Annex 1: Common and output theories of change






OUTPUT 2
OUTPUT 2
Improved input markets
OTHER INPUT MARKETS STRENGTHENED
Increased farmer uptake of improved seeds
Lower price of seeds
STAKEHOLDERS
Customs department
Ministries of Agriculture
Ministries of Trade
Private sector (seed companies, seed traders, agro dealers)
Farmers
Increased supply of improved seeds
Increased demand for improved inputs
Increased cross-border seed trade
OUTPUT 1
Input and credit package
Support for commercialisation of seed supply
Linking private sector to research base and existing foundation seed (CGIAR labs etc.)
Harmonised regional seed standards
Increased stakeholder advocacy for policy domestication
TA to support domestication of new seed policies
Support to increase stakeholder awareness of new regional seed agreements
Mapping from existing to desired national seed policies under harmonisation agreements and gap analysis
OUTPUT 3
OUTPUT 3
OUTPUT 3
Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment
A
More stable, predictable market system
Regional trade agreements successfully implemented at national level
C
OUTPUT 1
B
Detailed Theories of Change to be developed when specific interventions become clear
Gap analysis and TA to national governments for domestication
POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES:
• Maize Without Borders
• Maize grades and standards (Output 1)
• Seed harmonization (Output 2)
Identify existing regional trade agreements with opportunities to support national domestication
Identification of smaller/shorter term opportunities not related to regional agreements/treaties
Lobbying in support of strands A and B
Identification of key partners for advocacy (private sector, media, individuals in government)
In-depth political economy analysis / scoping for potential intervention opportunities

Programme theories

Storage and aggregation
By addressing market constraints/failures through improving warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities, FTESA interventions will increase access to warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities for traders and farmers, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes: by enabling farmers and traders to store surpluses at harvest time when prices are low and sell when prices are higher; by reducing post-harvest losses, hence increasing sales volumes for farmers and traders; by encouraging farmers to grow more produce, leading to more produce stored and sold; by giving farmers greater bargaining power with traders as they do not need to sell all their produce (to avoid spoilage); by enabling traders and farmers to aggregate their produce with others, and negotiate better prices for bulk purchases with buyers
Market information
By addressing market constraints/failures through improving improved market information, FTESA interventions will increase access to market information for traders and farmers, enabling them to use information to base their decisions (production, storage, sales) on more accurate and timely information, increasing trade between surplus and deficit areas and providing better information on when to store and release produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.
Credit
Original programme theory: By addressing market constraints/failures through improving credit facilities, FTESA interventions will increase access to credit, enabling farmers to use credit to increase investments in inputs and other services, leading to improved yields, higher volumes, greater sales and increased incomes. *Updated programme theory:* By addressing market constraints/failures through improving credit facilities, working with financial partners who are willing to work with smallholder farmers, FTESA interventions will increase access to credit, enabling farmers to use credit to increase investments in inputs and other services, leading to improved yields, higher volumes, greater sales and increased incomes.
Grades and standards
Original programme theory: By addressing market constraints/failures through improving the application of standards and grades for staple foods by traders and farmers, FTESA will improve the quality of produce and access to good quality storage facilities, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes. *Updated programme theory:* By addressing market constraints/failures through improving the application of standards and grades for staple foods by traders and farmers, and farmers are incentivised and able to reach standards, FTESA will improve the quality of produce and access to good quality storage facilities, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.
Inputs and good agricultural practices
By addressing market constraints/failures in the input market (especially seeds) through the provision of good quality inputs, and inadequate agricultural practices through GAP training, FTESA interventions will improve agricultural practices and use of better quality inputs (including use of market-demanded seed varieties), leading to increased productivity, production and quality, resulting in higher prices, greater sales and increased incomes.
Smallholder farmers' integration in structured markets
Original programme theory: By increasing access to more and better-quality services and inputs for farmers (including disadvantaged/poor groups – e.g. women), FTESA interventions will enhance the availability of better quality services and inputs for farmers, leading to increased use, improved yields and production, and better-quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes for farmers. *Updated programme theory:* By increasing access to more and better-quality services and inputs for farmers (including disadvantaged/poor groups – e.g. women), and farmers trust the intervention, find the activities credible and markets are available, FTESA interventions will lead to increased use, improved yields and production, and better-quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes for farmers.
Functioning of markets and systemic change
By funding interventions where there is potential to generate wider change in the market (beyond the intervention itself), FTESA interventions deliver changes in market functioning that trigger widespread changes in behaviour (interest, motivations, practices), maintained after external support has ended, leading to higher volumes sold, better prices received, greater integration into value chains and higher profits.
Consumers
By improving availability of food across space, FTESA interventions will stabilise prices for consumers between surplus and deficit regions; by improving availability of food across time, FTESA interventions will stabilise prices for consumers between harvest and hunger seasons.
Linkages and complementarities between grants
By funding interventions where there are identifiable complementarities and synergies, and creating links between interventions (some or all intervention components of a grant, e.g. linking grantees with G-Soko), FTESA generates results that are greater than if interventions were implemented in isolation, and these results continue beyond programme close.

Annex 2: Evaluation matrix

Evaluation question and sub-questions	Hypotheses/ programme theories	Realist enquiry	Modules, sources, analysis
Portfolio-level (complementarity/synergies)			
1) **To what extent is FTESA a collection of individual interventions or a coherent portfolio?** a) <u>What:</u> To what extent has the combination of interventions generated results in excess of the programme's component parts (i.e. generated complementarities/synergies)? b) <u>How, why and for whom and in what circumstances:</u> How and why have these complementarities/synergies materialised? What were the mechanisms at play? Who has benefitted from the complementarities/synergies? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/ constraining factors) are conducive (or not) to generating benefits in excess of the programme's component parts? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*By funding interventions where there are identifiable complementarities and synergies, and creating links between interventions (some or all intervention components of a grant – e.g. linking grantees with G-Soko), FTESA generates results that are greater than if interventions were implemented in isolation, and these results continue beyond programme close.*	- Are grantees collaborating? To what extent? Who? How and why are grantees collaborating? In what circumstances? What are the results? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - Key informant interviews (KIIs) and semi-structured interviews (SSIs) - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis
Market-level (systemic change/ sustainability)			
2) **To what extent is FTESA likely to improve the functioning of national and regional staple food markets and generate systemic change?** a) <u>What:</u> To what extent is FTESA likely to improve the functioning of national and regional staple food markets and generate systemic change? Is there any evidence it has done so, so far? b) <u>How, why and for whom and in what circumstances:</u> How and why have changes materialised, or are likely to materialise? What are the likely mechanisms for the spread of behaviour changes across networks of actors? Which actors are pivotal to the spread of new behaviours? Who is likely to benefit? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) are conducive (or not) to generating systemic change? c) What indications are there of sustainability?[232] What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*By funding interventions where there is potential to generate wider change in the market (beyond the intervention itself), FTESA interventions deliver changes in market functioning that trigger widespread changes in behaviour (interest, motivations, practices) that are maintained after external support has ended, leading to higher volumes sold, better prices received, greater integration into value chains, and higher profits.*	- Have motivations, interests, behaviours, practices, relationships, etc. of actors in the supply chain changed? To what extent? For whom? How and why? In what circumstances? What are the results? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis - Adopt-Adapt-Expand-Respond (AAER) framework

[232] The EMU will look for early indicators of sustainability—from the trade and market systems literature.

Evaluation question and sub-questions	Hypotheses/ programme theories	Realist enquiry	Modules, sources, analysis
Individual-level (producer/farmer/trader/firm/consumer)			
3) **To what extent have improved trade support systems (output 1: storage, aggregation, information, value chain coordination, grades and standards, credit) increased production and trade?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA improved trade support systems? To what extent has production and trade increased as a result? Where there has been an increase in trade, to what extent has this trade been cross-border or within national boundaries? b) How, why, for whom and in what circumstances: How and why have these changes materialised? What were the mechanisms at play? Who has benefitted? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) were conducive (or not) to generating benefits for producers, farmers, traders and firms? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*i. **Storage and aggregation:** By addressing market constraints/failures through improving warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities, FTESA interventions will increase access to warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities for traders and farmers, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes:* - *by enabling farmers and traders to store surpluses at harvest time when prices are low and sell when prices are higher;* - *by reducing post-harvest losses, hence increasing sales volumes for farmers and traders;* - *by encouraging farmers to grow more produce, leading to more produce stored and sold;* - *by giving farmers greater bargaining power with traders as they do not need to sell all their produce (to avoid spoilage);* - *by enabling traders and farmers to aggregate their produce with others, and negotiate better prices for bulk purchases with buyers* *ii. **Market information:** By addressing market constraints/failures through improving improved market information, FTESA interventions will increase access to market information for traders and farmers, enabling them to use information to base their decisions (production, storage, sales) on more accurate and timely information, increasing trade between surplus and deficit areas and providing better information on when to store and release produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.* *iii. **Credit:** By addressing market constraints/failures through improving credit facilities, FTESA interventions will increase access to credit, enabling farmers to use credit to increase investments in inputs and other services, leading to improved yields, higher volumes, greater sales and increased incomes.* *iv. **Grades and standards:** By addressing market constraints/failures through improving the*	- What [*insert storage, credit, etc.*] are being accessed or used or adopted? To what extent? How and why? By whom? In what circumstances? What are the results (prices, yields, etc.)? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies, quantitative surveys and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis - Contribution analysis (case studies and thematic studies)

Evaluation question and sub-questions	Hypotheses/ programme theories	Realist enquiry	Modules, sources, analysis
	application of standards and grades for staple foods by traders and farmers, FTESA will improve the quality of produce and access to good quality storage facilities, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.		
4) **To what extent have improved availability and use of inputs (output 2: inputs) increased production and trade?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA improved availability and use of inputs? To what extent has production and trade increased as a result? b) How, why, for whom and in what circumstances: How and why have these changes materialised? What were the mechanisms at play? Who has benefitted? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) were conducive (or not) to generating benefits for producers, farmers, traders and firms? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*i. **Inputs:** By addressing market constraints/failures by facilitating greater private sector participation in seed and fertilizer markets, FTESA will enhance the availability of better quality inputs, leading to increased use, improved yields and production, and better quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.* *ii. **Seeds:** By addressing market constraints/failures by improving and harmonising seed policy and regulations, FTESA will accelerate the adoption and use of improved seed varieties, leading to improved yields and production, and better quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.* *iii. **Fertiliser:** By addressing market constraints/failures through improving the fertiliser and regulatory environment, FTESA will improve the functioning of fertiliser markets, leading to improved use of fertiliser and improved yields and production, and better quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes.*	- What inputs (seeds, fertiliser) are being traded by programme partners? To what extent? By whom? How and why? In what circumstances? What are the results (volumes, etc.)? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure? - What inputs (seeds, fertilisers) are being accessed or used? To what extent? By whom? How and why? In what circumstances? What are the results (prices, yields, etc.)? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies, quantitative surveys and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis - Contribution analysis (case studies and thematic studies)
5) **To what extent and how has FTESA brought in (or facilitated) SHFs in structured regional markets?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA brought SHFs into structured regional markets? b) How, why and for whom and in what circumstances: How and why have these changes materialised? What were the mechanisms at play creating these changes? How have SHFs participated in these markets? Who has benefitted (poor people, women)? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) are conducive (or not) to bringing in SHFs? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*By increasing access to more and better quality services and inputs for SHFs (including disadvantaged/poor groups – e.g. women), FTESA interventions will enhance the availability of better quality services and inputs for SHF, leading to increased use, improved yields and production, and better quality produce, leading to better (higher and/or more stable) prices, greater sales and increased incomes for SHF.*	- Are SHF participating? To what extent? Who? How and why? In what circumstances? What are the results (prices, etc.)? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies, quantitative surveys and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis - Contribution analysis (case studies and thematic studies)

Evaluation question and sub-questions	Hypotheses/ programme theories	Realist enquiry	Modules, sources, analysis
6) **To what extent has FTESA benefitted consumers?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA delivered benefits for consumers? b) How, why, for whom and in what circumstances: How and why have these changes materialised? What were the mechanisms at play creating these changes? Who has benefitted? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) are conducive (or not) to generating benefits for consumers? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*i. By improving availability of food across space, FTESA interventions will stabilise prices for consumers between surplus and deficit regions.* *ii. By improving availability of food across time, FTESA interventions will stabilise prices for consumers between harvest and hunger seasons.*	- Have prices changed? To what extent? For whom? How and why? In what circumstances? What are the results? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Case studies and synthesis; thematic studies; portfolio review** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis - Contribution analysis (case studies and thematic studies)
Regulatory/policy level			
7) **To what extent have FTESA approaches to supporting reform to relevant policies, regulations, etc. contributed to change?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA delivered policy change? b) How, why, for whom and in what circumstances: How and why have these changes materialised? What were the mechanisms at play creating these changes? Who has benefitted? What circumstances (conditions, enabling/constraining factors) are conducive (or not) to generating policy change? c) What indications are there of sustainability? What is the likelihood these will be sustained after direct support has ended?	*By identifying and targeting specific policy and regulatory reform that impedes functioning of the FTESA programme, FTESA will work through partners to facilitate policy and regulatory changes that improves the results generated by the programme and improve market functioning more broadly.*	- Have policies changed? To what extent? How and why? For whom? In what circumstances? Any unanticipated outcomes? - What do you think caused these changes? How has FTESA contributed? Are these changes likely to endure?	**Policy dialogue and influencing studies** - KIIs and SSIs - PMU and grantee documents and data - Thematic analysis and synthesis
Value for Money			
8) **Does FTESA offer Value for Money in the results it achieves, compared with possible alternatives?** a) What: To what extent has FTESA delivered VfM overall? Which approaches provide more/less VfM (within the programme and compared to other programmes)? b) How and why: How and why has FTESA delivered VfM (or not)?	*i. FTESA is economical in terms of the cost of the resources used.* *ii. FTESA maximises both technical and allocative efficiency (i.e. outputs achieved for a given input).* *iii. FTESA is the most cost-effective way of addressing the constraints and achieving expected results.*	Not applicable	**VfM assessment** - KIIs with PMU - PMU documents and data - 4E VfM assessment

Annex 3: Methodology

The individual evaluation modules provide more details on the methods applied. We provide a summary of key methodological issues here.

1. Sampling strategy and coverage

Case studies: We selected a purposive sample of grant-funded interventions based on a long list of criteria (as outlined in the EMU's inception report), consulting with the PMU. The following criteria proved most critical:

- Interventions where we could identify and locate farmers (direct beneficiaries) for interview.
- Identifying similar interventions to enable the exploration and testing of programme theories across interventions to enable cross-case comparison.
- Interventions that represent a significant proportion of investment and reflect the geographical spread of the overall portfolio, as well as different business models.
- Interventions that enable the exploration of specific lines of enquiry.
- Balance between different funding modalities (development and challenge fund).

Thematic studies: Originally, the focus of the thematic study was on EAGC/G-Soko and the grants linked to the G-Soko platform. Given several reviews of G-Soko in 2017 and DFID's interest in exploring other farmer aggregation mechanisms to help inform the new FTESA programme, DFID requested that the EMU also explore Farm Africa (not covered at baseline and only briefly at mid-term). We mapped the physical sites for the two grantees to identify those where we could speak with as many actors as practically possible (given logistical considerations) and cover the most grants with potential/actual links to EAGC/G-Soko and Farm Africa. The other grants included Classic Foods, Kilimo, Raphael, Shalem and Virtual City.

Grant coverage of modules

Grants	Qualitative endline case	Quantitative endline surveys	Thematic studies	Policy dialogue and influencing	Portfolio review	VfM assessment
ACTESA					All 20 grants	All 20 grants
Classic			x			
EAGC/G-Soko	x		x	x		
Farm Africa			x			
Joseph Initiative	x	x				
Kaderes	x	x				
Kilimo	x		x			
Mount Meru	x					
Raphael			x			
Shalem			x			
Virtual City	x		x			
Other grants						

The case and thematic studies covered seven out of 20 grants in detail, accounting for 51% of the total value of the portfolio, and 56% of the portfolio when we include the additional grants linked to EAGC/G-Soko and Farm Africa interventions.

Policy Dialogue and Influencing Study: We selected policy issues for analysis based on the following sampling criteria:

- Where the intended result happened.
- Where activities are ongoing.
- Policy issues central to the success of FTESA's overall aims and objectives.
- Pillar coverage: structured regional market systems, seeds and soya.
- Policy issues where FTESA is applying a range of approaches and activities.

2. Evaluation design

2a. Qualitative case studies

Combining contribution analysis and realist enquiry



Combining **contribution analysis**[233] and **realist enquiry** helps us to understand for each grant:

1. **STEP 1 – Contribution analysis:** The extent to which the intervention contributed to change and the role played by the intervention versus other factors by assessing: what change has happened, has the intervention contributed to the observed results, how much of a difference/contribution has the intervention made, and what other factors led to the change?
   a) **Change:** What is the pathway to change (drawing on GToC, programme theories and ICMOs)? Have these theorised changes happened? To what extent have these changes occurred, and for which

[233] Mayne, J. (2008) 'Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect', ILAC Brief 16.

different groups, etc.? Are there any unintended results, positive or negative? Are there are any indications of sustainability, and whether these will endure after the programme closes?

b) **FTESA contribution:** How significant was the FTESA grant's contribution to the observed changes? What other factors (not related to the FTESA grant) led to the change?

i. What is the evidence that the FTESA grant contributed to causing the observed changes? What is the evidence that non-FTESA factors contributed?

ii. What is the relative importance of the FTESA grant and non-FTESA factors in explaining the observed changes? How much of a difference (contribution) has the FTESA grant made?

2. **STEP 2 – Realist enquiry:** how and why the intervention worked (or not) and for whom (e.g. youth, poor, women), and in what circumstances/contexts, exploring the influence of the features of the intervention and contextual factors (enabling and constraining factors) on the underlying mechanisms that helped to generate change (or not).

a) **How and why** did FTESA contribute (or fail to contribute) to the observed changes? For **whom** (e.g. youth, poor, women) and in what **circumstances/contexts**?

b) What **features of the interventions/grant and contextual factors** (individual, interpersonal, organisational and institutional) triggered the **mechanisms** that contributed to the observed changes (or blocked the mechanisms from occurring)?

c) Assess likely sustainability: Whether there are any indications of sustainability, and whether the changes will endure after programme closure (exploring how and why including contextual factors).

Data quality and strength of evidence

- Quality of data in the underlying case studies: to what extent can we be sure that reported outcomes and the change pathways described in the case study reports happened? Each qualitative case study describes the strength of evidence for reported outcomes based on the following indications of strength of evidence for qualitative research:[234]
    - A good degree of triangulation: (a) within interviews, (b) across stakeholders and types of stakeholders, and/or (c) across data sources.
    - The position, knowledge, analytical capacity, reflexivity[235] and potential biases of primary informants.
    - What we know about the broader context.

  We carry this assessment through into the synthesis with further aggregation of the evidence contributing to triangulation.
- Second, in the synthesis, how confident are we that a specific programme theory explains the outcomes and change processes? Is there a range of evidence from across several projects? Or strong evidence from individual projects or activities? The extent to which we are confident that our synthesis of programme theory explains the outcomes and change processes is based on a combination of the strength of evidence for outcomes and how emerging theory compares to the ToC and baseline and mid-term evaluation findings, as well as the degree and extent to which we have evidence from the projects against the programme theories and/or ICMOs.

To assess strength of evidence for (and project contribution to) outcomes and ICMOs (realist enquiry), we apply the criteria developed by the BCURE evaluation team for the realist enquiry in their final evaluation, to

[234] We have drawn on the approach developed under the evaluation of the Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence Programme (BCURE). This was a £15.7 million initiative funded by the DFID from 2013–17. It aimed to increase the capacity of policymakers to use research more effectively, through building the skills, incentives and systems required to access, appraise and apply evidence in decision making. The annexes of the realist Final Evaluation (Vogel and Punton, 2018) can be found here: http://itad.com/reports/annexes-final-evaluation-building-capacity-use-research-evidence-bcure-programme/ (accessed 14 June 2018).

[235] In this context, reflexivity refers to self-awareness and the degree to which someone has/is able to reflect on their own biases (preconceptions, position, assumptions, values and beliefs) and the ways in which these may affect an investigation and the evidence presented.

make systematic judgments about the strength of evidence and contribution that are comparable across the case studies.

Outcome and ICMO strength of evidence and contribution

Strength of evidence	Outcomes	Realist enquiry	Contribution
Strong evidence	High level of confidence that the outcome occurred…	High level of confidence that the outcome occurred/did not occur because of *x* mechanism, operating in *y* context and because of *z* features of the intervention…	High level of confidence that FTESA contributed to the outcome…
	• Based on a good degree of triangulation (a) within interviews, (b) across stakeholders and types of stakeholders, and/or (c) across data sources; • …considering the position, knowledge, analytical capacity, reflexivity and potential biases of primary informants; and • …also considering what we know about the broader context.		
Some evidence	More confident than not that the outcome occurred…	More confident than not that the outcome occurred/did not occur because of *x* mechanism, operating in *y* context and because of *z* features of the intervention…	More confident than not that FTESA contributed to the outcome…
	But reduced confidence due to: • …shortcomings regarding triangulation; • …concerns that the position, knowledge, analytical capacity, reflexivity and potential biases of primary informants lowers the reliability of evidence; and/or • …what we know about what is happening within the broader context.		
Limited evidence	Low level of confidence that the outcome occurred, given that…	Low level of confidence that the outcome occurred/did not occur because of *x* mechanism, operating in *y* context and because of *z* features of the intervention, given that…	Low level of confidence that FTESA contributed to the outcome, given that…
	• …evidence comes from a small number of sources with limited triangulation; • …there are major concerns that the position, knowledge, analytical capacity, reflexivity and potential biases of primary informants lowers the reliability of evidence; and/or • …there are contradictory insights into what is happening within the broader context.		

Coding system

We synthesised across the qualitative and quantitative case studies to answer the evaluation questions (1-6). We coded for themes that included outcomes, ICMOs (kept together where possible) and the evaluation questions and programme theories. We coded manually into the case study reports. Coding into the case study documents used a combination of colour coding and using comments to add codes/ keywords to chunks of text. We used multiple codes for sections of text, where relevant.

2b. Quantitative surveys

We conducted quantitative endline household surveys for the two grants subject to quantitative baseline surveys. We carried out before-and-after analysis[236] for Kaderes and difference-in-difference[237] for Joseph Initiative to assess impact on beneficiaries.

Kaderes quantitative survey[238]

The team undertook surveys at baseline (Q4 2015) and again in Q4 2017 to measure changes in output and outcome indicators for the Kaderes project. The team interviewed the same respondents at baseline and endline. The baseline panel consisted of an intervention group made up of farmers enrolled with Kaderes, and

[236] Without control group.
[237] With control group.
[238] Itad, Kaderes 2017 Monitoring Study Report (April 2018).

a suitable control group (counterfactual) not enrolled with Kaderes.[239] The intention was that the baseline design would enable comparison of the level of change in key indicators in the intervention group against the change in the control group to assess the effects of the Kaderes project on its beneficiaries and to capture the effect of the main intervention funded by FTESA, the warehouse. However, given delays in construction, the warehouse was not yet operational in December 2017. Therefore, the EMU and DFID agreed to downscale the endline survey to a monitoring survey, interviewing only Kaderes beneficiary farmers in the intervention group and not the baseline control group. We employed a before-and-after analysis to assess whether extension services (e.g. farmer training) took place between 2015 and 2017, to what extent beneficiary farmers benefited, and whether there were measurable changes in farm indicators such as gross margins and harvest volumes.

Joseph Initiative survey[240]

The survey followed a quasi-experimental impact assessment design, with difference-in-difference analysis of key indicators between the intervention and control groups at baseline and endline. We conducted surveys at baseline (Q1 2016) and endline (Q1 2018) interviewing the same respondents in a longitudinal panel design, including the Joseph Initiative intervention group and a control group (counterfactual).[241] This enabled comparison of the level of change in key indicators in the intervention group against the change in the control group, enabling an assessment of the project's effect on its beneficiaries. The survey explored whether farmers registered in the project experienced significant increases in their maize crop margins compared to farmers in the control group and whether any such changes were linked to an increase in agricultural efficiency and productivity brought about by the project.

2c. Thematic studies: assessing systemic change

We use system-level frameworks for exploring the presence of systemic change. In answering the evaluation question on systemic change and the sustainability aspects of other questions, we assessed 'systemic change' in line with the Adopt-Adapt-Expand-Respond (AAER) framework.[242] This examines the behaviours of actors in a market system to identify the degree to which they have adopted behaviours, adapted behaviours to suit their own purposes, or crowded in to a new market segment by exhibiting behaviours they observed. 'Respond' refers to other types of changes in the environment (e.g. regulatory) that may occur due to other changes in agent behaviour.

- **Adopt.** The market player has successfully adopted a behaviour/practice change to the ultimate benefit of the poor producer/worker/consumer, recognises the value of continuing with these changes irrespective of programme inputs, and has accordingly made plans to invest in upholding these changes and cover any associated recurrent costs.
- **Adapt.** The market player that adopted the behaviour/practice changes pioneered during the pilot has made qualitative and/or quantitative investments that allow them to continue with or augment changed practices, without programme support. These actions, independent of the programme, constitute an 'acid test' for whether pro-poor outcomes will be sustained at any level.

[239] The intervention group sample at baseline was drawn at random from farmer lists provided by Kaderes. The monitoring survey reached 210 of the 219 baseline farmers. Of the 210 surveyed farmers, 18 had either stopped agricultural activities or dropped out of the programme. This quantitative case study analyses the information from interviews with the remaining 192 farmers, 142 of which grew maize and beans on coffee intercrop systems, comparing 2017 and 2015 information from the same households, employing a panel design.

[240] Itad, Joseph Initiative Endline Qualitative Case Study (August 2018).

[241] We selected the intervention sample for the baseline survey from lists of farmers living in Masindi district who had signed up with the Joseph Initiative in the 12 months before enumeration. The control group is located in the northern sub-counties Butemba, Gayaza and Nsambya of Kyankwanzi district. This area lies around 50–80km away from Masindi town to the southwest of Masindi district and has similar livelihood zones as Masindi, with a focus on maize cultivation. Sample sizes were calculated with the goal to detect an increase of 50% in the average gross margin within the intervention group between baseline and endline, at 5% significance levels with 80% power. These assumptions resulted in planned sample sizes of 231 for the intervention and 360 for the control group.

[242] The Springfield Centre (2014), 'Adopt-Adapt-Expand-Respond: a framework for managing and measuring systemic change processes'. Itad Farm Africa Thematic Study

- **Expand.** Several market players, like those that pioneered the pro-poor behaviour/practice changes, have adopted comparable changes (either pure copies or variants on the original innovation) that continue without programme support.
- **Respond.** The emergence and continued presence of the pro-poor changes have incited market players in supporting systems to react to the new market reality by reorganising, assuming new/improved roles, developing their own offers, or moving to take advantage of any opportunities created. The response enables pro-poor behaviour/practice changes to develop further, or evolve, and indicates a new capability within the system, suggesting that it can and wants to support pro-poor solutions to emerge and grow.

2d. Policy Dialogue and Influencing Studies: assessing policy influence

In answering the question on policy influence, we examined specific policy influencing initiatives. The environment for influencing interventions is typically unpredictable: causes and effects are not easy to define clearly and may change depending on the context and circumstances. To interpret FTESA's progress toward influencing relevant policy and regulatory changes, the study therefore explores programme implementation and the influence of context on the success and failure of interventions.

The study team developed the questions for study based on the teams' understanding of FTESA's influencing strategy and what we considered useful lines of enquiry, in consultation with the PMU and DFID, employing a bottom-up (from activities to outcomes) and top-down (from outcomes to activities) approach. In practice, the bottom-up approach was more relevant since many of the policy influencing initiatives were yet to deliver intended outcomes.

- **Bottom up: approach to influencing:** focus on understanding the approach taken (strategy, engagement plan and activities) for a policy issue, exploring the potential contribution to expected change as well as identifying any unexpected potential changes. Questions include:
    - What does the programme do to affect change?
    - Who does the programme aim to influence?
    - What are the effects of the chosen approach?
    - To what extent are activities linked and co-occur to deliver results?
    - How does context influence the achievement of results?
    - How does the programme learn?



- **Top down: Change pathways:** focus on understanding an observed change and retrospectively examining multiple potential causes. Questions include:
    - What happened? What changes occurred?
    - What caused the observed outcome and why did it happen?
    - What and who influenced or contributed to the observed change?
    - What were the most significant contributing factors?
    - What changed over time in the context?
    - To what extent did the programme contribute to these changes?



3. Data collection methods against evaluation modules

Module	Documents and data review	Stakeholder survey	Interviews				
			PMU	FTESA partners	Grantees	Beneficiaries (e.g. farmers, other supply chain actors)	Non-FTESA beneficiaries (e.g. farmers, other supply chain actors)
1a. Qualitative case studies	■		■	■	■	■	■
1b. Quantitative surveys	■		■	■	■	■	■
2. Thematic studies	■		■	■	■	■	■
3. Policy dialogue and influencing studies	■		■	■	■		
4.Portfolio review (including online stakeholder survey)	■	■					
5. VfM assessment	■		■				

Annex 4: Evaluation questions and main modules

Evaluation questions	Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned					Synthesis
	Case studies and surveys	Thematic studies	Policy dialogue and influencing studies	Portfolio review	VfM assessment	Overall interpretation
EQ1: To what extent is FTESA a collection of individual interventions or a coherent portfolio?						
EQ2: To what extent is FTESA likely to improve the functioning of national and regional staple food markets and generate systemic change?						
EQ3: To what extent have improved trade support systems increased production and trade?						
EQ4: To what extent have improved availability and use of inputs and application of good agricultural practices increased production and trade?						
EQ5: To what extent and how has FTESA brought (or facilitated) smallholder farmers into structured regional markets?						
EQ6: To what extent has FTESA benefited consumers?						
EQ7: To what extent have FTESA approaches to supporting reform to relevant policies, regulations, etc. contributed to change?						
EQ8: Does FTESA offer Value for Money in the results it achieves, compared with possible alternatives?						

Shading indicate depth of data collection and analysis against each module

Annex 5: Generic data collection templates

a. Interviews

Evaluation questions/ theories	Interview questions	Findings (coded by grant where relevant)																			Synthesis
		INT1	INT2	INT3	INT4	INT5	INT6	INT7	INT8	INT9	INT10	INT11	INT12	INT13	INT14	INT15	INT16	INT17	INT18	INT19	INT20	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories	Interview questions, probing questions, etc.																					
Sub-questions and theories	Interview questions, probing questions, etc.																					

b. Documents

Evaluation questions/ theories	Findings (coded by grant where relevant)																				Synthesis
	DOC1	DOC2	DOC3	DOC4	DOC5	DOC6	DOC7	DOC8	DOC9	DOC10	DOC11	DOC12	DOC13	DOC14	DOC15	DOC16	DOC17	DOC18	DOC19	DOC20	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories																					
Sub-questions and theories																					

Annex 6: Module evidence assessment frameworks

a. Case Synthesis (evidence from review of interviews, documents and data)

Evaluation questions/theories	Findings								Synthesis
	CS1	CS2	CS3	CS4	CS5	CS6	QS1	QS2	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories									
Sub-questions and theories									

b. Thematic Studies (evidence from review of interviews, documents and data)

Evaluation questions/theories	Findings							Synthesis
	GR1	GR2	GR3	GR4	GR5	GR6	GR7	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories								
Sub-questions and theories								

c. Policy Dialogue and Influencing Studies (evidence from review of interviews, documents and data)

Evaluation questions/theories	Findings																		Synthesis
	GR1	GR2	GR3	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories																			
Sub-questions and theories																			

d. Portfolio Review (evidence from review of documents, data and online survey)

Evaluation questions/theories	Findings																			Synthesis
	GR1	GR2	GR3	GR4	GR5	GR6	GR7	GR8	GR9	GR10	GR11	GR12	GR13	GR14	GR15	GR16	GR17	GR18	GR19	GR20	Overall interpretation
Evaluation question and theories																					
Sub-questions and theories																					

Annex 7: Strength of evidence and triangulation

5 very strong; 4 strong; 3 medium; 2 low; 1 very low

Evidence available for each grant

Evidence sources	Joseph	Kaderes	EAGC	Farm Africa	Kilimo	Mount Meru	Virtual City	Classic	Raphael	Shalem	Afritec	ENAS	Musoma	Seba	Sosoma	WFP	Yak	ACTESA	Esoko	Pee Pee
Grantee monitoring data and reports	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
PMU verification missions and reports	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Qualitative case studies	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y													
Quantitative surveys	Y	Y																		
Thematic studies			Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y										
Policy dialogue and influencing studies			Y																	
Portfolio review	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Overall strength of evidence and triangulation	**5**	**5**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**

Evidence available against each evaluation question

Evidence sources	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	EQ7	EQ8
Grantee monitoring data and progress reports	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
PMU monitoring data and progress reports	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Key informant interviews	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Overall strength of evidence and triangulation	**3**	**3**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**3**

Evaluation modules against each evaluation question

Modules	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	EQ7	EQ8
Qualitative case studies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Quantitative surveys	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Thematic studies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Policy dialogue and influencing studies							Y	
Portfolio review	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
VfM Assessment								Y
Overall strength of evidence and triangulation	**3**	**3**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**3**

Annex 8: Programme context

Snapshot of the country context for the main countries currently receiving support under FTESA.

Current situation in the region (October 2018)

In East Africa, staple food price declined across most markets in Uganda, and Tanzania because of ongoing May-to-August harvests. Prices increased seasonably in most markets in Kenya as supplies tightened with the start of the lean season.[243] In Southern Africa, domestic maize availability remained adequate with above average supply levels for Zambia and Tanzania. Maize prices were generally stable. Maize grain and maize meal were able to circulate between surplus and deficit areas without major trade restrictions within the region.[244]

According to the WFP, El Niño is likely to start towards late 2018, petering out by mid-2019, with a peak sometime in January-February 2019. It is expected to be weaker and shorter than 2015-16's El Niño. In Southern Africa, rainfall deficits may cause staple food prices to rise from late-2019 enough to affect food security for poor and vulnerable populations. In East Africa, increased rainfall is expected to result in increased production, but will also increase flood risks in Kenya's river systems.[245]

Kenya

Although agriculture contributes about 30% of GDP, the country commonly faces food security concerns and therefore depends on formal and informal imports from its neighbours (especially Uganda and Tanzania, and Ethiopia[246]) and key global trading partners to meet national demand.[247] This makes the country vulnerable to volatility of world food prices and trade barriers by other countries.

In Kenya, smallholders account for 75% of agricultural output and 70% of market supplies.[248] Women provide 80% of farm labour and manage 40% of smallholder farms, but own only 1% of agricultural land and obtain only 10% of agricultural credit.[249] Yields of several staple crops have declined because of land degradation, high costs of inputs and services, overdependence on rainfed production and post-harvest losses of 20–30% for cereals.[250]

However, Kenya experienced historically above-average March to May long rains in 2018 and this has continued to drive food security improvements.[251] In August 2018 prices increased seasonably in most markets in Kenya as supplies tightened with the of the lean season.[252]

Maize is Kenya's most important staple food crop, and will remain so in the foreseeable future.[253] Over 95% of smallholder farmers (3.5 million) grow maize. It is crucial for the country's food security.[254] There is a forecast marginal increase in maize harvested in 2018-19 due to the Government of Kenya's new incentives for farmers under its 'Big Four' programme, and due to the country's emergence from a period of erratic

[243] FEWSNET (Aug 2018) August 2018 Global Price Watch
[244] Ibid.
[245] WFP (Sept 2018) El Nino: Outlook 2018
[246] WFP (2017) Greater Horn of Africa Climate Risk and Food Security Atlas: Technical Summary
[247] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Kenya 2016, World Food Programme
[248] Government of Kenya (2009) Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2009–2020, in: WFP (June 2018) Kenya country strategic plan (2018–2023)
[249] Ibid.
[250] Mutungi and Affognon (2013) Addressing Food Losses: Status and Way Forward for Postharvest Research and Innovations in Kenya. International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) Policy Brief No. 5/13, in: WFP (June 2018) Kenya country strategic plan (2018–2023)
[251] FEWSNET (September 2018) Food security improvements driven by above-average long rains and low staple food prices
[252] FEWSNET (Aug 2018) August 2018 Global Price Watch.
[253] USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (Feb 2018) Kenya Grain and Feed Annual 2018
[254] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Kenya 2016, World Food Programme

weather and Fall Army Worm infestations. Kenya remains a maize production deficit country, and importations—primarily from COMESA and the EAC—are expected to pick up in 2018-19.[255]

Rice production, like maize, is part of the Government of Kenya's food security 'Big Four' agenda. Rice consumption continues to increase due to consumer preferences. Demand exceeds supply, and the deficit is currently offset by imports from Asian countries. Rice retail prices were very volatile during 2016-17, but are expected to stabilise.[256]

Rwanda

FEWSNET expects Rwanda will experience an above average harvest in 2018-19, which is expected to improve household food security and income. Recent successive good seasons have meant better food security for poor households and lower staple food prices as compared to last year.[257] A good harvest in mid-2018 increased availability of all staple food crops except **beans**, for which there were production shortfalls.[258]

In Rwanda, 88% of agricultural households grow **beans**, 49% grow **maize** and 45% grow potatoes.[259] Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa, which limits the opportunity to expand area under production. With a growing population, food security is an issue. The government is addressing this through the Plan for the Strategic Transformation of Agriculture II – the main objective is the intensification and development of sustainable production systems.

Tanzania

Maize is Tanzania's main staple crop,[260] but maize productivity is very low in spite of its importance, due to lack of improved seeds, inefficient fertilizer delivery system, post-harvest loss, pests and diseases.[261] Tanzania exports maize to Rwanda, Zambia and Kenya, among others.[262] Maize prices declined in 2017-18, in part due to the export ban introduced in June 2016.[263] In August 2018 staple food price declined across most markets in Tanzania because of ongoing May-to-August harvests.[264]

Almost 20% of farmers are involved in **rice** production.[265] **Rice** is also a staple food, which Tanzania imports primarily from Asian countries, but also exports to Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya—in 2017-18 Tanzania exported 5,000MT of rice to Kenya.[266] In mid-2017, Tanzania was the second largest exporter of **beans** in East Africa.[267]

Uganda

Cooking banana (matoke), dry cassava chips, sorghum, millet, beans, and white maize are important food commodities for Ugandans.[268] In August 2018 staple food price declined across most markets in Uganda because of ongoing May-to-August harvests.[269]

Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, **maize** is not Uganda's primary staple and production of maize is primarily an income earner. In mid-2017, Uganda was the biggest exporter of maize and dry **beans** in East Africa, exporting

[255] USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (Feb 2018) Kenya Grain and Feed Annual 2018.
[256] Ibid.
[257] FEWSNET (Sept 2018) Early start of Season A rains and favorable forecasts bode well for sustained food security
[258] FEWSNET (July 2018) Recent harvests improve food availability of all major staples except beans
[259] WFP (2015) Rwanda 2015 Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis.
[260] FEWSNET (Aug 2018) Tanzania Price Bulletin
[261] USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (April 2018) Tanzania Grain and Feed Annual 2018
[262] Ibid.
[263] Ibid.
[264] FEWSNET (Aug 2018) August 2018 Global Price Watch
[265] USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (April 2018) Tanzania Grain and Feed Annual 2018.
[266] Ibid.
[267] FAO (July 2017) East Africa Cross-border Trade Bulletin
[268] FEWSNET (Sept 2018) Uganda Price Bulletin
[269] FEWSNET (Aug 2018) August 2018 Global Price Watch

primarily to Kenya, followed by South Sudan.[270] Uganda imported more **rice** in this same period, due to two consecutive seasons of below average harvests.[271]

Zambia

Maize is Zambia's main staple commodity. FEWSNET reported that Zambia's large 2016/17 harvest resulted in lower than normal prices for maize (a record harvest of 3.6 million MT) and some cash crops—including **soy**, and increased access to these foods for farmers and market-dependent households.[272] The supply of soy increased in response to high prices offered for it in the previous season, though these prices fell drastically in response to the large supply.[273]

Zambia is an important exporter of maize in Southern Africa.[274] In mid-2017 Zambian maize grain was the cheapest in East Africa and was likely to remain so—in this period Kenya imported 100,000MT of maize from Zambia.[275]

[270] FAO (July 2017) East Africa Cross-border Trade Bulletin.
[271] Ibid.
[272] FEWSNET (Sept 2017) Food Security Outlook Update: ZAMBIA Food Security Report
[273] Ibid.
[274] Regional Maize Market Fundamentals, August 2016, FEWSNET
[275] FAO (July 2017) East Africa Cross-border Trade Bulletin.

Annex 9: Results against DFID logframe[276]

Indicator	Gender	Achieved Year 5	Cumulative Year 5	Target (End Year 5)	Variance
Output 1.1: Number of male/female farmers accessing new/improved storage/ aggregation services/facilities as a result of FoodTrade	M	104,755	310,784		
	F	96,875	243,579		
	Total	201,630	554,363	254,183	300,180
Output 1.2: Number of male/female farmers accessing improved market information system as a result of FoodTrade	M	56,356	126,700		
	F	24,593	62,376		
	Total	80,949	189,076	180,000	9,076
Output 1.3: Number of male/female farmers accessing improved value chain co-ordination (e.g. application of grade and standard to their products, improved logistic and virtual market place) as a result of FoodTrade	M	82,506	250,563		
	F	60,629	201,817		
	Total	143,135	452,380	20,000	432,380
Output 1.4: Number of male/female farmers accessing warehouse receipt and supplier credit as a results of FoodTrade	M	599	19,523		
	F	403	11,606		
	Total	1,002	31,129	50,000	-18,871
Output 1.5: Number of private sector entities that adopt common grade and standard as a result of FoodTrade		251	294	68	226
Output 2.1a: Volume of new or improved inputs traded by programme partners (Metric Ton) as a result of FoodTrade - Seeds		881	11,303	22	11,281
Output 2.1b: Volume of new or improved inputs traded by programme partners (Metric Ton) as a result of FoodTrade - Fertiliser		7,218	15,177	500	14,677
Output 2.2: Number of male and female farmers using improved inputs as a result of the activities of programme beneficiary input suppliers	M	22,734	132,529		
	F	20,348	105,001		
	Total	43,082	237,530	15,000	222,530
Output 3.1: Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes identified for which a dedicated influencing strategy is developed		7	39	20	19

[276] FTESA (2018) *PMU Final Report.*

Output 3.2: Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes for which a dedicated influencing strategy is being implemented		10	33	20	13
Output 3.3: Number of identified regulatory or policy changes for which public-private dialogue platform functioning as outlined in each influencing strategy		14	29	8	21
Outcome 1: Net additional farm gate price received by FoodTrade beneficiaries relative to local comparator		21%	21%	10%	11%
Outcome 2: Volume of staple food sold by FoodTrade farmer beneficiaries (this measures the percentage increase in volume with the unit of calculation being metric ton)		40%	40%	20%	20%
Outcome 3a: Number of additional farmers benefiting from national and cross border value ch ains	M	118,711	293,698		
	F	71,985	204,555		
	Total	190,696	498,253	375,347	122,906
Outcome 3b: Number of additional individuals benefiting from national and cross border value chains including household members		953,480	2,491,265	1,876,733	614,532
Outcome 4: Number of improvements to regional trade policy/ its implementation to which policy facility-led activities contributed		8	13	10	3
Impact 1: Percentage differential between hungry and harvest season prices for key food staples (maize in key markets and rice in Tanzania)			**Maize:** Nairobi - 12%; Tororo - 37%; Dar - 31%; Kigali - 3%; Lilongwe - 52%; Lusaka - 32%; Rice: Dar -25%	**Maize:** Nairobi - 21%; Tororo - 42%; Dar - 17%; Kigali - 13%; Lilongwe - 64%; Lusaka - 12%; Rice: Dar - 16%	**Maize:** Nairobi - 9%; Tororo - 5%; Dar - 14%; Kigali - 10%; Lilongwe - 12%; Lusaka - 20%; Rice: Dar - 8%
Impact 2: (a) Number of consumer households in areas with more stable intra-annual food prices (b) Number of consumers in areas with more stable intra-annual food prices (includes all household members of consumer households)			(a) 596,264 (b) 2,981,320	(a) 314,700 (b) 1,573,500	(a) 281,564 (b) 1,407,820
Impact 3: Volume of regional food trade between programme countries (bilateral food trade between six (6) countries of focus, additional trade above existing trend): (Focus) maize and rice			84%	5% additional trade (above trend)	79%
Impact 4: Number of traders not supported by FoodTrade or similar initiatives trading through G-Soko platform			24	25	-1

Annex 10: Grant portfolio

This annex provides a snapshot of the overall portfolio of grants based on the *Portfolio Review Report*.[277]

Grants, type, round and budgets

The total portfolio includes six development fund and 16 challenge fund grants, with two grants cancelled in 2015/16. There were four funding rounds for the challenge fund:

- 2013 round 1: Early bird window invested in new technologies
- 2014 round 2: Inputs and related services
- 2015 round 3: Farmer aggregation mechanisms
- 2016 round 4: Soybean value chain

Between 2014 and 2016, the following received awards under the development fund:

- 2014: EAGC and ACTESA
- 2015: Kilimo and World Food Programme (WFP)
- 2016: Farm Africa non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortium

Grant size

The development fund grants comprise 59% of the total value of grants while the challenge fund accounts for 41%. The WFP grant is the largest and Sosoma the smallest. The average value for challenge fund grants is £0.54 million and £1.8 million for development fund grants.

FTESA grants by disbursement value



[277] Itad (2018) *Portfolio Review*.

Overview of grants[278]

	Grant	CF/DF	Round	Year	Output	Funds disbursed £	Model	Specific crops, if applicable
1	Esoko	CF	Early bird	2013	1	387,048	Market information system	
2	Mount Meru	CF	Early bird	2013	1, 2	933,302	Off-taker	Soy
3	Virtual City	CF	Early bird	2013	1, 2	566,978	Trade platform	
4	Joseph Initiative	CF	Round 2	2014	1, 2	981,311	Off-taker	Maize
5	Kaderes	CF	Round 2	2014	1, 2	450,000	Lead firm consortium	Beans
6	Ets Nkubili Alfred & Sons (ENAS)	CF	Round 2	2014	2	955,633	Inputs (fertiliser)	
7	Pee Pee	CF	Round 2	2014	1	500,003	Services	Maize, beans
8	Afritec	CF	Round 2	2014	2	449,220	Inputs (seed)	Rice
9	Musoma Food Co. Ltd	CF	Round 3	2015	1, 2	329,451	Lead firm consortium	Maize
10	Yak Fair Trade	CF	Round 3	2015	1, 2	542,153	Off-taker	Maize, beans
11	Sosoma Industries Ltd	CF	Round 3	2015	1, 2	103,463	Off-taker	Maize, soy
12	Shalem Investment	CF	Round 3	2015	1, 2	250,034	Lead firm consortium	Maize, beans, soy
13	Raphael Group Ltd	CF	Round 3	2015	1, 2	444,351	Lead firm consortium	Beans
14	Classic Foods Ltd.	CF	Round 4	2016	1, 2	430,355	Off-taker	Soy, maize
15	Seba Foods Ltd.	CF	Round 4	2016	1, 2	754,021	Off-taker	Soy
16	ACTESA	DF	2014	2014	3	1,057,922	Policy	
17	EAGC/G-Soko	DF	2014	2014	1, 3	3,647,720	Services, policy, trade platform	
18	Kilimo Trust	DF	2015	2015	1, 2	1,300,243	Lead firm consortium	Beans
19	WFP Farm to Market Alliance	DF	2016	2016	1, 2	3,772,760	Forward delivery contract	Maize
20	Farm Africa	DF	2016	2016	1	2,401,631	NGO consortium	Maize, rice, beans
	Total					20,257,599		

[278] We exclude the cancelled grants, Technoserve and Victoria Seeds

Grants by output, sub-output and model

Grants typically cover more than one of FTESA's three output areas:

- **Output 1: improved post-harvest markets** (storage and aggregation, market information, value chain coordination, credit, standards and grades)
- **Output 2: improved input markets** (seeds and fertiliser)
- **Output 3: improved policy and regulatory framework**

Three grants fall under output 1 only; two grants under output 2 only; one grant under output 3 only; 13 grants under both output 1 and output 2; and one grant falls under both output 1 and 3.

Number of grants according to sub-output[279]

#	Output and sub-output	No. of grants
1.1	Number of male/female farmers accessing new/improved storage/aggregation services/facilities as a result of FTESA	14
1.2	Number of male/female farmers accessing improved market information system as a result of FTESA	3
1.3	Number of male/female farmers accessing improved value chain coordination (e.g. application of grades and standards to their products, improved logistics and virtual market place) as a result of FTESA	17
1.4	Number of male/female farmers accessing warehouse receipts and supplier credit as a result of FTESA	4
1.5	Number of private sector entities that adopt common grades and standards as a result of FTESA	2
2.1a	Volume (MT) of new or improved inputs traded by programme partners as a result of FTESA (seeds)	13
2.1b	Volume (MT) of new or improved inputs traded by programme partners as a result of FTESA (fertiliser)	11
2.2	Number of male/female farmers using improved inputs as a result of the activities of programme beneficiary input suppliers	14
3.1	Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes identified for which a dedicated influencing strategy is developed	2
3.2	Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes for which a dedicated influencing strategy is being implemented	2
3.3	Number of identified regulatory or policy changes for which public–private dialogue platform functioning as outlined in each influencing strategy	1

Most grantees are active in improving value chain coordination, supporting farmers to use improved inputs and improving farmer access to storage and aggregation. Only a few grantees are working on improving farmers' access to market information systems and credit, and with private sector entities on adopting common grades and standards. Only two grantees (EAGC and ACTESA) are working on policy issues.

Several grants implemented farmer aggregation mechanisms under output 1:

- **WFP forward delivery contracts:** Under the Farm to Market Alliance (FtMA) project, WFP facilitated the signing of forward delivery contracts between aggregators and buyers/off-takers. These contracts included a pre-set 'floor price' (a minimum price), reviewed and revised at the time of sale to reflect current market

[279] PMU end-of-project grantee data (April 2018)

prices. WFP also linked aggregators to agro-dealers to improve smallholder farmers access to services and inputs.

- **Farm Africa NGO consortium**: Farm Africa's intervention facilitates farmer-based organisations entering into supply contracts with local buyers. Farm Africa's project partner RUDI facilitates consortia between farmer-based organisations, input suppliers, buyers and banks. Farm Africa also linked farmer-based organisations to the EAGC's G-Soko trading platform to enable them to aggregate and sell grain using the platform.
- **Lead firm consortium model:** Kilimo Trust formed 12 trading consortia, formalised with Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), that linked smallholder farmers to buyers (a lead firm), agro-input suppliers and financial institutions. Within each consortium, farmer-based organisations signed supply contracts with buyers. Lead firms include Kaderes, Shalem Investments, Musoma Foods and Raphael Group.
- **Off-taker model**: Off-takers made agreements with farmer-based organisations or individual farmers to buy aggregated quantities of grain. In most cases, off-takers also provided farmers with support on post-harvest handling and access to inputs. Off-takers include Classic Foods, Joseph Initiative, Mount Meru Millers, Seba Foods, Sosoma Foods and Yak Fair Trade.

Other grantees include:

- Esoko, providing access to market information
- Virtual City, providing an agro-voucher application
- Pee Pee, selling Purdue Improved Crop Storage (PICS) bags
- EAGC, promoting grades and standards, certifying warehouses, supporting village aggregation centres, providing an electronic trading platform and influencing staple food policy
- ENAS and Afritec, both retailers/service providers in the inputs market
- ACTESA, working to change staple food policy

Geographical areas

FTESA's intended programme scope covered nine countries across East and Southern Africa.[280] The programme's operations and grant coverage focused largely on four countries in East Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) and one in Southern Africa (Zambia). Tanzania is the country with the greatest grant coverage/activity, followed by Kenya and Uganda.

[280] Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Annex 11: Grant summaries[281]

FTESA grantees
Alliance for Commodity Trade in East and Southern Africa (ACTESA)
The Alliance for Commodity Trade in East and Southern Africa (ACTESA) is a regional agricultural specialised agency of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). ACTESA's mission is to integrate smallholder farmers into domestic, regional and international markets through an improved policy environment and expanded market facilities and services. FoodTrade ESA's investment has assisted ACTESA to facilitate the domestication of harmonised seed trade regulations in East and Southern Africa. The improvements in the policy and regulatory framework for seed production and trade within the region is expected to result in: 1) increased trade volume for improved seed, 2) increased number of and incomes for smallholder seed producers, 3) increased volume of improved seed produced, 4) increased number of farmers accessing improved seed. Farm Africa - NGO Consortium
Afritec Seed Company Ltd.
Afritec Seeds Ltd. is a limited for-profit company registered in Kenya with its core business in hybrid rice seed. The company is a beneficiary of product development contracts with BBSL and Hybrids East Africa Limited (HEAL). With the grant from FoodTrade ESA, the project is taking hybrid rice technology from the research farms of HEAL, and into the hands of small farmers around Eastern Africa. A key to Afritec's strategy is ensuring that farmers get provided pure, high quality clean seed and to help them transition from traditional varietals to the hybrid types. Afritec is marketing the very first hybrids developed in sub-Saharan Africa, seeds bred specifically for the needs of African farmers.
Classic Foods Ltd.
Classic Foods Ltd. is a food processing company established in 2007 to buy milk in-bulk quantities from farmers and sell it to milk processors, transforming into a milk processor in 2009. The business has since expanded into maize flour, porridge composite flour and animal feeds. To overcome the adverse climate change related challenges and the resultant erratic supply of raw materials, Classic Foods is providing capacity building and farmers' support initiatives, with the aim of increasing farmers' soybean produce and growing their markets. The Enhanced Crop Production, Value Chain Additions and Post-Harvest Crop Management project is further providing farmers with a ready market for their produce by procuring all sellable quantities of soybean to process maize-soya porridge flour and use the soy cake to process animal feeds. The farmers are benefitting from capacity building and extension service programs implemented by the company in Kenya and Uganda. Farmers are organised into groups and cooperatives for ease of administration.
The Eastern African Grain Council (EAGC)
The Eastern African Grain Council (EAGC) is a private sector membership-based organisation registered in Kenya. With the grant awarded by UK Aid through the FoodTrade ESA programme, EAGC in partnership with various industry stakeholders developed a private sector-driven, market platform that is linking buyers and sellers in staple foods trade across East Africa. The G-Soko platform is promoting structure and consistency in grain trade. It is facilitating title transfer, market transparency, and price discovery. The platform reduces transaction costs because coordination is managed through a centralised exchange. The G-Soko market platform is also accelerating utilisation of grades and standards for maize and beans, promoting certification of regional warehouses and extending the use of a regional warehouse receipt mechanism. Certified warehouses are automated and linked to G-Soko. In summary, G-Soko is ensuring that farmers growing maize and beans in East Africa and can sell their produce across the region through regionally certified warehouses.
Ets Nkubilli Alfred & Sons Ltd. (ENAS)
Established in 1997, Ets Nkubilli Alfred & Sons (ENAS) is a limited, for-profit company registered in Rwanda with the core business of fertiliser distribution. In addition to fertiliser importation and distribution, ENAS

[281] FTESA (2017) *Summary Grantee Profiles.*

is involved in livestock breeding, coffee washing stations, agriculture extension services, agricultural inputs and the buying and selling of staple crops. The goal of the grant is to establish the first Nitrogen-Phosphorous-Potassium (NPK) blending plant in Rwanda to blend fertilisers for the Rwandan market and secondarily, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC.
Esoko Networks Ltd.
Esoko Networks Ltd. is a for profit company aimed at making agriculture more profitable for smallholder farmers. Esoko has grown to become a leading initiative in delivering market information to farmers across Africa. The company developed a real time, SMS-driven, market information service for grain farmers, buyers, resellers and other agri-businesses. The East African Regional Market Information System (EARM) enables farmers to learn market prices, understand price trends, gain knowledge on crop management and climate issues, and better manage input supplies.
Farm Africa - NGO Consortium
Farm Africa works to reduce poverty permanently by unleashing smallholder farmers' ability to grow their incomes and manage their natural resources sustainably. The project is supporting smallholders in rural East Africa to increase their household income through participating in regional trade of staple crops. This was achieved through improved post-harvest handling and storage of staple crops, and linking farmers with surpluses in the key crops (maize, rice and beans) to new markets. Project activities are resulting in increased volume and value of staple crop sales by smallholder beneficiaries
Joseph Initiative Ltd.
The Joseph Initiative Ltd. is an agricultural commodity trading and processing company registered in Uganda. The company integrates small-scale production with regional buyers of whole grain and pulses by managing a fully capitalised and coordinated supply chain for dried agricultural commodities. It manages massive micro-quantity production support and village procurement - supporting and executing thousands of sub-one metric ton purchases while simultaneously managing upstream activities such as fulfilling large-scale, premium quality contracts. The Joseph Initiative has created commercially-viable access points to agricultural and financial services that are catalysing productive growth for Ugandan maize producers. The Joseph Initiative Rural Injini Project is improving end-to-end integration of smallholder maize and legume farmers into regional markets by reducing post-harvest loss at the farm level and increasing productivity by facilitating access to finance. The Rural Injini Project has developed village-based infrastructure to engage smallholder farmers, supplying them with inputs, storage solutions and financial services, and integrating them into a coordinated supply network that sources and distributes grains from farm gate to regional markets.
Kaderes Peasants Development (KPD) PLC
Kaderes Peasants Development (KPD) PLC is a public, limited for-profit company registered in Tanzania, whose core business activities are the processing, marketing and export of both fair trade and organic coffee (primarily to the European market) and beans. KPD's Warehouse for the Poor (W4P) project has created access to a warehouse in Kagera, in which agricultural products of smallholder farmers will be deposited. With W4P, farmers will receive warehouse receipts as proof of ownership of their products upon deposit and will also be able to obtain credit against their inventory at affordable interest rates. Loans will be provided by a partner financial institution in Tanzania. Farmers are being supported to market their crops during and after the season through cross-border trade.
Kilimo Trust
Kilimo Trust is an independent organisation working on agriculture for development across the East Africa Community (EAC). This project is focused on establishing trading systems that build the confidence of large buyers such as exporters, processors and large institutions, who hesitate to depend on local smallholders for supplies. This will break the vicious cycle typical with beans, where those serving domestic markets resort to importation, while potential large exporters to global markets are reluctant to take orders from international markets for fear of failure to deliver. The organisation is expanding structured trade of beans in response to specific market demand, enabling small holder producers of dry beans in the EAC, to operate commercial production enterprises that are profitable and become consistent, reliable and competitive

suppliers of raw and semi-processed beans to medium and bulk buyers and processors serving national, regional and international markets.
Mount Meru Millers Ltd. (MMML)
Mount Meru Millers Ltd., a subsidiary the Mount Meru Group, manufactures soft edible oil procured from locally grown oilseeds. MMML is currently the only processor in Tanzania equipped with a solvent plant which helps in the extraction of oil from cake, with three production units in Tanzania. The company's total crushing capacity is 50,000 Metric Tons per annum. Under the FoodTrade Project, MMML is promoting soybean growing among smallholder farmers in Tanzania and North East Zambia as a profitable rotation crop, and providing them with technical assistance, agro-inputs, pre-financing and a guaranteed off-take through an out-growers' scheme. MMML will process soybean at its milling plants, producing refined soybean oil fortified with vitamin A + D as cooking oil and soy cake for the animal feed industry in Kenya and Tanzania.
Musoma Food Company Ltd.
Musoma Food Company Limited (MFCL) is a company established in 2008 trading in maize and rice. The main markets for the grains are Tanzania National Food Reserve (NFRA), domestic wholesalers and cross border traders mostly from Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. The Sustainable Quality Maize (SQM) Project is solving the problem faced by MFCL where there is frequent shortage of maize and its products. The company has increased business efficiency by supporting smallholder maize farmers to enhance their productivity and quality of maize. MFCL with support from FoodTrade ESA has set up a sustainable maize aggregation system, ensuring the company procures the kind of quality maize needed. The company is aggregating maize of specific quantity and quality levels to meet market demands. Adherence to quality involves training on acceptable East African cereal and grain quality parameters. The company has contracted the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority to perform quality assurance on a periodic basis.
Pee Pee Tanzania Limited (PPTL)
Pee Pee Tanzania Limited (PPTL) is a limited, for-profit company registered in Tanzania, whose core business is the production and sale of woven packaging and sheeting for the agricultural and industrial sectors. Based in Tanga, the company is currently the regional market leader in the manufacture of packaging for agricultural produce, particularly fertiliser, seeds and other industrial products. Under this project, PPTL has enhanced its existing capacity to produce and sell PICS bags designed with a polypropylene outer and two inner high-density ethylene liners. This product has improved post-harvest storage capabilities and incomes by allowing farmers the flexibility between storing or selling their crops.
Raphael Group Ltd.
Raphael Group Limited (RGL) is one of the leading grain processors and distributors in Tanzania, with head offices in the Southern Highlands. It was established in 1995 and incorporated as a Limited Liability company in 2010. The core business activities of RGL include processing and selling of more than four grain products including rice, beans, groundnuts, sunflower cooking oil and other cereal grains. The project Raphael Group Bean Marketing Centre has setup a centralised marketing centre for the highly demanded bean varieties grown in the Southern Highlands region, supported by mini aggregation centres situated in the bean production locations. The marketing centre is owned by RGL, while the mini-aggregation centres are co-owned by RGL and the bean producer groups. This project is unique because it has set up an aggregation system which is partly owned by the farmers. By making farmers part owners of the village warehouses, the project is giving them opportunity to increase their income through revenue generated by the warehouses.
Seba Foods Zambia Ltd.
Seba Foods Zambia Limited is a Zambian registered company and a renowned producer of maize and soybean based consumer food products. Over the years, the company`s products have become house hold names in Zambia, priding themselves in very high quality products through well-known brands such as Golden Goodness. The project is increasing the capacity of soybean production and providing value addition to the oil seed for local consumption at competitive prices. The company is also playing the role of off-taker, aggregating and processing the soybean. The company is supporting smallholder farmers to commercialise their activities, increasing overall production of soybeans in Zambia and promoting cross-border trade of the finished products.

Shalem Investments
Shalem Investments is a private for profit Social Enterprise whose core business is aggregating, transporting and marketing grains and legumes (maize, sorghum, beans, wheat, and sunflower). It was established by the lead founder, Ruth Kinoti, to respond to a desperate need of the people closest to her. "A stitch in time" project is innovatively "stitching" together target value chain actors with relevant strategies to create a unique mechanism of facilitating collective marketing for smallholder farmers. The project has built on Shalem's unique business model, and is incentivising farmers and aggregators to take responsibility for cleaning and grading their produce, increasing their bargaining power and economies of scale. To ensure accessibility of appropriate agronomy and post-harvest management practices, the project has invested in creating relevant linkages, improving collection centres and providing capacity building.
Sosoma Industries Ltd.
Sosoma Industries Ltd. is a limited company established in 2008 in Kigali, Rwanda. The company started its business by manufacturing maize meal, roasted soybean flour, as well as red and white sorghum flours originally produced by the Sosoma production unit. The project has increased the company's storage capacity of grains from 800MT to 2,600MT, with 88% of the grain being maize and soya. The company has provided training to smallholder farmers in order to increase the production and quality of maize and soya beans, and enhanced smallholder grain trade by promoting aggregation, building awareness of grades and standards, and storing the grain. The project contracted three rural cooperatives which have 10,000 members to supply maize and soya grain.
Virtual City Ltd.
Virtual City is a Kenya based mobile technology provider that specialises in supply chain automation, particularly in the agriculture and Fast Moving Customer Goods (FMCG) sectors. Its solutions provide supply chain visibility, reducing fraud, increasing efficiency, and creating data-driven insights. The Agro Voucher solution presents a new business model that enables transactional revenue to be shared amongst market actors, not just the top of the value chain.
UN World Food Programme (WFP)
WFP is the food aid arm of the United Nations system. Food aid is one of the many instruments that can help to promote food security, which is defined as access of all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. The project is building structured grain markets by linking smallholder farmers to formal markets locally and regionally. This is achieved by promoting demand, and strengthening farmers' resilience. The Farm to Market Alliance (formerly known as Patient Procurement Platform) is a public-private sector led consortium of organisations seeking to transform food value chains in emerging markets. It is building a demand-led value-chain based on long-term linkages between suppliers (farmers), buyers and other key market players such as suppliers of finance, inputs and technical expertise. The Alliance is also actively engaging smallholders, increasing their productivity, profitability and resilience and their strength as reliable market players.
Yak Fair Trade Limited
The company, established in 2010, deals in agri-business (including livestock); this includes purchase and sale of agricultural commodities. Current investment in the commodities business includes an area equivalent to 100 Hectares for crop production and livestock development. "Nkunganire in Marketing and Post-Harvest Handling" is helping the farmer get access to finance, improve production and processing, decrease transaction costs and increase economies of scale as well as giving them access to wider markets. The project has helped farmers by offering them a chance to improve the quality of beans and maize produced by providing quality seeds and grading.

Annex 12: Key documents consulted

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Annex 13: Final Evaluation Terms of Reference

[see separate document]