the intervention has contributed to significant progress in the following intermediate outcomes:**
IO1. Enhanced openness/ responsiveness among local service providers/discretionary budget holders	Local service providers/ discretionary budget holders invite engagement, listen and respond to the voices of users
IO2. Increased formal citizen engagement in local platforms	Increase in sustained and effective citizen engagement through invited formal channels/ platforms
IO3. Increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups	Socially marginalised groups, including women, excluded castes, ethnic minorities, participate meaningfully (rather than tokenistically) in local channels/platforms and have their voices heard
IO4. Increased informal/independent citizen action	Civil society individuals and/or groups independently increase strategies and actions to hold local service providers/grant holders accountable and/or challenge public policy and governance of service delivery
IO5. Public policy and/or budgets progressively revised and/or increased in the relevant sectors	Progressive policy revision and/or, or increase, in budget investment in service provision (policy content)
IO6: Governance of service delivery improved at higher levels (above the facility or local discretionary budget level)	Improvement in higher-level organisational arrangements and procedures to deliver services, including greater openness to citizen engagement

Outcomes	Score a 1 if, on the balance of reported evidence available, we assess that the intervention has contributed to the following outcomes:

O1. Improved local-level (project area) service delivery	The quality, accessibility and/or relevance of local service delivery in the project area has improved
O2. Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery	The quality, accessibility and/or relevance of service delivery at levels of provision higher than the project area(s) (e.g. district, provincial, regional and/or national) has improved
O3. Services improved for marginalised social groups	An observable increase in the quality, accessibility and relevance of services to marginalised social groups, including women and girls

We combined and presented these conditions in a framework, as shown in Figure B2.

Figure B2: Context-mechanism-outcome configuration for social accountability project set

Context	Mechanism	Outcome
C1: Civil society capacity C2: State fragility C3: Pro-poor policies C4: State-society relations C5: Equality C6: Donor influence	M1: Directly supporting higher-level policy change and governance of service delivery M2: Supporting citizen evidence gathering, monitoring and feedback M3: Supporting media oversight M4: Citizen awareness raising and mobilisation M5: Building local deliberative platforms M6: Social inclusion targeted in design of local platforms M7: Feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions M8: Strengthening provider capacity/ responsiveness M9. Supporting long-term initiatives	O1. Improved local-level (project area) service delivery O2. Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery O3. Services improved for marginalised social groups Via Intermediate outcomes: IO1. Enhanced openness/ responsiveness among local service providers/ discretionary budget holders IO2. Increased formal citizen engagement in local platforms IO3. Increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups IO4. Increased informal/independent citizen action IO5. Public policy and/or budgets progressively revised and/or increased in the relevant sectors IO6: Governance of service delivery improved at higher levels (above the facility or local discretionary budget level)

Using Figure B2 as a menu, we then combined strings of conditions to develop a set of hypotheses that reflected our initial review process and discussions with DFID (explained above). Hence using the CMO framework, we developed the following list of 17 hypotheses to be tested using QCA:

1. Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2), results from evidence gathering (M2) and improved upward information flows (M7).

2. Higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when social accountability mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1).
3. Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved project-level service delivery (O1, O2).
4. Without improved governance of service delivery (IO6), social accountability mechanisms will not improve local service delivery (O1).
5. Social accountability mechanisms in any combination (M1–M9) do not result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3).
6. Combining social inclusion conditionalities in design of local platforms (M6) with Increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3).
7. Social accountability mechanisms in any combination (M1–M8) will improve service delivery (O1, O2) when they are supported through multiple phases or via embedded initiatives (M9).
8. Supporting long-term initiatives (M9) is more important for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) than for achieving Improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1) or Services improved for marginalised social groups (O3).
9. When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4) greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3).
10. In a state-society context with strong social contract (C4) improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal (IO2) and informal (IO4) citizen engagement with service providers.
11. An environment of pro-poor policies and openness (C3) is essential to increase citizen engagement for better service delivery (IO2, IO4).
12. In fragile state contexts (C2) local deliberative platforms (M5) are necessary but not sufficient to increase citizen engagement (IO2).
13. Building local deliberative platforms (M5) will increase and sustain the participation of marginalised social groups (IO3) in contexts of high social inequality (C5).
14. In contexts of high social inequality (C5), support to formal citizen engagement in local platforms (IO2, IO3) will not be achieved through any mix of mechanisms (M1-M9).
15. Where civil society capacity is weak (C1), media engagement (M3) is important to increase responsiveness (IO1) and increase citizen action (IO2, IO4).
16. In pro-poor policy making contexts (C3), feeding project-level evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) drives more progressive policy/increased budgets (IO5).
17. In pro-poor policy making contexts (C3), feeding project-level evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) drives improved higher-level governance of service delivery (IO6) without the need for direct support to governance (M1).

Selecting a project set for QCA

During the inception phase, we had identified 180 projects relevant to social accountability, and uploaded associated documentation onto the macro evaluation database. The methodology for this process can be found in the Annual Technical Report 2015.[28]

The next step was to select those projects which had sufficient evaluative data quality to be included in the QCA phase of the project set analysis. To do so, we undertook two steps:

- We selected those 84 projects which were initially coded as having sufficient evaluative data quality when the macro evaluation database was constructed; and
- We subjected these 84 projects to another round of data quality assessment, this time focusing more specifically on the extent to which there was evaluative data on the achievement of our main outcome of improved service delivery. This data quality screening process resulted in a reduced number of 50 cases which were included in the project set analysis.

Given that our sample included *all* projects with sufficient data quality and was not subject to any purposeful sampling which might introduce bias, we believe that the project selection is as close to a probability-based sample as it was possible. A probability-based sample would have required detailed coding of the whole DFID E&A portfolio which was far beyond the scope of this macro evaluation.

To further minimise external validity concerns, we considered possible biases that might arise through a geographically prioritised or politically driven selection of projects for additional evaluation or extra oversight by DFID. To explore possible biases, we analysed whether the project set was a good reflection of the portfolio by mapping the project set profile onto the total project population using the portfolio synopsis descriptive data.

We first compared the distribution of DFID outcome scores where available, which provided us with a preliminary indicator of possible positive or negative bias. We then compared our initial project set of 84 projects to the overall population of 180 social accountability (SAcc) projects on a number of descriptive criteria. Our comparative analysis confirmed that the sample was represented a good reflection of the portfolio against these criteria, which is important to consider when thinking about the external validity of our findings.

When comparing the two populations with project outcome scores, we found that the project set almost perfectly matchedthe project population in terms of outcome scores for the projects where such data was available. While outcome scores are not available for the large majority of projects, this provides nevertheless a strong indication that positive or negative bias is a minor risk when analysing this project set.

[28] Annex B Methodology for the Macro Evaluation in Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2015, May 2015, ePact.

Table B2. Outcome Scores for SAcc population and SAcc project set

Outcome score	Population %	Project set %
A++	1	0
A+	6	7
A	14	13
B	7	7
C	1	1
No information	71	71

When comparing projects by length of project, we found that the project set was composed of slightly older projects that tended to have ended already. This is expected, given that such projects are likely to have produced more evaluative material for the time being. However, the difference was not substantial. The duration of projects was comparable across the project set and the project population.

Table B3. Time data for SAcc population and SAcc project set

Start date	Population %	Project set %
2014	5	2
2013	20	12
2012	25	27
2011	12	13
2010	13	16
2009 or before	25	30
End date		
2012	4	6
2013	15	16
2014	11	9
2015	29	43
2016	20	12
2017 or later	21	15

Duration	Population %	Project set %
1 year	1	0
2 years	4	4
3 years	23	23
4 years	25	24
5 years	31	33
6 years	7	6
7 years	4	4
8 years	3	2
9 years	1	4
10 years or more	2	1

The project set almost perfectly matched the project population in terms of its geographical distribution (see Table B4).

Table B4. Geographical distribution of SAcc population and SAcc project set

Region	Population %	Project set %
East and Central Africa	30	31
Asia and the Caribbean	17	16
Middle East and North Africa	3	3
West and Southern Africa	35	30
Western Asia	10	14

Global or other	5	5
Income		
Low-income country	60	62
Middle-income country	40	38
Fragility		
Fragile/conflict-affected country	34	38
Non-fragile/conflict-affected country	66	62

In terms of budget, the project set was composed of projects with slightly larger budgets than the project population (see Table B5). This is expected, given that larger projects are more likely to be subject to evaluation. However, the differences were not substantial.

Table B5. Budget size of SAcc population and SAcc project set

Project budget		
	Population %	Project set %
£500,000 – £1 million	2	0
£1 – £2 million	5	3
£2 – 5 million	15	8
£5 – £10 million	13	11
£10 – £20 million	14	17
£20 – £50 million	28	32
£50 – £100 million	10	8
£100 million or more	14	21
DFID contribution		
	Population %	Project set %
£500,000 – £1 million	5	3
£1 – £2 million	3	4
£2 – 5 million	19	9
£5 – £10 million	14	15
£10 – £20 million	18	20
£20 – £50 million	26	31
£50 – £100 million	9	10
£100 million or more	6	9

Finally, we found that the project set was composed of projects with slightly more overlaps with other E&A areas, which was likely to be related to the somewhat larger budgets of these projects. Again, the differences were not substantial.

Table B6. E&A lens overlaps of SAcc population and SAcc project set

Overlaps		
	Population %	Project set %
Overlaps with political accountability	34	41
Overlaps with economic empowerment	6	13
Overlaps with both	3	5

Applying QCA to the project set

Having established a project set of 50 SAcc projects with sufficient outcome level evaluative data, we were then able to start QCA. In a first step, we subjected the 17 hypotheses listed above to QCA testing, with results presented in Annex C. This allowed us in the first instance to find, for each hypothesis, if there was *any* plausible underlying causal mechanism behind a given outcome, and then to elaborate on *how* that worked.

We first systematised the range of CMO conditions, introduced above, that emerged from our review of the project set reporting and evaluative data, and applied a binary score (1=largely present; 0=largely absent) to each condition for each project in the project set. When there was insufficient evidence to judge a condition, it was rated as missing and a blank cell was left in the QCA dataset.

This binary score emerged from a process of qualitative data extraction from the project documentation to provide evidence against each condition up on which to justify a score of 1 or 0. Hence when coding each condition as either 'present' or 'absent' for all 50 projects, we went through all available project documentation and extracted qualitative data on all 23 conditions using the macro evaluation database on EPPI Reviewer. This provided a clear evidence trail from the data to our coding and helped the team cross-check and quality assure each researcher's work. We also developed a comprehensive spreadsheet with summary justifications for each binary score applied.

To increase reliability further, the QCA scoring was systematically applied and triangulated by a group of researchers with shared conceptual understandings of the conditions involved. We also undertook a normalisation process among researchers through blind double-coding and follow-up discussions, to reach a shared understanding of our conditions and rubrics. We identified and coded our conditions in a transparent manner that could be replicated by any researcher. Each score was cross-checked by another member of the evaluation team, looking at the primary evidence extracted from project documentation as well as the summary justifications provided.

We note that mechanisms were easier to assess as present or absent than outcomes. We were also not able to specify conditions and thresholds more precisely without losing coverage (specificity vs generalisability)[29]. Given the complex concepts we were dealing with, a certain degree of subjective judgement was unavoidable but this was based transparently on the evaluative evidence available. This was further strengthened by rigorous cross-checking between researchers and a clear evidence trail linking coding judgements to the available evidence extracted into EPPI Reviewer as described above,

We then applied QCA to subsets of cases that shared the specified conditions (or causal configurations) in each hypothesis. For example, for hypothesis 1, above, we tested the strength of association with a positive outcome [improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2)] of a subset of projects that all had the following conditions present: results from evidence gathering (M2) and improved upward information flows (M7). We summarised the results of our QCA analysis in a series of truth tables (presented in Annex C) that allowed us to identify plausible patterns of conditions that would give rise to the given outcome. This

[29] According to the QCA literature, when using crisp set QCA it is not always necessary to provide a detailed definition of thresholds as long as absence and presence of a condition are clearly defined (see, for instance, Ragin and Rihoux 2008).

hypothesis-testing approach was agreed with DFID in a series of engagements prior to the analysis.

For a hypothesis to be confirmed, the following criteria had to be met:

- If the wording of a hypothesis implies a necessity relationship, a necessity consistency threshold of 0.9[30];
- If the wording of a hypothesis implies a sufficiency relationship, a sufficiency consistency threshold of 0.9;
- If the wording of a hypothesis relates to the likelihood of sufficiency or necessity, a stronger[31] association than in competing models as measured by consistency and coverage; and

Additionally, findings were characterised as ambivalent if the following was the case:

- For necessity statements, if the ratio of cases presenting the condition (or configuration) to cases not presenting the condition (or configuration) is over 0.9 or under 0.1; and
- For sufficiency statements, if the ratio of cases presenting the outcome to the total number of cases in the model is over 0.9 or under 0.1.

The wording of the hypotheses implies the following types of relationships:

Hypothesis	Type of relationship implied
Hypothesis 1: Higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when SAcc mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1).	Necessity
Hypothesis 2a: Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).	Likelihood of sufficiency or necessity
Hypothesis 2b: Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved higher-level service delivery (O2)	Likelihood of sufficiency or necessity
Hypothesis 3: Awareness raising (M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)	Sufficiency
Hypothesis 4: Combining support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) with increased participation by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)	Sufficiency
Hypothesis 5: When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3)	Likelihood of sufficiency or necessity
Hypothesis 6: In a state-society context with a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements	Sufficiency

[30] A threshold of 0.9 is good practice (see, for instance, Schneider & Wagemann 2010) and was judged as reasonable given the size of the dataset.

[31] Where differences are small significance tests were conducted using binomial tables as suggested in Befani , B. (2016): Pathways to Change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). EBA Report 05/16.

(M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2)	

Given the focus on hypothesis-testing, equifinality was assessed within the existing set of hypotheses. We tested multiple configurations within our hypotheses and often identified multiple pathways to achieving the outcome. More inductive analysis through the Quine McCluskey algorithm was not feasible given the large number of gaps in the database. Inconsistencies were systematically interrogated during the narrative analysis as discussed below.

Finally, we tested the robustness of our findings through 'sensitivity analysis' of our QCA results. Instead of randomly adding and removing conditions and cases, we were presented with a 'natural experiment' in that the original dataset was modified after new or improved data was obtained. This changed the content of some cells and added content to previously blank cells, which in turn affected the selection of cases included in the models (for all hypotheses except one). In spite of these changes, the vast majority of our findings did not change substantially, which is an argument supporting their robustness. The biggest change was observed for hypothesis 15, for which we only had 11 cases in the first place, which confirms that when findings are observed over a medium or large number of cases they are likely to be more robust (see QCA in Annex C).

Sensitivity analysis is approached in terms of a number of suggested operations.[32] Below we report these and explain how and why our "natural experiment" did or did not make these possible.

1. Removal of conditions: we could not remove conditions because in each hypothesis we already had a small number of conditions.

2. Change of calibration criteria: this would have been an extremely complex and cumbersome change for this dataset. This strategy is usually recommended when the calibration process is automatic or semi-automatic.

3. Change of frequency thresholds: we did not use frequency thresholds in the first place (all combinations were included in the analysis, irrespective of their frequency) so we could not change those as part of the sensitivity analysis.

4. Change of consistency criteria for inclusion in the truth table: we did not use Boolean minimisations in most cases so did not have to decide what to do with 'contradictory cases'. Most of our synthesis procedures are of a superset and subset nature so we do not need to select cases for inclusion in a truth table. We just simply measured consistency scores.

5. Removal and addition of cases: this is what the second round of analysis 'naturally' did, filling in data gaps and replacing data in a way that can be largely considered random. Note that no sensitivity analysis specifies how many cells in the matrix need to change. The only general idea is that the changes need to be marginal and simulate

[32] See Schneider C and C Wagemann (2012), *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge University Press.

measurement and random error: a total of 24 changes (which can be considered to some extent 'random') have been made out of 1200 cells.

For further detail on the application of QCA in this macro evaluation, please see the inception report.[33]

Selecting cases for narrative analysis

Following the application of QCA, we consulted DFID on which of the 17 hypotheses we would take forward for narrative analysis. As part of this discussion we flagged which hypothesis had yielded particularly strong associations between a given mix of contexts-mechanisms and a given intermediate outcome or outcome. This consultation process resulted in a final list of seven hypotheses where patterns emerged for a significant number of cases in that causal configuration and/or where interesting associations had emerged. We renumbered these seven hypotheses as follows:

- **Hypothesis 1 (Outcome 2)**: Higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when SAcc mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1).
- **Hypothesis 2a (Outcome 1)**: Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved project-level service delivery (O1).
- **Hypothesis 2b (Outcome 2)** Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved higher-level service delivery (O2).
- **Hypothesis 3 (Outcome 3)**: SAcc mechanisms M4 (awareness raising) + M6 (socially inclusive platforms) result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3).
- **Hypothesis 4 (Outcome 3)**: Combining social inclusion in the design of local platforms (M6) with achieving increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3).
- **Hypothesis 5 (Intermediate Outcome 1)**: When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4,) greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3).
- **Hypothesis 6 (Intermediate Outcome 2)**: In a state-society context with a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal (IO2) citizen engagement with service providers.

For each hypothesis we ensured that the selection of cases for in-depth, narrative analysis was transparent. For each hypothesis, we focused on the dominant configuration and we identified two clusters of cases to subject to in-depth analysis:

1. Cases that exemplified the configuration of conditions associated with a given outcome of interest (consistent cases).

[33] Macro Evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability: Inception Report Final Version, 18 March 2015, ePact.

2. Cases that were inconsistent, having the same configuration of conditions but with outcome absent (inconsistent cases).

Within each of these clusters there were too many cases to subject all of them to narrative analysis. We therefore sampled cases transparently for the following clusters of cases and selected a minimum of three cases per cluster:[34]

1. Consistent cases: In order to find any likely causal mechanisms connecting the conditions that make up the configuration we looked for 'modal cases' (i.e. those that had maximum similarity with all other cases in this group). Once a plausible causal mechanism was found, we checked to see if it could also be found in the 'outlier' cases in this group (i.e. those with least similarity with all others).
2. Inconsistent cases (if present in the identified causal configuration): We selected modal cases and outlier cases using the same method. Analysing inconsistent cases helped us identifying blocking factors that prevented causal mechanisms from working.

To identify cases with maximum or minimum similarity to others, we used the 'Hamming distance of similarity' method.[35] The Hamming distance is a measure of similarity of two strings of binary numbers.[36] In the case of the macro evaluation, we used the measure to calculate the similarity of projects when taking *all* conditions into account, not just the three or four CMO conditions that were used to form each causal configuration of cases for each hypothesis. This provided a transparent and systematic way of identifying those projects that were most or least similar to others within a given causal configuration.

The Hamming distance calculation brought up the same cases for several causal configurations, limiting the overall number of cases that we needed to analyse during the narrative analysis phase to 13. Table B7 below illustrates this selection of narrative cases, organised by focus area, as explained in Section 3 of the main report. The abbreviations are as follows: CMC denotes 'consistent modal' cases, COC 'consistent outlier' cases, and IMC 'inconsistent modal' cases.

[34] Focusing on the dominant configuration/finding for each hypothesis.
[35] Note that the hamming distance method was applied to the initial dataset (Table C1) not the revised dataset (Table C2).
[36] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamming_distance

Table B7: Case selection for narrative analysis

	Focus area 1			Focus area 2		Focus area 3		
	H1	H2a	H2b	H3	H4	H5*	H6b	H6a*
1. Rights and Governance Challenge Fund Bangladesh succeeded by the Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded programme (2004–16)	CMC	CMC						
2. Rural Water Supply Programme in Tanzania (2012–15)	COC							
3. Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme (2012–15)	IMC							
4. Supporting the implementation of the Free Health Care Initiative, Sierra Leone (2010–16)		COC					COC	
5. Partnership for Transforming Health Systems 2 Nigeria (2008–14)			CMC	CMC	CMC			
6. Foundation for Civil Society Programme, Tanzania (2008–15)			IMC			CMC	CMC	
7. Community Land Use Fund Mozambique (2006–14)			COC					
8. Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa Through the Revitalisation of Primary Health Care (2011–16)				COC	COC			
9. Drivers of Accountability Programme Kenya (2010–16)				IMC	IMC			
10. Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy, Rwanda (2009–13)						COC		
11. Twaweza, Tanzania (2009–15)							IMC	
12. Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project – Phase 2 (2007–14)								CMC
13. Strengthening Monitoring and Performance Management for the Poor in South Africa (2012–16)								COC

* There were no inconsistent cases for these hypotheses

Narrative analysis

Using these QCA findings of the causal configurations linked to each of the seven hypotheses, we then sought to interpret and illustrate these patterns based on narrative analysis. Narrative analysis involves a deeper comparative qualitative analysis of the evaluative material available. It also involved additional key informant interviews conducted by phone/skype with individuals who were deeply involved in the project and/or who had been linked to the project

in an evaluative capacity. The narrative analysis case studies are collected together in the accompanying Volume 2 to this report.

The narrative analysis sought to illustrate the QCA findings through the construction of simple readable narratives which connected the conditions in the dominant configuration of each CMO hypothesis in a way that was both plausible and respectful of the facts. It also aimed at excavating to establish if there was a 'real-life' causal mechanism or explanatory model that connected the events described by the configuration of conditions found via QCA. We systematically interrogated inconsistencies by selecting inconsistent cases for narrative analysis and investigating in detail why these inconsistent cases have failed to display the outcome. Contrasting consistent cases and inconsistent cases to achieve a deeper level of understanding was a key element of the narrative analysis.

We increased the trustworthiness of the causal inference in our narrative analysis through demonstrating 'rigorous thinking'.[37] For each case study this involved (a) coding, summarising and tabulating causal explanations and accompanying evidence for each outcome; and (b) translating this table into a causal flow diagram that showed our interpretative analysis of change and contribution to change. Once we completed this within-case analysis, we then compared the tables and flow diagrams for all sampled cases in the cluster in order to consider alternative explanations for change.

We further strengthened our confidence in the verifiability of these emerging explanatory models by subjecting them to cross-checking and interrogation by at least one other researcher, who reviewed the evidence cited and its interpretation. This internal challenge function – the basis of achieving trustworthiness in qualitative research[38] – enabled us to increase our confidence in the internal validity of our interpretations.

Methodology limitations

Throughout the application of this methodology discussed above we have explained our use of robustness principles to increase the reliability, internal validity and external validity of our findings. These three robustness principles, along with a fourth cross-cutting principle of transparency, are discussed in more detail in a Robustness Note,[39] included as Annex F and submitted to DFID during the methodology design phase of this SAcc macro evaluation.

Despite this purposeful application of robustness principles, the methodology remained subject to a number of limitations, including:

- The use of nationally comparable indices for context conditions, such as the CIVICUS enabling environment index (all indexes listed in Annex B, Table B1), allowed us to standardise and increase the reliability of the QCA scoring for context. These context conditions were agreed with DFID staff as part of the hypothesis development process in 2015 after a careful reading of some relevant case study documentation. However,

[37] On the distinction between rigour as statistically verifiable attribution and rigour as 'quality of thought, see Stern, E., Stame, N., Mayne, J., Forss, K., Davies, R. and Befani, B. (2012), *Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluations.* (Working Paper No. 38), London, Department for International Development; White, H. and Phillips, D. (2012), *Addressing Attribution of Cause and Effect in Small n Impact Evaluations: Towards an Integrated Framework* (Working Paper No. 15), International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).
[38] Lincoln, Y. S. and E. G. Guba (1985), *Naturalistic Inquiry*, London: Sage.
[39] ePact (2015), 'Achieving robustness in the E&A macro evaluation: A Technical Note', Brighton: Itad.

this decision to use existing indices created data gaps in cases where specific countries were not covered by any given index.

- The subsequent application of a binary score to these project context conditions proved for the most part to be too crude to be of utility. We were measuring the complexity of national context and its variation over project areas and over project lifetime. This rendered the binary scoring approach to be too insensitive to be useful as a pattern-finding tool for the influence of context. To create a more 'granular' set of contextual categories on the other hand, would have reduced our ability to score a sufficient number of projects against each context criterion for this to be useful for QCA analysis of clusters of conditions. This is because QCA requires a minimum number of scored conditions for significance to be established. However, it may be useful to explore this option through re-analysing existing case studies to determine whether it would be possible to identify mid-level context conditions that are more specific but still broad enough to be usefully coded across all cases.
- The QCA dataset had data gaps, with 104 out of 1200 data points missing. The majority (67) of these 104 missing data points related to project contexts and gaps in index coverage (discussed in the first bullet point above). Out of the remaining 37 missing data points, the majority (29) related to project intermediate outcome or outcome conditions for which we had insufficient evidence to score a '1' or a '0'. This meant that there were data gaps for each hypothesis tested, requiring the manual construction of 17 different sub-datasets. Most significantly, the data gaps limited our ability to perform more inductive analysis using QCA software and Boolean minimisation procedures. Hypothesis-testing[40] as agreed with DFID hence remained our primary approach.
- Our ability to iterate was limited due to time and resource constraints linked to the sequencing of the methods. Combining QCA with narrative analysis required sequencing each evaluation step carefully, which resulted in a long timeline. For instance, hypotheses had to be finalised before data extraction and coding could begin. Similarly, QCA had to be finalised before the cases studies for our narrative analysis were selected using the 'Hamming distance of similarity'. At the same time, both data extraction/coding and narrative analysis threw up additional factors and hypotheses to be tested which would have benefitted from another round of data extraction/coding. The resulting modifications to the dataset might also have affected the case study selection (through changes to the 'Hamming distance of similarity'), possibly generating another set of additional factors and hypotheses, and so on. Finally, it might also have been interesting to check the refined theory against the overall portfolio of 180 SAcc project. In short, iteration could have been useful but would have required a large amount of additional time and resources that were not available. This was not budgeted for and not agreed with DFID either.
- We did not complete the sensitivity analysis of the QCA data set as detailed in the Robustness Note. Instead, we relied on the 'natural experiment' of a second-round, modified QCA data set, which provided us with a proxy sensitivity test (see discussion on page 23 of this Annex). This was a fit-for-purpose alternative and affected the dataset as a whole, with most hypotheses being tested on different sub-datasets. However, there was one exception: the dataset relevant to hypothesis 6 was left

[40] Hypothesis-testing is a valid approach to using QCA as specific in the relevant literature.

unaffected and the 'natural experiment' did not work for this hypothesis specifically (and as a consequence we cannot claim to have performed a sensitivity test for this hypothesis in particular).

- While limited generalisation[41] is possible for our QCA findings, findings from the narrative analysis are only illustrative. The cases are used to illustrate what the hypotheses look like in practice and provide a more in-depth understanding of how change comes about. However, this means that insights from the narrative analysis are not necessarily applicable to other cases and that they could not provide the foundation for our recommendations. Through the initial review of project reporting in the SAcc project portfolio, we were able to confirm a minimum level of evaluative data quality in the selection of the 50 projects included in the final project set. Nonetheless, the evaluative quality of data for these projects still varied considerably in terms of coverage and analytical depth. This affected the depth of narrative analysis that could be achieved for any given project. The approach taken attempted to extract evidence on how causality was operating from existing reviews and evaluation, which in most cases had not used a theory/causality driven approach. Consequently, in most cases, evidence was insufficient to explain causal mechanisms in much depth. The presence of actual evaluations (as opposed to evaluative content in project reporting) was rare.
- Following on from the above, collecting primary data through key informant interviews proved effective in deepening our understanding of project contribution to change but was time-limited. We were able to engage with 20 key informants relating to 13 projects but the tight timeline prevented us from a reaching out more broadly.

[41] In the sense discussed in Befani, B. (2016). Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Stockholm, p. 145 onwards.

Annex C Qualitative comparative analysis findings

This annex provides information about the QCA models tested. For each hypothesis, we tabulate the main QCA findings. Venn diagrams and further measures can be supplied upon request. Where we modified models and tested different versions, this is made clear. Both necessity and sufficiency analysis were conducted using QCA software.

Importantly, we tested all hypotheses with two slightly different datasets:

- The initial dataset before undertaking the narrative analysis;
- A revised dataset with a few modifications that resulted from verifying our initial QCA coding during the narrative analysis.

This represented a 'natural experiment' and allowed us to test the sensitivity of our QCA findings (see Annex B for further detail on the sensitivity analysis). Throughout the document, findings from the initial dataset are stated in brackets where they differed from the revised dataset. This allows the reader to compare findings from both datasets.

H1: Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2), results from evidence gathering (M2) and improved upward information flows (M7)

Table H1 (O2): Presence of evidence gathering (M2) and improved upward information flows (M7); Absence of evidence gathering (m2) and improved upward information flows (m7)

		Outcome O2		
Configuration	M2*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	8	20 (19)	28 (27)
	Absent	4	13	17
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

		Outcome O2		
Configuration	M2*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	6 (7)	8 (9)
	Absent	10	27 (25)	37 (35)
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

		Outcome O2		
Configuration	m2*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	4 (3)	5 (4)
	Absent	11	29	40
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

		Outcome O2		
Configuration	m2*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	3	4
	Absent	11	30 (29)	41 (40)
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

m2	m7	number	o2	raw consist.
1	1	28 (62%)		0.285714
1	0	8 (80%)		0.250000
0	1	5 (91%)		0.200000
0	0	4 (100%)		0.250000

m2	m7	number	~o2	raw consist.
1	1	28 (62%)		0.714286
1	0	8 (80%)		0.750000
0	1	5 (91%)		0.800000
0	0	4 (100%)		0.750000

H2: Higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when SAcc mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1)

Table H2 (O2): Presence of learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1); Absence of learning into higher-level discussions (m7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (m1)

		Outcome		
Configuration	M1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	7	17 (15)	24 (22)
	Absent	5	16 (17)	21 (22)
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

		Outcome		
Configuration	M1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	4	7
	Absent	9	29 (28)	38 (37)
	Cases	12	33 (33)	45 (44)

		Outcome		
Configuration	m1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	7	9
	Absent	10	26 (25)	36 (35)
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

		Outcome		
Configuration	m1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	5 (6)	5 (6)
	Absent	12	28 (26)	40 (38)
	Cases	12	33 (32)	45 (44)

m1	m7	number	o2	raw consist.
1	1	24 (53%)		0.291667
0	1	9 (73%)		0.222222
1	0	7 (88%)		0.428571
0	0	5 (100%)		0.000000

m1	m7	number	~o2	raw consist.
1	1	24 (53%)		0.708333
0	1	9 (73%)		0.777778
1	0	7 (88%)		0.571429
0	0	5 (100%)		1.000000

H3: Mechanisms supporting formal social accountability initiatives (IO2) are more effective than those resulting in informal citizen action (IO4) in improving service delivery (O1, O2)

Table H3 (O1): Presence of formal social accountability initiatives (IO2) + informal citizen action (IO4); Absence of formal social accountability initiatives (io2) + informal citizen action (io4)

		Outcome		
Configuration	IO2*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	22	0	21 (22)
	Absent	18 (16)	2 (3)	20 (19)
	Cases	39 (38)	2 (3)	41
		Outcome		
Configuration	IO2*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	15 (13)	0 (1)	15 (14)
	Absent	24 (25)	2	26 (27)
	Cases	39 (38)	2 (3)	41

		Outcome		
Configuration	io2*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	0	1
	Absent	38 (37)	2 (3)	40
	Cases	39 (38)	2 (3)	41

		Outcome		
Configuration	io2*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	2	4
	Absent	37 (36)	0 (1)	37
	Cases	39 (38)	2 (3)	41

io2	io4	number	o1	raw consist.
1	1	21 (51%)		1.000000
1	0	15 (87%)		1.000000
0	0	4 (97%)		0.500000
0	1	1 (100%)		1.000000

io2	io4	number	~o1	raw consist.
1	1	21 (51%)		0.000000
1	0	15 (87%)		0.000000
0	0	4 (97%)		0.500000
0	1	1 (100%)		0.000000

Table H3 (O2): Presence of formal social accountability initiatives (IO2) + informal citizen action (IO4); Absence of formal social accountability initiatives (io2) + informal citizen action (io4)

		Outcome		
Configuration	IO2*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	8	13 (14)	21 (22)
	Absent	3	15 (14)	18 (17)
	Cases	11	28	39
		Outcome		
Configuration	IO2*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	11 (10)	14 (13)
	Absent	8	17 (18)	25 (26)
	Cases	11	28	39

		Outcome		
Configuration	io2*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	11	28	39
	Cases	11	28	39

		Outcome		
Configuration	io2*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	4	4
	Absent	11	24	35
	Cases	11	28	39

io2	io4	number	o2	raw consist.
1	1	21 (53%)		0.380952
1	0	14 (89%)		0.214286
0	0	4 (100%)		0.000000
0	1	0 (100%)		

io2	io4	number	~o2	raw consist.
1	1	21 (53%)		0.619048
1	0	14 (89%)		0.785714
0	0	4 (100%)		1.000000
0	1	0 (100%)		

H4: Without improved governance of service delivery (IO6), social accountability mechanisms will not improve local service delivery (O1)

Table H4 (O1): Presence of improved governance of service delivery (IO6); Absence of improved governance of service delivery (io6)

		Outcome O1		
Configuration	IO6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	27 (24)	2	29 (26)
	Absent	15 (17)	1 (2)	16 (19)
	Cases	42 (41)	3 (4)	45

io6	number	o1	raw consist.
1	29 (64%)		0.931035
0	16 (100%)		0.937500

H5: Awareness raising (M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)

Table H5 (O3): Presence of citizen awareness raising and mobilisation (M4) + socially inclusive local platform design (M6); Presence of citizen awareness raising and mobilisation (M4) + absence of socially inclusive local platform design (m6)

		Outcome O3		
Configuration	M4*M6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	19	1	20

	Absent	9 (8)	11	20 (19)
	Cases	28 (27)	12	40 (29)

		Outcome O3		
Configuration	M4*m6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	8 (7)	7	15 (14)
	Absent	20	5	25
	Cases	28 (27)	12	40 (39)

		Outcome O3		
Configuration	m4*M6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	1	1
	Absent	28 (27)	11	39 (38)
	Cases	28 (27)	12	40 (39)
		Outcome O3		
Configuration	m4*m6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	3	4
	Absent	27 (26)	9	36 (35)
	Cases	28 (27)	12	40 (39)

m4	m6	number	o3	raw consist.
1	1	20 (50%)		0.950000
1	0	15 (87%)		0.533333
0	0	4 (97%)		0.250000
0	1	1 (100%)		0.000000

m4	m6	number	~o3	raw consist.
1	1	20 (50%)		0.050000
1	0	15 (87%)		0.466667
0	0	4 (97%)		0.750000
0	1	1 (100%)		1.000000

H6: Combining social inclusion in the design of local platforms (M6) with achieving increased participation in local platforms by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)

Table H6 (O3): Presence of social inclusion in design of local platforms (M6) + participation by social marginalised groups in local platforms (IO3)

	Outcome			
Configuration	M6*IO3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	19	2	21
	Absent	10	10	20
	Cases	29	12	41

	Outcome			
Configuration	M6*io3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	0	2
	Absent	27	12	39
	Cases	29	12	41

	Outcome			
Configuration	m6*IO3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	2	5
	Absent	26	10	36
	Cases	29	12	41

	Outcome			
Configuration	m6*io3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	5	8	13
	Absent	24	4	28
	Cases	29	12	41

m6	io3	number	o3	raw consist.
1	1	21 (51%)		0.904762
0	0	13 (82%)		0.384615
0	1	5 (95%)		0.600000
1	0	2 (100%)		1.000000

m6	io3	number	~o3	raw consist.
1	1	21 (51%)		0.095238
0	0	13 (82%)		0.615385
0	1	5 (95%)		0.400000
1	0	2 (100%)		0.000000

H7: SAcc mechanisms in any combination (M1-M8) will improve service delivery (O1, O2) when they are supported through multiple phases or via embedded initiatives (M9)

Table H7 (O1): Presence of long-term initiative (M9); Absence of long-term initiative (m9)

	Outcome O1			
Configuration	M9	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	24	1 (2)	25 (26)
	Absent	10 (9)	1	11 (10)
	Cases	34 (33)	2 (3)	36

Table H7 (O2): Presence of long-term initiative (M9); Absence of long-term initiative (m9)

		Outcome O2		
Configuration	M9	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	9	16 (17)	25 (26)
	Absent	1	10 (9)	11 (10)
	Cases	10	26	36

	Outcome O2 when M9 is positive			
Configuration	M5*M8	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	9	6 (7)	15 (16)
	Absent	0	10	10
	Cases	9	16 (17)	25 (26)

	Outcome O2 when M9 is positive			
Configuration	M5*m8	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	7	7
	Absent	9	9 (10)	18 (19)
	Cases	9	16 (17)	25 (26)

	Outcome O2 when M9 is positive			
Configuration	m5*M8	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	3	3
	Absent	9	13 (14)	22 (23)
	Cases	9	16 (17)	25 (26)

	Outcome O2 when M9 is positive			
Configuration	m5*m8	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	9	16 (17)	25 (16)
	Cases	9	16 (17)	25 (26)

H8: Supporting long-term initiatives (M9) is more important for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) than for achieving improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1) or services improved for marginalised social groups (O3)

Table H8 (O1): Presence of long-term initiative (M9); Absence of long-term initiative (m9)

	Outcome O1			
Configuration	M9	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	26	1 (2)	27 (28)

	Absent	12 (11)	2	14 (13)
	Cases	38 (37)	3 (4)	41

	Outcome O2			
Configuration	M9	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	9	18 (19)	27 (28)
	Absent	2	12 (11)	14 (13)
	Cases	11	30	41

	Outcome O3			
Configuration	M9	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	22 (23)	5	27 (28)
	Absent	9 (8)	5	14 (13)
	Cases	31	10	41

H9: When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4,) greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3)

Table H9 (IO1): Different combinations of media oversight (M3) and greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) when social contract is weak (c4) and when social contract is strong (C4)
Absence of C4

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is absent			
Configuration	M3*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	8 (9)	0 (1)	8 (10)
	Absent	7 (6)	4 (3)	11 (9)
	Cases	15	4	19

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is absent			
Configuration	M3*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	2	2
	Absent	15	2	17
	Cases	15	4	19

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is absent			
Configuration	m3*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	2 (1)	5 (4)
	Absent	12	2 (3)	14 (15)
	Cases	15	4	19

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is absent			
Con figu rati	m3*io4	Present	Absent	Cases

	Present	4 (3)	0	4 (3)
	Absent	11 (12)	4	15 (16)
	Cases	15	4	19

m3	io4	number	io1	raw consist.
1	1	8 (42%)		1.000000
0	1	5 (68%)		0.600000
0	0	4 (89%)		1.000000
1	0	2 (100%)		0.000000

Presence of C4

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is present			
Configuration	M3*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	0	1
	Absent	7	1	8
	Cases	8	1	9

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is present			
Configuration	M3*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	0	1
	Absent	7	1	8
	Cases	8	1	9

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is present			
Configuration	m3*IO4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	0	3
	Absent	5	1	6
	Cases	8	1	9

	Outcome IO1 when C4 is present			
Configuration	m3*io4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	1	4
	Absent	5	0	5
	Cases	8	1	9

m3	io4	number	io1	raw consist.
0	0	4 (44%)		0.750000
0	1	3 (77%)		1.000000
1	1	1 (88%)		1.000000
1	0	1 (100%)		1.000000

H10: In a state-society context with a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal (IO2) citizen engagement with service providers

Table H10 (IO2): Improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2): in absence of strong social contract (c4); in presence of strong social contract (C4)

Absence of strong social contract (c4)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c4*M2*M4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	15	2	17
	Absent	3	0	3
	Cases	18	2	20

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c4*M2*m4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	0	1
	Absent	17	2	19
	Cases	18	2	20

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c4*m2*M4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	0	2
	Absent	16	2	18
	Cases	18	2	20

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c4*m2*m4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	18	2	20
	Cases	18	2	20

m2	m4	number	io2	raw consist.
1	1	17 (85%)		0.882353
0	1	2 (95%)		1.000000
1	0	1 (100%)		1.000000
0	0	0 (100%)		

Presence strong social contract (C4)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C4*M2*M4	Present	Absent	Cases

	Present	6	0	6
	Absent	2 (1)	0	2 (1)
	Cases	8 (7)	0	8 (7)
	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C4*M2*m4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	8 (7)	0	8 (7)
	Cases	8 (7)	0	8 (7)
	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C4*m2*M4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2 (1)	0	2 (1)
	Absent	6	0	6
	Cases	8 (7)	0	8 (7)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C4*m2*m4	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	8 (7)	0	8 (7)
	Cases	8 (7)	0	8 (7)

m2	m4	number	io2	raw consist.
1	1	6 (75%)		1.000000
0	1	2 (100%)		1.000000
1	0	0 (100%)		
0	0	0 (100%)		

H11: An environment of pro-poor policies and openness (C3) is essential to increase citizen engagement for better service delivery (IO2, IO4)

Table H11 (IO2): Presence of pro-poor environment (C3)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	28 (27)	3	31 (30)
	Absent	6 (7)	2	8 (9)
	Cases	34	5	39

Table H11 (IO4): Presence of pro-poor environment (C3)

	Outcome IO4			
Configuration	C3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	21	10 (9)	31 (30)

	Absent	2 (3)	6	8 (9)
	Cases	23 (24)	16 (15)	39

H12: In fragile state contexts (c2) local deliberative platforms (M5) are necessary but not sufficient to increase formal citizen engagement (IO2)

Table H12 (IO2): Building local deliberative platforms (M5) in presence of: non-fragile state (C2); fragile state (c2)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C2*M5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	25	1 (0)	26 (25)
	Absent	16 (15)	4 (5)	20
	Cases	41 (40)	5	46 (45)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	C2*m5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	3 (4)	5 (6)
	Absent	39 (38)	2 (1)	41 (39)
	Cases	41 (40)	5	46 (45)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c2*M5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	13	0	13
	Absent	28 (17)	5	33 (32)
	Cases	41 (40)	5	46 (45)

	Outcome IO2			
Configuration	c2*m5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1 (0)	1	2 (1)
	Absent	40	4	44
	Cases	41 (40)	5	46 (45)

c2	m5	number	io2	raw consist.
1	1	26 (56%)		0.961538
0	1	13 (84%)		1.000000
1	0	5 (95%)		0.400000
0	0	2 (100%)		0.500000

H13: Building local deliberative platforms (M5) will increase and sustain the participation of marginalised social groups (IO3) in contexts of high social inequality (c5)

Table H13 (IO3): Building local deliberative platforms (M5) in presence of: low social inequality (C5); high social inequality (c5)

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*M5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	13	5 (4)	18 (17)
	Absent	12	12 (13)	24 (25)
	Cases	25	17	42

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*m5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	2 (3)	3 (4)
	Absent	24	15 (14)	39 (38)
	Cases	25	17	42

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	c5*M5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	11	7	18
	Absent	14	10	24
	Cases	25	17	42

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	c5*m5	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	3	3
	Absent	25	14	39
	Cases	25	17	42

c5	m5	number	io3	raw consist.
1	1	18 (42%)		0.722222
0	1	18 (85%)		0.611111
1	0	3 (92%)		0.333333
0	0	3 (100%)		0.000000

H14: In contexts of high social inequality (c5), support to socially inclusive formal citizen engagement in local platforms (IO3) will not be achieved through any mix of mechanisms (M1–M9)

m5	m6	number	io3	raw consist.
1	1	9 (56%)		1.000000
1	0	5 (87%)		0.200000
0	0	2 (100%)		0.000000
0	1	0 (100%)		

m5	m6	number	io3	raw consist.
1	1	12 (57%)		1.000000
1	0	6 (85%)		0.166667
0	0	3 (100%)		0.333333
0	1	0 (100%)		

Table H14 (IO3): Presence of low social inequality (C5) + local deliberative platforms (M5) + socially inclusive platform design (M6)

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*M5*M6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	12	0	12
	Absent	2	7 (5)	9 (7)
	Cases	14	7 (5)	21 (19)

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*M5*m6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	5 (2)	6 (3)
	Absent	13	2 (3)	15 (16)
	Cases	14	7 (5)	21 (19)

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*m5*M6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	14	7 (5)	21 (19)
	Cases	14	7 (5)	21 (19)

	Outcome IO3			
Configuration	C5*m5*m6	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	2 (3)	3 (4)
	Absent	13	5 (2)	18 (15)
	Cases	14	7 (5)	21 (19)

H15: Where civil society capacity is weak (c1), media engagement (M3) is important to increase responsiveness (IO1) and increase citizen action (IO2, IO4)

Table H15 (IO4): Media engagement present (M3); media engagement absent (m3); Civil society capacity weak (c1)

	Outcome IO4 when c1 is negative			
Configuration	M3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present (M3)	3 (4)	0	3 (4)
	Absent (m3)	6 (5)	2	8 (7)
	Cases	9	2	11

Table H15 (IO1): Media engagement present (M3); media engagement absent (m3); Civil society capacity weak (c1)

	Outcome IO1 when c1 is negative			
Configuration	M3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present (M3)	3	0 (1)	3 (4)
	Absent (m3)	6	2 (1)	8 (7)
	Cases	9	2	11

Table H15 (IO2): Media engagement present (M3); media engagement absent (m3); Civil society capacity weak (c1)

	Outcome IO2 when c1 is negative			
Configuration	M3	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present (M3)	3 (4)	0	3 (4)
	Absent (m3)	8 (7)	0	8 (7)
	Cases	11	0	11

H16: In pro-poor policy making contexts (C3), feeding project-level evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) drives more progressive policy/increased budgets (IO5)

c3	m7	number	io5	raw consist.
1	1	28 (62%)		0.785714
1	0	8 (80%)		0.375000
0	0	5 (91%)		0.400000
0	1	4 (100%)		0.750000

Table H16 (IO5): Feeding evidence upwards present (M7); Pro-poor policy making context present (C3); Pro-poor policy making context absent (c3)

	Outcome IO5			
Configuration	C3*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	22 (19)	6 (7)	28 (26)
	Absent	8	9 (10)	17 (18)
	Cases	30 (27)	15 (17)	45 (44)

	Outcome IO5			
Configuration	C3*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	5	8
	Absent	27 (24)	10 (12)	37 (36)
	Cases	30 (27)	15 (17)	45 (44)

	Outcome IO5			
Configuration	c3*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	1	4
	Absent	27 (24)	14 (16)	41 (40)
	Cases	30 (27)	15 (17)	45 (44)

	Outcome IO5			
Configuration	c3*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	3 (4)	5 (6)
	Absent	28 (25)	12 (13)	40 (38)
	Cases	30 (27)	15 (17)	45 (44)

H17: In pro-poor policy making contexts (C3), feeding project-level evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) drives improved higher-level governance of service delivery (IO6) without the need for direct support to governance (m1)

Table H17 (IO6): Feeding evidence upwards (M7) + Direct support to governance (M1); Feeding evidence upwards (M7) + no direct support to governance (m1); No evidence feeding upwards (m7) + no direct support to governance (m1)

Pro-poor policy making context present (C3)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is positive			
Configuration	M1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	15 (13)	2	17 (15)
	Absent	9	7	16
	Cases	24 (22)	9	33 (31)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is positive			
Configuration	M1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	5	0	5
	Absent	19 (17)	9	28 (26)
	Cases	24 (22)	9	33 (31)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is positive			
Configuration	m1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	3	5	8
	Absent	21 (19)	4	25 (23)
	Cases	24 (22)	9	33 (31)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is positive			
Configuration	m1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	1	2	3
	Absent	23 (21)	7	30 (28)

	Cases	24 (22)	9	33 (31)

m1	m7	number	io6	raw consist.
1	1	17 (51%)		0.882353
0	1	8 (75%)		0.375000
1	0	5 (90%)		1.000000
0	0	3 (100%)		0.333333

Pro-poor policy making context absent (c3)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is negative			
Configuration	M1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	2	4
	Absent	2	3 (4)	5 (6)
	Cases	4	5 (6)	9 (10)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is negative			
Configuration	M1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	2	2	4
	Absent	2	3 (4)	5 (6)
	Cases	4	5 (6)	9 (10)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is negative			
Configuration	m1*M7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	0	0
	Absent	4	5 (6)	9 (10)
	Cases	4	5 (6)	9 (10)

	Outcome IO6 when C3 is negative			
Configuration	m1*m7	Present	Absent	Cases
	Present	0	1 (2)	1 (2)
	Absent	4	4	8
	Cases	4	5 (6)	9 (10)

m1	m7	number	io6	raw consist.
1	1	4 (44%)		0.500000
1	0	4 (88%)		0.500000
0	0	1 (100%)		0.000000
0	1	0 (100%)		

Table C1. Initial QCA Dataset (October 2015)

Project	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	IO1	IO2	IO3	IO4	IO5	IO6	O1	O2	O3
103993	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
200196		1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1		1	1	0	1	1	1		
200304		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
200318		1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1		1		
200696	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1
202183	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1			0	0
202367		1	1		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
202852		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0			0	0	1		1	1	0
202886		0				1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
203757		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1		0	0	0	1	0	0	0
GPAF IMP-043		1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1		0	0	1	0	
GPAF IMP-068		0	0			1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		1	0	1	0	1
105862		1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
201591		1	1		0	0	1	1		1	0	0		1				0						
201616		1	0		0	0	1	1	0	1		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
201625	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	0	1
201853	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1				0	0	0	1		1	1	0	1		1
202149		0	0		0	0	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
202190		0	0		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
202267		0	0		0	0	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
202295		1		1	0	0			0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0		0	1	0	1
202352	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
202378		1	1		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	0	1	0	0
202491		1	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1		1	0
202542		1		1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1		0	1	1	1	0	
202691		0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		0	1	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	1	1
105862		1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
104229	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
107460		1	1		0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
108572	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
113961		1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
114088	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
114532		1		1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
104025	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
108027		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
113540		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
113617		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
113976 202958		1	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
114161	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
114433		1	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
200120		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
200498		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
201590	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
200628	0	0	1		0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
201011		0	0		0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
200469		0	1	0		1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1

Project	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	IO1	IO2	IO3	IO4	IO5	IO6	O1	O2	O3
114506		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
114177 114158		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
202991		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
200469		0	1	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0

Table C2. Revised QCA Dataset (February 2016)

Project	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	IO1	IO2	IO3	IO4	IO5	IO6	O1	O2	O3
103993	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
200196		1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1		1	1	0	1	1	1		
200304		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
200318		1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1		1		
200696	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1
202183	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1			0	0
202367		1	1		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
202852		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0			0	0	1		1	1	0
202886		0				1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
203757		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1		0	0	0	1	0	0	0
GPAF IMP-043		1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1		0	0	1	0	
GPAF IMP-068		0	0			1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		1	0	1	0	1
105862		1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
201591		1	1		0	0	1	1		1	0	0		1				0						
201616		1	0		0	0	1	1	0	1		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
201625	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	0	1
201853	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1		1	1	0	1		1
202149		0	0		0	0	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
202190		0	0		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
202267		0	0		0	0	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
202295		1		1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
202352	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
202378		1	1		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	0	1	0	0
202491		1	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1		1	0
202542		1		1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1		0	1	1	1	0	
202691		0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		0	1	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	1	1
202988		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
104229	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
107460		1	1		0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
108572	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
113961		1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
114088	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
114532		1		1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
104025	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
108027		1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
113540		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
113617		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
113976 202958		1	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
114161	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1

Project	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	IO1	IO2	IO3	IO4	IO5	IO6	O1	O2	O3
114433		1	1		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
200120		1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
200498		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
201590	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
200628	0	0	1		0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
201011		0	0		0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
200469		0	1	0		1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
114506		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
114177 114158		1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
202991		1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
200469		0	1	0		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0

Annex D Terms of Reference

Macro evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and DFID's Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability

Introduction

Overview of these Terms of Reference

These Terms of Reference (ToRs) are for an independent service provider or consortium to conduct macro evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and DFID's investments in empowerment and accountability (E&A). A maximum of £1 million is available for the work covered by these ToRs, including funds earmarked for additional data collection. Documents supplied with these ToRs are:

- Business Case
- Logical Framework for the macro evaluation
- Spreadsheet of planned DFID evaluations
- 2012 Evaluability Assessment for Empowerment and Accountability and the Strategic Vision
- Empowerment and Accountability Conceptual Framework
- DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women.

For the purposes of these ToRs, a 'macro evaluation' is defined 'as an evaluation intended to synthesise findings from a range of programme evaluations and other programme data, in order to generate some generalisable findings (where possible).'

In this instance, the macro evaluation will support learning and evidence building; as well as improved accountability for DFID's spending in these two policy areas. The macro evaluations will test hypotheses within the two 'theories of change' for each policy area, drawing on evidence and data from clusters of projects with similar intended outputs and outcomes. In addition, non-programme sources pertinent to the hypotheses in the theories of change could be drawn upon, where there are too few DFID funded projects working on a particular area to generate comparable data. This may include drawing on existing research; and commissioning additional survey data or evaluative information as necessary.

Because there is much overlap between initiatives aimed at strengthening empowerment and accountability, and those aimed at empowering women and girls, DFID is commissioning one service provider to carry out the two macro evaluations, in order to ensure consistency, and to build synergies across findings. Each macro evaluation will ask different evaluation questions (EQs), relating to hypotheses within the theory of change for that policy area.

Empowerment and accountability

In February 2011, DFID's Development Policy Committee endorsed a proposal that DFID should do more to enable poor people to exercise greater choice and control over their own development and to hold decision-makers to account. The theory of change for this area is the Empowerment and Accountability Conceptual Framework. This includes a number of

linkages between donor-supported interventions that seek to enable different forms of empowerment (economic, social, or political) and accountability, in the expectation that improvements in empowerment and accountability will deliver better development and growth outcomes for the poorest.

This focus on empowerment and accountability is implemented through a range of programmes designed and implemented at country level, either as interventions with core objectives on E&A, or as components of broader programmes in particular sectors. At present, DFID has identified19 programmes specifically related to E&A, which will have evaluations that will report some findings by 2016; with a number of other evaluations planned in other areas that are also relevant to E&A, such as elections and anti-corruption also planned.

The Development Policy Committee requested that DFID undertake a 'macro evaluation' of its investments in Empowerment and Accountability to deepen accountability and widen learning and evidence building.

Strategic vision for girls and women

The UK has put the empowerment of girls and women at the heart of international development. DFID's 'theory of change' for this policy is the Strategic Vision for Girls and Women. This was launched in March 2011 and identifies four priority pillars for action to deliver real change for girls and women:

- Pillar 1: Delay first pregnancy and support safe childbirth
- Pillar 2: Get economic assets directly to girls and women
- Pillar 3: Get girls through secondary school
- Pillar 4: Prevent violence against girls and women

Achieving results across these four pillars also depends on improvements in the enabling environment – i.e. the attitudes, behaviours, social norms, statutory and customary laws and policies which constrain the lives of adolescent girls and women, and perpetuate their exclusion and poverty.[42]

The Strategic Vision has wide ranging implications for DFID and is being implemented through a large number of programmes developed across DFID – by country offices, Policy and Research Division, Private Sector Department, Civil Society Department and International Financial Institutions Department. A number of programmes specifically related to girls and women have evaluations that will report some findings by 2016.

Evaluability assessment

DFID commissioned a joint evaluability assessment of the two policy areas in March 2012. This concluded that neither the E&A policy area nor the Strategic Vision for Girls and Women is ready for a macro evaluation because of major gaps in available documentation and systemic difficulties with identifying investments in each policy area. A particular challenge for each policy area is the lack of clearly defined boundaries: outcomes for women and girls, and

[42] The Strategic Vision of Women and Girls is described in greater detail in the document found at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/strategic-vision-girls-women.pdf

initiatives involving E&A, may be embedded within other sectoral programmes, and not immediately picked up through DFID's established data sources such as ARIES or QUEST. The theories of change for both policy areas reflect this wider understanding of policy engagement, and the testing across sectoral engagement is of particular interest.

The evaluability assessment also concluded that there is simply not the body of projects being funded under each policy areas to generate generalisable findings across the whole theory of change. It would thus not be possible to evaluate across the entire intervention logic, but it would be possible to test certain hypotheses within the theories of change. The scope for this would be limited by the number of projects with similar outputs and objectives, engaged in activities that relate to the hypotheses. There is thus an additional clustering exercise required, whereby similar sets of projects would be identified that appear to relate to specific hypotheses, on the basis of their indicators.

The authors of the evaluability assessment recommended that steps be taken to address the issues of the availability of documentation and identifying investments in each policy area as a matter of priority in order to address concerns for accountability. They then recommended further steps that could be taken in order to complete the macro evaluations, including the clustering exercise, and that, given an apparently high level of overlap in projects that are of relevance to both the these two policy areas, these tasks could be carried out by one contractor.

The evaluability assessment also recommended that the approach to the macro evaluations:

- be an iterative one between generating initial EQs that relate to the hypotheses within the Theories of Change (i.e. the Conceptual Framework and the Strategic Vision) and establishing what questions can be answered by DFID programmes through grouping them into clusters of projects with similar anticipated outcomes;
- draw not just on evaluation data, but other sources such as annual reviews and project completion reports;
- be a process of continuous learning rather than a 'snapshot' at the end.

This approach would produce:

(a) a tabulated mapping, of all relevant programmes relevant to each policy area and links to supporting programme documentation – thus improving our transparency and accountability for spend in these areas
(b) annual reports that detail evaluation findings against hypotheses; and generate emerging evidence on a more real-time basis
(c) a theory of change that is tested and re-tested on an annual basis

The above recommendations were accepted by DFID and provide the framework for the ToRs.

Objective

The purpose of this consultancy is to increase DFID's accountability and learning in the areas of gender, and empowerment and accountability through:

- making it transparent what DFID has supported in response to two major policy commitments, empowerment and accountability, and gender;

- enhanced learning by systematically using evidence to test hypotheses within the 'theories of change' for each policy area and so helping to identify which of DFID's assumptions on what works and where are correct and evidence based.

The tasks involved in meeting this purpose are to:

- establish two tabulated mappings with the detail required to undertake macro evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and DFID's policy frame for Empowerment and Accountability;
- undertake the macro evaluations in both these two areas;
- maintain the tabulated mapping over the course of the contract: and
- transfer the tabulated mappings to DFID at the end of the contract.

The evaluation will cover the full range of OECD DAC and DFID evaluation criteria, namely:

- relevance
- effectiveness
- efficiency
- impact
- sustainability
- coverage – includes equity, differential impacts, inclusion/exclusion
- coherence: with other related policies and actions
- coordination – includes alignment with country priorities and systems, and harmonisation with others.

Note that these criteria should be considered in developing the EQs, although not all will be included within each hypotheses tested. Questions of coverage and differential reach and impacts should be tested in each case.

Scope of work

Purpose

The macro evaluations of both policy areas will have three components:

A. **Results** – establishing **accountability** for results from DFID's investments. The macro evaluation process will: gather information about the range of programmes that address empowerment and accountability, and women and girls' empowerment; and improve the internal and external availability of data generated through these programmes. The evaluation will aggregate findings from a number of DFID programmes in each policy area and establish what results (and, where possible, impact) if any, have been achieved from these investments. It is envisaged that this component will also include an assessment and comparison of value-for-money across different approaches.

B. **Portfolio – expanding the evidence base**. This component will address key questions about what works, what does not, why, for whom and under what circumstances; and about how certain interventions lead to changes in the lives of the

poor, including women and girls. It will test and retest the Theories of Change, as represented by the E&A Conceptual Framework and the Strategic Vision.

C. **Process –** the **impact on DFID processes of the Strategic Vision**. The evaluation of the Strategic Vision will include a policy review that will examine the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for supporting work on empowering women and girls.

The macro evaluations will need to take into account the fact that transformative change for both policy areas happens slowly; and that results, and thus learning for the three years period, may necessarily be somewhat limited.

General approach

The macro evaluations will involve an annual process of analysing programme-level data, including evaluation data where available, to build knowledge about clusters of activity over a three-year period. This will enable the testing of key hypotheses in the intervention logic, building up a more relevant theory of change through an iterative process. DFID staff and others will be able to incorporate learning into programmes throughout the lifespan of the evaluation and beyond. However, the EQs will also need to realistically reflect what changes can be expected within a three-year period. The changes that both policy areas seek to make in the lives of the poor involve long-term processes of social, political and economic change.

Tasks

The ToR will cover the following steps to ensure a robust and credible evaluation.

Gathering data about relevant programmes

The consultants need to construct two tabulated mappings of projects that are relevant to the policy objectives of the E&A policy areas and the Strategic Vision. The consultants will need to decide which programmes are relevant to each pillar/programme, group them accordingly, and provide a description of the portfolio of policy relevant projects, including links to supporting project documentation. Because of weaknesses in DFID's external listing of project documents, the consultants would be given access to DFID's internal data-storage systems (on completion of security clearance) to undertake this exercise. The tabulated mapping would be made publicly available.

The parameters for projects included in the tabulated mappings are:

- relevant to the E&A policy areas and the Strategic Vision;
- commenced in 2011 or after;
- in one of DFID's 28 bilateral focus countries;
- sourced from bilateral programmes only.

The year of 2011 has been determined as the starting date for any programmes to be covered, as this was the year in which new policy commitments were made in respect to E&A and girls and women. It is particularly relevant to the evaluation of the Strategic Vision as part of this evaluation looks at the impact of the Strategic Vision itself on DFID's interventions. That said, as many of these projects are extensions or second phases of previous interventions, the

tabulated mapping will include data from before 2011, so some comparisons will be possible between pre- and post-2011 projects.

The reason for sourcing data from bilateral programmes only is that most non-bilateral programmes have their own management structures and evaluation processes, which operate outside DFID. However, we envisage inclusion of data from DFID's support to civil society through our Programme Partnership Agreements and the Global Policy Action Fund (GPAF).

Establishing and testing hypotheses

The tabulated mappings will need to be constructed in such a way that enough information on each project can be easily gathered to enable the evaluators to cluster programmes around factors that they have in common. These common factors can then be matched to EQs, or may form the basis for new EQs where these relate to the hypotheses. Initial EQs can be found in Box 1 below. These are indicative questions that will be revised once the clustering process has been completed. Final questions must relate to hypotheses in the policy theories of change and be evaluable.

Box 1: Initial evaluation questions

- Why have some programmes worked and not others, and for some groups in certain contexts but not others?
- What doesn't work in development programming for E&A and women and girls?
- Is it more effective to integrate 'stand-alone' E&A programmes, including for women and girls, or to mainstream E&A into other programmes?
- Is working on multiple areas (taking a more holistic approach) more effective and better value-for-money than working on individual elements within a policy frame?
- How do the aims and associated interventions of the strategic vision pillars link together? For example, what is the relationship between economic assets and tackling violence against women and girls? How does tackling violence help delay first pregnancy and support safe childbirth?
- Does the effectiveness of programmes for women and girls depend on progress in the enabling environment?

Engaging in evaluation activities

Portfolio and results evaluations

The tabulated mappings will need to be continuously updated. It will form the basis for an annual assessment of EQs as part of a testing, revising and retesting of the Theories of Change (i.e. the Strategic Vision and E&A Conceptual Framework) that makes up the Portfolio Level evaluation (Component B) as well as the Results Level evaluation at the end (Component A).

For both the Portfolio Level and Results Level evaluations it is expected that DFID project review data will be supplemented by:

- Data from scheduled evaluations of DFID bilateral projects (supplied with these ToRs)
- Other data sources (e.g. annual and project completion reviews, corporate performance reviews, other project monitoring data e.g. from evaluation work, evaluations of other programmes with potential E&A / Strategic Vision outcomes such as civil society support funds, Programme Partnership Agreements)
- Research and learning products commissioned within the programmes
- RED evidence products (e.g. synthesis reviews, data from research programmes)
- Evidence from non-DFID sources.

The assessments will be conducted annually over the three years to ensure continual learning from new data that comes available. Each annual report will be written and structured with the needs of busy practitioners and policymakers in mind with the aim of aiding the uptake of findings and evidence within DFID and by external stakeholders.

Further supplementary information could come from comprehensive evaluations that are being conducted of programme areas that fall under the remit of the Strategic Vision (Reproductive, maternal and newborn health[43] and violence against women and girls). The consultants will need to link with these evaluations. These comprehensive evaluations may obviate the need for the consultants to engage in data-gathering exercises in these areas and will also make hypothesis-forming much easier. This will need to be examined by consultants during the inception period.

Specially commissioned additional work

As well as identifying hypotheses that can be tested using DFID programme data, the consultants are likely to identify hypotheses of interest to DFID, but which cannot be tested owing either to a lack of DFID programmes that relate to them or to a lack of DFID evaluations that focus on them. Firms responding to these ToRs should include in their proposal a sum not exceeding £250,000 (and within the total maximum budget of £1 million) for the commissioning of evaluations, surveys, interviews or other forms of additional data collection if required to enable the testing of key hypotheses. Approval to draw down these funds to commission evaluations or additional data collection must be secured from DFID in advance. Approval will be granted where it has been agreed with DFID that the proposed work is in an area of particular interest, and where it is clear that small additional evaluative work will generate generalisable data of sufficient quality to demonstrate external validity. It is anticipated that some possible uses of this fund will be identified during the inception phase.

Policy implementation review of the strategic vision

The Policy Implementation Review of the Strategic Vision on DFID's internal processes will be a separate exercise. This will look at the process connecting the original conception of the Strategic Vision to the approval of projects which are seen to embody the new policy direction. The policy review will address questions such as:

- How has the Vision guided the work of DFID country offices?

[43] A mid-term review (2013) and evaluation (2016) of Choices for women: Planned pregnancies, safe births and healthy newborns. The UK's Framework for Results for improving reproductive, maternal and newborn health in the developing world, is currently being planned, with an inception phase for the evaluation scheduled to take place in early 2013.

- How has implementation varied across the organisation?
- Has the Vision led to increased allocation of financial resources to girls and women?
- What effect did the Vision's focus on *girls* have on DFID programmes?
- Do the organisational structures for the Vision provide clear leadership, a strong accountability structure and positive incentives for effective delivery?
- Has DFID's ability to track spending on girls and women changed as a result of the vision?
- How have reporting requirements in the Corporate Performance Framework affected implementation of the Vision?

These questions could be answered via an analysis of documents available within DFID and through surveys of DFID staff and external stakeholders.

Audience and communications

Audience

There is likely to be broad interest in these evaluations, both DFID and other organisations. At a policy level, there is much discussion about approaches to empowerment and accountability, and specifically empowerment of girls and women, but the evidence on what works, and in which context, is limited.

The evaluations are likely to be of great interest to the evaluation community, both inside and outside DFID. The use of an evaluation approach which incorporates continuous learning, and looks at issues of complexity and context, is one that could be particularly appropriate to complex, multi-faceted development interventions, but which has been little used in development so far.

At a programme level, DFID staff and others will be able to incorporate learning into programmes throughout the lifespan of the evaluation and beyond. Other donors and research organisations and development practitioners and organisations will be interested in what works, under what circumstances and why.

Project partners will be interested in the information gathered during the course of implementation which will help them improve their project and increase the likelihood of success.

Communication strategy

The interest, both external and internal, in this evaluation means that it is essential that the organisation undertaking the evaluation has a well-formulated communications strategy. As the evaluation will provide continuous learning in areas where there is limited evidence on what works and how, the evaluation provides the opportunity to inform the design of interventions during the lifetime of the evaluation. At the same time, there is a risk of partial results being misused in the design of interventions. As a result, the evaluation methodology needs to have a clear strategy for both the communication of research and evaluation findings, and ensuring the appropriate uptake of such research and evaluation findings.

In order to understand whether and how the evidence generated by the macro evaluations has been taken up by DFID staff and external stakeholders, DFID will conduct an assessment of evidence uptake one year after the evaluation. It is envisaged that uptake will be increased by the effective implementation of a high quality communication strategy.

Methodology, skills, and ways of working

Response expected from contract bidders

The bidders for this contract will need to submit a methodology to achieve these ToRs, bearing in mind the need to evaluate at the three levels specified (process, portfolio and results) and to ensure that the evaluation approach is one that will provide both continuous learning and final impact evaluation (including lesson learning and recommendations). This methodology should include:

- Details of the approach and methods to be employed to undertake the results, portfolio and process evaluations, including detailing the analytical frameworks, approach to sampling, approach to ensuring internal and external validity, and mechanisms to avoid bias;
- For the portfolio evaluations, and strengthening of the ToCs: a) the design proposed for analysis and identification of both the internal and external validity of findings and conclusions; and b) how the evaluation will approach the identification of both key context and mechanism conditions, and their interaction;
- For the results evaluation, the proposed approach to assessment of VFM;
- Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed methods for collection, extraction and analysis;
- Details of the different expertise of the team members implementing the evaluation;
- Detailed costings and staffing for the data-gathering exercise;
- How the team will be structured to manage several overlapping evaluations at once, ensuring that duplications are minimised and information sharing is maximised;
- How they will manage the uncertainty over the time and staffing required to complete the tabulated mapping;
- How they will ensure that knowledge is transferred to DFID staff and to new consultants employed by them should these change during the lifetime of the contract;
- Their approach to ensuring that stakeholders listed in Section 4 above are involved in the process of setting EQs;
- Their approach to maximising value-for-money, particularly in the use of funds for specially commissioned work;
- Their approach to developing a communications strategy.

Working with DFID

During the contract the consultants will need to work closely with DFID staff, both in locating documents and discussing possible hypotheses. DFID staff will:

- provide lists (which are unlikely to be exhaustive) they already have of potentially relevant projects;

- help the consultants to contact staff in country offices to trace documents which cannot be found on DFID's internal systems and, interview staff if required;
- discuss with the consultants their proposed clustering of projects and draft EQs, as well as draft reports.

Both DFID's Empowerment and Accountability team and its Gender team will provide a named member of staff who will be the initial point of contact on the evaluations and who will help the consultants in their dealings with DFID country offices.

Skills

The team leader should have:

- extensive knowledge and experience of designing and managing evaluations in a range of contexts in development settings;
- experience of undertaking meta evaluations and synthesis evaluations (some experience of systematic reviews preferable);
- experience of undertaking complex and complicated evaluations using a range of theory-based evaluation approaches;
- track record of delivering quality outputs on time;
- excellent verbal and written communication skills with a track record of good writing in plain English;
- proven ability to build good relationships with a number of different stakeholders.

The evaluation team should have competence, expertise and experience in the following areas:

- Significant experience of a range of evaluation approaches, particularly those which can be applied where contexts and interventions vary
- Experience in using analytical frameworks that use systematic objective procedures, and enable generalisation through statistical and non-statistical representation; and identification of key context and mechanism conditions
- Experience of evaluations of policy implementation
- Very strong technical and theoretical knowledge of E&A, and gender
- Significant expertise in quantitative and qualitative data collection, data modelling, statistical analysis, survey planning, and a range of evaluation and research methods
- Demonstrated ability to assess VFM
- Significant experience in knowledge management and communicating evaluation results to a range of audiences and using varied approaches.

Risks

The consultants will be expected to report on risks identified and mitigation strategies in their inception report. Initial risks of relevance to this contract have been identified as:

- Construction of the tabulated mappings turns out to be a much bigger task than envisaged, leading to delays, increased costs, or reduced funds for the other elements of the evaluation
- Inability to retain consultants for the whole three-year contract leads to loss of knowledge during handovers, affecting the quality of the evaluation
- DFID staff are unable to provide sufficient support to ensure the service provider is able to implement the project effectively
- Data shortages mean that key hypotheses cannot be tested.

Timeframe and deliverable requirements

Timeframe

The envisaged timeframe for this contract is provided below (subject to timely conclusion of the procurement process):

- February 2014 – contract signed
- February 2014 – contract commences
- February 2014 – work on tabulated mappings commences
- March 2014 – submission of six weeks inception report. DFID will then agree with the service provider a work plan with key performance indicators in line with the finalised logical framework
- Every three months subsequently – the service provider will submit a quarterly progress report against results and deliverables and expenditure. These will be reviewed by the Steering Committee, at its meetings
- Annually – An annual synthesis (technical) report of evidence for each policy area, using knowledge from recent evaluations, analysis of available project data, and external evidence sources. In March 2015 the annual synthesis reports for each policy area should also include an analysis of the policy portfolios. It should also contain:
- Updated tabulated mappings
- Updated clusters of policy relevant project sets
- Updated testable hypotheses from the ToC which relate to clusters of comparable projects
- No later than March 2015 – Policy Implementation Review of the Strategic Vison for Girls and Women should be completed in order to feed into the development of the next gender policy in DFID
- No later than April 2015 – submission of the ‘Options Paper’ for moving forward
- Within three months of end of the programme and before expiry of the contract – final report, detailing progress against the deliverables and expenditure of all programme funds. Dependent on the decision at the mid-term review, this final report will be produced either at the end of the first 18 months if the contract is not extended, or at the end of the three years.

Reports in the first year of the contract

It is envisaged that the consultants will produce three reports in the first 12 months of the contract. Suggestions on the content and timing of these are provided below, but firms responding to the ITT are invited to suggest their own:

- After six weeks – Inception report on initial observations and progress
- After 11 months – A final inception report
- After 9 months – report on progress of the tabulated mapping outlining the organising framework, progress and any constraints
- After 12 months – report on completion of the clustering of projects, justifying the final clusters, updating the EQs and providing details of the proposed sample and sampling methodology employed; and any additional data requirements.

The inception report will cover:

- Progress in compiling the two tabulated mappings
- Proposed revisions, if appropriate, to the timetable for completing the tabulated mappings and undertaking the evaluations
- Risks identified and mitigation strategy
- Proposed revisions, if appropriate, to the evaluation approach
- Proposals on any additional data collection work required
- A draft communication strategy, covering purpose, audiences, channels, and timing of communications
- Based on the communications strategy, any other products (in addition to quarterly and annual reports) that would need to be produced in order to meet the needs of the identified audiences
- Initial thoughts, if any, on revisions to the EQs.

Accountability

Governance

A Steering Committee will be established to meet at least half-yearly and at strategic points in the evaluation cycle. The main responsibilities of the Steering Committee will be to oversee progress in the programme, to review proposed approaches and methodologies and quality of implementation and to coordinate involvement across DFID. Members will be drawn from the E&A and gender vision pillar policy leads, DFID's relevant chief professional officers and advisory cadres and evaluation department. Additional external experts in the two policy areas and evaluation will be invited to join the Steering Committee to provide additional knowledge.

DFID may also set up a small reference group, comprising sector specialists, to advise the Steering Committee. A decision whether to establish such a group will be made once the Steering Committee has been established.

Length of contract

The contract is for a period of 3 years and 6 weeks and is defined by three distinct phases:

- Inception Phase (11 Months)
- Implementation Phase 1 (7 Months)
- Implementation Phase 2 (18 Months)

Contractual accountability

The consultants will be contractually accountable to DFID and will report to the Head of Governance, Open Societies and Accountability Department and the Head of Inclusive Societies Department in DFID's Policy Division (or his/her designate) for all contractual issues and administrative oversight of the contract. The contract will be issued for the full implementation period, but will be subject to acceptance of deliverables, satisfactory performance of the service provider and approval of the service provider's inception report and annual work plans. Periodic break points for review of the programme will be agreed between the DFID Policy Division team (in consultation with the Steering Committee) and the service provider. The consultants will be expected to deal with all logistical issues.

There will be an 11 month inception phase. If DFID (in consultation with the Steering Committee) then decides not to proceed to the implementation phase, the contract will be terminated at no cost to DFID.

In the event that DFID (in consultation with the Steering Committee) decides to proceed to the implementation phase, the contract will be reviewed and amended as required. This will include details of the services to be provided in the form of updated ToRs and detailed costs. In addition, work plans and associated budgets will be discussed and amended annually.

Programme performance will be evaluated through an output-based contract with key performance indicators (KPIs). Payments will be made against firm milestones during the inception phase and on through implementation. KPIs and milestones for the implementation phase will be agreed between the EM and DFID (in consultation with the Steering Committee) during the inception phase. Delivery of the milestones will be continually reviewed through quarterly and annual reports provided by the service provider.

Ownership and copyright of all outputs will lie with DFID. Arrangements for storage and accessibility of any data generated through the work will be agreed in the inception phase between DFID and the service provider.

Duty of care

It is likely that the evaluation will require field visits to certain countries – the decision on country focus is expected to take place during the inception phase.

To ensure that the supplier selected has the capability to provide duty of care in countries where field visits may be required, DFID will provide, as part of the ITT, risk assessments of a sample high and medium risk countries that are likely to be visited. Bids will demonstrate, backed up by prior evidence, that the team have the ability to assess and mitigate risk as part of their work in both of these areas and also in any of the possible locations during the course

of this evaluation. This should reflect a clear, general approach to managing risk and duty of care, in line with DFID duty of care guidance

The supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property. DFID will share available information with the supplier on security status and developments in-country when countries are identified and where appropriate. DFID will provide the following if available in the selected countries:

- All supplier personnel will be offered a security briefing by the British Embassy/DFID on arrival. All such personnel must register with their respective embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures.
- A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the supplier may use to brief their personnel on arrival.

The supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the supplier must ensure they (and their personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

Once the country or countries to be visited has been decided during the inception phase, DFID will perform a risk assessment, and it will be a requirement that the service provider makes a full assessment of their ability to adequately cover their responsibilities for duty of care for direct and indirect staffing in support of delivery of this contract in those countries by completing the six questions in the duty of care guidance. Should the operating environment deteriorate during the lifecycle of this programme, a new duty of care assessment will need to be completed before the contractor and its subcontractors will be permitted to visit the selected locations.

Access to and external storage of DFID documents

10.1 The supplier may hold the following documents on an external server. These documents are considered public documents. Itad will access QUEST using a DFID issued laptop. To transfer DFID project documents from QUEST to the external server Itad will save the required documents onto the DFID laptop and then upload them on the external server. Once the documents have been uploaded onto the external server, Itad will delete them from the DFID laptop. In the event that a DFID laptop is not made available for the relevant team members in time for the work to proceed as planned, Itad will save the authorised documents onto a secure portable hard drive and then upload them onto the external server. Once this has been done, Itad will delete the documents from the portable hard drive. DFID believe these documents will comprise:

1. Business case/project memorandum
2. Logframe
3. Annual reviews: both ARIES and narrative reports, where available
4. Mid-term review reports
5. Project completion reports
6. Evaluation reports (evaluation frameworks, evaluation findings)

7. Other project scoping or analytical documents (e.g. project design reports, political economy analyses)
8. Project progress reports (possibly, though may not be essential).

Any documents not listed above and still required for the macro evaluation will need to be cleared DFID staff and may not be authorised.

10.2 The Supplier is not allowed to make any amendments to any DFID documents held; the supplier may electronically add comments to documents for the purposes of the evaluation.

10.3 The supplier must not make additional copies of the information without prior permission from DFID.

10.4 Only team members with the correct security clearance are allowed to access the external server.

10.5 Where the supplier wishes to hold other DFID documents on an external server it needs to seek DFID approval. This will be provided by Daniel Lampen or David Campbell.

10.6 The supplier must delete the information once there is no requirement for it to be held, unless otherwise specified, this will be at the point of termination or expiry of the contract.

Addendum to Terms of Reference (September 2015)

Macro Evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women and Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability

DFID has taken the decision to revise the scope of work under the macro evaluations of DFID's Strategic Vision for Girls and Women (SV) and the Empowerment and Accountability (E&A) Policy Frame.

Following the submission by the consultants (ITAD) of the first pilot evaluation phase and discussions around the options paper and DFID Annual Review, DFID informed OPM and Itad on 16 June 2015 that it would not continue the SV strand of the Macro Evaluation apart from the communication of the Policy Implementation Review PIR and tabulated mapping. . DFID will continue with the E&A strand of work, with another E&A project set analysis of approximately 50 projects before deciding whether to continue with the rest of the E&A workplan based on the implementation of the analysis against the agreed methodological note (see below), and the value of the findings to DFID and the wider development community.

DFID has highlighted specific considerations, which need to be addressed to ensure findings resulting from the next round of project set analysis are both rigorous and generalisable, and that the analytical approach can be replicated by other evaluators.

After extensive discussions DFID and Itad have agreed that adjustments are required to the project set analysis approach:

1. **A more collaborative approach to the project set analysis within the Itad team:** in the pilot, project set analysis was driven by the Principal Investigator, largely working alone, although with the assistance of the QCA Specialist for the QCA analysis specifically. Whilst this approach is suitable when timeframes are tight, there is the potential for expert bias, which undermines rigour. In the next round of project set analysis, a 3 person team (Jeremy Holland, the Principal Investigator and two Research Assistants) will drive the analysis, supported by the QCA Specialist. The team will adopt a collaborative approach and ensure that judgements are triangulated and standardised, thereby mitigating the potential for expert bias. Three key moments have been identified in the analytical process when this triangulation and standardisation will be critical, namely:

    a) Definition of ratings to be applied to agreed conditions;
    b) Validation of ratings applied to conditions;
    c) Validation of findings from narrative analysis.

    To achieve a) a team meeting will be planned to reach agreement on the ratings definition. For b) a proportion of the projects under analysis will be double-coded by different team members so that the team can share views on how they apply the ratings and reach a standardised approach. In addition, a team meeting format will be used for team members to present and justify their ratings. If other team members are not convinced by the evidence, the ratings may be adjusted. For c), team members involved in the narrative analysis will present and justify their analysis to other team members, including the Project Director and the QCA Specialist. This will be an opportunity to triangulate findings between the team and between the QCA and narrative analysis. Furthermore, Itad will use each of the team meetings associated with a)-c) for increased quality assurance by the Project Director of the analytical process.

2. **Narrative analysis will focus on cross-case analysis:** there are two main objectives for the narrative analysis. Firstly, it can be used to explore in more detail and elaborate any of the QCA findings. Secondly, it can be used to understand how context affects causal configurations. For both of these two objectives a cross-case comparative approach to the narrative analysis would seem appropriate, rather than selecting typical or "modal" case studies, as done in the pilot analysis. This will increase the scope of work associated with the narrative analysis. Even with the increased resources proposed in these revised budget estimates, the QCA is likely to generate far more causal configurations which could be further investigated using narrative analysis than can be accommodated with the resources available. Itad will agree with DFID the priority configurations to be the focus of the narrative analysis in the current round. At a later stage, if additional resources were available, DFID may decide to explore other causal configurations on the social accountability project set.

The consultants will prepare a methodological note for the project set analysis which will require approval and sign-off by DFID before further activities can be undertaken.

The revised contract will include a break clause for April 2016 to review progress after the 'Project Set Analysis for 2015/16' to and make a decision on whether to continue with the workplan.

Note: No mid-term review will be required as stated in the original Terms of Reference (Section 4, Annex A – Under Timeframe)

Annex E Achieving robustness in the E&A macro evaluation: A Technical Note[44]

Introduction

In developing and piloting a methodology for the E&A macro evaluation, we have identified a number of issues around achieving robustness in the evaluation research methodology. In this Note we pull these issues together around the following three robustness principles and one cross-cutting principle. The three robustness principles are:

- The first principle of **reliability** ensures that a result achieved with the chosen research method can be repeated by any given researcher. Reliability builds confidence in the repeatability of a study's given research method;
- The second principle of **internal validity** is applied to studies that attempt to establish a causal relationship. It allows us to be confident that a changing project outcome can be attributed to a given intervention. Internal validity builds confidence in the cause and effect relationship within a study;
- The third principle of **external validity** increases our confidence that we can generalise results beyond the immediate study population, thus building 'confidence of inference' from that study.

Cross-cutting these three principles is a fourth principle of **transparency**. This requires that the application of these robustness principles through research protocols is open to external scrutiny by third parties, enabling challenge and verification.

Applying these principles in practice is strongly influenced by the type of research methodology employed. Standard experimental research brings with it a clear set of procedures for increasing the reliability and (internal and external) validity of study. We have adapted these robustness principles to the application of our chosen realist synthesis[45] research approach for the macro evaluation (see Figure 1).[46] Rather than seeking universal truths based on experimental methods, a realist synthesis seeks to negotiate the complexities of programme interventions by identifying underlying causal mechanisms and exploring how they work in particular contexts and settings.[47]

Our approach sequences a pattern-finding **QCA method** that identifies significant 'causal configurations' of factors (or conditions) that are associated with a given project outcome, with an interpretive **narrative analysis method** that examines these causal configurations in greater depth and explores how they work in different contexts and under what conditions. In the first instance we will look to see (a) to find if there is *any* plausible underlying causal mechanism, and then (b) to elaborate on *how* that works. We note that it is likely that with

[44] The contents of this technical note were agreed with DFID to guide the application of the E&A macro evaluation methodology.
[45] See Pawson, R., Greenhalgh, T., Harvey, G. and Walshe, K. (2004), 'Realist synthesis: an introduction', *RMP Methods Paper* 2/2004. Manchester: ESRC Research Methods Programme, University of Manchester.
[46] For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see Annex B of Itad and OPM (2015), 'Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2015: Final Draft Version', Brighton: Itad, May
[47] Pawson et al., op. cit.

some configurations there may be *no* plausible underlying causal mechanism that can be found, at least with the evidence currently available.

Figure 1: Macro evaluation components and methods



Reliability: Ensuring the repeatability/ replicability of findings

The first robustness principle of reliability ensures that the findings generated through the chosen research method are repeatable over time, across projects and across researchers.

Applying this principle to our realist evaluation method means ensuring that the QCA 'conditions' (comprising contextual factors, project mechanisms and project outcomes) are identified and scored (using QCA binary scoring) in a replicable manner and that the emerging patterns/ causal configurations are then interpreted through narrative analysis in a replicable manner by any researcher using the same method.

In practical terms this means establishing a clear and replicable tabulated coding and rubric system that can be systematically applied by a group of researchers with shared conceptual understandings of the conditions involved. This is what gives the coding its transparency and openness to external scrutiny and challenge.[48] These rubrics use a mix of proxy indicators and extracted qualitative data:

- The proxy indicators for project contexts are selected from nationally comparable governance indexes and are used for standard binary measurements of the presence or absence of various contextual conditions (such as the strength of civil society or the openness of political society). These scores are reductionist but unambiguous, dividing the project set cases into two groups (1 or 0, with no case slipping between the two);

[48] These raw data will be available for scrutiny by a peer review group established with DFID, and we are open to discussions about how much public access we will allow for wider scrutiny.

- Extracted qualitative data are used for additional binary coding: to code for the presence or absence of project mechanisms (such as support to local dialogue or capacity building of media) and to code for evidence of achievement of project outcomes (such as strengthened civil society or improved service delivery). The extracted qualitative data are included in the relevant tabulated cell, accompanied by a summary statement that justifies the binary score applied;

- We will also test the replicability of our findings through sensitivity analysis of our QCA results. We will randomly add and remove conditions and cases from our models, and change calibration thresholds. The ease and extent to which this changes our results will give us an indication of the sensitivity of our QCA results. We will identify what constitutes acceptable versus excess sensitivity and will make this clear when we report on the results of these tests.

In order to increase our confidence that we have applied replicable scorings to the conditions and that the QCA analysis will therefore generate replicable sub-sets of projects with shared 'causal configurations' that can be subject to interpretive analysis of cause and effect using narrative analysis (see internal validity discussion below), we will subject the coding and tabulating process to triangulation. This involves as a first step *ex ante* work of normalisation among researchers through piloting and spot-checking. Once work begins on the main sample, the triangulation process involves random cross-checking between researchers of the coding of conditions, including the extraction and summarising of relevant qualitative evidence.

Internal validity: Increasing the confidence that we can place in identified cause and effect relationships

Reliability alone is not sufficient for ensuring a robust research methodology. We may be very confident that we will get the same result if we repeat the measurement but it does not tell us whether and how a given intervention is contributing to changing outcomes. Internal validity shows that the researcher has evidence to suggest that an intervention had some effect on the observations and results.

Establishing internal validity within our combined methods approach will involve first being confident about the causal configurations established by QCA and second being confident about our deeper interpretation of those configurations using narrative analysis. Hence:

- We will ensure first that the QCA analysis of the coded conditions (described under 'Reliability' above) is followed using a standardised and transparent protocol that is open to general external scrutiny and to specific scrutiny through a peer review panel established with DFID for this study.

- We will further ensure that sample sub-sets, identified to explore shared causal configurations, are established with clear criteria for their formation. We will express our findings in terms of necessity, sufficiency or INUS relations – consistently with multiple-conjunctural causal inference models.

- For each causal configuration we will ensure that the selection of cases for in-depth, interpretive (narrative) analysis is transparent. We will identify two clusters of cases to subject to in-depth analysis:

1. Cases that exemplify the configuration of conditions associated with a given outcome of interest. ('Consistent cases');

2. Cases that are inconsistent, having the same configuration of conditions but with outcome absent ('Inconsistent cases');

- Within each of these clusters there may be too many cases to subject all of them to narrative analysis. We will therefore sample cases transparently for the following clusters of cases and will select a minimum of three cases per cluster:[49]

    1. Consistent cases: In order to find any likely causal mechanisms connecting the conditions that make up the configuration we will look for 'modal cases', i.e. those that have maximum similarity with all other cases in this group. We will use the 'Hamming distance' method of establishing similarity to find this type of case.[50] Once a plausible causal mechanism is found, we will check to see if it can also be found in the most 'marginal' cases in this group i.e. those with least similarity with all others (identified again using the Hamming distance method);

    2. Inconsistent cases (if present in the identified causal configuration): We will select modal cases, and optionally marginal cases, using the same method. We would expect to find the same causal mechanism to be present in these inconsistent cases but to find some other factors that are blocking it from working delivering the outcome;

It is important to flag here that we will be selective in our application of this method of within-case analysis. We will prioritise within-case analysis based on our recognition of: (a) resource limitations, (b) data limitations and (c) stakeholders' views of which configurations are high versus low priority for this kind of analysis.

- We will then subject these causal configurations to within-case analysis with the following objectives:[51]

    1. **Verification** that the attributes of a project are actually those that are ascribed to them in the data set used in the QCA analysis. Given the procedure described above for coding, few errors should be expected, but will be addressed if they occur;

    2. **Enlivening** the QCA coding through the construction of simple readable narrative which connects the conditions in the configuration in a way that is both plausible and respectful of the facts;

    3. **Excavation** to establish if there is a 'real-life' causal mechanism or explanatory model that connects the events described by the configuration of conditions found via QCA.

[49] Assuming one dominant configuration per hypothesis.
[50] We will retain the option to prioritise cases with higher quality evaluative evidence for narrative analysis if these cases are also close to the modal case profile.
[51] Rick Davies (pers. comm.).

- We will increase the trustworthiness of the causal inference in our narrative analysis through demonstrating the 'rigorous thinking'[52] in our narrative analysis. We will apply causal process observation (CPO) to the selected case studies. For each cluster this will involve (i) coding, summarising and tabulating causal explanations and accompanying evidence for each outcome; and (ii) translating this table into a causal flow diagram that shows our interpretative analysis of change and contribution to change. Once we have completed this within-case analysis, we will then compare the CPO matrices and flow diagrams for all sampled cases in the cluster in order to consider alternative explanations for change. This approach represents a simplified adaptation of the empirical tests sometimes applied in the qualitative evaluative method of 'process tracing'[53]

- We will further strengthen our confidence in the verifiability of these emerging explanatory models by subjecting them to cross-checking and interrogation by at least one other researcher, who will review the evidence cited and its interpretation. This internal challenge function -- the basis of achieving trustworthiness in qualitative research[54] -- will enable us to increase our confidence in the internal validity of our interpretations.

External validity: generalising results beyond the immediate study population

The third and final principle that we apply to the macro evaluation research process is that of external validity. This increases our confidence that we can generalise our findings beyond the sample group and apply them to a larger population of interest.

In conventional empirical research external validity is established with a probability-based (random) sample that is sufficiently large to capture the variability of the 'population universe' (in this case the total Social Accountability project portfolio) under study.

The process of constructing project sets for the macro evaluation is described in the methodology annex (Annex B) of the E&A Annual Technical Report 2015.[55] This makes it clear that we have not been able to construct a probability-based sample from the Social Accountability project portfolio as we are limited to those projects whose evaluative content is quality-assured (as of summer 2014, 77 out of a total of 180, although this may increase slightly, with the addition of annual reviews and evaluation reports completed in the past year).[56] This in itself introduces an unavoidable bias towards those projects, which are well documented and evidenced. However, for the next round of analysis, we will include as many as possible of the 77 quality-assured projects to increase the coverage and breadth of our knowledge relating to the project portfolio. We have started the process of conducting a final data quality screening and are confident that the final number of quality-assured projects will

[52] On the distinction between rigour as statistically verifiable attribution and rigour as 'quality of thought, see Stern, E., Stame, N., Mayne, J., Forss, K., Davies, R. and Befani, B. (2012). *Broadening the range of designs and methods for impact evaluations.* (Working Paper No. 38), London, Department for International Development; White, H., & Phillips, D. (2012). *Addressing attribution of cause and effect in small n impact evaluations: towards an integrated framework* (Working Paper No. 15), International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).
[53] Collier D (2011) 'Understanding Process Tracing', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44:4 pp 823–30, Berkley, CA: University of California.
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3827/Understanding%20Process%20Tracing.pdf
[54] Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry*, London: Sage.
[55] Itad and OPM (2015), op. cit.
[56] The three quality assurance criteria of triangulation, transparency and contribution are described in Annex B.

be in the region of 50, and therefore within the budgetary ceiling of this analysis. This approach will increase our confidence that we have captured the variability of 'causal pathways' identified by QCA and explored through narrative analysis across the Social Accountability project portfolio. Moreover, since we are not sampling and using all projects with sufficient data quality, other sources of bias are relatively limited. Other possible biases may arise from geographically prioritised or politically driven selection of projects for additional evaluation or extra scrutiny by DFID.

To explore possible biases, we analysed the extent of the representativeness of this project set by mapping the project set profile onto the total project population using the portfolio synopsis descriptive data. We compared our project set of 77 quality-assured projects to the overall population of 180 Social Accountability projects on descriptive criteria such as geography, duration, budgets, etc. We also compared the distribution of DFID outcome scores where available, which provided us with a preliminary indicator of possible positive or negative bias. Our comparative analysis confirms that the sample is highly representative against these criteria. We will detail this comparative analysis in an annex of the next technical report.

When identifying and interpreting causal configurations of conditions that are associated with a specific outcome, we will focus on those conditions that are consistently displayed by a large number of cases. This will increase our confidence of interference and allow us to identify relatively generalisable findings.[57] To facilitate this, we will keep the ratio of conditions to cases small.[58] If findings are illustrated by a large number of cases with few inconsistencies, this will provide an indication of generalisability.

Finally, our realist synthesis approach will allow us to explain the *absence* of external validity in individual project causal mechanisms that we identify. We will be able to identify and interpret those projects – particularly through our case selection method of identifying inconsistent cases -- where causal mechanisms are too contextually specific to have external validity in order to share lessons on what mediating aspects of project context ensure that explanatory models are *not* generalisable to a wider population of projects.

[57] However, we will also analyse outlier configurations where they offer interesting learning opportunities.
[58] We will also look at some of the tables suggested by Marx and Dusa (2011), which intend to calculate probabilities of obtaining contradictory configurations for given numbers of cases and variables. However, we are aware of the limitations of this approach and will only use it where best applicable.