



DEEP DIVE IN KENYA

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM
THE BRACED NATIONAL POLICY
PROCESS IN KENYA?

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Acronyms

Ada Consortium	Adaptation Consortium
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters
BRACED-X	Extension of the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme
CCD	Climate Change Directorate
CEC	County Executive Committee
CECM	County Executive Committee Member
CCCC	County Climate Change Fund
CCD	Climate Change Directorate
CCU	Climate Change Unit
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CoG	Council of Governors
DCF	Decentralised Climate Finance
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
FM	Fund Manager
GCF	Green Climate Fund
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
KADDP	Kenya Accountable Development Programme
KMD	Kenya Meteorological Department
KSG	Kenya School of Government
MLE	Monitoring, Learning & Evaluation
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
StARCK+	Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus
WAPC	Ward Adaptation Planning Committee
WCCPC	Ward Climate Change Planning Committee

Key messages

The BRACED Fund Manager (FM) supported an existing policy priority in Kenya to devolve climate change funding and decision making to the subnational, county level. This was identified as a focus through an iterative process involving context and stakeholder analysis and working with local interlocutors familiar with the context.

The work centred around the ongoing process of scaling up the County Climate Change Fund (CCCCF) mechanism across Kenya, devolving further funding through it to meet the ambitions of Kenya's National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), working with existing actors who were advocating for this i.e. Adaptation Consortium (Ada Consortium) and Kenya's Council of Governors (CoG).

Tactics used by the FM team included convening a policy roundtable; building capacity within key agencies including the Council of Governors; contracting the synthesis of evidence/experience and promoting institutional linkages. Overall, this support and facilitation was found by the stakeholders involved to have been valuable, well aligned and timely.

The roundtable was well attended by a diverse set of stakeholders that might not normally convene on this issue e.g. academia and national treasury. There is evidence to suggest that the work elicited demand for more roundtable discussions, alignment of stakeholder priorities, further research into how best to roll out CCCC work and increased capacity at the county level to manage and effectively use decentralised climate funds. The activities also appear to have catalysed interest in conducting further roundtables.

The iterative approach – known as SPRINT cycles – allowed priorities and activities to be surfaced 'organically' and in a flexible way to respond to demand and opportunity as it emerged. One limitation to this flexible approach was the level of documentation completed by the FM Results Managers to support their decision making and release of funds to support activities although there is no evidence that this resulted in missed opportunities. Ultimately the work may have contributed to the national government's plan to roll out the CCCC mechanism to all counties (although this depends on whether governors 'opt into' the process – in line with the Constitution of Kenya and the devolved decision-making power) but the extent to which the Component D2 work contributed is unknown and attribution is challenging.

One of the major limiting factors in terms of identifying longer term policy change outcomes was time, with a compressed 12-month implementation period. The way of working through local actors may indicate the possibility of progress continuing after the FM ceases activities but at this stage that is impossible to say for sure.

There is some indication that the capacity building work with the Council of Governors has placed them in an improved position to access global climate finance as an implementing entity for World Bank and Green Climate Fund investment.

1. INTRODUCTION

This deep dive provides insights into policy engagement work known as 'Component D' conducted under the Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme in Kenya. It provides insights into the process and outputs of the work to support the scaled out decentralised climate finance (DCF) across all counties in Kenya.

1.1 What is BRACED?

Since 2015, the UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded BRACED programme has worked to build sustainable and scalable resilience for climate-vulnerable communities across the Sahel, East Africa, and Asia. DFID has awarded grants to 15 consortia projects to implement activities over a three-year period to collectively build the resilience of 5 million climate-vulnerable people. In late 2017, BRACED was extended for an additional 15-month period (January 2018-March 2019), referred to as BRACED-X.

The programme has four components:

- **Component A** works at scale through partners to directly build the resilience of people to cope with climate extremes in six countries in West Africa (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad).
- **Component B** operates similarly to Component A in target communities vulnerable to climate shocks and stresses in seven countries in East Africa and Asia (Nepal, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan).
- **Component C** builds evidence on adaptation and disaster risk reduction across the first two components, identifying the policy and institutional changes needed to strengthen resilience.
- **Component D** aims to develop national and international capability and capacity to respond to climate extremes through strengthening the policy environment for building resilience. (FM Component D2 Manual).


The Fund Manager (FM), led by KPMG, has been responsible for overseeing the transfer of funds and the delivery of all BRACED projects. A key characteristic of BRACED has been that each implementing partner has its own project-level Theory of Change (ToC). This has underpinned problem- and context-specific experiments to test solutions that build local resilience capabilities, which align with the principles of adaptive development and programming (see, Andrews et al. 2017, BRACED 2015, Booth and Unsworth 2014, Andrews et al. 2012, Booth 2011).

The BRACED Knowledge Manager (KM) is a consortium led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), an independent think tank, in consortium with Asia Disaster Preparedness Centre, ENDA Energie, Itad, Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, and Thomson Reuters Foundation. The Knowledge Manager leads the monitoring, evaluation and research activities of the BRACED programme.

1.2 Component D

Component D focusses on building national, regional and international government capacity to prepare and plan for expected increases in the frequency and severity of climate extremes. Approved as part of the BRACED extension, Component D aims to apply the lessons learned through BRACED to influence local, national and global resilience (BRACED FM 2019). Component D consists of three sub-components (Figure 1.)

Figure 1. BRACED Component D sub-components. Source: FM Component D2 Manual



1.2.1 Component D in Kenya

Under Component D1 of BRACED-X, five projects from the BRACED portfolio were selected to continue delivering policy work at subnational level, building on their experiences implementing resilience activities since 2015. In Kenya, the Programme for Resilient Systems (called PROGRESS) implemented by a consortium led by Mercy Corps was selected for extension after three years of working to build the absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of households and communities in Uganda and north-eastern Kenya (Wajir). Under D1, PROGRESS-X pursued three main policy activities in Kenya's Wajir county; a) natural resource mapping exercise and training to enable evidence-informed decision- and policy-making, b) pastoralism and policy training to encourage integration of pastoralist resilience building into policy, and c) conducting a water governance study to identify policy and practical measures that improve the management of water in Wajir (BRACED KM 2019).

Component D2 focusses on the establishment of national policy dialogue processes and is facilitated by the BRACED Results Managers (who sit within the FM and also oversee Component D1 activities). Building on BRACED project experience, D2 aims to initiate and/or influence an already established dialogue process between relevant stakeholders at the national level in Nepal, Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali and Chad. D2 activities in Kenya did not draw heavily from PROGRESS's previous work under BRACED and BRACED-X. However, PROGRESS team members were consulted throughout D2 and parallels can be drawn between PROGRESS's decentralised climate finance work supporting the implementation of Ward Adaptation Planning Committees (WAPCs) in Wajir. Wajir was one of the five pilot counties for the CCCF mechanism, earmarking 2% of its development budget for adaptation activities. As a lot of PROGRESS policy work was outsourced to IIED, IIED was in a very strong position to fully draw on Wajir experiences. For example, the PROGRESS water governance study led by IIED was also used as a model for one of the studies conducted under Component D2.

1.3 Scope of this report

This Deep Dive report, which was produced by the KM's Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation (MLE) team of Component D2, presents what was learned about the BRACED Component D2 policy dialogue process in Kenya. It is part of a set of three 'deep dives' and one summary report which takes a broader look at processes across the three country cases.

The audiences for this Deep Dive report are primarily DFID, the FM and the KM teams as well as Implementing Partners and those interested in policy engagement work focussed on climate change. The style of the report is non-technical and jargon-free. We have simplified the use of acronyms and specific words related to this initiative to make it accessible to the international community of researchers and practitioners interested in learning about the results of climate resilience initiatives in Kenya, and the use of adaptive and iterative approaches to inform climate-resilient policy development processes.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Learning questions

The overarching question the MLE team sought to answer is: *to what extent, how and in which circumstances does the Component D2 (policy dialogue) investment modality deliver (steps towards) policy change?* To answer this question, we identified the five learning questions below, with a short form of their focus in parentheses:

Q1: What change strategies have been designed to influence policy and capabilities at the country level? How appropriate and relevant are these strategies? (*Sense of direction*).

Q2: What internal systems have been put in place to design, adapt and iterate strategies and plans of action to address changes in context and circumstances? What changes have occurred as a result and why? (*Operational effectiveness of adaptive approach*).

Q3: What have been the responses to the policy dialogue (e.g. increased awareness of research and evidence, including from BRACED; demand for new or more evidence; etc.)? (*Effectiveness of the activities*).

Q4: Are there signs of behavioural change in line with the proposed change strategy? Were there any unintended changes observed? (*Overall effectiveness/outcome level change*).

Q5: How sustainable/scalable are these changes likely to be beyond the end of funding in July 2019? (*Sustainability*).

2.2 What is meant by policy change?

Both the FM and KM adopt a broad definition of policy change for the D2 policy dialogues. The contexts in which the policy dialogues have been designed is constantly evolving. As a result, it is important to refer to the definition of policy change developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) who have identified different types of policy change to which a policy engagement initiative can contribute (see also BRACED knowledge management MLE design document, 2018):



Framing debates and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge.



Influencing behaviour change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation.



Legislative change, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.

2.3 Data collection

To inform this Deep Dive, 14 stakeholder interviews (12 in Kenya, two remotely) were conducted with 16 individuals. During KM fieldwork, which overlapped with a FM D2 visit to Nairobi, four FM meetings were observed, granting access to the perspectives of an additional three individuals. Additionally, a number of calls and emails were shared with the FM Results Manager and the FM's D2 Coordinator. Taken together, this means that the number of individual perspectives gathered in relation to the Kenya D2 work is 20. Notes from Quarterly Review Meetings held with the FM, the KM and DFID also informed this work to some degree. Finally, secondary documentation was reviewed, consisting mainly of FM-produced documentation, email threads and reports.

Table 1 below presents how the use of language in the subsequent sections of this report reflects the strength of evidence allocated to the findings. For example, 'Several respondents said X...' would indicate that 8-16 respondents said X and thus we deem the strength of the evidence to be high.

Table 1. Strength of evidence descriptors

DESCRIPTOR	A FEW	SOME	SEVERAL
No. of respondents	4 or less	4-8	8-16
Strength of evidence	Low	Medium	High

2.4 Limitations

Some limitations of this deep dive that are important to highlight include:

- The sample frame was naturally limited to those who were involved in the policy dialogue or were able to offer an opinion as to the relevance and effectiveness of the work and thus is relatively small. Furthermore, the opportunity to collect additional evidence in the short time frame available to the MLE team was limited. Therefore, the triangulation and validation of information through the limited number of interview respondents is not sufficient to provide a comprehensive account of the impact of work carried out under D2. It was not always possible to speak with desired individuals and stakeholder organisations/institutions.
- It is possible that findings are subject to bias given that *several* respondents were in some way affiliated with the Fund Manager, either as sub-contracted consultants or recipients of FM support. This may have compelled respondents to respond positively when asked about D2 work. With more time and resource, care would have been taken to acquire additional perspectives outside of the sphere of potential influence of the D2 investment.
- Owing to KM contractual restrictions, the timing at which fieldwork had to be conducted (i.e. before the end of implementation) limits our ability to integrate progress to the end of Component D2 implementation in Kenya.

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS

3.1 Strategy and direction of the policy dialogue process

The findings in this section seek to answer the question:

What change strategies have been designed to influence policies and capabilities at the country level and what activities have happened? How appropriate and relevant are these strategies? Why?

The change strategy in Kenya was identified iteratively (see section 3.2 on internal systems) and using dedicated tools i.e. Theory of Change and Stakeholder Mapping. These were informed by consultations with relevant stakeholders, including IIED, Adaptation Consortium (Ada Consortium for short) and individuals associated with the BRACED-funded PROGRESS project operating in Wajir. Additionally, a consultant was commissioned to produce a draft Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to inform the Results Manager's understanding of the DCF space in Kenya.

As a result, the agreed mission statement for the D2 work in Kenya became to *'complement efforts by other actors to strengthen and fast-track the building of capacity of the Government of Kenya to drive the scaling out of the CCCF process to additional counties'* (FM Kenya D2 ToC – Annex 1).¹ Thus, the strategy and direction taken by the D2 policy dialogue process in Kenya focusses more on *supporting existing policy change processes* – rather than *creating new policy change*. By this, we mean that the ambition to scale out the CCCF mechanism to national level was not supported by the D2 policy dialogue process, this existed already. Instead, the context and stakeholder assessment conducted by the Results Manager led to identification of a strategy aimed at supporting the implementation of the scale out itself.

This support materialised in multiple forms (see Table 2), structured around three rounds of SPRINT cycles (more on this in section 3.2). Firstly, a roundtable was held to enable relevant stakeholders to take stock and agree on a way forward (SPRINT 1) plus to commission the synthesis of existing CCCF experience from five pilot counties. Secondly, two consultants were embedded into the Council of Governors (CoG) – an intergovernmental body that sits between national and subnational governments and is mandated to play an advisory role to the 47 county governments – to build its capacity on strategic and communication/knowledge matters related to climate change and the CCCF mechanism (SPRINT 2). Thirdly, IIED and Ada Consortium are supported with 'complementary, and targeted funding' feeding into (but not fully funding) a study of climate change-related public goods investments, a communications and engagement strategy for the CCCF mechanism, a legal and financial review of the CCCF mechanism, and a policy brief on Climate finance in Kenya (SPRINT 3).²

Stakeholders appreciated the adopted strategy and perceived it to be timely and well-aligned with existing activities and priorities. All respondents agreed that the change strategies pursued by the Results Manager were appropriate and relevant. Key to this was the way in which D2 funding and support was targeted at a pre-existing process of piloting and rolling out the CCCF mechanism, identified as the most appropriate course of action through stakeholder engagement and the initial roundtable. Success here was partly attributable to the pre-existing buy-in to this kind of policy work. Not needing to advocate for a new strategy or direction for policy meant that the Results Manager was able to align with the priorities of stakeholders:

- 1 Following implementation, revisions to the ToC changed the mission statement to *'WORK WITH AND complement efforts by other actors to MOVE CLIMATE CHANGE UP THE GOVERNMENT'S AGENDA AND strengthen and fast-track the building of capacity of the Government of Kenya, SPECIFICALLY CoG, County Governments, AND NDMA, TO scale out the county climate change fund (CCCF) process to additional counties'*.
- 2 SPRINT 3 originally included an activity developing the CCCF trainer's manual for the Kenya School of Government (KSG), but this was later dropped and replaced with latter two activities listed.

"I think it's successful but a key factor is that [the FM] tapped into something that is a priority for key actors and champions. It's one of their priorities to move it forward and that's why it's workable."³

Relatedly, the timing of the intervention was key, given that expansion of the CCCF mechanism is a priority of the National Climate Change Action Plan, 2018–22 and the Government of Kenya is preparing to scale out the mechanism nationally (Crick et al. 2019). Furthermore, D2 work feeds into (or at least complements) other donor activities in Kenya beyond DFID. For example, alignment can be drawn between the work of D2 and both SIDA's ongoing funding of the Ada Consortium (via IIED) and UNDP's support to the Kenya National Treasury on the management of climate financing. Similarly, the D2 work builds somewhat on the DFID-funded Strengthening Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change in Kenya Plus (StARCK+) programme which, among other activities, supported the establishment of Ward Climate Change Planning Committees (WCCPCs) to manage devolved climate funding.

The support provided to the CoG via the embedding of two consultants was welcomed and fills an important capacity gap. As an intermediary between national and county governments, the CoG is mandated to provide coordination and advisory support and promote the sharing of best practices across the 47 counties. The Tourism and Natural Resources Committee of the CoG is tasked with (among other things) supporting county governments to mainstream climate change into their plans, implement the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2018–22 and operationalise county-level Climate Change Units (CCU) (see Figure 2) to be responsible for climate-related affairs (FM Kenya D2 SPRINT 2). However, with no in-house climate change expertise or previous capacity building efforts, the Tourism and Natural Resources Committee has been unable to provide this support alongside its other responsibilities.⁴ The two consultancies under D2 – one on strategic and one on communications capacity building – respond directly to these resource and capacity gaps identified by the CoG themselves off the back of the initial roundtable.

"[CoG] can't afford the consultants themselves but now they can train their own staff with this. It was a wise investment. It will lead to bigger funding later."

³ This, and all subsequent quotations presented in this style, comes from stakeholder interviews conducted for this deep dive.

⁴ The committee is responsible for overseeing all matters related to mining, tourism, wildlife, disaster risk management, forestry, waste and environment.

To ensure buy-in and suitability of the D2 work, the strategy consultant, with input from CoG staff, county governments and the Climate Change Directorate (CCD) within the Ministry of Environment, produced strategy documents (including a needs assessment and capacity plan), internal training and a blueprint for the operationalisation of the CCUs that were relevant and necessary. Early feedback from climate financing and communications training indicates that they were well received and responded to the capacity gaps (more on this in section 3.3).

Table 2. Kenya D2 SPRINT cycles

SPRINT CYCLE	SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES	IMPLEMENTER	OUTPUTS
SPRINT 1 (Aug 2018- Apr 2019)	Preliminary consolidation of learning from the CCCF mechanism pilots and convening the relevant stakeholders at a roundtable to take stock and identify next steps; ...plus (informed by the roundtable) in-depth evidence piece/synthesis of CCCF experience from five pilot counties, (see publication 'output'). In addition, (March 2019), a short follow up consultancy upon request by CoG to develop a proposal with the CoG to unpack the specifics of the required support and align with Ada's objectives, and deliverables.	Consultant x1 IIED/Ada Consortium team Consultant x1 CoG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy roundtable (including agenda, summary report, stakeholder engagement plan, outcome report). • Publication: 'Delivering climate finance at local level to support adaptation: experiences of county climate change funds in Kenya' (Crick et al. 2019). • Political Economy Analysis (internal). • Log of meetings with key government stakeholders (in preparation of the roundtable discussion). • Light touch stakeholder engagement plan (government). • CoG costed mini-proposal for FM (internal), including draft Terms of Reference for short-term consultancy assignments with the CoG).
SPRINT 2 (Apr-July 2019)	SPRINT 2.1: Embedded a climate change expert in the CoG to 1) strategically advise the CoG Committee on Tourism and Natural Resources and set the direction on mainstreaming climate change into their operations; 2) build the CoG's internal capacity on various climate change topics, which will enable the CoG to support county governments to integrate and mainstream climate change; 3) develop a blueprint on the operationalisation of the Climate Change Units in the counties; and 4) pilot the blueprint to selected counties and advise them on improvement actions.	Consultant x1 Workshop coordinator CoG	SPRINT 2.1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three training workshops held (in counties) including validating the CCU blueprint, and capacity building plan, plus running climate communication sessions. • Training presentations held • Blueprint for operationalisation of Climate Change Unit (CCUs) (validated) • CoG capacity development plan (validated)

SPRINT CYCLE	SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES	IMPLEMENTER	OUTPUTS
SPRINT 2 (Apr-July 2019)	SPRINT 2.2: Embedded a knowledge management & communications consultant and technician in the CoG and provided knowledge management and communications support on climate change governance and management to CoG staff, help to increase the ability of communications staff in CoG to boost awareness of climate change and increase the knowledge base on climate change in the Maarifa centre.	Consultant x 2 CoG	SPRINT 2.2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for Maarifa centre and Comms Department staff held • Communications toolkit for CoG • Audio-visual piece on climate change and activities on climate change • Short article on climate change mainstreaming in CoG's Council monthly edition • Uploaded documents on climate change, policy, and legal frameworks in Kenya on the Maarifa Centre's online portal
SPRINT 3 (May-July 2019)	Supporting Ada's work with several key stakeholders to accelerate the pace at which devolved climate finance can expand to many more counties paving the way for creating an enabling legislative, governance, and technical environment. Supporting the roll-out strategy of the CCCF by supporting Ada with the following; a) phase 1 of public goods investment study to understand the challenges in the legislative process of planning, designing, managing and maintaining public good services, b) supporting the implementation of the policy engagement and communications strategy to strengthen more broadly government's leadership and ownership to drive the CCCF extension process beyond CoG, c) developing generic county CCCF legislations and Act by undertaking a legal and financial review of CCCF mechanism, and d) contribution to knowledge on climate change in Kenya (e.g. Odhengo et al. 2019)	IIED/Ada Consortium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy Brief and Discussion Paper published; '<i>Climate Finance in Kenya: review and future outlook</i>' (Odhengo et al. 2019) • Validation Workshop: Model climate change Act and Model CCCF regulations • Model Climate Change Act • Model Climate Change Regulations • Report by NDMA/Ada '<i>Assessing the functionality of the CCCF investments: A technical and governance study</i>' • Validation workshop reports in all five pilot counties – findings of the CCCF functionality survey & climate smart investments were discussed • Report analysing the findings of the completed survey in the five counties • Three county hub-meetings including reports of the latter • Gap analysis of communication capacities within key stakeholder organisations • Capacity building and implementation roadmap

Overall, the findings suggest that through deliberative engagement with key stakeholders (including the active BRACED project) from the outset, an appropriate, well aligned and relevant change policy priority and change strategy was identified. Building on existing policy processes was timely and opportunistic and well received by relevant stakeholders. Interning expertise into relevant government departments was appreciated and met a latent demand for additional capacity towards the policy goal.

Figure 2. CCCF Mechanism, Ada Consortium and CCUs

County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) Mechanism	Ada Consortium	Climate Change Units (CCUs)
<p>The Kenya County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) mechanism is 'a pioneering mechanism to facilitate the flow of climate finance to county governments and simultaneously empower local communities through strengthened public participation in the management and use of those funds to build their resilience to a changing climate' (Ada Consortium 2019). Having been successfully piloted in five counties (first in Isiolo, then later in Garissa, Kitui, Makueni and Wajir counties), a national scale out of the mechanism has been identified as a key priority of the Government of Kenya and the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2018–22.</p>	<p>The Adaptation (Ada) Consortium is a core component of the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) whose aim is to pilot and implement climate change adaptation planning approaches. Since 2013, Ada have piloted the CCCF mechanism and model in five counties (Garissa, Isiolo, Kitui, Makueni and Wajir). The consortium consists of county governments, international NGOs (Christian Aid and the International Institute of Environment and Development) and local NGOs (Anglican Development Service – Eastern and Western (ADS-E and W), WomanKind Kenya, Merti Integrated Development – Programme (MID-P), Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF), Community Rehabilitation and Environmental Programme (CREP), and Lifeskill Promoters (LISP).</p>	<p>The Climate Change Units (CCUs) are county-level units, the operationalisation of which is a prerequisite for implementing the CCCF mechanism. The National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) has prioritised establishment of CCUs in each county. To date, 44 counties have established a CCU but most have not become operational due to a lack of technical and institutional capacity and guiding strategy.</p>

3.2 Internal system and process set up to manage the policy dialogue process

The findings in this section seek to answer the question:

What internal systems have been put in place to design, adapt and iterate strategies and plans of action to address changes in context and circumstances? What changes have occurred as a result and why?

The FM adopted a SPRINT cycle approach to planning and delivering Component D2 activities (see Figure 3, as well as BRACED FM 2019 for more on this). The idea behind this approach is that, through small batches of work that generate learning throughout implementation, the Results Managers are able to 'respond

to uncertainties and changes in the environment during project implementation' and be 'solution-focussed and innovative when trying to overcome barriers to progress' (BRACED FM 2019).

In Kenya, the SPRINT cycle approach enabled the strategy for delivering (steps towards) policy change to emerge organically. As outlined in Table 2, the first SPRINT cycle was dedicated to an initial policy roundtable to bring together key stakeholders on DCF, allowing them to take stock on progress to date and agree on next steps. This was a strategic move to allow the identification of further avenues for subsequent SPRINTs whilst simultaneously promoting collaborative thinking by key players. According to one roundtable member and subsequent recipient of support:

"[D2] was very flexible and there were no prescriptive activities. It was based on what was identified at the roundtable."


Given the crowded nature of the climate policy space, this approach and the absence of predetermined activities was essential in allowing priorities to emerge throughout the implementation period. For example, once it was identified that the CoG was a key stakeholder requiring capacity building towards the end of SPRINT 1, time was taken to identify exactly what the FM's support could look like before SPRINT 2 was finalised via a needs assessment. According to a representative of the Maarifa Centre (CoG's best practice communications platform) the meetings conducted as part of this needs assessment promoted self-reflection among staff members whilst providing an objective viewpoint on their gaps and challenges.

Once gaps were identified, the Terms of References (ToR) for the consultants embedded into the CoG were co-developed with representatives of the CoG and those in need of the support, ensuring a relevant, appropriate and desirable injection of capacity. This stakeholder-driven approach, in which the Results Manager took a back seat and allowed the process to be led by national actors was appreciated and deemed an appropriate strategy to have adopted.


Time required to document throughout the SPRINT cycles may be a limitation which does not match the flexibility of the approach. The documentation demands – SPRINT cycles, quarterly reporting, etc – required a considerable time commitment from the implementing team (i.e. Results Managers). In Kenya, this appears to have been noted by the engaged stakeholders, one of whom interpreted the reporting process as '*micromanagement and lack of trust*'. Squeezed time frames, combined with local stakeholders taking longer than anticipated to fully understand BRACED's offer and clearly articulate their needs meant the first SPRINT occupied most of the implementation period, with SPRINTs 2 and 3 taking place in the final three months of the time frame, end-loading the implementation (see Figure 4). This meant that the activities in these final three months were under considerable time pressure and may be

less likely to be sustained. Though the Results Managers were always meant to determine the cadence of the SPRINT cycles, they were estimated to last one to four months (BRACED FM 2019). This suggested time frame does not appear to have been particularly helpful and in this case, a more even distribution would have reduced the compacted amount of work to be produced in a short period at the end. According to the FM, the failure of CoG to fully 'grasp' the modus operandi of BRACED and to clearly articulate their needs until around February 2019 were the main reasons for the initial slow progress and later condensed SPRINT cycling.

Figure 3. Component D2 SPRINT cycle model.



It was recognised from the outset that effecting recognisable policy change (in particular legislative or regulatory) in 12 months was ambitious. The potential (unproven) contributions made by the D2 process in Kenya demonstrates that with the appropriate entry point it is possible to effect some change in a short time period. However, the above findings suggest that a cycle approach is not appropriate for a 12-month period of policy influencing work but may be for a longer implementation window. It also suggests that coordination with multiple stakeholders in national government, necessary to build ownership of key Kenyan stakeholders, takes time. While it is impossible to say for sure, had Component D2 been commissioned alongside implementation work three years earlier, more significant change may have been possible.

Figure 4. Kenya D2 SPRINT cycle timeline

In summary, the flexibility afforded to the FM via the SPRINT cycle approach was key in constructing a relevant and appropriate strategy for the policy dialogue process. The absence of pre-determined activities gave the Results Manager time in the scoping phase to identify capacity needs and resource gaps to be filled, ensuring subsequent buy-in from recipients. However, the approach was burdensome in terms of documentation and the flexibility meant that implementation was end-loaded, with the bulk of the policy work taking place in the final three months of the D2 implementation window.

3.3 Responses to the policy dialogue process

The findings in this section seek to answer the question:

What were the responses to the policy dialogue process? What were the barriers to achieving responses to the policy dialogues?

'Responses' here are considered to be interim outcomes, occurring between the FM's intervention and eventual policy change. For example, a response could be increased interest and demand for the use of evidence in policy making produced by the policy dialogue process. Given the short implementation period of Component D2 and lack of clearly attributable policy change outcomes (see section 3.4 for more on this), we found that the responses to the policy dialogue process could provide an indication of future policy change.

There is agreement that the initial roundtable was well attended and that the key stakeholders were represented. A few respondents said that the initial policy roundtable was a first-of-a-kind meeting, where actors came together, took stock on progress and decided the future priorities regarding the CCCF mechanism. This made it an effective convening opportunity and according to one respondent, it 'gave a bit of energy' to the ongoing discussions on the topic. It is likely that subsequent relevant meetings, conferences and processes have and will benefit from this convening opportunity which helped build a consensus among important stakeholders.

Another respondent talks of the initial roundtable's success:

"When you have so many actors, you have competing ambitions. The policy roundtable provided a space where people could come to terms with these competitions which are really hindering implementation. Getting senior people aware that it's not enough for us all to keep running down our own small corridors but we all need to come together."

Key to this, for at least one respondent, was getting high-level contacts (including representatives of the National Treasury, the State Department of Devolution, National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), Kenya Meteorological Department (KMD), donors, NGOs, universities and more) into the room, providing an avenue for both policy and non-policy actors to discuss and agree on things in a 'safe space'. The same respondent talked of the importance of having representatives from academia, who are usually 'not in the room', engaging and providing insight that could inform practice.

The roundtable acted as a 'springboard' for catalysing additional workstreams. As stated in the FM's SPRINT 2 document, published following the roundtable, the 'majority of the follow up actions identified by stakeholders of the County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) policy roundtable (October 2018) have been included in the Ada Consortium's reworked workplan and as such, are now funded [and actioned] by SIDA or World Bank'. This speaks to the relevance of the roundtable, reflecting its alignment with existing activities and priorities and allowing the actors and funders already operating in this space to continue with their work. However, this does render attribution of subsequent outcomes difficult, an issue highlighted by some respondents and acknowledged by the FM Results Manager for the Kenya dialogue.

The roundtable elicited demand for additional, more focussed evidence on issues related to CCCF (thus the 'evidence/synthesis of CCCF experience across five pilot counties was commissioned and resulted in the publication 'Delivering climate finance at local level to support adaptation: experiences of county climate change funds in Kenya' (Crick et al. 2019)). During the roundtable, there were discussions around the need to adapt the CCCF pilot to non-Arid and Semi-Arid Land (non-ASAL) counties and since then, Ada Consortium have committed time and resources to implementing this.⁵

Another key issue that was identified and agreed upon at the roundtable was the need to ensure alignment and compatibility between national and county policies and legal frameworks. Especially relevant here was the revised public financial management act which could inhibit the successful roll out of the CCCF mechanism. It was thus agreed that a stocktake exercise was required to fully understand and address this, which later resulted in a review and analysis of the legal framework and of the functionality of investments in public goods to inform development of model policy/legal frameworks, more specifically a model climate change act and model climate change regulations. The delivery of the above (data collection, testing and validation) was funded by D2 under SPRINT 3. Additionally, there was anecdotal reference to SIDA's funding of projects in the Kenya's lake region, which one respondent believes to be a direct result of the initial policy dialogue.

The training has been well received and shows signs of uptake and increased demand for capacity building in climate finance. According to a CoG representative, the first internal training held as part of the consultancies' capacity building efforts in early July 2019 has been successful. The training focussed on communicating best practice and climate financing. An important response to this training is increased demand for training and capacity building internally. Training participants afterwards suggested that they should be held more frequently and for longer than one day. There was also consensus that the issues were relevant for all CoG committees, especially (but not limited to) those which are climate-related. Furthermore, on the back of the training a proposed restructuring of the CoG was sent to its senior management for consideration and a request was received for the training to be repeated for deputy governors. This demonstrates not only that the training was relevant and timely, reflected by increased demand but also that there may be an opportunity for greater vertical integration in the CoG.

⁵ This is not to say this work would definitely not have taken place without the roundtable, but for some respondents, the convening of different actors at that point in time was instrumental in identifying this priority agenda.

The short time frame was a barrier to achieving a stronger response. The short time frame for this work combined with the phased approach meant that by the time actionable activities were identified and pursued, the time to implement them was short. This will have undoubtedly had an effect on the responses generated by the investments. In terms of sustainability, one respondent suggests that starting earlier (or in the same vein, implementing longer) would have encouraged further uptake of the workstreams pursued under D2:

"policy work takes a very long time investment.
Had they begun early, someone could have
more easily taken it up, either another donor or
DFID...That would have been useful."

Overall, the responses to the D2 policy dialogue work thus far are promising. Stakeholders agree that the initial roundtable acted as an important convening opportunity which was well attended and acted as a springboard for subsequent workflows around the CCCF mechanism. In particular, the training held by the D2-funded consultants in July appears to have increased the interest in and demand for such capacity building work and by proxy, the use of evidence in policy implementation. With more time for implementation, it is likely that there would have been more and stronger responses.

3.4 Policy influence potential

The findings in this section seek to answer the question:

Are there signs of behavioural change in line
with the proposed change strategy? Were there
any unintended changes observed?

The 'behavioural' change we are ultimately interested in here is policy change. There is little evidence of policy change directly related to the Component D2 work in Kenya. As outlined in Table 3 which plots Kenya D2 work against the three types of policy change described in section 2.2, it is difficult and perhaps too early to identify changes attributable to D2 investments but there are some promising signs of potential change.

Table 3. Signs of Policy Change in Kenya

POLICY CHANGE TYPE	SIGNS SEEN IN KENYA?
<p>Framing debates and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge.</p>	<p>In terms of framing debates, D2 in Kenya did not seek to frame debates or draw attention to new issues. Instead, efforts were focussed on supporting an already established policy initiative looking to bring about a policy change, i.e. the national scale out of decentralised climate financing through the CCCF mechanism. In this sense, this 'framing debates' type of policy change does not directly correlate with the Results Manager's ambition for policy change in Kenya. That said, the internal training conducted so far with the CoG has drawn the attention of its staff to the importance of different sources of climate financing and its challenges. If this continues, it is possible that the intervention will contribute to more informed debates on climate change in Kenya in the future.</p>
	
<p>Influencing behaviour change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation.</p>	<p>As for influencing behaviour change of policy and non-policy actors, the CoG capacity building work and the support to Ada Consortium are both intended to encourage the effective implementation of the CCCF scale out, including capacity building and the use of evidence in doing so. Though it is too early to say whether this has been achieved, there are some signs of increased demand for sharing of evidence within CoG following the D2-funded internal training (see section 3.3). This indicates buy-in from policy actors not necessarily directly linked to the CCCF scale out. If the training is scaled out to reach those expressing interest (and further), it is likely that the demand and use of climate finance-related evidence in future policy work will increase. Additionally, according to the FM there is a 'sense' that government is taking ownership of mainstreaming climate change and the CCCF scale out (REF Q18) with others also claiming that the "Government of Kenya is committed to expanding and institutionalising the [CCCF] approach nationwide" (Crick et al. 2019). However, it has not been possible to directly evidence this, nor D2's contribution to it, as part of this Deep Dive.</p>
	
<p>Legislative change, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.</p>	<p>Finally, there is so far no evidence of legislative change that is directly attributable to D2 in Kenya. The review of legal frameworks conducted under D2 SPRINT 3 have the potential to pave the way for legislative change or alignment between county and national level change. If national and subnational policy and legal frameworks are streamlined, the CCCF mechanism is successfully rolled out and integrated into legislation with inputs from the blueprint for CCU operationalisation, D2's support will have contributed to the progression towards these legislative changes. However, the degree of that contribution will be difficult to determine given the range of ongoing complementary activities and because technically the D2 work would not have brought about this change, but it was designed to contribute towards it.</p>
	

3.5 Sustainability of the policy dialogue process

The findings in this section seek to answer the question:

How sustainable/scalable are these changes likely to be beyond Component D funding?

The sustainability of results is highly dependent on continued buy-in from stakeholders as well as other ongoing processes associated with Kenya's devolution. The success of the D2-funded consultancies depends on how CoG take forward the recommendations, training and outputs, and whether they can secure additional funding and the human capacity/resource required to take them on board. The outputs produced by the consultants – e.g. blueprint for the operationalisation of the CCUs and knowledge products – are envisioned to encourage and maintain momentum of the CCCF scale out within both CoG and Ada Consortium. This, of course, is dependent on the quality of the final products and the buy-in of their intended audiences.

The original desired outcome was for CoG to create full-time positions to keep the consultants in-house and lack of resources to do so was flagged as a risk in FM documentation. A few respondents concur that there is currently insufficient funding to make this happen. However, there is a sense among several respondents that the work conducted under D2 is both sustainable and scalable given that there is buy-in from all levels (counties, national government and donors) and it can be easily picked up by future funding bodies.

"What they've done is good work that a strategic leader would [look at and] think 'this is work that I can't leave'. It can produce long term results. It's been packaged well."

The D2 investment is supporting the alignment of the CoG with the requirements of potential external funding sources. World Bank's Kenya Accountable Development Programme (KADP) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) have both recently identified the CoG as a potential implementing agency. This means the D2 work on strengthening CoG capacity and achieving the successful scale out of the CCCF mechanism may improve CoG's ability to access and manage such global climate finance flows. Furthermore, it is envisioned by a CoG representative that when such funding does reach CoG, some of it will be used to retain the two consultants embedded during D2 to continue their training and strategic activities. Relatedly, it is hoped by the FM that SIDA may pick up the funding of additional follow-on work and conversations towards this are underway.

Additional roundtables would have helped ensure sustainability of stakeholder engagement and alignment around the CCCF mechanism scale out. A few respondents talk about the need for additional roundtable meetings to ensure the sustainability of the approach. It is seen by certain stakeholders as a missed opportunity to not have set these up as an ongoing process. The first (and only) roundtable was judged to be successful and it seemed that those who were not engaged following the roundtable were unaware of its outcomes but still had appetite for further roundtables. In terms of the ongoing CCCF scale out process, one respondent talks of how the roundtable approach would be helpful to maintain:

"Perhaps at the end of the process, my hope would be that CoG and CCD [Climate Change Directorate] could figure out how to continue the roundtable process...It would be very helpful to have roundtables periodically to move things forward."

According to the FM, the idea of another roundtable was discussed with IIED and Ada Consortium, who were provisionally keen to consider further roundtables but were very clear that this would need to be planned for after July/August, in the context of the new financial/planning year in Kenya. "The focus could be: 1) establishing links between the National Climate Fund and the County Climate Change Funds to enable the former to fund the latter; or 2) policy dialogues at the regional blocs level related to CCCF issues" (FM, personal communication).

DFID Kenya requested an internal workshop be held with the FM at the end of D2 implementation in order for them to identify activities and work which they could pick up and sustain. Having the country office's engagement and buy-in in this way further demonstrates the relevance of the work and the interest it has generated. However, at the time of writing (August 2019) these discussions had not been taken further, which the FM attributes to competing priorities and capacity constraints around climate change within the High Commission. These capacity constraints at DFID Kenya are typified by the lack of climate change advisor during the D2 implementation period and the FM's key contact therefore coming from the governance cadre instead. Though it is clear that DFID Kenya has been keen to endorse the D2 work, it could be argued that more committed engagement, ideally from a climate change advisor with capacity to hold the relationships built through D2, would have better facilitated future uptake of relevant workstreams.

In sum, the risk of losing momentum once BRACED-X is complete is low because, as highlighted throughout the report, the appetite for this policy action was not created by the FM, but was already present.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Deep Dive report sought to provide an account of the work conducted by the BRACED FM in Kenya under Component D2. Based on fieldwork, research and the MLE team's evaluative judgement, this section concludes with an overview of findings accompanied with recommendations for similar future work.

The FM supported an existing policy priority in Kenya to devolve climate change funding and decision making to the subnational, county level. This was identified as a focus through an iterative process involving context and stakeholder analysis and working with local interlocutors familiar with the context.

Recommendation: To ensure the relevance and appropriateness of policy interventions, take time to understand the context and relevant stakeholders prior to implementation, as was done with Kenya D2. This requires additional time and resources which need to be factored into the design and budget of similar policy engagement efforts, in particular when not directly building on any existing groundwork laid by projects or partner.

The work centred around the ongoing process of scaling up the County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) mechanism across Kenya, to devolve further funding through it to meet the ambitions of Kenya's National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), working with existing actors who were advocating for this i.e. Adaptation Consortium (Ada Consortium) and Kenya's Council of Governors (CoG). This was deemed an important and relevant focus area by stakeholders given its political salience at the time of intervention.

Recommendation: Where possible, consider aligning with political priorities to ensure buy-in and sustainability of policy work, particularly in short implementation windows as was the case in Kenya D2. In Kenya, the CCCF mechanism scale out is an ongoing process which requires further and consistent funding and was sufficiently well aligned with the broader desired climate adaptation and resilience outcomes of the Component D2 work. Where this is not the case, work is likely to take longer and target outcomes may need to be adjusted accordingly so that the focus is initially on laying groundwork and seizing strategic opportunities as they arise.

There is some evidence to suggest that the right DFID country office staff did not have sufficient capacity (time) to actively participate and, where needed, guide the D2 policy process.

Recommendation: Ensuring that there is minimum awareness of policy engagement work amongst DFID country office staff is essential. Alignment with DFID priorities in the country context is also desirable and requires that relevant country office staff (in this case climate change advisors) are engaged in the process from the beginning. Understanding the availability and capacity of the country staff and tailoring communications and expectations accordingly is one way of ensuring buy-in at critical points if not throughout.

Tactics used by the FM team included convening a policy roundtable; building capacity within key agencies including the CoG and; funding research in support of the policy goal. Overall, this support and facilitation was found by the stakeholders involved to have been valuable, well aligned and timely.

Recommendation: When conducting policy work in a short time frame employ a range of complementary tactics, i.e. convening, capacity building and knowledge creation, to ensure coverage and encourage better results. These may not necessarily be executed in sequence but are likely to begin with convening to better understand policy problems and explore potential solutions before other tactics are deployed.

The roundtable was well attended by a diverse set of stakeholders that might not normally convene on this issue e.g. academia and national treasury. There is evidence to suggest that the work elicited demand for more roundtable discussions, further research into how best to roll out CCCF work and increased capacity at the county level to manage and effectively use decentralised climate funds. The activities also appear to have catalysed interest in conducting further roundtables.

Recommendation: When interest and buy-in for convening opportunities (such as roundtables) are present, commit resources to setting them up as an ongoing process to ensure sustainability beyond implementation. In Kenya, given the large number of players, there remains a need for coordination and regular touchpoints between actors (local stakeholders and donors) involved in the CCCF scale out. This may involve focussing on systems and processes for convening or establishing a secretariat which can be maintained. It could also require capacity building to enable actors to continue convening or, for example, a virtual platform to sustain dialogue.

The iterative approach – known as the SPRINT cycles – allowed priorities and activities to surface 'organically' and flexibly, meaning the Results Manager was able to respond to demand and opportunity as it emerged. However, implementation was end-loaded after a longer than anticipated scoping phase. Another limitation to this flexible approach was the level of documentation required to be completed by the FM Results Managers to support their decision making and the release of funds for project activities. There is no evidence that this resulted in missed opportunities.

Recommendation: A 12-month implementation period for policy work does not align well with the SPRINT cycle approach. More time is needed to effectively identify priorities, run with them and change direction as the approach determines. If such an approach is to be taken within such a tight time frame, reduce the burden of strict documentation requirements where possible.

Ultimately, the Component D2 work may have contributed to the eventual roll out across all counties of the CCCF mechanism but the extent of that contribution is unknown. This is mainly due to the crowdedness of this space, with a high number of stakeholders contributing to the process in some way. One of the major limiting factors in terms of identifying longer term policy change outcomes was time, with a compressed 12-month implementation period. There is a possibility of progress continuing after the FM ceases activities because the work was conducted by local actors. However, at this stage it is impossible to be sure of this.

Recommendation: When feeding into pre-existing political processes with a funding history from different sources, be aware that it will be difficult to identify attribution (and perhaps even contribution) to subsequent outcomes. More time and resources are required to be able to identify, with confidence, contribution to policy outcomes using methods such as contribution analysis or process tracing. In this particular case, the outcomes were not fully established so this investment may not have represented good Value for Money.

There is some indication that the capacity building work with the Council of Governors has placed them in an improved position to access global climate finance as an implementing entity for World Bank and Green Climate Fund investment.

Recommendation: As was done in Kenya, ensuring short-term policy interventions align with the priorities of other donors increases the likelihood of sustained progress towards desired policy change outcomes. If the funding window is limited and known in advance, then it is important to have a clear exit or sustainability strategy at the outset which includes but is not limited to new funding streams.

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
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Annex 1: D2 Kenya Original Theory of Change

D2: KENYA TOC



D2: KENYA

KENYA D2 MISSION STATEMENT: To complement efforts by other actors to strengthen and fast-track the building of capacity of the Government of Kenya to drive the scaling out of the County Climate Change Fund process to additional counties.			
STAKEHOLDERS	Government of Kenya	Adaptation Consortium	Donors
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Council of Governors • National Drought Management Authority • Climate Change Directorate • National Environment Authority • Ministry of Environment and Forestry • County Governments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IIED • NDMA • SIDA • Kenya Meteorological Department • Christian Aid • Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF) and others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID-funded DDP project led by DAI • SIDA • World Bank
SHORT TERM GOALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better understand how the CCCF mechanism works at the county level • Learn from the five ASAL counties already implementing CCCF to understand how it can work to benefit communities and counties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a quality assurance system to ensure CCCFs have beneficial impacts for the community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate at CCCF policy dialogue and share relevant learning experience
MEDIUM TERM GOALS	<p>Strengthen the capacity of government to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drive the formulation of the scale out strategy for the CCCF mechanism • (For the CCD and CoG) coordinate more effectively between national and county governments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build-up the capacity of government and support the implementation of the CCCF across Kenya, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Break down barriers to complement each other's initiatives and silo-ed ways of working
LONG TERM GOALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drive the climate change agenda to ensure its integration into other sectors and initiatives (the Big 4 Agenda) • Guide and coordinate all activities/ projects/ interventions around climate change adaptation and mitigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help to adjust the CCCF to different contexts and support government in its role to scale it out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build-up close relationship with CCD, which coordinates all donor activities and ensures complementarity
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS & CHALLENGES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good entry point through and long-term relationship with Ada Consortium • There is potential for tension and conflict between NEMA and the CCD driven by interests and stakes • Too little commitment from national government to operationalise the National Climate Change Council 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well known and liked with excellent linkages to influential stakeholders • Too much demand from County Governments to support the establishment of CCCF mechanism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional financial resources dedicated to supporting the devolved government agenda and adaptation activities • Weak coordination amongst donors and implementing agencies • Projectised way of thinking and working is not aligned with the government's budget cycle

Annex 2: FM D2 START Document Template



BRACED-X
START

TEMPLATE A: [COUNTRY]

FM RESULTS LEAD		
MAIN DFID CONTACTS		
BRACED PROJECT IN COUNTRY		
OTHER RELEVANT DFID PROGRAMMES IN COUNTRY		
OTHER PROJECTS IN THE COUNTRY		
LAST UPDATE		
INITIAL ROUNDTABLE STAKEHOLDERS		
FM APPROVAL	[PERSON]	[DATE]
DFID APPROVAL		

PART 1. CONTEXT

The aim of Component D2 is to influence national, regional and global resilience policies. The summary below includes a brief outline of the rationale for choosing X as a D2 country, information on the country context and DFID in-country priorities.

WHAT IS THE COUNTRY CONTEXT?

*[This should be used to provide the **framing** and **context analysis** for your dialogue. You should provide details on political context, processes/ changes taking place in the space in which the BRACED project works/ areas to be explored by the dialogue – consider including discussion of/ details on key government players, donor space, relevant legislation/ policy processes, main stakeholders]*

WHAT ARE DFID'S RESILIENCE PRIORITIES?

*[Provide high level summary of **DFID's priorities** – complete from published literature, discussions with central team, in country staff and feedback from project (where they've already engaged been engaging with DFID in country)]*

WHAT ARE THE KEY BRACED LESSONS IN COUNTRY?

*[Summary of findings and learning from **BRACED interventions** – complete from discussions with projects, project documentation, final evaluation, KM etc.]*

PART 2. SCOPING

WHAT SCOPING WORK HAS BEEN DONE?

[Provide summary of info, intel, discussions you've done as part of your scoping work including what was discussed – include information from meetings with key stakeholders, scoping visits in country, desk-based research e.g. relevant KM literature etc.]

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL FOR A BRACED DIALOGUE?

*[From your initial scoping conversations, research, knowledge of BRACED lessons learned and DFID priorities provide some key areas that could be explored as part of your dialogue process – what the **opportunities** are, what **policy questions** you're looking to tackle, what **barriers** need addressing, **thematic** areas etc.]*

WHAT MIGHT SUCCESS LOOK LIKE?

[Based on your initial ideas on dialogue direction provide a sense of what it is the dialogue is looking to influence, change and achieve (bearing in mind that the exact direction/ focus may not emerge until further discussions or meetings e.g. roundtable(s) with key stakeholders. Make sure these are realistic and feasible in terms of the country context and timescales available]

*[This could be approached through using KM's "dimensions of technically sound and politically feasible policy change – **impact, scale, sustainability and feasibility**]*

WHAT ARE THE KEY RISKS TO SUCCESS?

[Include any challenges or risks you may face as part of your specific dialogue – you should aim for these to be specific to the context in which you're working]

SHOULD WE PROCEED WITH A DIALOGUE?

IS THERE THE BUY-IN FROM STAKEHOLDERS TO SUPPORT A DIALOGUE?	YES / MAYBE/ NO
IS THE DFID COUNTRY OFFICE / ADVISER SUPPORTIVE OF A DIALOGUE?	YES / MAYBE/ NO
WILL DFID BE ABLE TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE DIALOGUE?	YES / MAYBE/ NO
SHOULD WE PROCEED WITH THE DIALOGUE	YES / MAYBE/ NO

*[From your experience to date use above box to indicate the **level of buy-in, support and participation** you are expecting to receive from your key stakeholders (incl. DFID) and provide a summary of any concerns you may have or anything you'll have to manage e.g. limited DFID in country capacity]*

WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS?

*[Provide some bullets on your **next steps** i.e. D2 visit, design first sprint which will aims to do XYZ, convening roundtable, follow up discussions with X,Y,Z – preferably with **timescales**]*

FURTHER READING

*[Include **bibliography** of resources that (1) you've drawn on to complete this form (2) have informed your thinking and (3) should be drawn on/ referred to as part of your dialogue]*

Annex 3: FM D2 SPRINT Document Template

 BRACED-X SPRINT	
TEMPLATE B: [INSERT COUNTRY]	
FM RESULTS LEAD	
SPRINT CYCLE NUMBER	
ESTIMATED DURATION OF SPRINT CYCLE	
ESTIMATED TOTAL BUDGET	
PART 1 APPROVAL	
PART 2 APPROVAL	

PART 1 : BEFORE SPRINT

WHAT THE SPRINT CYCLE WILL DO?

[This should include an overarching/ high-level summary of what the SPRINT is looking to do and what will be delivered]

WHY THIS SPRINT CYCLE IS NEEDED? i.e. justification

[This should detail why the SPRINT is needed and how it is situated in the overall policy dialogue for your country e.g. it should refer back to/ link to earlier SPRINTS, what barriers is it trying to overcome, what perceptions is it trying to change etc.]

ESTIMATED BUDGET FOR SPRINT			
Activity	Description	Resources	Cost
<i>e.g. Roundtable/ stakeholder engagement</i>	<i>High level description of the activity and any associated deliverables</i>	<i>Description of resources required to deliver the activity e.g. 50 days of international consultant (should be high-level and not reference names of individuals/ organisations)</i>	<i>Estimated cost</i>
Total budget			XX +/- 20%

RISKS

*[Include risks box if there are any **specific risks** to delivering this specific **SPRINT** e.g. availability of stakeholders, conflicting priorities between key roundtable participant etc. – no need to repeat overarching risks for whole dialogue from START document]*

WHAT WOULD A GOOD OUTCOME LOOK LIKE?

*[What are you hoping to **achieve** though the SPRINT? Needs to be **SPRINT specific** and not a repeat of the high-level objectives is included in the equivalent box in your START document but should feed into and be a building-block to get you to the overarching aim (how is this SPRINT helping to get you from A to B)]*

HOW WILL THE SPRINT CYCLE BE ASSESSED?

*[Should include information on how you're planning to assess this SPRINT, who you'll be looking to get **feedback** from and also how you'll engage with the KM on **After Action Reviews** and feed **learning** into the other dialogues]*

PART 2: AFTER SPRINT

This should form part of your **After Action Review** with your KM M&E lead. On completion of a SPRINT you should complete the following 4 questions and use these to frame your AAR with the KM. Following this meeting update this document (if required) and get approval from FM Team Leader.

WHAT WAS SUPPORTED TO HAPPEN?

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?

WHY WERE THESE DIFFERENCES?

WHAT DID WE LEARN?

Annex 3: FM D2 Quarterly Progress Report template

D2		COUNTRY	
Stakeholders		Other partners	
<small>* names in orange denote an addition from the previous quarter</small>			
FINANCIAL SUMMARY			
BUDGET ENVELOPE			£0.00
TOTAL ALLOCATED FUNDS		<i>SPRINT NUMBER</i>	
TOTAL PAYMENTS TO DATE		<i>SPRINT NUMBER</i>	
CONTINUE / STOP			
STATUS OF DIALOGUE			
SCOPING ▶ SURFACING ▶ EXPLORING ▶ ENABLING			
ACTIVITIES COMPLETED SINCE LAST REVIEW			
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS OR AREAS OF PROGRESS			
KEY CHALLENGES OR BARRIERS TO PROGRESS			
NEXT STEPS AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES/ENTRY POINTS FOR NEXT QUARTER (action plan)			

BRACED aims to build the resilience of more than 5 million vulnerable people against climate extremes and disasters. It does so through a three year, UK Government funded programme, which supports 108 organisations, working in 15 consortiums, across 13 countries in East Africa, the Sahel and Southeast Asia. Uniquely, BRACED also has a Knowledge Manager consortium.

The Knowledge Manager consortium is led by the Overseas Development Institute and includes the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, ENDA Energie, ITAD, Thompson Reuters Foundation and the University of Nairobi.

The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of BRACED, its partners or donor.

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The BRACED Knowledge Manager generates evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and the wider resilience community. It gathers robust evidence of what works to strengthen resilience to climate extremes and disasters, and initiates and supports processes to ensure that evidence is put into use in policy and programmes. The Knowledge Manager also fosters partnerships to amplify the impact of new evidence and learning, in order to significantly improve levels of resilience in poor and vulnerable countries and communities around the world.

This paper has been awarded with the BRACED Knowledge Manager's SILVER Accreditation. The purpose of Gold and Silver Accreditation is to set apart knowledge and evidence that significantly advances understanding of what it takes to build resilience to climate and disaster extremes. To be awarded, publications are reviewed by an Accreditation Board whose aim is to identify BRACED funded products that significantly advance knowledge, thinking or practice.

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