

SAVING
LIVES
CHANGING
LIVES



Strategic Evaluation of WFP Support for Enhanced Resilience

Evaluation Report: Volume I

Prepared by: Tim Bene, Team Leader; Dorcas Robinson, Fatima Laanouni, Karen Bahr Caballero, Ben Murphy and Dave Wilson.

Commissioned by the

WFP Office of Evaluation



World Food
Programme

January 2019

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation. In particular, we are grateful to staff and management from WFP country offices in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan and Zambia, as well as the regional bureaux in Bangkok, Johannesburg and Nairobi for hosting evaluation missions. We appreciate the participation of staff from headquarters and from a wide range of government, donor, international organization and implementing partners, as well as members of communities served by WFP. Special thanks go to representatives of the Office of Evaluation and the external reference group for their overall guidance and support.

The evaluation team was supplemented during the country missions by a number of additional consultants. For Ethiopia, we thank Judith Sandford and Do'e Berhanu, members of another evaluation team undertaking the country programme evaluation of Ethiopia, for their collaboration and additional work and reporting on behalf of our evaluation. We also thank Roger Lewins (Nepal and Kenya), Placide Bulaimu (Niger) and Stuart Coupe (Zambia) for participating as members of country mission teams.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Key Personnel for the Evaluation

Office of Evaluation (OEV)

| | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| Andrea Cook | Director of Evaluation |
| Deborah McWhinney | Evaluation Manager |
| Lia Carboni | Research Analyst |
| Kathinka Lyche | Research Analyst |

ITAD Limited Evaluation Team

| | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Tim Bene | Team Leader |
| Ben Murphy | Evaluator |
| Chris Bene | Senior Evaluator |
| Dorcas Robinson | Senior Evaluator |
| Dave Wilson | Quality Assurance |
| Elise Sandri | Data Analyst/Researcher |
| Fatima Laanouni | Senior Evaluator |
| Karen Bahr Caballero | Evaluator |
| Nick Nisbett | Senior Evaluator |
| Philippa Tadele | Quality Assurance |
| Placide Bulaimu | Evaluator |
| Phuong Dang | Evaluator |
| Roger Lewins | Evaluator |
| Stuart Coupe | Evaluator |

Table of contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Executive Summary | i |
| 1 Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1 Evaluation Features | 1 |
| 1.2 Context | 6 |
| 1.3 WFP Strategic Directions in Support of Enhanced Resilience | 11 |
| 2 Findings | 16 |
| 2.1 Node 1 – Concept | 16 |
| 2.2 Node 2 – Strategy | 22 |
| 2.3 Node 3 – Guidance | 27 |
| 2.4 Node 4 – Systems | 31 |
| 2.5 Node 5 – Programmes | 35 |
| 2.6 Node 6 – Partners..... | 44 |
| 2.7 Node 7 – People | 51 |
| 2.8 Node 8 – Information | 53 |
| 3 Conclusions and Recommendations | 60 |
| 3.1 Conclusions | 60 |
| 3.2 Recommendations | 62 |
| Acronyms | 67 |
| Photo Credit | 70 |

Annexes (in volume II)

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference
- Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix
- Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology
- Annex 4: Evaluation Phase Timelines
- Annex 5: List of People Consulted during the Inception and Evaluation Phases
- Annex 6: Bibliography
- Annex 7: Web Survey for Country Directors
- Annex 8: Web Survey for Gender Advisers
- Annex 9: Web Survey for Performance Management and Monitoring Division
- Annex 10: Review of Country Strategic Plan Focus-Area Tagging, with Emphasis on Resilience Building
- Annex 11: Resilience Definitions and Concepts
- Annex 12 : Organizational Approaches to Operationalizing Resilience
- Annex 13: Resilience and Cross-Cutting Issues
- Annex 14: WFP Policies, Strategies and Guidelines and the Definition of Resilience
- Annex 15: Evidence Matrix
- Annex 16: Findings – Conclusions – Recommendations Matrix
- Annex 17: Innovative Resilience-Building Approaches Captured during the Field Visits
- Annex 18: Monitoring and Assessment
- Annex 19: Evaluation Governance

List of Figures


| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 1: Theory of delivery nodes..... | 3 |
| Figure 2: Data sources | 3 |
| Figure 3: Key conceptual components of resilience from current literature and practice | 9 |
| Figure 4: WFP landscape of work along the humanitarian-development nexus..... | 13 |
| Figure 5: Total number of outcome tags by focus area by region and needs-based plan budget in 2018, <i>n</i> =76 | 25 |
| Figure 6: Focus-area tag count by strategic result (<i>n</i> =311)..... | 26 |
| Figure 7: Ongoing regional bureau resilience guidance | 31 |
| Figure 8: Needs-based plan compared to implementation plan in 2018, <i>n</i> =61 | 33 |
| Figure 9: Implementation plan in 2018 by activity category, <i>n</i> =61 | 34 |
| Figure 10: Total FFA and R4 beneficiaries in 2017 | 36 |
| Figure 11: WFP use of assessments and their role in providing resilience-related information.... | 53 |

Executive Summary

Introduction and evaluation features

1. The strategic evaluation provides a formative and forward-looking assessment of WFP's support for enhanced resilience. Its purpose is predominantly to promote learning regarding the extent to which WFP is organizationally capable of undertaking resilience programming.
2. The evaluation addresses the following five evaluation questions:
 - i) How relevant is WFP's resilience work and for whom?
 - ii) Is WFP engaged in the right partnerships to enable strong resilience outcomes?
 - iii) Is WFP "fit-for-purpose" to implement resilience programming?
 - iv) (a) Are WFP country offices able to generate and use data to make informed decisions related to resilience-related programming? (b) Does WFP have a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience?
 - v) What emerging lessons can be identified?
3. The evaluation team used a "theory of delivery" model to examine how and to what extent WFP's concepts, strategies, guidance, systems, programmes, people, partners and information work together to strengthen its support for enhanced resilience. These delivery "nodes" are used as an organizing structure for the summary report (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Theory of delivery used in the evaluation



Source: Itad. Evaluation team based on learning from theory-based evaluations.

4. A wide range of WFP literature was studied, including corporate strategies and results frameworks, policies, guidelines, evaluation reports and technical material from a range of functional units, primarily for the period from 2014 to 2017. An analysis of an Integrated Road Map (IRM) database, including data on 80 country strategic plans (CSPs) and country portfolio budgets, was undertaken in order to provide information on the "tagging" of focus areas (see paragraph 18) and resource allocations. Web surveys were carried out with country directors, employees working on gender-related topics¹ and monitoring and evaluation officers. A short survey was sent to the

¹ Staff of the Gender Office at headquarters, regional gender advisers and members of the gender results network.

Executive Board Bureau for circulation to all lists of Board members. A comparative analysis was carried out with two agencies – the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Mercy Corps. Nine field missions to country offices in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malawi, Nepal, the Niger and Zambia and to regional bureaux in Bangkok, Johannesburg and Nairobi were undertaken for data collection, including through key informant interviews with WFP staff, key donors and government and other partners. In total, nearly 300 people were interviewed individually and about 250 people participated in focus group discussions. Limitations included a low response rate from Board members; a shift in the way in which the comparative analysis was carried out — from a “node” approach to a more holistic examination of other agencies’ approaches to enhancing resilience; and the early stage of implementation of resilience-related initiatives, which resulted in the emergence of few lessons.

Context

5. The concept of resilience has long featured in WFP’s support for the prevention of food insecurity caused by shocks and stressors. Affirming WFP’s core business of saving lives, the current WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021) positions the organization in the global resilience agenda by anchoring its actions across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Setting two strategic goals – Support countries to achieve zero hunger (Sustainable Development Goal [SDG] 2) and Partner to support implementation of the SDGs (SDG 17)² – the plan states that “WFP works to strengthen the resilience of affected people in protracted crises by applying a development lens in its humanitarian response.”³

6. A range of recent policies have articulated WFP’s position on resilience:

- WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management – Building Food Security and Resilience (2011) describes WFP’s approach to bridging emergency response, recovery and development. It identifies one of WFP’s comparative advantages as “building resilience and protecting the most vulnerable”, including through food assistance programmes, social protection and productive safety nets and innovative risk finance, transfer and insurance for food security.⁴
- The Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015) is intended to guide WFP’s adoption of a resilience building approach to programming in that it: “i) provides coherence for WFP’s actions to reduce vulnerability; ii) aligns WFP with global policy on resilience; and iii) ensures that WFP’s activities complement the resilience-building programmes of other actors”.⁵
- The policy goal of WFP’s first Climate Change Policy (2017) is for vulnerable people, communities and governments to be able to address the impacts of climate on food security and nutrition and to adapt to climate change. The policy provides guiding principles and programme options for integrating activities that address climate change into WFP’s work.⁶

7. The Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015) builds on the collaborative approach to resilience defined by the Rome-based agencies (RBAs), which emphasizes strengthening the resilience of food production systems and the livelihoods of rural poor, vulnerable and food-insecure people. The policy reflects the fact that many of WFP’s past

² For SDG 17, WFP’s support for countries may have development or humanitarian objectives other than zero hunger.

³ [WFP/EB.2/2016/4-A/1/Rev.2.](#)

⁴ [WFP/EB.2/2011/4-A.](#)

⁵ [WFP/EB.A/2015/5-C.](#)

⁶ [WFP/EB.1/2017/4-A/Rev.1.](#)

operations included elements of resilience building and emphasizes that a fundamental shift is being made in how programming is designed, implemented and managed.

8. The WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021) sets the approach to strengthening WFP’s ability to address food insecurity in specific contexts, in line with government priorities and the renewed emphasis on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that drives the ongoing United Nations reform.

9. WFP’s support for resilience enhancement is not ascribable to a single initiative, but to a range of programme activities, approaches and packages, functions and initiatives. Figure 2 illustrates where these different elements fit along the humanitarian–development nexus.

Findings

10. The summary of key evaluation findings presented here is organized by delivery “node”.

Node 1 – Concept

11. **WFP’s commitment to enhancing resilience is integrated into policies and guidelines, but a unifying, agency-wide conceptualization of resilience is lacking.** Strategic documents demonstrate a shift in focus from disaster risk reduction and prevention to “development outcomes”, but among WFP staff, the perception persisted that resilience was disaster risk reduction with a few integrated services – mainly social protection and income support and, to a far lesser extent, nutrition.

12. **There is a gap in understanding of resilience capacities as being owned by people who face shocks.** Only staff with clear roles in resilience enhancement understood resilience in terms of anticipatory, absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities, although the idea that resilience is a set of capacities needed to respond to shocks over the long-term was often expressed. On the whole, WFP sees resilience as an intervention that it or its partners deliver. As such, there is a tendency to view resilience as a one-time solution rather than a means by which people continue to address myriad stressors and shocks drawing on and choosing among a range of services, information and their own assets as needed. This creates the risk that WFP could support maladaptation in which well-intentioned actors deliver initiatives that have the unintended result of limiting people’s ability to deal with shocks.

13. **The importance of addressing the structural causes of vulnerability is largely absent from WFP’s definition of resilience, which has implications for WFP’s dual humanitarian–development mandate and work along the humanitarian–development nexus.** In international development, the definition of resilience⁷ has expanded beyond the idea of “coping” with shocks and stressors and now includes a focus on improvement in well-being and consideration of the factors that may inhibit well-being due to social, political or economic exclusion. The exception to this finding were gender and nutrition teams, especially at headquarters, which focus on individual capacities and social inequalities alongside support for institutional responses.


14. **There is uncertainty regarding the relevance of enhancing resilience in situations of instability or crisis.** The complexity of these situations is acknowledged in WFP’s policies, but has not been reflected in approaches. This is not surprising given that only limited evidence has been drawn from **practical experience on how to strengthen resilience capacities in conflict or protracted crisis settings, with an emphasis currently placed on the principle of “do no harm”.**

15. **WFP recognizes that it needs to target a range of different groups, including communities and households.** More weakly articulated is how such targeting helps to enhance

⁷ As distinct from ecosystems resilience, which is where the concept of resilience was first proposed.

the resilience of individual women, men, girls and boys. During the evaluation process, WFP employees repeatedly explained that actors at different levels have contributed to the resilience of people who face shocks. They described the rationale for working with community level, government, private sector and regional actors, but not how it relates to resilience building.

Figure 2: WFP’s work along the humanitarian–development nexus



Source: Evaluation team.

ARC – African Risk Capacity

CFSVA – comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis

FFA – food assistance for assets

FoodSECuRE – Food Security Climate Resilience facility

IPC – Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

SISMod – shock impact simulation model

C-ADAPT – Climate Adaptation Management and Innovation Initiative

EFSA – emergency food security assessment

FNG – Fill the Nutrient Gap tool

FSMS – food security monitoring system

MAM – moderate acute malnutrition

VAM – vulnerability analysis and mapping


Node 2 – Strategy

16. **Resilience is at the heart of WFP’s strategic response to protracted crises; however, there is no clear, coherent framework to advance resilience enhancement from concept to integrated programming and measurable results.** The overlap between WFP’s humanitarian and emergency preparedness policies and those on the development side of its work remains unreconciled, leaving a “do no harm” approach as the *modus operandi* in conflict settings rather than directly addressing persistent causes of vulnerability. In the absence of a clear resilience strategy at the corporate level, country offices where national strategies or governance structures support resilience have developed integrated, multi-year and multi-partner resilience programmes, such as in Guatemala, Malawi and the Niger.

17. **Country strategic plans provide a potentially good platform for resilience programming.** There is significant opportunity to embed a focus on resilience at the country level based on the comprehensive analysis of the situation in a country during the zero hunger strategic review. The review process enables WFP to identify gaps in the national policy framework and programmes and to examine the implementation capacities of government institutions and non-governmental partners at the national and local levels. Implementation of the policy on CSPs can foster links between humanitarian and development assistance and facilitate the transition to recovery and resilience building programmes, especially in protracted crises.

18. The Financial Framework Review⁸ introduced “focus area tagging” as a means of clarifying the alignment of donor funding with CSP strategic outcomes. The three focus area tags are crisis response, resilience building and root causes. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of these tags among corresponding needs-based budgets in all six regional bureaux. In the case of resilience building, the number of tags far outweighs the budgetary allocations.

Figure 3: Total number of outcome tags by focus area, region and needs-based planning budget, 2018 (n = 76)



Includes all the CSPs active in 2018 for which needs-based planning figures are available in the database, excluding the outlier Turkey (76 in total).

Source: WFP Integrated Road Map reporting platform, country portfolio budget (CPB) project plan details report.

Node 3 – Guidance

19. **The evaluation team found no evidence of explicit guidance that supports WFP’s work to enhance resilience.** Technical support for the identification of entry or exit points for resilience work after completion of a zero hunger strategic review or a Level 3 emergency response is a particular gap. The three-pronged approach⁹ stands out as a tool for linking assessments to integrated programme designs from the national to the community level; the approach is referred to in both emergency preparedness and resilience policies, although it is not yet consistently promoted or adopted beyond the food assistance for assets team.

20. **The IRM guidance encourages greater integration of programmes, but technical and process-related guidance needs more specificity.** Although several guidance documents refer to “integrated programming”, WFP does not have a specific definition of what this is and provides little practical advice on how to carry it out. Even less guidance is provided on the internal systems needed to make integration possible. The centralized use of tools, such as the 3W (“who is doing what where?”) method lose their utility when the urgency of a disaster recedes and organizations return to their own budgeting and planning systems, which are often inconsistent with each other.

⁸ WFP/EB.2/2016/5-B/1/Rev.1.

⁹ WFP’s three-pronged approach comprises integrated context analysis at the national level, seasonal livelihood programming at the subnational level and participatory community planning at the community level.

21. **The technical support for resilience provided by regional advisers is viewed as useful and there is a demand for its expansion.** Regional advisors work in a range of settings and must be able to contextualize and connect the support they provide for resilience. There were good examples of this in the regional bureaux in Johannesburg and Dakar, but country offices' demand for technical visits exceeds the capacity to provide them in all regional bureaux.

Node 4 – Systems

22. **WFP's tendency to work in "silos" constrains its ability to follow the integrated approach needed to enhance resilience.** Although the Livelihoods, Resilience and Food Systems Service has promoted resilience as a broad, encompassing topic, the evaluation team found that resilience enhancement was often perceived as a food assistance for assets initiative. The CSP process promotes greater integration but practical considerations continue to be a constraint, including the ability to partner effectively. More advanced integration exists in specific resilience projects, such as WFP's G5 Sahel initiative,¹⁰ through which WFP promotes integration with external partners based on comparative strengths and current and projected requirements in each setting.

23. **WFP's financial framework is currently transitioning towards a dual needs-based and resource-based planning structure, which could be beneficial for resilience building when completed.** The ability for a single CSP to have a dual perspective allows greater funding flexibility and a sharpened "line of sight" on the gaps between needs and resources. A CSP has the potential to support enhanced resilience through needs-based approaches for relief activities (in the crisis response and resilience building focus areas) and resource-based approaches for development activities (in the root causes focus area).

Node 5 – Programmes

24. **WFP supports a range of interventions that contribute to different resilience capacities.** WFP has expanded its resilience offerings by piloting new approaches such as the Rural Resilience Initiative. Table 1 shows that WFP's core interventions (underlined) have the potential to contribute to all four resilience capacities, but particularly to the anticipatory capacities of communities, households, individuals and national governments. Nevertheless, the potential for resilience enhancement is not yet fully realized.

25. **While there are examples of WFP's programmes using a "convergence approach", much more could be done to enhance synergies among WFP-supported interventions.** The three-pronged approach has the potential to foster synergies because it starts with an integrated context analysis supported by vulnerability analysis and mapping, consolidates seasonal and livelihood-related data in order to inform programming choices and then enables communities to agree on the targeting and choice of interventions in a participatory manner. It also encourages WFP to identify partners' programmes, especially government programmes, in which food assistance for assets is WFP's main, but not necessarily sole, contribution.

¹⁰ G5 Sahel is an institutional framework for the coordination of regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa. See, WFP West Africa, *Scaling up for resilient individuals, communities, and systems in the Sahel: Operational Reference Note* (October 2018).

Table 1: Examples of WFP’s interventions for enhancing resilience-related capacities

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Transformative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A combination of programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in livelihoods and markets that provide reliable incomes that are sufficient to prevent negative impacts from a shock (Purchase for Progress, R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, home-grown school feeding, Farm to Market Alliance). • Gender approaches when they help to alter the social conditions that lead to women experiencing greater negative impacts during the preparation for, response to or recovery from shocks and when women’s ability to anticipate, absorb and adapt is utilized without burdening them. • A combination of capacity building approaches when they lead to the development of a reliable government system that covers shock eventualities and livelihood needs (WFP’s capacity building for disaster risk reduction; shock-responsive social protection; climate adaptation; nutrition; education and food systems assessment) • Asset building when the threat to a community is completely prevented (food assistance for assets) |
| Anticipatory | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saving groups and credit services (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative) when they allow groups to increase their financial reserves and utilize them before a shock occurs. • Local-level weather monitoring services (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative) when they provide communities with timely and usable information for foreseeing anticipated weather patterns in their area and when early action is taken to minimize losses and damage caused by climate hazards (forecast-based financing). • Capacity building support when it increases the ability of national or regional governments to predict shocks before they occur, identify particularly vulnerable groups and mobilize responses. |
| Absorptive | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lean season food and cash-based support when it smooths consumption patterns and reduces the use of negative coping strategies (food assistance for assets). • Insurance mechanisms when they allow farmers to maintain food consumption during a drought and replenish assets used or destroyed (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, African Risk Capacity). • Asset building when it reduces the impact of a shock on a community (food assistance for assets). • Nutrition programmes when they prevent serious nutrient loss during a shock or build individuals’ long-term physical and mental health, enabling them to absorb and deal with shocks (Fill the Nutrient Gap) • School feeding when it smooths consumption for children during a shock and relieves pressure on household food supply. |
| Adaptive | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asset building when it alters the nature of a shock, reducing or avoiding its impact (food assistance for assets). • Programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in the diversification of crops (Purchase for Progress; conservation agriculture through the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative). • Programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in the diversification of buyers (Purchase for Progress, Farm to Market Alliance). • Training when it equips people with new skills that can be used to diversify incomes (food assistance for training). |

26. **WFP has the programmatic tools to support a phased “layering” of activities that facilitate graduation from extreme poverty.** Unconditional transfers are a unique entry point for providing the immediate food needs of the very poorest people and could be used to connect people to a phased layering of activities that facilitate graduation from extreme poverty. WFP’s increasing use of cash-based transfers has the potential to enable increased adaptation to shocks and stressors, but attention to the design and targeting of programmes using cash-based transfers is needed. Work with smallholder farmers enables WFP to support the major livelihood activity in the countries where it operates, but requires contingency plans for responding to shocks, such as the Rural Resilience Initiative, and close attention in order to ensure that the emphasis on production, sales or market-related results does not exclude the poorest smallholders.

27. **WFP’s current range of interventions is not particularly well-suited to the mobility or migration of food-insecure people.** Many of WFP’s interventions are aimed at building resilience in defined rural areas and with population groups that are not mobile and are free from active conflict. Outside its emergency response, WFP’s technical assistance has the aim of improving parts of the enabling environment, potentially providing people with access to social assistance, markets or other United Nations services wherever they are within national boundaries. Some of these interventions, such as distributions linked to psychosocial support for internally displaced persons, can specifically target people facing the shock of forced migration.

28. **More time is needed for food assistance for assets initiatives to realize their resilience building outcomes.** Food assistance can prevent people from falling into food and nutrition insecurity during cyclical shortages; asset creation can reduce or remove the threat of a natural shock and provide skills and relationships for dealing with shocks when they occur. Food assistance for assets was found to be more effective in encouraging communities to maintain single assets that provide immediate relief from a prevalent shock than the combinations of assets that are required to protect from slow-onset or distant shocks.

Node 6 – Partners

29. **WFP is improving the support it provides to governments through the zero hunger strategic review process and continued country capacity strengthening, which will help to strengthen the resilience of potentially vulnerable individuals and communities.** A strong governance system for food security and livelihoods can enhance the provision of support to the most vulnerable people before, during and after a shock. Partnerships with governments are fundamental to WFP's work in countries that have functional governments and WFP's strategic plan has institutionalized an approach in which national governments have the leading role.

30. WFP commits significant technical expertise to the strengthening of government capacities in school feeding, nutrition, food security, livelihoods, emergency preparedness and response and support for smallholder farmers. During the evaluation, WFP's role in strengthening capacities to conduct food security assessments was consistently identified as a strength. However, the evaluation team found that government departments are often approached individually, rather than in a coordinated manner so as to strengthen the enabling environment for resilience.

31. **WFP actively engages in partnerships, including with the other RBAs, in enhancing the resilience of food-insecure target groups, but the different needs and priorities of women, men, girls and boys have not been systematically taken into account in these joint initiatives.** WFP has developed partnerships with the RBAs and other agencies in order to address gender inequalities, but gender-differentiated needs often remain misunderstood. The RBAs have a long-standing resilience agenda, but the evaluation team found that joint implementation has been of varied quality and driven by funding opportunities rather than agreements. Certain donors are now encouraging partnerships for programmes by funding centrally agreed RBA initiatives. At the country-level, United Nations agencies are jointly applying for funding for resilience activities with clearer articulation of roles and responsibilities. The 2030 Agenda frames and prioritizes these interlinked approaches, including the implementation of food security interventions in protracted and conflict settings.

32. **Some donors perceive WFP as a leading humanitarian organization and channel their funding towards the fulfilment of this role; it is too early to determine whether the CSP framework will allow the more diversified partnership modalities and funding streams needed for longer-term resilience approaches.** The resilience policy notes that resilience building requires the engagement of multiple actors, but the evaluation team found that local, civil society and non-governmental organizations are often constrained by WFP's procedures and partnering practices. WFP is broadening its partnerships with private sector actors, but the enabling factors for this need to be strengthened. **In the examples where WFP has attracted specific funding for resilience, such as the Rural Resilience Initiative or in G5 Sahel, it has articulated its role in relation to the actions of other partners in a particular geographic area. WFP's seasonal livelihood programming and the "whole of society" approach support this.**

Node 7 – People

33. **Country offices have experienced and dedicated staff; however, with notable exceptions, there is a need to broaden the skill sets available.** Retaining excellent logisticians is essential for WFP's response capacity; however, as suggested in node 1 on concept, the enhancement of resilience requires a broader mindset focused on the fostering of "people-owned" capacities in order to shift from WFP's perception of "delivering" resilience to people and communities. Greater awareness of social and political exclusion and the risks of intervening in it is also required. At headquarters, the technical skills for assessing, planning and designing aspects of resilience support exist, but they are spread across numerous units and neither the organizational structure nor the corporate philosophy of WFP promote their integration.

Node 8 – Information

34. **WFP has access to a wealth of tools that provide insights into specific aspects of resilience; various combinations, along with new assessments, are being piloted with a view to providing a more holistic picture of these tools.** WFP has the ability to understand the impacts that a range of shocks have on food security. However, WFP's assessments focus on vulnerability rather than resilience capacities. The two exceptions to this are the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis II initiative and resilience context analysis, both of which WFP has piloted but has not yet endorsed at the corporate level. Innovative use of satellite imaging and seasonal forecasting linked to insurance payment triggers is being tested, but these initiatives are still in their early stages.

35. **WFP's corporate monitoring framework includes some areas that are relevant to the measurement of resilience but is limited by differences among the methodologies used for measuring indicators and a tendency to equate outputs with outcomes.** Programme and monitoring staff see the value in gathering information on resilience, but current corporate tools do not enable them to do so systematically or effectively. WFP country offices can assess and use various types of resilience-related information, but face barriers related to timeframes, consolidation, capacity and cost.

Conclusions

36. This section provides responses to the original evaluation questions by drawing broad conclusions and lessons on the relevance, status and potential future direction of WFP's approach to resilience strengthening.

The relevance of WFP's contributions to enhanced resilience

37. The evaluation team found that WFP has made a concerted and deliberate effort to contribute to resilience strengthening and has undertaken a range of policy, programming and assessment work over the last decade with a view to improving people's abilities to deal with shocks and reducing the need for repeated humanitarian interventions. WFP is meaningfully engaged with the concept of and approaches to resilience as it grapples with their implications for its work.

38. However, this engagement is not yet fully manifested in a concerted drive by WFP's leadership to develop a shared understanding of resilience and of how WFP can consistently enhance it in order to improve food security. The degree of application of the concept was, therefore, found to be variable both vertically and horizontally throughout the organization. In a few units, regional bureaux and county offices, enhancing resilience is considered as an imperative and approaches to the planning, implementation and monitoring of interventions are being developed; but in many other WFP units and offices, staff struggle to see the difference between the capacity for resilience and single-point interventions in disaster prevention and livelihoods.

39. Low awareness of maladaptation is the most serious gap in understanding but could be quickly addressed by WFP's drawing from "do no harm" principles. This would cover other knowledge gaps by placing more emphasis on the means by which people choose among and draw on a range of services, information and their own assets in order to protect their livelihoods from myriad stressors and shocks. Such emphasis may also result in greater attention to the political and social root causes of persistent vulnerability. These are issues where WFP's civil society and non-governmental partners play a more active role, but WFP requires a clear position on them in order to ensure programme quality.

Organizational arrangements in support of resilience programming

40. WFP's strategic framework is becoming more conducive to approaches aimed at enhancing resilience. The CSP process places greater emphasis on context, government priorities, "whole of society" approaches and integrated programming, all of which enhance the relevance of WFP programming for populations exposed to shocks. Nevertheless, and despite the designation of resilience building as a focus area tag, a clear "resilience lens" has not yet been applied to the design and implementation of CSPs. This is largely because there is no clear, explicit guidance that leads staff from a definition of resilience to the analysis of entry and exit points that could follow the zero hunger strategic review process or an emergency response.

41. Operational aspects also limit the application of a resilience approach. Although there is now a greater emphasis on integrated programming, WFP's tendency to work in "silos" has persisted beyond the introduction of the IRM and limits programming and internal learning. With some notable exceptions, WFP's breadth of interventions — ranging from the stabilization of nutrition in emergencies, unconditional transfers and asset building to the modelling of climate change and food security-related responses — seldom converge in a way that could help a population group progress from food insecurity to resilience. Tools such as the three-pronged approach, which could help layer and link interventions to specific settings, are associated with particular interventions and are underutilized. In addition, realizing the ambition to overcome the structural conditions that limit the social, political and economic participation of women and girls, as laid out in the gender policy, requires a committed engagement of units and teams throughout WFP.

Partnering for the delivery of better resilience outcomes

42. WFP has expanded its partnerships to offer more comprehensive support for resilience. Partnerships with government have become of central importance in this work via the CSP process and are expected to contribute to the strengthening of governance systems that could significantly increase the level of support given to the most vulnerable people before, during and after a shock.

43. RBA collaboration on resilience at headquarters level has not been matched with the longer-term commitments required, although certain donors are encouraging greater collaboration with a view to reducing the need to fund humanitarian responses to recurrent crises. Other donors regard WFP's remit as primarily in humanitarian response and, therefore, do not expect enhanced resilience outcomes.

44. If these and other working relationships (with national governments, civil society organizations and the private sector) can evolve past the administrative difficulties that currently constrain them, it should be possible for WFP to articulate the strengths and limits of its role and enhance resilience more efficiently and effectively as a contribution to the achievement of zero hunger.

Systems for tracking progress towards resilience outcomes

45. WFP's corporate reporting on resilience remains weak because core programmes are not yet integrated in ways that create a coherent resilience "outcome" and the monitoring indicators used are designed to track the outputs of separate interventions.

46. WFP's assessment capacity can be used to support targeting and the identification of shocks throughout the organization. WFP is testing the use of assessments that focus on measuring improvements in resilience capacities in addition to measuring the characteristics of vulnerability and is increasingly considering ways of developing understanding of the connections between shocks and responses that occur in a given social, political, ecological or economic system.

47. WFP is not currently equipped to articulate clearly how resilience can be strengthened in a given context, what its contribution to resilience enhancement will be, what roles other actors can play, what results are intended and what assumptions should be tracked during work to achieve these results. WFP offices in countries where the conditions for development are stable have found it easier to continue resilience programmes initiated prior to their CSPs, but there is far more uncertainty about how to position work on resilience in protracted crises and conflict situations as set forth in the WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021).

48. The evaluation team concludes that WFP has the foundations for and high-level strategic commitment to supporting the enhancement of resilience in order to avoid recurrent crises. These need to be grounded in the operational realities and matched by demands for better guidance, measurement and systems if WFP is to make a significant contribution in this area.

Recommendations

49. The evaluation team defined a number of recommendations for addressing various aspects of WFP's ways of working. These are meant to strengthen WFP's ability to contribute to efforts to enhance the resilience of individuals, households, and communities.

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|--|---|---|
| <p>Recommendation 1: Establish an interdivisional leadership team tasked with developing a strategy for enhancing resilience in order to achieve zero hunger and chaired by the Assistant Executive Director of the Operations Services Department (OS).</p> <p>Responsibilities should include the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Define clear principles for WFP's work on enhancing the resilience of women, men, boys and girls against shocks that set back progress on food security. ii. Define the contributions of different WFP units and divisions to the enhancement of resilience to different types of shocks, including climate, economic and political shocks, in different contexts. iii. Develop a strategy for including explicit approaches to the enhancement of resilience in future CSPs. iv. Define approaches to the strengthening of resilience in protracted crisis and conflict situations. v. Define approaches to the strengthening of resilience in settings affected by recurrent and worsening climate shocks. vi. Review activities according to the resilience capacities that they are intended to support and link them to partnership mapping. vii. Conduct an internal review of and synthesize existing knowledge on WFP's approaches to and lessons learned from the implementation of programmes that contribute to enhanced resilience, including work on shock-responsive social protection. | <p>Assistant Executive Director, OS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Director of each OS division to nominate a member of the team. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resilience leadership team formed by June 2019. • First meeting of the team by 30 June 2019. • Meetings to be held once every two months until the intended results have been delivered or until December 2020 (whichever comes first). |
| <p>Recommendation 2: Integrate issues related to gender equality, empowerment and resilience into guidance on the zero hunger strategic review process and the IRM for country offices.</p> <p>An open set of questions that encourage country offices to adopt a resilience approach should include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Whose resilience should WFP contribute to enhancing (by gender and age group)? ▪ Against which types of shock does resilience need to be built (economic, political, climate)? ▪ How will resilience be enhanced – through what combination of governance, social, ecological, technological, welfare, food or market assets and systems? ▪ Which capacities can WFP best support? ▪ How is WFP's contribution linked to those of other actors, including government entities? ▪ What food security and nutrition-related results are expected? | <p>IRM team and Strategic Coordination and Support Division.</p> | <p>Within the next six months – by June 2019.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| <p>Recommendation 3: Strengthen the financial and partnership base for initiatives on resilience enhancement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Identify seed money for baseline data collection and the planning of integrated resilience initiatives. Funding could be provided through unearmarked funds, such as the proposed 2030 Transition Fund. ii. Develop a fundraising strategy for long-term funding of initiatives on resilience enhancement, including through thematic funding windows (such as for climate resilience) and engagement with the private sector (for example, on insurance instruments). iii. Revise the partnership action plan template in order to incorporate a “resilience lens” with explicit roles defined for government and non-governmental partners. | <p>Government Partnerships Division and Strategic Resource Allocation Committee.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |
| <p>Recommendation 4: Building on the strategy developed (Recommendation 1), commission a workforce study that assesses the horizontal and vertical adjustments needed in order to ensure that WFP employees can successfully deliver on resilience-focused commitments.</p> <p>The study would examine ways of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ promoting the development of integrated teams to replace the “silo” working approach in country offices, regional bureaux and headquarters units and appointing team leaders who will lead on behalf of the various units represented in each team and be accountable to senior managers; ▪ based on a sustainable financing model, increase the availability of headquarters and regional bureau staff for providing sustained technical support to country offices, including through secondments; ▪ at headquarters, maintain specialist capacity to develop and curate technical methods and guidance suitable for incorporation in integrated programmes; ▪ match job profiles, skills and contract terms with needs, bearing in mind the long-term nature of resilience work; ▪ develop a roster of “non-traditional” employment profiles useful for resilience programming; and ▪ consider adding to staff performance evaluation an indicator of staff members’ performance in working as part of an integrated team. | <p>Policy and Programme Division (OSZ) with support from the Human Resources Division (HRM).</p> | <p>By February 2020.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|---|---|----------------------------|
| <p>Recommendation 5: Consolidate performance measurement data from resilience-related initiatives for corporate reporting and sharing with national partners.</p> <p>Develop a result tracking framework that is compatible with the corporate results framework (CRF):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Include information on the contributions and outcomes related to resilience, including underlying assumptions, that WFP and its partners expect to see in shock-prone populations. ▪ Develop an aggregate or indexed score that feeds into the CRF, with short accompanying contextual descriptions of external and internal influences on the results. <p>Country offices should consider measuring differences in resilience outcomes using dedicated econometric analysis such as Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis II, ensuring that analytical processes can be conducted annually. Routine monitoring could act as a lighter, less expensive option for facilitating learning and reporting applied more regularly than a large-scale measurement of resilience capacities. This recommendation is only feasible if WFP converges interventions to create resilience outcomes. Where interventions remain singular and separate, WFP should consider further use of perspective-based indicators (introduced in the CRF) to move beyond the output level monitoring to a better understanding of how interventions help or hinder peoples' ability to pursue food security.</p> | <p>Performance Management and Monitoring Division (RMP) and OSZ.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |
| <p>Recommendation 6: Strengthen the ability of headquarters units and regional bureaux to collect, collate and analyse information on covariate transboundary and localized shocks before they happen.</p> <p>This would involve:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ expanding the use of climate modelling and linking it to existing information from market, agro-ecological and population data (possibly including other categories, such as data on drops in remittances); ▪ reviewing WFP's information systems with a view to strengthening the connections among different databases and thereby enlarging the evidence base for resilience programming; ▪ supporting regional bodies in connecting and understanding the food security implications and uses of their data; and ▪ continuing to test the "trigger" functions introduced by index-based insurance (the Rural Resilience Initiative and the African Risk Capacity initiative) and forecast-based financing for facilitating early, anticipatory action in shock-prone settings. | <p>OSZ — Analysis and Trends Service; Asset Creation and Livelihoods Unit; Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes; Livelihoods, Resilience and Food Systems Service and regional bureaux.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Recommendation 7: Support the generation of evidence on the relevance of food security and resilience interventions in conflict and protracted crises.</p> <p>This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • working with research institutions, governments and United Nations partners, including those with mandates for work on gender issues, on the commissioning of operational research and evaluations that generate learning and evidence on the appropriateness of resilience programming for different individuals (women, men, boys and girls) and communities; • organizing a wide consultation with current and past beneficiaries of WFP’s food security and resilience interventions in order to establish how food assistance, cash-based transfers, asset creation and other interventions help or hinder their coping strategies; and • carrying out an evaluation or review of WFP’s interventions in this area with attention to entry and exit strategies and beneficiaries’ experiences. | <p>OSZ — Analysis and Trends Service.</p> | <p>Start immediately and report back by February 2020.</p> |

1. Introduction

1.1 EVALUATION FEATURES

Rationale and Objectives

1. This evaluation is a formative and forward-looking assessment of WFP support for enhanced resilience. Its purpose is predominantly to assist learning about the extent to which the current conceptual, strategic, programmatic, financial and operational arrangements are conducive to the ability of WFP to undertake resilience programming. The evaluation will also contribute to accountability by providing a clear evidence base to inform WFP decision making. It is not intended to focus on the results of WFP programmes given the early stage of programming in this area. The terms of reference are provided in Annex 1.

2. The evaluation is timely both in the global context and internally for WFP. Globally, there has been a growing number of protracted crises for which purely humanitarian solutions do not go far enough, as well as recurrent crises that could be better mitigated. Internally for WFP, most country offices have moved to the country strategic plan (CSP) framework¹¹ and are embarking upon their implementation.

3. The idea of resilience has long featured in WFP support for food security outside of humanitarian contexts. However, the country strategic plans are considered a new opportunity to put resilience at the heart of WFP programmes by providing a long-term planning framework to address national needs jointly assessed and agreed with governments and local stakeholders. The more explicit treatment of resilience in the Strategic Plan (2017-2021) is part of WFP continuing the strategic shift¹² from being primarily a humanitarian organization delivering food aid, to one that is also involved in enabling work using food assistance.¹³ Nevertheless, the evaluation learned that there is an ongoing internal discussion as to whether WFP has the mandate, resources and expertise to successfully enhance resilience.

4. This evaluation investigates the extent to which a concept that, until recently, was somewhat abstract is transforming into an approach that is: consistent with the needs of the people, communities and governments that WFP serves; aligned with the skills and competencies of its own staff and the staff of the many organizations with which it partners; and consistent with the values, frameworks and modalities of the wide range of donors that support its work.

5. The WFP “resilience approach” is defined or referenced in different policies and strategies and operationalized through a combination of activities, packages and approaches that vary across space and time. Understanding how and why these combinations form and evolve – and their drivers and constraints – is a key aim of the evaluation. An additional objective is to examine the extent to which WFP resilience outcomes¹⁴ can be identified and measured, and whether adequate information is available to support decision making about resilience programming.

¹¹ This includes CSPs, interim CSPs and transitional interim CSPs.

¹² Initiated in the WFP Strategic Plan (2008–2013).

¹³ Most directly through Strategic Objective 2 addressing disaster preparedness and mitigation but also through Strategic Objectives 4 and 5 addressing chronic hunger and undernutrition, and the strengthening of host countries’ food and nutrition security systems.

¹⁴ “Resilience outcomes” is a phrase used in the report to capture the range of changes that can occur in resilience-related capacities – the ability of a person/household/community to anticipate, absorb or adapt to climate or other shocks or even to transform at a systemic level.

6. The evaluation addresses the following five evaluation questions (EQs):

EQ1: How relevant is WFP resilience work and for whom?

EQ2: Is WFP engaged in the right partnerships to enable strong resilience outcomes?

EQ3: Is WFP “fit-for-purpose”¹⁵ to implement resilience programming?

EQ4: (a) Are WFP country offices able to generate and use data to make informed decisions related to resilience-related programming?

(b) Does WFP have a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience?

EQ5: What emerging lessons can be identified?

7. Gender must be analysed when examining resilience because shocks and crises affect women and men, girls and boys, differently; gender is also a factor because it is socially constructed and, as such, influences a person's roles, relations, responsibilities and access to resources, all of which directly impact on individual and collective resilience. Specific sub-questions¹⁶ were included in the evaluation matrix to gather gender-specific evidence (Annex 2). These were designed to reflect the WFP Gender Policy (2015–2020) goals of integrating gender equality and women’s empowerment into all its work and pursuing gender-transformative approaches to achieving food security and nutrition.

Approach


8. The evaluation team chose a theory of delivery (ToD) approach, which allowed it to address the evaluation questions through eight organizational components referred to as “nodes” (Figure 1). This enabled it to retain a focus on WFP as a whole and examine how its various parts interact to determine its “fitness for purpose” for enhancing resilience. The approach was used to frame the data collection and resonated well with many WFP interlocutors, particularly at country office level, as a tool to reflect on how their work relates to resilience. The theory of delivery is used as a conceptual framework for the findings, conclusions and recommendations in this report.¹⁷

¹⁵ This term is used to convey the organizational, cultural, process and systemic changes needed for WFP to operate more effectively.

¹⁶ The pertinent questions are 1c, 2a and 3b.

¹⁷ It is not intended to act as a new “theory of change” for resilience.

Figure 1: Theory of delivery nodes



Source: Itad, evaluation team based on learning from theory-based evaluations.

Methodology

9. The evaluation team gathered and triangulated evidence for each of the nodes of the theory of delivery individually and assessed how each node influences or is influenced by the others. To facilitate this, and to ensure accountability to the stated evaluation questions, all the sub-evaluation questions in the evaluation matrix (Annex 2) were mapped to the nodes of the theory of delivery. Three broad assessments with different sets of questions were carried out for each node:

- a) Does the node itself contain adequate and relevant resilience content? For example, do the concepts, programmes and performance measurements include reference to resilience capacities, systems approaches, and gender aspects of vulnerability and resilience? Does WFP have staff with the correct skill sets?
- b) Does the way in which the node is working support or hinder resilience building? That is, does it operate on a timescale suitable to resilience building? Does it support empowerment or detract from it?
- c) Is the node sufficiently connected to other nodes to allow for partial or whole delivery to work?

Data-Collection Methods

Figure 2: Data sources

| Primary sources: | Secondary sources |
|---|---|
| a. Key informant interviews (KIIs) b. Facilitated technical discussions c. Focus group discussions (FGDs) d. Web survey and outreach to wider stakeholders | e. Internal documentation review f. Internal data/system review, including CSP and CPB information g. External literature review. |

10. In total, the evaluation consulted 300 people through individual interviews, and approximately 250 people in focus group discussions. Of all individuals consulted throughout the evaluation (Annex 5), 40 percent were female and 60 percent male. 13 percent of individuals were from headquarters or liaison offices, 83 percent from country offices, and 5 percent from regional bureau offices.

11. Key informant interviews were conducted during the inception and data-collection phases of the evaluation. Evaluation team members interviewed senior staff from various divisions, as well as technical specialists in the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit (VAM) and the Performance Management and Monitoring Division (RMP). Representatives of donor countries and comparator organizations were also interviewed.

12. Field visits to a range of WFP country offices were carried out in order to assess the approach to enhancing resilience on the ground. Document review prior to the missions facilitated the identification of key partners and issues. Interviews were conducted with WFP staff, key donors, government and other partners. Wherever applicable, the team conducted focus group discussions separately with men and women and assigned an interviewer of the same gender to conduct the focus groups. All interviewee data was audio recorded (except when the interviewee preferred otherwise) and written up and analysed using a common database purposely built during the inception phase.

13. Web surveys were prepared for respondents in three different functions – Country Directors, employees from the gender office/regional gender advisers/gender results network members and monitoring and evaluation officers. Three questions were posed to WFP Executive Board members in an email to members, but this resulted in only two replies.

14. A wide range of WFP literature, primarily for the period from 2014 to 2017, was studied including corporate strategies and results frameworks, policies, guidelines, evaluation reports and technical material from a range of functional units. WFP data and reports produced by VAM and RMP were reviewed to understand how WFP captures and analyses information related to resilience. A considerable amount of country-level WFP, government and external documentation was consulted in relation to the country missions. An analysis of an Integrated Road Map database, including data on country strategic plans and country portfolio budget, was undertaken to provide information on focus area tagging and resource allocations. A comparative analysis of the approach to resilience work in Mercy Corps and IFRC was also carried out.

15. The inception phase took place from October 2017 to March 2018.¹⁸ It included preliminary literature review and visits to WFP headquarters, Malawi and Pakistan. Whereas desk reviews had been planned, it was determined that the formative nature of the evaluation would be best served by replacing six planned country desk reviews with three country visits, while also extending the country missions to ten days. The country selection, tools and methodology for data collection were presented in an inception report that was approved in April 2018.

16. Key criteria used for field mission selection included: ensuring a wide range of countries at different stages along the humanitarian-development nexus; amounts budgeted under the resilience-building focus area tag; a wide geographic spread, including at least one country from each of the six WFP regions; a representative range of different types of activities; consideration

¹⁸ The inception period was extended by three months (from December 2017) to prevent the data-collection period from overlapping with a series of evaluations and CSP processes being conducted at regional and country levels. A second inception mission – to Pakistan – was added during the inception period.

for offices with L2/L3 and those with only country capacity strengthening activities; and, consideration for the amount of recent evaluative activity.

17. The evaluation phase ran from April to June 2018 and included further visits to Rome, nine country offices¹⁹ and three regional bureaux,²⁰ as well as telephone interviews with international stakeholders. Desk study was a continuous process throughout the evaluation. Data consolidation, triangulation, analysis and initial reporting took place in July 2018. The reporting process continued to November 2018 and included a stakeholder workshop in Rome in September 2018.

18. Annex 3 describes the methodology used in more detail. Annex 4 presents a summary timeline of the inception and evaluation phases, showing the key activities and participating team members. A list of people met is provided in Annex 5, and of documents consulted in Annex 6: Bibliography. The web surveys for country directors, gender advisers and monitoring and evaluation officers are reported in Annexes 7, 8 and 9 respectively, and the analysis of country strategic plan data is presented in Annex 10.

19. The evaluation team was independent of WFP and comprised six core members – a team leader; triple-nexus,²¹ nutrition, gender and information specialists/evaluators; and a resilience concept and measurement adviser. The evaluation benefitted from consultation with an internal reference group made up of colleagues from various units and departments, as well as from an external review panel of recognised experts in the field and UN colleagues who had evaluated similar topics in the recent past. The list of members of these groups can be found in Annex 19.

Limitations

20. Although the evaluation proceeded well, and all respondents were open and willing to share views on the topic, the following limitations had a bearing on data availability and use:

- Scheduling of field missions proved challenging once additional countries were added to the list.
- In some countries, the evaluation team were not able to access certain donors, meaning that the weight of data in this area is insufficient to come up with a fully representative finding on donor influence. Related findings reflect this incomplete picture.
- Low invitation rates to some web surveys and a low response rate to the Board questionnaire limited the use of this information to quantify the richer detail provided in the key informant interviews.²²
- The approach used for the comparative analysis differed from what was originally envisaged due to practical constraints (Annex 12).
- The evaluation was conducted at a time when WFP was rolling out the Integrated Road Map (IRM), including the policy on country strategic plans. Levels of transition were not uniform across the countries visited,²³ so staff had varying levels of experience with the country strategic plan process. As such, it was not possible to draw conclusions from interviews about the extent to which country strategic plans were incorporating resilience, or even about the potential for country strategic plans to do so. It was also too early to

¹⁹ Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, Niger, Malawi and Zambia.

²⁰ Bangkok, Johannesburg and Nairobi. A Dakar representative was interviewed in Rome and two regional bureaux staff were contacted by telephone during the inception phase and in-country debriefings.

²¹ The humanitarian-development nexus is extended to include peace in many contexts in which WFP works.

²² There were fewer responses from respondents to the gender-focused survey than expected.

²³ At the time of the missions, only Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon and Guatemala had approved CSPs and Kenya and Pakistan (inception mission) had CSPs pending approval. ZHSRs were only available for Lebanon and Guatemala.

witness whether the changes resulting from the introduction of country strategic plans were likely to result in improved resilience outcomes. The Corporate Results Framework (CRF) was still in flux, and this was often highlighted by interviewees and survey respondents. The issues of ambiguity that they raised are thoroughly discussed in our analysis of the information node.

- The evaluation analysed country strategic plan data (see Annex 10) to understand how the “resilience building” tag is currently being used. The early stage of the roll-out has meant that clear conclusions about the use of the resilience tag cannot be drawn.

21. The evaluation team does not consider that these limitations have materially affected the findings or recommendations of this report.

Intended Users

22. There are two broad groupings of intended users within WFP. The first includes the Executive Board, WFP senior management and the Rome-based agencies division – these contribute to shaping WFP resilience discourse and positioning within the global food and nutrition governance system. The second grouping includes country offices, regional bureaux and units from the Policy and Programme Division, the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division, Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Unit, Performance Management and Monitoring Division, Nutrition Division, and the Gender Office.

23. The findings will also be of interest to the full range of WFP implementing partners – governments, international and national organisations – as well as donors.

1.2 CONTEXT

Resilience Concept

24. Over the past decade, the concept of “enhancing resilience” has moved from a loosely interpreted, desirable quality of human, economic and environmental systems, to a mainstreamed, operationalized approach for developing programmes, policies, partnerships and investments. The idea of enhancing resilience has been used for some years, in the context of specific interventions and technical approaches to reduce vulnerability and manage risks, such as disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate-change adaptation.²⁴

25. However, since the early 2010s, there has been significant exploration into, and application of, resilience as an integrative concept²⁵ with potential to facilitate greater collaboration between sectors and types of intervention.²⁶ For example, United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) *Policy and Program Guidance, Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis (2012)*,²⁷ developed after the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, aims to stimulate integrated efforts by humanitarian assistance and development experts, to work together in order to reduce emergency caseloads in contexts facing recurrent crisis, while supporting improved social and economic conditions of vulnerable populations over time. The guidance states that resilience to

²⁴ Turnbull, M. et al. (2013) [Toward Resilience: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation](#).

²⁵ References to the “nexus” are made in different ways throughout the report. This is intentional and is based on the specific reference being made.

²⁶ Béné, C. et al. (2016). [Is resilience a useful concept in the context of food security and nutrition programmes ? Some conceptual and practical considerations](#). Food Security 8(1): 123-138.

²⁷ USAID (2012) [Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance](#).

recurrent crisis should be a common objective across its development and humanitarian programmes.

26. Efforts to apply the concept of resilience and break down silos across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus are grounded in the understanding that new approaches and innovations are needed to promote and protect international development gains. The increasing frequency, severity and negative impacts of risks, shocks and stressors due to climate change, environmental degradation, global economic interdependence and volatility, conflict and protracted crises fundamentally undermine initiatives to achieve the SDGs. In the *Agenda for Humanity*,²⁸ the outcome document of the World Humanitarian Summit of May 2016, five core responsibilities and 24 key transformations were identified to reduce humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability. Core responsibility 4, to “work differently to end need”, and 5, to “invest in humanity”, include transformations that are foundational to enhancing resilience, namely: anticipate crises; transcend humanitarian-development divides; and invest in local capacities.

27. Programmatic and organizational efforts to operationalize resilience have been accompanied by initiatives among programme implementers, academics and measurement and evaluation specialists. These efforts define the properties, principles and processes that enhance resilience at individual, household, community and institutional levels.²⁹ Such work contributed to the concept of “development resilience”, an early definition of which was:

“the capacity over time of a person, household or other aggregate unit to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks. If and only if that capacity is and remains high over time, then the unit is resilient.”³⁰

28. The multi-agency Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group³¹ of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), co-sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), defined it more simply as:

“the capacity to ensure that shocks and stressors do not have long-lasting adverse development consequences.”³²

29. This definition encompasses the understanding that resilience is a set of capacities, not an end objective or state to be reached. This set of capacities, required before, during and after the onset of shocks and stressors, supports the ability to: i) absorb shocks and stressors; ii) adapt to change through making proactive choices; and iii) transform, thus changing the set of available choices. The capacities are applied in various ways, such that development gains are maintained despite shocks and stressors. Annex 11 includes examples of resilience definitions and concepts, many of which conceive of the process of enhancing resilience as not only protecting, but potentially improving well-being outcomes or human development gains over time.

30. A review³³ of 45 frameworks developed to guide, diagnose, plan, and/or evaluate resilience interventions found that while resilience definitions vary, they share common ideas, including: i)

²⁸ Agenda for Humanity (2016). [Homepage](#) (website).

²⁹ Tango International (Nov 2012). [Enhancing Resilience to Food Security Shocks in Africa: Discussion Paper](#).

³⁰ Barrett, Christopher and Constanas, Mark A. (2014) Toward a theory of resilience for international development applications. *PNAS* 111(40): 14625-14630.

³¹ Food Security Information Network (2019). [Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group](#) (website).

³² FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2014) [Resilience Measurement Principles: Toward an Agenda for Measurement Design](#). Rome, FAO & WFP.

³³ Overseas Development Institute (ODI); Resilience Measurement, Evidence and Learning (MEL) Community of Practice (CoP); Winward Fund (2016). [Analysis of Resilience Measurement Frameworks and Approaches](#).

that resilience should enable systems to function and flourish in the face of shocks and stressors; and, ii) that limiting damage from disturbance and promoting recovery from shocks is a critical concept in resilience. Half the frameworks were found to refer to the role of capital assets, or the deployment of human, social, financial, natural, physical and, sometimes, political capital. Two-thirds of the frameworks make use of the concept of resilience capacities – the ability to anticipate, prepare for, absorb, adapt to, and transform in the face of shocks, stressors and change – with a focus on household and local levels, and how such capacities can be enhanced through interventions, as a means to achieving and sustaining desired well-being outcomes.

31. The WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015),³⁴ referred to hereafter as the 2015 Resilience Policy, refers to the “development resilience”³⁵ definition of the Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (paragraph 27). The policy builds on the collaborative approach for resilience defined by the Rome-based agencies (RBA), with an emphasis on strengthening the resilience of the livelihoods of rural poor, vulnerable and food-insecure people, as well as the production systems. The joint framework is guided by six principles:

- i. Resilience building³⁶ should be developed through country- and community-led efforts.
- ii. Assisting vulnerable people to build resilience is beyond the capacity of a single institution or activity and requires the integration of multi-sector and multi-stakeholder partnerships to reach scale.
- iii. Humanitarian relief and development action need to be combined.
- iv. Focus should be on the most vulnerable and food-insecure people who typically have no access to safety nets.
- v. Risk management and decision-making of national governments need to be mainstreamed effectively.
- vi. There must be investment in evaluation to generate rigorous evidence of impacts, effectiveness and value for money over time.

32. The operationalization of this concept has led to the generalized understanding by WFP staff of the key components of a resilience approach, as outlined in Figure 3.

³⁴ ‘Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition’ (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-C).

³⁵ As distinct from ecosystem resilience i.e. in a human development context.

³⁶ This report favours terminology of “enhancement” rather than “building”, because the former places greater focus on people’s existing resilience capacities. It is also consistent with the title of the evaluation. However, resilience “building” is also used as it is the title of one of the CSP focus areas and is consistent with usage in documents being quoted.

Figure 3: Key conceptual components of resilience from current literature and practice

- 1) Resilience is defined in relation to shock or stressors.
- 2) Resilience is considered as a set of capacities (for instance to anticipate, absorb, adapt or transform) for dealing with a shock or stressor. These capacities should be owned, accessible to, and modifiable by, those who have to deal with shocks: enhancing resilience should not be reduced to focusing purely and primarily on households and communities as passive, primary recipients or beneficiaries.
- 3) Resilience is considered as a short- and long-term capacity.
- 4) Resilience is considered a means rather than end goal.
- 5) Resilience involves multiple actors: different groups have different contributions to, and requirements from, resilience-enhancing projects. There is a need to draw on different knowledge and expertise from a wide range of actors and perspectives within a system to promote legitimacy and ownership of the processes and outcomes.
- 6) Resilience is facilitated through “systems”: risk and vulnerability to specific shocks and stresses is the consequence of multiple interacting factors operating within complex, inter-connected systems. Those designing resilience-building operations should aim to build an ever deeper understanding of the multiple actors and interest groups involved and the wider structural and institutional processes and constraints at play, which are often the more complex and unpredictable nature of these interactions.

Resilience Practice: Programming and Organizational Developments

33. The evolution of resilience as an integrative concept across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus is affecting how agencies programme. The WFP 2015 Resilience Policy acknowledges that many of its operations already included elements of resilience building, but emphasizes that a fundamental shift was being made in how programming was designed, implemented and managed: “A resilience-building approach starts with the way strategies and programmes are conceived, with resilience at the centre of the programme cycle. Enhancing capacities to absorb, adapt and transform in the face of shocks and stressors requires a significant level of collaboration over a prolonged period”.³⁷ The USAID Policy and Program Guidance for Resilience identifies the need for specific efforts to “layer, integrate, and sequence” across humanitarian and development programmatic capabilities, through joint problem analysis and objective setting, coordinated strategic planning around resilience, mutually informed project design and robust learning in order to achieve results.

34. The development of an organizational resilience strategy or framework has prompted some agencies to develop a suite of organizational guidance and tools to mainstream “enhanced resilience” (for example, Oxfam, USAID and Mercy Corps). These include a combination of:

- Technical guidance for resilience programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation³⁸
- Orientation and training materials for staff and partners³⁹
- Establishing resilience technical teams located in different parts of the agency

³⁷ ‘WFP Policy on Resilience Building for Food Security and Nutrition’ (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-C). Executive Summary.

³⁸ Febles Carmona, E. (2018) *Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning for Resilience: A companion guide*. Prepared for Oxfam..

³⁹ USAID (undated). *AgriLinks: An Introduction to Resilience at USAID and Beyond* (website).

- Creating resilience learning hubs, portfolios, or regional resilience strategies⁴⁰
- Developing resilience standards or markers⁴¹ intended to promote a resilience focus in programming portfolios or fund-raising.

35. Organizational approaches to systematically mainstream “enhancing resilience” can be seen as somewhat akin to other approaches to mainstreaming organizational action on cross-cutting and systemic issues, such as gender equality and women’s empowerment, including the WFP suite of gender tools. Annex 12 outlines the ways in which two agencies, the IFRC and Mercy Corps, are mainstreaming the commitment to enhance resilience, from concept and guidance to partnerships, drawing comparisons with WFP.

36. WFP is one of a number of agencies, including Mercy Corps, USAID,⁴² the World Bank and Oxfam, that have worked in collaboration with leading technical specialists⁴³ to develop resilience measurement, evaluation and learning (RMEL) guidance to support evaluation design, evidence generation, and programmatic learning for resilience initiatives. The results from RMEL initiatives are generating insights into the positive impacts of resilience investments. For example, the report⁴⁴ from a USAID-hosted Resilience Evidence Forum in October 2017⁴⁵ discusses the emerging evidence that investments in resilience reduce humanitarian spending needs and asset losses. The report also points to the growing body of evidence for specific sources of resilience that transcend specific contexts, such as social capital, financial inclusion, diversification of livelihood risk, and women’s empowerment and gender equality.

37. There remain real challenges to scaling up and sustaining effective resilience programming. Some agencies advocate for donors, governments and implementing agencies to increase multi-year, flexible investments to strengthen resilience in those areas experiencing recurrent crises.⁴⁶ There are challenges in integration, not only across the humanitarian-development nexus, but across and between projects and programming interventions. Fundamental to resilience concepts is systems thinking and understanding the relationships within and between systems. The interrogation of the concept of resilience has, for some agencies, deepened the appreciation that the exposure to, sensitivity to, and capacities to recover from shocks and adapt to change, are shaped by multiple sources of exclusion (gender norms, socioeconomic status, ethnic status etc.) that affect women, men, girls and boys, in different ways. Critical cross-cutting issues – including gender equality and women’s empowerment, nutrition-sensitive approaches, and environmental sustainability – are as yet poorly integrated into resilience frameworks and programming approaches. A number of agencies that have made a commitment to mainstreaming gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout programming are now working to promote improved integration of gender, from design to evaluation, in resilience programming (Annex 13). However, the strategic integration of organizational gender equality commitments into resilience frameworks remains limited.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Oxfam (2016). [Oxfam’s Strategy for Resilience in Asia](#) (website).

⁴¹ Care (undated). [Toolkits: Resilience Marker](#) (website).

⁴² See e.g.: USAID (undated) [Resilience Measurement Practical Guidance Series](#); USAID (2017) [Recurrent Monitoring Survey](#).

⁴³ Many of whom are members of the FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group and of the RMEL Community of Practice.

⁴⁴ USAID (2018) [Resilience Evidence Forum Report](#).

⁴⁵ The Resilience Evidence Forum brought together over 150 participants from USAID, implementing partners, NGOs, United Nations organizations, universities and USAID partner-country governments.

⁴⁶ Mercy Corps (2017) [Enhancing Resilience to Serve Drought: What Works?](#).

⁴⁷ The ODI (2016) and RMEL CoP analysis of 45 resilience frameworks shows only one example, from Oxfam, where gender and women’s empowerment are clearly integrated.

Similarly, the development of nutrition-sensitive approaches and their integration into resilience frameworks and programming needs attention. Approaches are needed that will help address the gap left by longer-term programmes that do not include explicit nutritional goals,⁴⁸ despite nutrition commonly being a stated outcome of efforts to enhance resilience.

38. Despite emerging consensus on the concepts, the field of Resilience Policy and practice continues to evolve. For example, the review of resilience frameworks by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and members of the Resilience Measurement, Evidence and Learning Community of Practice concludes that all frameworks have limitations in terms of the scale of the challenges to enhancing resilience. It notes that few frameworks consider the resilience of individuals and concludes that there is a need to promote substantial collaboration across disciplines and sectors, and to strengthen the capacity of organizations to engage not only at household and community levels, but across and between scales, such as at population and landscape levels. The opportunities for greater impact in the lives of the most poor and vulnerable, and the challenges of achieving this through strategic partnerships, better integrated and sequenced programming, longer-term and systemic thinking informed by a strong evidence and knowledge base, continue to stimulate considerable programmatic and organizational development in applied resilience thinking.

1.3 WFP STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS IN SUPPORT OF ENHANCED RESILIENCE

The Resilience Concept in WFP

39. The WFP Strategic Plan (2014–2017) affirmed WFP commitment to support the response to shocks in ways that better link relief and development. It also laid a foundation for expected results related to stability, resilience and, ultimately, self-reliance. The plan mainstreamed capacity-development efforts across all strategic objectives (SO), while resilience building was articulated in interventions supporting livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies (SO2), as well as in programmes reducing the risks and vulnerability of poor people, communities and countries (SO3).

40. Affirming its core business of saving lives, the current WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021) further positions the organization in the global resilience agenda by anchoring its actions across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Setting two strategic goals – support countries to achieve zero hunger (SDG 2); and partner to support implementation of the SDGs (SDG 17)⁴⁹ – the plan states that “WFP works to strengthen the resilience of affected people in protracted crises by applying a development lens in its humanitarian response.”⁵⁰

41. The WFP resilience agenda has been framed through a large portfolio of policies, strategies and guidelines that have been developed over the last ten years. Annex 1 (Section 1.2), outlines the ways in which WFP has articulated its position during this time in relation to the areas of disaster risk reduction, climate change, conflict and, more recently, the humanitarian-development nexus.

42. The WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management: Building Food Security and Resilience (2011)⁵¹ emphasizes the WFP approach to bridge emergency response, recovery and

⁴⁸ Feinstein International Center (2018). Persistent Global Acute Malnutrition: Discussion paper..

⁴⁹ For SDG 17, WFP support to countries may relate to developmental or humanitarian objectives other than zero hunger.

⁵⁰ 'WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021)' (WFP/EB.2/2016/4-A/1/Rev.2*).

⁵¹ 'WFP Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management - Building Food Security and Resilience' (WFP/EB.2/2011/4-A).

development. It identifies one of WFP comparative advantages as “building resilience and protecting the most vulnerable”, including through food assistance programmes, social protection and productive safety nets, and innovative risk finance, transfer and insurance for food security.

43. The WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015) is intended to guide WFP adoption of a resilience building approach to programming in that it: “i) provides coherence for WFP actions to reduce vulnerability; ii) aligns WFP with global policy on resilience; and iii) ensures that WFP activities complement the resilience-building programmes of other actors”.⁵² WFP is guided by its policies on humanitarian principles (2004), humanitarian protection (2012) and peacebuilding in transition settings (2013).⁵³

44. The policy goal of the first WFP Climate Change Policy (2017)⁵⁴ is for vulnerable people, communities and governments to be able to address the impacts of climate on food security and nutrition and to adapt to climate change. The policy provides guiding principles and programmatic options for integrating activities addressing climate change into WFP work.

45. The WFP Integrated Road Map (2017–2021) – comprising the WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021), the Policy on Country Strategic Plans, the Financial Framework Review, and the Corporate Results Framework – provides the framework for country offices to replace operations by developing a set of activities within one country strategic plan. The Policy on Country Strategic Plans states that country strategic plans are intended to “enable a multi-sector approach to recovery programming, addressing risk and building resilience for food security and nutrition, which requires wide consultation and long-term collaboration”.

WFP Support to Enhanced Resilience: Programme Approaches, Guidance and Projects

46. WFP support to resilience enhancement is not ascribable to a single initiative, but rather to a plurality of programme activities, programme approaches, programme packages, functions, and initiatives. Figure 4 lays out schematically where these fit along the humanitarian-development nexus.

47. Stand-alone programme activities with a resilience-enhancement aim, each with their own specific technical guidance to ensure standards and quality, include food assistance for assets (FFA), home-grown school feeding (HGSP), purchase for progress (P4P), and purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA) (Annex 1). The evolution of WFP established programming approaches – such as food assistance for assets, which address government- and community-led disaster risk reduction and livelihood resilience – coupled with innovative responses to climate change, shape WFP approaches to resilience enhancement.

48. Food assistance for assets, as a programme approach, is an example of WFP incremental organizational progress towards resilience enhancement. It represents WFP evolution from food aid and food for work, to food assistance and food assistance for assets, and provides the largest concentration of resilience-related programming in WFP (Annex 1). A 2014 synthesis report of a series of impact evaluations of food assistance for assets undertaken between 2002–2014 found that, while overall improvements in longer-term food security were limited, longer-term benefits were achieved through the contribution of asset creation to improved livelihoods and social cohesion, even in programmes that did not specifically plan to address longer-term livelihood


⁵² ‘Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition’ (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-C).

⁵³ ‘Humanitarian Principles’ (WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C); ‘WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy’ (WFP/EB.1/2012/5-B/Rev.1); ‘WFP’s Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings’ (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1).

⁵⁴ ‘Climate Change Policy’ (WFP/EB.1/2017/4-A/Rev.1).

resilience.⁵⁵ However, with the exception of Ethiopia, the evaluations found limited evidence of a comprehensive, community-led approach to asset planning, or of delivery of a comprehensive package of assets with potential to balance short-, medium- and long-term risk-reduction needs. The lessons described in the report were instrumental in the development of the current food assistance for assets approach, which aims to “help meet the immediate food needs of food insecure people whilst building assets, helping them strengthen their livelihoods, reduce the risks from natural disasters, and make them and their communities more resilient to shocks”.⁵⁶

Figure 4: WFP landscape of work along the humanitarian-development nexus⁵⁷



Source: Strategic evaluation team.

49. The three-pronged approach (3PA), initially developed as an implementation framework under food assistance for assets, aims to “strengthen the design, planning and implementation of programmes in resilience building, productive safety nets, disaster risk reduction and preparedness”.⁵⁸ It is composed of three steps to inform longer-term programme design, particularly for, but not limited to, resilience building: (i) a national level integrated context analysis (ICA), that overlays historical trends of recurring food insecurity and exposure/risk to natural shocks, mapping where these converge to inform where long-term response investments are justified, bringing together combinations of safety nets, disaster risk reduction, preparedness and early warning strategies; (ii) sub-national seasonal livelihood programming (SLP) consultations to populate the programme strategies identified through the integrated context analysis with activities, using temporal, livelihood, and gender lenses to identify context-specific integrated programme complementarities and the partnership to deliver them; and (iii) community-based

⁵⁵ WFP (2014). Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002–2011) and Lessons for Building Livelihoods Resilience. Rome, WFP (OEV/2014/11).

⁵⁶ WFP (2016). Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) for Zero Hunger and Resilient Livelihoods: A Programme Guidance Manual.

⁵⁷ Source: SE resilience team (based on document review).

⁵⁸ WFP (2016). [The Three-Pronged Approach \(3PA\)](#).

participatory planning processes (CBPP) that place affected populations at the centre of their local level planning. To date, the 3PA has been used primarily by food assistance for assets with governments and partners, while other programming divisions are using it to varying degrees.

50. Climate change-related resilience programming includes the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4), which provides an integrated risk management approach to farmers facing climate risks and shocks.⁵⁹ Food assistance for assets interventions form the foundation for R4, in promoting risk reduction through asset creation and improved resource management. R4 then adds on additional elements to existing beneficiary groups, integrating up to three additional risk-management strategies: risk transfer through weather index insurance; prudent risk taking through livelihoods diversification and microcredit; and managing risk reserves through building capacity of saving groups.

51. The Climate Adaptation Management and Innovation Initiative (C-ADAPT) provides another approach to climate-resilience initiative in WFP, focused on understanding the impacts of climate change and climate risks on the most food insecure populations, in order to help individuals, communities and governments adapt, strengthen livelihoods, build resilience and ensure food security.⁶⁰ The Consolidated Livelihoods Exercise for Analysing Resilience (CLEAR),⁶¹ developed by WFP in Asia, under C-ADAPT, provides an analytical approach to help rank the resilience of different livelihoods to climate risks, and to support the development of targeted climate change adaptation activities for those livelihoods.

Enhancing Resilience and Cross-Cutting Issues

52. The 2015 Resilience Policy identifies cross-cutting policies that contribute to the WFP resilience-building approach, including the gender, nutrition and school feeding policies. WFP policies and guidance for gender and for nutrition, developed in 2015 and 2017, respectively, are therefore important to the WFP resilience agenda.

53. **Gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE):** The WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020)⁶² and 2017 Gender Policy Update demonstrate a bold and ambitious commitment to GEWE as operationalized through the Gender Action Plan. This plan has led to the integration of gender equality into core corporate documents; the launch and consolidation of gender mainstreaming mechanisms, such as the Gender Transformation Programme; and the strengthening of the gender architecture and gender competencies of WFP staff and entities, including the online gender toolkit.⁶³

54. While WFP is committed to implementing strategies for achieving a world of zero hunger that are gender transformative,⁶⁴ it is noteworthy that neither the gender policy nor the gender toolkit engage explicitly with the 2015 Resilience Policy, or provide guidance on how to systematically apply WFP gender tools to resilience initiatives.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the 2015 Resilience Policy does indicate the need to prioritize gender equality and women's empowerment.

⁵⁹ In 2017, R4 worked with 57,625 farmers (50 percent women), benefiting an estimated 300,000 people, in Ethiopia, Senegal, Malawi, Kenya and Zambia (WFP & Oxfam America, Annual Report, 2017).

⁶⁰ WFP (undated). [C-ADAPT](#) (website).

⁶¹ WFP (undated). [The CLEAR Approach](#) (website).

⁶² 'Gender Policy (2015-2020)' (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-A).

⁶³ 'Update on the Gender Policy' (WFP/EB.A/2017/5-D).

⁶⁴ WFP (undated). Gender and Country Strategic Plans. WFP Gender Office.

⁶⁵ As has been done for other initiatives, for example, WFP (2017) The WFP Gender-Sensitive Social Protection for Zero Hunger: WFP Role in Latin America and the Caribbean.

It recognizes that conflicts, natural hazards and protracted crises often aggravate gender inequalities, and that they affect the food security and nutrition of women, men, girls and boys differently. It indicates that resilience-building approaches should disaggregate by gender and age and ensure that women, men, girls and boys benefit from WFP assistance according to their needs, and notes that a specific focus on the protection and empowerment of women and girls may often be required.

55. A recent participatory study provides insights into the ways in which an explicit focus on women's empowerment could be integrated into food assistance for assets, and similar resilience-related initiatives.⁶⁶ It explored the potential for food assistance for assets to empower women and improve women's nutrition. The five country case studies identify changes in women's socioeconomic empowerment, not only in terms of improved livelihoods and reduced financial dependence, but also in terms of improved skills and confidence, strengthened mutual support among women, and improvements in women's leadership roles in the public sphere. As with improvements in women's nutrition, the study concludes that these outcomes arise where food assistance for assets is implemented with complementary actions, implemented by WFP or other actors, including agricultural extension, group farming and linkages with health services.

56. **Nutrition:** Nutrition is a stated well-being outcome of a zero hunger agenda and is central to the WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition, which recognizes the need to prioritize the prevention of undernutrition to promote resilience. The Nutrition Policy (2017)⁶⁷ and the Guidance for Nutrition-Sensitive Programming (2017) both reflect the understanding that nutrition and resilience are mutually reinforcing. The guidance envisages that the three-pronged approach will be an important platform through which to ensure nutrition integration into programmes, including for enhancing resilience.

⁶⁶ WFP (2017). The Potential of Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) to Empower Women and Improve Women's Nutrition: A Five Country Study – Final Report.

⁶⁷ 'Nutrition Policy' (WFP/EB.1/2017/4-C).

2 Findings

2.1 NODE 1 – CONCEPT

Finding 1: WFP commitment to enhancing resilience is integrated into policies and guidelines, but a unifying, agency-wide conceptualization of resilience is lacking.

57. The 2015 Resilience Policy refers to the FSIN Technical Working Group definition of resilience; however, WFP does not integrate it widely as a corporate definition. The evaluation team has not found the definition used elsewhere in WFP documentation, except in areas of food assistance for assets’s guidance material, where it is used with reference to FSIN rather than its corporate position. Very few staff members beyond the resilience advisors and the headquarters team involved in the policy were aware of the definition, and a small number of country office respondents said that WFP did not have a position on resilience.

58. Some respondents saw the absence of a central WFP concept of resilience as a potential benefit, allowing WFP to be flexible to government and donor strategies and plans, which has been the case in Ethiopia, for example, and is a core part of the country strategic plan. This also has the advantage of saving time and resources in revising concepts. The downside is that it limits WFP ability to advocate for improvements when government or partner policies are not sufficient for resilience, which respondents at the report workshop⁶⁸ mentioned was a constraint.

Finding 2: Strategic documents demonstrate a shift in focus from disaster risk reduction and prevention to “development outcomes” but among WFP staff, the perception persisted that resilience was disaster risk reduction with a few integrated services – mainly social protection and income support and, to a far lesser extent, nutrition.

59. Documentary analysis (Annex 14) of 12 policies and relevant associated guidance indicates that WFP has adopted two approaches to resilience that reside at different points on the humanitarian-development nexus: one approach focuses on disaster risk reduction, the other on community-development outcomes. Whilst there appears to be a shift to the latter in the evolution of reviewed documents, consulted staff are generally closer to the disaster risk reduction perspective.

All respondents at all levels of WFP⁶⁹ were aware that resilience is defined in relation to shocks and stressors. This fits with the WFP core emergency response function. Headquarters informants and some Country Directors emphasized the importance of enhancing resilience to prevent repeated humanitarian assistance in the same places. Staff had an impressive understanding of causal chains that result in food insecurity, although limited reference to potential systemic connections between them. For example, staff spoke about the impact that fluctuations in market prices (some referred to remittances) have on the households, but not how these could lead to the over-exploitation of an ecosystem, to migration, and potentially a natural disaster or conflicts (see Annex 17). Connections between “shock-response-shock” are being thought through as WFP

⁶⁸ SE resilience report workshop, 25-26 September 2018, Rome. Participants were representatives of headquarters units, regional bureaux and country offices who took part in the data-collection phase.

⁶⁹ The evaluation analysed how WFP respondents described resilience when asked about their understanding of the concept and as they spoke about WFP operations.

enhances its corporate alert system.⁷⁰ The new systemic food assistance⁷¹ appears to have led to a more holistic thinking by those involved with it.

60. Similarly, nearly all staff spoke about resilience as having short- and longer-term objectives; the limited ability of WFP to deliver long-term programming was frequently equated with a constraint for enhancing resilience. The long-term nature of resilience was often used synonymously with 'sustainability', although the latter is a broader term that can be equated with any intervention rather than the specific capacities of resilience. The CSP tag for resilience-building describes it as involving mid-long term recovery, as well as early preparedness.

61. Staff widely referenced resilience as a capacity and referred to it as the "ability to cope" with shocks and stressors, which can be loosely related to "absorptive capacity". Beyond improvements to early warning systems, the ability was nearly always equated with income improvements and developing protective assets, which is consistent with the definition of the focus area tag for "resilience building" in the country strategic plans (Annex 10). Only staff with clear resilience remits referred to anticipatory, absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities, although the general ideas behind the first three were often expressed.

62. The major innovation with resilience work was widely seen as the addition of services to the support package; social protection was most frequently mentioned as an addition. Nutritional services were mentioned, but only by those working within that sector. Those most familiar with resilience spoke of integrated programming as encouraged by the country strategic plans and 3PA and some of "layering and linking". It is also the direct corollary of the 'fundamental shift' that the Resilience Policy states is needed: 'The multi-sector approach to addressing risk and building resilience for food security and nutrition requires wide consultation and long-term collaboration. For each context, applying a resilience lens relates to all aspects of the programme cycle and will determine how actions can be best layered, integrated (linked), and sequenced with national government strategies and partner-supported programmes'.

63. These are important practical aspects of providing more comprehensive support to people's resilience capacities, but do not equate directly to resilience. In other words, integrated programming is good practice and necessary but not sufficient to enhance resilience.

Finding 3: There is a gap in understanding of resilience capacities as being owned by people who face shocks.

64. By and large, the requirements for resilience mentioned by staff were often single-point solutions and closer to technical fixes rather than building capacities of those facing shocks. For instance, staff often mentioned that people need to "adapt" (predominantly in relation to climate change), but saw this as a single change – for instance planting a different crop variety using seed and agricultural techniques provided by WFP or a partner. Instead, the capacity to adapt should be understood as the ability to continue changing crop varieties or agricultural techniques as the stressor progresses, based on information or signals that can be interpreted and acted upon by the individual or community. It is the ability to deploy capacities and techniques in the face of variable and sometimes multiple shocks.

65. As such, staff implicitly perceive resilience to be an "end" delivered through interventions, rather than the "means" by which people "ensure that shocks and stressors do not have long-

⁷⁰ WFP Emergency Preparedness Policy (2017) (WFP/EB.2/2017/4-B/Rev.1).

⁷¹ WFP (2017). Systemic Food Assistance: Interim Strategic and Operational Guidance for WFP Engagement and Investment in Food Systems.

lasting adverse development consequences”⁷² “over time [and] in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks.”⁷³

66. This view focuses on people as vulnerable recipients of assistance rather than as potential active agents capable, with the right support, of responding to shocks and it is implicitly prevalent in WFP operations. The 2015 Resilience Policy refers to national and community-led initiatives, but also to “lifting people out of poverty”.

67. The exceptions within WFP are the two units that place greater emphasis on individuals (while not losing sight of collective levels): the Gender Office and Nutrition Division. The headquarters gender team recognises that different subgroups within the household⁷⁴ have unique capacities as well as vulnerabilities. The gender policy refers to the different needs and capacities of women, men, girls and boys, as well as specific targeting of gender or age groups. The nutrition policy states that “good nutrition results in resilient people, communities and nations” and that “resilient people, communities and nations are also better able to protect the nutrition of the most vulnerable” – points often mentioned by nutrition staff at country office, regional bureau, and headquarters levels.

68. The operating mandates of humanitarian actors⁷⁵ limit their ability to promote resilience as a means because they address immediate needs (usually) in shorter timeframes and with people outside of their regular livelihood and shock contexts. Supporting adaptive capacity for climate change (and other shocks) requires a more complex and longer-term multi-sectoral approach involving, for example, the farmers themselves, agricultural research, agricultural extension and the private sector. Many of these approaches are beyond the mandate of WFP. A positive change in this regard is the WFP “whole of society approach to zero hunger”,⁷⁶ which was released as part of the support in the Integrated Road Map process. It is explicit that communities lead their own development, and WFP and a range of actors should support.

69. Viewing resilience principally as an end also carries risks. Well-intentioned interventions can result in maladaptation – locking in practices that are neither cognizant of, nor able to flex to, future shocks. Such practices can become limiting or detrimental during a shock, create dependency or affect surrounding groups.⁷⁷ This concept was almost completely missing in conversations with staff and does not feature in the 2015 Resilience Policy. The Food Assistance for Assets Guidance 2016 stresses the risks of asset building in pastoralist contexts if migration patterns and resource usage are not considered in planning stages.⁷⁸ However, as these patterns and usage can change in the face of a shock or a social change, planning needs to be followed up with monitoring and consultation. Shocks are often characterized by uncertainty, for which people require the ability “to choose – from a whole ‘portfolio’ of options – what they perceive [at the time

⁷² FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2014). [Resilience Measurement Principles: Toward an Agenda for Measurement Design](#).

⁷³ Barrett, C. and Constan, M.A. (2014) [Toward a theory of resilience for international development applications](#) PNAS 111(40):14625-14630.

⁷⁴ The gender officers in Lebanon gave a full analysis of the vulnerabilities of men refugees and the risks that women face when greater attention is placed on utilizing their capacities to overcome traditional employment norms.

⁷⁵ For a discussion on the early debate relating to resilience in the humanitarian space see: Kindra, J. (2013) [Understanding resilience](#). IRIN (news article).

⁷⁶ WFP (2017). The Whole of Society Approach to Zero Hunger: Civil Society Engagement and Capacity Strengthening.

⁷⁷ Barnett, J. & O'Neill, S. (2010) Maladaptation. *Global Environmental Change* 20(2): 211-213.

⁷⁸ WFP (2016). Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) Guidance Manual (Internal document).

of a shock] as the 'right' response(s), rather than be forced by circumstance to pick the only option they have at their disposal at that moment."⁷⁹

70. Practically, this may mean supporting people to modify the interventions initiated by other humanitarian/development actors – being able to adapt, replicate or even remove a physical asset if it is deemed inappropriate for an approaching shock - or having the skills and knowledge to abandon one income source in favour of an alternative that may be less affected by a shock. WFP staff were conscious that communities must take ownership of assets if the assets are to remain useful, but they showed less understanding that assets could be abandoned if those assets were found to be less useful for changing contexts.⁸⁰

Finding 4: The importance of addressing the structural causes of vulnerability is largely absent from WFP's definition of resilience, which has implications for WFP's dual humanitarian–development mandate and work along the humanitarian–development nexus.

71. Resilience has moved beyond the idea of coping⁸¹ with shock and stressors, which was prevalent in WFP staff's perceptions and is one of the organization's core measures of vulnerability (see Information node).⁸² This approach is intended to avoid a focus on maintaining or returning to the pre-shock status-quo, which may contain many social, political and economic exclusions that keep people in poverty and vulnerable. This difference has been identified as the unique value of resilience – a return to “looking at the forces and dynamics that restrict people's choices and opportunities” and avoiding the repackaging of any intervention as resilience,⁸³ an issue that often came up in conversations with WFP staff. Again, the exceptions to this are the gender and nutrition teams, especially at headquarters, who focus on individual capacities and social inequalities alongside support for institutional responses.

72. More recently in the global discourse, there is greater currency given to the capacity to transform⁸⁴ these structural conditions. This concept was very rarely referenced by WFP staff. Various parts of the organization differ in the extent to which they seem to have adopted it. It features in the 2015 Resilience Policy, but without stating whether returning to or going beyond ex-ante conditions is desirable. The policy specifies that empowerment should lead to “positive changes in systems, structures and livelihoods”, but it does not apply the gender policy's focus on “transforming (our emphasis) unequal [...] relations to promote shared power, control of resources and decision-making.” The latter approach was also not widely understood beyond the gender focal points; the perspectives of other staff were largely focused on gender inclusion and “do no harm” principles.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ Christophe B., Tim F. and Suzanne N. (2015) Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Resilience Interventions: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations. *IDS Working Paper* 2015(459).

⁸⁰ The FFA manual identifies this as a specific risk for mobile pastoralist groups.

⁸¹ Also using synonyms such as 'persist', which feature in: UN OCHA (2011) [Position Paper on Resilience](#).

⁸² The CSP tagging for resilience building refers to “outcomes that seek to increase the risk thresholds” of vulnerable individuals.

⁸³ Levine, S., et al. (2012). [The relevance of 'resilience'?](#). *Humanitarian Policy Group Brief 49*. London, ODI.

⁸⁴ Bahadur, A., et al. (2015) [The 3As: Tracking resilience across BRACED](#). London, BRACED Knowledge Manager/ODI.

⁸⁵ In most interviews with country office staff, the topics that they raised about gender were limited to: data was disaggregated by sex; some activities required 50 percent participation by women and others were exclusively for women; and that women's needs were taken into account by finding alternatives to hard physical labour on conditional food or cash-transfer schemes. Only one key informant commented that in a number of countries a particular concern of governments and communities is the specific engagement of youth in resilience-enhancing activities, due to factors of demographics, vulnerability to extremism, conflict and political instability. This is consistent with the findings of the 'Synthesis Report of Operation Evaluations (2016–2017) – Optimizing Performance' (WFP/EB.2/2017/6-B*), which noted that

73. Addressing structural causes of vulnerability can be challenging for a humanitarian mandate where there is a need to protect the “impartiality and neutrality of their needs-based response and ensure that assistance is not politically driven.”⁸⁶ Early warning systems and protective assets are less political than promoting human rights, gender or exclusion approaches to addressing systemic poverty. Activities tagged so far under the country strategic plan root-causes focus area tag appear to focus on interventions aimed at long-term problems;⁸⁷ however, as noted of the women’s empowerment assumptions of cash-based transfers (CBT), it is the way in which these are implemented rather than the activity that supports the objective.⁸⁸

74. As suggested in the 2015 Resilience Policy, the community and advocacy approaches of civil society organizations will be important for targeting root causes of vulnerability. Many of the WFP civil society organization partners met in this evaluation were active in these areas. However, the WFP position on what it considers appropriate at this level appears to be split: the policy on emergency preparedness describes a strictly apolitical approach to working at the community level,⁸⁹ and the peacebuilding policy counsels the use of local-level approaches to avoid the political risks of working with fragile national governments. Other units have increased their community engagement designs, especially for targeting, but past evaluations have pointed out risks from not sufficiently considering the social and political conditions manifest at the local level.^{90,91} The lack of clarity means that WFP may not be learning as much as it could from civil society organizations’ approaches and/or potentially creating organizational risks.

75. Recently, some humanitarian actors have adopted the transformation concept.⁹² The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development specifically calls for a “universal, integrated, transformative and people-centred” approach to address the root cause of multidimensional poverty and building capacities for resilience.⁹³ In 2018, UNDP and OCHA released an analysis of the resilience requirements in the Lake Chad Basin, which unpacks many of the political, social and economic characteristics underlying and exacerbating the conflict and environmental degradation. It is clear from the analysis that “resilience in the affected zone means going beyond simply restoring the status quo ante” and the analysis projects this as a long-term endeavour.⁹⁴

Finding 5: There is uncertainty regarding the relevance of enhancing resilience in situations of instability or crisis.

76. WFP has less conceptual clarity on the relevance or implications of resilience in protracted crises and/or conflict areas. The complexity of these situations has been acknowledged in WFP policies, but they have not been matched by approaches. In 2014, WFP re-articulated its understanding of these contexts, moving beyond the assumption that there is a linear progression

WFP operations showed increased gender sensitivity in numerical terms but that approaches remain focused on the inclusion of women rather than effecting gender-transformative change.

⁸⁶ UN OCHA (2011) [Position Paper on Resilience](#).

⁸⁷ See Annex 10.

⁸⁸ WFP (2014). Evaluation of WFP’s 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy. Rome, WFP (OEV/2014/08).

⁸⁹ “WFP will align its actions with communities’ priorities and work with them to strengthen food security responses. For example, by working with communities to identify seasonal issues influencing gender roles and responsibilities, agriculture and labour cycles, and cultural activities, WFP can support better preparedness planning for more efficient, targeted and effective response”.

⁹⁰ WFP (2018) Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2012-2017): Volume II - Annexes. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/013).

⁹¹ WFP (2017). OpEv Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: West and Central Africa Region. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/009).

⁹² See the changes in the IFRC concept of resilience detailed in Annex 12.

⁹³ UNDP (2016). [UNDAF Guidance: Principles for integrated programming](#) (website).

⁹⁴ UNDP & OCHA (2018). [Background paper on Resilience for Sustainable Development in the Lake Chad Basin](#).

from emergency to recovery or conflict to peace, and placing greater emphasis on contextualization.⁹⁵ These concepts fit with how resilience literature characterizes heterogeneous shock-responses and volatile/chaotic pre- and post-shock conditions.⁹⁶

77. This is not surprising, given that wider literature and practical experience on resilience capacities, and how to contribute to them in conflict or protracted crises contexts, is limited, with a greater emphasis currently placed on “do no harm” principles. Some studies suggest it requires more individual capacities, social networks, and institutional (potentially military) responses, but also that some conflicts may simply exceed the capacity of a community, household or individual to be resilient with flight or migration as the only options.^{97,98}

78. WFP was invited to lead in developing a United Nations analytical framework on risk and resilience⁹⁹ aiming to bring a greater conceptual clarity, and to operationalize it in a common and joined-up fashion across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.¹⁰⁰ This has reached the development stage for operational guidelines that will be implemented by United Nations country teams; only a very limited number of informants at WFP headquarters are aware of this initiative and there is concern that without the conceptual clarity of an agreed framework, the guidelines might not gain traction.

79. The role of food security for avoiding or de-escalating tension has been considered by WFP¹⁰¹ and its partners,^{102,103} but there is no uniform approach. WFP staff in Kyrgyzstan used asset creation to reduce natural resource and border-related tensions and conditionality was considered a mechanism for refugees to demonstrate their contribution to host communities in Lebanon. Social cohesion is part of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for the Syria response (alongside supporting host government capacities and prevent spiraling poverty). However, in the eighth year of the crisis funding commitments for these activities remain far smaller than those for basic needs, food security, and health/nutrition. Future evidence on the effectiveness of food and assets to support or even hinder social cohesion and individual responses should be accounted for in WFP discussions on whether a new approach to enhance resilience in these contexts is viable.

Finding 6: WFP recognizes that it needs to target a range of different groups, including communities and households. More weakly articulated is how such targeting helps to enhance the resilience of individual women, men, girls and boys.

80. The 2015 Resilience Policy identifies that approaches must be nationally and community-led. This corresponds well with staff expectations of the most appropriate place to target WFP resilience support. When asked to select two options from a list, 17 of 22 Country Directors selected communities (Annex 7), and 16 of those 17 gave an institutional response (national/sub-

⁹⁵ ‘WFP Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings (2014)’ (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1).

⁹⁶ FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2014) [Resilience Measurement Principles: Toward an Agenda for Measurement Design](#). Rome, FAO & WFP.

⁹⁷ Auletta-Young, C., et al. (2015). [We Mobilized Ourselves: Community Resilience in Areas Impacted by the Lord's Resistance Army](#). Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.

⁹⁸ Maxwell, D., et al. (2017). [Conflict and Resilience: A Synthesis of Feinstein International Center Work on Building Resilience and Protecting Livelihoods in Conflict-related Crises](#).

⁹⁹ United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (2016). *Report of the High-Level Committee on Programmes at its thirty-first session* (CEB/2016/4).

¹⁰⁰ United Nations High-Level Committee on Programmes (2017). *Analytical framework on risk and resilience* (CEB/2017/6).

¹⁰¹ ‘WFP Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings (2014)’ (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1).

¹⁰² FAO (2017). [Food Security and Peace – Discussion Note](#).

¹⁰³ Breisinger, C., et al. (2014). [How to Build Resilience to Conflict: The Role of Food Security](#). Washington D.C., IFPRI.

national government or food systems) as their other choice. In field visits, Country Directors¹⁰⁴ and programme staff referred more to targeting households, whilst only gender and nutrition teams specified intra-household targeting in recognition of the specific capacities and vulnerabilities at the individual level.¹⁰⁵ In countries with specific resilience programming, the lifecycle approach to nutrition has introduced an individual and intra-household dimension, with a significant influence on staff's understanding of whose resilience WFP is targeting.

81. WFP employees repeatedly explained that multiple actors at different levels have contributed to the resilience of people who face shocks. They described the rationale of working with a specific actor – from the community level, government agencies, private sector to regional actors – but largely from the perspective of current engagements rather than a holistic understanding of resilience requirements.

82. The 2015 Resilience Policy lists individual, household, community, government, and other regional and global institutions as partners for, or targets of, enhanced resilience work. However, WFP does not explicitly stipulate the contribution of each group to resilience as the IFRC framework does, for example (in greatest detail for the community level, but also for local government, national government, organizational, regional and global levels).¹⁰⁶

83. The risk of not clearly distinguishing between the identification of a group and how this relates to resilience building was seen in a number of conversations where respondents referred to resilience of a system rather than using the system for the resilience of people. This is an important distinction because building the resilience of a governance system can mean preventing political collapse, and similarly for the resilience of ecosystems. Each of these systems have a bearing on food security, but are not directly within WFP mandate. Furthermore, without articulating how the level contributes to resilience, there is a tendency for any aspect of WFP work to be classed as resilience despite the results being far removed from the benefit of people – for instance, better supplier contracting arrangements were described as creating resilient supply chains. Resilient market systems are not necessarily markets that work for the poor.

2.2 NODE 2 – STRATEGY

Finding 7: Resilience is at the heart of WFP's strategic response to protracted crises; relevant policies rightly offer a more cautious approach.

84. The WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021) identifies that protracted crises represent the norm of food insecure contexts. Later versions of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report (2017) (on which the strategy is based) identifies the increase of climate related conflicts as a key driver of food insecurity.¹⁰⁷ It directly positions resilience as a solution, but provides limited

¹⁰⁴ In the field missions, the Country Directors participated in semi-structured interviews and were not prompted with the list of levels used in the survey.

¹⁰⁵ Only 1 of the 22 Country Directors responding to the web survey considered that the need to identify, understand and incorporate gender-differentiated needs, vulnerabilities and capacities was a constraint to adopting a more integrated approach to resilience programming, indicating the possibility that gender issues are not well understood at that level. This was corroborated by interviews conducted in seven of the country offices, where, with the exception of staff with gender and nutrition roles, there was limited understanding that women, men, boys and girls might be affected in different ways by the same shock or stressor and that, therefore, resilience planning should take account of their different needs.

¹⁰⁶ IFRC (2014). *IFRC Framework for Community Resilience*. Geneva, IFRC.

¹⁰⁷ FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2017) *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017 : Building resilience for peace and food security*. Rome, FAO.

clarity on positioning beyond “applying a development lens in [our] humanitarian response”.¹⁰⁸ Below this, policies tend to apply one lens or the other despite frequent cross-referencing. The 2015 Resilience Policy positions WFP humanitarian support as a key part of resilience. The emergency preparedness policy partially bridges the gap by referencing the use of the 3PA in (some) country offices, but does not go as far as to suggest how it could be used to scale up or down a humanitarian or resilience initiative as necessary. The overlap in relevant policies equates to a “do no harm” approach, which may be the best approach until further guidance and evidence is developed.

Finding 8: There is no clear, coherent framework to advance resilience enhancement from concept to integrated programming and measurable results.

85. Although a number of WFP policies reference resilience and the reinforcing elements of other policies,¹⁰⁹ it is not clear whether there is any advised hierarchy or sub-classification that may help a country office understand the intended placement of the 2015 Resilience Policy in WFP strategy framework, or the most appropriate sequence and logic for their particular context. A country office with a strong record in social protection, but limited resilience experience, for instance, may struggle to understand whether the policy should directly inform their work or support it indirectly.

86. Heads of functional units in seven of the visited country offices explained that new policies are released regularly, and it is hard to keep up with them, particularly if they do not include an implementation plan or technical guidance, which is the case with the 2015 Resilience Policy.

87. In the absence of a clear resilience strategy at headquarters level, country offices where national strategies or governance structures support resilience have developed integrated, multi-year, multi-partner resilience programmes, such as in Malawi, Niger and Guatemala (Annex 17). In its resilience context analysis (RCA), the Lebanon country office presented a comprehensive case for expanding the use of resilience capacities to support food security for vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees. It was able to tailor this to the Government’s strategy for Syrian refugees in Lebanon; however, as the resilience context analyses are small-scale, pilot initiatives they do not have the same influence as a “zero hunger” strategic review (ZHSR) or country strategic plan. The RCA does not feature in the country office’s current CSP, although staff suggested it should be included in future iterations. A number of partners expressed a lack of awareness of its existence and/or potential.

88. While changes in WFP structure and processes are evolving,¹¹⁰ respondents could be grouped in two cohorts concerning the way to drive resilience programming: those who see the need for leadership through a resilience unit or focal point (creating a new silo), and those advocating for an integrated, mainstreamed approach, building “development DNA” in a process where expertise is increasingly expected to feed the organization’s continued transition towards an enabling role. Annex 12 illustrates that mainstreaming efforts in other organizations take

¹⁰⁸ The 2015 Resilience Policy acknowledges that enhancing resilience is particularly challenging in fragile states and conflict situations, and states that WFP will work with local partners to build resilience, while remaining conflict-sensitive and realistic about what can be achieved through humanitarian assistance.

¹⁰⁹ Annex 14 presents an overview of how the idea of resilience has been integral to WFP, appearing, amongst others, in core directional policies (WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021), positional approaches on major issues (Climate Change Policy 2017; WFP Gender Policy (2015–2020) and earlier versions; WFP Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings 2013), and policies on specific interventions (Capacity Strengthening 2017; School Feeding 2013; and Nutrition (2017), and a specific policy on Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security (2015).

¹¹⁰ ‘WFP Management Plan (2018–2020)’ (WFP/EB.2/2017/5-A/1/Rev.1*).

different forms to align with the specific agency's structure, partnerships and financing modalities. Efforts to institutionalize resilience apply across and between the nodes of the theory of delivery.

Finding 9: Country strategic plans provide a potentially good platform for resilience programming.

89. The Policy on Country Strategic Plans was approved in 2016 as a component of the Integrated Road Map. The country strategic plans provide the opportunity for country offices to move away from project-based portfolios and develop coherent multi-year, multi-stakeholder programmes based on nationally identified needs and priorities. Country strategic plans can be developed for periods of up to five years, but recognizing that not all countries are in a position to undertake the nationally owned and led ZHSR that guide country strategic plan development, two other formats are available: interim country strategic plans (ICSPs), with durations up to three years, are based on WFP existing studies and assessments while transitional interim country strategic plans (T-ICSPs) enable continuation of activities based on previously approved projects or following limited emergencies, for up to 18 months as a bridge to preparation of a full country strategic plan.

90. The Integrated Road Map goes a long way towards embedding resilience in the new organizational approach. The ZHSR, on which a full country strategic plan is based, is expected to provide a comprehensive analysis of the challenges a country faces in achieving zero hunger by 2030, to identify gaps in the national policy framework and programmes, and to examine implementation capacities of government institutions and non-governmental partners at the national and local levels. The policy on country strategic plans can promote links between humanitarian and development assistance and can facilitate the transition to recovery and resilience-building programmes, especially in protracted crises. In line with the 2015 Resilience Policy, it states that it enables a multi-sector approach to recovery programming and that in emergencies and protracted crises, all aspects of the programme cycle should be examined through a resilience lens to determine how actions can best be integrated with national government strategies and partner-supported programmes.

91. The Financial Framework Review introduced focus area tagging as a means of clarifying the alignment of country strategic plan strategic outcomes (SO) to donor partner funding lines.¹¹¹ The three focus-area tags are crisis response, resilience building and root causes. Each strategic outcome can be tagged to only one focus area. While crisis response and root causes align with humanitarian- and development-oriented budget lines respectively, the alignment of resilience building is less clear. The Country Portfolio Budget Guidelines indicate that it could be needs-based, while other guidance¹¹² does not mention the resource implications of tagging. Headquarters informants indicated that the resilience-building tag is intended to give confidence to donors with humanitarian priorities: the tag indicates that programmes that enable communities and institutions to prepare for, respond to, and recover from, crises are eligible. However, the informants also recognized that the tag could be of interest to development-oriented donors.

92. Using resilience to describe both an overall strategic lens and one exclusive focus area could cause confusion for country office staff when developing their country strategic plans. Staff


¹¹¹ 'Financial Framework Review, 2016' (WFP/EB.2/2016/5-B/1/Rev.1). p.13-14.

¹¹² This includes internal guidance notes on strategic outcomes, outputs and activities (December 2017), key considerations for CSP drafting (November 2017), and how to build your CSP summary logframe in 10 steps (nd).

in some of the visited country offices indicated uncertainty over the use of the tagging and “resilience building”, in particular. They pointed out that interventions addressing both crisis response and root causes could also contribute to resilience. Definitions of the focus areas are provided in “Guidance notes on strategic outcomes, outputs and activities (December 2017)” and describe typical contexts, target groups and WFP potential programming approaches for each. However, the definitions are not comprehensive, and they leave gaps. For example, strengthening livelihoods, capacities and assets is indicated as an approach for resilience building while people and communities suffering from persistent poverty are suggested as target groups for root causes, leaving the focus area for addressing persistent poverty through a livelihoods approach open to question.

93. An analysis of the focus area tagging of the 80 country strategic plan-related documents (including country strategic plans/ICSPs/T-ICSPs) as of October 2018 is presented in Annex 10. Altogether there were 311 strategic outcomes, of which 120 were tagged as resilience building, 111 as root causes and 80 as crisis response. The issue of focus-area tagging is relevant due to its role in funding alignment, since a resilience approach requires multi-sectoral, multi-year funding. The fact that one of the focus areas is called “resilience building” might give the impression that the others are not related to resilience, which would be unfortunate.

Figure 5: Total number of outcome tags by focus area by region and needs-based plan budget in 2018, n=76¹¹³




Source: Integrated Roadmap Reporting Platform, CPB project plan details report (as of October 2018)

¹¹³ Includes all CSPs (76 in total) active in 2018 only for which there are needs-based plan figures available in the database, excluding the outlier Turkey.

94. Source: WFP Integrated Roadmap Reporting Platform, CPB project plan details report (as of October 2018). Figure 5 shows the needs-based plan by focus area for each region in 2018, represented alongside the number of outcome tags in the same country strategic plans across the regional bureaux. In the case of resilience building, the number of tags far outweighs the budgetary allocations. Resilience building had the largest budget in Regional Bureau Cairo compared to the other regions, but the highest number of tags in Regional Bureau Dakar.

95. The WFP Corporate Results Framework has eight strategic results (SR) and each of the strategic outcomes developed by country offices in their country strategic plans is linked to one of them. Most country strategic plans comprise multiple strategic results with strategic outcomes tagged to different focus areas.¹¹⁴ The distribution of the three focus-area tags across strategic results is shown in Figure 6. This reveals that there is clear targeting of the crisis response tag to only two strategic results (SRs 1 and 8), while the resilience building and root causes tags are more widely distributed across most of the strategic results, except for SR4, which is clearly linked to resilience.

Figure 6: Focus-area tag count by strategic result (n=311)



Source: Integrated Roadmap Reporting Platform, CPB project plan details report (as of October 2018).

96. The Guatemala country strategic plan states that WFP will articulate its interventions in each geographical area by integrating strategic outcomes 1 (stunting prevention, tagged root causes), 3 (asset creation and livelihood support in climate risk areas, resilience building) and 4 (smallholder market support, resilience building). Its strategic outcomes 2 (institutional capacity strengthening, tagged resilience building), also integrates well with each of those strategic outcomes by strengthening government capacities in nutrition, climate change and agricultural marketing, among others. The Zambia T-ICSP features strategic outcomes that have been designed to have strategic inter-linkages and synergies. These cover home-grown school meals and promotion of nutritious food processing and marketing (tagged as root causes), and support to smallholder farmers and government capacity strengthening in social protection and disaster preparedness and response (tagged as resilience building). Although this is not yet a fully

¹¹⁴ For the 80 CSPs, the range is from 1-7 SOs with a modal value of 5.

integrated approach, the country office team strongly indicated that the full country strategic plan would be integrated.

97. Whereas there are examples that demonstrate the potential of country strategic plans to enable integrated approaches that promote resilience, the strategic evaluation of country strategic plan pilots found that the presentation of humanitarian and development activities in one portfolio did not guarantee sustained, holistic thinking across that portfolio, still less the integration of activities and outcomes in WFP operations or beneficiary livelihoods.¹¹⁵ WFP informants indicated that it was hard to develop synergies between the strategic outcomes of their country strategic plans.

98. It is possible that the country strategic plan process could limit the analysis of the root causes of vulnerability. The evaluation of the country strategic plan pilots found that, “Where the causes of food insecurity are political, such as possible post-election violence, the added transparency of the country strategic plan process made it difficult to include a contingency in the country strategic plan.” Although the example refers to a political shock, an analysis of country strategic plans where political, social or religious causes of systemic vulnerability are likely shows a more mixed picture: there are instances where WFP has been more forthright on the causes and others where they are not described. All give a good description of gender exclusions. A review of the country strategic plans shows that many do reference human-rights approaches; mostly, but not always, where there is a government strategy on human rights. The risk that these conditions may be less examined does remain, however, especially if government-linked agencies perform the ZHSR, which was the case in at least two countries visited.

2.3 NODE 3 – GUIDANCE

Finding 10: The evaluation team found no evidence of explicit guidance that supports WFP’s work to enhance resilience.

99. The 2015 Resilience Policy recognizes that, “the fundamental shift that is being made is in how programming is designed, implemented and managed”, but there is no accompanying guidance on how to accomplish such a shift. This was identified as a constraint by 8 of the 22 Country Directors who responded to the web survey.

100. The country strategic plan development process provides the opportunity for WFP headquarters specialists to advise on resilience initiatives. However, the strategic evaluation of the country strategic plan pilots notes there is little evidence that country offices were supported to understand how a resilience approach could address the issues raised in national ZHSR or how resilience-related assessments, planning approaches, activities and partnerships could be integrated into a country strategic plan.¹¹⁶ Regional bureau staff struggle to support all the countries in their regions and tend to be reactive to requests from country offices rather than to proactively initiate support for resilience programming.

¹¹⁵ WFP (2018). Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/14). para 96.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Finding 11: Technical support for the identification of entry or exit points for resilience work after completion of a zero hunger strategic review or a Level 3 emergency response is a particular gap.

101. National ZHSRs create a rich description of the country context and priorities. However, there is limited subsequent guidance for analysing whether or how a resilience approach may be a relevant response, or for improving existing resilience initiatives to better address the ZHSR.¹¹⁷ WFP has various tools for determining the relevance of discrete interventions in relation to the general country context, food security, institutional, seasonal, and shock contexts,¹¹⁸ but these leave three gaps:

- i. There is no guidance to suggest whether certain conditions (i.e. government support/capacity; level of food security; shock/livelihood; market/remittances conditions) warrant a resilience approach, rather than a disaster risk reduction or food assistance for assets approach.
- ii. There is limited assessment of community-owned capacities for resilience; the closest is the seasonal livelihood programming analysis of seasonal cycles when the interventions may best support community responses, and in the CBPP (by which stage the available interventions are already determined).
- iii. There is no unifying framework to explicitly state the theory of change and (most importantly) the assumptions of how resilience will be enhanced by various actors in a certain situation. The closest is the resilience context analysis, but aspects are found in the seasonal livelihood programming and the “whole of society” approach.

102. There is less guidance on how to transition to a resilience approach from an emergency intervention and these moments are recognized as weaknesses in planning.¹¹⁹ The learning tool for assessing an L3 intervention with beneficiaries on closeout is almost wholly retrospective and does not prompt questions relevant for moving to a resilience approach with a group or a country.

103. Two of the country offices visited in this evaluation were established in the last decade in response to humanitarian events – Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon. Their transition from immediate response to programming for food insecurity in a stable context involved a broader assessment of: 1) national food security levels; and 2) the capacity of government institutions. Kyrgyzstan used the National Capacity Index for resilience (NCI-R), whereas the Lebanon country office commissioned a resilience context analysis. The resilience context analysis is the more complete of the two because it considers community capacities¹²⁰ as well as government and United Nations programming; however, neither of these currently appear to be included in core WFP guidance.

¹¹⁷ Prior to the ZHSR, WFP approaches to resilience have been characterized by a lack of coherence: a report synthesizing the findings of 15 operation evaluations conducted between mid-2016 and mid-2017 includes a finding related to the “variable scale of results and clearer framing required on resilience” and a specific lesson related to the need to use national resilience frameworks “as critical policy vehicles for changing lives, which require a sharper and more directive corporate drive”. Source: ‘Synthesis report of operation evaluations (2016–2017)’ (WFP/EB.2/2017/6-B*), para 44, p.19.

¹¹⁸ As an example, the 3PA starts with a national food security/shock context analysis under the ICA, with specific guidance for how FFA should or should not be programmed in each of the nine contexts. The SLP level can be used to analyse seasonal patterns and intervention linkages (especially with government programmes), and community activities are defined at the CBPP level. The social protection team has created four country contexts typologies with suggested implications for WFP approach, and provides typologies of social protection systems. Capacity strengthening has used the National Capacity Index (now the Zero Hunger Score card) to assess current capacities in the four pillars of food security.

¹¹⁹ WFP (2017). Annual Evaluation Report 2016.

¹²⁰ In Lebanon, this did not involve primary data collection with communities, but RCAs in South Sudan and Uganda do.

104. There is some evidence to suggest that country offices have better processes for returning to, scaling up,¹²¹ or maintaining emergency support when food security data suggests it is necessary. In Somalia, WFP used risk-mitigation assessments and long-term food security trend analysis to deprioritize its livelihood and resilience work and refocus on humanitarian response, in the process providing leadership to the donor, United Nations and government community.¹²² In Lebanon, WFP has reiterated the continuing need for humanitarian support for refugees whilst providing greater funding commitments to the region aimed toward tipping points to economic integration.

Finding 12: The Integrated Road Map guidance encourages greater integration of programmes, but technical and process-related guidance needs more specificity.

105. Informants across visited country offices and all three visited regional bureaux cited challenges of resilience programming, such as the concentration of programmatic area knowledge that sits in silos, lack of clarity on how objectives and targets of the functional units can complement and reinforce each other to support enhanced resilience, and difficulties in attaining convergence in target groups.

106. Although a number of guidance documents reference “integrated programming”, WFP does not have a specific definition for it and little practical advice is provided. The interim systemic food system guidelines¹²³ demonstrate how programmes can be linked within a context, but from a resilience perspective they do not suggest how integration or convergence could be used to support different at-risk groups, or how integrated support should be modified in the face of a stressor or shock, or to promote graduation in stable contexts. Still less guidance is provided on the internal systems needed to make integration possible. Country office respondents mentioned that guidance on (external) integration is much clearer in humanitarian situations because of the centralized use of tools, such as the 3W (who is doing what, where), but that these tools lose their utility when the urgency of a disaster recedes, and organizations return to their own budgeting and planning systems, which are often out of synchronicity with each other.

107. Written technical guidance is perceived as oriented to specific operational issues and offers little help when designing and managing resilience interventions. For instance, the Food Assistance for Assets Programme Guidance Manual¹²⁴ identifies four major areas for collaboration on resilience and stresses that building resilience at household and community levels depends on the strengthening of absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities. It describes food assistance for asset’s potential contribution to each one of them. However, specific guidance on how to analyse and intervene to strengthen these capacities – the types of activities, outputs and outcomes that might help achieve resilience in the context of food assistance for asset programmes – is not provided.

108. If the country strategic plans are to develop more holistic or integrated approaches, this needs to be reflected in both technical and process guidance. In the roll-out of the Integrated Road Map, a suite of process guidance was produced; although some of it touches on the need for a more holistic approach, it does not explain how to achieve it. For instance, a document entitled

¹²¹ The ‘Annual performance report for 2017’ (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1) notes that 55 of 60 strategic outcomes in the crisis response area are well formulated for rapid scale up of operations if necessary.

¹²² WFP (2018) Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2012-2017): Volume II - Annexes. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/013).

¹²³ Systemic Food Assistance: Interim Strategic and Operational Guidance for WFP Engagement and Investment in Food Systems (2017).

¹²⁴ WFP (2016). FFA for Zero Hunger and Resilient Livelihoods: A programme guidance manual.

Functional Area Resources for Successful Strategic Reviews and Country Strategic Plans (April 2018) takes a unit by unit approach that provides a convenient collation of guidance but is more likely to reinforce than to break down the silo mentality. In that document, the need for integration is raised by two functional units (nutrition and food assistance for assets), but solutions are lacking.

109. Monitoring officers at all levels described the challenges to monitor resilience, as the guidance they receive for each indicator in the Corporate Results Framework is produced separately and by programme, without synchronization with other indicators, addressing any overlaps, or identifying potential for synergies that might contribute to a more complex story of progress to enhance the resilience of certain populations.

110. Key informants indicated that resilience guidance would need to be flexible enough to be customized to their specific contexts. They consistently reported that partnership, nutrition and gender guidance was not flexible enough to be directly applicable to resilience-building work.

111. An analysis of 24 guidance documents developed for gender¹²⁵ show that, while they make reference to resilience, they do not provide comprehensive guidance on the relationship between gender and resilience, how to systematically apply WFP gender and nutrition tools to an integrated programming context, or how to create linkages between different programmes involved in resilience building. This makes it difficult for staff who are not experts on gender to apply the guidance in their resilience work.

112. Informants at headquarters, regional bureau and country office levels indicated that shock-responsive social protection guidance does cover resilience appropriately. Prepared in support of the country strategic plan process¹²⁶ it explains social protection's relevance to humanitarian and development agendas and the value of bridging them by strengthening the capacity of national systems to respond to shock. It specifically refers to resilience as a focus area and includes reinforcing countries' abilities to reach and respond to those affected by crisis and shocks (ex-post) and adapt social protection to build resilience to shocks (ex-ante), among the services that WFP can provide to governments. The guidance includes technical guidelines and indicates potential sources of support for country offices, but stops short of detailing what support can be expected.

Finding 13: The technical support for resilience provided by regional advisers is viewed as useful and there is a demand for its expansion.

113. Some of the regional bureaux have been particularly active in promoting resilience agendas in their regions. Regional bureaux in Johannesburg (RBJ) and Dakar (RBD) have developed strategy papers to advocate for long-term resilience visions: the RBJ approach is outlined in an analysis released in 2018¹²⁷ while that of RBD¹²⁸ is anticipated to be adopted more widely as a resilience framework for the Sahel G5.¹²⁹ These documents provide very good explanations of the needs and approaches required to enhance resilience in those regions and go a long way towards providing contextualized guidance.

¹²⁵ WFP (2018). Gender Toolkit (internal website).

¹²⁶ WFP (2018). WFP and Social Protection: Options for Framing WFP Assistance to National Social Protection in Country Strategic Plans, Guidance Note.

¹²⁷ WFP (unknown). Partnering for Resilience: Strengthening Food Systems across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.

¹²⁸ WFP (2017) Tackling Hunger at the Source. A call for an operational partnership for scaling up resilience in the Sahel and fostering the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (Draft document).

¹²⁹ WFP (2018). Scaling up for resilient individuals, communities, and systems in the Sahel: Operational Reference Note (Internal document).

114. Visits from headquarters and regional bureau specialists and advisors were cited by six country offices as being much more useful than written guidance, as long as the specialists have the capacity to adapt their messages to the local context. However, unless these visits are part of a global drive from headquarters (for example, support for the Integrated Road Map roll-out was well funded), they must be paid for by the country offices. Whereas this is possible in relation to existing, funded programmes, when it comes to seeking guidance to develop, organize and manage a new programming approach – as is needed for resilience programming – it is more difficult to find funding.

Figure 7: Ongoing regional bureau resilience guidance

During this evaluation, several initiatives were taken up by regional bureaux that demonstrate increasing commitment to resilience guidance:

- A resilience-focused team was established in Regional Bureau Bangkok strengthening its capacity to provide guidance. Regional Bureau Cairo established a resilience team in 2015.
- Regional bureaux organized workshops and learning events focusing on resilience in Malawi, El Salvador and Egypt.
- Regional Bureau Panama organized a regional food assistance for assets learning event in El Salvador in February 2018, during which various resilience programming aspects were discussed. Participants included WFP and government participants from eight countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- The learning exchange workshop hosted for Regional Bureau Johannesburg countries in Malawi in June 2018 provided the opportunity to exchange concepts, approaches, and lessons learned, with the objective of setting a common vision for WFP Regional Bureau Johannesburg countries on integrated resilience programming.

These south-south learning exchanges promote inter-country office learning based on best practices and represent a move away from top-down guidance. There is evidence of other south-south cooperation, such as the Zambia country office seconding a senior officer to Ethiopia prior to commencing its R4 initiative.

2.4 NODE 4 – SYSTEMS

Finding 14: WFP’s tendency to work in “silos” constrains its ability to follow the integrated approach needed in order to enhance resilience.

115. Almost all informants at all levels highlighted that WFP works in silos, which constrains the potential for the integrated programming essential to a topic that requires the engagement of a wide range of departments, units, and functions. Different endeavours were underlined to address this issue: at headquarters level, the Livelihoods and Resilience Unit’s role in promoting a resilience agenda and building an opportunistic network across sectors is widely recognized. Equally important is acknowledging that a resilience approach is more than an food assistance for assets initiative, and requires integration with external partners based on current and projected requirements in each context and comparative strengths. Other headquarters units struggle to provide their best support to respond to resilience guidance requests from country offices, because demand outstrips supply and budgets are uncertain.

116. Three of the visited country offices¹³⁰ that had taken the most initiative in resilience programming re-organized themselves to foster a more integrated approach. For example, the organizational structure in WFP Niger links core functions contributing to resilience, including asset creation, climate change, knowledge management (including gender), and capacity development. In some of those without explicit resilience programmes, there were signs of re-organization into “outcome units” under the country strategic plans, which has the potential to blur silos. Some feel that it is the role of the heads of programme to make things work. However, heads of programme do not have oversight of all units in a country office. For example, gender, nutrition, supply chain and procurement staff do not always report to the head of programme and, even if they do, they are not always invited to key programme design meetings. Informants point to the lack of incentives to overcome the silo mentality – especially in an organization facing a resource dilemma, which drives each unit to protect and promote its own interests.

Finding 15: WFP’s financial framework is currently transitioning towards a dual needs-based and resource-based planning structure, which could be beneficial for resilience building when completed.

117. WFP is a voluntarily funded organization. In 2017, it received USD 6 billion of contributions against an operational requirement of USD 9.8 billion,¹³¹ indicating a funding gap of 39 percent. Ninety-five percent of the contributions were earmarked of which 88 percent were earmarked to below project level.

118. The ability for one country strategic plan to include a dual perspective allows for greater funding flexibility and a sharpened line of sight on the gaps between needs and resources. A country strategic plan has the potential to support enhanced resilience with needs-based approaches for relief activities (crisis response and/or resilience-building focus areas) and resource-based approaches for development activities (root causes focus area).¹³²

119. The country strategic plans were expected to enhance the predictability of funding and reduce the amount of earmarking. However, two-thirds (15 out of 22) of the Country Directors who responded to the web survey indicated “lack of assured funding” as a constraint to adopting a more integrated approach for resilience and nearly half of them referred to aspects of funding as a key challenge to developing programming to support enhanced resilience (Annex 7). An informant in one regional bureau noted that “the vast majority of funding used to support these [resilience building] activities unfortunately continues to be disbursed in short tranches with implementation limited to a handful of months.”

120. Country offices are encouraged to produce a resource-mobilization strategy and a partnership action plan with their country strategic plans, but informants indicated that more guidance was needed on these. An issue raised in one country office was that activity managers already had relationships with donors from previous operations and were reluctant to risk having those disrupted through an office-wide resource-mobilization strategy. This indicates a need for strong leadership and guidance on how to replace the silo mentality with a more holistic outlook.


¹³⁰ Guatemala, Niger and Malawi.

¹³¹ ‘Annual performance report for 2017’ (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1).

¹³² WFP (2018). Country Portfolio Budget Guidelines (Internal document).

121. Figure 8 compares the needs-based plan to the implementation plan for 61 country strategic plans¹³³ in 2018. With Turkey's T-ICSP excluded as an outlier, resilience building has the highest gap at 46 percent, indicating the greatest funding constraints relative to needs. Root causes has the second highest gap at 36 percent, and crisis response has the lowest at 25 percent. It is too early to say whether the use of focus areas has enabled improved alignment with donor funding lines.

Figure 8: Needs-based plan compared to implementation plan in 2018, n=61



Source: Integrated Roadmap Reporting Platform, CPB project plan details report (as of October 2018).

122. Figure 9 charts the implementation plan for 2018 by activity category and focus area. While institutional capacity strengthening had the highest number of resilience-building tags (50 tags), asset creation and livelihoods support (38 tags) has the greatest proportion of the budget allocated to this focus area.


123. Headquarters informants reported that as of mid-2018, earmarking to activity level was at around 90 percent, and this is also reported in the Strategic Evaluation of the Country Strategic Plan Pilots.¹³⁴ That evaluation noted that most country strategic plan pilots reported continuing high levels of earmarking by donors, preventing the desired flexibility of resource allocation across focus areas or across the whole country strategic plan.¹³⁵ This is a serious constraint for country offices attempting to pursue an integrated resilience approach through their country strategic plans.

¹³³ Includes all CSPs active in 2018 only for which both needs-based and implementation plan budget data was available in the database. Data for Turkey's I-CSP was excluded as it was considered an outlier, due to it having a very large and fully funded budget allocated to the resilience-building focus area amounting to approx USD 680 million in 2018, which would almost double the figures presented in the analysis and distort the picture. See Annex 10 for further details.

¹³⁴ WFP (2018). *Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans*. Rome, WFP (OEVI/2017/14), referring to WFP (2018). *Impact of earmarking in the IRM Framework* (draft document for Viterbo workshop on IRM simplification and alignment, 7-9 May).

¹³⁵ WFP (2018). *Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans*. Rome, WFP (OEVI/2017/14). para 106.

Figure 9: Implementation plan in 2018 by activity category, n=61¹³⁶



Source: Integrated Roadmap Reporting Platform, CPB project plan details report (as of October 2018).

Finding 16: Integrated programming to enhance the resilience of women, men, boys and girls requires investments in detailed capacity assessments and integrated programme design.

124. A critical aspect of a resilience approach is the planning, which requires more detailed assessments of the capacities and vulnerabilities of the women, men, girls and boys, disabled people, the elderly and minority groups in target communities, followed by proactive and integrated programme design. VAM has the technical ability to carry out these kinds of assessments and is recognized internally for its cross-unit/division support. However, this level of disaggregation can increase the scope of data collection and the costs of a preparation phase, which are often unfunded.

125. When a country office can demonstrate results from integrated programming it might be able to obtain advance donor funding to support future planning cycles – as happened on a project basis under the R4 in Zambia. Without this, alternative sources of funding would need to be sought for planning and design phases. The evaluation learned that a new WFP 2030 Fund might be a suitable source that could be used for this purpose. This fund will “finance actions that bridge the gap between WFP’s previous and its new ways of working with a view to positioning WFP so that it can deliver transformative country strategic plans that address the findings of countries’ comprehensive zero hunger strategic reviews”.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Includes all CSPs active in 2018 only for which there is implementation plan figures available in the database, excluding the outlier Turkey.

¹³⁷ ‘WFP Management Plan (2019–2021)’ (WFP/EB.2/2018/6-A/1/Rev.1). p. 4.

2.5 NODE 5 – PROGRAMMES

Finding 17: WFP supports a range of interventions that contribute to different resilience capacities. It has expanded the range of its work on resilience by piloting new approaches, such as the Rural Resilience Initiative.

126. WFP has a range of interventions or approaches (across a number of programmes) that can contribute to resilience capacities.¹³⁸ Table 2 shows that WFP core interventions have the potential to contribute to all four resilience capacities, but with a greater clustering around the anticipatory capacities of communities, households and individuals and national governments.

Table 1: Examples of WFP interventions mapped according to resilience-related capacities

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Transformative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A combination of programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in livelihoods and markets that provide reliable incomes that are sufficient to prevent negative impacts from a shock (Purchase for Progress, R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, home-grown school feeding, Farm to Market Alliance). • Gender approaches when they help to alter the social conditions that lead to women experiencing greater negative impacts during the preparation for, response to or recovery from shocks and when women's ability to anticipate, absorb and adapt is utilized without burdening them. • A combination of capacity building approaches when they lead to the development of a reliable government system that covers shock eventualities and livelihood needs (WFP's capacity building for disaster risk reduction; shock-responsive social protection; climate adaptation; nutrition; education and food systems assessment) • Asset building when the threat to a community is completely prevented (food assistance for assets) |
| Anticipatory | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saving groups and credit services (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative) when they allow groups to increase their financial reserves and utilize them before a shock occurs. • Local-level weather monitoring services (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative) when they provide communities with timely and usable information for foreseeing anticipated weather patterns in their area and when early action is taken to minimize losses and damage caused by climate hazards (forecast-based financing). • Capacity building support when it increases the ability of national or regional governments to predict shocks before they occur, identify particularly vulnerable groups and mobilize responses. |
| Absorptive | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lean season food and cash-based support when it smooths consumption patterns and reduces the use of negative coping strategies (food assistance for assets). • Insurance mechanisms when they allow farmers to maintain food consumption during a drought and replenish assets used or destroyed (R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, African Risk Capacity). • Asset building when it reduces the impact of a shock on a community (food assistance for assets). • Nutrition programmes when they prevent serious nutrient loss during a shock or build individuals' long-term physical and mental health, enabling them to absorb and deal with shocks (Fill the Nutrient Gap) • School feeding when it smooths consumption for children during a shock and relieves pressure on household food supply. |
| Adaptive | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asset building when it alters the nature of a shock, reducing or avoiding its impact (food assistance for assets). • Programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in the diversification of crops (Purchase for Progress; conservation agriculture through the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative). • Programmes for smallholder farmers when they result in the diversification of buyers (Purchase for Progress, Farm to Market Alliance). • Training when it equips people with new skills that can be used to diversify incomes (food assistance for training). |

127. As identified in the WFP 2015 Resilience Policy, strengthening resilience requires multiple and connected approaches rather than single programmes or activities.

128. Delivered on its own, food assistance for assets has three specific attributes that can catalyse movement toward enhanced resilience contributions. The first two attributes distinguish food assistance for assets within WFP,¹³⁹ and the third within wider resilience programmes:

- It is implemented with conditionality, which is used to meet lean season food requirements and improve physical assets (food assistance for assets) or human capital (food assistance for training) in support of those assets.

¹³⁸ The evaluation team recognize that those interventions included here may not be comprehensive but are based on the data collection undertaken by the team. Feedback and comments received after the data-collection period and too late to be verified and included here suggest that other relevant interventions may include EFSN in Bangladesh, Conectarte and Gastromotiva in El Salvador, the safe markets initiative in Afghanistan.


¹³⁹ Although asset building is not unique to WFP, FFA's incentivization via lean season food/cash is.

- It is typically implemented in contexts where people experience shock and utilize livelihood assets. It is also used increasingly through more holistic context plans (such as the watershed approach).
- It provides an opportunity for the extreme poor to benefit from resilience strengthening activities.

When combining these attributes, food assistance for assets and for training provide a useful entry point for enhancing resilience capacities at the community, household, or even individual level.

129. WFP has been able to expand its contribution beyond the cluster of absorptive capacities by linking to or adopting the interventions of others – most notably through the R4 programme (see paragraph 49), which builds on food assistance for assets activities to enhance adaptive, absorptive and anticipatory capacities. In 2017, FFA activities reached 9.9 million beneficiaries, making it the largest programme with conditionality, and fourth largest overall.¹⁴⁰ In contrast, R4 reached around 350,000 beneficiaries in total across five countries in 2017, comparable to typical NGO resilience interventions.¹⁴¹ The number of beneficiaries for each and the relationship between them is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Total FFA and R4 beneficiaries in 2017¹⁴²



Source: Provided by WFP Vulnerability Analysis Unit (VAM, January 2019)

130. In the Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot and home-grown school feeding programme, WFP has combined the smallholder farmer approaches of others with its unique experience as a procurer in food systems. WFP has developed the lessons from these approaches into its 2017 Strategy for Boosting Smallholder Resilience and Market Access. While interesting examples, these two pilots have beneficiary numbers that are much smaller than WFP “core” interventions.¹⁴³

131. WFP capacity strengthening work is used particularly to enhance the anticipatory capacities of governments, including support for vulnerability assessments and early warning

¹⁴⁰ 'Annual performance report for 2017' (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1)

¹⁴¹ For example, Market Approaches to Resilience, led by FARM Africa in Ethiopia under BRACED, reaches 340,000 direct beneficiaries

¹⁴² The overlap signifies beneficiaries who access insurance through R4 within an FFA branded activity, while the remaining R4 beneficiaries receive an insurance voucher as part of another programme.

¹⁴³ See for example: 'Strategic Evaluation of WFP Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2008-2013)' (OEV/2013/024); 'Evaluation of WFP Policy on Capacity Development: An Update on Implementation (2009)' (OEV/2015/028); 'WFP's 2012 Nutrition Policy: A Policy Evaluation' (OEV/2014/22)

systems. The combination of WFP capacity strengthening with a social protection agenda could lead to a transformative outcome in which food security and livelihoods are protected by timely action from national or even regional systems.

Finding 18: Despite increased attention to resilience enhancement in certain programmes, the potential for resilience enhancement across the organization is not yet fully realized.

132. Findings from evaluations of related to activities listed in Table 1 were corroborated by interviews, survey data and document review in this evaluation. There are areas where interventions are converging so as to enhance capacities to respond to shocks but where more attention to targeting and socio-cultural and gender-differentiated dimensions are needed. Further work is also needed to strengthen food assistance for assets, work with smallholder farmers and with the use of cash-based transfers to enhance resilience.

General factors influencing programming

Finding 19: While there are examples of WFP programmes using a “convergence approach”, much more could be done to enhance synergies among WFP-supported interventions.

133. Although there are instances of greater convergence in Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, WFP does not yet consistently frame or converge its interventions in such a way that a particular population group could consolidate their absorptive capacities and strengthen adaptive, anticipatory and transformative capacities. Conceptual synergies between food assistance for assets, school feeding, nutrition¹⁴⁴ and general distribution existed prior to the Integrated Road Map, but there was a struggle to implement them.¹⁴⁵ The intention to foster resilience by creating synergies between programmes was repeatedly mentioned by senior WFP informants but it is as yet unclear whether the country strategic plan framework will facilitate this.¹⁴⁶ The food systems approach currently under development is intended to provide a framework for planning the connections between system-level interventions and smallholder initiatives.

134. The three-pronged approach (3PA) has the potential to foster synergies because it begins with an integrated context analysis, consolidates seasonal and livelihood-related data to inform programming choices (seasonal livelihood programming) and then enables communities to agree on targeting and choice of intervention in a participatory manner (CBPP). Some aspects of the 3PA – namely, the integrated context analysis – are supported by VAM whereas the seasonal livelihood programming and CPBB are supported by the food assistance for assets team. It also encourages WFP interventions to identify partner programmes (especially government programmes) in which food assistance for assets is intended to act as the main (but not necessarily sole) WFP contribution. Partial or non-application of the 3PA at country office level was identified as a key limitation for food assistance for asset’s contribution to resilience by an internal audit in 2017.¹⁴⁷ It is clear from respondents that the 3PA has not had the leadership steer to ensure it becomes core WFP practice. Some WFP staff noted that the different budget and planning cycles of partner organizations make it difficult to coordinate food assistance for asset programmes once needs have been identified at the subnational level. However, Rome-based agency informants in Niger

¹⁴⁴ A nutrition-sensitive working group was created in headquarters in 2016 to build nutrition into other programming. This includes a detailed programme impact pathway.

¹⁴⁵ WFP (2017). *Operation Evaluation Series: Regional Synthesis 2013-2017*. (6 reports: Latin America/Caribbean, East/Central Africa, West/Central Africa, Middle East/North Africa/Central Asia/Eastern Europe, Asia/Pacific, and Southern Africa).

¹⁴⁶ An evaluation of the CSP pilots suggests that the long term, established presence of these activities in WFP portfolio has meant the CSP process has not yet created the synergies.

¹⁴⁷ WFP (2017) Internal Audit of WFP’s Management of Food Assistance for Assets. Rome, WFP (AR/17/14).

noted the use of the 3PA as a genuine programming/partnership tool to support the Nigerian Government's food security strategy.

Finding 20: There is a need for WFP to strengthen its ability to carry out differentiated, context-specific programming that is attentive to social, cultural and gender-differentiated dimensions.

135. Strengthening resilience requires identifying at-risk groups and offering interventions that allow the most vulnerable sub-groups to benefit. VAM is widely recognized for ensuring that WFP interventions are geographically targeted where high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability exist.¹⁴⁸ The unique contribution of WFP in the development sphere is seen to be its ability to target and work with the poorest and most vulnerable in ways that other United Nations organizations with livelihood, disaster risk reduction or resilience programmes do not. This role becomes more or less important depending on the national government's ability or willingness to target the most vulnerable.

136. Targeting tensions arise, however, when development objectives are added to short-term food consumption objectives. Some WFP staff believe that working towards resilience through smallholder approaches requires working with more successful farmers.¹⁴⁹ The P4P final evaluation found that the 10 percent of the most successful farmers captured the most benefit.¹⁵⁰ The issue is also noted in relation to food assistance for assets: a number of evaluations point to a challenge in targeting food assistance for asset activities to ensure not only that quality assets are built but also that the most vulnerable groups benefit.¹⁵¹ Food assistance for asset participants met during this evaluation clearly identified those who were eligible for a non-conditional transfer (usually the elderly or those with a high-dependency ratio), but evaluations have pointed to a need for strong facilitation skills to establish community consensus on who is poor but eligible to work.¹⁵²

137. Specific targeting takes more time and a different mind-set to that required for emergency contexts, where the risk of providing food to too many people is overshadowed by the necessity to address urgent needs. In development contexts or protracted crises, the provision of food support to those in less need has the potential to disrupt markets, livelihoods and social relations.¹⁵³ Furthermore, shocks can indiscriminately affect those who are eligible for food support and those who are not – an issue that can become divisive where the difference between the two is marginal.¹⁵⁴

138. Such considerations place greater emphasis on the financial and technical ability of WFP to perform more context-sensitive targeting than the VAM mapping allows. Furthermore, unless the assets that are built up completely remove the threat of a shock for all groups, they will target

¹⁴⁸ Mentioned in all Regional Syntheses of Operational Evaluations 2013–2017 (WFP, 2017).

¹⁴⁹ Respondents mentioned that in WFP market-based approaches, these farmers are intended to subsequently become demonstrators to encourage wider uptake, although demonstration could only address one aspect that deters the more vulnerable from uptake.

¹⁵⁰ WFP (2014). Strategic Evaluation of WFP Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2008-2013). Rome, WFP (OEV/2013/024).

¹⁵¹ Raised in relation to 11 operations in four of the regional Syntheses of Operational Evaluations 2013–2017 (WFP, 2017) – 5 in RBD, 4 in RBJ, 1 each in RBB and RBC.

¹⁵² WFP (2017). OpEv Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: West and Central Africa Region. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/009).

¹⁵³ WFP has the capacity to track the former of these through market monitoring, but understanding livelihoods and, especially social conditions, are more dependent on the local understanding of field and country office staff.

¹⁵⁴ For instance, a large clustering of people just above the poverty line in Myanmar are still susceptible to being drawn back into poverty were a shock to happen: World Bank (2017). [An analysis of poverty in Myanmar: part one – trends between 2004/05 and 2015 \(Vol. 2\)](#). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

differently for separate layers of interventions or they will link to a shock-responsive social protection system (where existing). The CBPP of the 3PA allows for this but its usage is not widespread and country offices have limited flexibility to offer tailored interventions where more specific targeting was carried out. Past evaluations have identified that WFP has not applied the level of social understanding necessary to ensure that targeting through the country strategic plan does not become disruptive or captured.¹⁵⁵ However, WFP gender and nutrition teams are exploring targeting that identifies the individual, in order to support programming that addresses the social, economic, environmental and other conditions that help or hinder realization of the WFP mandate.

Finding 21: There are examples of convergence of targeting and joint planning, but more work is needed in this area.

139. The concept of convergence for resilience, in which a range of interventions are provided to the same target group in a coherently planned manner, was widely understood at all levels of WFP and is encouraged by the seasonal livelihood programming level of the 3PA.¹⁵⁶ Malawi, Niger¹⁵⁷ and Kenya have adopted a convergence approach explicitly to enhance resilience. In Nepal, the country strategic plan process provided an opportunity to reduce the WFP geographic footprint in three of the seven provinces. In most visited countries, the need to plan jointly for resilience had not developed into practical measures, despite resilience building being one of the country strategic plan focus-area tags, and a number of country offices raised the challenge of converging interventions whilst aligning with host government and/or multiple donor interests if they are not supportive.

140. In some documents reviewed, the greater concentration of activities is treated as a risk for WFP ability to scale up for a humanitarian response if needed. In the annual performance report (APR) 2017, five crisis response strategic outcomes were identified as not immediately scalable because they work with specific populations and/or in certain areas.¹⁵⁸

Finding 22: WFP has the programmatic tools to support a phased “layering” of activities that facilitate graduation from extreme poverty.

141. Non-conditional transfers provide WFP with a unique inclusion modality where government safety nets do not exist or reach the extreme poor. They also provide an opportunity to support the progression¹⁵⁹ of the most vulnerable towards resilience capacities.¹⁶⁰ Meeting consumption needs is the first step identified by the literature on approaches to graduation from extreme poverty,¹⁶¹ and followed over time with savings groups and then asset development, which are included in R4. Asset building can also be deployed to drastically reduce or remove certain threats, thus creating a safer space in which progression could take place.

¹⁵⁵ WFP (2018) Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2012-2017): Volume II - Annexes. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/013).

¹⁵⁶ WFP (2016). Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) Guidance Manual.

¹⁵⁷ WFP (2018). Scaling up for resilient individuals, communities, and systems in the Sahel: Operational Reference Note (Internal document).

¹⁵⁸ ‘Annual performance report for 2017’ (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1).

¹⁵⁹ RBD advocates for the term “progression”, as “graduation” is often considered to be undignified.

¹⁶⁰ The specific context should determine whether graduation is/is not a feasible objective. In conflict and emergency settings, it is often not possible. Where it is, the context should also determine what people graduate or progress. In a context where social protection or shock responsive social protection systems do not exist and WFP cannot advocate for their development, the saving groups and, later, insurance mechanisms of R4 represent the best offer for WFP if phased for different population groups over a longer time frame.

¹⁶¹ CGAP (2014) *From Extreme Poverty to Sustainable Livelihoods: A Technical Guidance to the Graduation Approach*.

142. Practical aspects reduce the ability of WFP programming to support graduation. Food assistance for assets and training guidance advises that asset building or training activities in non-emergency contexts should be designed within a longer-term plan and with uptake to a safety net programme, where existing. However, key informants and past evaluations¹⁶² noted that funding limits food assistance for assets to short-term food provision and asset building, which nearly all key informant interviews referring to the topic stated was insufficient to catalyse the longer-term processes that lead to resilience. The graduation literature suggests that a phased layering of activities to a particular extremely poor group over a period of 18–36 months is required to achieve sustainable livelihoods.¹⁶³ Evidence from the longest-running WFP food assistance for asset intervention, the MERET programme in Ethiopia,¹⁶⁴ shows that food assistance for assets has improved incomes, productive assets and food security, but the lack of a baseline limits learning on what interventions most efficiently support the very poorest groups to develop livelihoods that help cope with or respond to shocks. This is corroborated by evidence from an impact evaluation of MERET.¹⁶⁵

Finding 23: WFP’s current range of interventions is not particularly well-suited to the mobility or migration of food-insecure people.

143. Many of WFP interventions work to build resilience in defined rural geographies and with populations that are expected to remain static and free from active conflict.^{166, 167} Food assistance for asset guidance describes how to consider pastoralist mobility within planning processes, but recognizes that its interventions have limited applicability to mobile pastoralists.¹⁶⁸ Whilst food assistance for assets has greater relevance for pastoralist sub-groups who remain non-mobile (whom the manual identifies as potentially more food insecure), there is no guidance on resilience strengthening for groups who have been forced into migration, who have no social or historic experience of moving and who are likely to be the most food insecure.

144. Smallholder approaches, insurance schemes, and localized climate information services associated with R4 and P4P are dependent on people remaining on their land. This in turn makes it more urgent that WFP build resilience capacities before a shock or conflict forces people away from their locations and potentially towards urban areas.

145. Outside of its emergency response, WFP has two streams of interventions that are relevant should movement or migration take place. The first intervention is that its technical assistance and coordination aims to improve parts of the enabling environment, potentially allowing people to access social assistance, markets, or other United Nations services, wherever they are within national boundaries. Some of these, such as linking food distribution to psychosocial support for internally displaced persons, can specifically target the shock of forced migration, which, as seen in Lebanon, places particular stress on women. The use of e-vouchers, which requires

¹⁶² WFP (2014) Impact Evaluation Synthesis: Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002 – 2011). Rome, WFP (OE/2014/11); WFP (2011) Strategic Evaluation of WFP Role in Social Protection and Safety Nets. Rome, WFP (OE/2011/006).

¹⁶³ Hashemi, S.M. & Montesquiou, A.D. (2016). *Graduation Pathways*. CGAP.

¹⁶⁴ Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition.

¹⁶⁵ WFP (2012). *WFP Ethiopia - MERET Impact Evaluation*. Prepared by TANGO, IDS and the Ethiopian Economics Association.

¹⁶⁶ FFA, for example, promotes working within a defined watershed or rangeland and its guidance advises against working with displaced groups unless a series of measures – including “relative security and stability of displaced populations” are met.

¹⁶⁷ The role of FFA in peacebuilding is being explored in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere; however, as in Lebanon, from the examples witnessed the contribution is closer to reducing social tension than establishing peace from an active conflict.

¹⁶⁸ WFP (2016). Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) Guidance Manual.

strengthening the capacity of a network of vendors, is intended to improve the coverage and transferability of food access.

146. The second intervention is that food assistance for training is designed to provide a portable asset. This is an important offer when displaced groups are moving frequently and have no chance to permanently stay in their areas of relocation. As mentioned elsewhere, these interventions are not yet connected so as to offer a holistic service for resilience throughout displacement, or to identify where there are gaps in the service or partnerships.

Factors relating to specific interventions

Finding 24: More time is needed for food assistance for assets initiatives to realize their resilience-building outcomes.

147. Food assistance can prevent people from falling into food and nutritional insecurity during cyclical shortages; asset creation can reduce or remove the threat of a natural shock and provide skills and relationships for dealing with shocks when they occur.

148. Impact evaluations of food assistance for asset projects between 2002–2011 suggest that they were successful in strengthening absorptive capacities by establishing short-term food security in groups who had experienced and continued to experience shock, and in building assets that remained in the mid-term, but with limited success in delivering longer term food security.¹⁶⁹ Food assistance for assets was found to be more effective at encouraging community maintenance of single assets that provide immediate relief from a prevalent shock, rather than a combination of assets that are required to protect from slow onset shock or distant shocks.¹⁷⁰ This was corroborated in focus group discussions with food assistance for asset participants by this evaluation.¹⁷¹¹⁷²

149. Later studies have explored the social effects of food assistance for assets for women, scoping its transformative potential. An internal study in five countries documents food assistance for asset's potential to change women's socioeconomic empowerment, not only in terms of improved livelihoods and reduced financial dependence, but also in terms of improved skills and confidence, strengthened mutual support among women, and improvements in women's leadership roles in the public sphere. As with improvements in women's nutrition, the study concludes that these outcomes arise where food assistance for assets is implemented with complementary actions, by WFP or other actors, including agricultural extension, group framing and linkages with health services.¹⁷³

150. The assumptions in the food assistance for assets programme that people will move from asset and food outputs to resilience outcomes¹⁷⁴ were questioned in at least two of the regions

¹⁶⁹ WFP (2014) Impact Evaluation Synthesis: Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002 – 2011). Rome, WFP (OEV/2014/11).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ For example, in Kyrgyzstan participants gave examples and demonstrated their efforts to maintain or expand their single built asset (in two cases a mudflow protection dam, another river bank protection, and two others water canals) but had limited understanding or ability to address the upstream causes of landslides and erratic rainfall within their catchment area. Local government officials confirmed that activities such as tree planting were difficult to sustain via the FFA modality.

¹⁷² The impact evaluations the FFA team has placed greater emphasis on formalized project design and equal focus on the transfer and the asset creation.

¹⁷³ WFP (2017). The Potential of FFA to Empower Women and Improve Women's Nutrition: A Five Country Study.

¹⁷⁴ WFP (2016). *FFA for Zero Hunger and Resilient Livelihoods: A programme guidance manual*. Within the manual, the theory of change positions the intervention on a transition between short-term food security in time of shocks and longer-term

during 2013–2017¹⁷⁵ but were also widely found to be difficult to test because of an absence of internal data in nearly all regions. The 2017 internal audit report on food assistance for assets recognized that the programme was only part way in its transition from being a short-term intervention of food/cash distribution and asset building to its longer term stated outcomes of resilience building.¹⁷⁶

Finding 25: WFP’s increasing use of cash-based transfers has the potential to enable increased adaptation to shocks and stressors, but attention to the design and targeting of programmes using cash-based transfers is needed.

151. Financial resources built up before, or triggered after, a shock can allow people to protect their assets or alter their livelihoods to reduce or avoid a negative impact.

152. Cash-based transfers are a form of financial service, and there is a body of evidence to suggest that they encourage a range of benefits for recipients, including the ability to manage risk.¹⁷⁷ They are also identified as an entry point for creating or improving national social protection schemes.¹⁷⁸ WFP registration of cash recipients using SCOPE¹⁷⁹ has been acknowledged as contributing to this in Somalia.¹⁸⁰ Beyond the direct outcome, the greater choice associated with cash can be considered an essential requisite in the ability to adapt to shocks and stressors, although the level of associated conditionality can reduce¹⁸¹ this. The use of cash-based transfer to enhance women’s empowerment is dependent on both design and the modality.¹⁸²

153. WFP has experience providing financial services directly associated with shock. Under R4, farmers employing food assistance for assets are offered insurance coverage, which is triggered to pay out during a drought. The programme also introduces savings groups and credit facilities. The evaluations of R4 did not measure its contribution to resilience capacities (or changes in resilience),¹⁸³ but did point to some improvements in asset ownership and savings for insured farmers in Ethiopia,¹⁸⁴ and the combination of interventions was linked to greater agricultural production and maintaining food security levels during a drought in Senegal.¹⁸⁵

benefits, when created or rehabilitated household and/or community assets deliver on a context specific objectives “such as early recovery, disaster risks reduction, resilience building, climate change adaptation, safety nets, or a combination of those.” In emergency settings, FFA encourages lower tech and more modest objectives, which should be seen as “entry points for resilience-building efforts and [to] begin restoring and building back better a number of livelihoods” rather than a longer-term contribution. The manual does not go as far as to conceptualize its contribution to “resilience capacities”, but the description of the later stage outcomes relates to the main components of these.

¹⁷⁵ WFP (2017). OpEv Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: West and Central Africa Region. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/009); WFP (2017). OpEv Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: Southern Africa Region. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/010).

¹⁷⁶ WFP (2017) Internal Audit of WFP’s Management of Food Assistance for Assets. Rome, WFP (AR/17/14).

¹⁷⁷ FAO, UNICEF & Oxford University Press (2016). [From Evidence to Action: The Story of Cash Transfers and Impact Evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa](#).

¹⁷⁸ M. Adato & L. Bassett (2009). Social protection to support vulnerable children and families: the potential of cash transfers to protect education, health and nutrition. *AIDS Care* 21(sup1): 60-75..

¹⁷⁹ SCOPE is the WFP beneficiary identify and benefit management system.

¹⁸⁰ WFP (2018) Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2012-2017): Volume II - Annexes. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/013).

¹⁸¹ WFP (2014). Evaluation of WFP 2018 Cash and Voucher Policy. Rome, WFP (OEV/2014/08).

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ This should become possible as the use of RIMA II is used to measure R4 outcomes at mid- and long-term. Assessments so far have been baseline or first instance project monitoring.

¹⁸⁴ Oxfam (2013). Managing Risk to Agricultural Livelihoods. Impact Evaluation of the Harita Programme in Tigray, Ethiopia 2009–12.

¹⁸⁵ WFP & Oxfam (2016) *Impact evaluation of the R4 initiative in Senegal*. The evaluation also pointed to benefits for those who only received FFA and for those who received FFA plus savings groups, which is an important distinction as insurance coverage requires land ownership.

154. A current limitation of R4 is that its core intervention addresses a single shock. Risk modelling only allows the provision of insurance coverage for drought events,¹⁸⁶ whereas communities typically face multiple threats. R4 communities visited in Zambia were receiving a pay-out for drought damage but mentioned that losses associated with flooding earlier in the season were not being compensated. In Senegal, an impact evaluation identified that beyond economic potential and climate information, R4 has done little to improve community responses to unexpected shocks.¹⁸⁷

Finding 26: Work with smallholder farmers enables WFP to support the major livelihood activity in the countries where it operates, but requires contingency plans for responding to shocks, such as R4, and close attention in order to ensure that the emphasis on production, sales or market-related results does not exclude the poorest smallholders.

155. Agricultural livelihoods are especially vulnerable to natural and financial shocks, but for the poorest groups, in particular, they often form the major source of income that could be used to absorb and adapt.

156. The P4P pilot was the first major focus of WFP on smallholder farmer interventions. The final evaluation found P4P was improving the capacity of smaller farmer organizations to act as effective market actors (and to foster women's participation), increasing volumes sold, but missing income improvement targets. It noted heavy elite capture of benefits, questioning P4P's ability to reach the most vulnerable.¹⁸⁸

157. Smallholder approaches that lack a contingency for shock events overlook the likelihood that private-sector actors will not be able to buy from such farmers when a shock affects the quality or quantity of crops or the physical supply chain. Conversations with country office informants in Zambia and visits to farmers and aggregators suggested that in non-shock periods farmers were still struggling to meet volume requirements as they are operating in a buyers' market. Thus, the role of these approaches in resilience building requires a guaranteed purchase or insurance element during shocks. Both Malawi and Zambia country offices are connecting smallholder approaches to their respective R4 programmes, which includes insurance coverage.

158. The P4P evaluation found that the pilot had "supported the innovative evolution of long-term thinking in WFP about the organization's role and its development impact"; this is evident through the development of the 2017 Strategy for Boosting Smallholder Resilience.¹⁸⁹ Although this does not introduce a new contingency for shock, it does encourage a food system approach that connects savings from "good years" to respond to "bad years" and groups together other smallholder farmer initiatives that WFP has developed.

¹⁸⁶ Information provided after the main data-collection period by representatives of the VAM team indicated that, "new products such as the area yield based insurance actually promoted in Kenya by R4, cover households from the different covariate shocks (floods, pests, drought...) affecting the crops in the wards of intervention". This could not be further explored by the evaluation team.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ WFP (2014). Strategic Evaluation of WFP Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2008-2013). Rome, WFP (OEI/2013/024).

¹⁸⁹ WFP (2017). Pro-Smallholder Food Assistance: A Background Paper for WFP Strategy for Boosting Smallholder Resilience and Market Access Worldwide.

2.6 NODE 6 – PARTNERS

Finding 27: WFP is improving the support it provides to governments through the zero hunger strategic review process and continued country capacity strengthening, which will help to strengthen the resilience of potentially vulnerable individuals and communities.

159. Partnership with government is fundamental to WFP work in countries that have functional governments. The new WFP strategic plan has institutionalized an approach that places national governments in the lead. Host government engagement and contributions to WFP programmes are expected to continue to grow in importance in this organizational shift. An increasingly wide range of government institutions are expected to benefit from technical assistance aimed to strengthen their capacities to achieve zero hunger in the new country strategic plans.

160. The country strategic plan process begins with a ZHSR that is led by a respected, high-level national figure usually working with an independent national research institute or think tank and advised by a multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral body including senior government officials, donors, civil society, academia, international organizations and others. The objective is to establish a hunger baseline, determine gaps in the national food security and nutrition response, and identify priority actions, thereby enabling WFP, the government and other partners to develop a coherent plan to achieve SDG 2.

161. Only two ZHSRs (Guatemala¹⁹⁰ and Lebanon)¹⁹¹ were available for countries visited by the mission. Two other countries visited have approved country strategic plans, but their ZHSRs were not completed at the time of the mission; of these, one (Kenya) references the findings of the ZHSR very clearly while the other (Kyrgyzstan) does not mention it, and neither does the country strategic plan for Pakistan, which was approved shortly after the inception mission. Review of the Guatemala and Lebanon ZHSRs confirms that they do comprehensively cover the food and nutrition security situations in their respective countries, based on detailed review of secondary data, to develop a hunger baseline.

162. The Lebanon review pre-dates the policy on country strategic plans and was not produced independently. The Guatemala review was headed by a former vice-president and foreign relations minister with strong diplomatic credentials and included interviews with public sector officials and representatives from civil society and the international community in four townships and workshops in three regions. The report's conclusions and recommendations are numerous, and many address aspects of resilience without explicitly using the term. While the country strategic plan summarizes these aspects rather generically – for instance, address the underlying causes of chronic malnutrition; focus on vulnerable populations; support adaptation to climate change – the strategic outcomes and underlying activities are aligned with them.

163. The Strategic Evaluation of Country Strategic Plan Pilots noted that the quality and usefulness of ZHSRs were variable, citing issues relating to bias towards one sector (agriculture), insufficient attention to gender, social protection and nutrition, the amount of local consultation, and the time required to complete the reviews. Nevertheless, it did find that ZHSRs improved WFP

¹⁹⁰ Association for Research and Social Studies (2017). Strategic review on the food and nutrition security situation in Guatemala, focusing on chronic malnutrition and its determinants.

¹⁹¹ United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2016). *Strategic review of food and nutrition security in Lebanon*.

alignment with national policies and priorities.¹⁹² This was also confirmed by country visits of the present evaluation, and indicates that the country strategic plan process is capable of enabling WFP to better understand and address government priorities.

164. In 2017, WFP registered a range of host government contributions and will continue efforts to obtain more from them, noting that intensified partnerships with host governments are fundamental to WFP work and programme resourcing.¹⁹³ The closer alignment with government priorities described above is essential for this. However, host governments can also reduce WFP financial needs and demonstrate resilience by taking over or scaling up some activities, often in association with technical assistance provided by WFP. This was seen in Kyrgyzstan, where, in addition to managing a school meals programme, WFP is strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Development.

165. Sixty-three of the 80 country strategic plans/I-CSPs/T-ICSPs analysed in Annex 10 contain institutional capacity-strengthening activities, which are the most frequently occurring activity category. Its 129 activities represent about 25 percent of all activities listed in the plans, but less than 1.5 percent of the implementation plan budget. These activities cover a range of technical, policy and management support across many sectors and demonstrate the closeness, complexity and value for money of partnerships with host governments.

Finding 28: WFP support for country capacity strengthening is a critical element to enhance resilience of individuals, households and communities.

166. A strong governance system for food security and livelihoods can transform the level of support given to the most vulnerable before, during, and after a shock. WFP commits significant technical expertise to strengthen government capacities in school feeding, nutrition, food security, livelihoods, emergency preparedness and response, support for smallholder farmers, and other areas.¹⁹⁴ There have also been resilience-specific initiatives, such as the on-going RBD-led work under G5 Sahel agreement, which supports technical institutions and promotes use of the 3PA.

167. WFP capacity strengthening is mainly targeted at specific individuals or institutions, but a proportion is focused on the enabling environment, where connections are made more holistically to address food security.¹⁹⁵ WFP has attempted to support enabling environments for resilience in the past with the National Capacity Index (NCI) for resilience. The application of the National Capacity Index for resilience was limited by its roll out¹⁹⁶ and risked creating a parallel system to government initiatives by treating resilience as a reportable outcome. The switch to the zero hunger score card (see Footnote 129) may help to avoid these problems while maintaining the convening/coordination function of the National Capacity Index.

168. The role of WFP in strengthening capacities to conduct food security assessments was consistently identified as a strength during the evaluation. It is often delivered in combination with capacity strengthening for disaster risk reduction¹⁹⁷ and/or for early warning systems.¹⁹⁸ In at least

¹⁹² WFP (2018). Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/14). paras 43-45.

¹⁹³ 'Annual Performance Report for 2017' (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1).

¹⁹⁴ During PRRO from 2013–2015. Source: WFP (2017). Evaluation of WFP Policy on Capacity Development: An Update on Implementation (2009). Rome, WFP (OEV/2015/028).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Referenced in: WFP (2016). *Evaluability Assessment of WFP's Strategic Plan 2014-2017*. Rome, WFP (OEV/2015/022); and confirmed in interviews during the SE.

¹⁹⁷ See, for example, Regional Synthesis of Operational Evaluations 2013–2017 from RBP.

¹⁹⁸ See, for example, at least four countries (Chad, Niger, Ghana, Senegal) building these capacities in Regional Synthesis of Operational Evaluations 2013–2017 from RBD.

six countries, this evaluation met government informants who referred positively to WFP work in this area. The disaster risk reduction/early warning nature of the capacity strengthening means that the support often focuses on vulnerability identification and response,¹⁹⁹ but in some examples WFP is helping governments to incorporate resilience. Regional Bureau Johannesburg, for instance, is supporting the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to build capacity for resilience measurement, create information connections between the SADC countries, and ensure information feeds into programmes and response. Informants from the Zambia Meteorological Department highlighted WFP support in connecting farmers to rainfall and soil temperature monitoring, which is then sent to the department for processing. Informants distinguished this approach from that of UNDP (which is also supporting local weather reading systems) and mentioned that the farmer model provided more timely and reliable information than some of their own stations.

Finding 29: WFP actively engages in partnerships to enhance the resilience of food insecure target groups, but these have not systematically taken the different needs and priorities of women, men, girls and boys into account.

169. Most Country Director respondents (21 out of 22; see Annex 7 for further details) are engaged in partnerships to build resilience. Seventeen had partnerships with explicit resilience-building objectives, while four reported having partnerships that contributed to resilience building without having it as a specific objective.

170. More than 70 percent of the Country Director respondents reported explicit resilience objectives in partnerships developed with United Nations agencies. Of these, FAO was by far the most common partner (60 percent of responses). Among the United Nation family, UNICEF, UNDP and IFAD were also mentioned but to a much lesser extent. This is broadly consistent with findings from the country missions. Only two of the web survey respondents reported resilience partnerships with the private sector.

171. WFP has embarked on partnerships intended to address gender inequalities, such as the ongoing Rome-based agency and UN Women “Accelerating progress towards rural women’s economic empowerment” (RWEE), implemented since 2012.²⁰⁰ The initiative clearly differentiates the roles of the agencies – for example with WFP supporting agricultural assets and in some cases nutrition, FAO agricultural technologies and UN Women overseeing women’s leadership and participation, while all the agencies play a role in gender responsive policy development interventions. However, project stakeholders agreed that although they target the most vulnerable women, they have not undertaken an analysis to understand their gender differentiated needs.

172. WFP Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017) incorporated gender and equity, however a recent evaluation highlighted a lack of corporate guidance²⁰¹ to ensure that gender and equity principles were integrated into all WFP partnerships.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Detailed further in Node 8 “Information”.

²⁰⁰ Sweden is a key partner and the largest donor to the programme implemented in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Nepal, Niger and Rwanda.

²⁰¹ The evaluation team recognizes that there is a partnerships module in the gender toolkit but the finding of the strategy highlighting a lack of corporate guidance remains valid.

²⁰² WFP (2018). Evaluation of WFP’s Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017). Rome, WFP (OEV/2016/010).

Finding 30: The Rome-based agencies have a long-standing resilience agenda, but the evaluation found that joint implementation has been varied.

173. The Rome-based agencies have been working together to develop and promote a joint resilience-building approach since 2009²⁰³ and the 2015 Rome-based agency resilience conceptual framework is a result. Progress reports and case studies present the status of Rome-based agency collaboration and showcase examples of joint needs assessments, joint planning, and joint programming.²⁰⁴ The number of joint projects has increased steadily over the past seven years, and sharply since 2016, although these are not necessarily all resilience related.²⁰⁵ However, as mentioned earlier, an internal audit of food assistance for asset management found that some country office's food assistance for asset teams and/or management had no knowledge of the existence of the joint conceptual framework.²⁰⁶ A five-year Rome-based agency memorandum of understanding (MoU), signed in June 2018, aims to scale up efforts in joint food security assessments, joint programme and outcome formulation and resilience initiatives, and highlights renewed efforts in developing a common understanding of the context, needs and capacities of target groups.

174. According to informants from eight countries, joint initiatives are less the result of agreements signed in Rome but, rather, of the opportunities that arise at country level. As previously mentioned the Country Directors' web survey indicated frequent partnership with FAO (in 10 countries, out of 22 responding countries of which 13 reported partnerships with United Nations agencies for resilience-building objectives). Only three Country Directors reported such partnerships with IFAD, with a fourth in process, and in all these cases there was also a link with FAO, making it more likely that those partnerships were related to the Rome-based agency initiative rather than being opportunistic. The evaluation team found that the implementation of Rome-based agency resilience work was uneven in five of the countries visited for two main reasons: lack of convergence on target groups/geographic areas and lack of synchronized fund availability.

175. In terms of joint resilience planning, the preparation of the national ZHSR provides opportunities for intensive consultations with partners enabling them to understand each other's comparative strengths and to design proposals and workplans accordingly. However, there is not significant evidence to indicate that this occurs in practice. In terms of resource mobilization, there are examples of joint fundraising strategies using the Rome-based agency framework, for instance with the EU Trust Fund 'Madad' in Lebanon and Jordan.²⁰⁷

176. Although WFP does not have a clear internal resilience strategy, it does play a role in developing such strategies with wider groups of organizations. Over the last decade, donors, such as USAID and the European Union, have urged increased synergy among the Rome-based agencies. In response, the Rome-based agencies developed a joint approach to resilience, resulting in a joint conceptual framework for collaboration to strengthen resilience for food security and nutrition in April 2015.²⁰⁸ In 2018, Canada approved funding for a Rome-based agency

²⁰³ 'Directions for Collaboration among the Rome-based Agencies' (WFP/EB.2/2009/11-C).

²⁰⁴ 'Update on collaboration among the Rome-based agencies' (WFP/EB.2/2016/4-E); FAO, IFAD & WFP (2017) *Progress report on Rome-based Agencies collaboration*. Rome, FAO (CL 158/9); WFP (2015) *Collaboration for strengthening resilience Country Case Studies Guatemala, Kenya and Niger*.

²⁰⁵ 'Annual performance report for 2017' (WFP/EB.A/2018/4-A/Rev.1). p.49.

²⁰⁶ WFP (2017) Internal Audit of WFP's Management of Food Assistance for Assets. Rome, WFP (AR/17/14).

²⁰⁷ European Union (2017). [Action Document for EU Trust Fund](#).

²⁰⁸ FAO, WFP, and IFAD (2015). A Conceptual Framework for Collaboration and Partnership among the Rome-based Agencies.

initiative to strengthen the resilience of livelihoods in protracted crises in three countries.^{209, 210} United States and European Union representatives reiterated their support in 2017.²¹¹ However, similar to this evaluation's finding concerning the 2015 Resilience Policy, a recent internal audit of food assistance for assets management found that some country office's food assistance for assets teams and/or management had no knowledge of the joint conceptual framework.²¹²

177. The 3PA includes a seasonal livelihood programming tool, which aims to position partners around intervention areas based on their comparative advantages, and sequence programmes to best complement each other to strengthen resilience outcomes. Seasonal livelihood planning has been used in a range of countries, including South Sudan and Niger, to develop WFP-FAO joint planning and programming. The tool also contributed to seasonally align WFP, FAO and UNICEF activity in the framework of their joint resilience strategy reinforcing safety nets, agricultural production, and the provision of basic services.²¹³

178. Certain donors are now encouraging programme partnership by funding centrally-agreed Rome-based agency initiatives. The evaluation found limited concrete examples of the Rome-based agencies coming together to develop joined up approaches but did find evidence that country level United Nations agencies are jointly applying for resilience funding with a clearer articulation of roles and responsibilities. The framing of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development prioritizes these joined-up approaches, and key partners are exploring the role of food security interventions in protracted and conflict settings.

Finding 31: Some donors perceive WFP as a leading humanitarian organization and channel their funding towards the fulfilment of this role; it is too early to determine whether the country strategic plan framework will allow the more diversified partnership modalities and funding streams needed for longer-term resilience approaches.

179. Whereas WFP donor base has embraced the global resilience agenda, its expectations are mixed regarding the role of WFP and its comparative advantage in enhancing resilience. Informants at all levels in WFP stated that donors consider WFP to be primarily a humanitarian agency and may not clearly recognize its role in enhancing resilience. However, they express frustration at the need to repeatedly fund humanitarian interventions because earlier ones did not promote resilience to a recurrent shock. Donors are eager to identify opportunities to promote resilience – for instance, as noted by the evaluation of multi-year planning by OCHA²¹⁴, the Syria regional crisis spurred them to develop multi-year humanitarian financing and planning that enables humanitarian and development actors to work across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus.²¹⁵ While multi-year financing has gained traction since 2010,²¹⁶ and countries such

²⁰⁹ Canada is funding the implementation of an innovative, five-year programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Niger and Somalia (USD 38 million).

²¹⁰ FAO, IFAD & WFP (2018) [Rome-based Agencies Resilience Initiative](#).

²¹¹ Remarks by Chargé d'Affaires Thomas Duffy at the Opening of the World Food Programme Executive Board (Nov 2017). Draft Council conclusions on the EU and its Member States' medium-term priorities for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

²¹² WFP (2017) Internal Audit of WFP's Management of Food Assistance for Assets. Rome, WFP (AR/17/14).

²¹³ WFP (2013). A WFP approach to operationalise resilience, Part 2: Seasonal livelihood programming.

²¹⁴ OCHA (2017). Evaluation of Multi-year Planning.

²¹⁵ In 2017, 26 donors pledged a total of USD 3.7 billion of humanitarian and development funding for the Syria crisis from 2018 to 2020.

²¹⁶ OCHA, NRC & FAO (2017). Living-up to the Promise of Multi-Year Humanitarian Financing.

as Canada,²¹⁷ Sweden²¹⁸ and Germany²¹⁹ invest specifically in multi-year resilience programmes, in general, donors remain hesitant to provide WFP with funding that promotes a longer-term resilience approach. Fifteen of 22 respondents to the Country Directors' web survey underlined the lack of assured funding for an integrated approach as a constraint.

180. Donor timeframes and earmarking were frequently mentioned as not conducive to resilience programming, for which long-term planning and commitment are key. Furthermore, a significant amount of crisis response resources are provided as in-kind contributions²²⁰ intended for food distribution which, as one country office informant pointed out, "doesn't leave much room" for engaging in resilience work. The strategic evaluation of the country strategic plan pilots recommended that constraints on more flexible and predictable financing be addressed. WFP is conducting an analysis of donor requirements to understand "what information and incentives are needed to further inspire donors to reduce earmarking and to provide more flexible funding".²²¹ This is part of an advocacy and engagement initiative with donors to develop flexible and long term financial commitments.

181. The introduction of focus-area tagging in the country strategic plans was intended to facilitate resource mobilization/allocation with the resilience-building tag intended to provide the transparency to give donors with strong humanitarian outlooks the confidence to fund programmes that go beyond crisis response, without fearing their resources were being diverted to development. As previously shown in Figure 8 under Node 4, of the 61 country strategic plans for which budget figures were available in the Integrated Road Map analytics database (excluding Turkey), the overall needs-based budget for resilience building in 2018 was around USD 846 million and the implementation plan budget was USD 456 million, indicating anticipated funding of about 54 percent of the need (see Annex 10). This compares with a much higher funding expectation of 75 percent on a needs-based budget of just over USD 3.5 billion for crisis response the same year. As the country strategic plans are new, it is too early to be able to assess the effect that tagging has had on mobilization of longer-term funds from humanitarian-leaning donors, and thus whether the resilience-building tag is serving its purpose.

Finding 32: WFP is broadening its partnerships with private-sector actors, but the enabling factors for this need to be strengthened.

182. WFP is in partnerships with private-sector companies – for example in cash-delivery transactions, drought insurance schemes and the production of fortified food. Some respondents indicated a willingness to replicate and/or scale-up public-private partnerships, such as the Africa Improved Foods²²² in Rwanda, the local production of fresh milk for schools in Burundi, or the Farm-to-Market Alliance implemented in Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Rwanda.²²³ The potential for expanded support to the latter is noteworthy as the alliance is supported by the WFP Innovation Accelerator.²²⁴

²¹⁷ WFP (2017). [Canada Provides CAD\\$50m For Unique 5-Year Integrated Resilience Program By UN Agencies](#) (news article).

²¹⁸ Government Offices of Sweden (2018). [Sweden and WFP sign landmark agreement bringing hope to millions in forgotten crises](#) (press release).

²¹⁹ WFP (2017). [Record German Funding To WFP Delivers Lifeline To Syrians, Boosts Global Zero Hunger Efforts](#) (news article).

²²⁰ In-kind contributions represent, for example, 40 percent of the USAID food assistance modality. USAID Food for Peace. 2017 Year in Review report.

²²¹ 'WFP Management Plan (2018–2020)' (WFP/EB.2/2017/5-A/1/Rev.1*).

²²² Africa Improved Foods Rwanda Limited (undated). [Nutrition](#) (website).

²²³ [Farm to Market Alliance](#) (website) and WFP (2017) [IFC And WFP Collaborate To Finance Smallholder Farmers In Rwanda And Tanzania](#) (news article).

²²⁴ WFP (2018). [Annual Report 2017: UN WFP Innovation Accelerator](#).

183. Findings from the evaluation of WFP corporate partnership strategy²²⁵ were corroborated by respondents who identified the following challenges:

- a. In terms of guidance, the last private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy dates back to 2013.²²⁶
- b. In terms of tools, the standardized data available in COMET and WINGS²²⁷ are not able to capture complementarities among partners, duplication of efforts or innovations from partnering.
- c. Corporate systems and processes (procurement, due diligence, cost recovery, legal services) are felt to be limiting the scaling up of successful small-scale partnerships.

184. A private-sector partnership and fundraising strategy (2018–2022) has been drafted. This draft strategy has reviewed WFP legal procedures and due-diligence framework and recommends increased investments in skills and expertise.²²⁸ The latter are paramount as country offices continue the transition from a direct implementer role to that of a “convener of multiple stakeholders” role working to develop local and market-based solutions. In this regard, all the regional bureaux as well as many country offices²²⁹ have prepared partnership action plans as recommended in the evaluation of the corporate partnership strategy.

185. The draft strategy also suggests the need to define “shared value partnerships” in the United Nations family, since current incentive structures encourage agencies to make separate deals and compete with each other. The Sustainable Development Goal philanthropy platform²³⁰ is a multi-partner trust fund contributing to SDG 17. WFP Regional Bureau Nairobi is among the United Nations organizations that have joined.

Finding 33: Local organizations play an essential role in conveying communities’ resilience needs and enhancing community ownership but are constrained by WFP procedures and partnering practices.

186. A strength of WFP is its ability to get to the hardest-to-reach places where it collaborates with local organizations. This was confirmed and very much valued by government officials and local partners encountered during this evaluation. The localization agenda includes a set of commitments that promote linkages with local actors. WFP staff at all levels, but particularly in country offices and sub-offices, recognize the paramount role of community-based and civil society organizations, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and NGOs, in building long-term relationships with communities, conveying their ideas and concerns, and enhancing their ownership.

187. However, many partners raised issues about their working experience with WFP. These fall into two categories: (i) very short contracts resulting in: disruption through staff turnover; inability to manage seasonal activities through the complete cycle; and difficulty in promoting the longer-term planning and activities that are essential for resilience building, because of uncertainty over future resource availability; and (ii) the contract-based working relationship is often not seen as a

²²⁵ WFP (2018). Evaluation of WFP’s Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017). Rome, WFP (OEV/2016/010).

²²⁶ ‘WFP Private-Sector Partnerships and Fundraising Strategy (2013-2017)’ (WFP/EB.A/2013/5-B). A new strategy was due to be presented to the Executive Board in February 2018, but has been postponed.

²²⁷ COMET: Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool and WINGS: Information Network and Global System.

²²⁸ Investment to Achieve Zero Hunger. Building WFP New Private-Sector Partnerships & Fundraising Strategy. Second Informal Consultation Rome, 26 April 2018.

²²⁹ Of the 80 CSPs, ICSPs and T-ICSP, 60 percent include a partnership action plan. Source: WFP PGG data.

²³⁰ UNDP & Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors. [SDG Philanthropy Platform](#) (website).

partnership from the WFP side, so that the strengths and strategies of the partner are not always recognized and respected.²³¹

188. These issues are well known throughout WFP and have been partly addressed. Together with UNICEF, UNHCR and OCHA, WFP is working on a set of initiatives, including the harmonization and simplification of contractual procedures and tools and the establishment of a United Nations' partner portal. A new type of strategic partnership is also being developed. In Somalia, for example, WFP has broadened its collaboration with Save the Children, World Vision, and the Danish Refugee Council to include joint advocacy, complementary knowledge and resource generation.²³² Similarly a more collaborative, and less transactional, partnership with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society was launched in Burundi, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Sudan in 2017.²³³

2.7 NODE 7 – PEOPLE

Finding 34: Country offices have experienced and dedicated staff; however, with notable exceptions, there is a need to broaden the skill sets available.

189. Country Directors identified “lack of country office expertise” as one of the top three constraints to taking a more integrated approach that would support resilience programming. It was also recognized by senior managers in WFP, as well as by donors and United Nations partners in countries visited, that the nature of ‘resilience’ as a conceptually complex and technically challenging area would require an assessment of the workforce if resilience enhancing work is to be successful.

190. Concern was raised in six visited country offices that they lacked staff with development experience and with the full range of expertise that was likely to be needed to undertake resilience programmes. Informants noted that WFP needs to build and retain expertise (as opposed to hiring short-term consultants) to strengthen institutional capacity in sectors such as agriculture, social protection, climate change and others. This concurs with comments by donors in two countries who raised the need for increased staff capacities in social protection and livelihoods. Further, a finding of the country strategic plan pilots evaluation was that additional capacity in social protection and farm-to-markets linkages was needed.²³⁴

191. Institutional capacity strengthening is the most abundant activity category across 80 active country strategic plans (Annex 10). The recent Evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy Update²³⁵ concluded that there have not been any comprehensive efforts to increase the skillsets of staff to let them more fully understand and implement capacity strengthening, and recommended a roster of capacity development experts in relevant thematic and geographic areas.

²³¹ These issues reflect, to a certain extent, the findings of the Evaluation of WFP's Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017) (OEV 2016/010) and Evaluation of Policy on Capacity Development: An Update on Implementation (2009) (OEV/2017/028).

²³² WFP (2018). Evaluation of WFP's Corporate Partnership Strategy (2014–2017). Rome, WFP (OEV/2016/010).

²³³ This was part of an IFRC-WFP capacity strengthening flagship initiative launched during the 2017 WFP Annual Partnership Consultation.

²³⁴ WFP (2018). Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans. Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/14). para 101.

²³⁵ WFP (2017) Evaluation of Policy on Capacity Development: An Update on Implementation (2009). Rome, WFP (OEV/2017/028). Recommendation 3.

192. There is also a need to ensure that all staff have a clear understanding of the objectives of the country strategic plans and of their roles within them. This is particularly pertinent for sub-office staff, who were found to have a stronger focus on implementation than on results. Field monitors need to understand why data collection is becoming more complex, not only for themselves but because they often accompany visitors, including donors, and thus play an important public relations role.

193. In at least three country offices, nutrition staff and gender advisors/focal points stressed that non-specialized staff struggle to systematically apply knowledge on nutrition and gender to better achieve resilience objectives. This is consistent with a decentralized evaluation conducted in Niger that recommended WFP “increase learning and knowledge management capacities to increase enhanced resilience outcomes” and “deepen the learning generated by the resilience approach on gender”.²³⁶ Following the evaluation, the Niger country office mainstreamed knowledge sharing and capitalization internally and began participating in knowledge-management initiatives, like the Sahel Resilience Learning project and the Resilience in the Sahel Enhanced (RISE) network.²³⁷

Finding 35: At headquarters, the technical skills for assessing, planning and designing aspects of resilience support exist, but they are spread across numerous units and neither the organizational structure nor the corporate philosophy of WFP promote their integration.

194. WFP headquarters staff refer to the “silo mentality” as much as staff at other levels, but this is the only level where resilience appears to have one or more silos of its own. Informants indicated that there have been regular reorganizations of the organigram and that resilience units have come and gone, or at least been given greater or lesser prominence over the last decade. Currently, the most explicit resilience thrusts are coming from the Livelihoods and Resilience Unit and the climate and disaster risk reduction programme, both of which are part of the Policy and Programme Division. However, there is also strong resilience interest and relevance in several other units, including the Food Systems Unit, Safety Nets and Social Protection Unit, Nutrition Division,²³⁸ VAM and the Gender Office. These units have headquarters-based staff complements ranging from below 10 to above 40 and range from being fully funded to being fully self-supporting. Most of them have produced their own policies and guidance and are focused on implementing them. The overarching framework is the WFP Strategic Plan and that does not necessarily incentivize internal collaboration. The country strategic plan policy provides an environment in which closer collaboration could be fostered but there was no indication from interviews in headquarters and country offices that the opportunity has been taken.

195. In countries where resilience approaches are more advanced, there has been a regional bureau role in shaping the strategy and sharing approaches, and Country Directors have encouraged greater synergies between their units, either through specific programmes, such as R4, or through their country strategic plans. In other countries, resilience is regarded more as an activity alongside, rather than encompassing, nutrition or education, and mainly for development contexts rather than the nexus. A recurring theme in interviews at country office and regional

²³⁶ WFP (2015). Niger PRRO 200583 Saving lives, protecting livelihoods and enhancing the resilience of chronically vulnerable populations: A mid-term Operation Evaluation. Rome, WFP (OEV/2015/009).

²³⁷ WFP (2017). Knowledge management – A pillar of WFP Zero Hunger Strategy. Rome, WFP (WFP-0000018916).

²³⁸ The nutrition team has attempted to overcome silos through the nutrition-sensitive working group, which was launched in July 2016 with senior management involvement.

bureau levels was that a directive from headquarters senior management would be needed before resilience could gain significant traction as an integrated approach. The senior management view was that the country strategic plan process provides the opportunity to mainstream a resilience approach, and whether the opportunity is taken is a question of mindset and leadership in the country offices. However, they did not indicate how WFP could go about influencing mindset or strengthening leadership in cases where it might be necessary.

2.8 NODE 8 – INFORMATION

Finding 36: WFP has access to a wealth of tools that provide insights into specific aspects of resilience; various combinations, along with new assessments, are being piloted with a view to providing a more holistic picture of these tools.


Source: Strategic evaluation, based on a document review of assessment methodologies and interviews with pertinent staff.

196. Figure 11 demonstrates that WFP has developed or used a number of assessments that include technical components to inform typical decisions made in resilience-strengthening approaches. These components can be analysed in the following way:

- **Who** is most at need of resilience-strengthening support?
- What **shocks** are expected and what impact might they have?
- In what **context** is resilience being strengthened?
- What capacities or assets should be strengthened in **response** to shocks?²³⁹

Annex 18 provides more detail.

Figure 11: WFP use of assessments and their role in providing resilience-related information²⁴⁰



²³⁹ Adapted from: Mercy Corps (2016). [Our resilience approach to relief, recovery and development](#).

²⁴⁰ *These are non-corporate tool/assessments that WFP has recently used or been involved in developing.

Source: Strategic evaluation, based on a document review of assessment methodologies and interviews with pertinent staff.²⁴¹

197. Both WFP and external informants in a number of countries consider WFP as having core strengths in two of these areas (“Who” and “Shock”), because of its longstanding vulnerability mapping services and risk modelling. Other tools, such as the 3PA, were developed by other departments in WFP, and some (marked with an asterisk in the diagram) have been developed by WFP partners.

198. **Who:** WFP uses several tools to identify vulnerability in a population. They serve different purposes with, for instance, the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) providing identification valid for five years over wide areas, compared to the Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) which is triggered during a shock to rapidly identify those at risk within smaller affected areas. These assessments take the household level as the lowest unit of data collection. More localized identification is possible using the CBPP, where participatory wealth ranking is performed using Household Economic Analysis (HEA).

199. **Shocks:** WFP has several dedicated assessments that consider how economic, weather and climatic covariate shocks do (or may) effect food consumption or food security. Some of these, such as Market Monitor, use ex-post analysis, from which impacts can be determined and historic trends identified. Others, such as the climate change assessment, use ex-ante analysis to project the effects of future changes. The Shock Impact Simulation Model (SISMod) developed by VAM provides a combination of ex-ante and ex-post and has also been used to model the impact of biological shocks on food security. It gives an estimation of the capacity of a household to resist and absorb a shock. These tools model shock within broad population areas; more localized impacts are identified in the CBPP, Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA),²⁴² and the qualitative component of the resilience context analysis. As these assessments are more open and adaptable (compared to corporate reporting assessments), they could be used to examine the resilience of any group or sub-group, provided the county and field offices could access the relevant sociological expertise for tool design, data collection, analysis and interpretation.

200. The above assessments necessitate a time-lag between shock identification and response; in the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC), FoodSECuRE²⁴³ (and regional derivatives such as LEAP),²⁴⁴ WFP is working with anticipatory assessments to scale up funding for food and nutrition security closer to or even before a shock impacts.

201. **Context:** Resilience is widely understood as being influenced by conditions or actions occurring within social, political, ecological and economic systems.^{245, 246} WFP does not attempt a

²⁴¹ The diagram is based on a review of the available technical guidance for the major assessments encountered during the evaluation. For each, the evaluation team reviewed: 1) the purpose of the tool; 2) its area of focus; and 3) the level of information it is intended to provide. Where available the assessment outputs were also reviewed. The diagram presents a specific and/or unique contribution of the reviewed tools (rather than their full function) and is intended to show that across WFP there is sufficient technical focus at each of the four points. It is not intended as the definite list of assessments available as specific RBs, COs and HQ units have developed other tools that are also likely to have relevance.

²⁴² FAO (2019). [Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis \(RIMA\)](#) (website).

²⁴³ Food Security Climate Resilience (FoodSECuRE) Facility.

²⁴⁴ Livelihoods, Early Assessment and Protection. Developed in collaboration with the Government of Ethiopia and WFP.

²⁴⁵ FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2014). [Resilience Measurement Principles: Toward an Agenda for Measurement Design](#).

²⁴⁶ WFP is a member of the FSIN network, which has developed or commissioned a body of literature on resilience measurement.

single, holistic system assessment,²⁴⁷ however a number of its assessments track multi-level and multi-scalar factors, which could be explored more fully to track causal relationships. WFP informants at headquarters and country office levels mentioned an interest in testing greater integration of assessments, and several examples exist. The 3PA provides a tool for linking food security assessments and for integrating programme designs from the national, sub-national, to community level. It also intersects assessments on seasonality, natural resources, livelihoods, shocks, and sources of support and interventions. Other types of WFP analyses, particularly market monitoring and climate change assessments, use trans-boundary information to anticipate or review the impact on food security.

202. Informants at all levels of WFP agreed that the linkages between assessments have not yet been made and, therefore, analysis of influences on food security focuses largely on single chains of causality rather than on effects that occur in a more complex system. It was suggested that the integration of climate change information could help VAM “get off the map” and provide a forward-looking dimension to the integrated context analysis. There have been steps towards the innovative use of climate forecasts,²⁴⁸ and satellite and aerial imaging to trigger interventions before a shock takes place, and to assess the condition of natural resources.

203. **Response:** Several WFP assessments gather information about coping strategies for consumption and livelihoods. However, the strategies assessed are typically negative ones – for example, selling major assets, using up savings – used to identify those most at risk should a shock happen. WFP history in vulnerability analysis means those who employ fewer negative strategies are often equated as being more resilient.²⁴⁹ VAM informants agree that responses to shocks are often developed from positive capacities held by communities, households or individuals, and these capacities enables a different mode of intervention aimed at enhancing existing strategies.

204. Two assessments that apply this focus on resilience capacities are being piloted by WFP – RIMA II²⁵⁰ and the resilience context analysis.²⁵¹ An important function of both is that they attempt to inform programmes about which elements are most important for strengthening resilience in a particular context and could therefore increase the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP resilience programmes. In WFP core operations, the 2016 food assistance for assets manual encourages an exploration of positive (as well as negative) strategies that people use to adapt to a shock.

Finding 37: WFP’s corporate monitoring framework includes some areas that are relevant to the measurement of resilience but is limited by differences among the methodologies used for measuring indicators and a tendency to equate outputs with outcomes.

²⁴⁷ For a suggested example, see FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2015) [FSIN Technical Series No. 6: Systems Analysis in the Context of Resilience](#).

²⁴⁸ For example, the FoodSECURE facility will use climate forecasts to trigger advance payments before climate hazards occur.

²⁴⁹ WFP (2011). Measuring Household Resilience to Food Insecurity in a Shock-Prone Environment: a trend analysis in Niger, 2006-2011 (draft).

²⁵⁰ RIMA I and II are an econometric model for indexing resilience developed by FAO. This is not a standard measurement tool being used across all country offices and programmes. WFP is currently piloting RIMA II in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. For more information see: FAO (2016). [RIMA-II: Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis - II](#). Rome, FAO..

²⁵¹ The RCA is a participatory assessment tool developed by WFP, FAO, UNDP and UNICEF for IGAD. It attempts to assess the levels of adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities in a context using existing data and qualitative interviews, and then performing a gap analysis of interventions to increase these capacities. It has been used in Uganda, South Sudan and Lebanon. For more information see: FAO, UNDP, UNICEF & WFP (2015) [Resilience Context Analysis: Resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition in Karamoja, Uganda](#).

205. The same organizing framework can be used to assess monitoring- “who”, “shocks”, “context” and “response”.

206. **Who:** Resilience-related monitoring indicators do not track changes in a single population. Mismatches occur on a number of levels:

- There is no instruction in their respective indicator methodologies to advise that, for instance, community asset scores or the asset benefit index should be tracked in the same communities where WFP is monitoring community capacity to deal with climate change or quantities bought from smallholders.
- The capacity of communities to deal with climate change is assessed in focus group discussions, and the methodology provides no requirement for sub-community analysis or instructions for who should participate.
- Indicators related to smallholder production relate only to farmers - a population which, WFP informants and past P4P evaluations confirm,²⁵² contains a hierarchy of wealth sub-groups. This point was also raised by a respondent in the RMP survey (see Annex 9), who suggested the outcome indicator “needs further tracking at lower level to ensure that contributors to the aggregated commodities are really from the smallholder farmers”.

207. An advantage of the new asset benefit indicator²⁵³ is the advice to randomly sample households within a community and to ensure community members not involved in the asset building are interviewed. It stops short of recommending tracking a panel below the community level; several country office informants considered a panel to be important for understanding resilience. However, they also mentioned that it poses challenges for WFP, particularly the need for sustained access to specific areas and groups most at risk of shocks and the difficulty of incorporating new populations into baseline data when a project expands to new areas.

208. As with assessment systems, the household level is the lowest unit of data collection in monitoring. Although the WFP corporate reporting system does require disaggregation of results by sex, even activities that may contribute to women’s empowerment, such as involvement in asset or work committees, only measure women’s participation rather than qualitatively explore outcomes from it.

209. **Shocks:** WFP corporate resilience-related outcome indicators²⁵⁴ do not register the occurrence of a shock during project implementation (although this could be done in the narrative description) or attempt to measure non-food outcomes in relation to a hazard event (either pre- or post-event). With skillful questioning, the new asset benefit indicator in the Corporate Results Framework may help to overcome this as it focuses on people’s usage of assets. The importance of linking indicators to shocks when assessing resilience was evidenced during interviews with lead farmers and WFP staff in Zambia. Smallholder farmers’ ability to sell, and then to pass on the transport costs to the buyer, was said to be dependent on a volume threshold, which is threatened during drought, flooding or pest outbreak. The indicators related to smallholder purchase, or access to market, in a non-shock season, therefore, do not provide a full picture of a market system’s contribution to resilience in times of need.

210. **Context:** WFP resilience related indicators in both the recent Strategic Results Framework (SRF) and the new Corporate Results Framework track aspects of wider influences on resilience.

²⁵² WFP (2014). Strategic Evaluation of WFP Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative (2008-2013). Rome, WFP (OEV/2013/024).

²⁵³ In the CRF the asset benefit indicator replaces the community asset score in the SRF. Both indicators are used to capture the outcomes of the assets built under the FFA.

²⁵⁴ Source: Indicator Compendiums for SRF 2014–2017 and CRF 2017–2021 (internal).

The series of indicators relating to smallholder market-support activities have indicators that relate most closely to system connections, positioning the outcome “percentage of smallholders selling through aggregation systems” in a chain of other indicators tracking select aspects (post-harvest losses; purchase from smallholder farmers; sales through aggregation systems; and contractual defaults) of a particular (WFP facilitated) market system.

211. The indicator for “improved capacity to manage climatic shocks and risks” can be used to assess whether communities are connected to components of a larger governance system for managing shocks (including risk planning, national and sub-national policy, and early warning systems). However, the indicators track the presence of these components, not their usage; as social, economic and political conditions can modify their utility, WFP indicators make leaps in assumption that local resilience is being built.

212. **Response:** WFP resilience-related indicators track some relevant aspects of resilience capacities – assets, early warning systems, stock reserves – and are partially linked to shock response. However, they are driven by WFP interventions rather than the actions people may take in relation to shock.

213. Furthermore, indicators tend to present outputs as outcomes – for instance the outputs “early warning system in place and functional” and “community aware of the early warning system” are combined as “community capacity to manage climatic shocks and risks”. Again, the asset benefit indicator could help to address this as it goes further in questioning what benefits the assets bring to the community than the community asset score, which largely quantified the number of functioning assets and assumed that an increase was improving resilience.²⁵⁵

Finding 38: Programme and monitoring staff see the value in gathering information on resilience, but current corporate tools do not enable them to do so systematically or effectively.

214. The ability of WFP corporate reporting system to encourage and guide the meaningful assessment of resilience outcomes was identified as one of its key weaknesses in the 2016 Evaluability Assessment of the WFP Strategic Plan (2014–2017).²⁵⁶ Based largely on staff perspectives of using the indicators, the assessment highlighted concerns with the indicators themselves, the lack of guidance received on them, and a lack of confidence that the findings provided an accurate account of resilience.

215. Staff perceptions on resilience-related indicators have not changed much since 2016. Informants in all countries expressed common frustrations with the resilience indicators, reinforcing and augmenting those in the 2016 report. Only one of the 15 respondents to the RMP web survey considered that the indicators allowed WFP to understand resilience to the extent that WFP needed, with a slight majority (eight) reporting that the indicators give insights but leave important gaps in understanding. Four of the respondents said the indicators give WFP very little meaningful understanding of resilience levels (see Annex 9).²⁵⁷ RMP interviewees at all levels regularly opened interviews by explaining that they know WFP has a problem with measuring resilience.

²⁵⁵ Source: Indicator Compendiums for SRF 2014–2017 and CRF 2017–2021 (internal).

²⁵⁶ WFP (2016). Evaluability Assessment of WFP's Strategic Plan 2014-2017. Rome, WFP (OEV/2015/022).

²⁵⁷ The remaining two respondents replied “don't know”.

216. More positively, staff do see the value of measuring resilience. In the RMP survey, 10 out of 15 monitoring officers rated understanding resilience as more important than tracking the individual intended outcomes of WFP initiatives. Informants pointed out that options for improving resilience measurement had been discussed during the Corporate Results Framework review.²⁵⁸ In line with the FSIN principles,²⁵⁹ WFP staff expressed a strong interest in using more qualitative information to: perform better contextual analysis, understand subjective states of resilience and understand shock and system influences (see Annex 18 for further details).

Finding 39: WFP country offices can assess and use various types of resilience-related information, but face barriers related to timeframes, consolidation, capacity and cost.

217. Most monitoring staff interviewed in country offices were better able to explain the challenges of resilience measurement than how resilience measurement could help their work.²⁶⁰

218. **Timeframe:** WFP limitations in returning to an area and assessing whether people are more or less resilient and “achievements are sustained for several 'good', 'bad' and 'average' years”²⁶¹ was the most commonly recognized constraint expressed by WFP informants at all levels. The multi-year R4 project was cited as an example that counters this, as it has a systematic longitudinal evaluation component, but it does not go as far as post-hoc evaluation. A few other examples were cited of Country Directors who had commissioned evaluations some years after a project had closed, but these were personal initiatives rather than systematic practice. WFP monitoring budget does not cover post-hoc assessments.

219. WFP was said by a number of internal informants to have advantages in that it does higher-frequency monitoring on shorter timeframes because it operates a schedule of baselines, food-distribution monitoring, and endlines, and is increasingly using mVAM in between. Although these assessments are currently limited to a focus on vulnerability (see Annex 18), there is potential to explore positive and heterogeneous coping strategies so that WFP and partners can better target their support in the run-up to, during, and after a shock, whilst also tracking well-being indicators.

220. **Consolidation:** For a WFP country office to collect resilience information would require them to have a resilience programme and to use an open and adaptable programme design. The transition to country strategic plans has not yet resulted in integrated programming or monitoring in most countries. Monitoring is “silo-based” to meet the requirements of individual projects and their donors and cannot usually be aggregated to represent overall progress on resilience. To do so would require that the data from all projects be aggregated related to the same target groups and, until convergent planning is achieved, that will not be the case. Even without convergence across the country office, there is scope for individual initiatives to follow resilience approaches through carefully selected and coordinated partnerships. WFP uses two assessment tools that can facilitate a participatory approach to programming – the resilience context analysis and, with a lesser focus on resilience capacities, the seasonal livelihood programming component of the 3PA.

²⁵⁸ 'Revised Corporate Results Framework (2017–2021)' (WFP/EB.2/2018/5-B/Rev.1). The revised CRF issued in October 2018 suggests that a number of the resilience-related indicators are to be improved and released in a revised indicator methodology anticipated in January 2019.

²⁵⁹ FSIN Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (2014) [Resilience Measurement Principles: Toward an Agenda for Measurement Design](#). Rome, FAO & WFP.

²⁶⁰ The exceptions were respondents from the countries where RIMA II is being used on the R4 project. This was initiated after the Malawi country office realized that HEA could not be linked to shocks and was not providing relevant information for their resilience programming.

²⁶¹ Monitoring survey respondent.

While examples of partnerships arising from such assessments exist, no examples of them leading to coordinated monitoring for resilience monitoring were found.

221. **Capacity and cost:** The existing requirements to provide information for the Corporate Results Framework and donors use are significant, and the country office monitoring units visited mentioned that the time taken to do this erodes into their ability to apply the information for country office or programme learning. Staff indicated an intellectual enthusiasm to embrace resilience monitoring, but also referred to their limited budget for doing so. Practical considerations were discussed, such as whether it would be possible to combine it with existing monitoring activities, but the need for longer timeframes raised doubts about sustainability of the approach. Staff were concerned that the indicators may be difficult to implement, especially if they involve collecting data from different domains (for example, women, men, girls and boys instead of households) and if new design and analytical skills might be needed to address the different timeframe and potential usage of the data.

222. An example of resilience monitoring that is currently being undertaken is the RIMA II approach being used by R4 (see Annex 18). Its usage was requested first by the Malawi country office in order to overcome the limitations of the household economic analysis, and FAO informants mentioned that WFP use is helping them to expand its testing. It is widely considered by WFP headquarters and regional bureau informants to be too expensive to apply in its current format as part of regular country office monitoring. Although this is likely to be simplified after the pilot, it is possible that its cost and capacity implications might make it difficult to use outside of a funded programme approach such as R4. RIMA II offers the ability to index resilience; although there is no single agreed standard for this, RIMA II is one of a small set of models accepted by donors. It is not a requirement of R4 donors, but some country offices using it have found it useful for more robustly demonstrating their results.

223. Country offices have also introduced donor-requested resilience-related indicators into their project monitoring for activities funded by the Green Climate Fund, for example. Amongst other measures, the Green Climate Fund requires measurement of adaptive capacity at household and institutional levels. In three countries offices with Green Climate Fund proposals submitted, the logframe has increased the ambition of WFP reporting on resilience and country office staff are seeking to improve their capacity to fulfil the requirements.

3 Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

224. This section is arranged around the original evaluation questions to draw broader conclusions and lessons on the relevance, status and potential future direction of the WFP approach to resilience strengthening.

The relevance of WFP contributions to enhanced resilience

225. The evaluation team found that WFP has made a concerted and deliberate effort to contribute to resilience strengthening and has undertaken a range of policy, programming and assessment work over the last decade with a view to improving people's abilities to deal with shocks and reducing the need for repeated humanitarian interventions. WFP is meaningfully engaged with the concept of, and approaches to, resilience as it grapples with implications for its work.

226. However, this engagement is not yet fully manifested in a concerted drive by WFP leadership to develop a shared understanding of resilience and of how WFP can consistently enhance it in order to improve food security. The degree of application of the concept was, therefore, found to be variable both vertically and horizontally throughout the organization. In a few units, regional bureaux and county offices, enhancing resilience is considered as an imperative and approaches to the plan, implementation and monitoring of interventions are being developed; but in many other WFP units and offices, staff struggle to see the difference between the capacity for resilience and single-point interventions in disaster prevention and livelihoods.

227. Low awareness of maladaptation is the most serious gap in understanding, but could be addressed by drawing from "do no harm" principles. This would cover other knowledge gaps by placing more emphasis on the means by which people choose from and draw on a range of services, information and their own assets in order to protect their livelihoods from myriad stressors and shocks. Such emphasis may also result in greater attention to the political and social root causes of persistent vulnerability. These are issues where the civil society and non-governmental partners of WFP play a more active role, but WFP requires a clear position on them in order to ensure programme quality.

Organizational arrangements in support of resilience programming

228. The WFP strategic framework is becoming more conducive to approaches aimed at enhancing resilience. The country strategic plan process places greater emphasis on context, government priorities, "whole of society" approaches and integrated programming, all of which enhance the relevance of WFP programming for populations exposed to shocks. Nevertheless, and despite the designation of resilience building as a focus area tag, a clear "resilience lens" has not yet been applied to the design and implementation of country strategic plans. This is largely because there is no clear, explicit guidance that leads staff from a definition of resilience to the analysis of entry and exit points that could follow the zero hunger strategic review process or an emergency response.

229. Operational aspects also limit the application of a resilience approach. Although there is now a greater emphasis on integrated programming, the WFP tendency to work in "silos" has persisted beyond the introduction of the Integrated Road Map and limits programming and internal learning. With some notable exceptions, the breadth of interventions from WFP – ranging

from the stabilization of nutrition in emergencies, unconditional transfers and asset building to the modelling of climate change and food security-related responses – seldom converge in a way that could help a population group progress from food insecurity to resilience. Tools, such as the three-pronged approach, which could help layer and link interventions to specific settings, are often associated with specific interventions and are underutilized. In particular, realizing the ambition to overcome the structural conditions that limit the social, political and economic participation of women and girls, as laid out in the gender policy, requires a committed engagement of units and teams throughout WFP.

Partnering to deliver better resilience outcomes

230. WFP has expanded its partnerships to offer more comprehensive support for resilience. Partnerships with government have become of central importance in this work via the country strategic plan process and are expected to contribute to strengthening governance systems that could significantly increase the level of support given to the most vulnerable people before, during and after a shock.

231. Rome-based agency collaboration on resilience at headquarters level has not yet been matched with the longer-term commitments required, although certain donors are encouraging greater collaboration with a view to reducing the need to fund humanitarian responses to recurrent crises. Other donors regard the WFP remit as primarily in humanitarian response and, therefore, do not expect enhanced resilience outcomes.

232. If these and other working relationships (with national governments, civil society organizations and the private sector) can evolve past the administrative difficulties that currently constrain them, it should be possible for WFP to articulate the strengths and limits of its role and enhance resilience more efficiently and effectively as a contribution to the achievement of zero hunger.

Systems to track progress towards resilience outcomes

233. WFP corporate reporting on resilience remains weak because core programmes are not yet integrated in ways that create a coherent resilience “outcome” and the monitoring indicators used are designed to track the outputs of separate interventions.

234. WFP assessment capacity can be used to support targeting and the identification of shocks throughout the organization. WFP is testing the use of assessments that focus on measuring improvements in resilience capacities in addition to measuring the characteristics of vulnerability and is increasingly considering ways of developing understanding of the connections between shocks and responses that occur in a given social, political, ecological or economic system.

235. WFP is not currently equipped to clearly articulate how resilience can be strengthened in a given context, what its contribution to resilience enhancement will be, what roles other actors can play, what results are intended and what assumptions should be tracked during work towards these results. Country offices, in countries where the conditions for development are stable, have found it easier to continue resilience programmes initiated prior to their country strategic plans, but there is far more uncertainty about how to position work on resilience in protracted crises and conflict situations as set forth in the WFP Strategic Plan (2017–2021).

236. The evaluation team concludes that WFP has the foundations for, and high-level strategic commitment to, supporting the enhancement of resilience in order to avoid recurrent crises. These foundations need to be grounded in the operational realities and matched by demands for better guidance, measurement and systems if WFP is to make a significant contribution in this area.

3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

237. The evaluation has defined a number of recommendations to address various aspects of the organization that are meant to strengthen WFP ability to contribute to efforts that enhance the resilience of individuals, households, communities and countries. They are detailed in the Recommendations table.

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|---|---|---|
| <p>Recommendation 1: Establish an interdivisional leadership team tasked with developing a strategy for enhancing resilience in order to achieve zero hunger and chaired by the Assistant Executive Director of the Operations Services Department (OS).</p> <p>Responsibilities should include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> viii. Define clear principles for WFP's work on enhancing the resilience of women, men, boys and girls against shocks that set back progress on food security. ix. Define the contributions of different WFP units and divisions to the enhancement of resilience to different types of shocks, including climate, economic and political shocks, in different contexts. x. Develop a strategy for including explicit approaches to the enhancement of resilience in future CSPs. xi. Define approaches to the strengthening of resilience in protracted crisis and conflict situations. xii. Define approaches to the strengthening of resilience in settings affected by recurrent and worsening climate shocks. xiii. Review activities according to the resilience capacities that they are intended to support and link them to partnership mapping. xiv. Conduct an internal review of and synthesize existing knowledge on WFP's approaches to and lessons learned from the implementation of programmes that contribute to enhanced resilience, including work on shock-responsive social protection. | <p>Assistant Executive Director, OS</p> <p>ii. Director of each OS division to nominate a member of the team.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resilience leadership team formed by June 2019. • First meeting of the team by 30 June 2019. • Meetings to be held once every two months until the intended results have been delivered or until December 2020 (whichever comes first). |
| <p>Recommendation 2: Integrate issues related to gender equality, empowerment and resilience into guidance on the zero hunger strategic review process and the IRM for country offices.</p> <p>An open set of questions that encourage country offices to adopt a resilience approach should include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Whose resilience should WFP contribute to enhancing (by gender and age group)? ▪ Against which types of shock does resilience need to be built (economic, political, climate)? ▪ How will resilience be enhanced – through what combination of governance, social, ecological, technological, welfare, food or market assets and systems? ▪ Which capacities can WFP best support? ▪ How is WFP's contribution linked to those of other actors, including government entities? ▪ What food security and nutrition-related results are expected? | <p>IRM team and Strategic Coordination and Support Division.</p> | <p>Within the next six months – by June 2019.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|---|--|----------------------------|
| <p>Recommendation 3: Strengthen the financial and partnership base for initiatives on resilience enhancement.</p> <p>iv. Identify seed money for baseline data collection and the planning of integrated resilience initiatives. Funding could be provided through unearmarked funds, such as the proposed 2030 Transition Fund.</p> <p>v. Develop a fundraising strategy for long-term funding of initiatives on resilience enhancement, including through thematic funding windows (such as for climate resilience) and engagement with the private sector (for example, on insurance instruments).</p> <p>vi. Revise the partnership action plan template in order to incorporate a “resilience lens” with explicit roles defined for government and non-governmental partners.</p> | <p>Government Partnerships Division and Strategic Resource Allocation Committee.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |
| <p>Recommendation 4: Building on the strategy developed (Recommendation 1), commission a workforce study that assesses the horizontal and vertical adjustments needed in order to ensure that WFP employees can successfully deliver on resilience-focused commitments.</p> <p>The study would examine ways of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ promoting the development of integrated teams to replace the “silo” working approach in country offices, regional bureaux and headquarters units and appointing team leaders who will lead on behalf of the various units represented in each team and be accountable to senior managers; ▪ based on a sustainable financing model, increase the availability of headquarters and regional bureau staff for providing sustained technical support to country offices, including through secondments; ▪ at headquarters, maintain specialist capacity to develop and curate technical methods and guidance suitable for incorporation in integrated programmes; ▪ match job profiles, skills and contract terms with needs, bearing in mind the long-term nature of resilience work; ▪ develop a roster of “non-traditional” employment profiles useful for resilience programming; and ▪ consider adding to staff performance evaluation an indicator of staff members’ performance in working as part of an integrated team. | <p>Policy and Programme Division (OSZ) with support from the Human Resources Division (HRM).</p> | <p>By February 2020.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|---|---|----------------------------|
| <p>Recommendation 5: Consolidate performance measurement data from resilience-related initiatives for corporate reporting and sharing with national partners.</p> <p>Develop a result tracking framework that is compatible with the corporate results framework (CRF):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Include information on the contributions and outcomes related to resilience, including underlying assumptions, that WFP and its partners expect to see in shock-prone populations. ▪ Develop an aggregate or indexed score that feeds into the CRF, with short accompanying contextual descriptions of external and internal influences on the results. <p>Country offices should consider measuring differences in resilience outcomes using dedicated econometric analysis such as Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis II, ensuring that analytical processes can be conducted annually. Routine monitoring could act as a lighter, less expensive option for facilitating learning and reporting applied more regularly than a large-scale measurement of resilience capacities. This recommendation is only feasible if WFP converges interventions to create resilience outcomes. Where interventions remain singular and separate, WFP should consider further use of perspective-based indicators (introduced in the CRF) to move beyond the output level monitoring to a better understanding of how interventions help or hinder peoples' ability to pursue food security.</p> | <p>Performance Management and Monitoring Division (RMP) and OSZ.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |
| <p>Recommendation 6: Strengthen the ability of headquarters units and regional bureaux to collect, collate and analyse information on covariate transboundary and localized shocks before they happen.</p> <p>This would involve:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ expanding the use of climate modelling and linking it to existing information from market, agro-ecological and population data (possibly including other categories, such as data on drops in remittances); ▪ reviewing WFP's information systems with a view to strengthening the connections among different databases and thereby enlarging the evidence base for resilience programming; ▪ supporting regional bodies in connecting and understanding the food security implications and uses of their data; and ▪ continuing to test the "trigger" functions introduced by index-based insurance (the Rural Resilience Initiative and the African Risk Capacity initiative) and forecast-based financing for facilitating early, anticipatory action in shock-prone settings. | <p>OSZ — Analysis and Trends Service; Asset Creation and Livelihoods Unit; Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes; Livelihoods, Resilience and Food Systems Service and regional bureaux.</p> | <p>By the end of 2019.</p> |

| Recommendations | Action by | Implementation deadline |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Recommendation 7: Support the generation of evidence on the relevance of food security and resilience interventions in conflict and protracted crises.</p> <p>This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • working with research institutions, governments and United Nations partners, including those with mandates for work on gender issues, on the commissioning of operational research and evaluations that generate learning and evidence on the appropriateness of resilience programming for different individuals (women, men, boys and girls) and communities; • organizing a wide consultation with current and past beneficiaries of WFP’s food security and resilience interventions in order to establish how food assistance, cash-based transfers, asset creation and other interventions help or hinder their coping strategies; and • carrying out an evaluation or review of WFP’s interventions in this area with attention to entry and exit strategies and beneficiaries’ experiences. | <p>OSZ — Analysis and Trends Service.</p> | <p>Start immediately and report back by February 2020.</p> |

Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| 3PA | Three-Pronged Approach |
| ABI | Asset Benefit Indicator |
| APR | Annual Performance Review |
| BRACED | Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extreme and Disasters |
| C-ADAPT | The Climate Adaptation Management and Innovation Initiative |
| CARE | Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. |
| CAS | Community Asset Score |
| CBPP | Community-Based Participatory Planning |
| CBT | Cash-Based Transfer |
| CD | Country Director |
| CFSVA | Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis |
| CGIAR | Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research |
| CLEAR | Consolidated Livelihoods Exercise for Analyzing Resilience |
| CO | Country Office |
| CRF | Corporate Results Framework |
| CSP | Country Strategic Plan |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| EFSA | Emergency Food Security Assessment |
| EQ | Evaluation Question |
| ET | Evaluation Team |
| FAO | Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations |
| FFA | Food Assistance for Assets |
| FFR | Financial Framework Review |
| FFT | Food Assistance for Training |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FNG | Fill the Nutrition Gap |
| FSIN | Food Security Information Network |
| FtMA | Farm to Market Alliance |
| GAP | Gender Action Plan |
| GEWE | Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment |
| GRAID | Guidance for Resilience in the Anthropocene: Investments for Development |

| | |
|-------|--|
| GRP | Global Resilience Partnership |
| HEA | Household Economic Analysis |
| HGSF | Home-Grown School Feeding |
| ICA | Integrated Context Analysis |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| IFPRI | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| IFRC | International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IRM | Integrated Road Map |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MERET | Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| OS | Operations Services Department |
| P4P | Purchase for Progress |
| PAA | Purchase from Africans for Africa |
| R4 | R4 Rural Resilience Initiative |
| RBA | Rome-Based Agencies |
| RBD | Regional Bureau Dakar |
| RBJ | Regional Bureau Johannesburg |
| RBN | Regional Bureau Nairobi |
| RCA | Resilience Context Analysis |
| RCI | Resilience Capacity Index |
| REAL | Resilience Evaluation, Analysis and Learning |
| RIMA | Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis |
| RMEL | Resilience Measurement, Evaluation and Learning |
| RMP | Performance Management and Monitoring Division |
| SADC | Southern Africa Development Community |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| SLF | Sustainable Livelihoods Framework |
| SLP | Seasonal livelihood programming |
| SO | Strategic Objectives |
| SO | Strategic Outcome |

| | |
|--------|--|
| SRF | Strategic Results Framework |
| STRESS | Strategic Resilience Assessment |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToD | Theory of Delivery |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| UNISDR | United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VAM | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WG | Working Group |
| ZHSR | Zero Hunger Strategic Review |

Photo Credit

Cover Photo: WFP/Badre Bahaji

World Food Programme

Office of Evaluation

www1.wfp.org/independent-evaluation

Report number: OEV/2017/003