NATIONAL-LEVEL POLICY ENGAGEMENT UNDER BRACED

LESSONS FROM KENYA, MALI AND NEPAL

BRACED
KNOWLEDGE MANAGER

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Acronyms

ADA Consortium	Adaptation Consortium
AEC-FNCCI	Agro Enterprise Centre of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry
AFL	Acting For Life (Mali)
AIIM	Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix
ANICT	National Agency for Territorial Collective Investments (Mali)
ASHA	Adaptation for Smallholders in Hilly Areas (Nepal)
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters
BRACED-X	Extension of the BRACED programme
CCCF	County Climate Change Fund (Kenya)
CoG	Council of Governors (Kenya)
CPA	Commercial Pocket Approach (Nepal)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DCF	Decentralising Climate Funds (Mali)
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DGCT	General Directorate of Territorial Communities (Mali)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EWS-RU	Local Early Warning System
FM	Fund Manager
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GIZ	German Development Corporation
iDE Nepal	International Development Enterprises Nepal
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
KM	Knowledge Manager
LM	Livestock Mobility (Mali)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MLE	Monitoring, Learning & Evaluation
MoFE	Ministry of Forests and Environment (Nepal)
NAP	National Adaptation Plan (Kenya)
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan (Kenya)
NCCSP	Nepal Climate Change Support Programme
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority (Kenya)
NEF	Near East Foundation (Mali)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PROGRESS	Programme for Resilient Systems (Kenya)
RM	Results Manager
SUR1M	Scaling-Up Resilience to Climate Extremes for over 1 Million People in the Niger River Basin (Mali)
ToC	Theory of Change
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
WAPC	Ward Adaptation Planning Committee (Kenya)
WHH	Welthungerhilfe
WYL	Wati Yelema Labenw (Mali)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Since 2015, the UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme has worked to build sustainable and scalable resilience for climate-vulnerable communities across the Sahel, East Africa and Asia. At the end of 2017, to build on the results already delivered, the Programme was further extended and an additional policy engagement component was commissioned – Component D. This was further split into three parts – local-level work led by implementing partners (IPs) (D1), national-level policy engagement work (D2) and international policy-focussed activities (D3).

Component D2 work was led by the BRACED Fund Manager (FM), with results managers (RMs) assigned to establish and facilitate a process in the following six countries: Nepal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Senegal and Chad. As stated by the FM: 'The aim of the D2 process is to consolidate evidence and lessons learned from the BRACED experience in terms of what builds resilience and use this to influence policy making at the national level.'

Recognising that policy change processes are complex and emergent, and can take significant time, an adaptive and flexible approach to Component D2 was taken – that is, rather than delivering through a traditional project work plan, budget and logical framework ('logframe') approach, Component D2 was designed to be more organic and stakeholder-driven.

The main purpose of this report is to summarise, compare and contrast the main findings from three country-level 'deep dive' case studies in Kenya, Mali and Nepal conducted by the BRACED Knowledge Manager (KM). As well as presenting the key findings, we also offer more summative lessons drawing from all three studies in an attempt to answer the key learning question: **To what extent, how and in which circumstances did the Component D2 (policy dialogue) investment modality deliver (steps towards) policy change?**

Methodology

For the proposes of this work we adopt a broad definition of policy change that could be observed from the policy dialogues:

1. **Framing debates** and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge.
2. **Influencing behaviour** change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation.
3. **Legislative change**, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.

The primary data was collected during three in-country 'deep dives' conducted between May and June 2019. These mainly comprised face-to-face key informant interviews (KIIs) but was augmented by remote interviews conducted in advance of and after the in-country work. The data collection for the three deep dives involved the following:

- A total of 45 interviews (remotely and face-to-face interviews with key respondents involved in the policy dialogue process and working closely with the RMs and wider climate-change and governance policy experts).
- Regular calls between the Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation (MLE) team and the RMs throughout the Component D2 design and implementation.
- Attendance at policy dialogue meetings in Nairobi.
- Participation in quarterly FM and DFID meetings to update about progress on Component D2.
- Review of 80 project documents and wider literature (agenda, notes and feedback from the policy-dialogue meetings); the Component D2 Manual and an After-Action Review.

Key findings

Based on our analysis, we have been able to identify six main approaches or tactics, employed by the FM teams to establish, develop and maintain the policy dialogues in one or more countries and that are aligned with an adaptive approach to activity design and implementation. These are:

1. **Convening:** Assembling identified stakeholders and actors with a potential interest in the policy issue or issues being considered. This was often described as a roundtable.
2. **Capacity building:** In some cases, the FM identified consultants or experts to be seconded into organisations or directly build the expertise of target stakeholders.
3. **Research:** Collating and packaging existing evidence or commissioning new research focussed on the policy problem or solution identified.
4. **Demonstration:** Using existing examples of policy solutions to demonstrate value and efficacy to target policy actors.
5. **Knowledge transfer:** Transferring knowledge and skills on a focus topic between actors.
6. **Building on BRACED policy work:** Linking to existing policy work led by BRACED-X IPs under Component D1.

Based on interviews with key informants for the three deep dives, we have identified a set of five common responses that were observed in one or more of the three countries. These are:

1. **Incrseased interest and participation in the policy dialogue process:** This was demonstrated through regular participation at roundtables by the same people and/or organisations, the 'right' or targeted people being at those meetings, or an increased membership or presence at meeting.
2. **Demand for evidence and/or knowledge:** In some cases, activities stimulated increased demand for more information about the proposed policy solution or problem.
3. **Perceived usefulness of activity** (meeting; roundtable; demonstration): There was evidence from key informants that they found the roundtable, meeting or demonstration visit useful in learning more about the solution or problem being addressed.
4. **Uptake of evidence-based solution to policy problem:** There are instances when stakeholders signalled intent to use the proposed solution.
5. **Consensus built:** In some cases, consensus was built around a policy problem or solution where it had previously not existed.

Lessons

1. **There is little evidence of policy change towards intended goals but this should not be viewed as a failure overall**

The data collected for this learning exercise has not revealed any contribution towards policy change in the three countries. However, this does not mean the Programme should be considered a failure overall – rather that there has been insufficient time for the effects of the work to emerge. Evidence indicates a set of responses from policy stakeholders that could represent stepping-stones towards more recognisable changes in behaviours, knowledge and attitudes, elicited by the activities and tactics employed by RMs. There is also evidence that points to the potential for policy changes in the future, building on the foundational work completed in the past 15 months, but this is impossible to confirm with any certainty.

2. **The timeframe for implementation was too short to expect concrete policy change – but good foundations were laid**

The time planned for the policy dialogues and the BRACED extension was probably too short to start to see signs of behavioural change, however, it is possible that the policy dialogues in the three countries have laid a good foundation that can be built on by other initiatives. The short timeframe was always recognised as a potential constraint and to some extent there was as much interest in testing the model – that is, using an adaptive approach – as there was in delivering policy results. However, determining whether a model works requires some assessment of the results it has delivered and therefore it is difficult to assess whether the model has worked and should be replicated. It is possibly unrealistic to expect that even if the policy influencing work under BRACED had started at the same time as implementation, there would have been observable, significant and attributable policy change achieved.

3. **Overall, the policy dialogue process was adaptively managed when considered against accepted good practice**

While this is true, it is difficult to determine whether this approach was effective and impossible to say how it compares with other non-adaptive approaches in terms of delivering results. There were also some issues that may have limited the flexibility of the process, for example the level of documentation required within the FM to track the process, enable decisions and release funds. While the FM deemed this not overly detrimental to the process overall (e.g. no opportunities were missed a result), some RMs felt a more streamlined process would have helped them be more agile.

4. **The role of the facilitator may have been compromised by location and their position in the wider policy system**

The need to have a knowledgeable and credible individual or organisation leading policy engagement work was recognised in the design process. Identifying actors with the right contextual understating, connections and convening power was a priority for the RMs, who saw themselves as facilitators rather than implementers. Despite hiring local interlocuters and regular in-country visits by RMs, there was an absence of consistent representation for the work in country. Some respondents saw this as a limitation to progress.

5. **The level of engagement and oversight from DFID seemed to strike an appropriate balance**

As the donor, DFID offered a good level of flexibility and demonstrated a higher-than-usual level of risk tolerance when commissioning Component D, and it remained engaged at key decision points throughout the process. There may have been some tension between the centrally managed nature of the work and the Country Office's engagement and prioritisation, which may have limited the enabling environment somewhat.

6. **Some of the BRACED-X theory of change assumptions relating to Component D2 held; others did not and some were untestable**

Central to both the BRACED and BRACED-X programmatic theory of change (ToC) was the assumption that both a 'bottom-up' and a 'top-down' approach would be required to deliver sustainable and transformational change. This rested on the assumption that the sub-national project-level work would be able to demonstrate the effectiveness of resilience work that could be used as a platform for national-level engagement and dialogue towards creating a more conducive policy environment. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to test this assumption fully through the Component D2 work because not all Component D2 work used project evidence and experience as the basis for engaging nationally. Where this was most clearly the case, in Nepal, there was no clear sign of policy change as a result.

1. INTRODUCTION

This section provides a brief introduction to the wider Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme, BRACED-X (its extension), Component D and Component D2. Finally, the section outlines the scope and focus of this report.

1.1 What is BRACED?

Since 2015, the UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded BRACED programme has worked to build sustainable and scalable resilience for climate-vulnerable communities across the Sahel, East Africa and Asia. Through funding from DFID, BRACED has awarded grants to 15 consortia projects to implement activities over a three-year period to collectively build the resilience of 5 million climate-vulnerable people. Nine projects were further awarded an extension in late 2017 to continue working until mid-2019.

A Fund Manager (FM) represented by KPMG has been responsible for overseeing the transfer of funds and the delivery of all BRACED projects as well as associated sub-annual and annual monitoring. The BRACED Knowledge Manager (KM) has been led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), in a consortium with Asia Disaster Preparedness Center, Enda Energie, Itad, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre and Thomson Reuters Foundation. The KM leads the monitoring, evaluation and research activities of the BRACED programme.

Towards the end of 2017, an assessment of the progress and changes achieved by the Programme revealed that there were signs of transformational change as a result of activities at the local level. These went beyond the geographical extent and direct sphere of the project's influence.

These positive results led to a decision by DFID in November 2017 to continue and extend the BRACED programme for 15 months for nine (out of 15) projects. This extension began in January 2018 and project delivery ended in March 2019.

1.2 What is Component D?

The original BRACED design had four main components, which are encapsulated in the theory of change (ToC) (BRACED 2019):

- Component A works at scale through partners to directly build the resilience of people to cope with climate extremes in six countries in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal).
- Component B operates similarly to Component A in target communities vulnerable to climate shocks and stresses in seven countries in East Africa and Asia (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Myanmar, Nepal).
- Component C builds evidence on adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) across the first two components, identifying the policy and institutional changes needed to strengthen resilience.
- Component D aims to develop national and international capability and capacity to respond to climate extremes through strengthening the policy environment for building resilience.

The BRACED ToC hypothesised that these investments – both 'bottom up' and 'top down' – would lead to targeted communities becoming more resilient, and also contribute to a better understanding of what works and what does not work in building climate resilience. Under BRACED, Component D (the 'top-down' approach to supporting national and local government capacity) was not implemented. However, in 2017, under BRACED-X, Component D was commissioned with the aim of: 1) further supporting BRACED-X projects to continue, expand or initiate policy work at sub-national level (Component D1) in five countries; 2) establishing six policy dialogues and influencing processes at the national level in Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Nepal and Senegal, facilitated by the FM (Component D2); and 3) increasing evidence to support national adaptation planning and support to least developed countries to develop long-term strategies (Component D3). Figure 1 summarises each of these three elements of Component D under BRACED-X.

Figure 1: The three elements of Component D under BRACED-X



Source: BRACED (2019)

1.3 Component D2

Component D2 work is led by the FM, with results managers (RMs) assigned to establish and facilitate a process in one or more countries. While this links to much of the work undertaken by BRACED projects in that country under Component D1, it is in some cases complementary, building on existing dialogues, and in others quite separate (as we shall see later in this report).

As stated by the FM: 'The aim of the D2 process is to consolidate evidence and lessons learned from the BRACED experience in terms of what builds resilience and use this to influence policy making at the national level.' (BRACED 2019)

Recognising that policy change processes are complex and emergent and can take significant time, DFID proposed using an adaptive and flexible approach to Component D2 – that is, rather than delivering through a traditional project work plan, budget and logical framework ('logframe') approach, Component D2 was designed to be more organic and stakeholder-driven (BRACED 2019). The response by the FM was to design an adaptive approach to policy dialogues drawing from good practice and using so-called Sprint Cycles to design, test, reflect and adapt their activities and work plans in each country (more on this in Section 4.2).[1]

1 See DFID LearnAdapt, Things to Try flyer. 'Build–measure–learn approach: Sprints and reflection' [Shortened reference in fullnote + Full reference to be added in References section at the end.]

In so doing, DFID did not require a fixed policy outcome to be predefined and therefore adopted a higher risk tolerance for potential failure. This also recognised the severe limitations on time, with only 15 months to conduct policy-influencing work, thus reporting against specific logframe and outcome indicators was not required. DFID was also very keen to learn not only what had happened as a result of this approach but also about the efficacy of the approach itself.

To support this, the BRACED KM was asked to conduct a learning exercise alongside the FM. This was designed not to evaluate results per se but to support learning about the pathways towards policy change, the systems and processes established to support this and any responses or signals of behaviour change from actors in the policy spheres in each country. This report is the result of that work.

1.4 Purpose and scope of this report

The main purpose of this report is to summarise, compare and contrast the main findings from three country-level 'deep dive' case studies in Kenya, Mali and Nepal. As well as presenting the key findings, we also offer more summative lessons drawing from all three studies in an attempt to answer the key question:

To what extent, how and in which circumstances did the Component D2 (policy dialogue) investment modality deliver (steps towards) policy change?

We reflect on what we have learnt from the three different country contexts and offer generalised lessons and recommendations for future work in this area. The main focus is on learning for DFID and other donors or implementers that may consider embarking on policy engagement and influencing work using an adaptive approach.

1. Importantly, we do not cover all six countries in which BRACED X Component D2 work took place, for three main reasons:

2. Through the course of the 15 months from start-up to conducting the learning exercise, it became clear that, while there is documentation associated with each country produced by the FM, this is not sufficient to offer answers to each of the learning questions without additional primary data collection.

3. Time and budget constraints did not allow for 'deep dive' primary research in all six countries; therefore, a decision was taken with DFID to focus on three of six countries.

The three countries were identified as those in which most progress had been made, thus where the weight of the evidence would lie. This is not to say that in the other three countries (Chad, Ethiopia and Senegal) some progress had not been made, but it was not as great as in the three selected countries. This was a pragmatic decision, but the choice also provides a good range of geographical, political and intervention contexts.

1.5 Navigating this report

The next section (Section 2) briefly describes the methodology. Section 3 summarises the key findings from each country organised by learning question and offers some further insight into what these results mean. Section 4 draws together some generalisable lessons and Section 5 provides a set of recommendations for those considering commissioning or implementing similar work.

2. METHODOLOGY

Here we briefly describe the methods used across all three country 'deep dive' case studies with more detail found in the full monitoring, learning & evaluation (MLE) design document[2] and each of the country-level papers.[3]

2.1 Learning questions

The learning exercise was structured around a key DFID question regarding investment in policy dialogues of BRACED Component D2 with sub-questions to unpack and analyse the policy dialogue processes. The overarching question that we set out to answer is:

To what extent, how and in which circumstances did the Component D2 (policy dialogue) investment modality deliver (steps towards) policy change?

To answer this question, we identified five learning questions,[4] with a short form of their focus in parentheses:

2 See BRACED (2018).

3 Pellini (2019) (Nepal); Smith (2019); Correa (2019) (Mali).

4 Originally called Key Evaluation Questions but with a shift in emphasis to learning, revised accordingly here.

1. What change strategies have been designed to influence policy and capabilities at the country level? How appropriate and relevant are these strategies? (Sense of direction)
2. What internal systems have been put in place to design, adapt and iterate strategies and plans of action to address changes in context and circumstances? What changes have occurred as a result and why? (Operational effectiveness of adaptive approach)
3. What have been the responses to the policy dialogue (e.g. increased awareness of research and evidence, including from BRACED; demand for new or more evidence; etc.)? (Effectiveness of the activities)
4. Are there signs of behavioural change in line with the proposed change strategy? Were there any unintended changes observed? (Overall effectiveness/outcome level change)
5. How sustainable/scalable are these changes likely to be beyond the end of funding in July 2019? (Sustainability)

2.2 What we mean by policy change

We adopt a broad definition of policy change for the policy dialogues. The contexts in which the policy dialogues have been designed is constantly evolving. As a result, it is important to refer to the definition of policy changes developed by Keck and Sikkink[5], who identified different types of policy change to which a policy engagement initiative can contribute (see also BRACED 2018):

Framing debates and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge.

Influencing behaviour change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation.

Legislative change, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.

5 Keck and Sikkink (1998). Transnational advocacy networks in the movement society

2.3 Data collection

The primary data was collected during three in-country 'deep dive' case studies conducted between May and June 2019. These mainly comprised face-to-face key informant interviews (KIIs) but was augmented by remote interviews conducted in advance of and after the in-country work. In addition, an ongoing dialogue was held between the FM's RMs responsible for each country process through regular calls to discuss progress, plans (and changes in plans) and participation in the policy dialogue by national stakeholders.

The data collection for the three 'deep dive' case studies involved the following:

- A total of 45 interviews (remotely and face-to-face interviews with key respondents involved in the policy dialogue process and working closely with the RMs and experts of the broad climate change and governance policy context in the three countries).
- Regular calls between the MLE team and the RMs throughout the Component D2 design and implementation;
- Attendance at policy-dialogue meetings in Nairobi.
- Participation in quarterly FM and DFID meetings to update about progress on Component D2.
- Review of 80 project documents and wider literature (e.g. FM's START documents, Sprint Cycle documents, quarterly progress reports, ToC, stakeholders' maps, etc.); agenda, notes and feedback from the policy dialogue meetings; the Component D2 Manual (BRACED 2019); and an After-Action Review conducted with the RM for Nepal in October 2018.

Table 1 summarises the total number of respondents for the three deep 'dive' case studies as well as the number of documents that have been reviewed by the MLE team and the debriefs with the RMs throughout the collaboration on Component D2 with the FM.

Table 1: Summary of data sources for each country

	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Number of respondents	16	17	12
Documents reviewed	28	19	33
Debriefs with FM's RMs	7	6	6

Throughout the 'deep dive' reports we kept the anonymity of any key informants. Table 2 shows the terms used to consistently describe evidence strength and data points in this document as it relates to triangulation across respondents. For example, where fewer than 25% of the respondents agreed on a point we would say 'a few' and this would represent weak evidence.

Table 2: Data description and strength of evidence table

Descriptor	Several	Some	A few
Number of respondents	>50%	26–50%	<25%
Strength	Strong	Some	Weak

2.4 Limitations

Some limitations of this summary report that are important to highlight include the following:

- The report does not refer to the policy dialogue in all the six countries of Component D2, but focusses on and draws from the three countries where the 'deep dive' case studies were conducted: Kenya, Mali and Nepal.
- The report does not try to be a comprehensive account that analyses all possible explanations of the changes or limited changes of the policy dialogue in three countries.
- The authors of this summary report (as well as the authors of the three 'deep dive' case studies) worked closely with the FM and had regular conversations during the design and implementation of the initiative. In some cases, the FM suggested tools that could help the activities. This collaborative approach to monitoring influences the way the initiative is assessed and limits a more traditional evaluative approach.
- The triangulation and validation of the information gathered throughout the policy dialogue process took place with a limited number of key informants.
- The budget allocated to the MLE work on Component D2 allowed for three 'deep dive' case studies and a brief four-to-five days visit to the capital in the three countries to conduct interviews with a limited number of key informants.

Reflections on the MLE system

Component D2 was designed with the broad aim of drawing from the BRACED experience in six countries over the past three years and informing national-level policy decisions and/or debate. DFID provided the FM with the space to assess the policy context in each country, engage with stakeholders, and let the policy objective and ToC emerge during implementation rather than at the outset. This adaptive and iterative design required that the MLE function be designed differently as well.

- The work of the MLE team has focussed mainly on the M and the L, and less on the E. This is because the MLE team has accompanied/worked alongside the FM's RMs through regular communication and sharing. Now, and with the benefit of hindsight, we want to share the following reflections with regard to the MLE role and function under Component D2:
- Adaptive projects and programmes show close collaboration between teams designing and implementing activities and teams monitoring progress. This is because learning is key to adaptation of activities and plans. This is why in the MLE design document (BRACED 2018) we described, in addition to the monitoring approach and activities, some tools derived from the policy-influencing literature to help the design of the policy-dialogue activities. The idea behind that suggestion was to establish collaboration during the design of the policy dialogue between the FM's RMs and the MLE team. Close collaboration from the outset can bring some bias or reduce the traditional objectivity that is expected from a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function, but is better aligned with design thinking and the principle of an iterative project such as Component D2, where policy objectives and ToC tend to emerge over time.
- Given what we know now about Component D2, what has been possible to accomplish by the RMs in a limited period of time they have been given and the context in which they had to operate, and the financial resources allocated to MLE, the MLE approach and function was probably over-designed. What we mean by this is that the tools that were suggested to design the policy dialogue could have emerged during conversations with the FM's RMs and adapted to the specific circumstances of each policy dialogue. The MLE design document that was produced in response to demand from DFID seems to be more suited to larger policy-influencing initiatives than Component D2.
- To some extent, Component D2 has been a missed opportunity to test innovative ways of linking the design–implementation function with a monitoring–learning one. Closer collaboration from the policy-dialogue design stage could also have helped to set up an efficient

progress reporting system to which both the RMs and the MEL team could have contributed from their respective perspectives – the RMs as implementers/facilitators and the MLE team as a critical friend less involved in the day-to-day of shaping and adapting the policy dialogues. Our sense is that there has been duplication in the reporting about the progress of the policy dialogues. The RMs had their internal reporting systems as well as reporting to DFID which were then repeated to the MLE team during the regular catch-up call or at the quarterly progress-review meetings. A design for Component D2 oriented at testing closer collaboration between the RMs and the MLE team could have made the data collection, analysis and reporting more efficient.

- A challenge in establishing closer collaboration was linked to the budget to support the MLE activities. It would have been very beneficial for the MLE team to attend at least some of the initial in-country policy-dialogue roundtables and/or planning meetings to meet some of the stakeholders and identify from the outset key informants who test some of the ideas and options being discussed, and support the design and iterative process or the policy dialogues.

3. COUNTRY CONTEXTS

The three countries we focus on in this report are very different in terms of social and economic development as well as the specific climate change challenges addressed by the respective BRACED initiatives. One common denominator, in terms of policy context in which the BRACED climate resilience projects have been implemented, is the decentralisation of the government administration.

Decentralisation has been applied during the past two decades in different regions around the world with different objectives and outcomes. A study by Work in 2002 indicated that, out of 126 countries in the World Bank's World Development Report tables, 96 had at least one sub-national level of elected government and 46 had two sub-national levels. Policy researchers in this area have identified different types and degrees of decentralisation.[6]

6 See Litvack et al. (1998); Ford (1999); Manor (1999); Work (2002). The rationales in favour of decentralisation include (Azfar et al. (1999); Lister and Betley (1999); Ford (1999)): the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation; decisions taken closer to the local-level benefit from a reduced bureaucracy; decentralisation aligns with the principle of 'subsidiarity' in welfare economics whereby total welfare can be increased by allocating resources according to local preferences; and decisions about public expenditures that are taken by a level of government closer to the local constituency are also more likely to better address local needs, resulting in a more efficient delivery of public services.

- **'Deconcentration' or administrative decentralisation** – the dispersal of responsibilities from higher levels of government to lower-level agencies. In this case, the government retains political authority and control over the lower levels. This is the most common form of decentralisation among the countries that have undertaken the reform.
- **Fiscal decentralisation** – the process through which the central government gives financial responsibility to lower levels of administration. Also, in this case, local-level bureaucrats remain responsible to higher levels of the administration.
- **Devolution or democratic decentralisation** – the transfer of political power, decision-making authority and accountability to lower-level authorities, which are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government and which are democratic in some ways and some degrees.

In terms of climate change policy and governance, the principles underpinning decentralisation reforms match the reality that, globally, local governments and sub-national actors are increasingly seen as key players in addressing climate change. This is because local government tends to be the level of government most directly confronted with the everyday impacts of climate change, and operates in the political space between national governments and communities.[7]

Kenya, Mali and Nepal have all established some form of decentralisation that influences the ways climate change policies, regulations and budget allocation are designed and implemented. Table 3 provides a summary of the specific governance characteristics in the three countries.

7 See Funder et al. (2017).

Table 3: Overview of governance, decentralisation and climate policy context

Characteristic	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Governance architecture	National level, counties (47), constituencies (290) and wards (1,450).	National level with three levels of decentralisation: regions (10; a bill under consideration in the National Assembly plans to move to 20); circles (49); communes (703; a bill under consideration in the National Assembly plans to move to 800).	National level; provinces (7), rural/urban municipalities (753), and wards. Elected representatives at provincial and municipal level.
Degree of current decentralisation (administrative, fiscal, devolution)	**Devolution** is ongoing and began in 2013 after the Constitution passed in 2010. The legislature and the executive arms of government are devolved to the 47 counties. Remaining lack of clarity between national and sub-national institutions/governments.	**Deconcentration** accompanies **decentralisation** since 1960 but it is the law of 1993 that defines the current architecture. There is a gap between the highly decentralising discourse and a centralising practice inherited from colonisation. There are areas of competence transferred to local authorities but financial transfers do not keep pace.	**Uncertain:** Constitution passed in September 2015 mandates a federal reform and has set the shift from **deconcentration/ administrative decentralisation to fiscal decentralisation and devolution.** Implementing regulations being developed with some delays.
Maturity of climate change-related policies	The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources developed the National Climate Change Response Strategy in 2010 and the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2013–2017. The latter is reiterated in the NCCAP 2018–2022. Kenya's National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2015–2030 operationalises the NCCAP. The National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Act was passed in 2016, as was the National 2016 Climate Change Act, which provides a framework for promoting climate-resilient low-carbon economic development.	An institutional framework as well as strong political commitments. National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) developed in 2007. National Climate Change Strategy and Climate Change Action Plan developed for 2012–2017. The revised Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) submitted in 2016. However, implementation is very limited. In addition, there are many agencies with overlapping mandates and Mali's Environment and Sustainable Development Agency seems to be too overwhelmed in its agenda and its internal organisation to be able to fulfil its mission in an optimal way.	**Uncertain:** NAPA approved in 2010 and National Climate Change Policy launched in 2011. Uncertainty about climate resilience responsibilities at national and sub-national levels in the new federal system.
Overall enabling environment	**Promising** National commitment to devolution and maturity of climate change-related policies provides a strong enabling environment. Potential barrier in the lack of clarity among institutions regarding climate change responsibilities as devolution continues.	**Challenging** The Sustainable Development Fund is still not operational despite budget allocations renewed year after year. The security problem is such that humanitarian approaches tend to override development priorities for both the government and the donors. Many local authorities are administered remotely, with mayors and state representatives having limited presence due to insecurity.	**Uncertain – potentially enabling** Federal system provides opportunities for localised climate resilience investments and policy and programme design. Focus of government is on establishing the capability of the new federal system over the next 10–15 years.

3.1 BRACED projects

The BRACED programme has supported a total of five projects in Kenya, Mali and Nepal since 2015. Below is a synopsis of each of the projects. Table 4 summarises the key information for each project, including lead implementing partner (IP), the focus of Component D1 activities during BRACED-X and the focus of the policy dialogue of Component D2.

PROGRESS, Kenya

In Kenya, the **Programme for Resilient Systems (PROGRESS)** implemented by a consortium led by Mercy Corps was selected for extension after three years of working to build the absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of households and communities in Uganda and north-eastern Kenya. Under Component D1, PROGRESS-X pursued three main policy activities in Kenya's Wajir county: 1) resource mapping; 2) pastoralism and policy training; and 3) conducting a water governance study. Component D2 activities in Kenya did not draw heavily from PROGRESS previous work under BRACED and BRACED-X. However, PROGRESS team members were consulted in Component D2's scoping phase and parallels can be drawn between PROGRESS' decentralised climate finance work supporting the implementation of Ward Adaptation Planning Committees (WAPCs) in Wajir. The PROGRESS water governance study was also used a model for one of the studies conducted under Component D2 work.

Livestock Mobility, WYL, DCF and SUR1M, Mali

In Mali, four projects were selected under BRACED-X with an extension of funding for each. Working in close cooperation with local authorities in border regions, the **Livestock Mobility (LM) project** aims to prevent conflicts between farmers, agropastoralists and pastoralists by mapping and securing existing pastoral rangelands. LM provides pastoralists with facilities (water points, transit areas, etc.), as well as climate information, veterinary services and more. The project has a policy component that supports cross-border livestock mobility policies. The **Wati Yelema Labenw (WYL) project** works in Mali's poorest regions (San, Segou, Koulikoro and Mopti) by promoting livelihoods adapted to climate change at the community level. Its strategies focus on risk management against climate disasters; on decision-making approaches for livelihoods; on the development of productive capacities, particularly in the field of smart agriculture, in the sustainable management of soils, pastures and forest areas; and on the dissemination of good practices. To support rural communities in the Mopti region in integrating climate change adaptation into their planning and budgeting processes, the **Decentralising Climate Funds (DCF) project** works to develop the institutional, financial and technological capacities of local authorities. On the political front, DCF supports the National Agency for Territorial Collective Investments (ANICT) to obtain accreditation from the Green Climate Fund (GCF). **Scaling-Up Resilience to Climate Extremes for over 1 Million People in the Niger River Basin (SUR1M)** is a project in the Gao region (for Mali) aimed at strengthening resilience to extreme large-scale climate events, placing women (empowerment) and communities at the centre of climate change responses with a focus on the promotion of good governance; seed improvement

and technological approaches; promotion of local markets; dissemination of climate information, including through local radio.

Anukulan, Nepal[8]

The Nepal policy dialogue builds on the BRACED **Anukulan** project.[9] Anukulan was implemented between February 2015 and July 2019 by a consortium led by International Development Entreprises Nepal (iDE Nepal).[10] The aim of Anukulan has been to reduce the vulnerability of smallholder farmers to climate-induced disasters in the midwest and farwest regions of Nepal. The goal was 'to support half a million poor and vulnerable people in rural Nepal to build their resilience to climate change impacts like floods and drought'.[11] Anukulan has worked in 41 municipalities in three (out of seven) provinces. Anukulan was one of the BRACED projects to be extended in February 2018 for 15 months to build on the results acquired over the previous three years and to inform and influence policy debates at the local and national levels by focussing on the Commercial Pocket Approach (CPA) tested by Anukulan in remote areas through the establishment of 57 collection centres and associated marketing and planning committees to provide farmers with better access to markets and agricultural and climate resilience technology and know-how.

8 See the deep dive Nepal paper for more information about Anukulan (Pellini 2019).

9 See http://www.braced.org/about/about-the-projects/project/?id=ac922db5-8324-4cff-a6a8-b85e3ff81c04

10 The consortium included and comprised: the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Nepal, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre, the International Water Management Institute, the Middlesex University Flood Hazard Research Centre, the Nepali Technical Assistance Group, Netafim, the Renewable World, Resource Identification and Management Society Nepal, Rupantaran, Support Activities for Poor Producers in Nepal and six local IPs, one in each of the districts where the project has operated.

11 See BRACED (2015b), 2.

Table 4: Overview of BRACED projects in Kenya, Mali and Nepal including a summary of policy engagement work

	Kenya	Mali				Nepal
Project	PROGRESS	DCF	SUR 1M	WYL	Livestock Mobility	Anukulan
Lead IP	Mercy Corps	NEF	CRS	WHH	AFL	iDE
Component D1 project?	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓
Implementation of D1 activities	PROGRESS-X aims to build resilience to climate extremes in northern Kenya and Uganda by improving linkages between communities, government and the private sector to plan for and manage climate risk. It focusses on expanding access to sharia-compliant microfinance services, creating sustainable value chains for camel milk and promoting and disseminating information on natural resource management, gender and climate information. Further, it strengthens governance structures by supporting the establishment and/or strengthening WAPCs. In Uganda, it supports formalisation of community land associations and land registration by individuals to prevent land grabbing.	DCF-X in Mali and Senegal bridges the divide between top-down, nationally-driven planning and local adaptation. The strategy has five core elements: 1) resilience assessments; 2) establishment of local climate adaptation funds; 3) setting up local adaptation committees (within local governments) to identify resilience investments based on inclusive consultations and fund criteria; 4) linking national and local processes for mainstreaming.	The project aims to foster women's empowerment and increase demand for good governance and access to improved seeds and other technologies through market engagement, radio messaging and targeted advocacy. It seeks to scale up impact in Niger and Mali through an integrated strategy, fostering a culture of risk management and climate change adaptation learning.	WYL focusses on: 1) making community-managed resilience a priority with a strong community basis; 2) building on farmers and communities' existing use of climate-weather information, empowering communities to use climate information to make management decisions about livelihood activities; and 3) increasing assets and access to resources through improved adaptation and DRR practices.	LM aims to build resilience among pastoral and agropastoral communities in Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger by continuing to: 1) map, protect and equip strategic livestock corridors with transit campsites, grazing reserves and water points; 2) provide key services along corridors and test innovative services through action research; and 3) advocate for trans-border livestock mobility.	Anukulan has supported smallholder farmers to take advantage of economic opportunities by forming smallholder 'commercial pockets' and encouraging investments in climate-smart technologies such as drip irrigation, essential oil production, multiple-use water systems and community-based renewable energy. The project has also worked on the harmonisation of Local Adaptation Plans for Action with DRR planning.

	Kenya		Mali			Nepal
Project	PROGRESS	DCF	SUR 1M	WYL	Livestock Mobility	Anukulan
Lead IP	Mercy Corps	NEF	CRS	WHH	AFL	iDE
Component D1 project?	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓
Policy dialogue focus of Component D2	Build the capacity of Wajir County Government to develop a better policy and legislative environment. This includes: securing communal land ownership and defining regulations for the management of pastoral resources; training on the dynamics of pastoral systems aimed at facilitating community consultations, to prevent cross-border conflicts; and identifying policy and practical measures to improve management of public water points.	Continue to work with government to gain direct access to the GCF; work with government and the UN Capital Development Fund to evaluate and harmonise two approaches to local climate finance currently being piloted in Mali and Senegal; and advance development of the national platform for decentralised climate finance and its related framework programme in Senegal.	n/a	n/a		The policy dialogue focussed on informing policy actors at national level about the lessons and experiences from Anukulan's CPA which aims to strengthen smallholder farmers' access to markets as well as agricultural and climate resilience technology and know-how.

3.2 Tactics and activities

Based on our analysis, we have been able to identify six main approaches or tactics, employed by the FM teams to establish, develop and maintain the policy dialogues in one or more countries, and that are aligned with an adaptive approach to activity design and implementation. These are:

Convening: Assembling identified stakeholders and actors with a potential interest in the policy issue or issues being considered. This was often described as a roundtable.

Capacity building: In some cases, the FM identified consultants or experts to be seconded into organisations or directly build the expertise of target stakeholders.

Research: Collating and packaging existing evidence or commissioning new research focussed on the policy problem or solution identified.

Demonstration: Using existing examples of policy solutions to demonstrate value and efficacy to target policy actors.

Knowledge transfer: Transferring knowledge and skills on a focus topic between actors.

Building on BRACED policy work: Linking to or building from existing policy work led by BRACED-X IPs under Component D1.

Table 5: Summary of tactics used in each of the three countries

Approach/tactic	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Convening	✓ Roundtable (1)	✓ Roundtable (2)	✓ Roundtable/ coordination meeting
Capacity building	✓	✓	-
Research & evidence	✓	✓	✓
Demonstration	-	-	✓
Knowledge transfer	-	-	✓
Building on BRACED project policy work	-	✓	✓

Table 5 above shows how the RMs in the three countries have combined these tactics and activities throughout Component D2. The specific circumstances and context of the policy dialogue determined the more appropriate approaches and tactics. The Nepal policy dialogue shows a greater range of activities because, compared with in the other two countries, it has been able to link and build on Anukulan's activities from an early stage of Component D2 implementation. This allowed the focus and theme of policy dialogue to be identified relatively quickly as well as the core policy-dialogue stakeholders who have participated in coordination meetings, field visits to project locations and the procurement of an external assessment or Anukulan's CPA.

4. REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPONENT D PROCESS

This section presents the key findings from across all three country case studies. Results are summarised for each, with more details available in the following sections of this part of the report and the accompanying country reports. The findings are organised by the learning questions with an accompanying discussion to highlight similarities and differences between countries and the implications of these for broader resilience policy-influencing work. The aim is to offer answers to each of the questions from across the Component D2 investment, not only at country level. The degree to which this is possible based on the available data is highlighted in Table 6, which provides an overview of the sufficiency of evidence from the case studies to be able to answer the question with confidence. It is important to note that this is not an assessment of the quality of the work in each of these areas but rather the availability of evidence that, in most cases, is related to what has been feasible given the tight timeframe in which the work was being delivered, the available resources, the remote management of the in-country activities and the point at which the learning work took place – none of which was within the control of the KM or FM teams.

Table 6: Sufficiency of evidence to fully answer the learning questions

Learning question	Kenya	Mali	Nepal	Overall
Direction of policy process	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient
Operational effectiveness – systems and processes	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient
Response to the policy process	Some	Some	Some	Some
Outcome-level change	Unclear	Insufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient
Sustainability	Some	Insufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient

4.1 Tools to support change strategies

The Component D2 process was designed to be adaptive, flexible and iterative to allow policy priorities to emerge through dialogue with national stakeholders. There were no predetermined policy outcomes identified at the outset or fixed by the donor in a logframe or ToC. However, this does not mean the process was directionless; rather, it operated in a loose framework, which became more refined over time. To support this, a set of tools (some developed with the support of the KM MLE team) were used to guide the policy dialogue design and implementation. These included:

- Context assessments.
- Stakeholder maps.
- A change strategy/ToC.

Table 7 summarises the way and the degree to which these were used in each country. This shows that in all cases there was some form of context assessment, a stakeholder mapping exercise and a change strategy or ToC, which were used as tools to guide the dialogues.

The START document (discussed in more detail in Section 4.2) formed the main basis for the context analysis and considered the broad political context in each country and well as policies and institutions that relate specifically to resilience-building work. While the depth of these context assessments varied – some used full political economy analysis (PEA) conducted by specialist consultants; others used information gathered from key stakeholders and secondary data – they all served to help the RMs 'make sense' of the prevailing enabling (or constraining) environment, which is a critical step in both policy engagement work and adaptively managing a programme.

A form of stakeholder analysis was conducted in all cases at the start of the process, but stakeholder maps were not created at that time in Mali. Where maps were created, the degree to which these were revisited and updated periodically is inconsistent. It was most actively used in Nepal, where Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix (AIIM) criteria were used to demonstrate how the dialogues there had succeeded in engaging more stakeholders and in some cases increasing existing stakeholders' level of interest towards the stated policy goal <Insert LINK to Nepal report>.

Table 7: Description of the tools used to guide the policy process in each country

Tool	Kenya	Nepal	Mali
Context assessment (Relevance or alignment of Component D2 work with national priorities)	Included in START document; based on consultation with stakeholders in Kenya (including PROGRESS); early consultancy included a PEA.	Included in START document and derived from initial consultations, which began in February 2018 with iDE, Anukulan partners and DFID Country Office.	Included in START document. Stakeholder consultation mainly concerned international actors and development partners.
Stakeholder mapping (Partnerships including DFID)	Documented in November 2018 and linked to first iteration of ToC. No further updates to stakeholder map or AIIM conducted (at the time of writing – July 2019).	Policy dialogue stakeholders map produced in November 2018 as part of first ToC iteration. Stakeholders' map updated in May 2019 using the AIIM criteria and focussed on key actors for the policy dialogue.	Identification of potential actors done in November 2018. However, stakeholder mapping for policy dialogue carried out in June 2019, near end-of-dialogue process.
Change strategy (ToC in place, target policy outcome/priority identified)	First iteration of ToC in November 2018 and second expected late July 2019 (not available at time of writing).	First iteration of ToC in November 2018 and second in May 2019.	First iteration of ToC in November 2018 and second expected late July 2019 (not available at time of writing).

In all cases, a ToC was created after the initial scoping, context and stakeholder analyses, to as clearly as possible chart a pathway towards a target policy change. Initially, these were very ambitious, given the timeframe and levels of influence required; they were revised to be more realistic. The theories of change developed by the RMs in the three countries have evolved as a result of the information acquired through consultations, meetings and discussions with local partners and DFID Country Offices to identify the main themes and focus of the dialogues. For example, in Nepal, the ToC prepared in November 2018 was later updated in May 2019 with a greater focus on the theme selected for the policy dialogue (i.e. CPA) and reframing of more achievable objectives in the time available for the initiative.

In Kenya, the change strategy was identified iteratively using dedicated tools – that is, the ToC and stakeholder mapping. These were informed by consultations with relevant stakeholders, including individuals associated with the BRACED-funded PROGRESS project operating in Wajir. Additionally, a consultant was commissioned to produce a draft PEA to inform the RM's understanding of the DCF space in Kenya.

In Mali, mobilisation of national actors and development partners was slower. This resulted in a significant gap between the first (in February 2019) and the second Sprint Cycles (in June 2019) – see next section. It is from April 2019 that the efforts invested by the RM began to produce effects. The third Sprint Cycle was also developed in June 2019. It is thus clear why the production of a ToC has not been an easy exercise.

These differences owe mainly to difference in the climate resilience policy context, the influence the DFID climate resilience portfolio has in the three countries compared with the climate-resilient investments by other development partners and the close link between the Component D2 work with the BRACED IP and the activities carried out in the country under BRACED.

What change strategies have been designed to influence policy and capabilities at the country level? How appropriate and relevant are these strategies?

To answer this question overall, and taking into consideration the constraints on time and access, the strategies adopted by the RMs were appropriate and relevant. In all cases, tools were used that provided structure to an otherwise open process and balanced the flexibility required while still providing sufficient detail to give a sense of direction. This was also helped by DFID not requiring a ToC from the outset and instead allowing for the START document and the ToCs to emerge over time from in-country consultations. However, more use could have been made of stakeholder maps to be able to track change over time rather than a more static 'snapshot' of the stakeholders at a particular moment in time. While this may not have fundamentally altered the outcome, it would have provided a better sense of progress and provided more demonstration of attitudinal changes of key stakeholders. In terms of contextual understanding, it is difficult to say whether the different analyses were sufficiently in depth and, in turn, what, if any, impact this had on either the identification of the policy problem or the target outcome. Perhaps a more consistent approach to this would have been better and also produced outputs useful beyond the scope of the Component D2 work.

4.2 Adaptively managing the policy dialogue process

Adopting a flexible and adaptive approach does not mean the absence of any structure or direction. The FM established an operational framework with common systems and processes to guide the work in each country. Comprehensive details of these systems and processes can be found in the FM Component D2 Manual[12] and therefore the constituent steps are only briefly summarised here:

- **SCOPE–START** was used to capture initial context analysis and possible policy problems to focus on.
- **SPRINT** sets out the proposed activities over a predetermined time and includes proposed outputs form that activity. It also suggests a point at which the success, progress or failure of that Sprint Cycle is considered and decisions are made as to whether to extend, adapt or change the course of action. Any potential risks are also included in this document.
- **SPEND** follows the approval of the Sprint Cycle and involves: 1) a more in-depth design and costing of activities and 2) procurement and contracting of relevant experts, be they individuals or organisations, to then deliver the activities. All in all, the SPEND process involves nine steps.

These documents are needed to receive approval and sign-off from the FM's senior managers and DFID (only for the START document) to describe and keep a record of the rationale for suggesting specific activities, access budget, document progress and spending.

Timing and frequency of adaptive management tools and activities

Figure 2 maps these documents and processes over the 15-month implementation period from May 2018 to July 2019 for each country. It shows the timing of the START documents, essentially the point at which DFID approved the proposed course of action and also the timing and length of the Sprint Cycles. The figure also includes the timing of the roundtables or equivalent meetings. Finally, the quarterly meetings between the FM, DFID and the KM MLE team are mapped.

Overall, there is a great deal of variability between the different countries in terms of the frequency and length of the Sprint Cycles. These can be considered the main mechanism for adaptively managing the policy dialogues, as they were intended to map out a course of action for a defined period after which a decision would made as to whether to continue, discontinue or adapt the approach based on its perceived utility and results it delivered. As the figures shows, the first Sprint Cycle in Kenya lasted more than seven months, with a further two cycles taking place between May and July. Similarly, in Mali, the initial Sprint Cycle lasted a long time and a further two were squeezed into the remaining implementation months. In Nepal, the cadence of the Sprint Cycles

12 See BRACED Manual (2019), 33.

was more regular, with shorter, more frequent cycles than might be expected of an adaptively managed programme. Each cycle began or ended with a roundtable meeting as the culmination of or planning for the next cycle, to ensure priorities were still agreed on and aligned.

It is interesting to note that none of the main processes or decision points aligned with the quarterly meetings. While it was never intended that the Sprint Cycles would last for one calendar quarter, these meetings instead became updates on work completed and planned as opposed to an opportunity to substantively discuss progress and engage the donor in decisions about whether and how to proceed.

As discussed in the three 'deep dive' reports <Insert LINK>, the amount of time required for the RMs to prepare these documents, respond to comments and receive approvals was restrictive. Overall (without exact data), the impression is that the RMs had to spend a considerable amount of time producing the documentation required by the processes described in this section while establishing relationships with in-country stakeholders against a relatively small budget for the respective policy dialogue activities.

Timeline of activities and outputs

Figure 2: Timing of START, SPRINT and SPEND documents and cycles including roundtables (RT) and quarterly meetings



5. KEY FINDINGS

5.1 Was the Component D process managed adaptively?

In order to determine whether the tools and processes discussed above as well as the wider approach to the Component D2 work were appropriate, they were assessed against seven adaptive management good practice principles derived from the literature.[13] Table 8 describes each principle and the degree to which it was upheld in each of the three countries.

As the table demonstrates, overall there is a good indication that the Component D2 policy dialogue process was implemented in line with adaptive management principles as defined in the literature. This was particularly the case in Nepal, where all the principles were followed. In Mali, there was some uncertainty as to whether the work was fully aligned with local stakeholders' priorities, and whether more could have been done to work through local convenors and build on the work BRACED-X projects had established.

13 Fabella et al. (2011); Booth and Unsworth (2014); Faustino and Booth (2014); Williamson (2015); Green (2016); Andrews et al. (2017).

As discussed in the previous section, there is also some potential deviation from the fifth principle in Table 8, which relates to the blending of implementation and design. The use of Sprint Cycles certainly fits with this principle but the frequency of them in some cases does not fit with the idea of using 'rapid cycles of planning, action and reflection'. Furthermore, there was little available data or information on the process for reflecting on the progress, results and direction of the work conducted in each Sprint Cycle. It is also unclear as to how decisions were reached about whether to continue, adapt or discontinue activities and who had the final say in this matter.

Principles 6 and 7 in the table are cross-cutting and relate more to the funder's (in this case DFID) delegation of authority, flexibility in agreeing outcomes and tolerance of risk. The way DFID explicitly did not require logframe reporting and delegated funding decisions to the FM demonstrated a commitment to the principles of adaptive management, and a willingness to accept some risk of failure or of results that may not emerge at outcome or impact level.

Table 8: Assessment of the degree to which adaptive management good practice was followed in each country.

Principle	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
1. Develop a good knowledge of the political economy of the space in which a development programme operates to be able to design pilots and experiments, pursuing activities that look promising and dropping others	✓ Developed a good knowledge of local context. PEA commissioned and sensitivities understood. Helped with identifying 'tactics' not necessarily with design or policy priority.	? Not sufficiently in depth BRACED evidence and project experience were the entry point, not a broad enough perspective.	✓ Conducted context analysis which may have relied mainly on iDE/Anukulan perspective.
2. Focus on solving problems that are debated and defined by local people and stakeholders	✓ **Well aligned** with actively debated topic/priority.	? Focus may **not have been fully aligned** with broader processes/locally-defined priorities.	✓ **Aligned** with this principle but less well aligned with climate resilience policy problems that may be being debated.
3. Work through local conveners who have the authority and credibility to mobilise all those with a stake in the process to tackle the problem and introduce change	✓ This was central to the policy dialogue, which involved the Adaptation Consortium (ADA) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).	? BRACED projects aligned local conveners but Component D2 did not build on this and contacts with appropriate actors were relatively weak although later strengthened.	✓ iDE and former government staff and DFID Nepal. RM acted mainly as a facilitator and coordinator.
4. Invest considerable time and resources into brokering relationships and discovering common interests around problems with local partners	✓ Initial roundtable built consensus among stakeholders on progress and next steps.	✓ Significant time invested in convening roundtable – a lot of uncertainty as to whether it would proceed.	✓ Several roundtables, coordination meetings and field visits.
5. Blend design and implementation through rapid cycles of planning, action and reflection to discuss and share lessons and design new solutions	? Long initial Sprint Cycle and later overlapping Sprint Cycles.	? Overlapping Sprint Cycles 'squeezed' into final period.	✓ Regular Sprint Cycles designed and adapted to the evolution of policy dialogue activities.
6. Funder does not require at the outset to write a fixed activity planning and/or a ToC without taking the time to adequately take into account complexity and unpredictability	✓ Didn't require milestones/indicators in a logframe or a ToC at country level at the outset but requested updated versions later. Also didn't state desirable policy outcomes at outset. These were identified, selected or approved during reviews of START documents.		
7. Do not set spending targets but allowing funding requirements to emerge as you go	✓ Funding envelopes allocated under delegated authority to the FM but specific activity funding not set. The RM could determine budget needs for each Sprint Cycle; SPEND documents used to internally request release of funds for specific tasks, including contracting interlocutors and local experts.		

5.2 Responses to the policy dialogue process

Much of the report to this point has focussed on the processes and systems established to manage the Component D policy dialogues adaptively. This section explores the results of the dialogues by examining the extent to which responses were elicited by the activities and tactics used by the RMs and their in-country counterparts.

The questions that we are seeking to answer is: **What have been the responses to the policy dialogue process? What were the barriers to achieving responses to the policy dialogues, if any?**

Based on interviews with key informants for the three 'deep dive' reports, we have identified a set of five common responses that were observed in one or more of the three countries. These are:

1. **Increased interest and participation in the policy dialogue process:** This was demonstrated through regular participation at roundtables by the same people and/or organisations, the 'right' or targeted people being at those meetings or an increased membership or presence at meeting.
2. **Demand for evidence and/or knowledge:** In some cases, activities stimulated increased demand for more information about the proposed policy solution or problem.
3. **Perceived usefulness of activity** (meeting; roundtable; demonstration): There was evidence from key informants that they found the roundtable, meeting or demonstration visit useful in learning more about the solution or problem being addressed.
4. **Uptake of evidence-based solution to policy problem:** There are instances when stakeholders signalled intent to use the proposed solution.
5. **Consensus built:** In some cases, consensus was built around a policy problem or solution where it had previously not existed.

Table 9 summarises the responses to the policy dialogue process observed in the three countries based on the criteria described in this paragraph.

Table 9: Summary of responses to policy dialogues observed in the three country cases based on primary data

Possible response type	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Increased, consistent or targeted representation	Agreement that the initial roundtable was well attended and that the key stakeholders were represented. Also, some senior ministerial representation, which was unexpected but welcome.	The MLE team was able to attend and observe only one roundtable, which was well attended by target participants, in terms of both numbers and participants' profiles. Note that this may not be fully representative of the second roundtable meeting, which happened after the team collected data.	DFID and DFID-funded programmes (Nepal Climate Change Support Programme (NCCSP), ASHA (Adaptation for Smallholders in Hilly Areas) and project leads (IOD PARC and OPM (Oxford Policy Management)) have consistently attended the policy roundtable/ coordination meetings. They are the core group of the policy dialogue. Government representatives joined meetings towards the end of the Component D2 policy dialogues when new evidence was presented and discussed from May 2019 (e.g. Ministry of Forests and Environment (MoFE)).
Demand for evidence and/or knowledge	Funding of studies and evidence consolidation reports provides improved access to evidence/ knowledge but it is not clear that the Component D2 work was directly responsible for creating a demand for it.	The studies carried out through consultants have provided evidence for the dialogue, but it is not clear that was based on explicit or latent demand.	Roundtable participants, including DFID, agreed in September 2018 to conduct an external assessment of the CPA model and use the results to engage with government. Evidence from Anukulan is not strong enough and can be perceived as biased.
Perceived usefulness of activity (meeting; roundtable; demonstration)	General consensus that the activities were relevant, appropriate and (potentially) useful. Feeding intoo pre-existing processes and priorities (scale-out of County Climate Change Fund (CCCF) mechanism) was key to this.	Dissemination of the conference reports was welcomed by the participants of the two roundtable meetings that have taken place in Mali.	Roundtable participants have given positive feedback on the usefulness of the roundtable meetings and field visits to Anukulan's area to learn about the design and implementation of the CPA model.

Possible response type	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Uptake of evidence-based solution to policy problem	The intention for funded studies was to encourage the use of evidence in the upcoming national scale-out of the CCCF mechanism. It is too early to observe uptake of this evidence at the time of writing.	With financial support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), an expert position has been established to support the General Directorate of Territorial Communities (DGCT) in integrating climate change resilience into local planning. Wetlands International has clearly positioned itself to play a role in the development of an early warning system at a community level (EWS-RU).	The under-secretary of MoFE has asked DFID to consider including the CPA approach in the design of the NCCSP II in May 2019. MoFE organised in June 2019 a climate conference in Nepalganj and invited iDE, the Director General of Agriculture and the Under-Secretary and NCCSP-II focal person of MoFE to present a joint paper titled Effects of Climate Change in Agriculture and Food Security, and Initiatives, which included references to Anukulan's experience with the CPA.
Consensus built	The initial roundtable helped build consensus around the priorities, barriers and way forward for various stakeholders engaged in the ongoing CCCF mechanism scale-out process.	There is broad consensus around the need to develop a climate change mainstreaming approach in local planning. But the training of planning experts as well as local authorities remains a gap.	There is agreement among the roundtable/policy dialogue members that the CPA is a useful approach and adapts well to include climate reliance measures/elements.

How did key stakeholders respond to the policy dialogue and associated activities in each country?

In Nepal, the number and continued attendance of participants at roundtable/coordination meetings indicates that there was a gradual increase in the degree of interest to learning around the CPA. Several respondents mentioned that the field visits in September 2018 and April 2019 in the areas of the Anukulan project were particularly useful in terms of learning and sharing about the CPA model, and opportunities for visits created a space for informal communication and sharing, which helped participants learn about other climate reliance initiatives as well. Four factors help to explain why the interest in the policy dialogue process in Nepal has gradually improved, even though it is limited to a relatively small number of organisations involved in climate resilience programmes and projects:[14] (i) the close involvement of the DFID Country Office, which made sure the climate resilience programmes it funds in Nepal were brought into the process; (ii) the diversity of organisations involved in the policy dialogues; (iii) the fact that the focus on the CPA model was agreed relatively early together with the agreement about generating new externally-validated evidence on the

14 The core group of the roundtable has involved DFID Nepal, IOD PARC, NCCSP, Anukulan, OPM, ASHA, AEC/FNCCI and Muktinath Bank. Other organisations that have participated in meetings, discussions, field visits include: The World Food Programme, Mercy Corps, the Agriculture Sector Development Project, High Value Agriculture Project and Rising Incomes of Small and Medium Farmers Project.

CPA; and (iv) the close link between the Component D2 work with the BRACED experiences in Nepal.

In Kenya, there is agreement that the initial roundtable was well attended and that the key stakeholders were represented. A few respondents said the initial policy roundtable was a first-of-a-kind meeting, where actors came together, took stock on progress and decided the future priorities regarding the CCCF mechanism. This made it an effective convening opportunity and, according to one respondent, ' it gave a bit of energy' to the ongoing discussions on the topic. It is likely that subsequent relevant meetings, conferences and processes have and will benefit from this convening opportunity, which helped build consensus among important stakeholders.

The roundtable also acted as a 'springboard' for catalysing additional workstreams. As stated in the FM's SPRINT 2 document, published following the roundtable, the majority of the follow-up actions identified by stakeholders of the CCCF policy roundtable (October 2018) have been included in the ADA Consortium's reworked work plan and, as such, are now funded (and actioned) by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) or the World Bank.

The training has been well received and shows signs of uptake and increased demand. According to a Council of Governors (CoG) representative, the first internal training held as part of the consultancies' capacity-building efforts in early July 2019 has been successful. The training focussed on communicating best practice and climate financing. An important response to this training is increased demand for training and capacity-building internally. Furthermore, on the back of the training, a proposed restructuring of the CoG was sent to its senior management for consideration, and a request was received for the training to be repeated for deputy governors. This demonstrates not only that the training was relevant and timely, reflected by increased demand, but also that there may be an opportunity for greater vertical integration in the CoG.

In Mali, the regional conference organised by the DCF project and supported by Component D2 was a significant trigger, allowing national and international actors to finally see a concrete perspective of BRACED in the country. This helped to address some of the doubts about the approach as well as the financial capacity of BRACED to bring something additional to the current dynamics, especially in the eyes of technical and financial partners and government agencies. From this first roundtable and with the availability of the study report, the Component D2 process started to be better perceived. It should be noted that, at the level of government sub-agencies, the availability of the primary decision makers is limited in the roundtables, as they prefer bilateral meetings in face-to-face. This can create a gap in decision-making processes. Nevertheless, the interest and strong participation in the second roundtable of the local authorities of the region of Mopti is to be noted.

Overall, and in the main, the responses to the policy dialogue have been largely positive across a range of areas. There have been barriers to the detectable response being stronger, which include:

- **Time constraints:** The range and strength of response from identified key stakeholders may have been greater with more time. It is clear that the design elements of the dialogues and associated activities are relevant and well received and it can be inferred that, had these continued, a more sustained response might have been signalled.
- **Power of detection:** The MLE team's ability to detect the responses to the dialogues was limited to interviews with key informants and to a lesser extent secondary documentation. This may mean there is an under-estimation of the responses cited in this section, because of the limited scope of the learning exercise. Furthermore, activities have continued in each country beyond the point at which the MLE team was able to collect data, owing to its contractual end date.
- **BRACED's profile and additionality:** In most cases, the BRACED-X projects were not especially high profile in the broader contexts in which they were operating. This is commensurate with the size of investment they represented. In most cases, it was difficult to demonstrate the additionality of the BRACED project work and, therefore, gaining traction for the policy dialogue using the BRACED 'brand' was limited, despite the total investment by DFID being large.

5.3 Policy influence potential

This section presents a summary for each of the three countries on the extent to which the policy and/or behaviour changes[15] by key stakeholders involved in the policy process, in particular policy actors, have been achieved. It also considers the potential for the policy dialogue process to continue beyond the end of the Component D2 work in July 2019. This address the fourth and fifth learning questions together in recognition that the extent to which policy change results have emerged is limited. In addition to the three policy change areas, we also consider any funding allocation towards the stated policy goals and also the extent of the contribution from the Component D dialogue to observed change. Table 10 summarises these observations for each country.

15 Framing debates and getting issues on the national political agenda by drawing attention to new problems with evidence and new knowledge; Influencing behaviour change of policy and non-policy actors so that policies are effectively implemented and make use of evidence to inform implementation; Legislative change, such as changes in regional and national budget allocations, or the passage of new legislation and/or ministerial policy positions.

Table 10: Summary of policy outcomes and behaviour changes observed in each of the three countries

Outcome type	Kenya	Mali	Nepal
Framing debates	n/a Component D2 in Kenya did not seek to frame debates or draw attention to new issues. Efforts focussed on supporting an already established policy initiative looking to bring about a policy change, i.e. national scale-out of decentralised climate financing through the CCCF mechanism. In this sense, this 'framing debates' type of policy change does not directly correlate with the RM's ambition for policy change in Kenya.	Potentially If NEF manages to obtain new funding to continue the actions initiated for the accreditation of ANICT to the GCF. If Wetlands International succeeds in taking over the portfolio relating to implementation of EWS-RU. If the territorial communities can play a more active role in integrating climate change into planning, especially with the German Development Corporation (GIZ).	Potentially framing debates as expressed by interests of some government actors and climate resilience programmes about the CPA model.
Influencing behaviour change	Unclear There are some signs of increased demand for sharing of evidence within the CoG following the Component D2-funded internal training. This indicates buy-in from policy actors not necessarily directly linked to the CCCF scale-out.	No	No
Legislative, regulatory or institutional change	No	No	No
Funding allocation	Yes However, the government is already allocating funds - not D2-influenced.	No, from the government side Yes, from UNDP	No
Clear contribution from Component D2	Unclear Ultimately, the Component D2 work may have contributed to the eventual roll-out across all counties of the CCCF mechanism but the extent of the contribution is unknown. This is mainly because of the crowdedness of this space, with a high number of stakeholders contributing in some way to the process.	Unclear	Unclear Convening actors around a specific climate reliance experience (i.e. the CPA), sharing of lessons through presentations of evidence and field visits, identification of the need to produce new external evidence about the CPA and sharing of new evidence and learning.

Based on this assessment using accepted definitions of policy change that are broader and not limited simply to demonstrable legislative or regulatory change, there is currently limited evidence of policy change brought about by the Component D2 work in these three countries. However, this does not tell the full story and there have been some successes in potentially framing debates around target policy issues in Nepal and Mali. Overall, it is unclear what contribution the Component D2 work has made to even these modest changes. This is not to say that there has been no contribution but that, in such a crowded policy context, the specific effects of the work, which represents a relatively minor investment, is impossible to trace.

The fact that the policy dialogues have not yet contributed to informing changes of behaviour by policy actors in the three countries is not a failure of the initiative. The reasons that explain this outcome pertain to both the design and the operationalisation of Component D2. We summarised the factors linked to operationalisation in Section 4.2, where we described the management systems and processes of the initiatives.

In terms of the design of Component D2, three factors emerged in the 'deep dive' reports that explain the limited policy outcome in Kenya, Mali and Nepal:

- **Time constraints:** The planning for Component D2 of BRACED-X began towards the end of 2017, which may have been too late to establish and build relationships in country with relevant actors and decision makers. It was always recognised as unrealistic to expect concrete policy change in such a short time period.

- The **enabling environment** for bringing about policy change may not have been conducive. This was certainly the case in Mali and Nepal. In Nepal, for example, the priority of the national government is implementation of the federal reform mandated by the Constitution of September 2015. While many see this as an opportunity to influence change, it also means instability, and many competing priorities exist. The reform is evolving and there is considerable uncertainty about the role, function and resources that local governments will have at their disposal for climate change and climate resilience policy and programming.

- **Absence of continued in-country presence:** The fact that RMs were mainly based in London, albeit with regular travel to the countries, has, in the opinion of several respondents in the 'deep dive' reports, limited the ability to create links with a greater number of policy actors. Working with local convenors and interlocuters was a tactic the RMs used that was well received, but they did not represent a consistent and ongoing presence, which respondents proposed was essential in influencing policy.

What is the future for potential change linked to Component D2?

The policy dialogue process in **Nepal** has brought together programmes linked to the climate resilience portfolio of DFID Nepal, organisations such as Mercy Corps and the World Food Programme and some policy actors. This has allowed for sharing a wider set of experiences around strengthening the climate resilience of smallholder farmers. There is growing interest in the CPA model (as shown by the request by a MoFE official to DFID Nepal to consider including the CPA in the NCCSP II programme design, for example), but it has not yet materialised in policy decisions or budget commitments by national and local governments in terms of expanding or adopting the CPA model more widely.

Looking beyond July 2019, it is uncertain whether the regular coordination meetings between programmes such as NCCSP II, ASHA, Anukulan and others will continue once the support ends (even though NCCSP and ASHA have said that they intend to continue). Actions to mitigate this risk have included establishing a rotating host of the meetings. The hope is that the meetings and sharing of the policy dialogue process will continue, and perhaps diversify and decentralise to include specific discussions at the sub-national level linked to specific contexts and climate resilience challenges for farmers.

The picture in **Kenya** may be more positive in terms of sustainability. If national and sub-national policy and legal frameworks are streamlined, and the CCCF mechanism is successfully rolled out and integrated into legislation with inputs from the blueprint for Climate Change Unit operationalisation, Component D2's support will have contributed to the progression towards these legislative changes. However, the degree of that contribution will be difficult to determine given the range of ongoing complementary activities, and because technically the Component D2 work would not have brought about this change even if it was designed to contribute towards it.

The sustainability of results is highly dependent on continued buy-in from stakeholders as well as other ongoing processes associated with Kenya's devolution process. The success of the Component D2-funded consultancies depends on how the CoG takes forward the recommendations, training and outputs, and whether it can secure additional funding required to take them on board. To that end, the Component D2 investment is supporting the alignment of the CoG with the requirements of potential external funding sources. World Bank's Kenya Accountable Development Programme and the GCF have both recently identified the CoG as a potential implementing agency. This means the Component D2 work on strengthening CoG capacity and achieving the successful scale-out of the CCCF mechanism may improve the CoG's ability to access and manage such global climate finance flows.

6. LESSONS

In **Mali**, the policy dialogue took two major directions: integrating climate change resilience into local planning (building on the experience of GIZ and other partners) and deploying EWS-RU, in partnership with Wetlands International and Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency (LuxDev). At this stage, the effects of these two processes are not yet perceptible; however, this ownership by well-established partners in the country has positive prospects. This situation at the same time creates a risk, in terms of said partners setting the agenda and prioritising these axes. By widely disseminating studies and the reports on the various conferences (including at the government level and with local authorities and parliamentarians), it will certainly be possible to reach a wider audience and to stimulate actions that take into account the outcomes of Component D2 and BRACED projects in Mali. The ambition of NEF/DCF to continue its actions in another form constitutes an interesting model of consolidation of the acquired assets, in default of a replication or an extension.

This section draws together the main lessons based on assessment of evidence from across the three country cases discussed in detail here. In addition, we also reflect on the appropriateness of the approach taken by the MLE team.

1. **There is little evidence of policy change towards intended goals but this should not be viewed as a failure overall**

The data collected for this learning exercise has not revealed any contribution towards policy change in the three countries. However, this does not mean the Programme should be considered a failure overall – rather that there has been insufficient time for the effects of the work to emerge. Evidence indicates a set of responses from policy stakeholders that could represent stepping-stones towards more recognisable changes in behaviours, knowledge and attitudes, elicited by the activities and tactics employed by RMs. There is also evidence that points to the potential for policy changes in the future building on the foundational work completed in the past 15 months, but this is impossible to confirm with any certainty.

2. **The timeframe for implementation was too short to expect concrete policy change – but good foundations were laid**

The time planned for the policy dialogues and the BRACED extension was probably too short to start to see signs of behavioural change; however, it is possible that the policy dialogues in the three countries have laid a good foundation that can be built on by other initiatives. The short timeframe was always recognised as a potential constraint and to some extent there was as much interest in testing the model – that is, using an adaptive approach – as there was in delivering policy results. However, determining whether a model works requires some assessment of the results it has delivered and therefore it is difficult to assess whether the model has worked and should be replicated. It is possibly unrealistic to expect that even if the policy influencing work under BRACED had started at the same time as implementation, there would have been observable, significant and attributable policy change achieved.

3. **Overall, the policy dialogue process was adaptively managed when considered against accepted good practice**

While this is true, it is difficult to determine whether this approach was effective and impossible to say how it compares with other non-adaptive approaches in terms of delivering results. There were also some issues that may have limited the flexibility of the process, for example the level of documentation required within the FM to track the process, enable decisions and release funds. While the FM deemed this not overly detrimental to the process overall (e.g. no opportunities were missed a result), some RMs felt a more streamlined process would have helped them be more agile.

4. **The role of the facilitator may have been compromised by location and their position in the wider policy system**

The need to have a knowledgeable and credible individual or organisation leading policy engagement work was recognised in the design process.

Identifying actors with the right contextual understating, connections and convening power was a priority for the RMs, who saw themselves as facilitators rather than implementers. Despite hiring local interlocuters and regular in-country visits by RMs, there was an absence of consistent representation for the work in country. Some respondents saw this as a limitation to progress.

5. **The level of engagement and oversight from DFID seemed to strike an appropriate balance**

As the donor, DFID offered a good level of flexibility and demonstrated a higher-than-usual level of risk tolerance when commissioning Component D, and it remained engaged at key decision points throughout the process. There may have been some tension between the centrally managed nature of the work and the Country Office's engagement and prioritisation, which may have limited the enabling environment somewhat.

6. **Some of the BRACED-X ToC assumptions relating to Component D2 held; others did not and some were untestable**

Central to both the BRACED and BRACED-X programmatic ToC was the assumption that both a 'bottom-up' and a 'top-down' approach would be required to deliver sustainable and transformational change. This rested on the assumption that the sub-national project-level work would be able to demonstrate the effectiveness of resilience work that could be used as a platform for national-level engagement and dialogue towards creating a more conducive policy environment. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to test this assumption fully through the Component D2 work because not all Component D2 work used project evidence and experience as the basis for engaging nationally. Where this was most clearly the case, in Nepal, there was no clear sign of policy change as a result.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

Ref	Recommendation	Audience
1.	**Consider the enabling environment before investing** The broader environment in a country should be considered as a major enabler or constraint to policy change outcomes and therefore a prerequisite before selecting countries in which to begin to engage in policy dialogues.	Donors
2.	**Be realistic about what change is possible** Policy change requires investing considerable time to build relationships and coalitions for change, even when building from a foundation of sub-national activity. Donors' expectations should align with the timeframe for investment. More effort is required to ensure that these are locally-led processes which in turn inform the direction of the donors wishing to support these processes.	Donors, national governments, civil society actors
3.	**Consider elements of an adaptive approach if a longer process** An adaptive approach with regular cycles of reflection has the potential to be effective. However, the time required to regularly reflect on a sub-annual basis in a programme running for little more than a year may introduce more hurdles than simply agreeing a priority at the start and focussing efforts for 12–15 months on that.	Donors, implementers

Ref	Recommendation	Audience
4.	**Appoint suitable national organisations with deeper linkages and understanding of national contexts** Suitable 'global south' partners may be better positioned to conduct policy work in country and be a consistent presence. Consideration should be given to their position in the wider political system to avoid the potential for bias, conflict of interest or unintended consequences.	Donors
5.	**More frequent Sprint Cycles** If an adaptive management approach is used, more agile Sprint Cycles should be established to enable decision making around whether to continue, adapt or discontinue a set of activities.	Donors, implementers

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DFID LearnAdapt, Things to Try flyer. 'Build–measure–learn approach: Sprints and reflection'

BRACED aims to build the resilience of more than 5 million vulnerable people against climate extremes and disasters. It does so through a three year, UK Government funded programme, which supports 108 organisations, working in 15 consortiums, across 13 countries in East Africa, the Sahel and Southeast Asia. Uniquely, BRACED also has a Knowledge Manager consortium.

The Knowledge Manager consortium is led by the Overseas Development Institute and includes the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, ENDA Energie, ITAD, Thompson Reuters Foundation and the University of Nairobi.

The BRACED Knowledge Manager generates evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and the wider resilience community. It gathers robust evidence of what works to strengthen resilience to climate extremes and disasters, and initiates and supports processes to ensure that evidence is put into use in policy and programmes. The Knowledge Manager also fosters partnerships to amplify the impact of new evidence and learning, in order to significantly improve levels of resilience in poor and vulnerable countries and communities around the world.

This paper has been awarded with the BRACED Knowledge Manager's SILVER Accreditation. The purpose of Gold and Silver Accreditation is to set apart knowledge and evidence that significantly advances understanding of what it takes to build resilience to climate and disaster extremes. To be awarded, publications are reviewed by an Accreditation Board whose aim is to identify BRACED funded products that significantly advance knowledge, thinking or practice.

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