Annex 1: Evaluation matrix [165]

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria and original questions	Hypothesis	Indicators	Approach
Portfolio-level (complementarity)				
1. To what extent is FTESA **a collection of individual interventions or a coherent portfolio**? a. To what extent are **potential synergies/complementarities** across grants, and with other programmes, being **leveraged**? b. Will the **combination** of the interventions **deliver results in excess of its component parts**?	Relevance Effectiveness Synergies (OEQ9)	i. There are **identifiable synergies** between FTESA interventions (CF and DF) and other programmes, and these are being targeted by FTESA. ii. FTESA interventions **collectively deliver results that are greater than if they were undertaken in isolation**.	- Evidence of synergies between FTESA interventions and other programmes. - Evidence of greater impact of multiple FTESA interventions operating in a country, compared to a comparator country with one only one FTESA intervention.	Thematic study Portfolio review
Market-level (systemic change/ sustainability)				
2. What is the **potential to generate systemic change**? a. What **type** of systemic change seems likely to result from FTESA? b. What are the likely **mechanisms** for the **spread of behaviour changes** across networks of actors? c. Which **actors** are pivotal to the spread of new behaviours?	Relevance Effectiveness Sustainability Replicability (OEQ2) (OEQ6)	i. FTESA interventions **facilitate the achievement of systemic change**. ii. FTESA interventions deliver changes in market functioning that **trigger changes in behaviour** (interest, motivations, practices) **beyond the intervention**. iii. **Changes in behaviour are maintained** after external support has ended.	- Profitability of grantees offering new services/products. - Evidence of new or better relationships in the value chain. - Duration and satisfaction of commercial relationships between actors clustered around FTESA interventions. - Adaptation of service/product offerings by grantees. - Crowding in by new actors, following the demonstration of the viability of a funded service/product.	Thematic study Portfolio review
Individual/farmer/consumer level				
3. To what extent (and how) is FTESA **bringing in (or facilitating) smallholder farmers in structured regional markets**?	Relevance Effectiveness Cross-cutting	i. FTESA interventions **identify and target SHFs** including disadvantaged/poor groups. ii. FTESA interventions **meet the financial and technical needs of farmers including SHFs**.	- Evidence of higher level of SHF participation in structured regional markets. - Evidence of SHFs accessing services (storage, aggregation, market information, credit, inputs, etc.)	Thematic study Portfolio review

[165] May 2016 version; updated original evaluation matrix (May 2014).

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria and original questions	Hypothesis	Indicators	Approach
a. What **forms** will increased smallholder farmer participation in markets take? b. What **benefit** would increased participation offer smallholder farmers? c. What is the likely **differentiated benefit** to smallholder farmers? 4. To what extent is **gender** a focus of the programme? a. Is gender meaningfully included in the sales/service strategies of the grantees? 5. To what extent do FTESA grants indicate a **likelihood of benefitting consumers**? a. What are the likely **benefits**? b. What are the **mechanisms** for creating those benefits?	(OEQ1) (OEQ8)	iii. FTESA interventions **increase access to services and inputs for farmers including SHFs**. i. FTESA interventions contribute to **higher farm gate prices received by farmers including SHFs**, accounting for a higher proportion of the retail price.[166] ii. FTESA interventions contribute to **increases in food production, sales and income for farmers including SHFs**. iii. FTESA interventions target women and the **benefit to women is greater than the norm**. iv. **Unintended negative effects** due to FTESA interventions are **identified and minimised**. v. FTESA interventions contributes to **more stable prices and food availability for consumers**. vi. **Identified outcomes can be measured and attributed to FTESA** interventions.	- Evidence of increased production, sales, prices and/or income for target beneficiaries including SHF. - Evidence of socially differentiated groups accessing services (storage, aggregation, market information, credit, inputs, etc.). - Evidence of more stable prices and food availability for consumers.	Baseline case studies
Producer/farmer/trader/firm level				
6. **Under what conditions** have FTESA interventions **improved trade support systems**[167]**?** 7. **What are the enabling/constraining factors** affecting the achievement of expected results? 8. **To what extent** have improved trade support systems **increased production and trade**?	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Replicability (OEQ3)	i. **Storage and aggregation:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to **improved warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities:** • Increased access to warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities for traders and farmers enables them to **store surpluses at harvest time when prices are low and sell when prices are higher**. Traders and farmers will be able to receive better (higher and more stable) prices, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. • Traders and farmers are able to store produce, **reducing PHL and allowing greater produce to be sold**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. • Increased access to warehouse, storage and aggregation facilities for traders and farmers	- Evidence of better access to improved services (storage, aggregation, market information, credit, etc.) for traders and farmers. - Evidence of use of improved services by traders and farmers. - Evidence of better access to markets for traders and farmers. - Evidence that use of improved services and better access to markets has led to more profitable opportunities. - Evidence that use of improved services and better access to markets has contributed to increased production, sales, prices and/or income.	Thematic study Portfolio review Baseline case studies

[166] NB. Traders often do not give up their margins; will explore distribution of benefit.

[167] Output 1 – storage, aggregation, market information, value chain coordination (grades and standards, etc.), warehouse receipts and credit, etc.

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria and original questions	Hypothesis	Indicators	Approach
		encourages farmers to grow more produce, leading to **more produce sold**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. • Farmers are able to store produce, rather than selling all their produce to a trader, giving them **greater bargaining power with traders** as they do not need to sell all their produce (to avoid spoilage), leading to better prices received from traders, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. • Traders and farmers will be able to **aggregate their produce with other farmers** and receive higher prices as aggregators negotiate better prices from bulk buyers, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**.	- Evidence that use of improved services and better access to markets has contributed to improved food availability and more stable prices for consumers.	
		ii. **Credit:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to **improved credit facilities.** Increased access to credit enables farmers to **use credit** to **increase investments in inputs/services**, leading to **improved yields and production**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**.		
		iii. **Market information:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to **improved market information.** Increased access to market information for traders and farmers enables them **to use information to base their decisions** (production/storage/sales) **on more accurate/timely information**, increasing flows from surplus to deficit areas and providing better information on when to store/release produce, leading to **more profitable opportunities**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**.		
		iv. **Grades and standards:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to **improved standards and grades** for staple foods. Increased application of standards and grades by traders and farmers **improves the quality of produce** and access to good quality storage facilities, **leading to better prices received**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**.		
Producer/farmer/trader/firm level				

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria and original questions	Hypothesis	Indicators	Approach
9. Under what conditions have FTESA interventions **improved availability and use of inputs (seeds and fertiliser)**[168]**?** 10. **What are the enabling/constraining factors** affecting the achievement of expected results? 11. **To what extent** has improved availability and use of inputs (seeds and fertiliser) **increased production and trade**?	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Replicability (OEQ4)	i. **Inputs:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by facilitating **greater private sector participation** in seed and fertilizer markets (CF), **enhancing the availability of better quality inputs**, leading to **increased use and improved yields and production**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. ii. **Seeds:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to an **improved and harmonised seed policy and regulatory environment** (DF), **accelerating the adoption of improved seed varieties**, leading to **improved yields and production**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**. iii. **Fertiliser:** FTESA interventions address market constraints/failures by contributing to an **improved fertiliser and regulatory environment**, thereby **improving the functioning of fertiliser markets** (DF), leading to **improved use of fertiliser** and **improved yields and production**, therefore **increasing and smoothing incomes**.	- Evidence of <u>better access to improved inputs</u> (seeds and fertiliser) for traders and farmers. - Evidence of <u>use of improved inputs</u> by traders and farmers. - Evidence that <u>use of improved inputs</u> relates to <u>increased private sector participation</u> in input markets. - Evidence that <u>use of improved inputs</u> has led to <u>more profitable opportunities</u>. - Evidence that <u>use of improved inputs</u> has contributed to <u>increased production, sales, prices and/or income</u>. - *Evidence of <u>improved seeds/fertiliser policies and regulatory frameworks</u>.* - *Evidence that <u>improved seeds/fertiliser policies and regulatory frameworks</u> has led to <u>greater availability and use of better quality inputs</u>.*	Thematic study Portfolio review Baseline case studies
Regulatory/policy level				
12. What approaches to supporting **reform to entrenched policies** (related to staple food production and trade in East and Southern Africa) can contribute to lasting change?	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency (OEQ5)	i. FTESA's approach to facilitating policy and regulatory reform **delivers 'good enough' change** in relevant target areas. ii. FTESA's **DF interventions catalyse policy reform** that **'unlocks' the impact of CF** interventions.	- Evidence of relevant policy and regulatory reform. - Evidence that policy and regulatory reform plausibly contributed to changes in productions, sales, trade, etc. - Evidence that changes are sustainable.	Organisational review Portfolio Review
Organisational level				
13. To what extent is the FTESA **programme performing optimally**? a. Has FTESA maintained its **relevance**? b. How **effective** is FTESA in delivering the expected outputs through its activities?	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Governance	i. FTESA delivers **activities in line with stakeholder need and the external environment**. ii. FTESA **learns from experience, adapting its approach.** iii. FTESA's **organisational set up** is optimal for delivering its **activities** (grant management, technical oversight, learning and dissemination). iv. FTESA's **organisational set up** is optimal for delivering the programme's **expected outputs**.	- Stakeholder (grantee, partner, etc.) perceptions of PMU activities. - Evidence of adaptation in the PMU strategy and structure due to: learning; external environment; stakeholder needs. - Grant management: no. of beneficiaries; financial leverage; efficiency of grant application process.	Organisational review Value for Money assessment

[168] Output 2 – inputs (seeds and fert)

Evaluation questions and sub-questions	Evaluation criteria and original questions	Hypothesis	Indicators	Approach
c. How **efficient** is FTESA in delivering the expected outputs through its activities?	(OEQ7)	v. FTESA's **way of working** is optimal for delivering its **activities** (grant management, technical oversight, learning and dissemination). vi. FTESA's **way of working** is optimal for delivering the programme's **expected outputs**.	- Technical oversight: examples of influencing/advocacy/technical input. - Learning: evidence of established feedback loops and learning between grantees and the programme.	Portfolio Review
14. Does FTESA offer **Value for Money** in the results it achieves, compared with possible alternatives?	Effectiveness Efficiency Governance (OEQ7)	i. FTESA is **economical** in terms of the cost of the resources used. ii. FTESA **maximises both technical and allocative efficiency** (i.e. outputs achieved for a given input). iii. FTESA is the **most cost effective way** of addressing the constraints and achieving expected results.	- Fund management cost ratio: The ratio of direct fund management costs to the total grant funds committed by FTESA - Administrative cost ratio: Total admin + fund management costs to total grant funds committed by FTESA - Portfolio-wide leverage ratio: Ratio of additive private investment mobilised to FTESA total grant amount committed - Employment generation ratio: Ratio of total committed grants under CF and DF to total jobs created - Smallholder engagement rate: Total committed grants to total number of small holders engaged through CF and DF[169]	

[169] VFM indicators/metrics are from the November 2015 DFID Annual review.

Annex 2: Evaluation questions and main modules

Evaluation questions	Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned					Synthesis
	Organisational Review	VFM Assessment	Thematic Study	Baseline Synthesis	Portfolio Review	Overall interpretation
EQ1: To what extent is FTESA a collection of individual interventions or a coherent portfolio?						
EQ2: What is the potential to generate systemic change?						
EQ3: To what extent (and how) is FTESA bringing in (or facilitating) smallholder farmers in structured regional markets?						
EQ4: To what extent is gender a focus of the programme?						
EQ5: To what extent do FTESA grants indicate a likelihood of benefitting consumers?						
EQ6: Under what conditions have FTESA interventions improved trade support systems?						
EQ7: What are the enabling/constraining factors affecting the achievement of expected results?						
EQ8: To what extent have improved trade support systems increased production and trade?						
EQ9: Under what conditions have FTESA interventions improved availability and use of inputs (seeds and fertiliser)?						
EQ10: What are the enabling/constraining factors affecting the achievement of expected results?						
EQ11: To what extent has improved availability and use of inputs (seeds and fertiliser) increased production and trade?						
EQ12: What approaches to supporting reform to entrenched policies (related to staple food production and trade in East and Southern Africa) can contribute to lasting change?						
EQ13: To what extent is the PMU performing optimally?						
EQ14: Does FTESA offer Value for Money in the results it achieves, compared with possible alternatives?						

Annex 3: Generic data collection templates

a. Interviews

Evaluation questions	Interview questions	Findings (coded by grant where relevant)																			Synthesis
		INT1	INT2	INT3	INT4	INT5	INT6	INT7	INT8	INT9	INT10	INT11	INT12	INT13	INT14	INT15	INT16	INT17	INT18	INT19	INT20	Overall interpretation
1. EQ	Interview questions, probing questions, etc.																					
1.1. EQ sub-question	Interview questions, probing questions, etc.																					

b. Documents

Evaluation questions	Findings (coded by grant where relevant)																				Synthesis
	DOC1	DOC2	DOC3	DOC4	DOC5	DOC6	DOC7	DOC8	DOC9	DOC10	DOC11	DOC12	DOC13	DOC14	DOC15	DOC16	DOC17	DOC18	DOC19	DOC20	Overall interpretation
1. Evaluation question																					
1.1. EQ sub-question																					

Annex 4: Module evidence assessment frameworks

a. Portfolio Review (summary of findings from review of documents and data)

EQs	Findings																		Synthesis
	GR1	GR2	GR3	GR4	GR5	GR6	GR7	GR8	GR9	GR10	GR11	GR12	GR13	GR14	GR15	GR16	GR17	GR18	GR19	Overall interpretation
EQ																				
EQ sub-question																				

b. Thematic Study (summary of findings from review of interviews, documents, data and survey)

EQs	Findings																			Synthesis
	Grant-specific					General														
	GR1	GR2	GR3	GR4	GR5	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	Overall interpretation
EQ																				
EQ sub-question																				

c. Organisational Review (summary of findings from review of interviews, documents, data and survey)

EQs	Findings																			Synthesis
	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	GEN	Overall interpretation
EQ																				
EQ sub-question																				

d. Baseline case evaluation synthesis (summary of findings from review of interviews, documents and data)

EQs	Findings									Synthesis
	CS1	CS2	CS3	CS4	CS5	CS6	CS7	QS1	QS2	Overall interpretation
EQ										
EQ sub-question										

Annex 5: Programme context

Snapshot of the country context for the main countries currently receiving support under FTESA.

Current situation in the region (July 2016)

According to FEWS NET, the impact of last year's El Niño, which induced drought conditions, is likely to have a substantial impact across Southern Africa (Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe). This is likely to affect farmers and households in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, with prices increasing as food supplies become scarce during the peak lean season. Maize grain prices are already showing signs of an upward trend. Current prices are above the average prices during similar periods in the previous five years. Already, Malawi and Mozambique are facing a steep increase in maize grain prices. As result of the drought, each country in the region, except Zambia, is exhibiting a deficit in the national production of cereals for the current marketing year.

In East Africa, maize prices followed seasonal downward trends in surplus-producing Tanzania, supporting a steady flow of exports to regional markets. Despite the availability of well below average supply from production in Ethiopia in late 2015 and early 2016, staple food prices have remained stable with the availability of food through humanitarian assistance programs underway.

In Southern Africa, maize availability is well below average following a consecutive year of well-below average regional production. Production in Zambia is estimated as average, while South Africa did not produce enough to meet domestic requirements. Maize prices began to increase several months early in many areas and prices are well above-average levels across the region. Imports from outside of the region (likely from well-supplied international markets) will be required to fill the very large maize import gap.

Source: https://www.fews.net/sectors/markets-trade

Kenya

Although agriculture contributes about 30% of GDP, the country commonly faces food security concerns and therefore depends on formal and informal imports from both its neighbours (especially Uganda and Tanzania) and key global trading partners to meet national demand.[170] This makes the country vulnerable to volatility of world food prices and trade barriers by other countries.

Maize is Kenya's most important staple food crop. Until the 1990s, Kenya produced a surplus. However, production growth has not kept pace with population growth, resulting in a perennial deficit. Fluctuations in production are dependent on rainfall as irrigation takes place on less than 10% of the land area. As a result, Kenya's agriculture sector is susceptible to droughts and flooding. In addition, up to 30% of the harvest is lost due to pests and diseases (e.g. Aflatoxin) due to missing and/or poor storage facilities.

Over 95% of smallholder farmers (3.5 million) grow maize. It is crucial for the country's food security.[171] While the Rift Valley Province typically generate a surplus in production, this is not the case for Kenya as a whole. Most of areas are at best self-sufficient or exhibit a production deficit. Although maize production has increased in recent years, it has not kept pace with demand.

With smallholder production accounting for nearly 70% of total agricultural output and average smallholder farm size falling (as families divide), it is difficult to see where the production gains needed to meet growing demand will come. Moreover, there are several constraints to improving production, including (but not limited to) inadequate access to technology and credit as well as high input costs (fertiliser and seeds). In addition, farmers also face unfavourable institutional arrangements.

[170] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Kenya 2016, World Food Programme

[171] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Kenya 2016, World Food Programme

Generally, smallholder farmers experience significant post-harvest losses, made worse by poor agricultural practices including short-term outlook and limited entrepreneurial mind-set. In addition, they face low prices and limited market access. These challenges are prevalent across smallholder farmers, especially those from farming communities with limited landholding and market access.

Fertiliser usage among maize farmers has increased, but cost remains a barrier to uptake at the smallholder level. Yields relative to the regional average are poor; at 1.7MT per hectare, they are approximately 35% of what is technologically possible but still some 10% above the regional average.

The maize value chain is long and inefficient, making it difficult to build formal links along the chain. At the processing end of the value chain, 20 millers account for roughly 85-90% of the market and rely on an extensive network of large, medium and small traders to source from smallholders.

The market is subject to unpredictable government pricing policies and allegations of corruption within the marketing boards. High interest rates deter investment in the sector and farmers and agro-businesses are regularly subject to double or multiple taxation because of the imperfect regulatory framework.[172]

In spite of favourable growing conditions, Kenya imports large volumes of **soybean**, soybean oil and cake from Latin America as local production is very limited. Smallholder farmers lack the inputs, knowhow, finance, storage and market access needed to grow soybeans profitably.

Rice production is mainly through National Irrigation Board schemes and consumption is steeply rising by approximately 11% per year.[173] Even though production also increased steeply from approximately 21,900MT in 2008 to 112,200MT in 2014, Kenya is still a net importer of rice[174] and imports rice mainly from India, Pakistan, Thailand and Viet Nam.[175]

Kenya relies heavily on **bean** imports and is the largest importer in the East Africa region. Kenya experiences shortages of up to 46% relative to demand. Uganda and Tanzania are net exporters of beans. Kenya's bean value chain is highly fragmented, with many small-scale traders and aggregators. Pulses production in Kenya is declining and yields are significantly lower than regional and global averages.

Malawi

The most important food commodities in Malawi are maize, rice and cassava.[176] Since the government launched the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) in 2005, the country shifted from a maize deficit of 0.5 million MT in 2004/2005 to a surplus of more than 1 million MT in 2008/2009. Between 2007/2008 and 2008/2009, maize production increased 43% (from 2.63 million MT to 3.77 million MT) and total production across all staple foods[177] increased 31% (from 4.4 million MT to 5.84 million MT). Beans and pulses, often intercropped with maize, also experienced strong production gains over the same period, increasing 37% and 20% respectively. Malawi is the second largest pigeon pea producer in East and Southern Africa; pigeon peas accounted for 85% of the country's total pulse production. The AISP and favourable weather conditions delivered significant improvements in yields for maize and rice. However, after record seasons, production volumes fell due to weather conditions.[178]

During the 2002/03 Malawian food crisis, informal traders from Mozambique and Tanzania delivered additional supplies, amounting to 20-25% of normal consumption in Malawi. A USAID/COMPETE simulation suggests that even more modest inflows, in response to a moderate drought, can cut price spikes by as much

[172] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Kenya 2016, World Food Programme

[173] Kenya – Grain and Feed Annual – 2015 Corn, Wheat and Rice Report, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

[174] For previous year (2005-2010) see also: Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Rice in Kenya, December 2012, MAFAP

[175] Kenya – Grain and Feed Annual – 2015 Corn, Wheat and Rice Report, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

[176] MALAWI Price Bulletin, March 2016, FEWSNET

[177] Maize, beans, pulses, rice, wheat, sorghum, millet, groundnuts and cassava

[178] FAOSTAT

as 50%, demonstrating the potential for regional trade flows to soften supply deficits.[179] This is particularly noteworthy now as Malawi is currently facing acute food shortages as 2015/2016 production volumes for both cash and food crops have decreased significantly due to drought. Food prices in Malawi are already rising. According to FEWS NET, both maize and rice prices for the second quarter of 2016 are well above prices for the same period in both the previous year as well as the 5-year average.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, 88% of agricultural households grow beans, 49% grow maize and 45% grow potatoes.[180] Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa, which limits the opportunity to expand area under production. With a growing population, food security is an issue. The government is addressing this through the Plan for the Strategic Transformation of Agriculture II – the main objective is the intensification and development of sustainable production systems. Government programmes have led to a significant increase in maize production for the period 2007-2013, with output increasing from approximately 100,000MT to 670,000MT.[181] Government efforts to address the staples deficit have also had an impact on rice production. Although the majority of rice consumed in Rwanda is imported, Rwanda is making use of valley land to increase its production. Between 2004 and 2008, the total area under rice production increased more than 50%. Rice production increased from 11,700MT in 2000 to 93,700MT in 2013.[182] In addition, Rwanda has established a National Strategic Grain Reserve (NSGR) to respond to food emergencies, with a capacity of nearly 40,000 MT.[183] While the policy environment is broadly favourable, the sector faces a range of challenges: limited land availability; uneconomical smallholder farm sizes; limited market access; poor rural roads; inadequately trained extension officers; significant post-harvest losses linked to inadequate storage; and, variable rainfall.

Tanzania

Tanzania has an abundance of land and water resources. The climate is generally favourable for a large variety of crops. However, Tanzania's staple foods sector suffers from underinvestment. Expensive fertilisers lead to utilisation rates that are less than half the average for sub-Saharan Africa. While fertiliser consumption almost doubled between 2008 and 2010 from 4.6kg (per hectare of arable land) to 8.8kg, consumption fell back to previous levels in 2013.[184] Additionally, less than 25% of farmers have access to extension services and, of those with access, fewer than 50% attempted to implement the technical advice, demonstrating low adoption rates.

However, Tanzania increased its output of key staple food commodities. Between 2009 and 2013, **maize** production increased from 3.3 million MT to 5.4 million MT.[185] In the same period, **rice** production increased from approximately 1.3 million MT to 2.2 million MT, and wheat production from 82,000 MT to 104,000 MT.[186] For 2016, Tanzania is estimating a maize production surplus of 650,000MT, most for export to East and Southern Africa.[187] Kenya is likely to be the biggest recipient of Tanzanian maize exports. In addition, Tanzania has a strategic grain reserve of 400,000MT.

Despite a production surplus, predictions for production in 2016 are less encouraging due to rainfall levels in the main growing season between March and May.[188] While some areas experienced only half of the amount of average rainfall, other areas had rainfalls twice the average volume. Tanzania is vulnerable to highly variable

[179] Haggblade et al. (2008)
[180] Rwanda 2015 Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis, MINAGRI, NISR and WFP
[181] FAOSTAT
[182] FAOSTAT
[183] Rwanda 2015 Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis, MINAGRI, NISR and WFP
[184] World Bank Data
[185] FAOSTAT
[186] FAOSTAT
[187] Tanzania Remote Monitoring Update, June 2016, FEWSNET
[188] Tanzania Remote Monitoring Update, June 2016, FEWSNET

weather conditions and has not adapted via use of technology (e.g. irrigation systems). Additional constraints at the sector level include weak extension services with limited reach; limited village-level storage infrastructure; unrealised potential for the warehouse receipt system; and, lack of information and transparency across the entire value chain.

In spite of favourable growing conditions, Tanzania imports substantial volumes of sweet beans from China. Local production is mostly subsistence farming. Smallholder farmers lack the input, expertise, finance, storage, and market access needed to grow beans profitably. They experience significant post-harvest losses, absence of processing facilities and a lack of transparency along the value chain, ultimately resulting in low prices.

Uganda

Uganda has a favourable climate with two cropping seasons and extensive and productive agricultural land. From 2000-2007, Uganda experienced a marked increase in food production, achieved mainly through increases in area under production. The production continued to increase between 2008 and 2014, from 2.3 million MT to 2.8 million MT.[189] Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, maize is not Uganda's primary staple and production of maize is primarily an income earner. Consumption accounts for only 32% of local production in Uganda. There is typically a significant surplus, exported mainly to Kenya, Rwanda and increasingly South Sudan. Estimates put Uganda's annual maize export potential at between 200,000 and 250,000 MT.[190]

Rice production in Uganda increased dramatically in the period 2004-2008, primarily because of rapid adoption of rain-fed upland rice varieties. The production continued to increase between 2008 and 2014, from 180,000MT to 240,000MT.[191]

Lack of access to quality inputs, including improved seeds, and limited market access are both significant constraint to improving productivity and incomes. Subsistence farmers' have limited capacity to evolve into commercially oriented production systems.

Zambia

Maize is Zambia's main staple commodity. Throughout the 1980s, Zambia, due largely to producer subsidies, produced an average of 1 million MT a year, which was generally sufficient to meet domestic demand and provide a surplus. Since the early 2000s, maize production steeply increased and totalled over 3.3million MT in 2014.[192] As a result, Zambia became an important exporter of the crop in Southern Africa.[193]

Currently, Zambia's production levels are around average levels. However, stocks are well-below average due to very strong regional export demand (2015/16) because of poor regional growing conditions. Prices are higher than the average of the previous 5 years.[194] Zambia announced a temporary suspension of formal exports, scheduled for removal in October 2016. Hence, estimated surplus quantities (net supply) in Zambia this year are marginal and well below average levels.

Despite strong growth in demand, rice is a marginal crop mainly consumed when maize stocks are low. However, production has strongly increased between 2004 and 2013 from 17,000MT to 50,000MT.[195]

[189] FAOSTAT
[190] Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Maize in Uganda, December 2012, MAFAP
[191] FAOSTAT
[192] FAOSTAT
[193] Regional Maize Market Fundamentals, August 2016, FEWSNET
[194] Southern Africa Monthly Food Price Update, June 2016, World Food Program
[195] FAOSTAT

Annex 6: Output Theories of Change




OUTPUT 3
OUTPUT 3
Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment
A
More stable, predictable market system
Regional trade agreements successfully implemented at national level
C
OUTPUT 1
B
Detailed Theories of Change to be developed when specific interventions become clear
Gap analysis and TA to national governments for domestication
POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES:
• Maize Without Borders
• Maize grades and standards (Output 1)
• Seed harmonization (Output 2)
Identify existing regional trade agreements with opportunities to support national domestication
Identification of smaller/shorter term opportunities not related to regional agreements/treaties
Lobbying in support of strands A and B
Identification of key partners for advocacy (private sector, media, individuals in government)
In-depth political economy analysis / scoping for potential intervention opportunities

Annex 7: DFID logframe

PROJECT NAME	FoodTrade East and Southern Africa							
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	
Improved functioning of national and regional staple food market systems	Percentage differential between hungry and harvest season prices for key food staples (maize in key markets and rice in Tanzania).	Planned	MAIZE: Nairobi - 26%; Tororo - 47%; Dar - 22%; Kigali - 18%; Bujumubura - 28%; Lilongwe - 69%; Maputo - 29%; Harare - 48%; Lusaka - 17%; RICE: Dar - 21% (2007-2011 average)*	MAIZE: Nairobi - 25%; Tororo - 46%; Dar - 21%; Kigali - 17%; Bujumubura - 27%; Lilongwe - 68%; Maputo 28%; Harare - 47%; Lusaka - 16%; RICE: Dar - 20%	Nairobi - 23%; Tororo - 44%; Dar - 19%; Kigali - 15%; Bujumubura - 25%; Lilongwe - 66%; Maputo 26%; Harare - 45%; Lusaka - 14%; RICE: Dar - 18%	Nairobi - 22%; Tororo - 43%; Dar - 18%; Kigali - 14%; Bujumubura - 24%; Lilongwe - 65%; Maputo 25%; Harare - 44%; Lusaka - 13%; RICE: Dar - 17%	Nairobi - 21%; Tororo - 42%; Dar - 17%; Kigali - 13%; Bujumubura - 23%; Lilongwe - 64%; Maputo 24%; Harare - 43%; Lusaka - 12%; RICE: Dar - 16%	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			USAID FEWSNET East Afica Price Bulletin and Southern Africa Price Bulletin (Baseline					
	Impact Indicator 2		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	
	(a) Number of consumer households in areas with more stable intra-annual food prices (b) Number of individuals benefitting from more stable intra-annual food prices (includes all household members of consumer households)	Planned (a)	0	31,470	157,350	236,025	314,700	
		Planned (b)		157,350	786,750	1,180,125	1,573,500	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			National and regional food market data provides context. Attributed figures estimated from modeling and summing of market impact of individual interventions.					
	Impact Indicator 3		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	
	Number of pro-market policies and/or practices introduced in food and inputs markets	Planned	0	1	4	6	10	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System					
	Footnote 1: Impact indicator 1 price difference is measured as the hungry season price (highest annual price) divided by the harvest season price (lowest annual price) minus one, to get the percentage difference. It is then assumed that this difference can be decreased by 3 percentage points by Year 3, and 5 percentage points by Year 5. The target may be revised at Annual review stage to take into account extreme fluctuation in global stapple food prices.							
	Footnote 2: There are 31.5 million rural households in the target region (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique) according to WEO and CIA World Factbook data. Impact Indicator 2(a) assumes that in year 1, 0.2% would see improvements; 0.5% in year 3; 1% in year 5. This may turn out to be a conservative assumption.							
	Footnote 3: Impact indicator 2(b) reflects indicator 2(a) expressed in terms of individual household members benefitting, based on an average household size of 5 people (Tanzania Demographic & Health Survey 2010)							
	Footnote 4: Apart from Impact Indicator 1, Outcome Indicator 1 and Outcome Indicator 2, All logframe indicators are cumulative.							

OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	Assumptions
More staple food traded and more people benefit from participation in national and cross border value chains	Volume of regional food trade between programme countries (bilateral food trade between all 9 countries of focus, additional trade above existing trend): maize and rice	**Planned**	Trend trade data at 2011	0	2% additional trade (above trend)	3% additional trade (above trend)	5% additional trade (above trend)	Improved national and regional staple food input and output markets, linked to effective storage capacity will lead to greater trade and less intra-annual price fluctuation. Deeper markets will benefit both consumers and producers
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Intracen for formal trade data; UBOS and other survey sources for informal trade data					
	Outcome Indicator 2		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Net additional farm gate price received by FoodTrade beneficiaries relative to local comparator.	**Planned**	Requires baseline survey	0	5% Increase	8% Increase	10% increase	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System					
	Outcome Indicator 3		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Volume of staple food sold by FoodTrade farmer beneficiaries (Metric Ton)	**Planned**	Requires baseline survey	0	10% Increase	15% Increase	20% increase	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System					
	Outcome Indicator 4		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	(a) Number of additional male and female farmers benefiting from national and cross border value chains; (b) Number of additional individuals benefiting from national and cross border value chains (includes household members of benefitting farmers)	**Planned (a)**	0	20,944	167,551	272,332	375,347	
		Planned (b)	0	104,720	837,753	1,361,660	1,876,733	
		Achieved (a)		29,906				
		Achieved (b)		149,532				
			Source					
			Outcome indicator 4(a) combines the producer beneficiaries as measured by the output indicators below (1.1,1.2,1.3 and 2.2). There is an assumption that a fifth of these individuals experience more than one service (overlap), and therefore the total number is multiplied by 4/5 for the final figures. Outcome indicator 4(b) includes the farmers identified under indicator 3(a) and additionally includes their household members, who are also assumed to benefit from national and cross border value chains as a result of this programme. Calculations are based on an average household size of 5 people (Tanzania Demographic & Health Survey 2010)					
			Source					
			National and regional food market data provides context. Attributed figures estimated from modelling and summing of market impact of individual interventions.					
INPUTS (£)	**DFID (£)**		**Govt (£)**	**Other (£)**	**Total (£)**		**DFID SHARE (%)**	
			0	0	£ -		#DIV/0!	
INPUTS (HR)	**DFID (FTEs)**							

Footnote 1: For Outcome Indicator 1, trade data for 2011 should be used alongside trade trend data for the previous five years. This should be used to generate trade projections for Year 1, Year 3 and Year 5 for the quantity of maize traded between countries of focus. Additional trade is then projected above this trend.

Footnote 2: For Outcome Indicator 2, average price will be based on interventions in the areas of output 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 that directly address increase in farm gate price.

OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	Assumptions
Improved post-harvest markets	Number of male/female farmers accessing new/improved storage/aggregation services/facilities as a result of FoodTrade	**Planned**	0	20,180	136,438	200,415	254,183	Improved national and regional staple output markets, linked to increased supply chain information and co-ordination will lead to more informed decision making and lower transaction costs along with other market improvements will result in more trade and greater investment in production and post harvest handling technique and infrastructure. Adoption of grade and standard will play a role in facilitating trade of greater volume of staple food.
		Achieved		10,067				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 1.2		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of male/female farmers accessing improved market information system as a result of FoodTrade	**Planned**	0	-	60,000	120,000	180,000	
		Achieved		6,500				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 1.3		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of male/female farmers accessing improved value chain co-ordination (e.g. application of grade and standard to their products, improved logistic and virtual market place) as a result of FoodTrade	**Planned**	0	1,000	3,000	10,000	20,000	
		Achieved		10,067				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 1.4		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of male/female farmers accessing warehouse receipt and supplier credit as a results of Foodtrade	**Planned**	0	4,000	10,000	30,000	50,000	
		Achieved		11,169				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 1.5		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of private sector entities that adopt common grade and standard as a result of FoodTrade	**Planned**	0	8	16	32	68	
		Achieved		9				
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)		**Source**						**RISK RATING**
45%		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						Medium
INPUTS (£)	**DFID (£)**		**Got (£)**	**Other (£)**	**Total (£)**		**DFID SHARE (%)**	
			0	0	£ -		#DIV/0!	
INPUTS (HR)	**DFID (FTEs)**							
	Footnote 1: Number of beneficiaries may be redistributed across intervention areas the programme progresses. Beneficiaries under 1.4 are subset of 1.1 ,1.2 and 1.3 and will make no separate contribution to outcome indicator 4. Supplier credit also include inputs provided under contract farming arrangement.							

OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	Assumptions
Improved input markets	Volume of new or improved inputs traded by programme partners (Metric Ton) as a result of FoodTrade	**Planned (Seeds)**	0	0	10	12	22	Access to inputs and other services, combined with improved storage and more stable markets will result in increased investment in production. Latent farmer demand for inputs and services will be sufficient to maintain the supply chain. Greater access to financial and insurance instruments by farmers, traders and other key players in the value chain will lead to more investment in infrastructure and value addition equipment.
		Achieved (Seeds)		94.256				
		Planned (Fertilisers)	0	0	0	300	500	
		Achieved (Fertilisers)		28.65				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 2.2		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of male and female farmers using improved inputs as a result of the activities of programme beneficiary input suppliers	**Planned**	0	5,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	
		Achieved		10,749				
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)		**Source**						**RISK RATING**
35%		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						Medium
INPUTS (£)	**DFID (£)**		**Got (£)**	**Other (£)**	**Total (£)**		**DFID SHARE (%)**	
			0	0	£ -		#DIV/0!	
INPUTS (HR)	**DFID (FTEs)**							

OUTPUT 3	Output Indicator3.1		Baseline (Start)	Milestone 1 (Year 2)	Milestone 2 (Year 3)	Milestone 3 (Year 4)	Target (End Year 5)	Assumption
Improved Trade environment and Reduced Uncertainty	Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes identified for which a dedicated influencing strategy is developed	**Planned**	0	4	12	15	20	A minimum combination of policy, regulation and practice standards, in support of improved market function, will enable markets to grow and deepen. Facilitated dialogue between private sector stakeholders, policy makers and public officials will help building trust in the market system which in turn will encourage more people to participate (CP5) . The introduction of some market innovations requires policy and regulatory changes which are not politically sensitive (CP4b). Selected policy and regulatory changes which are necessary to the development of regional staple markets but politically sensitive can be achived through a political economy analysis of stakeholders' interets, the implementation of an inlfuencing strategy tailored on context specific drivers of change and by facilitating dialogue and building trust between private sector stakeholders, policy makers and public
		Achieved		4				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 3.2		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of achievable regulatory and policy changes for which a dedicated influencing strategy is being implemented	**Planned**	0	4	12	15	20	
		Achieved		2				
		Source						
		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						
	Output Indicator 3.3		**Baseline (Start)**	**Milestone 1 (Year 2)**	**Milestone 2 (Year 3)**	**Milestone 3 (Year 4)**	**Target (End Year 5)**	
	Number of identified regulatory or policy changes for which public-private dialogue platform functioning as outlined in each influencing strategy	**Planned**	0	2	5	6	8	
		Achieved		2				
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)		**Source**						**RISK RATING**
20%		Programme Monitoring and Result Measurement System						Medium
INPUTS (£)	**DFID (£)**		**Govt (£)**	**Other (£)**	**Total (£)**		**DFID SHARE (%)**	
			0	0	£ -		#DIV/0!	
INPUTS (HR)	**DFID (FTEs)**							

Annex 8: Grants by sub-output

#	Output indicators	Esoko	Mt. Meru	VC	Joseph	Kaderes	VSL	ENAS	PPTL	Afritec	Musoma	Raphael	Yak Fair	Shalem	Sosoma	EAGC	ACTESA	Kilimo	WFP PPP	Farm Africa
1.1	Number of male and female farmers accessing new and/or improved storage and/or aggregation services and/or facilities		■	■	■	■			■		■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■
1.2	Number of male/female farmers accessing improved information system as a result of FTESA	■			■											■		■		■
1.3	Number of male and female farmers benefit from improved value chain co-ordination				■	■					■			■		■		■		■
1.4	Number male and female farmers benefit by accessing warehouse receipt and supplier credit		■	■	■	■	■							■		■				■
1.5	Number of private sector entities that adopt certified warehouses as a result of FTESA															■		■		
2.1	a) Volume of new or improved inputs accessed by programme beneficiaries as the results of FTESA activities (Metric Tonne) - Seeds		■				■	■		■								■	■	
	b) Volume of new or improved inputs accessed by programme beneficiaries as the results of FTESA activities (Metric Tonne) - Fertilizer																		■	
2.2	Number of male and female farmers benefit by using improved inputs		■			■	■	■		■	■	■						■	■	
3.1	Number of initiatives taken to facilitate policy changes for which a dedicated influencing strategy is developed																■			
3.2	Number of identified policy changes for which a dedicated influencing strategy is being implemented																			
3.3	Number of identified regulatory or policy changes for which public-private dialogue platform functioning as outlined in each influencing strategy																			

Annex 9: Country coverage[196]

	Burundi	Kenya	Malawi	Mozambique	Rwanda	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Mount Meru									
Esoko									
Virtual City									
Joseph									
Kaderes									
Victoria*									
ENAS									
Pee Pee									
Afritec									
Musoma									
Yak Fair									
Sosoma									
Shalem									
Raphael									
EAGC									
Kilimo									
WFP									
Farm Africa									
ACTESA									

**indicates cancelled grant*

*Colour codes: **Green** shows the actual implementation; **Amber** shows planned implementation; **Red** shows intentions to implement in the design documents but no work has taken place (as far as we know).*

[196] It would be useful if the PMU could check if our interpretation here is correct, as we relied largely on grantee documents which in some cases do not provide full and accurate information on intentions, plans and actual.

Annex 10: Review of the new FTESA M&E framework

The PMU has proposed a revised FTESA logframe, MRM manual and quarterly report template, responding to challenges faced in implementing the M&E system, including comments received by DFID and the EMU. FTESA has made considerable investments in developing the M&E system and capacity.[197]

Logframe:

- The **areas covered at output level (e.g. storage, aggregation, etc.) remain broadly intact**. An indicator on 'grades and standards' now replaces the indicator on 'value chain coordination' possibly due to concerns about the broad interpretation of the latter and the extent of FTESA's potential influence on actors along the value chain[198]. *However, the removal of the value chain coordination indicator removes an indicator that could potentially measure, for instance, the number of buyers and sellers brought together by the programme (e.g. through Gsoko).* The logframe no longer includes an indicator on warehouse receipts and credit, despite the fact that FTESA is funding activities that support both.
- **Revised output 1 indicators now measure results at lower levels of the results chain** – i.e. number of aggregation centres established and number of farmers trained or registered, rather than access to new/improved services. *This reduces the ability to report on access (use and uptake) of services, including quality, reducing the onus on the grantees to measure the effectiveness of interventions.*
- The **outcome and impact indicators remain broadly intact** with one outcome indicator (volume of regional trade between programme countries) moved to the impact level.
- The **gap between output and outcomes/impact indicators is now much larger**, presenting a large leap from, for example, 'number of farmers trained on benefits and application of grades and standards' and 'net additional farm gate price received' or 'volume of staple food sold'. With no reporting on the effects (e.g. uptake and use) of training, this limits the potential usefulness of grantee data and opportunity for the programme to understand whether and how the grants are working (to inform programme learning, management and decision-making) and reduces the PMU's ability to report on performance to the funder (accountability).

New MRM framework/manual:

- The new MRM manual is a much more simplified and easier to follow document than the previous version, designed to guide PMU staff and grantees in developing and implementing grant-level M&E. It highlights the importance of having sufficient data to report on progress and inform learning on programme effectiveness, informing programme decision making and improvements. It aims to mainstream MRM in grantee activities to: improve reporting and programming; ensure compliance with FTESA and DFID standards; ensure uniformity and consistency across grantee reporting; and enable grantees to put in place necessary systems for effective monitoring and learning to contribute to better quality programming. The manual lists requirements of grantees:
    - Prepare an M&E work plan (data collection, analysis, reporting), indicator definition and analysis framework, and indicator (quarterly) performance tracking table.
    - Determine baseline data within three months of starting, and report on cumulative progress against targets.
    - Analyse and interpret data "to communicate and document the change or early signs of outcomes being achieved, together with challenges and lessons".
    - "…update existing information and data relating to beneficiaries, stakeholders and communities... on an ongoing basis… to enrich understanding of context… and enhance effectiveness".

[197] FTESA (2016) MRM framework

[198] Interviews

- The manual (and annexes) attempt to standardise indicators across the portfolio of grants, requiring grantees to align indicators to the DFID FTESA logframe and report on these in both quarterly and annual reports. Annex 2 provides a template for grantee M&E plans including outcomes and outputs linked to the logframe. Compared to earlier MRM plans, this should create uniformity and consistency of reporting and focus down the number of indicators.
- The PMU is planning 'annual learning events' with grantees to reflect on progress, challenges and lessons learnt and 'annual programme reviews' to facilitate learning and synergies across grants.
- The manual also includes details of PMU activities to verify and quality assess grantee data collected and reported.
- The MRM manual includes an old out-dated version of the ToC from the DFID Business Case, rather than the one developed in 2014 and subsequently used in PMU documentation.
- *It is not clear the extent to which existing grantees are required to adopt the new guidelines. It would be useful to spell out what is required of existing grantees, compared to new ones.*

Quarterly reports:

- The updated **quarterly report template** focuses mainly on "activities implemented, outputs and inputs deployed", reported against logframe indicators. It includes an 'indicator tracker' linked to 'grantee indicator matrix' (Annex 1). The former includes all outputs from the revised logframe and some of the outcomes (2, 3 and 4[199]) as well as three outputs from the old logframe[200]. However, the 'grantee indicator matrix' includes only outputs. *Since grantees are required to complete the 'grantee indicator matrix', it is likely that they will overlook reporting on the other indicators (including outcomes) mentioned in the tracker. It is recommended that outcome indicators are included in the 'grantee indicator matrix' (annex 1 of the QR template) as they are in the annex 2 of the MRM manual.*

(As of 26th August 2016)

[199] Outcome 1 on 'net additional farm gate price received by FTESA beneficiaries relative to local comparator' is not included.

[200] Number of farmers accessing new and/or improved storage and/or aggregation services and/or facilities; number of farmers benefit by accessing warehouse receipt and supplier credit; number of farmers benefit from improved value chain co-ordination

Annex 11: Documents consulted

Programme documents

Africa Practice (2014) Stakeholder Mapping Matrix

DFID (2012) Terms of Reference. Programme Manager for DFID East and Southern Africa Staple Food Markets Programme.

DFID (2013) Annual Review

DFID (2013-16) steering committee minutes (various)

DFID (2013b) Terms of Reference. Evaluation Management Unit for DFID East and Southern Africa Staple Food Markets Programme.

DFID (2014) Annual Review

DFID (2015) Annual Review

DFID (undated) FTESA Business Case and Intervention Summary

EMU/Itad (2014a) FTESA Theory of Change Workshop Report

EMU/Itad (2014b) Inception Report

EMU/Itad (2016a) Qualitative Case Study Evaluation Design

EMU/Itad (2016b) Baseline Case Evaluation

EMU/Itad (2016c) Organisational Review

EMU/Itad (2016d) Thematic Study

EMU/Itad (2016e) VFM Assessment

FTESA (2013-16) grantee proposals/applications (various)

FTESA (2013-16) grantee MRM plans (various)

FTESA (2013-16) grantee work plans, budgets, KPIs (various)

FTESA (2013-16) grantee quarterly reports (various)

FTESA (2013-16) CF and DF rounds concept notes (various)

FTESA (2013a) Annual Report

FTESA (2013b) Inception Report

FTESA (2014a) Monitoring and Results Measurement Manual

FTESA (2014b) Annual Report

FTESA (2014c) Communication Strategy

FTESA (2015) Annual Report

FTESA (2015b) Influencing Strategy for FTESA: Enhancing Predictability of National and Regional Staple Food Markets

FTESA (2016a) Enhancing the Poverty Impact of FTESA: Mainstreaming Poverty within Operations and Systems

FTESA (2016b) Monitoring and Capacity Building Support to Grantees

FTESA (2016c) Annual Report

FTESA (2016d) Organisational Structure

Others:

Irwin and Porteous (2005) Financial Deepening Challenge Fund Strategic Project Review

Jayne (2010) Patterns and Trends in Food Staples Markets in Eastern and Southern Africa

KPMG (2012) Challenge Funds as Private Sector Development Tools: Progress and Potential

Mayne (2008) Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect

Miles and Huberman (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis

Noblit and Hare (1988) Meta-Ethnography: Synthesising Qualitative Studies

OECD (1991) DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance

Pawson and Tilley (1997) Realistic Evaluation

Pope et al. (2007) Synthesising Qualitative and Quantitative Health Evidence: A Guide to Methods

Stern et al. (2012) Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluations

Westhorp (2014) Realist Impact Evaluation: An Introduction

Wong et al. (2013) Realist Synthesis: Rameses Training Materials

Yin (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods

Annex 12: Organisational Review

See separate document

Annex 13: Thematic Study

See separate document

Annex 14: Value for Money Assessment

See separate document

Annex 15: Original ToR

See separate document

Annex 16: Revised ToR / mini design document

See separate document

Annex 17: Updated evaluation risk matrix

Internal programme risks and mitigation measures			
Most significant risks	**Analysis**	**Mitigation measures**	**Residual risk**
Lack of high quality and verified data **MEDIUM/HIGH RISK**	• The existence of high quality data is varied across the programmes. Even where data are of high quality, there is often a limited amount (or absence of) metadata outlining how the data were collected. • During the inception phase, the EMU collaborated with the PMU to identify data requirements and developed a data collection plan and division of labour. PMU baseline surveys did not take place as agreed. And only two of three EMU surveys were carried out. However, the PMU has requested several grantees to undertake their own baseline and endline surveys. The risk is that there data will not be comparable and maybe insufficient to cover a sufficient proportion of the portfolio. • Throughout implementation, the EMU has assessed data availability and quality through reviewing annual PMU monitoring reports. However, the EMU is not involved in verification activities, and the PMU has undertaken few until recently, so the quality of data is yet to be properly verified. Moreover, the reviews of monitoring data show deficiencies in data collection, particular at the level of intermediate outcomes and outcomes.	• The EMU will make timely recommendations to the PMU and DFID where it identifies weaknesses in data availability or quality in the areas where the PMU is responsible for data collection. • Where data availability or quality is found to be weak, mitigation measures or adjustments to evaluation design will be made where feasible.	**MEDIUM RISK**
Poor and inconsistent monitoring data generated by the interventions themselves	• Inadequate data provided by grantees. • Overall dataset is of such variable standard that its use for evaluating the overall programme approach is compromised.	• The EMU will centrally review PMU monitoring data. However the EMU will not directly engage with grantees to review and support data collection. • The programme ToR envisage a transparent data audit process, in which a stratified random sample of data,	**MEDIUM RISK**

MEDIUM RISK		including baselines where relevant, will be independently checked at source. This is particularly critical to the integrity of the evaluation given the limited scope for the EMU to verify monitoring data. • The PMU is responsible for ensuring the quality of grantees' reporting, including verification and independent checks at source if required. • The EMU will explore any data gaps in Q1/2 2017 ahead of the final evaluation in 2018 and explore any gaps that the evaluation can feasibly fill.	
Wrong combination of data collection tools for evaluating the overall programme **MEDIUM RISK**	• The evaluation needs to have the right mix of tools for data collection and analysis, including targeted impact evaluation methodologies for selected interventions and also tools to evaluate the PMU's overall approach. Given that the programme will support a number of interventions across a broad region, there is a risk that data collection will be of variable quality depending on the different levels of complexity of different interventions and regional and geographical differences, which may complicate the evaluation of the overall approach.	• Data collection tools and methodologies were refined and revised ahead of the MTE to ensure continued relevance, and will be further updated post-MTE ahead of the FE. • The EMU will report on data collection difficulties as they arise and corrective action will be taken where possible. However the EMU will have little or no resources available to engage with the PMU and grantees to rectify serious data inadequacies at the country level. • The EMU will make timely recommendations to the PMU where it identifies weaknesses in data availability or quality in the areas where the PMU is responsible for data collection.	**LOW RISK**
Poor or variable quality of survey data **MEDIUM RISK**	• Survey results are of insufficient quality or standard. • Survey data quality may be variable in different areas due to different challenges to data collection due to remoteness and other factors.	• Surveys will be undertaken by University of Reading and local partners who understand the local context. The university has extensive experience undertaking similar quantitative surveys and employs robust quality assurance processes.	**LOW RISK**
Problems with selection of control areas for impact evaluation **MEDIUM RISK**	• Control groups are not adequately identified.	• Surveys will be undertaken by University of Reading and local partners who understand the local context. The university has extensive experience undertaking similar quantitative surveys and employs robust quality assurance processes.	**LOW RISK**
Insufficient sample size to detect changes of the correct order **MEDIUM RISK**	• The size of the sample will impact on the analysis and statistical significance.	• The University of Reading have significant statistician expertise and have calculated appropriate sample sizes for statistical significance.	**LOW RISK**
There will be a large drop-out rate from the comparison groups	• This is typically the case and hard to prevent in longitudinal impact evaluations.	• Our mitigation strategy provides for oversampling of the comparison group to ensure that we achieve the	**MEDIUM RISK**

HIGH RISK		requisite targets to generate a statistically significant sample.	
Contamination of control areas **HIGH RISK**	• Control areas may be contaminated by intervention as a result of copying by other market players and wider systemic impacts of the intervention on the market.	• Interventions for impact evaluation will be selected carefully to ensure that chances of contamination are minimal. • Timing of baseline and follow-up survey will be selected to minimise extent of contamination outside of treatment group.	**MEDIUM RISK**
Insecurity may affect data collection **MEDIUM RISK**	• Insecurity may affect the ability of enumerators to go to certain areas.	• Risks assessments are carried out ahead of all data collection exercises. The two surveys undertaken are in low risk areas.	**LOW RISK**
Maintaining independence of the evaluation **MEDIUM RISK**	• Important to ensure that all stakeholders fully understand the role/ boundaries of this assignment	• From the outset, we have engaged closely with the PMU to ensure that it understands our role. • During 2013-14, we worked with the PMU to develop and agree a clear division of responsibilities in M&E functions. • The Evaluation Reference Group (or equivalent) will be responsible for overseeing the credibility and independence of the evaluation, and will review all products, and agree dissemination plans and formats with the EMU.	**LOW RISK**
Staff turnover (e.g. the loss of key staff members) **MEDIUM RISK**	• The 5-year initial timeframe for this project implies the possibility of staff turnover during the period, with associated problems of loss of institutional memory, capacity and credibility.	• Minimising staff turnover though provision of clear individual objectives and staff development to aid retention. • Knowledge management system to aid institutional memory. • Contracting mechanisms to ensure that key staff can carry on in case they move institution. • The replacement of staff with like-for-like capacity (in consultation with the client) – Itad are able to draw on an extensive network of known associates.	**LOW RISK**
The evaluation may fail to take sufficient account of the complex political economy of staple food markets in the region **HIGH RISK**	• The political economy of staple food markets in the region is complex. If this is not thoroughly accounted for in the evaluation of interventions, there is a significant risk that the analysis will not take account of important contextual factors.	• Evaluation team members and PMU staff have relevant experience of regional work in this sector and will take political economy issues into account. • Whilst the EMU will attempt to consider political economy issues in the evaluation, resources for this are limited. Given the wide range of countries, sub-sectors and institutions that the programme will engage with, there is a significant residual risk that the evaluation will be unable to fully take account of political economy issues in its analysis, which may compromise the value of the evaluation findings. However, by using local experts, this risk will be reduced.	**MEDIUM RISK**

Changes to the PMU's implementation plan affect the applicability of the evaluation design modules **HIGH RISK**	• At the time of preparing the Inception Report, there were significant concerns that the contract may be terminated, with significant implications for the evaluation. • Given the programme follows a portfolio approach, it is difficult to predict the nature of the portfolio to evaluate at mid-term and final, and it is possible some of the evaluation modules will be less appropriate.	• There is sufficient built in flexibility in the work plan and evaluation team to respond to the PMU's evolving implementation plan. • Open communication channels with both the PMU and DFID help the EMU to discuss and adapt as needed.	**MEDIUM RISK**

External programme risks and mitigation measures			
Most significant risks	**Analysis**	**Mitigation measures**	**Residual Risk**
Disagreements and territorial behaviour within the governance structure of the evaluation can disrupt the evaluation **MEDIUM RISK**	• It is important to establish early on a shared concept for evaluation and ground rules for how this will happen. • With the communication of evaluation findings emanating from the PMU, there is a risk that stakeholders may question the independence of the findings, with consequent reputational risks to the EMU.	• One of the first steps in the inception phase was for the PMU and EMU to meet to discuss modus operandi. • DFID and the Evaluation Reference Group is responsible for overseeing the credibility and independence of the evaluation, and will review all communication products before wider dissemination. • Any differences of opinion regarding the modus operandi, or problems in the relationship between the PMU and EMU will be discussed internally and, if not resolved, will be raised with the Programme Steering Committee.	**LOW RISK**
Assumption that PMU and grantees will cooperate usefully and fully with the EMU **HIGH RISK**	• Evaluations and reviews can point out sensitive and uncomfortable performance issues, and the PMU may be defensive (or restrict access to information). • Grantees may be unwilling to share required data due to commercial or other sensitivities. • The lack of in-country / site-level verification of monitoring data by the EMU may compromise faith in the integrity of monitoring data. • Limited M&E capacity in the PMU until recently limited the EMU's ability to fully engage with the PMU on technical evaluation issues in first couple of years. • Progress against the evaluation work plan and milestones is partly dependent on the ability and timeliness of PMU M&E and grant-making activities.	• During the inception phase, the EMU established a modus operandi with the PMU, setting out clearly each of our respective roles (particularly for M&E). • Itad has significant experience of working with a wide range of beneficiaries and is very accustomed to working with them to ensure that relevant M&E data can be provided whilst respecting their specific sensitivities. • The EMU has the ability to alert DFID if we consider that there is undue influence that will affect the credibility and independence of the evaluation. • The PMU is responsible for ensuring the quality of grantees' reporting at source (e.g. verification checks, etc.) and has recently stepped up its efforts to verify grantee data.	**MEDIUM RISK**